

SOUTH-NORTH DIALOGUE IN KOREA



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Part I

Consistent Resolve Toward National Reconciliation and Peaceful Unification

1. President Chun's Address at the Second Regional Meeting of the Advisory Council on Peaceful Unification Policy

- Urging North Korea to Resume Dialogue and to Participate in the 1986 Asian Games and 1988 Olympics—

The Advisory Council on Peaceful Unification Policy held its second regional meetings in Seoul and 12 other major cities on May 12, 1986, in observance of the fifth anniversary of its founding.

In an address sent to the meetings, President Chun Doo Hwan, chairman of the Advisory Council, stressed that “in order for the nation to create an advanced homeland and to enjoy national dignity and prosperity forever, we must accomplish national reunification with our people’s own determination and energies.” The President stressed that unification is a question of the Koreans’ own, for the resolution of which “we cannot and must not turn to others.”

President Chun said that the shortcut to achieving the reintegration of the Korean people is for the two sides of Korea to proceed toward reconciliation rather than confrontation; dialogue rather than violence, and exchanges and cooperation rather than opposition. It was in this line, he said, that the South set forth the Formula for National Reconciliation and Democratic Unification and proposed an inter-Korean top leaders’ meeting and other talks and exchanges. President Chun then urged the North to show sincerity in cultivating the “valuable seed of dialogue” sowed so laboriously last year.

The President also said he expects that North Korea will join in the effort to enhance national prestige and pride and display an atmosphere of national conciliation before the world

by taking part in the Seoul Asian Games this fall and the 1988 Seoul Olympics instead of boycotting the great festivals for peace and thus becoming an international orphan. He reiterated that the South would warmly welcome a North Korean delegation as the same brethren and guarantee all participants their individual safety and provide them with all available conveniences.

President Chun stressed that no matter whatever reaction North Korea may make toward the South's efforts to realize peaceful unification, the South would continue to pursue dialogue and exchanges with North Korea with unbounded patience for ultimate national reconciliation and independent unification.

Before concluding, the President called on the members of the Advisory Council to accomplish their role as the core of the nation's unification efforts by solidifying the resolve of the people who aspire for peaceful unification and take the lead in the creation of an advanced homeland.

The text of President Chun's message which was read by Prime Minister Lho Shin-yong at the Seoul regional meeting and by regional vice chairmen at other regional meetings, was as follows:

Members of the Advisory Council for Peaceful Unification Policy and sixty million fellow compatriots,

Today we have assembled here with the acute wish to surmount the 40-odd-years-long state of national division and advance the time of peaceful unification.

I would like to extend my heartfelt congratulations to you members who have exhibited exceptional dedication and service in practicing the nation's resolve to realize unification.

I am confident that during the past five years since the Advisory Council on the Peaceful Unification Policy was historically inaugurated amidst many expectations and much encouragement, your commitment to the cause has resulted in the valuable achievement of pooling and further cementing the determination of the people in various strata of society to realize peaceful unification.

As such a fruition serves as the most important basis for building up the nation's unification capabilities and at the same time inspires us to continue pursuing the goal of unification, your toils will certainly earn broader national acclaim and support.

Moreover, the upsurge of national destiny and firm national confidence, which we physically feel lately, plus the expanding support of our peaceful unification policy by the rest of the world community, further support our conviction that the national wish for peaceful and independent unification will come true for this generation.

At the summit meeting of the seven leading Western countries that was closed in Tokyo last May 6, the participating free world leaders expressed hope for the acceleration of the inter-Korean dialogue, the successful staging of the Seoul Olympics and the simultaneous entry of South and North Korea into the United Nations, vowing their support and cooperation to this end. This cannot but be a very valuable reinforcement in our struggles to gain the long-hoped-for unification.

Together with you people, I feel much rewarded because such support for our peaceful unification policy by the rest of the world community was one of the important achievements resulting from my tour of European countries last month and our other positive diplomatic efforts.

I, therefore, would like to stress that this meeting today marks a significant occasion for us to reiterate anew our determination to subjectively lead the great task of unification at this

time when our capability toward national reconciliation and democratic unification has been enhanced and when an international atmosphere has further matured for national unification.

Members of the Advisory Council,

In order for us to create an advanced homeland and enable our posterity to lead national self-esteem and prosperity forever, we must realize national reunification with our own determination and capability.

We always should remember that the overcoming of the national division and the realization of unification is the task of our own, and for whose resolution we cannot and must not turn to others.

Herein lies the reason why we must create an international atmosphere ripe for unification from the nation's subjective standpoint and in a manner that would assure us the nation's historical continuity and maximum benefits.

There is no denying that the rightful shortcut for us, who have been a homogenous people and single nation throughout our long history, to get reintegrated into oneness again, will be for the South and the North to proceed toward reconciliation instead of confrontation, toward dialogue instead of violence, and toward exchanges and cooperation instead of discontinuation.

This is way we, with unbounded patience, have been urging North Korea time and again to agree to have dialogue and exchange with us, such as the Formula for National Reconciliation and Democratic Unification and an inter-Korean top leaders meeting.

Nonetheless, North Korea, without giving up a policy to communize the South by force, has moved their offensive forces to areas closer to the Demilitarized Zone, increasing the danger of the recurrence of war. At the same time, they employ all means in their stepped-up maneuvers around the world against the 1986

Asian Games and the 1988 Olympics, both set to be held in Seoul.

Furthermore, North Korea has suspended the inter-Korean Red Cross, economic and preliminary parliamentarians talks with the excuse of the annual Team Spirit military training. Recently, the North Koreans, capitalizing on demonstrations in some sectors of the South, have intensified slanderous propaganda against us, thus shedding light once again on their wickedness.

I wish to take this occasion to serve a strong warning to them that if they miscalculate our situation and perpetrate an armed provocation, it would result in their own self-destruction. I urge the North to show sincerity in cultivating the seeds of inter-Korean dialogue which the two sides laboriously sowed last year.

As I hope that the North Koreans would take part in the Asian Games this fall and the 1988 Seoul Olympics and thereby help enhance national prestige and pride and demonstrate the proud look of national conciliation before the whole world, instead of becoming an international orphan by boycotting the two festivals for peace, we would warmly welcome them as the same brethren and would like to make it clear once again that we would guarantee all participants their individual safety and provide them with all available conveniences.

Members of the Advisory Council,

No matter what the North Korean reaction may be to our peaceful unification efforts, we must refrain from harboring any hasty expectations or getting disappointed easily.

While successfully staging the great festivals by consolidating our stability and national strength, we must relentlessly pursue a dialogue and exchanges with North Korea with unbounded perseverance to gain the ultimate goal of national reconciliation and independent unification.

We, therefore, find ourselves at a juncture where we must maintain national harmony and unity more solidly than at any

other time in the past.

I wish to ask you members of the Advisory Council to fulfill your given mission as a key subject in national unification by joining in the resolve and efforts of the people craving for peaceful unification while playing the central role in achieving national harmony and social stability, and thereby taking the lead in the creation of an advanced homeland.

Before concluding, I once again extend my congratulations and encouragement to you for the toils you have made, and pray that happiness will always be with you and your families.

At a session that followed the opening ceremony, Minister of National Unification Park Tong-jin made a "Report on the Implementation of the Unification Policy." In the report, Minister Park explained in detail about the four channels — economic talks, Red Cross conference, preliminary parliamentary sessions and Lausanne sports meetings — of the dialogue held last year, as well as the government's position with respect to the dialogue.

Minister Park said that despite some encouraging developments last year such as the first exchange of hometown visitors and art troupes in the 40 years of national division, each channel of the talks "has yet to reach a satisfactory stage."

Noting that North Korea has turned down the South's repeated calls for the resumption of the dialogue since they suspended the talks at the turn of the year with the excuse of an annual military training exercise in the South, Minister Park stressed that "if North Korea is really interested in peaceful unification and the improvement of the inter-Korean relations, they should cease in turning a deaf ear to the dialogue and return to the table of talks in response to our sincere proposals."

The text of Minister Park's "Report on the Implementation of the Unification Policy" was as follows:

Honorable members of the Advisory Council on Peaceful Unification Policy,

I heartily extend my respect to you members of the Advisory Council, who have endeavored so hard to lay a foundation for peaceful unification — the desire of our nation — and to advance the time of unification.

Last year, which happened to be the 40th anniversary of national liberation and also national division, inter-Korean dialogue took place briskly in many areas. It thus was a period in which public interest in the dialogue was greater than ever before at home and abroad.

As you well know, the four-channel talks — economic, Red Cross, preliminary parliamentarians and Lausanne sports meetings — were held last year.

At the Red Cross meeting, in particular, the two sides agreed on the exchange of hometown visitors among dispersed families and art troupes, enabling separated families to cross the truce line in person and meet their long-missed families for the first time in the 40 years of the national division.

Such a substantial achievement made in the inter-Korean dialogue was the result of the continuous efforts made by all of us to embody the Formula for National Reconciliation and Democratic Unification in deference to the burning desire of the entire people for peaceful unification and the unswerving determination of President Chun Doo Hwan to achieve unification.

Despite the initial encouraging results, the multi-pronged dialogue we carried out over the past one year has yet to reach a satisfactory stage.

In the case of the South-North Economic Meeting, the two sides produced some ideas in common at the first economic meeting held in November 1984, brightening the prospects of the

economic talks. Among the tradable items the two sides offered, there were many which were mutually acceptable, such as briquette coal, iron ore, steel products and textiles. In the area of economic cooperation also, the two sides advanced similar ideas, like the linking of a railroad line, the joint exploration of underground resources, the creation of a joint fishery zone and the establishment of an economic cooperation organization.

Beginning with the second meeting in May last year, however, the North Koreans began to delay tactics by demanding the creation of a South-North economic cooperation organization, while shunning the discussion of any substantial matters such as the exchange of materials and the linking of a railroad line.

In accordance with our side's comprehensive offer, the two sides agreed to adopt an agreed minute on the exchange of materials, implementation of economic cooperation and the creation of an economic cooperation organization. In the course of discussing the proposed minute, North Korea showed an irrational attitude, thus preventing the talks from going smoothly. They refused to put down the already agreed-on tradable items on the proposed agreed minute. North Korea also insisted on including unification principles, having nothing to do with the economic question, in the agreed minute as an independent article.

North Korea rejected our side's proposal to purchase 300,000 tons of North Korean briquette coal as a means of advancing the time of material exchange, asserting that "the inter-Korean economic talks shouldn't be like a traders' meeting."

It is believed that North Korea shuns the exchange of materials like briquette coal and steel products and other economic cooperation, in a bid to delay the economic talks because they fear any material exchange and other economic cooperation would lead to exposing the weakness of their economy.

In the South-North Red Cross Conference, the first exchange

of hometown visitors, that took place in September last year, paved the way to the possibility of resolving the dispersed family question. Yet, no progress has been registered in the Red Cross talks to date.

South and North Korea have been discussing the preparation of an agreed minute after concurring on the package discussion of the five topics of the full-dress Red Cross talks, which included the determining of the fate and whereabouts of dispersed families and relatives, mutual visits, the exchange of letters and reunions, and the guarantee of free visits between dispersed families.

Nonetheless, the North Koreans dodged the debate of the five agenda topics, and have since been delaying the early resolution of the dispersed family issue by putting forth the question of free visits as a de facto prerequisite.

North Korea's persistent attempt to make an issue of the question of free visits, which is no more than one of the various conceivable methods of settling the dispersed family issue, was no different from their roadblocking the Red Cross talks in the early 1970s by demanding, as a prerequisite, the "improvement of statutory conditions and the social environment of the South" and thus disputing our anti-Communist policy and the National Security Law.

Moreover, the fact that North Korea limited the areas to be visited by hometown visitors to a specific zone and turned down our proposal for the continuous exchanges of visitors, well illustrates treacherousness and fictitiousness of their demand for "free visits" among dispersed families.

At the preliminary contacts designed to prepare for an inter-Korean parliamentarians meeting, the two sides managed to reach an accord on the form of the meeting, formation of delegations and the place of the meeting. But, they differed on the most important item, the agenda of the parliamentarians talks.

As to the issue of agenda, our side suggested that the topic

should be the "question of organizing a Consultative Conference for National Reunification to draft a constitution of a unified state and related matters necessary for the laying of a groundwork for unification," so that it can befit the inherent duty of the legislature. North Korea, on the other hand, held fast to the question of making "a joint declaration about non-aggression."

Although the North offered at the second contact a modified topic, "concerning the alleviation of tension between the South and the North, and the acceleration of national unification," there was no essential change in the intransigent attitude of North Korea. It seems that many difficulties have to be overcome before the two sides will reach an accord on the issue of the agenda topic.

We believe that the business of bringing about lasting peace on this land, such as agreement on the question of non-aggression and other devices to ease tension and prevent war between South and North Korea should be discussed and solved between the responsible government authorities of the two sides, not by the legislatures.

Since long ago, our side has called for an inter-Korean top leaders meeting to sincerely discuss and resolve the pressing issues pending between the two sides of Korea such as the alleviation of tension and the prevention of war. We also proposed the conclusion between government authorities of the two sides of a Provisional Agreement on Basic Relations.

Therefore, if North Korea is interested in discussing and resolving the question of "non-aggression" truly to ease tension and consolidate peace between the two sides, it would be more effective for them to favorably respond to our call for talks between government authorities such as a top leaders meeting instead of insisting on the handling of such issues at parliamentarians talks.

Meanwhile, the Lausanne sports meeting was held two times under the auspices of the International Olympic Committee

(IOC).

At the meeting, our side, with a view to enabling North Korea to take part in the Seoul Olympics, expressed the willingness to affirmatively study the issues of joint entry of South and North Korean delegations into the opening and closing ceremonies of the Seoul Olympics and of transferring some preliminary matches over to the North should North Korea respect IOC decisions and the Olympic Charter.

However, no progress was achieved at the sports meeting as North Korea insisted on the co-hosting of the 24th Olympics in Seoul and Pyongyang in violation of the Olympic Charter and IOC decisions.

Members of the Advisory Council,

In his address on state affairs last January 16, President Chun said that the South would "carry on the present talks and would willingly open new channels of dialogue in any area if only North Korea's sincerity can be guaranteed."

Again in his Samil Independence Movement Day message last March 1, President Chun said he expects that North Korea would affirmatively respond to the South's repeated call for a top leaders meeting so that it could be held within the year.

All these represent the manifestation of the President's positive and consistent determination to unfold a new chapter of peace and unification before the close of the 1980s and ultimately bring about peaceful unification by discussing and resolving early through dialogue various issues pending between the South and the North such as exchanges and cooperation.

Notwithstanding our positive efforts to promote dialogue, the inter-Korean talks came to be faced with many difficulties again this year.

Early in the year, North Korea unilaterally suspended the economic, Red Cross and preliminary parliamentarians meetings with the excuse of our annual Team Spirit military training exercise. They then rejected our side's March 26 call for the early

resumption of the talks.

As the whole world knows, our side's military exercises are a defensive and peace-keeping training. The Team Spirit, in particular, is an annual training that has been held for about ten years. This year's training was well foreseen when the two sides agreed on the timing of the talks.

In light even of the past practices in which not a few rounds of talks were held during the Team Spirit training period, it was sheerly nonsensical for the North Koreans to suspend the talks in connection with a military training exercise.

Historically seen, the tension and distrust existing between the South and the North are the product of the belligerent policy North Korea has been pursuing for 40 years in a bid to take over the South by force of arms or in a subversive revolution.

It is more than natural for the South to undertake proper self-defensive steps to forestall a contingency and safeguard our own survival under the present circumstance where the North's hostile policy against the South remains unmitigated and inter-Korean relations have not been improved.

If the North is genuinely interested in peaceful unification and the improvement of inter-Korean relations, they should return to the table of dialogue in response to our side's sincere proposal instead of turning a deaf ear to the dialogue or persisting in an insincere posture any further.

The government will continue to make steady efforts to pave the way for material exchanges and economic cooperation by way of the inter-Korean economic meeting, and do its utmost to realize the reunion of dispersed families at an early date by positively supporting the South-North Red Cross Conference.

At the same time, our side shall persuade the North Koreans with maximum patience so that the 1988 Seoul Olympics, a festival of whole mankind, could be sublimated into a grand festival for national reconciliation.

To make these efforts come to a successful fruition, they

should, needless to say, be backed up by a national consensus on the inter-Korean dialogue and the Korean question and by the steady expansion of national strength.

I conclude my report on the government's unification policy with the expectation of unchanging support and positive participation from you members.

Meanwhile, at the end of the second regional meeting of the Advisory Council on Peaceful Unification Policy, the participating members adopted a resolution calling, among other things, on North Korea to return to the table of dialogue with sincerity.

The text of the resolution was as follows:

We the members of the Advisory Council on Peaceful Unification Policy,

Affirming the greater importance of national unity and the coherence of national energies than in any other time in the past in order to pave the solid way to peaceful unification of the homeland and national progress, and

In deference to the desire of the entire 60 million people,

Believe that to deter war and consolidate peace on the Korean peninsula, an inter-Korean top leaders meeting should be realized at an early date, and urge the North Korean authorities to affirmatively join in our efforts to realize national reconciliation and democratic unification;

Strongly call upon North Korea to abandon their negativism with which they unilaterally suspended the inter-Korean dialogue with an undue excuse and rejected the resumption of the dialogue, and instead show a more sincere posture so as to resume the Red Cross, economic and parliamentarians contacts at an early date;

Will, convinced that the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Seoul Olympics would serve as an occasion to realize national progress and prosperity and advance the time of peaceful unification, take the lead in solidifying national determination and capabilities for the successful staging of the two festivals; and

Pledge ourselves firmly to render dedicated service in our respective areas to explore a new chapter of our national history, reaffirming that solid national unity, social stability and the positive expansion of national strength serve as a cornerstone in the realization of unification and as a prime propellant in the creation of a glorious and advanced homeland.

2. Minister of National Unification Park Discusses Nation's Persistent Efforts to Surmount Division

—Keynote Address at Korea-Germany International Symposium on the Question of Divided Countries—

Minister of National Unification Park Tong-jin made a keynote speech on “Present State and Prospects of Korean Question” at the Third International Symposium on Question of Divided Countries held in Munich, West Germany, on June 25, 1986, under the theme, “International Environment of the Latter Half of the 1980s and Prospects of Inter-German and Inter-Korean Relations.”

In the address, Minister Park pointed out that despite a change made in the inter-Korean relations since mid-1984, North Korea continues to pursue a policy of “linking the inter-Korean dialogue to a strategy to communize the whole peninsula.” The Minister said that no substantial achievement can be expected in the inter-Korean dialogue so long as North

Korea remains attached to the daydream of communization of all of Korea.

Minister Park observed that the inter-Korean relationship would develop in one of the four directions in the future: 1) the maintenance of the present unstable condition, 2) adoption and translation into action of an idea of peaceful unification through an epochal compromise and agreement, 3) possibility of the occurrence of a new military clash, and 4) North Korea's agreement with the South on the expanded exchanges between South and North Korea and on the cross contacts and recognition with the world powers surrounding the Korean peninsula against the background of South Korea's supremacy over the North in terms of economy and diplomacy and of military equilibrium between South and North Korea. He said that from the South's viewpoint, the most likeliness is the fourth type, which, he said, is the most realistic course of development.

The Minister said that what is essential to making the presumption come true are the South's maintenance of far supremacy over the North in terms of national strength, political and social changes in North Korea, and support from world powers.

Minister Park added that although chances are small for a rapid improvement of the inter-Korean relations, the South is promoting the dialogues with the North with patience, hoping that the North would affirmatively respond to the South's realistic and humanitarian approach.

The text of Minister Park's keynote speech was as follows:

Professor Gumpel, Professor Kinderman, Professor Kim, Dr. Priesnitz, distinguished scholars, ladies and gentlemen,

It is indeed a great pleasure and privilege for me to be with you here today.

Let me express my confidence at the outset that this German-Korean Academic Conference will provide a valuable opportunity to discuss and exchange views on the reality and prospects concerning the matter of reunification of our two nations in the context of relevant international conditions. We share a common misfortune of having to live with the division of our beloved fatherlands.

The twentyfifth day of June, marks the anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War. It is therefore all the more significant for me to attend this seminar today dealing with the question of peace on the Korean peninsula.

In addition, the day before yesterday, the twenty-third day of June, was another meaningful day for the Republic of Korea.

On the basis of an objective assessment of both the changing internal and external conditions, my Government proclaimed a new policy on June 23, 1973 that we would open our door to all nation of irrespective of the difference in ideologies and system.

My Government further proclaimed that we would not oppose North Korea's participation with us in international organizations including the United Nations, as a means to achieve peaceful and self-determined unification of the Korean peninsula.

However, in contrast to our open-door policy to pursue peace and prosperity for both of our peoples, North Korea has not changed yet her isolationism and belligerence based on the revolutionary line of communism.

Indeed, she has not abandoned her illusion of unifying the Korean peninsula under communist rule, and to this date, she continues to obstruct improvement of South-North relations, and peace in the region, by resorting to various forms of violence and provocation.

In 1984, dialogues between South and North revived once

again after thirteen years of impasse — thus, meetings through various channels such as the Red Cross, economic, sports meetings in Lausanne have been taking place. In September last year, the South and the North saw a realization of exchanging groups of separated family members and performing artists to each other's capitals, under the auspices of the Red Cross. This was the first human exchange of its kind between the two Koreas in its forty year history of tragic national division.

Despite these new developments, however, the basic attitude of North Korea is to exploit South-North dialogues for their strategic objective of promoting the communist domination of the Korean peninsula than to foster mutual trust.

As long as North Korea adheres to the dream of communist unification of divided Korea through revolutionary means, it is hard to expect any positive result from the dialogue.

This year, North Korea unilaterally decided to discontinue all the talks, citing as an excuse an open and routine U.S.-Korea joint military exercise. This abrupt action taken by North Korea against her original commitment is far from justifiable and rightful. This suspension of dialogues have inevitably resulted in an escalation of tensions between the South and North. Up to this date, even after the military exercise is over, North Korea has not yet shown any sign of resuming the Red Cross talks, economic talks and so on.

When we review the history of the South-North relations, we come to realize easily that there have been different developments according to the changes in both Korea's internal and external circumstances. Unlike the case of Germany, the relations between South and North Korea are bound to go through ups and downs, influenced by the changes in military situation on the Korean peninsula as well as surrounding international conditions. I think that a number of hypothesis may be considered in this regards.

First, we can think of a continuation of status quo of fragile

peace without making any special breakthrough. This would be a phenomenon created by North Korea as she does not make a decision on which policy to choose from either of the following two options; one is to pursue an isolationist policy as previously, with the result of accepting a deteriorating position in political, economic, and diplomatic arenas vs. the South; and the other option is to abandon the policy of isolationism and actively pursue dialogues, exchanges, and open-door policy by accepting various proposals, put forward by the Republic of Korea so far.

Because the adoption of open-door policy will cost them a tremendous political burden, the North Korean authorities cannot help but agonize and hesitate, and consequently they tend to become passive in carrying out dialogues with the South contrary to what they say in public.

When the North feels it necessary to slow down the progress of dialogues, it will employ the tactic of suspending dialogue unilaterally, imputing the responsibility to the South, and try to cover up tarnished image of the North through international propaganda. In such a case, it would be very hard to expect any positive result from the dialogue, no matter how hard South Korea tries to improve its relation with the North. North Korea's primary objective will be to make psychological offensive against the South, and will stage political shows at Panmunjom for international propaganda purpose only. The present state of the South-North relations belongs to this category.

Second, we can suppose a dramatic situation in which an epoch-making compromise and agreement are made between the South and the North to realize national unification by peaceful means. This would be the most desirable and ideal situation. I believe, however, this scenario can hardly be realized since the South and the North maintain diametrically opposing modes and political system. Moreover, the possibility of sudden integration of the two different social systems which hold wounds from the bloodshed of internal strife of 1950 would be very dim indeed.

Third, we can suppose the possibility of a new military confrontation between South Korea and North Korea. As there exists only a state of cease-fire on the Korean peninsula and lacks the relationship of peaceful co-existence such as seen in the German case, an emergency can develop whereby the existing armistice is replaced by a hot-war. And a local war in Korea contains the danger of escalating into a global war inviting military involvement of the United States and the Soviet Union depending on circumstances. This is the most undesirable state for both South and North Korea and for the sake of world peace.

As long as South Korea maintains a firm and effective deterrence against war, on the foundation of the U.S.-Korea Mutual Defence Treaty as is today, the North Korean military provocations will not so easily take place. To do so would be a great gamble for North Korea from both military and political standpoints.

Nevertheless, if North Korea miscalculate that the political power of the South Korean government is substantially weakened due to the social and political unrest or the South Korea's defense capability is markedly crippled due to a retreat of the American policies in its security commitment to Korea, she may choose such a radical option in an attempt to realize her longstanding goal of communized unification.

As a matter of fact, North Korea today is capable of carrying out an armed invasion on its own without any external assistance. Especially, in case North Korea becomes confident that it is able to receive necessary military assistance from the Soviet Union or China, the possibility of such an adventure would become much greater.

Last, we can think of a situation in which North Korea cannot avoid a compromise with South Korea. This would happen when the North falls into the position of clear inferiority to the South, economically and diplomatically, and the military powers of the two sides become balanced. This will lead to an expansion

of exchanges between the two parts, and an agreement to mutual contacts and even to recognitions by surrounding big powers.

Under the present circumstances, such a development would be most conducive to achieving a peaceful unification of the Korean peninsula. If such a condition is created, I believe joint entry of two Koreas to the United Nations and overall cooperation between South and North Korea will soon be realized.

To turn such a desirable hypothesis into a reality, I believe that first there must be a wide gap in national power between the two in favor of the South which the North cannot help acknowledging; in other words, the Republic of Korea must surpass North Korea in economic and diplomatic arenas, achieving social and political stability and progress so that North Korea is voluntarily induced to abandon its objective of communizing the Korean peninsula.

Second, there must take place social and political changes within North Korea itself. As long as North Korea maintains an isolationist and totalitarian system as is today, opening up of the North Korean society as a result of dialogues between the South and the North, and winds of freedom blowing from the outside would pose serious threats to the dictatorial political structure of the North. Therefore, until the political system of the North reaches the stage where certain degree of liberalization is accepted, I believe it would be difficult to expect any positive exchanges between the two parts of Korea.

Third, if any real improvement in the South-North relation is to be realized, there must be a moral support from major powers concerned with peace in Northeast Asia; United States, Soviet Union, China and Japan. From the latter half of the seventies, China's attitude toward Korea has changed favorable to a certain degree as an outcome of China's both internal and external changes. But on the other hand, it must be noted that the Soviet Union, although showing some support for the relaxation of tensions on the Korean peninsula, is still maintaining a posture of

exploiting the Korean situation for its military and political objectives in the context of her global strategy.

The close ties that have been developing between North Korea and the Soviet Union and the incidence of merciless shooting down of 007 of the Korean Airline in 1983 by the Soviet Union showed coldbloodiness of her attitude toward the Republic of Korea. The relations between South Korea and North Korea are obviously different from the case of divided Germany: In Korea, the unstable situation wandering between the two poles of war and peace may turn out various shades of outcomes depending on the variable of internal and external conditions.

Since it is the most desirable and realistic condition that a system of peaceful co-existence is firmly established first to guarantee continued efforts for peaceful Korean unification without interruption, my government has proposed to North Korea to conclude "a provisional agreement of basic relations" and the conclusion of mutual non-aggression pact between the two sides. And we have repeatedly called on North Korean authorities to accept these proposals. We have even proposed a summit meeting between the two top-leaders of the South and the North to discuss ways and means to prevent the danger of another war in Korea and so on.

Then, what are the prospects for improving relations between the South and the North? To get to the heart of the matter, I believe it to be a realistic appraisal to say that there is no possibility of a rapid improvement in mutual relations today. The communist North Korean authorities are caught in a dilemma of making a serious choice between the possible practical gains in the economic and diplomatic fields and some political losses in the domestic field from opening up their closed society to the free world.

It is our hope that one day the ruling circle of communist North Korea wakes up from the illusion of eventual communist triumph in the Korean peninsula, and come to choose realistic

and humanitarian approach to the question of unification. With this hope, and in the spirit of dialogue we will deal with North Korean regime. We believe that any policy or means that lacks the sense of realism cannot be expected to succeed in achieving a peaceful integration of two opposing ideologies and systems in a divided nation.

We therefore take pride in our policies and formulas regarding the Korean unification as they are well balanced products of realism and ideals. At the same time, as we are making efforts to improve relations with communist countries including the Soviet Union and China, we feel confident that time favors our side.

In conclusion, I wish this academic conference would become a good momentum in further stimulating the academic exchanges between German and Korean scholars, and in addition for promoting better understanding and cooperation between our two Republics.

*I wish you all a fruitful and friendly conference.
Thank you.*

Part II

Latest Developments in Inter-Korean Relations

1. Efforts of the South to Resume Dialogue

In telephone messages sent to the North on March 26, 1986, the South's chief delegates to the inter-Korean dialogue urged the North Koreans again to agree to resume the suspended dialogue at an early date. The messages came amidst the North's unilateral suspension of the many-sided dialogue such as Red Cross and economic talks originally slated for early in the year, and their rejection of the repeated call of the South for the resumption of the dialogue.

In the messages, the chief delegates to the Red Cross, economic and preliminary parliamentarians talks expressed regret over the suspension of the originally agreed-on meetings due to the North's unilateral suspension and refusal to resume the dialogue. They proposed that the sixth economic meeting be held on April 30, the third preliminary parliamentarians contact on May 14, both at Panmunjom, and the 11th full-dress Red Cross meeting in Pyongyang on May 27, 1986, respectively.

The text of the telephone messages the South's chief delegates sent to their respective northern counterparts was as follows:

To Yi Song-rok, northern chief delegate to the
Inter-Korean Economic Meeting,

I deeply regret that the 6th Inter-Korean Economic Meeting, originally slated for last January 22 at Panmunjom, has not been held to date, more than two months after it was called off due to your side's unilateral suspension.

Through five rounds of talks, the South and the North have

decided to adopt an agreed minute on the implementation of material exchanges and other projects of economic cooperation as well as on the formation of a Joint South-North Economic Cooperation Committee. We are now at a juncture where we are about to enter the stage of adjusting the wording of the proposed minute.

Today the entire nation look forward to the successful fruition of the Inter-Korean Economic Meeting and the concrete realization of material exchanges and other economic cooperation between the South and the North, hoping that groundwork for national reconciliation and prosperity could thereby be consolidated.

In this respect, I propose that the 6th Inter-Korean Economic Meeting be held at the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission at Panmunjom at 10 a.m. April 30 (Wednesday), 1986.

I look forward to your side's affirmative response.

March 26, 1986

Moon Hi-gab
 Chief Delegate
 Republic of Korea Delegation to the
 Inter-Korean Economic Meeting

(Vice Economic Planning Minister Moon Hi-gab has replaced Kim Ki-hwan, chief of the International Economic Council, as chief delegate to the Inter-Korean Economic Meeting, which was notified to North Korea on March 24, 1986).

To Chon Kum-chol, chief delegate of the North Korean Supreme People's Assembly to the Inter-Korean Preliminary Parliamentarians Contacts,

I deeply regret that the 3rd Inter-Korean Preliminary Parliamentarians Contact, originally set to be held on last February 18, has not been held to date due to your side's unilateral postponement of it.

Today the entire people ardently hope that the multi-pronged inter-Korean dialogue suspended will be resumed at an early date so that personnel and material exchanges can take place between the South and the North and a solid groundwork laid for national trust and reconciliation.

Nonetheless, your side has indefinitely put off the 3rd preliminary contact with the excuse of our side's annual military exercise in violation of a mutual agreement. This cannot be a proper action.

As I urge your side once again to respect and faithfully carry out mutually agreed matters, I propose that the 3rd preliminary inter-Korean parliamentarians contact be held at the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission at 10 a.m. May 14 (Wednesday).

I look forward to your side's affirmative response.

March 26, 1986

Kwon Jung-dal
Chief Delegate
Republic of Korea National Assembly
Delegation to the Inter-Korean Preliminary
Parliamentarians Contacts

To Yi Jong-ryul, chief delegate of the North Korean Red Cross to the South-North Red Cross Conference,

I regret that your side has failed to negotiate with us to determine the time of the 11th full-dress Red Cross meeting after your side unilaterally postponed indefinitely the meeting originally

scheduled to be held on last February 26 in Pyongyang.

I believe that your side's continuous delaying of the 11th full-dress Red Cross meeting amounts to an act of betraying the desire of dispersed families and beclouding the good atmosphere for dialogue created through the historical exchange of hometown visitors and art troupes last year.

This year which happens to be the 15th year after the initiation of the South-North Red Cross Conference, should be a period of great progress in which the acute wish of the separated families can be met and a solid stepping stone laid for national unification.

In this sense, I propose that the 11th full-dress Red Cross meeting be held in Pyongyang on May 27 (Tuesday).

I look forward to your side's affirmative response.

March 26, 1986

Lee Yung-Dug
 Chief Delegate
 Republic of Korea National Red Cross
 Delegation to the South-North
 Red Cross Conference

However, the North Korea again turned a deaf ear to the consistent efforts of the South to resume the dialogues.

In their telephone messages sent to the South on March 31 and April 1, the North Korean chief delegates to the economic, Red Cross and preliminary parliamentarians meetings rejected the South's March 26 proposal to resume the dialogue, arguing that the Team Spirit exercise was still going on.

Again in a so-called joint statement of the chief northern delegates to the dialogue, which was made on April 24 timed with the end of the Team Spirit military exercise, North Korea,

trying to shift the blame for the suspension of the dialogue to the South, rejected the resumption of the dialogue while making a malicious propaganda tirade against the South in connection with the military training and the South's political situation.

Moreover, North Korea from nowhere proposed a three-way military meeting on June 17, 1986, and unfoundedly made the military meeting a prerequisite to the resumption of the inter-Korean dialogue.

This latest maneuver, preceded by the unilateral suspension of the dialogue with the excuse of the Team Spirit exercise on January 20, 1986, and subsequent refusal to resume the talks, indicates that North Korea is not interested in the progress of the inter-Korean dialogue. All they are after is only to shift the blame for the suspension of the dialogue to the South in their wicked propaganda campaign.

Due to this negativism on the part of North Korea, the initial expectation that the dialogue could be resumed once the Team Spirit training was over, ended in smoke. Now it is totally unpredictable when the dialogue can be resumed.

It was against the background that the South, in telephone messages to the North on July 11, 1986, called on the North Koreans again to return to the arena of dialogue instead of continuously rejecting the South's proposition to resume the talks.

In the messages signed by the South's chief delegates to the many-sided dialogue, the South proposed that the 6th economic meeting be held on August 6, the 3rd preliminary parliamentarians contact on August 13, both at Panmunjom, and the 11th full-dress Red Cross meeting in Pyongyang on August 28, respectively.

The text of the telephone messages of the southern chief delegates was as follows:

To Yi Song-rok, northern chief delegate
to the Inter-Korean Economic Meeting,

It is to my deep regret that your side refuses to agree to the holding of the 6th economic meeting to date, eight months after the 5th meeting was held on November 20 last year.

One and half a years have already elapsed since our two sides initiated the economic talks with the intent of restoring the economic bond between the South and the North and thereby preparing conditions for national reconciliation and unification.

As you well know, our two sides have had five rounds of talks, in which we reached a substantial accord on the exchange of materials and other economic cooperation and agreed on the creation of a joint economic cooperation organization chaired by both sides' deputy-prime-minister-level officials. We are now preparing to begin adjusting the wording of a concrete agreed minute.

As I regard such a progress very encouraging, I believe that if only both sides show a little more sincerity, our talks could be developed to a point before long where we could translate material exchange and other economic cooperation into action.

It cannot but be a case of utter insincerity and irresponsibility for your side to suspend an agreed-on meeting and reject our repeated call for the resumption of the talks at this juncture.

I think your side should deeply consider and reflect on itself over how much such a suspension of the dialogue has disappointed our people.

I believe that considering the nation's invariable wish and expectation from the inter-Korean dialogue, our talks cannot be delayed any further and your side should agree to resume the talks without any prerequisites.

I propose that the 6th inter-Korean economic meeting be held

at the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission at Panmunjom at 10 a.m. August 6 (Wednesday), 1986.

July 11, 1986

Moon Hi-gab
Chief Delegate
Republic of Korea Delegation to the
Inter-Korean Economic Meeting

To Chon Kump-chol, chief delegate of the North Korean
Supreme People's Assembly to Inter-Korean
Preliminary Parliamentarians Contacts,

I deeply regret that your side unilaterally cancelled the mutually agreed-on time of the 3rd inter-Korean preliminary parliamentarians contact and turned a deaf ear to our side's repeated calls for the resumption of the meeting, thus suspending the preliminary parliamentarians contact over a protracted period of time.

Our two sides, through two rounds of contacts held last year, agreed in principle to hold a parliamentarians meeting and shared opinions on other matters excepting a few issues including the topics of the main meeting.

Our side thus could harbor the expectation that if only both sides exerted a little more efforts, the remaining questions regarding the convocation of a parliamentarians meeting could be resolved smoothly.

I believe that if your side is truly interested in the realization of a parliamentarians meeting, your side should return unconditionally to the table of talks instead of shunning the resumption of the meeting, and show sincerity in discussing and resolving early the issue of topics and other matters yet to be agreed on.

In this respect, I propose that the 3rd preliminary contact be held at 10 a.m. August 13 (Wednesday), 1986, at the conference

room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission at Panmunjom.

I look forward to your side's affirmative response.

July 11, 1986

Kwon Jung-dal
Chief Delegate
Republic of Korea National Assembly
Delegation to the Inter-Korean Preliminary
Parliamentarians Contacts

To Li Jong-ryul, chief delegate of the North Korea Red Cross
to the South-North Red Cross Conference,

I deeply regret that the 11th full-dress Red Cross meeting could not be held for seven months despite our side's repeated calls for the resumption of the dialogue.

Not only a substantial progress was seen in the discussion of the projects envisaged in the five topics through three full-dress meetings last year, but an actual achievement was registered in the form of the exchange of hometown visitors and art troupes, thus brightening the future of the dispersed family reunion project.

The dispersed families in the South and the North and the rest of the nation, who still vividly remember the historic exchange of hometown visitors and art troupes, ardently hope that much progress will be made again in the Red Cross talks in this year so that separated families could freely visit their hometowns and become reunited with their missing blood relatives.

Our Red Cross societies should meet the acute wish of the dispersed families and the nation as a whole in a humble manner. And, our Red Cross workers, keeping deep in mind the all-important responsibility and mission imposed on them, should

do our utmost in our given duty.

If the 11th full-dress meeting had been held in last February 26 as was originally agreed on and a further progress were seen in the discussion of the agenda topics, the two sides could have moved one step closer to making an agreement on the method of implementing the projects of the topics, which in turn could have advanced the resolution of the dispersed family question that much and given much joy to the peoples watching the talks at home and abroad.

In this context, our side has time and again urged your side to come to the table of the 11th full-dress meeting to realize early the dispersed family reunion project.

Your side, too, contended at the 9th and 10th meetings that the discussion of the topics designed to redress the pains of the dispersed families should be concluded before September this year which happens to mark the 15th anniversary of the initiation of the South-North Red Cross Conference.

We hope that such contention of your side would not end in words but be put into practice. I believe that to this end, your side should unconditionally return to the dialogue in conformity with the Red Cross humanitarian spirit instead of putting off the meeting indefinitely.

I propose that the 11th full-dress Red Cross meeting be held in Pyongyang on August 28.

I look forward to your side's affirmative response.

July 11, 1986

Lee Yung-dug
Chief Delegate
Republic of Korea National Red Cross
Delegation to the South-North
Red Cross Conference

Domestic Reaction Major domestic newspapers editorially welcomed the latest proposal of the South for the resumption of the suspended inter-Korean economic, Red Cross and preliminary parliamentarians talks. The newspapers, in addition, denounced North Korea for proposing yet another channel of dialogue, “a three-way military meeting,” while refusing to return to the table of the existing dialogue. The new North Korean offer, the press observed, cannot be anything more than an altered form of Pyongyang’s pet idea of a tripartite meeting.

Pointing out that the North Korean proposal for an additional conduit of dialogue is merely part of their propaganda campaign, the newspapers said that for the alleviation of tension and for the building up of mutual trust what is most important is to faithfully maintain and develop the existing channels of the dialogue. They then urged North Korea to affirmatively respond to the South’s call for the resumption of the talks without delay.

2. The North’s Proposal for “Three-Way Military Meeting”

a. North Korean Proposal

North Korea, which unilaterally suspended a series of inter-Korean talks on the grounds of the Team Spirit training exercise and has rejected the South’s offers to resume the dialogue, proposed on June 17, 1986, a “three-way military meeting” among the defense ministers of South and North Korea and the commander of the United Nations Command in Korea.

In a message addressed to Minister of National Defense Lee Ki-baek, which was signed by O Jin-wu, North Korea's people's armed forces minister, North Korea, contending that the "Korean situation is now at a perilous point where a war may break out due even to a casual cause," suggested that a military authorities meeting be held in July to discuss the questions of "halting military exercises and arms buildup," "reducing military manpower and equipment" and "respecting the Armistice Agreement," issues which, they argued, constitute the direct causes of tension and danger of war. North Korea proposed that a preliminary contact be held at Panmunjom on June 27 to discuss the proposed military meeting.

Also in the message, North Korea argued that "if a military meeting were held and substantial measures taken to ease tension on the Korean peninsula, it would bring about a new breakthrough in the effort to ease tension and promote peace, unfolding an epochal phase for the inter-Korean dialogue." North Korea thus let it be known that they could use the convocation of a three-way military meeting as a prerequisite to the progress of the existing economic, Red Cross and parliamentarians talks.

The gist of the North Korean message was as follows:

- Many-sided talks were held last year between the South and the North.
- This year, however, the inter-Korean relations have reverted to the pre-dialogue state and tension has further built up. We are now at a perilous stage where a war may break out due even to a casual cause.
- In the hope of preparing effective steps to ease tension and eliminate the danger of war, we propose a military

authorities meeting among the Defense Minister of the Republic of Korea, commander of the United Nations Command in Korea and North's People's Armed Forces Minister.

- At the meeting, the question of halting military exercises and arms buildup, which constitute the direct cause of the danger of war, the question of reducing military manpower and arms, and the question of respecting the Military Armistice Agreement, may be discussed and resolved.
- The site of the meeting could be Panmunjom or other place of convenience. The time of the meeting could be some time in July.
- We propose that a preliminary contact attended by about three delegates from each side be held on June 27, 1986, at Panmunjom to discuss the issue of opening a military authorities meeting.
- If a military authorities meeting were held and actual measures taken to ease tension, a new breakthrough could be provided for the alleviation of tension and peace on the Korean peninsula.
- We expect that our new overture will be affirmatively responded to.

Meanwhile, North Korea sent an identical message to the commander of the United Nations Command in Korea around the same time they delivered a message to the Defense Minister of the Republic of Korea on June 17.

Initially on June 7, North Korea said that they would send a message of the People's Armed Forces Minister to the concurrent commander of the Eighth U.S. Army and the Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command. The United Nations Command,

however, pointed out that under the practices of the Military Armistice Commission, messages ought to be exchanged between the commander of the United Nations Command and the Supreme Commander of the North Korea forces, telling Pyongyang that if North Korea followed the practice, it would accept their message.

Nevertheless, the June 17 message addressed to the United Nations Commander was signed not by the supreme commander of the North Korean forces but by O Jin-wu, People's Armed Forces minister or the first deputy of the supreme commander. North Korea thus violated the long-held practice of the Military Armistice Commission.

Ulterior Motives It is believed that the North's proposal for a three-way military meeting stemmed not from the sincere manner to resolve the Korean question through dialogue but from sinister motives as can be seen in the following.

First, by proposing a three-way military meeting ostensibly to discuss military issues, North Korea sought to move a step closer to the realization of the so-called tripartite meeting they persistently have demanded since January 1984.

Second, the fact that the North advanced the idea of a military meeting while rejecting the resumption of the existing channels of the dialogue and that they hinted at resuming the suspended dialogue only when the military meeting they proposed is realized, suggests that they made the offer in the hope of escaping censure for their refusal to resume the talks and, at the same time, shifting the blame for the suspension of the dialogue to the South.

Moreover, by insisting that the dialogue remains suspended due to "Team Spirit and other military training exercises on the part of the South," North Korea, capitalizing on the desire

of surrounding countries for the continuation of the inter-Korean dialogue, hopes to have military training exercises scaled down or suspended.

Third, with an eye at the Nonaligned Summit Meeting slated for August 26-September 7, 1986, in Zimbabwe and an "international meeting for peace on and non-nuclearization of the Korean peninsula" set to be held in Pyongyang September 6-8, 1986, North Korea attempts to make it appear as if the basic obstacle to the dialogue and the easing of tension lies in the Team Spirit training and the presence of the U.S. forces in Korea, thus hoping to enlist international support for their call for the suspension of the Team Spirit exercise and the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea.

b. The South's Reply

Minister of National Defense Lee Ki-back sent a letter to North Korea on June 24, 1984, in reply to the North's June 17 letter proposing a three-way military meeting.

In the message, Minister Lee stressed that it is unreasonable for the North to propose a military authorities meeting while unilaterally suspending the existing channels of dialogue. He urged the North to return to the Red Cross and economic meetings first.

Stressing that tension and the danger of war on the Korean peninsula are attributable to the North's reckless arms buildup, hostile policy against the South and violation of the Armistice Agreement, the Minister said that North Korea should agree to discuss the "measures to ease military tension" which the South proposed through the Military Armistice Commission instead of indulging in propaganda activities by proposing a

military meeting.

At the same time, Minister Lee said that if the North is truly interested in easing tension and preventing war on the Korean peninsula, they should agree to a meeting between the highest authorities of South and North Korea, aware that such a top leaders meeting would be a shortcut to bringing about peaceful unification.

The text of Minister Lee's letter to O Jin-wu, the North's people's armed forces minister, was as follows:

I received your letter of June 17. As your side knows, many-sided talks such as the Red Cross and economic meetings were held between the South and the North of Korea last year. And, dispersed families' hometown visitors and art troupes were exchanged for the first time last year since national division, giving great joy to the whole people and brightening the future of inter-Korean relations.

Since the turn of the year, however, your side regrettably suspended the dialogue one-sidedly and rejected our calls for the early resumption of the talks, thus driving the inter-Korean relations into an atmosphere of distrust and tension and disappointing the entire Korean people in the South and the North who crave for peace and unification. It is thus utterly unreasonable to propose a military authorities meeting among the defense ministers of South and North Korea and the commander of the United Nations Command on the pretext of discussing the suspension of military exercises and arms reduction at a time when your side has suspended the existing dialogue.

As our side has expressly substantiated through the Military Armistice Commission, tension and the danger of war on the Korean peninsula are attributed to your side's reckless arms buildup, hostile policy against the South and violations of the

Military Armistice Agreement.

Few persons can accept your side proposing a military meeting while covering up such fundamental causes and refusing to take any sincere steps to ease tension and foster trust.

In this context, I believe that your side should first agree to resume the Red Cross and economic meetings your side has suspended to realize a reunion between dispersed families and undertake economic exchanges at an early date, and thereby show a sincere attitude in easing tension and restoring trust between the South and the North.

At the same time, instead of proposing a so-called military meeting and indulging in a propaganda campaign, your side should affirmatively respond to discussing the measures to ease military tension our side has already proposed through the existing Military Armistice Commission, which include the “genuine demilitarization of the Demilitarized Zone,” “mutual notification of major military training exercises,” “mutual observation of major military exercises” and “introduction of the mutual confirmation system in the Joint Security Area.”

Moreover, if your side is truly interested in easing tension and preventing war on the Korean peninsula, your side should agree to holding a meeting between the highest authorities of South and North Korea at an early date, aware that such a top leaders meeting would be the shortest way toward achieving peace and unification.

June 24, 1986

Lee Ki-baek
Minister of National Defense
Republic of Korea

Meanwhile, the United Nations Command in Korea sent a

message to North Korea on June 21 in reply to the North's June 17 letter.

In the letter signed by the commander of the United Nations Command in Korea and addressed to the supreme commander of the North Korean forces, the U.N. Command first invited the North Korean attention to the fact that although any North Korean letter to the commander of the United Nations Command ought to be signed by the supreme commander of the North Korean forces under long-held practices, North Korea failed to observe it in their June 17 letter.

The U.N. Command also said in the letter that most of the topics the North suggested for a military meeting should, in nature, be properly discussed between South and North Korea, adding, however, that the U.N. Command is prepared to discuss those matters related to the military armistice at any time at the Military Armistice Commission. The U.N. Command noted that the Command has already produced before the Armistice Commission major ideas to ease tension.

In the meantime, despite the fact that South Korea and the U.N. Command expressly rejected the North Korean offer for a military meeting because of its unreasonableness, the North notified the South on July 3 of their plan to deliver a second letter in connection with a military meeting. When the South refused to accept the letter, North Korea openly called for the convocation of a three-way military meeting in a radio broadcast on July 11 while stepping up slanderous propaganda against South Korea and the United States.

On the morning of July 11, the South notified the North that it won't accept the second letter. The United Nations Command also refused to accept the second letter because it wasn't signed by the supreme commander of the North Korean forces.

c. Reactions at Home and Abroad

Major domestic newspapers rejected the idea of a three-way military meeting North Korea recently proposed as “another form of a tripartite meeting North Korea proposed in January 1984.”

Editorially commenting on the latest North Korean proposal, the newspapers observed that the proposal which came at a time when the North unilaterally suspended the existing channels of dialogue, was advanced not for the dialogue’s sake but for their wicked propaganda scheme to shift the blame for the suspension of the talks to the South and also to foment an “atmosphere for the realization of a tripartite meeting aimed at engineering the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea.”

In particular, the editorials pointed out that the issues of halting military exercises, arms reduction and respect for the Armistice Agreement all constitute sensitive political problems beyond the reach of military authorities, which, they said, can only be effectively handled at a top leaders meeting between South and North Korea. To resolve these and other political issues, the media said, the North should agree to a top leaders meeting as the South has proposed.

Meanwhile, foreign media expressed concern at the North Korean proposal for a military meeting, pointing out that “North Korea’s peace gestures were always accompanied by major armed provocations.”

They also observed that North Korea offered the idea of a military meeting in a circumstance where they cancelled scheduled economic, Red Cross and preliminary parliamentary talks, out of a political calculation of Kim Il-sung who they said had been driven into a corner.

The foreign press comments then concluded that there is

little chance for the South to accept the latest North Korean proposal.

Part III

IOC-Sponsored Inter-Korean Sports Talks

1. Third Meeting

The 3rd Inter-Korean Sports Meeting sponsored by the International Olympic Committee (IOC) was held at the IOC Headquarters in Lausanne, Switzerland, on June 10-11, 1986, behind closed doors.

At the third meeting, held five full months after the second meeting, the IOC, in an apparent move to wind up the sports talks early, produced a mediatory plan it worked out based on the results of the first and second sports meetings and its separate contacts with both sides of Korea, asking South and North Korea to notify the IOC of weather to accept the plan by the end of June.

At the meeting, North Korea seemed to have backed down from their original stand by not reiterating their previous demand for “joint sponsorship” and the “formation of a single team.” However, they still reiterated their contention with regard to the “split of Olympic Games between South and North Korea” and other issues involving the titles of 1988 Games and its organizing committee, cultural programs related to the Olympics, etc.

As at the second meeting, the third meeting comprised two rounds of three-way talks among the IOC and South and North Korean delegates, two rounds of meeting between IOC and Republic of Korea Olympic Committee (KOC) officials, and three rounds of talks between IOC and North Korean officials.

a. First-Day Talks

On the first day of the two-day meeting on June 10, 1986, a

joint meeting among IOC and South and North Korean officials and a separate IOC-North Korean meeting were held in the morning, followed in the afternoon by separate meetings between the IOC and the KOC, and between the IOC and the North Korean side.

At the morning joint session, IOC President Juan Antonio Samaranch made greetings, which was followed by keynote speeches by the chief delegates from South and North Korea.

In his greetings, IOC President Samaranch expressed the hope that the three parties of the IOC and South and North Korea would do their utmost and reach an affirmative agreement at the third meeting. He then explained about the schedule of the first-day meeting.

Meanwhile, Chief KOC Delegate Kim Chong-ha, in his keynote speech, said that the KOC had already made clear its willingness to study sincerely the question of the North Korean Olympic Committee's participation in the Seoul Olympics to an extent that the Olympic Charter permits with a view to staging the 24th Seoul Olympics more successfully than any other games in the past and to allowing the entire Korean people to enjoy the honor of the City of Seoul having been granted the right to host the Olympics.

Kim Chong-ha said that it was in this context that the KOC had positively cooperated in the sincere mediatory efforts of IOC President Samaranch and the IOC itself while "setting forth a reasonable plan to allow North Korean athletes to take part in the 24th Seoul Olympics more significantly and exerting efforts to realize the plan" in accordance with the topics of the talks prepared by the IOC.

The KOC chief delegate also urged North Korea to "participate in the Seoul Olympics without any conditions by respecting the Olympic Charter and the IOC decision made at

its 1981 Baden-Baden meeting.” He then said his delegation would make sincere efforts in discussing and resolving the four topics which the IOC produced at the second meeting, which were:

- The question of simultaneous entry of the South and North Korean delegations into the opening ceremony of the Seoul Olympics;
- The question of allotting some preliminaries to the North Korean area;
- The question of holding group road cycling through the areas of South and North Korea; and
- The question of North Korea’s participation in Seoul Olympic cultural activities.

Stressing in particular that if these problems could be resolved, it would serve as a historical occasion to facilitate the mutual door-opening between South and North Korea through the 24th Seoul Olympics and forge inter-Korean relations based on trust and peace, KOC Chief Delegate Kim called for unspared cooperation on the part of the IOC and North Korea, reminding them that the success of the third meeting hinges on whether all the parties respect the Olympic Charter and the decision of the IOC session.

On the other hand, the North Korean delegation did not mention in their keynote speech their previous demand for “joint sponsorship” and the “formation of a single delegation.” They instead concentrated on obtaining the right to host some sports in the North Korean area.

In the speech, the North’s chief delegate Kim Yu-sun said that North Korea disclosed its stand over the question of splitting the 24th Olympics between South and North Korea and

other issues such as those involving the titles of the 24th Olympics and its organizing committee, cultural activities and other Olympic events during a separate meeting it had in last March with the IOC, suggesting that if the “basic problem” related to organizing the 24th Olympics, namely, the question of allotting some Olympic sports to the North Korean area, were resolved, other concomitant problems could be settled easily.

This attitude of North Korea was believed to have represented not so much a change in their basic position advocating the joint sponsorship as a tactical change aimed at securing the right to hold some Olympic sports in the North Korean area and seeking the resolution of other related problems step by step.

Following the joint meeting and a separate IOC-North Korean conference in the morning, separate talks between the IOC and the KOC and between the IOC and North Korea were held in the afternoon.

At the talks between the IOC and the KOC, the two sides discussed chiefly the question of allotting several sports to the North Korean area. In particular, the IOC asked the KOC if it were willing to transfer several sports including their finals to the North Korean zone.

In response, the KOC said that it is “willing to affirmatively review the question holding two sports including their finals in the North Korean area under the sponsorship of the Seoul Olympic Organizing Committee” provided that North Korea makes it clear that they would respect the Olympic Charter and the IOC decision made at its Baden-Baden session and unconditionally take part in the 24th Seoul Olympics.

Kim Chong-ha, chief KOC delegate, also discussed the KOC’s basic position on major pending issues as follows, which included the questions of entrance to the opening

ceremony, staging a competition across the areas of South and North Korea, the North's participation in cultural activities, the hostship of the Olympics, and the formation of organization.

(1) Question of Entrance into the Opening Ceremony

—The KOC suggested that during the opening ceremony of the Seoul Olympics, South and North Korean officials and athletes enter simultaneously, with South Korean members entering in three rows on the right in their own uniform and carrying the Republic of Korea national flag and the North Korean members also in three rows on the left in their uniform and carrying their flag. The IOC agreed on the idea.

(2) Question of Allotting Specific Sports including Finals to North Korea

—The KOC has not received any reply from North Korea to the suggestion it made at the first and second sports meetings that it was willing to transfer the preliminaries of man's volleyball and man's handball and some preliminaries of soccer to the North Korean area. We therefore regard the lack of response as their rejection.

—If North Korea expressly pronounces their respect for the Olympic Charter and IOC decisions and their unconditional participation in the 24th Seoul Olympics, we are willing to hold two sports inclusive of their finals in the North Korean area under the sponsorship of the Seoul Olympic Organizing Committee (SLOOC).

—The sports that can be allotted to North Korea are table-tennis and fencing including their finals.

—If North Korea agrees to the proposal, we will discuss

and resolve the questions of checking the facilities of venues, travels back and forth, guarantee of the safety of traveling persons, and communications and the shipping of goods necessary for the operation of the sports.

(3) Question of Staging a Competition Across South and North Korean Areas

—We suggested at the first and second meetings that group road cycling start in the North Korean area and finish in Seoul.

(4) Question of Participation in Cultural Activities

—North Korea's participation in various cultural events to be staged during the 24th Seoul Olympics period will be welcomed.

(5) Question of Title of 24th Seoul Olympics

—The question of the title of the 24th Seoul Olympics does not deserve any discussion.

(6) Question of the Formation of Separate Organization in Case Some Sports Are Allotted to North Korea

—The formation of any organization separate from the Seoul Olympic Organizing Committee (SLOOC) in connection with the question of allotting some sports to North Korea, runs counter to the Olympic Charter and, therefore, cannot be considered.

b. Second-Day Talks

At the second-day meeting on June 11, separate meetings were held between the IOC and the KOC and between the IOC

and North Korea, followed by a 25-minute joint meeting among the three parties.

At the exclusive meeting with the KOC, IOC President Samaranch reiterated the proposal the IOC made at the first-day meeting, a proposal for the transfer of table-tennis and archery including their finals to North Korea, holding of a road cycling over South and North Korean areas and the transfer of an additional group of soccer preliminaries to North Korea. The IOC President asked the KOC to make a reply to the IOC suggestion by the end of June.

The IOC let it be known that if South and North Korea agree to the IOC's mediatory idea and reach a complete agreement on the sports to be allotted to the North, then the issues of North Korea's opening of its door to the 25,000 Olympic family (9,000 journalists, 12,000 athletes and officials and 4,000 International Sports Federation and IOC officials), demand and supply of goods, and other related matters would be discussed one or two months later.

In response, the KOC stressed that North Korea should first respect the right of the South to host the 24th Olympics, and expressed the willingness to affirmatively consider the IOC suggestion for the transfer of additional soccer preliminaries to the North Korean area.

At the subsequent three-party joint meeting, IOC President Samaranch said the IOC would officially forward its mediatory plan in paper to both sides of Korea, and asked the two sides to notify the IOC of whether to accept it by the end of June.

Samaranch also said that if South and North Korea agree to the mediatory plan, the IOC would discuss various related problems through working-level contacts before the fourth meeting is convened. He called on both sides of Korea to respond to the IOC plan early, noting that everything has to be

resolved before the IOC session tentatively scheduled for October so that they can gain the IOC session's approval.

Following the two-day meeting on the afternoon of June 11, IOC President Samaranch held a press conference with about 50 foreign correspondents including those from South and North Korea to discuss the results of the third inter-Korean sports meeting.

The statement and the gist of remarks Samaranch made at the press meeting were as follows:

At the initiative of the International Olympic Committee, delegations from the National Olympic Committees of the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, led by their respective Presidents, Mr. Chong-Ha Kim and Mr. Yu Sun Kim, met for the third time at the IOC headquarters in Lausanne, on 10th and 11th June 1986, under the Chairmanship of the President of the IOC, H.E. Juan Antonio Samaranch.

The IOC was also represented by its Vice-Presidents, Mr. Alexandru Siperco, Mr. Ashwini Kumar and Mr. Berthold Beitz as well as the Administrateur délégué and member of the IOC, Mr. Raymond Gafner and assisted by Maître Samuel Pisar, Mr. Howard Stupp and Mr. Alain Coupat.

In the course of extensive discussions which took place in a cooperative and cordial atmosphere, the differences between the parties were narrowed considerably, both NOCs stressing their sincere desire to ensure the success of the Games of the XXIVth Olympiad in 1988.

With this fundamental objective in mind, the IOC delegation, in the spirit of the "Olympic Charter" and the decisions taken at the 1981 IOC Session in Baden-Baden, proposed to both parties that a number of events on the programme of the Games of the

XXIVth Olympiad be delegated to the NOC of DPR Korea. Especially, the organization of two full sports would be entrusted to the NOC of the DPR Korea to be held in its territory.

The IOC has also proposed that certain additional events be partly located in the DPR Korea, and that cultural manifestations connected with the Olympic Games be organized in both parts of the Korean peninsula.

The two Korean NOCs have undertaken to study this proposal and to communicate to the IOC their willingness to accept it in principle by 30th June 1986; they have already confirmed to the IOC that free access of all members of the Olympic Family to the relevant Olympic venues in the North and South would be ensured. The IOC will then convene a new meeting in order to settle all necessary organizational and operational aspects.

Gist of Remarks Made in Reply to Questions

- (1) The question of allotting some sports to North Korea:
 - The IOC proposed the transfer of an additional group of soccer preliminaries to the North in addition to the allotment of two sports — table tennis and archery — to the North, the holding of road cycling over the South and North Korean areas, and the staging of some activities such as cultural programs.
 - The IOC proposal is final. If they do not accept this, there will be no other offer. If and when the IOC suggestion is accepted, various related problems such as the organization of sports in North Korea, free travels back and forth, television coverage and athletic village, would be discussed.

- (2) The question of opening and closing ceremonies:
 - The opening and closing ceremonies will be held in Seoul

only. The 24th Olympics has been granted to Seoul, and only some sports are to be held in North Korea.

(3) Problems incidental to the allotment of some sports in North Korea:

- Even if some sports were allotted to North Korea, no amendment to the Olympic Charter would be required. It would be good if only the IOC session so approves.
- The fact that both National Olympic Committees (NOC) of Korea accepted the idea of free travel back and forth indicates that North Korea would open their border to the 25,000-member Olympic family.
- The Olympic family refers to those who will receive registration cards during the Olympics, who will include 9,000 correspondents, 12,000 athletes and officials and 4,000 International Sports Federation and IOC officials.
- The period of the opening of the South and North Korean border will be from two weeks before the Games to the time of the end of the Games.
- The question of television coverage, etc. will be discussed after the IOC plan was accepted.

2. Subsequent Developments

On June 12, 1986, IOC President Samaranch sent official messages containing the mediatory plan the IOC produced at the third inter-Korean sports meeting, to both sides of Korea.

In the message addressed to Kim Chong-ha, president of the Republic of Korea Olympic Committee (KOC), the IOC proposed that:

- Of the 24th Olympics sports, table tennis and archery inclusive of their finals be held in the North Korean area,
- Road cycling and some additional sports including a group of soccer preliminaries be allotted to the North Korean area, and
- Cultural activities related to the Olympics be held in both areas of South and North Korea.

The IOC also said that as soon as South and North Korea accept the plan, an official meeting will be held between South and North Korean delegates under the auspices of the IOC to resolve various operational problems such as organization. The IOC again asked the KOC to notify the IOC of whether to accept the plan by June 30, 1986.

The KOC accepted the IOC suggestion on June 30, 1986, in the hope that it could help prompt the North Korean Olympic Committee to respect the Olympic Charter and the 1981 Baden-Baden decision of the IOC session and participate in the 24th Seoul Olympics without any preconditions.

Meanwhile, on the same day, North Korea was known to have agreed to the IOC plan and to hold table tennis and archery matches in North Korea. In a letter to the IOC, North Korea, however, asserted that in view of the 24 sports of the Olympics, the two — table tennis and archery — are too small for them, asking that the IOC would continue to strive to transfer more sports to the North as they hoped before. It was also said that in the letter, North Korea expressed the hope that at a fourth meeting, continuous discussions would be made on the title of the Olympics, the question of organization and operation, and the number of sports.

The IOC announced on July 3 that both South and North Korea had sent affirmative replies to its mediatory plan.

IOC press officer Michele Berdier said that North Korea's reply contained a few conditions and that the IOC would send an official message to the North demanding clear explanation about the conditions.

3. Reactions at Home and Abroad

Commenting on the IOC mediatory plan which IOC President Samaranch produced at the 3rd IOC-sponsored Inter-Korean Sports Meeting, domestic newspapers, speaking highly of the efforts of the IOC and the KOC for the success of the Seoul Olympics, expressed the hope that the new IOC plan will serve to resolve the question of North Korea's participation in the 1988 Seoul Olympics.

The press said that the progress made at the Lausanne sports meeting amidst persisting obstructive maneuvering of North Korea against the Seoul Olympics, was the product of the "patience and concession" showed by South Korea which, they noted, has been trying to use the question of North Korea's participation in the Seoul Olympics as a momentum to help resolve the Korean question, going beyond the extent of a "simple sports program or understanding."

The media then urged North Korea to stop persisting in unreasonableness any further and instead return to the spirit of reciprocity and reconciliation, and thereby accept the IOC plan.

Major overseas newspapers observed that if some of the 1988 Seoul Olympic sports were actually held in the North Korean area, it would constitute a significant step forward in the effort to ease tension on the Korean peninsula. They said

that the successful staging of the Seoul Olympics would certainly serve to materialize peaceful unification between South and North Korea.

On the other hand, the foreign media expressed the fear that even if both sides of Korea agree to the IOC proposal, all the incidental matters such as the questions of the title of the 1988 Olympiad, entry of correspondents to the North, security of stadium and hotel facilities, etc., would not necessarily be resolved smoothly and peacefully.

SOUTH-NORTH DIALOGUE IN KOREA



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Part I

Unswerving Will Toward Dialogue and Unification

President Chun's 1987 Policy Statement

— Renewed Call for the North's Return to Dialogue —

In a nationally televised policy statement on the morning of January 12, 1987, President Chun Doo Hwan discussed in detail the new year's policy programs he had devised as the nation's leader.

The policy statement was significant in that President Chun humbly looked back over the past six years of his administration and once again set forth his far-reaching and clearcut ruling philosophy before the nation at a time when he had only one year or so more to go before his term of presidency expires.

Rather than freshly setting forth concrete policy programs, President Chun discussed in the policy statement overall aspects of state affairs from a broader viewpoint, stressing the importance of the mission of times imposed upon the contemporary generation at an important historical turning point.

Specifically, President Chun reviewed the efforts his administration had exerted in the past years to "safeguard and develop liberal democracy," which is the highest national goal and ideal. As immediate tasks to accomplish the goal, the President cited a peaceful power transfer, continued expansion of self-ruling and door opening, promotion of democratic development in stability, and pursuit of peace and unification. He then vowed to make unreserved efforts during the rest of his term to successfully fulfil these tasks.

Regarding the question of unification and dialogue, President Chun pointed out that "the kind of an advanced democratic country we seek to realize can be materialized fully only through national unification." The President reiterated his

determination to carry on efforts to resume the suspended inter-Korean dialogue and realize national reconciliation as an initial step toward unification.

While stating that thanks to the efforts of the Fifth Republic, unification no longer remains a remote dream but has now become a realistic national goal, President Chun said firmly that the nation's advancement toward unification has reached a new plateau along the fast track into the forefront of development onto which the nation has been lifted by the impetus of the Seoul Olympics.

At the same time, the President called upon North Korea to stop constructing the Kumgangsan Dam and agree to hold a South-North water resources meeting, resume the suspended dialogue, and agree to hold a South-North top leaders meeting.

Regarding the question of a top leaders meeting, in particular, the Chief Executive, expressing the hope that it will be held during his term of office, said that if the top leaders meeting takes place, it could discuss all inter-Korean issues including the recent North Korean proposal to hold political and military talks. He thus showed an unabated attachment to accomplishing national reconciliation and peaceful unification.

Following is a part of President Chun's policy statement related to the question of unification and the inter-Korean dialogue:

It is my belief that our goal of building an advanced democratic nation within the 20th century is one that can be fully attained only when national unification is achieved. Territorial division is an unbearable pain for a single ethnic family. The territorial partitioning is the source of a constant threat of a war that would completely demolish us and our prosperity. The divi-

sion is a heavy yoke that forces us to waste national energies and thus throttles the engine of national development.

The task of breaking the fetters of division and thus accomplishing unification will be major test of our national capabilities. I feel that now that division has continued for 40 long years not a few have been thinking that unification is in actuality a distant goal that is difficult to attain, especially because we have to work toward it without outside help. However, as the growth of our national capabilities has accelerated on the strength of a liberal democratic system, we have been steadfastly grappling with that paramount task. Upon its birth, the Fifth Republic refused to regard unification as a remote dream and adopted it as a realistic national goal. We have thus been stepping up independent endeavors toward that objective. As a result, the nation's advancement toward unification has reached a new plateau along the fast track into the forefront of development onto which we have been lifted by the impetus provided by the awarding of the '88 Olympics to Seoul.

Under any circumstance, that long-cherished national goal must be reached through peace and reconciliation, rather than through violence and war. Even while gripped by anger and sorrow over the terrorist bombing in Rangoon, I consistently adhered to the principle of peace and dialogue. This was because of a single-minded determination to pry open the door to reconciliation and unification.

And yet, North Korea continues to turn a blind eye to our determination to seek dialogue with the intent of establishing peace by reducing tensions and promoting exchanges, eventually leading to national reintegration. Moreover, flouting every international law and practice requiring nations, even of different ethnic origins, to consult each other about the development and use of common rivers and to respect the interests of all riparian countries, they have started building the Kumgangsán hydroelectric dam out of an idle dream of communizing the whole

peninsula by force: The dam is designed to deluge the most populous and vital region of the Republic in total disregard of the well-being of their own compatriots. It can only be concluded that such an attitude on the part of North Korea increases the mistrust and tension between the two halves of the country, hindering the cause of national reconciliation and unification.

It is all too evident that all issues between South and North Korea must be resolved peacefully through dialogue based on the principle of self-determination of peoples. In view of that, North Korea must, first of all, cease the construction of the Kumgangsan Dam and agree to discuss the joint development of common rivers in compliance with relevant international laws and practices. If the Kumgangsan Dam was being built for purely economic reasons as Pyongyang claims, I think North Korea would not see any reason to eschew such a dialogue or to refuse to allow our experts to inspect the dam construction site. If North Korea comes forward to the conference table to solve this question, this would be a tangible step toward easing tension on the Korean peninsula and restoring trust between the South and the North. The most important thing, however, is to steadfastly continue the dialogue and improve inter-Korean relations. In this regard, the suspended channels of dialogue, especially the South-North Red Cross conference and economic talks, must be reopened as quickly as possible.

I hope also that a South-North summit meeting will take place during my term of office to achieve a breakthrough toward peace, reconciliation and unification. Once again, I urge North Korea to accept these proposals. If the top leaders of the South and the North do meet, we could resolve a full spectrum of fundamental issues, ranging from the basic approaches to unification that I have already proposed to practical measures to ease tension. In this spirit, we could discuss frankly and candidly all inter-Korean issues, including the recent North Korean proposal to hold political and military talks.

Part II

Proposal for South-North Prime Ministers' Meeting

1. Background

Abruptly on December 30, 1986, North Korea proposed a “high-level South-North political and military meeting.” The overture came after the North unilaterally suspended the ongoing inter-Korean dialogues such as Red Cross and economic talks, and instead proposed a “three-way military meeting,” making the offer as a prerequisite to the resumption of the existing dialogues.

In his policy speech at the first session of the eighth Supreme People’s Assembly, Kim Il-sung contended that “a high-level political and military meeting should be held to ease political confrontation and military tension between the South and the North, and to promote a genuine atmosphere for trust between the same people.” North Korea reported the proposal in a radio broadcast on January 11, 1987.

The proposal was made formally to the South in an open letter addressed jointly to Prime Minister Lho Shin-yong and Minister of National Defense Lee Ki-baek from the North’s Administration Council premier Li Gun-mo and People’s Armed Forces Minister Oh Jin-woo.

In the proposal, North Korea asserted that “a political and military meeting is a reasonable and realistic nation-saving measure which can dispel the ever-intensifying political confrontation and military tension and provide a breakthrough in bringing about peace and peaceful unification.” The North suggested that its first meeting be held at the Tong-il-kak hall at Panmunjom on January 27, 1987 and that each delegation to the high-level meeting be headed by a deputy-prime-minister-level official and comprise seven to nine government officials and military leaders.

With regard to the topics of the high-level political and

military meeting they proposed, North Korea argued that as steps to dissolve political confrontation, the two sides could discuss the questions of desisting from mutual slander and defamation and realizing multi-pronged collaboration and exchanges between the South and the North. To ease military tension, the North asserted, the meeting could take up such issues as arms reduction, halt to arms race, turning of the Demilitarized Zone into a peace zone, and the suspension of large-scale military training exercises. They said the meeting could further discuss the possibility of organizing a neutral nations supervisory force among the member nations of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission — Czechoslovakia, Poland, Sweden and Switzerland.

At the same time, the North insisted that only when a high-level political and military meeting comes to a successful fruition can the suspended inter-Korean dialogues resume, and also that only when such a political and military meeting and the existing channels of dialogues are held successfully, can a South-North high-level meeting be opened. North Korea thus showed an unreasonable posture by making their idea of a political and military meeting as a prerequisite to the holding of the overall inter-Korean dialogues including the resumption of the suspended talks.

In connection with the proposal, the North, in a telephone message of January 9, 1987, notified the South that they would deliver a letter from their Administration Council premier and the People's Armed Forces minister to the Prime Minister and the Defense Minister of the South on the following day, January 10. In a reply, the South told the North that it would let them know in the near future the time the South would receive their letter.

Nevertheless, the North made public in a radio broadcast

on January 11 the letter they said they would send to the South, and thus made an utterly undiplomatic act of publicizing the contents of the letter even before its addressee received it in breach of theretofore inter-Korean practices.

Given their insincere attitude, it is apparent that their latest proposal for a political and military meeting was intended not to resolve inter-Korean problems through dialogue as they loudly claim but for them to shun blame for the suspension of the existing dialogues, to build up their image of being a "peace lover" and further to loosen the anti-Communist sentiments and vigilance that have been heightened in the South in connection with the North's Kumgangsan Dam project.

In particular, the North's suggestion for the discussion of arms reduction and the stoppage of arms race at a political and military meeting they proposed was, in reality, intended to secure a military edge over the south, rather than to ease tension, by causing the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea and the containment of any buildup of South Korean forces. Similarly, their idea of organizing a neutral nations supervisory force was designed to display outwardly "the absence of their intent of invading the South" and thus give an "added validity" to their call for the departure of U.S. troops.

On January 12, 1987, President Chun Doo Hwan made clear in his policy statement the government's position toward the North Korean proposal for a political and military meeting.

In the statement, President Chun urged the North to agree to resume the suspended talks such as Red Cross and economic meetings and to hold a South-North top leaders meeting at an early date. The President stated that if a top leaders meeting were held, the South would be willing to discuss even the question of a political and military meeting suggested by the North.

Moreover, the Seoul side's chief delegates to the Red Cross, economic and preliminary parliamentarians contacts issued a joint statement on January 14 to reiterate the South's stand toward Pyongyang's idea of a political and military meeting.

The statement pointed out that the North's contention that they cannot resume the existing channels of dialogue they had suspended unless a three-way military meeting or a political and military meeting they proposed is held satisfactorily, gives rise to the doubt if the North wasn't using the inter-Korean dialogue for ulterior political objectives. The southern chief delegates then stressed that "this is a time when the two sides, most of all, should lay a groundwork for substantial mutual trust by conducting personnel and material exchanges between them."

At the same time, the statement urged that if the North is genuinely interested in easing tension and promoting reconciliation and unification between the South and the North, they should correct the mistaken act of rejecting the existing dialogues with unrealistic excuses and unconditionally agree to resume the suspended talks.

The text of the joint statement is as follows:

**A Joint Statement by Chief Delegates of Republic of
Korea Delegations to South-North Meetings**

We deeply regret that North Korea is yet to agree to resume the inter-Korean dialogues to date, nearly one full year after they, with the excuse of an annual military training exercise, unilaterally suspended early last year the 11th full-dress Red Cross meeting, the 6th inter-Korean economic meeting and the 3rd South-North preliminary parliamentarians contact, whose

times were already agreed on between the two sides.

With the turn of the hopeful new year of 1987, all our compatriots earnestly hope that the inter-Korean dialogue will resume to bear successful results and a solid groundwork for national trust and reconciliation will be laid through many-sided exchanges and cooperation between the two sides this year.

We have exerted all available efforts with sincerity and patience to resume the suspended dialogues.

On January 20 last year, we called for holding all the ongoing inter-Korean meetings as scheduled. On March 26 and again July 11 last year, we offered rescheduled times of the suspended meetings.

Despite such calls by us for the resumption of the dialogue, the North was busy shifting the blame for the suspended talks to the other side while setting forth unreasonable preconditions to the resumption of the dialogues. Thus they have in reality continued to shun the dialogues.

While refusing to resume the suspended dialogues, North Korea offered a so-called "three-way military meeting," making its progress a prerequisite to the resuming of the suspended channels of talks. Lately, moreover, they laid down the idea of a South-North high-level political and military meeting, contending nonsensically that they could agree to resume the suspended dialogue only after the high-level meeting came to a substantial fruition.

Their argument that they cannot return to the table of the existing dialogue channels — humanitarian Red Cross talks, economic meeting for national co-prosperity and preliminary parliamentarians contacts for the formulation of a unified constitution — unless a three-way military conference or a political and military meeting is held substantially, leads to the suspicion of whether they are not using the inter-Korean dialogue for ulterior political objectives.

Besides, when North Korea informed the South on January

10, 1987, that they would deliver a letter, the South told them it would let them know in the near future the time it would receive the letter. Nonetheless, North Korea made public in haste the contents of the letter in a radio broadcast the following day, January 11. This insincere attitude might have well been a clue to the fact that their idea of a political and military meeting was to score propaganda gains rather than resolve the pending inter-Korean problems through talks.

Their dialogue logic wherein they demand yet new talks while rejecting the existing channels of dialogue, can hardly stand to reason much less enjoy support by sensible people.

What is important at this juncture is for the two sides to carry on the existing dialogues successfully and to lay down a foundation for substantial mutual trust through personnel and material exchanges between them.

At the South-North Red Cross Conference, significant progress was seen in the discussion of programs related to the five topics. Furthermore, a substantial achievement was made through the mutual exchange of dispersed family hometown visitors and art troupes.

At the inter-Korean economic meeting, the two sides not only came close to an accord on the exchange of goods and economic cooperation but also arrived at an agreement in principle on the creation of a joint economic cooperation organization.

Also, at the South-North preliminary parliamentarians contacts, they in an amicable atmosphere, agreed in principle on the convocation of a parliamentarians meeting. The two sides shared views on various matters with the exception of the issue of topics and a few other items.

We expect that if only the South and the North exert a little more effort based on the achievements made at these talks, good results could be produced to the great satisfaction and joy of all of our compatriots.

From this standpoint, we urge that if North Korea is truly in-

terested in easing tension and bringing about national reconciliation and unification between South and North Korea, they should correct their mistaken posture wherein they reject the existing dialogue with the excuse of unreasonable and unrealistic contention, and agree to resume the suspended talks unconditionally at an early date.

At the same time, inasmuch as President Chun Doo Hwan, in his January 12 policy statement, stated that if a top leaders meeting were held, all issues pending between the two sides including the one on a political and military meeting proposed by the North could be discussed there, we believe that North Korea should agree to hold a South-North top leaders meeting if they are really interested in materializing national reconciliation and easing tension.

We expect that North Korea will show an affirmative response to our urging.

January 14, 1987

Kwon Jung-Dal
Chief Delegate
South-North Preliminary Parliamentarians
Contacts

Moon Hi-Gab
Chief Delegate
Inter-Korean Economic Meeting

Lee Yung-Duk
Chief Delegate
South-North Red Cross Conference

Despite the fact that the South thus made clear its stand with respect to the North Korean proposal, North Korea again sent

a letter to the South on January 30, 1987, renewing their call for a political and military meeting.

In the letter which, as was their January 11 letter, was addressed to the Prime Minister and the Defense Minister of the South from their North Korean counterparts, the Administration Council Premier and the People's Armed Forces Minister, North Korea again demanded a political and military meeting, arguing that "no repetition of such unrealistic issues as the resumption of the existing dialogues or holding of a top leaders meeting can be an answer to our peace overture."

It was the very position of North Korea that was unrealistic, for it was the North that suspended the on-going dialogues unilaterally and, while rejecting as "unrealistic" the South's call for the resumption of the suspended talks, demanded time and again a political and military meeting.

On February 14, 1987, Prime Minister Lho Shin-yong and Minister of National Defense Lee Ki-baek sent a message to their respective North Korean counterparts to explain the South's position with respect to their January 30 letter in which they renewed a call for a political and military meeting.

In the message, the South, pointing out the unreasonability of the North Korean logic behind their demand of a political and military meeting, urged the North to agree early to the joint utilization and survey of water resources and to a South-North top leaders meeting as well as the resumption of the suspended on-going dialogue.

In particular, reminding the North of President Chun's remarks made in his January 12 policy statement that if a South-North top leaders meeting were held, all issues pending between the two sides including their proposal for a political and military meeting could be discussed, the message urged the North Koreans to agree to hold a top leaders meeting at an

early date if they were truly interested in easing tension and improving inter-Korean relations.

Initially the South planned to deliver the message to the North on February 13. But, the delivery was made on February 14 due to the North's request for a delay.

The text of the message of Prime Minister Lho and Minister of National Defense Lee is as follows:

To: Li Gun-Mo, Premier of the Administration Council
Oh Jin-Woo, People's Armed Forces Minister North Korea

Your letter of last January 30 has been received. With the turn of the new year, the whole compatriots and world peoples eagerly wish that the inter-Korean dialogue will resume and come to successful fruition, thus unfolding a new chapter in the improvement of the inter-Korean relations.

In pace with these wishes and expectations at home and abroad, we have exerted various sincere efforts in the recent days alone to resume the South-North dialogue.

In his policy statement last January 12, President Chun Doo Hwan, calling for the resumption of the existing channels of dialogue and the opening of a top leaders meeting, said that once a top leaders meeting is held, all the issues pending between South and North Korea can be discussed, including the question of a political and military meeting your side has proposed.

Again on last January 14, our side's chief delegates to the dialogue again urged, in their joint statement, the unconditional resumption of the suspended Red Cross talks, South-North economic meeting and preliminary parliamentarians contacts.

However, your side, while unreasonably demanding a high-level political and military meeting, asserted that only when this high-level meeting is held first and comes to fruition can your

side agree to resume the suspended dialogue, and that a top leaders meeting could be held only after other channels of dialogue progressed successfully. Your sides thus uses a political and military meeting as a prerequisite to all the inter-Korean talks, turning a deaf ear to our consistent dialogue efforts.

Moreover, to much our astonishment and disappointment, your side, in the recent letter, described as an “unrealistic matter” the resumption of the existing dialogue and the holding of a top leaders meeting.

At the Red Cross talks, South-North economic meeting and preliminary parliamentarians contacts which the South and the North had held in the past, the two sides neared an agreement on the majority of issues with the exception of a few. We were at a stage where we could produce satisfactory results if only we had striven harder.

In particular, the South and the North reaped a substantial result at the Red Cross meeting by exchanging dispersed family hometown visitors and art troupes. We thus could give the 10 million dispersed family members and the rest of the Korean people much hope and expectations for the alleviation of tension and peaceful unification.

To ease tension and dispel distrust between the South and the North, therefore, we must sincerely maintain and develop the already prepared channels of dialogue instead of increasing the number of dialogue conduits. Besides, the matters that were agreed on between the two sides through dialogue must be respected or carried out by all means.

Despite such being the reality, your side, while calling the resumption of the existing dialogue “unrealistic,” insists on holding a political and military meeting first but rejects the resumption of the suspended dialogue. This cannot but be an act of denying the results and achievements made in the past talks, and, at the same time, an unrealistic and contradictory attitude.

As your side knows, it is a historical lesson already proven in

the cases of other divided countries or foreign nations that top leaders talks are an effective method of dialogue in seeking a breakthrough in long-standing confrontation.

If the top leaders of South and North Korea meet directly and open-heartedly discuss matters related to the nation's future as well as the question of restoring mutual trust and easing tension, there must be no more efficient and speedier method for peace and unification.

Moreover, we believe that inasmuch as our side let it be known that even the question of a political and military meeting could be discussed at a top leaders meeting, there can be no reason why your side cannot accept the proposal for a top leaders meeting if your side is truly interested in dialogue.

At the same time, your side should desist from indulging in fomenting enmity and distrust between South and North Korea.

Your side's construction of the Kumgangsan Dam is a perilous project that would lay a new tension between the South and the North and that would bring about a horrendous national calamity. We have asked for the suspension of the project many times, expressing the willingness even to make compensation for the suspension of power plant construction.

However, your side has yet to take proper steps to meet our side's righteous demand, thus driving the inter-Korean relations in the direction of further deterioration.

Your side should first stop building the Kumgangsan Dam and agree to an inter-Korean dialogue on the utilization and development of the water resources of a common river in accordance with international law and practices.

Furthermore, we believe that your side ought to rectify your undue practice of attempting to link to the inter-Korean dialogue matters that have nothing to do with the talks.

We make it clear once again that our side's Team Spirit military exercise is a peace-keeping training conducted every year.

Your side should realize that the necessity of the Team Spirit military exercise would decline if your side halts hostile policies against our side and mutual trust is fostered through contacts and exchanges between the South and the North.

It cannot but be an utterly improper behavior for your side to dispute the military exercise having nothing to do with talks and level all sorts of slander and defamation at us.

Therefore, if your side is genuinely interested in accelerating national reconciliation and peaceful unification of the homeland, the proper sequence would be for your side to show a sincere attitude whereby your side agree to resume and steadily develop the Red Cross talks, South-North economic meeting and the preliminary parliamentarians contacts which your side has unilaterally suspended instead of turning your back to the existing channels of dialogue with a political and military meeting as a prerequisite.

And if, your side truly hopes to ease tension and improve relations between the South and the North, your side should agree to realize at an early date a top leaders meeting which can discuss even the political and military meeting your side has proposed.

It is in this context that we again urge your side to agree at an early date to resume the suspended inter-Korean dialogue, to joint utilization and survey of water resources and to hold a top leaders meeting between South and North Korea.

February 13, 1987

Lho Shin-Yong, Prime Minister
Lee Ki-Baek, Defense Minister
Republic of Korea

Meanwhile, a sign was seen of North Korea backing down from their demand for a “political and military meeting first and the resumption of the existing talks later” as their call had

gone unaccepted by the South and lacked persuasiveness at home and abroad.

In another letter sent to the Prime Minister and the Defense Minister of the South on March 3, 1987, North Korea, though reiterating their offer for a high-level political and military meeting, suggested that once a political and military meeting was held, the question of the Kumgangsan Dam project could be discussed as proposed by the South and the existing dialogues resumed at the same time.

2. Proposal for South-North Prime Ministers' Meeting

In a message sent to their respective North Korean counterparts on March 17, 1987, Prime Minister Lho Shin-yong and Minister of National Defense Lee Ki-baek proposed a South-North prime ministers' meeting.

In the message, the South, while stressing that "a top leaders meeting would be the most effective and quickest way to reach an epochal turning point leading to improved inter-Korean relations and to resolve the fundamental problem of peaceful unification," proposed that a South-North prime ministers meeting be held to discuss comprehensively various issues raised by the two sides to improve relations and ease tension between the South and the North.

They expressed the fear that the present abnormal inter-Korean relations which have been characterized to date by distrust and confrontation, would, if left unchecked under these circumstances, only aggravate national misfortunes and suffering.

Stressing that groundwork for mutual trust should be laid in the first place to put an end to distrust and confrontation and resolve problems through dialogue, the South suggested that the minimum conditions for mutual trust be created by holding a water resources meeting in March in connection with the Kumgangsan Dam project and resuming the Red Cross and economic talks in April before a prime ministers meeting is held.

The South challenged the North to prove their will to dialogue, if any, by deeds, and left the specific times of the meetings to the North.

The South also stressed in the message that once a South-North prime ministers' meeting is held, it would contribute to creating a more progressive and productive atmosphere for the early realization of a South-North top leaders meeting that would provide an epochal and fundamental turning point in the effort to bring about peace and unification on the land.

The text of the message of Prime Minister Lho Shin-yong and Defense Minister Lee Ki-baek is as follows:

To: Li Gun-Mo, Premier of the Administration Council, North Korea

Your side's letter was received on last March 3.

I believe that the most important step to easing tension and improving the inter-Korean relations in a circumstances in which the South and the North find themselves today, will be to restore and build up their mutual trust.

I also believe that a top leaders meeting between South and North Korea will be the most effective and shortest way to laying an epochal turning point in the improvement of the inter-Korean

relations and to resolving the fundamental problem of peaceful unification. There is no change in this position.

Nonetheless, your side showed an insincere attitude in your recent letter. Your side insisted that the existing inter-Korean dialogue could be resumed only when a political and military meeting is held. And, even regarding our side's proposal for a top leaders meeting, your side asserted that it could be opened only after a political and military meeting was held and progressed fruitfully, thus in effect shunning a top leaders meeting.

As I am worried that if the present abnormal inter-Korean relations studded with distrust and confrontation as has been the case to date, are left unchecked under the circumstances, it would only aggravate national misfortune and sufferings, I feel that measures should be prepared urgently to surmount it.

To desist from distrust and confrontation and to resolve problems through dialogue, a base of trust should be laid foremost of all.

Your side has unilaterally suspended the South-North Red Cross Conference, inter-Korean economic meeting, etc., and scrapped agreed matters to which the two sides duly committed themselves. Moreover, by using the issue of military exercise which has nothing to do with the talks as a prerequisite to the resumption of the dialogue, your side laid an obstacle before the talks.

Lately, your side has further fomented tension between the South and the North by pushing through the construction of the Kumgangsan Dam, a project that threatens the human lives and properties of the other side.

These series of your side's conducts have led to the deepening of distrust and enmity between the South and the North. Today's reality thus dictates the creation of an atmosphere of trust between the two sides on a priority basis.

I am convinced that in order to foster elementary and substantial trust between the South and the North, your side

should above all agree to hold an inter-Korean water resources meeting without delay to discuss and resolve issues related to the utilization and development of the water resources of the common rivers of the South and the North in connection with the question of your side's Kumgangsan Dam project which emerges as a new source of tension and distrust. At the same time, I think that the suspended dialogue should be resumed unconditionally.

From this standpoint, I sincerely propose to your side that a South-North prime ministers meeting be held to discuss comprehensively various issues raised by the two sides to improve relations and ease tension between the South and the North at least under the circumstance in which mutual trust is created by holding a water resources meeting and resuming the suspended dialogues.

I am sure that once a South-North prime ministers meeting is held, it would contribute to creating a more developed and mature atmosphere for the early realization of a South-North top leaders meeting that would provide an epochal and fundamental turningpoint in the effort to bring about peace and unification on this land.

I believe that if your side does not ignore the nation's wish for improved inter-Korean relations and peaceful unification, your side would affirmatively respond to our side's proposal.

I suggest that a first South-North water resources meeting be held at Panmunjom within March and the inter-Korean Red Cross and economic talks in Pyongyang and at Panmunjom, respectively, in April.

The sooner these meetings take place, the better it would be. I leave the concrete times of the meetings to your side.

March 14, 1987

Lho Shin-Yong
Prime Minister
Republic of Korea

The South originally planned to deliver the message to the North on March 14. But, North Korea, as in the delivery of the February 13 message, asked for a deferment, resulting in the delivery of the message on March 17.

3. Proposal and the South's Position

a. The Proposal as a Product of the South's Consistent Efforts to Dispel National Misfortune and Pains through Dialogue

A South-North top leaders meeting would be the most effective and quickest way to reach an epochal turning point leading to improved inter-Korean relations and to resolve the fundamental problem of peaceful unification.

It is in this conviction that the government of the Republic of Korea has been making continued efforts to open a top leaders meeting between South and North Korea.

Instead of agreeing to such a reasonable offer, however, the North proposed a high-level political and military meeting, making it a prerequisite to a top leaders meeting.

The proposal made by the South for a prime ministers meeting under the circumstances stemmed from the unswerving and comprehensive posture of the South to dissolve the national misfortune and pains which otherwise would inevitably ensue if the present abnormal inter-Korean relations were left unchecked.

If a prime ministers meeting were held, it would allow for the comprehensive discussion of all issues raised by the

two sides to improve their relations and ease tensions, and, at the same time, contribute greatly to fostering an atmosphere for a South-North top leaders meeting.

b. Mutual Trust Essential to Resolving Pending Issues through Dialogue

Due to intransigency on the part of North Korea, enmity and distrust have deepened between the two sides of Korea.

Therefore, for a fruitful prime ministers meeting, groundwork should be laid first for mutual trust. To this end, the North should, first of all, agree with sincerity to the South's call for a South-North water resources meeting and the resumption of the suspended dialogues. This would be one way they could prove their commitment, if any, to dialogue by deeds.

Despite the South's justifiable call for a halt to the Kungangsan Dam project, North Korea has carried on the dam construction that may cause to the South great losses in human lives and properties. The fact that the North proposed to discuss the dam issue at a political and military meeting they suggested, instead of agreeing to the South's proposal for a water resources meeting, can only be taken as a move to cover up their ulterior motive behind the dam project and to gloss over the seriousness of the issue.

If the North Koreans are really interested in the resolution of national issues as they claim, they should show the minimum-required sincerity toward fostering mutual trust by agreeing to the South's call for a water resources meeting.

Moreover, it is unreasonable for the North, which has unilaterally suspended the on-going dialogue, to link the

resumption of the suspended talks to a political and military meeting. North Korea should return to the table of the existing dialogues unconditionally.

c. Direct Dialogue One Way to Positively Cope with Changing Situations

Amid the U.S.'s policy to maintain a power balance in Northeast Asia and the Soviets' new Asian policy, the two super powers have made moves to seek the alleviation of tension on the Korean peninsula as can be seen in the recent U.S. measure to allow its diplomats to make contacts with North Korean diplomats and in the discussion of ways to ease tension in Korea at the U.S.-USSR foreign ministers meeting held in Moscow May 16-17, 1987.

If only to cope actively with the international environment that has turned favorable to easing tension and cementing peace on the peninsula, North Korea should favorably respond to the South's latest offer and thereby show sincerity toward improving inter-Korean relations.

d. North Korea Must Do Away with Insincere Dialogue Posture

In every person's eyes, it is unreasonable for the North to link the resumption of the existing dialogues to a political and military meeting after they themselves suspended the on-going talks unilaterally.

It was due to such intransigency of North Korea that the inter-Korean dialogue begun in the early 1970s failed to register

any substantial achievement with exception to the exchange of hometown visitors among separated families.

Ever since the initiation of the dialogue, it was not rare that North Korea suspended on-going talks whenever they saw little chance for exploiting dialogue the way they hoped for, and then attempted to shift the blame for such suspension to the other side in the talks.

Under the circumstances, it is important for the North to prove their commitment to dialogue, if any, by showing sincerity and reliability instead of demanding any new form of dialogue.

— Examples of North Korea’s Suspension of Dialogue and Attempts to Shift Blame to the Other Side —

- Bewildered at positive reactions to and growing support for the South’s June 23, 1973, Special Foreign Policy Statement for Peace and Unification, North Korea announced on August 28, 1973, the unilateral suspension of the on-going South-North Coordinating Committee meetings and the South-North Red Cross Conference on the excuse of “persecution of a democratic person” in the South.

- With the intent of keeping South Korea from participating in the 35th World Table Tennis Championships slated for April 25-May 6, 1979, in Pyongyang, North Korea proposed an inter-Korean sports meeting to discuss the formation of a single South-North team to the world championships on February 20, 1979, barely two months before its opening. Four rounds of table tennis talks ensued.

But, given the lack of time and technical problems, it was impossible for the two sides to field a single team to the championships. Nevertheless, North Korea denied the South’s vested

rights to take part in the world matches on the ground that the South's participation "would run counter to the formation of a single team." While demanding a prior "agreement on the formation of a single team," North Korea broke up the meeting, thus blocking the South's participation in the Pyongyang championships.

- Also at the ten rounds of working-level contacts held from February 6, 1980, to discuss the question of holding a South-North prime ministers meeting, North Korea, once their attempt to fan political unrest during the Fourth Republic in the South through a prime ministers meeting proved unsuccessful, suspended the contacts unilaterally making an issue of the qualifications of the then acting Prime Minister of the South.

- On March 30, 1984, barely two months before the deadline for entries for the 23rd Olympics in Los Angeles, North Korea proposed an inter-Korean meeting to discuss the formation of a single Korean team to the Los Angeles Olympics. Three rounds of sports talks were held thereafter between the two sides.

At the meetings, the North asserted that the Rangoon terrorist bombing they perpetrated was a "fabrication" wrought by the South and leveled all sorts of slander and defamation at the South. At times, they even walked out of the meeting unilaterally.

Finally after Communist-bloc countries decided to boycott the Los Angeles Olympics in a meeting held in Prague, Czechoslovakia, on May 24, 1984, North Korea, joining forces with them, broke up the sports meeting with their boycott of the Olympics.

- As recently as January 22, 1986, North Korea, as they did a year before, unilaterally suspended the on-going inter-Korean

Red Cross, economic and preliminary parliamentarians contacts with the excuse of the Team Spirit training exercise.

4. Reactions

Commenting on the South's proposal for a prime ministers meeting, major newspapers in the country welcomed the overture as a "comprehensive new offer," urging North Korea to agree to the proposal.

In editorials, the newspapers said there was no reason why North Korea should reject the offer because the overture encompassed even the ideas North Korea had raised. The media then expressed the hope that with a prime ministers meeting as an impetus, a "chapter of grand national reconciliation" will be unfolded to mark an important milestone toward unification.

Noting that international situations surrounding the Korean peninsula tend to emphasize reconciliation and coexistence, the newspapers stressed that both sides of Korea should capitalize on the trend in bringing about the peace and unification of the nation.

The newspapers said that if the South-North dialogue were to genuinely contribute to accelerating national reconciliation and peaceful unification, North Korea, most of all, should come to the table of talks based on sincerity and reliability, and help lay the minimum necessary conditions for the removal of accumulated distrust and confrontation between the South and the North. In this connection, the press recalled that on a number of occasions since the dialogue began in the early 1970s, North Korea had suspended talks with unfounded ex-

cuses at times when they saw little hope to achieve their intended aims through the dialogue.

Meanwhile, major foreign media, reporting Seoul's proposal for a South-North prime ministers meeting, described it as a "constructive and comprehensive counter-proposal." They then hoped that the new overture would "contribute to resuming the inter-Korean dialogue on the Koreans' own will."

While speaking highly of the proposal which they said was reflective of "a positive posture" of the South, the foreign press doubted whether North Korea would positively respond to the South's proposal. This is all the more so in view of the insincerity of North Korea toward the dialogue, as could be seen in their suspension of the existing talks and call for an unreasonable political and military meeting, they said.

Part III

Developments Regarding North Korea's Kumgangsan Dam Project

1. Developments

On October 21, 1986, North Korea formally announced that they began construction on the Kumgangsan power plant in the Kangwon-do area north of the truce line under the cloak of a "grand reformation of nature."

Reacting to the North's announcement on the Kumgangsan Dam project, the South demanded an immediate halt to the project, pointing out the seriousness of the impact the dam would have on meteorological and ecological conditions as well as on economic and military aspects.

In a statement on October 30, 1986, Minister of Construction Lee Kyu-hyo, asking the North to stop the project immediately, charged that the North Korean project totally ignores international practices governing the utilization of rivers and streams and goes against the principle of peaceful use of national land especially because it would lead to the shortage of agricultural, industrial and household water in the South and also to the destruction of the ecological system.

Concerned that should the mammoth dam collapse, it would have a profound effect on the security of the South, the Minister said the South was studying appropriate steps to take in case North Korea did not suspend the project.

The text of the Construction Minister's statement is as follows:

North Korea has recently launched a project by mobilizing a large number of military troops to build the so-called Kumgangsan power station in the northern area of Kangwon Province. They announced through their news media that all-out efforts are being made to complete the power station at an early

date.

Contrary to their allegation, the North Korean project poses various grave problems to the Republic of Korea.

According to North Korean announcements, the new power station is going to be the largest of its kind in the North. Accordingly, it is estimated that the station will have a power generating capacity of at least 800,000 kw.

In choosing the site for a hydroelectric plant, top priority must be given to both an abundant availability of water and to the height of the drop. In view of such engineering requirements, it is concluded that the Kumgangsan Power Station will be located below where the Pukhan River (North Han River) converges with the Kumgang-chon (Kumgang River) just north of the Demilitarized Zone so that the water resources of the Pukhan River can be utilized to the maximum possible extent.

Our analysis shows further that North Korea plans to build a reservoir at Hoeyang and dig a tunnel extending 30 to 60 kilometers northeastward in order to channel the water backward into the Wonsan area. In that way, the water will fall from a height of at least 300 meters to turn the power generators.

One of the grave problems resulting from the power dam construction is that by diverting northeastward the water in the upper stretch of the Pukhan River, which now flows in a southward direction, the North Korean project will inflict on the South an annual loss of about 1.8 billion metric tons of water for industrial, agricultural and household purposes, which would otherwise flow through the Pukhan River system into the Hwachon area. The project is also certain to greatly affect the power generating capabilities of the five dams at Hwachon and further downstream.

In the long term, by reversing the flow of the upper stretch of the Pukhan River, a major source of water for the Han River, the North Korean project will cause terrible disturbances in the ecological system in the east central part of the Korean peninsula

including the Kumgang and the Sorak Mountains.

The North Korean dam will have to be built to a height of at least 200 meters in order to maintain the water level in the projected reservoir at 350 meters above sea level so that a natural drop of about 300 meters can be created by diverting the water toward the Wonsan area.

As a result, up to 20 billion metric tons of water will be stored in the reservoir. In the event that the dam, holding back such an enormous quantity of water, collapsed due to natural or artificial causes, there would be a horrible disaster in the Republic.

The dam would begin to pose a potential danger as soon as the volume of water in the reservoir reaches about 900 million tons. If the dam breaks at that point, 300,000 tons of water per second would push forth, directly endangering the five dams at Hwachon and further downstream in the South.

Moreover, enormous quantities of water would suddenly pour into the lower stretches of the Han River via the Paltang Dam. This would cause an overflow of water 10 times that recorded during the Han River flood in September 1984 in Seoul and other areas along the entire lower stretch of the Han River, wreaking tremendous havoc.

That disaster could result if the North Korean dam in question only held 900 million tons. Should the mammoth dam collapse after the reservoir filled up with 20 billion tons of water, sudden torrents would pour down the Pukhan River, destroying the five dams downstream one after the other and flooding the entire region along the Han River.

This would completely devastate the central section of the Korean peninsula, including not only Seoul but Kangwon and Kyonggi provinces, inflicting a horrendous disaster.

Under the circumstances, we cannot help but conclude that North Korea's Kumgangsan power plant project totally ignores international practices governing the utilization of rivers and streams and goes against the principle of peaceful use of national

land.

We must point out that the safety of the planned dam is a matter of grave concern that will spell life or death for us. We make it clear that the use of a river that runs from the North to the South must not be unilaterally decided on by the North for its own purposes alone.

We believe that the Kumgangsan power station project must be promptly discontinued. North Korea is strongly urged to agree to our rightful position. We make it clear also that the Republic of Korea government is thoroughly studying appropriate countermeasures to be taken in case North Korea refuses our rightful demand.

North Korea rejected this statement of the South in a statement of their own issued on November 4, 1986 in the name of the director of Resources Development Bureau, Electric Power Industry Commission.

In the statement, North Korea asserted that their Kumgangsan Dam project is a "peaceful undertaking" designed to "develop and reasonably utilize water resources in the area of the Kumgang Mountains." They then argued that the project would have a favorable effect on the South, too, such as flood control.

The North maintained that their project cannot be subject to inter-Korean negotiations by insisting that the project is "an internal issue of the North's own, which cannot be meddled in by a third party."

Even in the circumstance where the North rejected the South's demand and went so far as to rule out any negotiations between the two sides, the South continued to urge the North Koreans to discontinue the project, trying to resolve the dispute through dialogue.

In a statement issued by the Minister of National Defense

on November 6 and another made by the Minister of Culture and Information on November 21, 1986, the South said ulterior military motives lurk behind the North's dam project, warning if North Korea persists in turning a deaf ear to the South's justifiable demand, the South would take all necessary steps to cope with the situation.

Further in their joint statement of November 26, the Ministers of National Defense, Construction, Culture and Information, and National Unification made public a government decision to build a dam to counter the North's Kumgangsan Dam.

The four ministers said the South had decided to build an effective counterdam across the upper reaches of the Pukhan-River to the south of the Demilitarized Zone as a rightful means of national self-defense against the terrifying threat posed by the North Korean project.

Urging the North Koreans again to restore their sense of national conscience, abandon the reckless and wasteful war of resources and return to a path leading to the common good of the Korean people based on national reconciliation and mutual trust, the ministers said in the statement that if the North ceases the Kumgangsan Dam project, the South is ready to earnestly discuss with them all issues involved in the utilization of the resources of rivers that flow through the territories of both South and North Korea.

The text of the four ministers' joint statement is as follows:

While clearly pointing out the North's ulterior military intent of securing a horrendous water weapon against the South through the construction of a huge dam allegedly for the Kumgangsan hydroelectric power station, our government

strongly urged the North several times to immediately discontinue the dam project from the standpoint of the common good of the Korean people.

Citizens throughout the land are now voicing irate denouncement of North Korea's unilateral move to build the dam. The overseas news media have also exposed in concrete terms the foolhardy North Korean scheme of aggression incorporated in the dam project and now report daily from major cities around the world on the extent to which the international community is scandalized by the dam project.

North Korea, however, keeps turning a deaf ear to the domestic and international censure and is pressing ahead with the dam project even at this very moment. Keeping a total silence on the project, they are brazenly mounting a campaign of disinformation, alleging that our side is "slandering" them on this matter, and thus attempting to escape censure for the national sin they commit.

Under the circumstances, the government has been awaiting an affirmative response from the North, while at the same time carefully studying various possible countermeasures to be taken to safeguard the survival of the nation.

To that end, intensive efforts have been exerted to work out nationwide measures with the help of indepth research and analyses by experts and on the strength of the entire public's invariably ardent desire to counteract with wisdom the threat to national security.

The government has thus decided to build a sufficiently effective counterdam across the upper reaches of the Pukhan River to the south of the Demilitarized Zone as a rightful means of national self-defense against the terrifying threat posed by the North Korean project. Since the counterproject will require a vast investment, the government has already begun the necessary preparations, including engineering studies and the budgeting of necessary funds.

The government considers it to be of great significance that the countermeasures have been derived from the uniformly strong resolve of all our citizens to protect national security.

We ardently hope that the entire people will continue to extend support and encouragement for the construction of the Peace Dam to neutralize yet another sinister North Korean scheme to communize the South through a water offensive.

At the same time, as the government urges North Korea once again to restore their sense of national conscience, abandon the reckless war of attrition of national energies, and return to a path leading to the common good of the Korean people based on national reconciliation and mutual trust, we want to make it clear that if North Korea ceases the Kumgangsan Dam project, we are ready to earnestly discuss with them all issues involved in the utilization of the water resources of the rivers that flow through the territories of both South and North Korea. The North Korean authorities are strongly urged to affirmatively respond to our manifestation of a deep love of the Korean people.

We have now reached a critical juncture at which we must unite even more firmly than ever to crush the North Korean scheme and plot to breach the peace and bring about national self-injury in order to safeguard our security and survival as a nation.

We believe that in the face of this crisis, the government and the people must be united like one in exerting wisdom and courage to tide over the difficult situation created by the increased menace from the North Korean Communist regime.

November 26, 1986

Lee Ki-Baek,
Minister of National Defense

Lee Kyu-Ho,
Minister of Construction

Lee Woong-Hee,
Minister of Culture and Information

Huh Moon-Doh,
Minister of National Unification

Meanwhile, in a so-called "White Paper of the Electric Power Industry Commission" issued on December 25, 1986, North Korea rejected the South's demand, reiterating their argument that their dam won't do any harm to the South and rather would bring many advantages to the South such as the "elimination of floods in the Kangwon-do area."

As North Korea pushed through the dam project in total disregard of the South's repeated demand, Minister of Construction Lee Kyu-hyo sent a message to his North Korean counterpart, chairman of the Electric Power Industry Commission of the Administration Council, on November 28, 1986, proposing a South-North water resources meeting to discuss the reasonable exploration and utilization of the rivers that flow through the areas of the two sides.

On January 16, 1987, moreover, the Construction Minister issued a statement, in which he renewed the call for a South-North water resources meeting and expressed the willingness to compensate, if the North gives up the dam project, for the loss resulting therefrom.

Also in the statement, the South pointed out that the North's "White Paper" was full of fabrications intended to cover up their sinister move to use the dam as a water weapon, and proposed that a joint study team be formed of experts from both the South and the North to conduct joint studies to determine such practical engineering questions as the geographical and geological conditions of the Kumgangsan

Dam sites, the safety of the dams and their optimum dimensions.

The South also suggested in the statement that if the North sincerely takes part in a dialogue and joint studies concerning the joint use of water resources and as a result abandons the project to reverse the flow of the Pukhan River, the South is willing to supply power to the North to sufficiently make up for the loss of power thus incurred.

The series of these suggestions by the South were made in an effort to forestall by all means heightened tension and the reckless war of attrition that would inevitably ensue and thereby explore a path leading to national co-prosperity.

Nevertheless, the North rejected the offers, contending that the Kumgangsan power plant project will not have any effect on the South at all. Going a step further, they refused even to receive the South's message of November 28, 1986, in which a South-North water resources meeting was proposed. The North has thus obliged the South to build the "Peace Dam," driving the inter-Korean relations into the state of a protracted war of attrition.

The text of Minister of Construction Lee Kyu-hyo's statement of January 16, 1987, is as follows:

Deeply concerned about a horrifying deluge that could be unleashed by the Kumgangsan Dam being built by North Korea, our side has recently urged the North to immediately discontinue the project and to open a dialogue to discuss the issue of the water resources of rivers that flow through the areas of the two sides.

However, North Korea refuses to pay any attention to our proposals. And, ignoring domestic and international censure,

they have distorted the facts of the dam project with a myriad of lies and far-fetched allegations and continue to press ahead with their disguised scheme to inflict a catastrophic flood on the Korean people.

It must be pointed out again that our paramount task is to make provisions for the eventual unification of the peninsula, even if it is divided at present. And yet, in going ahead with the Kumgangsan Dam project, North Korea does not hesitate to artificially alter the geographic characteristics of our homeland, thereby perpetuating the division and inter-Korean confrontation. This is a major crime before the national history of repudiating unification.

Conscious of the mounting domestic and international uproar over their Kumgangsan Dam project, North Korea on December 25 last year issued a fabricated "white paper" in the name of their Electric Power Industry Commission in which they slandered the South with preposterous allegations. Expert analyses show that such North Korean claims represent a sly and wily attempt to conceal the grave hazards inherent in the dam project and to placate domestic and international public opinion.

To cite a few examples of the falsity of the North Korean assertions, the North asserted that the height of the Kumgangsan Dam will be 121.5 meters. And yet, they say the width of the dam at its bottom will be 700 meters. If this were true, it would be possible at any time to increase the height of the dam to over 200 meters, as long as the lower part of the dam had no major structural defects, thereby tremendously boosting the volume of water that could be held back.

North Korea also alleges that because the four dams that they are building will fill four separate reservoirs, water in them will have nothing to do with the Kumgangsan Dam at Imnam. Engineering examinations of the terrain, however, show that water from all those dams can naturally flow into the Kumgangsan Dam. It is beyond question that the North Korean

assertions are shrewdly concocted to camouflage the threat of a flood inherent in the hydroelectric dam project.

Moreover, the Kumgangsan hydropower dam sites are on a limestone bed and thus there are the high risks of water leakage and natural crumbling during and after the dam construction and even of triggering an earthquake if it should collapse. The safety of the dams, against either artificial destruction or natural disaster, is a grave matter of life and death for the Korean people. Unless North Korea promptly discontinues the Kumgangsan Dam project, we will continue to implement our Peace Dam project as a self-defensive measure.

As we see even different nations or states mutually negotiate and peacefully resolve the issue of the exploration and utilization of rivers flowing through their areas while respecting mutual rights and interests, we believe that there can be no reason why the South and the North, the same people, cannot discuss and resolve the issue through dialogue. The fact that this is the invariable determination of our 40 million people is well proved by their enthusiastic participation in the current campaign to raise funds for the Peace Dam.

The issue of the joint use of water resources in rivers flowing through both South and North Korea is now an urgent and grave concern, a question which should be resolved urgently and satisfactorily if we are to eliminate a root cause of a national holocaust. Such a solution would set a most practical precedent for achieving reconciliation and trust between the South and the North.

We are convinced that if the North agrees to conduct earnest discussions on the joint use of water resources, both the South and the North will be able not only to avoid a costly war of resources but also to achieve mutual benefits and rewards for a better future for the Korean people.

With such a conviction, we propose the following to North Korea:

North Korea is once again urged to immediately cease the Kumgangsan hydroelectric dam project and to sincerely and affirmatively respond to our call for a South-North dialogue to discuss all issues involved in the joint use of water resources of common rivers.

A joint study team should be formed of experts from both the South and the North and should conduct joint studies to determine and clarify such practical engineering questions as the geographical and ecological conditions of the Kumgangsan Dam sites, the safety of the dams and their optimum dimensions. If North Korea is agreeable, we would welcome the participation of a specialized international organization in the joint studies to help ensure the most effective development of national land, while enhancing the international credibility of the joint studies.

If North Korea sincerely and earnestly takes part in a dialogue and joint studies concerning the joint use of water resources and as a result abandons the project to reverse the flow of the Pukhan river, we make it clear that we are willing to supply power to the North to sufficiently make up for the loss of power thus incurred.

Once more, we urge North Korea to affirmatively respond, without delay, to our realistic and earnest proposals and sincere efforts regarding the joint use of water resources.

2. Unreasonability of the North's Attitude

As can be seen in the foregoing, North Korea is pushing ahead the Kumgangsan Dam project under the cloak of a "reformation of nature" despite the South's repeated calls for its suspension.

North Korea cannot escape denunciation for undertaking

the project as it not only runs counter to the peaceful utilization and development of land but also violates general international practices regarding the exploration and utilization of rivers that flow through two or more countries.

In particular, all indications are that the North is pushing through the project with the intent of using the dam for military purposes. It is due to this very probability that tension is building up between the two sides of Korea over the dam.

North Korea ought to stop building the dam forthwith and return to the table of dialogue to discuss with the South the question of exploring and using the water resources of rivers that flow through the areas of the two sides.

a. An Act Running Counter to Peaceful Use and Development of National Land

The North Koreans argue that the Kumgangsan Dam would do “no harm whatsoever” to the South. But, studies by experts and scholars in the South show that the dam would have a profound impact on the South as can be seen in the following:

First, a decline in the volume of water would cause the insufficiency of agricultural, industrial and household water in need along the basin of the Han River. In particular, the North Korean dam will decrease the amount of the Pukhan River water by no fewer than 1.8 billion tons, 21 percent of the present total of 8.6 billion tons, resulting in a decline of the power output at Hwachon and four other power plants along the downstream area by as much as 24 percent.

Second, the dam will have a grave impact on soil and geological conditions. In geological aspects, it would lead to accelerating the dissolution and efflorescence of soils through chemical actions on a long-term basis. Moreover, a decline in

surface and subterranean water would reduce the quality of soils and make it difficult for plants and creatures to survive. Besides, ground subsidence is feared due to reduced water, and if and when the dam overflows, mud could devastate a large area and even alter river courses.

Third, the dam would bring about a change in the ecological system. The aridity caused by the reduced water level would prompt climatic changes such as lowered temperatures, making it difficult for fauna and flora to survive. It would thus destroy the ecological balance.

Fourth, the dam would affect weather conditions. The holding of a huge amount of water at the dam would cause a change in the climate of the area around the dam. In particular, the evaporation of some 200 million tons of water from the dam a year would make fog part of daily life there. In summer, excessive moisture would cause frequent thunderstorms, and in winter there would be severe cold and heavy snows. Due to aridity in the downstream area, on the other hand, difference in day- and night-time temperatures would be acute.

Fifth, in the event the dam is destroyed, it would have a grave effect on the South's security and survival.

Given its location, size and economic conditions, the Kungangsan Dam is designed to serve military purposes rather than to gain power output. If the dam were motivated purely by economic factors as the North Koreans assert, they could have built a far less costly atomic power plant or hydroelectric station along the Yalu River at less cost. If the dam's goal is to obtain agricultural and industrial water, they could more profitably exploit the Yonghung River near Yonghung which could easily provide up to 1 million tons of water per day.

Despite such being the case, they are building a huge and

utterly uneconomical dam near the truce line with unfavorable terrain conditions. This cannot but make objective watchers to believe that the dam is totally for military purposes.

It is understood that the Kumgangsan Dam would be capable of holding up to 20 billion tons of water, as many as more than ten times the annual inflow of about 1.8 billion tons. Granted that about 5 billion tons are actually used a year, the remaining 15 billion tons would be unproductive “dead” water, namely, a reserve for use as a lethal weapon against the South.

The Kumgangsan Dam would begin to endanger the security of the South from the time its water reserve reached 900 million tons. If its flood gates were completely opened at this stage, the torrent, it is feared, could destroy the Hwachon Dam and the four other dams in the downstream area at Ui-am, Chunchon, Chongpyong and Paldang.

b. Violation of International Practices on Exploration and Use of Water Resources of Rivers Flowing through Two or More Countries

International disputes flare up often, some so serious as to set off war as can be seen in the Iran-Iraq war, over the use of rivers known to be the source of human civilization and a resource essential to human survival. Such disputes concern mostly the issues of free navigation and the utilization and exploration of water resources.

But, river disputes have been resolved peacefully through talks in most cases in accordance with international practices and agreements.

Despite the fact that even different nations used to resolve river-related disputes through dialogue, North Korea, turning a

deaf ear to the South's call for negotiations, is pressing ahead with their dam project to the detriment of the lives and properties of a large number of their own compatriots. North Korea can hardly escape the censure of being anti-national.

East and West Germany, divided countries like Korea, closely cooperate with each other on matters related to their common rivers under the basic inter-German agreement concluded in December 1972. The agreement has given birth to the East and West German Border Commission which cooperatively handles not only the question of the joint utilization of rivers but also such matters as flood control and the prevention of other disasters. North Korea should learn from the inter-German practices.

— Examples of East and West German Agreements —

- Agreement on Principles on Repair of Rivers and Facilities Attached Thereto, September 20, 1973.
- Agreement on the Prevention of Disasters such as Floods, Avalanches, etc. along Border, September 20, 1973.
- Agreement on Joint Fishery in Luebeck Bay, June 29, 1974.
- Agreement on the Floodgates and Water Courses along the Ecker River, May 3, 1978.
- Agreement on the Operation, Management and Repair of Piped-Water Supply Facilities, February 3, 1976.
- Agreement on the Construction and Operation of Reservoirs for Flood Control, November 29, 1978.

c. North Korea Should Cease to Build the Dam and Agree to the South's Offer for Talks

In view of international practices or seen from the aspect of the peaceful development and utilization of national land, it is highly proper for the South to demand the suspension of the Kumgangsan Dam project.

However, North Korea is pressing ahead with the dam project instead of taking acceptable steps in response to the South's call. They argue that their dam will not have any negative effect on the South and that the question of exploring and using resources is an "internal matter in which a third party cannot meddle."

Prior to the outbreak of the Korean War, North Korea unilaterally cut off the power and irrigation water they were supplying to the South, thus dealing a hard blow to the people's livelihood.

If the North persists in cutting off the water flow again for their military purposes, thus splitting the land perpetually they won't be able to escape the censure of being traitorous.

The South has since long ago made it clear that it is willing to resolve the question of joint exploration and utilization of water resources through talks with North Korea.

This was first suggested in the 20 inter-Korean pilot projects proposed on February 1, 1982. The South again put this forth at the first inter-Korean economic meeting held on November 15, 1984.

North Korea should restore their sense of national conscience, immediately stop building the Kumgangsan Dam, and agree to the South's proposal for talks. They, thereby, ought to show an interest in forestalling a reckless war of attrition and discussing and resolving together with the South the question

of national co-prosperity.

3. Reactions

Commenting on the Kumgangsan Dam project launched by North Korea ostensibly to build a hydro-power plant, all newspapers in the South branded the project as the “biggest war scheme since their unleashing of the Korean War in 1950.” Expressing fear that the dam would bring a horrendous tragedy to South Korea, the media editorially called on the North Koreans to halt the project forthwith.

Noting that the North was pressing ahead with the project despite the South’s repeated calls for its stoppage, the papers warned that North Korea should be held responsible for the “crisis” and “heightened tension” resulting from the dam construction. The media, at the same time, urged the government to take due “self-defensive measures” to counter the North’s project.

While observing that when the South builds a counter-dam against the Kumgangsan Dam, it would inevitably lead the inter-Korean relations into the state of a war of attrition, the newspapers stressed that the best reasonable way to resolve the issue is for the North to give up the project promptly and agree to inter-Korean talks to discuss the joint use of the water resources of rivers flowing through the areas of the two sides.

SOUTH-NORTH DIALOGUE IN KOREA



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Part I

Reaffirmation of Determination to Achieve Peaceful Unification

1. President Chun Renews Call for South-North Summit Meeting

—Opening Address at the Fourth Meeting of the Advisory Council on Peaceful Unification Policy—

The Advisory Council on Peaceful Unification Policy held its fourth plenary meeting at the Chamsil Gymnasium in Seoul on the morning of June 3, 1987 with the attendance of 9,564 members, some of whom came from abroad.

In his opening address, President Chun Doo Hwan, who serves as the chairman of the Advisory Council, stressed that a South-North summit meeting should be held at an early date to “authoritatively discuss and resolve all key issues pending between us.” The President made it clear that once a meeting is held, he is “willing to earnestly discuss, in addition to the issues already advanced, the question of sharing with North Korea the economic, technological and other benefits that the Republic has reaped so far.”

Stating that “unification must be achieved peacefully through democratic procedures resulting in a liberal democratic system,” President Chun stressed that “so far as this basic principle is concerned, there cannot be any difference between the ruling and opposition camps or any conflicting interests among individuals or groups.” The President said that “because we are pitted against a traitorous group which has pursued a policy of communizing the whole Korean peninsula by force for approximately a half century, there is a pressing need for supra-partisan agreement and united efforts at least on the question of unification.”

Touching on the Seoul Olympics, President Chun said that “it is the earnest wish of all our people that even before the

Olympics become a great festival of East-West detente, they be a major turning point leading to reconciliation between the two parts of our divided country.” He also emphasized, “North Korea should stop injuring the Korean people as a whole by trying to obstruct the Seoul Olympics and subvert the Republic of Korea and should, instead, join as quickly as possible in the efforts to bring glory and prosperity to the nation.”

Before concluding, President Chun urged the North Korean authorities to agree to reopen the existing channels of dialogue and respond sincerely to the proposal for a South-North Summit meeting without any further delay in compliance with the national aspiration for unification.

The following is the full translated text of President Chun’s opening address at the fourth meeting of the Advisory Council on Peaceful Unification Policy.

Members of the Advisory Council on Peaceful Unification Policy, distinguished guests and 60 million compatriots,

We have assembled here today at a time of surging national potential and confidence to step up our steady march toward the forefront of development and the unification of the homeland. I wish first of all to extend my warm appreciation and congratulations to you who have worked with enthusiasm and conviction to enable the Advisory Council on Peaceful Unification Policy to successfully fulfill, over the past six years, its invaluable role of giving focus to the pan-national determination to achieve unification.

Since the birth of the Fifth Republic we have had a strong determination to achieve unification and prosperity and as a result our national strength has grown to such an extent that we have attracted worldwide admiration and envy. An increase in private initiative and openness in all sectors of national life has

brought fresh vitality to our society and thus vigorous growth and development is the strong current of the future. Furthermore, as we steadily go through the political schedule and carry out the procedures for a peaceful transfer of administrations, we are laying an important milestone in the development of democracy in this land.

In parallel with past achievements and present developments, our independent ability to achieve peaceful unification has been strengthened more than at any other time in the past. Accordingly, the people are now confident that with our national strength, determination and united efforts, we will not fail to achieve unification.

Fellow countrymen,

We should now, with solid unity and relentless determination, make the most of this opportune time of surging national fortunes to unflinchingly enter the path leading to a prosperous, unified and democratic country. If we miss this opportunity and allow ourselves to revert again to a state of confusion and destitution, national unification which we have striven so hard to bring closer will be pushed further away.

At this historic turning point, we must guard against the emergence of radical leftist ideas that contradict our liberal democratic system. The type of unified country we seek is a democratic republic committed to the ideals of freedom, democracy and public welfare. Needless to say, unification must be achieved peacefully through democratic procedures resulting in a liberal democratic system. So far as this basic principle is concerned, there cannot be any difference between the ruling and opposition camps or any conflicting interests among individuals or groups. Because we are pitted against a traitorous group which has pursued a policy of communizing the whole Korean peninsula by force for approximately a half century, there is a pressing need for supra-partisan agreement and united efforts at least on the question of unification.

Fellow compatriots,

The way to put our unfortunate history stained by division and war behind us and start out fresh toward a future of peace and unification is to overcome confrontation and distrust within our single ethnic family by creating a viable basis for trust and reconciliation. It was with such a conviction that I suggested the Formula for National Reconciliation and Democratic Unification and a South-North summit meeting as the most reasonable way to fulfill the national wishes and urged North Korea to respond to them affirmatively.

We have exerted every possible effort through the inter-Korean dialogue to have greater openness and cooperation and more exchanges between the two sides. We thus took the initiative in opening a series of talks, including the economic and Red Cross talks. Going a step further, we realized the exchange of hometown visitors and art troupes. Such inter-Korean openness and exchanges, though limited, are a precious bud promising a flower of national reconciliation.

Last year, however, North Korea spurned the national call for the alleviation of tension and the consolidation of peace and unilaterally suspended all channels of dialogue, causing great disappointment and fury. Moreover, they are posing a mounting threat to our safety and survival by building the Kumgangsan Dam for use as a water weapon against us who are their brethren and have intensified other acts of military confrontation and provocation. This contravenes the national desire for unification and threatens world peace.

North Korea should stop injuring the Korean people as a whole by trying to obstruct the Seoul Olympics and subvert the Republic of Korea and should, instead, join as quickly as possible in the effort to bring glory and prosperity to the nation. I once again urge the North Korean authorities to reopen the existing channels of dialogue without any further delay in compliance with the national aspiration for unification. They should

also respond sincerely to my proposal for a South-North summit meeting. I wish to emphasize again that a summit meeting should be realized at an early date to authoritatively discuss and resolve all key issues pending between us. I make it clear that if such a meeting is held I am willing to earnestly discuss, in addition to the issues already advanced, the question of sharing with North Korea the economic, technological and other benefits that the Republic has reaped so far. North Korea should accept this accommodative proposal with a sincere attitude and come forward to the talks without any reservations.

Furthermore, with magnanimity and patience, we earnestly urge North Korea to take part in the Seoul Olympics with us as a single people. It is certain that the 1988 Seoul Olympics will be the most successful festival of goodwill and harmony in the history of the Olympic movement. It will be attended by almost all member countries, transcending differences in ideology and political system. It is the earnest wish of all our people that even before the Olympics become a great festival of East-West detente, they be a major turning point leading to reconciliation between the two parts of our divided country. North Korea should participate in the grand festival of peace so that all Koreans, South and North, can increase their prestige in the world and share national glory together.

Members of the Advisory Council,

What is most essential to solidifying the basis for unification are, first of all, political and social stability, national unity and a firm faith in unification. I wish to especially ask you, the Council members representing all walks of life, to work even harder to achieve stability and harmony and to consolidate public opinion concerning unification. We cannot rest for even a minute in our march toward the forefront of development and peaceful unification. I believe, therefore, that even after the change in administrations, the Advisory Council on Peaceful Unification Policy should continue to strengthen itself as an organization

dedicated to giving focus to the national determination to achieve unification.

Let us pledge once again that through the unbounded development of the Advisory Council on Peaceful Unification Policy and the successful efforts of its members, we will move quickly toward the time when we will be an advanced and unified nation. I pray for the good health and happiness of all of you and your families as you take the lead in exploring the great future of the nation.

Thank you.

June 3, 1987

Chun Doo Hwan

At a meeting following the opening session, Minister of National Unification Huh Moon-doh made a report on the implementation of unification policies. In the report, Minister Huh pointed out that despite the government's painstaking efforts to pave the way for dialogue, exchanges and cooperation, North Korea had unilaterally suspended the on-going dialogue on the excuse of the South's annual Team Spirit military exercise. The Minister said that the government will nevertheless, with patience and magnanimity, continue to strive to induce North Korea back to the table of dialogue so as to wisely overcome the present inter-Korean situation and realize national prosperity and unification.

Predicting that the time of full-fledged and substantial dialogue, exchanges and cooperation will come before long as a result of the South's surging international standing and resultant changes in the situation surrounding the Korean peninsula, the Minister said that "the government will first try to induce North Korea into holding productive dialogue, rather than ill-

advisedly using the inter-Korea dialogue for propaganda purposes. Second, the government will take the initiative in the inter-Korean dialogue, with the concern of an elder brother, while trying to check their pursuit of adventurism. Third, the government will prepare itself fully for full-fledged dialogue in the future...’

The following is the full text of Minister Huh’s report on the implementation of unification policy.

Members of the Advisory Council on Peaceful Unification Policy who are leading the effort to achieve national unification,

I wish to pay my heartfelt tribute to you, the members of the Advisory Council who have dedicated yourselves, with firm confidence and an unflinching sense of mission, to laying a foundation for peaceful unification with a view to advancing the time when the sacred national task is accomplished.

As you all well know, last year was a lustrous milestone in our history. Our national prestige and confidence were elevated more than at any other time in the past. We laid the firm groundwork for national development by beginning to register a surplus in our international payments position and by reducing our foreign debts. Moreover, by successfully staging the 1986 Asian Games, we fully demonstrated our national vitality and potential. In particular, through the all-out competition among nations in the games, we were able to actually feel the possibility that we will even outpace Japan someday.

Today, having cast off the historic bonds that blocked our progress, Korea holds a respectable position in East Asia, a natural consequence of hard work and perseverance. Few deny that we are now at a time of surging national fortunes. We have a momentous opportunity to construct a thriving and blessed country, the long-cherished wish of the people.

Under these circumstances, peaceful unification, the greatest political challenge facing the nation, has become an attainable objective instead of simply a farfetched dream. Unification, however, must be an extension of our survival, freedom and prosperity. We do not seek unification simply to be impoverished by it. Therefore, realizing that the way to promote unification is to promote the prosperity and well-being of the whole nation, we have steadily built up our capabilities to achieve freedom, peace and public welfare.

That choice was the right one. The scale in the competition to make the nation better off which has been going on for the 40 years of division has already tipped toward the South. The results are in as to which side — the South or the North — has a superior system.

In the North, there is a house of cards built on a diabolical Communist ideology that has no roots in Korea. They have turned back the clock to a time of regimentation and poverty while we have worked the miracle on the Han-gang. While covering up their complete defeat with a distortion of history, a personality cult and the equal distribution of poverty, they are driving our brothers and sisters into an isolated quagmire of oppression.

As can be seen in the recent escape of Kim Man-ch'ol and his family, they are already in the process of disintegration. At this juncture, we should find the justification for unification in the clear moral imperative of rescuing and liberating our brethren from the yoke of oppression, poverty, fear, falsehood and irrationality.

We have amassed wealth not simply to wage a race with North Korea. We had sowed the seed of wealth in a bid to broaden the national interest and elevate our prestige. This is the very time for us to lead our unfortunate brethren in the North to the path of happiness. Only through the manifestation of such a genuine brotherly love can we properly accomplish what is ex-

pected of us.

Therefore, the practical task facing us in the realization of peaceful unification is for us, with the concern of an elder brother, to embrace the North and expose them to a tide of freedom and openness. We cannot leave our problems to changes in the international situation or to the flow of the times. We must continuously fan a warm breeze of freedom and affluence into the society of the North and thereby melt the frozen land and unlock their closed heart.

I am sure that if we embrace the rebels with kindheartedness and keep them from running over the cliff that can be the driving force to accelerate our grand march toward unification. It was from this standpoint that the government has tried hard to carry on a dialogue and have exchanges and other forms of cooperation despite the North's atrocities.

Nevertheless, North Korea unilaterally suspended the ongoing South-North Red Cross, economic and other talks early last year using our annual "Team Spirit" military exercises as an excuse. They have still refused to return to the table of dialogue, one and a half years later. Moreover, turning their backs on the magnanimity and sincerity with which we have endeavored to resume the dialogue, North Korea has instead increased tension between South and North Korea by, for instance, pressing ahead with the construction of the Kumgangsan Dam.

In a policy speech early this year, President Chun Doo Hwan urged North Korea to stop building the dam which he said threatens the lives and property of our people and which only serves to fan distrust between the two sides. Stressing the importance of dialogue to restore trust and ease tension, the President said the North should agree to hold an inter-Korean meeting on the joint use of water resources as well as to resume the suspended Red Cross, economic and other talks.

So far, North Korean responses can be boiled down to total rejection. They have insisted that they can resume the meetings

only after their proposals for a three-way meeting and a political and military meeting have first been met. I believe that though they reject our call for the resumption of dialogue, they won't be able to continue to turn their back on national aspirations nor on the historic trend toward improvement of inter-Korean relations, alleviation of tensions and peaceful unification.

With a view to wisely overcoming the present inter-Korean situation and realizing national prosperity and reunion, the government will, with patience, magnanimity and affection, continue to strive to bring North Korea back to the table of dialogue. For this purpose, the government will first try to induce North Korea into holding a productive dialogue rather than ill-advisedly using the inter-Korean dialogue for propaganda purposes. Second, the government will take the initiative in the inter-Korean dialogue, with the concern of an elder brother, while trying to check their pursuit of adventurism. Third, the government will prepare itself fully for full-fledged dialogue in the future, in the belief that North Korea will, in due course, have to accept a substantial dialogue since the gap between the two Koreas in national strength will further deepen while the security conditions will change greatly in parallel with our surging international standing,

Members of the Advisory Council on Peaceful Unification Policy.

As I have just said, the 40 million people in the South are now making last-ditch efforts to advance the nation, after having cast off the vestiges of backwardness and stagnation.

Next year, the world's young people will assemble in this land to stage a big festival of peace. The occasion will be a drum beat informing the world of our national advancement, a glorious festival linking our national destiny to that of the world, and beacon highlighting the unity of our nation.

Therefore, the 1988 Seoul Olympics are a bridge which we must cross before we can arrive at our hoped-for destination. On

the other hand, we must guard against those who cry for “a half share of the Olympics” or who attempt to subvert the games. Those who fear or are jealous of the success of the Olympics — the North Korean Communists and those South Koreans who advocate the “rule of the masses” — are the ones who oppose unification and try to sell out the nation.

In history, elements of crisis always lurk beneath every opportunity. The adventurous North Korean Communist regime is seeking to play with fire by exploiting any crack in the South and is going all-out to nurture the vicious virus of leftism in our society. If, in spite of that, some people ignore the present situation and fail to recognize the fact that the superiority of the liberal democratic system has been proven by a comparison between South and North Korea and throughout the world at large and are swayed by anachronistic leftist ideology, this would be to dance to the tune of North Korea and would be tantamount to ruining the nation.

What we need now is not divisiveness but harmony and not confusion but stability. Denying any foothold for those who, under the cloak of democratization and unification, attempt to overthrow the liberal democratic system with violence and agitation, I believe, is the shortcut to putting an end to our painful national sojourn and putting us on the track to prosperity.

Before long, the oppressive North Korean regime will fall and there will unfold a glorious tune of unification. Wouldn't it be a pity if our achievements were shattered and we became victims of the surrounding situation because of internal friction and enmity at such a juncture? To give ground of those skillfully trying to disarm us ideologically at this time when even our security situation remains unstable due to changes in the interests among the great powers surrounding the peninsula would be equivalent to foolishly passing up a golden opportunity in favor of crisis.

Members of the Advisory Council on Peaceful Unification Policy,

Full-fledged and substantial dialogue, exchanges and cooperation will come before long. If we believe that history is not accidental but the result of human determination, we cannot help but rise up to improve our abilities to prepare for such a time.

The great task of liberating our North Korean brethren cannot be accomplished for us by anyone else. We ourselves, who have achieved today's prosperity, should do it. I wish to take this occasion today to urge you to take the lead in promoting public confidence in peaceful unification and, at the same time, in promoting grand national unity by eliminating any factor detrimental to national consensus.

If you, the council members, as the main players in bringing about unification, realize that there is no shortcut but that the way to peaceful unification is through accelerating national development as we have been doing and through boosting the morale and unity of the nation, then no one will be able to impede our powerful march under the banner of historic reform. I am positive that if you become the cement holding our society together and if you unite the people in brotherly love and an affirmative spirit, we will go down in history as pioneers who have transformed an "era of division" into an "era of national prosperity."

In concluding my "report on the promotion of unification policy." I trust that you, the council members, will work even harder for our own good and that of our northern brethren.

Thank you.

June 3, 1987

Huh Moon-Doh
Minister
National Unification Board

The fourth Meeting of the Advisory Council on Peaceful Unification Policy also adopted a resolution, in which the members rejected reckless debate on unification and called for positive participation to create a correct public understanding of the unification issue; asked for concerted efforts to realize a South-North summit meeting and to bring about national reconciliation and democratic unification; called on the North Korean authorities to abandon their scheme to communize the South by force of arms, and to cease obstructive activities which hurt the Korean people and unconditionally take part in the glorious 1988 Seoul Olympics; and vowed to strengthen their determination to peacefully achieve unification.

The following is the full text of the resolution.

The time has come when we must accelerate the national advancement and the rise in the fortunes of the nation and concentrate our energies on building a glorious, advanced and unified homeland;

On the occasion of the Sixth Anniversary of the founding of the Advisory Council on Peaceful Unification Policy, we accept the historic mission to solidify the national foundation by achieving grand national unity and political and social stability and by accomplishing such urgent tasks as the peaceful transfer of power and the 1988 Seoul Olympics as well as the sacred task of unification, and hereby resolve:

To reaffirm that unification of the homeland should be based on the ideas of nationalism, democracy, liberty and public well-being, and should respect the values of liberal democracy, to reject reckless debates on unification, and radical leftist thought that may cause us to be taken in by North Korean strategies against the South, and to take the lead in forming a correct public understanding of the unification issue;

To realize a South-North summit meeting by all means to ease tension and improve substantial relations between South and North Korea, and to strongly urge North Korea to affirmatively respond to our sincere efforts to realize national reconciliation and democratic unification;

To urge the North Korean authorities again to give up forthwith their scheme to communize the South by force of arms and their obstructive maneuvers which hurt the Korean people and unconditionally take part in the glorious 1988 Seoul Olympics, convinced that, while being a festival of all mankind, it will become a decisive turning point in the nation's eternal progress toward prosperity and peaceful unification; and

To renew the realization that lasting peace on the Korean peninsula will contribute to the stability of Northeast Asia and to world peace and to positively dedicate ourselves to consolidate the foundation of peaceful unification by winning deeper and broader world-wide support for our firm determination to bring about unification.

June 3, 1987

Members
Advisory Council on Peaceful
Unification Policy

Part II

Proposal for a South-North Foreign Ministers Meeting

1. Background of the Proposal

In a message to North Korea, dated March 14, 1987, the South proposed a South-North prime ministers meeting. Making the proposal, the South expressed the worry that the abnormal inter-Korean relations which have been characterized by distrust and confrontation, would, if left unchecked, only aggravate national misfortunes and sufferings. The proposal suggested that the meeting, if held, could comprehensively discuss various issues raised by the two sides to improve relations and ease tension between the South and the North.

Previously North Korea had unilaterally suspended the ongoing South-North dialogue and then proposed a "three-way military meeting" and a high-level South-North political and military meeting," making the latter a prerequisite to the resumption of the suspended dialogue.

Also in the message to the North, the South pointed out that distrust and enmity between the South and the North have depended due to a series of North Korean actions, and stressed that to prepare for the various discussions for the improvement of inter-Korean relations and the alleviation of tension at a prime ministers meeting, it was necessary to create the proper atmosphere by resuming the suspended inter-Korean dialogue and holding a water resources meeting without delay to discuss and resolve the problem of the utilization and development of the resources of rivers flowing through the South and the North, a problem which has been raised by the North's Kumgangsan Dam project which has emerged as a new source of tension and distrust.

In a reply dated March 30, 1987, North Korea agreed to a South-North prime ministers meeting but suggested that a preliminary meeting of minister-level officials be held at P'an-

munjom on April 23, 1987. While favorably responding to a prime ministers meeting, however, North Korea limited the matters to be discussed at such a meeting to the alleviation of tension. They thus eliminated such things as the mutual suspension of slander and defamation and the introduction of many-sided exchanges and other forms of cooperation which would ease political confrontation, even though the North had earlier wanted to take up just such issues at the political and military meeting they had proposed.

Moreover, they became more inflexible. In their March 3, 1987 letter they said that a political and military meeting could take place in parallel with the resumption of the suspended channels of dialogue and that the issue of the Kungangsan Dam project could be discussed. North Korea now insisted that the existing dialogue could be resumed only after a prime ministers meeting. Furthermore, they called for a preliminary meeting to prepare for a prime ministers meeting although they had not done so when they suggested a political and military meeting.

Their demand for a preliminary meeting seemed to have stemmed from a determination to raise the issues of disarmament and the Team Spirit military exercise, which they had previously suggested for the agenda of the political and military meeting, and to use these issues and the South's internal political situation as the basis by which to decide whether to hold a prime ministers meeting or not.

At this point, the South, in a message signed by Prime Minister Lho Shin-yong on April 10, 1987, proposed that a South-North water resources meeting be held at P'anmunjom on May 6, 1987, the sixth South-North economic meeting at P'anmunjom on May 12, 1987, and the 11th Red Cross meeting in P'yongyang on May 19, 1987. It added that if these

meetings were held and progressed satisfactorily, preliminary talks for a prime ministers meeting could be held in the foreseeable future.

The following is the text of Prime Minister Lho's message to the North.

To: Li Gun-Mo, Premier of the Administration Council, North Korea

I have received your letter of March 30.

I regard the fact that you showed an interest in our proposal for a South-North prime ministers meeting as a positive thing. We made that proposal in the hope of laying the groundwork for peaceful unification through the improvement of inter-Korean relations, the alleviation of tension, and the creation of an atmosphere conducive to the early realization of a meeting between the top leaders of South and North Korea.

If a South-North prime ministers meeting were to be held and it made progress, it would foster an atmosphere of mutual trust, as you too said in the March 3 letter. This is why we proposed in our previous message that a South-North water resources meeting be held and the suspended Red Cross and economic talks be resumed to create the minimum conditions for the fostering of mutual trust in a prime ministers meeting.

In the recent reply, however, you turned a deaf ear to the proposal for a water resources meeting and the resumption of the existing dialogues, both of which should precede a prime ministers meeting, thus making it difficult in reality to realize a prime ministers meeting.

The deepening tension and confrontation between the South and the North today are due to accumulated distrust and discontinuity over a long period of time.

I firmly believe that in view of our past experiences and the scarcity of any achievement made in the dialogues since the turn of the 1980s, the best way to dissolve such distrust and discontinuity and transform them into trust and cooperative relations is for the South and the North to carry on and develop the dialogues sincerely and without interruption.

I, therefore, think that what is most pressing under the present condition of the suspended dialogues is to positively revive the existing dialogues which your side has unilaterally suspended.

I note that you, too, said in the letter delivered to us on March 3 that "it is our firm stand to resume the suspended multi-pronged dialogues and hold a South-North top-level meeting," thus taking an interest in the resumption of the stalled dialogues.

At the same time, the question of the Kumgangsan Dam project, which is now the source of heightened tension between the South and the North and which will only exact unnecessary waste from both sides, must be urgently discussed and resolved. Inasmuch as your side, too, has already recognized the need to discuss the issue of the Kumgangsan Dam project and in view of the seriousness and urgency of the issue a South-North water resources meeting ought to be held at an early date.

Once the minimum conditions for mutual trust have been created by the convening of a water resources meeting and the resumption of the suspended dialogues, preparation for a South-North prime ministers meeting would progress smoothly. From this standpoint, we sincerely propose that a South-North water resources meeting be held at P'anmunjom on May 6, the sixth inter-Korean economic meeting at P'anmunjom on May 12, and the 11th full-dress South-North Red Cross meeting in P'yongyang on May 19. In the near future, when these meetings have been held and registered progress, a preliminary meeting could be held to prepare for a South-North prime ministers meeting.

I look forward to an affirmative response from you.

April 10, 1987

Lho Shin-Yong,
Prime Minister
Republic of Korea

In response to the South's April 10 message, North Korea on April 24 issued a "statement of the spokesman for the Administration Council," in which it rejected the South-North dialogue and tried to shift the blame for the suspension of talks onto the South. In the statement, the North reiterated their previous assertion that "non-political talks cannot resolve the issue of distrust and enmity resulting from the political and military confrontation between the South and the North," and denounced the South's proposal for talks as a "mere time device" designed to shatter all channels of dialogue between the two sides.

Moreover, they sought to shift the blame for the suspension of the dialogue to the South by insisting, "now the South Korean authorities have no right to discuss any further the South-North dialogue and the alleviation of tension... They should be held fundamentally responsible for the consequences of the rejection, which would hurt the nation, of the golden opportunity to resume the South-North dialogue."

North Korea, which was thus busy shifting the blame for the suspension of talks to the South after they had turned down the South's reasonable proposal for dialogue, again proposed on July 23, 1987, a "multi-national arms reduction talks" to discuss "phased disarmament" on the Korean peninsula.

In an Administration Council statement, North Korea, contending that "acute military confrontation on the Korean

peninsula can be resolved only through effective arms reduction," argued that the military forces of South and North Korea should be reduced in three stages from 1988 through 1991 to less than 100,000 for each side, that in parallel with that the U.S. troops in Korea should be withdrawn on a phased basis, so that by the time the South and North Korean forces are reduced to less than 100,000, all the U.S. forces in Korea, including their nuclear weapons, would be pulled out and their bases deactivated. The North then proposed that to discuss these issues, multi-national arms reduction talks among South and North Korea and the United States be held in Geneva in March 1988. They also suggested that observers from the member nations of the Neutral Nations' Supervisory Commission attend.

The following is the gist of the North Korean statement.

They said that the acute military confrontation on the Korean peninsula could be resolved only through effective arms reduction. To ease tension on the Korean peninsula and provide a decisive turning point toward peaceful unification, they proposed multi-national arms reduction talks to realize phased arms reduction in South and North Korea.

The suggested topics of the disarmament talks were the reduction of the armed forces of South and North Korea in three stages from 1988 through 1991, the maintenance of less than 100,000 troops beginning in 1992; the complete withdrawal from Korea of the U.S. forces in Korea on a step by step basis, including their nuclear weapons, and the dismantling of U.S military bases in Korea when the South and North Korean forces have been reduced to less than 100,000; the public notification of the progress of arms reduction; and

the turning of the Demilitarized Zone into a peace zone and the stationing of neutral peace supervisory forces there.

They proposed the arms reductions talks be attended by South and North Korea and the United States, and observers from the member countries of the Neutral Nations' Supervisory Commission. The meeting, they said, should be in Geneva in March 1988. Furthermore, they said north Korea would unilaterally reduce the People' Army by 100,000 by the end of this year.

An Analysis of the North Korean Proposal

The North Korean proposal for "multi-national arms reduction talks" is believed to have stemmed not from a sincere desire to resolve national problems through direct talks between the parties involved, namely, South and North Korea, but from several ulterior motives. First, their latest proposal is nothing new. It was merely a rehash, with the additional suggestion of substantial topics for discussion, of their earlier proposals for a three-way meeting made in January 1984 and for a three-way military authorities meeting which was put forth in June 1986. In the latter proposal, North Korea suggested as topics for discussion the suspension of military training exercises, a halt to the arms buildup, reduction of military manpower and equipment and respect for the Armistice Agreement.

On the surface, the latest offer represented a return to three-way talks from the direct inter-Korean talks they suggested in December 1986 when Kim Il-sung called for a "South-North high-level political and military meeting." Most of all, their failure to mention, in their most recent proposal, anything about the resumption of the suspended dialogue

meant that they have no interest in a dialogue directly with the South.

Second, the fact that they set the time of the meeting for next March after a new government is to be installed in the South, shows that they are not really after dialogue, the alleviation of tension or disarmament, but to obstruct democratization in the South by fomenting support for disarmament and the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea and thereby splitting public opinion.

In fact, whenever the South goes through a political transition, North Korea makes a deceptive peace offer to split public opinion. Immediately after the April 19 Student Uprising in 1960, North Korea proposed a confederation system as a means of unification. Again on the heels of the assassination of President Park Chung Hee on October 26, 1979, they suggested a South-North prime ministers meeting and other bilateral and multilateral contacts between South and North Korean politicians. Thus seen, the latest North Korean proposal, too, was intended to realize contacts with the United States in connection with the U.S.'s recent policy toward North Korea, and, at the same time, to find an excuse to brand the South as a "warmonger" by making a proposal that the South would turn down, and thus to jeopardize the atmosphere for the Seoul Olympics in 1988.

Third, their unusual idea that the talks be held in Geneva and be attended by observers from the member countries of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission was motivated by an attempt to maximize the propaganda effect, capitalizing on the on-going U.S.-USSR disarmament talks in Geneva and Moscow's peace offensive.

Fourth, the unilateral announcement that they were going to reduce their troops by 100,000 by the end of this year, in-

dicates that the North suffers from excessive military outlays, which have become even more acute lately due to serious economic difficulties. On the other hand, the planned reduction, even if actually carried out, would be meaningless in view of the fact that the reduction would be nothing more than the discharge from active service of part of the 150,000 whom they have been using since September 1986 in various construction projects. They would nevertheless remain on the construction projects in a military-like organization.

2. Proposal for a Foreign Ministers Meeting

On August 3, 1987, the government of the Republic of Korea proposed to North Korea that a South-North foreign ministers meeting be held either in New York or in another convenient place during the period of the United Nations General Assembly in September.

In a statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the government stressed that the Korean question should be discussed and settled through talks between the parties directly concerned, South and North Korea, on the basis of the principle of national self-determination, adding that "...if North Korea is truly interested in improving relations and relaxing tension between the South and the North, it must first show sincerity in confidence-building which is the basis for consolidation of peace." It then suggested that the proposed foreign ministers meeting could discuss measures to build trust, relax tension and establish peace such as the conclusion of a non-aggression agreement, U.N. membership, cross-recognition, resumption of the suspended dialogue, water resources,

armed forces reduction, and all other matters of concern to each side like the South-North prime ministers talks and a summit meeting.

In particular, the South pointed out in the statement that the most practical approach to the solution of the pending problems between South and North Korea lies in strengthening the foundation for mutual trust by convening water resources talks at an early date while resuming the Red Cross and economic talks that North Korea unilaterally suspended.

The South also stressed that talks on armed forces reduction could bear concrete results only when trust had been restored and peace consolidated through such things as exchanges and cooperation between the South and the North, the entry of both Koreas into the United Nations and cross-recognition by the four neighboring powers.

The following is the text of the statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The government of the Republic of Korea has exerted every possible effort to reduce tension on the Korean peninsula and fulfill the aspiration of the entire Korean people for peaceful reunification through dialogue and negotiation in the spirit of national reconciliation, and such an effort will continue in the future.

We believe that to settle the Korean issues through talks between the parties directly concerned of South and North Korea on the basis of the principle of national self-determination is the most appropriate approach reflecting the ardent national aspirations of the Korean people.

The issue of peace and reunification is basically a problem to be settled by the Korean people themselves, as they are masters of their own country.

Accordingly, if North Korea is truly interested in improving relations and relaxing tension between the South and the North, it must first show sincerity in confidence-building which is the basis for consolidation of peace.

In the meantime, we had the Red Cross talks, the economic talks and preliminary contacts for parliamentary talks in order to reduce tension and restore trust between the South and the North. In the autumn of 1985, we also had a touching moment of shedding tears over the reunion of members of separated families when they exchanged the home town visiting groups for the first time in the 40 years of division.

Furthermore, the Red Cross talks and the economic talks have reached such a stage that concrete projects could have been implemented with only modest concession and cooperation from both sides.

However, North Korea suspended unilaterally all channels of dialogue in January 1986 under the pretext of the Team Spirit exercise and put forward the so-called three-way military authorities talks and politicomilitary talks. Furthermore, North Korea recently made a proposal to hold armed forces reduction negotiation in Geneva among the three parties, including the United States. Such a proposal runs counter to the principle of self-determination which calls for the settlement of the pending problems by the parties directly concerned, South and North Korea.

It is to be reemphasized that the most practical approach to the solution of the pending problems between South and North Korea lies in strengthening the foundation for mutual trust by convening water resources talks at an early date while resuming and facilitating the Red Cross and economic talks that the North Korean side has unilaterally suspended.

Talks on armed forces reduction can bear concrete results only when confidence is restored and peace consolidated through exchanges and cooperation between the South and the North on

the basis of arrangements for maintaining peace and security such as both Koreas' entry into the United Nations and the cross-recognition by the four neighboring powers.

Under the present circumstances, as far as the issue of armed forces reduction between South and North Korea is concerned, it is important to make the arrangements for maintaining peace and security as well as avoiding military conflicts.

It is in this perspective that we propose to hold Talks between the Foreign Ministers of South and North Korea in order to discuss such issues as conclusion of non-aggression agreement, U.N. membership, cross-recognition and other matters.

In this meeting, all matters of each other's concern may be discussed, comprising confidence-building measures such as resumption and progress of the suspended dialogue, and consultations and settlement on water resources problem; various issues including armed forces reduction to relax tension and establish peace on the Korean peninsula; and the issue of bringing about successful South-North Prime Ministers' Talks and of realizing eventually a meeting between the highest authorities of the South and the North.

It is desirable that the Foreign Ministers' Talks be held either in New York during the period between the opening of the United Nations General Assembly session and the end of September this year when the Foreign Ministers of South and North Korea will be visiting the United Nations or in any other mutually agreeable place during the same period.

We expect that North Korea respond positively to our proposal in full appreciation of our genuine desire for restoring trust and improving relations between the South and the North.

Reacting to the South's proposal for a foreign ministers meeting, North Korea on August 6, 1987, in effect rejected the offer by reiterating their previous call for a three-way meeting. In a statement by the spokesman of the Foreign Ministry, the

North insisted that any South-North foreign ministers meeting include the U.S. Secretary of State so that the question of armed forces reduction could be discussed as a priority.

The North Koreans argued that Seoul's offer to hold an inter-Korean foreign ministers meeting to discuss U.N. membership and cross-recognition was intended to use the South-North dialogue to "perpetuate the division of the nation." They contended that to relax tension on the Korean peninsula, the issue of armed forces reduction should first be resolved.

P'yongyang further asserted that since any settlement of arms reduction would inevitably involve the question of the U.S. forces in Korea, such talks should include the United States. Proposing that a foreign ministers meeting of South and North Korea and the United States be held at the soonest possible date in Geneva or any other convenient place, North Korea suggested that to prepare for the meeting, a preliminary meeting of vice-minister-level officials be held at P'anmunjom toward the close of August 1987 or at any other mutually agreeable time.

In particular, the North said that if South Korea and the United States regard such a preliminary meeting as awkward, bilateral preliminary contacts could be held between the U.S. and North Korea and between South and North Korea. They thus revealed their ulterior motive of holding official contacts with the United States.

On August 13, 1987, the South, pointing out the unreasonableness of a three-way foreign ministers meeting, again urged the North to affirmatively respond to a South-North foreign ministers meeting. In a statement by the spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the South stressed that all pending problems between South and North Korea should be discussed

and settled by the parties directly concerned, South and North Korea, on the basis of the principle of national self-determination. It also stated that talks on armed forces reduction could bear concrete results only when arrangements are made for durable peace such as the conclusion of a non-aggression agreement between South and North Korea, entry into the United Nations and cross-recognition by the four concerned powers.

In the statement, the South again reminded the North that at the South-North foreign ministers meeting, all matters of concern to both sides could be discussed, including measures to build trust, relax tension and establish peace such as the resumption of the suspended dialogue, settlement of the water resources problem and armed forces reduction as well as South-North prime ministers talks and a summit meeting.

The statement said it is desirable that the foreign ministers talks be held in New York during the period between the opening of the U.N. General Assembly and the end of September this year when the foreign ministers of the two sides of Korea will be visiting the United Nations. But, it said, if North Korea finds it inconvenient, the talks could be held at any other mutually agreeable place at the earliest possible date.

The following is the text of the statement of the spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The Government of the Republic of Korea, in its statement issued on August 3, proposed Talks between the Foreign Ministers of South and North Korea to discuss all matters of each other's concern in the spirit of national reconciliation and on the basis of the principle of national self-determination. On August 13, we once again urged the North to respond positively to our

proposal.

The proposal for South-North Foreign Ministers' Talks is reasonable and forward-looking in that both ministers may discuss in the talks, without any precondition, all matters between the South and the North including confidence-building measures and armed forces reduction for relaxing tension and establishing peace on the Korean peninsula. In this meeting the issue can also be discussed of bringing about successful South-North Prime Ministers' Talks which South and North Korea had already discussed and of realizing eventually a meeting between the highest authorities of the South and the North.

In reply to our proposal, North Korea, on August 28, reiterated its proposal for a tripartite meeting to discuss the issue of armed forces reduction with the participation of U.S. Secretary of State and proposed to hold preliminary talks at vice-ministerial level at the end of September. This proposal in which North Korea changed only the timing of the preliminary talks has nothing new, because the North had suggested in its August 6 proposal to hold such preliminary talks at the end of August.

The government of the Republic of Korea holds the firm policy to settle all pending issues between the South and the North at any place, any time through dialogue between the parties directly concerned on the basis of the principle of self-determination.

If the North does not want to turn away from the national aspiration for building confidence between the South and the North and relaxing tension on the Korean peninsula, it should accept our proposal for the South-North foreign Ministers' Talks rather than evade it without involving any third¹ party in the discussion of the inter-Korean problems.

3. The South's Position

a. The Korean Question Should be Discussed and Settled through Direct Dialogue between South and North Korea.

The consistent position of the Seoul government is that the question of unification should be resolved peacefully through dialogue. In other words, the South has held fast to a policy of resolving the Korean question in direct discussions with North Korea. The policy stems from the recognition that although the national division was enforced upon the Koreans by outsiders, it is incumbent upon the Koreans themselves to resolve the problem.

The series of North Korean proposals for three-way talks are not-reasonable attempts to improve inter-Korean relations. Following their calls for a three-way meeting in January 1984 and a tripartite military authorities talks in June 1986, North Korea again demanded multi-national arms reduction talks and a three-way foreign ministers meeting.

The only way to satisfy public opinion is to settle the question of peace and unification through direct talks between South and North Korea, based on the principle of national self-determination.

b. Various Matters Pending between South and North Korea, Including Military Issues, Should be Resolved on the Basis of Mutual Trust in Accordance with the Spirit of National Reconciliation and Democratic Unification.

Given that South and North Korea have conflicting ideologies and systems and have been distrustful and hostile to each other for more than 40 years, it would be senseless for

anyone to try to improve inter-Korean relations without first realizing political reconciliation or building up trust.

The government of the Republic of Korea has made consistent efforts to build trust between the South and the North. In 1981, the Seoul government proposed mutual visits by the presidents of South and North Korea and also a summit meeting. On January 22, 1982, the South made public the Formula for National Reconciliation and Democratic Unification, proposing, as a practical measure to promote national reconciliation, the conclusion of a seven-point Provisional Agreement on Basic Relations between South and North Korea, which called, among other things, for inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation.

With such an attitude, the South has remained committed to peace despite the North's direct armed provocations. Even at the time of mounting distrust following the terrorist bombing in Rangoon, Burma, in 1983, the South, in a presidential policy statement on January 17, 1984, strongly urged North Korea to agree to direct dialogue, stressing that "there is no way but dialogue to achieve unification."

Moreover, when North Korea unilaterally suspended the on-going channels of dialogue such as the Red Cross and economic talks using the Team Spirit training exercise as an excuse and instead proposed a separate political and military meeting, making it a prerequisite to the resumption of the suspended dialogue, the South, also in a presidential policy statement on January 12, 1987, reiterated the call for the resumption of the suspended dialogues and disclosed its willingness to discuss in a summit meeting all matters pending between the two sides including the South's ideas to consolidate peace and promote national unification and the North Korean idea of a political and military meeting.

If North Korea is truly interested in improving inter-Korean relations and relaxing tensions, they should first show a sincere desire to increase mutual trust which is the basis for peace. To this end, the North should, first of all, agree to resume the existing Red Cross, economic and other talks which they unilaterally suspended and immediately stop the construction of the Kungangsan Dam that poses a great threat to life and property in the South. Furthermore, North Korea should agree to hold a South-North prime ministers meeting designed to discuss ways to improve inter-Korean relations and ease tension as well as a summit meeting that would provide an epochal turning point leading to improvement in such relations.

In particular, if the military issue which North Korea wants to settle on a priority basis, is to be discussed and resolved, a viable device should be prepared first to ensure peace on the peninsula based on mutual trust.

c. The Question of U.S. Forces in Korea Is Basically a Bilateral Issue between South Korea and the United States, and, Therefore, Cannot Be Subject to Discussion between South and North Korea.

North Korea claims that the U.S. Forces in Korea are the root source of tension on the peninsula and demands their withdrawal. In fact, however, uncertainty and rising tension on the peninsula is caused by North Korea's reckless arms buildup and southward provocation. The U.S. military came to Korea because of North Korean aggression against the South during the Korean War.

The U.S. forces which first landed in Korea on September 8, 1945, to disarm the defeated Japanese army, withdrew from Korea on June 29, 1949, having accomplished that mission.

But, they returned to Korea on July 1, 1950, to help safeguard the Republic of Korea from North Korean aggression during the Korean War. Therefore, the U.S. forces continue to stay in Korea to ensure peace and the security of the Republic from continuing military threats from the North. The U.S. military presence is based on the Mutual Defense Treaty which the Republic of Korea and the United States signed on October 1, 1953.

Therefore, the question of the U.S. military presence in Korea is a bilateral matter between South Korea and the United States. There is no ground whatsoever for North Korea, a third party, to make an issue of it. If North Korea is truly interested in easing tension and realizing peaceful unification as they claim, they should earnestly discuss various issues to build trust between the two sides of Korea and arrange a systematic device to ensure peace on the peninsula as the South has suggested, instead of raising the issue of the U.S. forces in Korea.

4. Domestic and International Reactions

Commenting on the South's proposal for a South-North foreign ministers meeting, major domestic papers described the offer a "comprehensive overture," the suggested topics of which incorporated even the "multi-national armed forces reduction talks" North Korea proposed on July 23. The press editorially called upon North Korea to accept the proposal. In particular, the press said that the proposal, made at a time of complex political transition, indicated that the Seoul government's firm determination and top-priority policy, under all circumstances, was to resolve the inter-Korean issue by easing

tension and bringing about durable peace through dialogue and compromise. They called upon North Korea to accept the South's reasonable offer and thereby show sincerity in creating a "miracle of grand national unity" instead of trying to produce a counter-proposal under a "deceptive peace strategy." They stressed that North Korea should stop attempting to use a fake peace offer to fan unrest in the South taking advantage of the current political transition and to weaken the security preparedness of South Koreans in a bid to provide an "invented" ground for their demand to co-host the Seoul Olympics.

Meanwhile, major foreign newspapers called the proposal for a foreign ministers meetings a "positive and constructive measure" to ease tension on the Korean peninsula, expressing the hope that the overture would give momentum to "substantial dialogue" between South and North Korea. At the same time, the press expressed scepticism about whether North Korea, given their hitherto intransigence and their July 23 proposal for arms reduction talks, would respond affirmatively to the South's proposal.

Part III

The IOC-Sponsored South-North Sports Talks

1. The Fourth Meeting

The fourth South-North sports meeting, sponsored by the International Olympic Committee (IOC), was held at the IOC headquarters in Lausanne on July 14-15, 1987, 13 months after the third meeting. The delay of the fourth meeting for more than a year was because of North Korea's *de facto* objection to the IOC compromise plan. While saying they had accepted the IOC plan "in principle," the North Koreans demanded additional sports and laid down one demand after another in connection with the organization and operation of the games.

As part of an effort to induce North Korea to take part in the Seoul Olympics, the IOC had produced the compromise plan on June 12, 1986, granting North Korea table tennis, archery and part of road cycling and the soccer preliminaries. It also suggested that Olympics-related cultural activities be staged in both South and North Korea. The IOC said that if both sides of Korea accepted the plan, it would arrange a fourth meeting to discuss organizational and operational matters.

The IOC exchanged messages with P'yongyang four times and had one contact with them in Lausanne in February 1987 to sound out their attitude toward a possible fourth meeting. Thereafter, the IOC suggested to the Korean Olympic Committee (KOC) in April 1987 that the fourth meeting be held to discuss pending issues.

Even at the fourth meeting, however, North Korea not only renewed their demand to co-host the Olympics but showed less flexibility than before, demanding, for instance, eight sports or one third of the total, in proportion to the population of South and North Korea. Because of such North Korean intransigency, no substantial discussions were held. The meeting adjourned after the IOC offered a partially modified compromise plan,

asking the two sides to notify the IOC by the end of August 1987 whether they would accept it.

On July 14, 1987, the first day of the fourth meeting IOC President Juan Antonio Samaranch greeting the delegates and then the senior delegates of each side delivered position papers.

Kim Chong-ha, the KOC senior delegate, welcomed the fourth meeting which, he said, was designed to work out the details of the IOC's compromise plan. He recalled that at the three past meetings, his delegation had exerted earnest efforts with broad-mindedness and patience to bring the dialogue to fruition so that the Seoul Olympics would be more successful than any other in history.

The KOC senior delegate said that the remaining task was to discuss and quickly settle the issue of guaranteeing free travel by the Olympic family back and forth between South and North Korea and working-level operational and organizational matters in connection with the staging of some sports in North Korea. He then asked the North Koreans to cooperate in the successful conclusion of the meeting by making it clear that they would participate in the 24th Olympics in Seoul, guarantee the free travel of the Olympic family between South and North Korea, and willingly take part in the official opening and closing ceremonies in Seoul.

Kim also stressed that if an agreement on the IOC compromise plan and other related matters were to be quickly reached, sincere discussions should be conducted in conformity with the basic spirit of the Olympic Charter and regulations.

The following is the position paper of the fourth IOC-sponsored South-North sports talks.

First I wish to express my heartfelt appreciation to President

Samaranch and the International Olympic Committee, which have been exerting their utmost efforts to make the 24th Seoul Olympic Games a success.

It is very significant that this meeting, being held at the initiative and under the chairmanship of President Samaranch, has resumed after a year's lapse to work out the details of the International Olympic Committee compromise plan. At the past three meetings, the Korean Olympic Committee exerted earnest efforts with broad-mindedness and patience to bring the dialogue to fruition so that the Seoul Olympics will be more successful than any other in history.

In particular, it was difficult for us to accept the compromise plan of the International Olympic Committee presented at the third meeting, which featured the allocation of two full sports and some events of two others to North Korea. Nonetheless, we accepted it without any conditions in deference to the International Olympic Committee which has been working hard for the successful staging the 24th Seoul Olympics. Though it is somewhat late, I regard it as fortunate that North Korea said it would accept the IOC compromise plan in principle.

What remains for us to do now is to discuss and quickly settle the issue of guaranteeing free travel by the Olympic family back and forth between South and North Korea and working-level operational and organizational matters in connection with the staging of some sports in North Korea.

I, therefore, expect that North Korea will cooperate in the successful conclusion of the meeting by making it clear that they will participate in the 24th Olympics in Seoul, guarantee the free travel of the Olympic family between South and North Korea, and willingly take part in the official opening and closing ceremonies in Seoul.

We not only will heartily welcome the participation of a North Korean delegation in the 24th Seoul Olympics but will also assure them of maximum security and conveniences. I also make

it clear that we will, with pleasure, have our athletic teams take part in the sports to take place in the territory of North Korea.

Since an IOC delegation visited Seoul last June, I have disclosed many times our complete support of an early settlement of the IOC compromise plan and various related matters.

I believe that the organizational and operational matters necessary for the realization of the IOC compromise plan can be settled without difficulty if and when South and North Korea discuss them in conformity with the spirit of the Olympic Charter and regulations. To realize the IOC compromise plan, the International Olympic Committee and the two sides of Korea should carry out sincere negotiations while conforming to its basic spirit and content.

There are only 14 months to go before the opening of the 24th Seoul Olympic Games. In concluding, I expect that the question of the details of the IOC compromise plan will be successfully resolved at this fourth meeting.

However, the North Koreans began by demanding to co-host the Seoul Olympics and reiterated their previous assertions with respect to the title of the Games, the organization of the Organizing Committee and the opening and closing ceremonies in defiance of the IOC compromise plan. In fact, they showed less flexibility than before by making the unreasonable demand that eight sports, or one third of the total, should be allocated to North Korea in proportion to the population of the peninsula.

While avoiding a discussion of such working-level, technical matters as the guarantee of free travel back and forth between South and North Korea by the Olympic family and the organization and operation of the sports to be held in North Korea under the IOC compromise plan, North Korea simply repeated their assertions that eight full sports including all of soccer

should be granted to North Korea, that there should be a separate organizing committee in P'yongyang, and that opening and closing ceremonies should be held both in Seoul and P'yongyang.

The following is the gist of the North Korean remarks.

They said that, an agreement should be reached at this meeting on a concrete proposal based on the principle of co-hosting. They then outlined the position of North Korea for the success of the fourth meeting:

Eight full sports including soccer should be allocated to North Korea in proportion to population;

The title of the northern part of the games should be the "24th Olympic Games, P'yongyang," and a separate organizing committee should be created in P'yongyang; and

Opening and closing ceremonies should be held both in Seoul and P'yongyang.

At the first separate meeting with the KOC delegation, the IOC sounded out the KOC's attitude toward a slight modification to the compromise plan that called for the additional awarding of women's volleyball to North Korea and the holding of men's road cycling in North Korea exclusively. Before presenting its opinion on the modification, the KOC delegation pointed out that despite the fact that the fourth meeting was called to discuss concrete working-level and technical matters related to the compromise plan, North Korea had again raised the issue of co-hosting the Games and demanded more sports in proportion to population, thus giving rise to the danger that the sports talks would revert to the start-

ing point in defiance of the IOC compromise plan. The KOC delegation added, however, that if North Korea withdrew the demand to co-host, would participate in the official opening and closing ceremonies in Seoul and would guarantee the free travel of the Olympic family between South and North Korea, it would review IOC President Samaranch's new proposal affirmatively.

At the second-day session on July 15, separate meetings were held between the IOC and the KOC and between the IOC and the North Korean delegation, which was followed by a joint meeting among the South and North Korean delegations and the IOC. Before concluding the fourth meeting, IOC President Samaranch announced in the form of a joint statement the results of the two-day meeting.

At the second separate meeting with the KOC, the IOC president asked the KOC to notify the IOC of its position on the modified compromise plan not later than the end of August, the modification being that women's volleyball would be additionally granted to North Korea and that men's road cycling, originally set to cross from North to South Korea, would be staged entirely in North Korea.

In response, the KOC said there was no change in the KOC position as disclosed on the previous day. In other words, if North Korea withdrew their demand to co-host, would guarantee the free travel by the Olympic family between South and North Korea and would take part in the Seoul Olympics opening and closing ceremonies, it would affirmatively review the IOC's amendment.

At the subsequent three-way joint session, IOC President Samaranch, pointing out that there was a "slight improvement" in the sports to be allocated to North Korea, asked South and North Korea to notify the IOC of whether

they accepted the amendment by the end of August 1987. He then made public the prepared joint statement.

The following is the gist of the IOC statement as announced by IOC President Samaranch.

The IOC reaffirms that Seoul was chosen as the venue of the 24th Olympic Games in Baden-Baden on September 30, 1981, in accordance with the IOC Charter.

It is hoped that all relevant people pay attention to the steady efforts the IOC has been making to ensure the success of the 24th Olympics and the participation of all the national Olympic committees.

As a result of the four rounds of meetings and an IOC delegation's visit to North Korea and on the basis of consultations with the International Federation of Sports and national Olympic committees, the existing compromise plan has been amended to grant the following sports to the North Korean National Olympic Committee: Table tennis, archery (men and women), women's volleyball, one group of soccer preliminaries and men's road cycling.

In consideration of the fact that the IOC will have to send invitations to the 24th Olympics' to the national Olympic committees by September 17, 1987, the two sides of Korea should notify the IOC headquarters in Lausanne of their decision concerning the IOC plan as soon as possible.

The IOC stressed that the IOC plan was exceptional and unprecedented in the history of the Olympic movement.

2. Subsequent Developments

On July 16, 1987, IOC President Samaranch officially sent messages containing the new compromise plan produced at the fourth South-North sports meeting to both sides of Korea. In the message to Kim Chong-ha, president of the Korean Olympic Committee (KOC), the IOC, recalling that the honor of hosting the 24th Olympic Games had been granted to the city of Seoul at the IOC Baden-Baden meeting on September 30, 1981, suggested to allocate the following sports to North Korea: Archery, table tennis, women's volleyball, including the finals, one group of soccer preliminaries, and the entire men's road cycling. Also in the message, the IOC said that it would send to all the national Olympic committees the invitations to the 24th Olympic Games on September 17, 1987, asking that the KOC review the IOC's final compromise plan and inform the IOC of its decision as soon as possible.

The KOC sent a reply to the IOC on August 17, 1987, saying that it would accept the amended IOC compromise plan provided North Korea withdrew its demand to co-host, guaranteed free travel by the Olympic family between South and North Korea, and promised their unconditional participation in the opening and closing ceremonies in Seoul.

Meanwhile, in a statement issued by Kim Duk-jun, vice-chairman of the North Korean Olympic Committee, on August 4, 1987, North Korea responded negatively to the IOC's modified plan. The statement said the new compromise plan produced by the IOC at the fourth meetings was no different than the previous plan and was far from meeting their demand to co-host. On August 11, Jin Chung-kuk, vice-chairman of the North Korean Olympic Committee, held a press conference to make public their official stand on the modified IOC plan.

At the press meeting, Jin asserted that:

Five full and one partial sports should be held in the area of North Korea;

At a fifth meeting, not only the issue of sports but such matters as the questions of the title of the games, organization of organizing committee, opening and closing ceremonies and television rights, should be discussed comprehensively; and

The fifth meeting should be held in August.

As for the sports to be staged in North Korea, the North Koreans demanded all of table tennis, archery, women's volleyball and soccer, including the finals, a full sport, to replace road cycling, and still another sport, thus complicating the prospects for the opening of a fifth meeting.

3. Domestic and International Reactions

Commenting on the demand to co-host which North Korea renewed at the fourth IOC-sponsored South-North sports meeting in defiance of the IOC's mediatory efforts, major domestic newspapers observed that the North Korean attitude represented a sinister scheme to splash cold water on the Seoul Olympics right up to the end without any plan to take part in the Seoul Olympics. Noting that the IOC had produced a new compromise plan despite North Korean intransigence, the papers said that if North Korea continues to turn a deaf ear to such an unprecedented plan, it would remain an "eternal orphan" in the international community.

The press said that because of the North Koreans, the fourth meeting had failed to reap any fruit despite the accommodating attitude of the IOC and the patience and concession of the KOC delegation. The press urged North Korea to come forward to the table of dialogue with more sincerity if they were interested in sharing even part of the glory of the 1988 Olympics.

The major foreign newspapers, too, said that North Korea was more combative and political at the fourth Lausanne meeting than in the past two years, as could be seen in their demand for more sports, in proportion to population and in disregard of the IOC Charter. The foreign press expressed the view that it was an "excessive demand" which could hardly enlist support even from their fellow Communist-bloc countries. The newspapers described positively the IOC's new compromise plan as "part of the IOC efforts to reach a compromise with North Korea which is threatening another Olympic boycott." They observed that there would be much rough going before a settlement could be hammered out.

SOUTH-NORTH DIALOGUE IN KOREA



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Part I

Search for a New Approach to National Co-Prosperity and Peaceful Unification

1. Proclamation of the Age of Inter-Korean Cooperation

The new government of the Sixth Republic has, since its inauguration, professed the position that the south and the north of Korea should depart from the practice of viewing the other as an adversary and terminate competition and confrontation in favor of cooperation and prosperity as a nation.

At the same time, and in recognition of the need for a more positive approach to unification based on national self-esteem and reconciliation, the government announced that it would concentrate its efforts on the enactment of policies to bring about a lasting peace, promote peaceful exchange, and further the cause of peaceful unification.

To this end, the government continues to pursue a unification policy to prompt north Korea to renounce its revolutionary policy to communize the whole Korean peninsula and thereby join in the efforts to construct a unified, advanced, welfare country in which both the south and north would benefit from the advantages to be derived from a single "national community."

This basic stand of the new government on the question of national unification was well manifested in President Roh Tae-woo's inaugural address, his Samil Independence Day message, and during his April 21, 1988, press conference.

In his inaugural address declaring the birth of the Sixth Republic on February 25, 1988, President Roh, discussing the issue of unification, said, "If only I can perceive a path to peace and the reunification of the Korean peninsula, I am prepared to go anyplace on earth for a sincere dialogue with anyone." Stressing that dialogue, not violence, is the most

direct route to ending the division and bring about the unification of our nation, the President stated that, "the door of dialogue will always be open."

The new government thus underscored its determination to use all means to promote coexistence and cooperation in line with the dawn of the new age of national self-esteem and thereby paved the way for peaceful unification.

In his Samil Independence Day message on March 1, 1988, President Roh defined the age of national self-esteem as a "period in which we prepare for and march toward unification." He then reiterated the new government's determination and attachment to unification by saying, "To pave the way for unification, I will meet with anyone at anyplace... I will follow this path without hesitation or fear no matter how rugged it may be."

President Roh also emphasized the importance of the open-door foreign policy of the new government. He said that the exploring and developing of a broad exchange with the northern continental countries with which Korea has yet to established diplomatic relations would "represent a significant milestone in our march onward toward unification."

Moreover, in his first press conference on April 21, 1988, the President stated that he would make the rest of his term of office a period dedicated to paving the way for peaceful unification through inter-Korean cooperation. In so doing, preliminary steps will be taken to make ready for the forthcoming full-fledged preparation for unification.

"If and when north Korea renounces its avowed scheme to communize the south, we will take determined steps to put an end to the state of confrontation and forge a productive relationship based on mutual confidence," he said.

All of these Presidential remarks indicate that the unifica-

tion policy of the Sixth Republic is directed toward the formation of a “national community” in which all Koreans will enjoy a better life. The focus of the unification policy supports fresh initiatives to bring about genuine, peaceful unification and an end to the war of attrition and propaganda between south and north Korea.

Meanwhile, during talks with the presidents of the opposition parties on May 28, 1988, President Roh said that he would pursue unification programs fostering the formation of a national community based on brotherly love and carried out in the spirit that all Koreans, both of the south and the north, should realize the benefits of prosperity.

The President further indicated that the position and views of the opposition parties would be faithfully reflected in the development of all unification related policies.

In this way, the new government, armed with a nationwide consensus and a firm confidence in unification, is exploring in a positive and forward-looking manner a new approach for drastically improving the environment for and strengthen the national ability to attain unification.

2. Announcement of the Government’s Position on the Unification Question

— Opening up of Debate on Unification and Establishing a Single Conduit for Contact with the North —

On June 2, 1988, the government announced that it would take positive steps to liberalize debate on unification in line with growing public concern about and aspiration for unifica-

tion, and that the government should be the sole conduit for proposals to and contacts with north Korea.

The government also announced its official stand on the question of unification, calling for an inter-Korean exchange of personnel and materials to diminish the relationship of confrontation and solidify a basis for peaceful unification.

In a government announcement, a spokesman indicated that in an effort to stimulate healthy discussion about unification, the government had decided to actively liberalize debate on the issue by progressively increasing public access to information and data about north Korea and the rest of the Communist bloc. To this end, he said, a special government unit would be established to revise relevant laws and regulations and ease the criteria used to classify information.

The spokesman stressed that debate on unification must be conducted in accordance with constitutional order and within the framework of existing laws, and that it must be clearly distinguished from the actual implementation of national unification policy. He further made it clear that as the south and the north remain locked in sharp confrontation, and given the fact that north Korea is maintaining a regimented, monolithic system, national interest dictates that the government function as the sole channel for presenting proposals to or having contact with north Korea.

It was also stressed that attempts by some people to make proposals to or effect direct contact with the north over the head of the government is neither conducive to healthy debate nor beneficial to any substantive improvement in south-north relations. As such, efforts of this nature should be stopped as a matter of common sense.

Further, the government stated that in order to bolster confidence and promote national unification, it is essential to

establish a program to facilitate the exchanges of materials and personnel. The program between the south and the north would include mutual visits of artists, athletes, businessmen, journalists, politicians, scholars, students, and writers.

The full text of the announcement made by Chung Han-mo, the Minister of Culture Information, was as follows:

In line with the June 29, 1987, Declaration of Democratic Reforms and the basic democratization policy enunciated in the launching of the Sixth Republic, the government has decided to stimulate healthy discussion on unification by actively liberalizing debate on the issue and by progressively increasing public access to information and data about north Korea and the rest of the Communist bloc.

To this end, the government will establish a special unit to revise relevant laws and regulations and ease the criteria for the classification of information. The opinions of experts and representatives from various walks of life and authoritative private organizations will be reflected in this process.

Debate on unification must be conducted on the basis of constitutional order and within the framework of the existing laws and must be clearly distinguished from the actual implementation of national unification policy.

At present, the south and the north remain locked in sharp confrontation, and their relations are almost totally severed. What is more, north Korea continues to maintain a regimented, monolithic system. In light of such realities, it is necessary, from the standpoint of national interest, for the government to function as the sole channel for making proposals to and for all contact with north Korea.

In this context, recent attempts by some people to make direct contacts with north Korea over the head of the government is not

helpful to healthy debate on unification or to substantive improvement in south-north relations and ought to be stopped as a matter of course.

On the other hand, there is a consensus among all citizens that the Seoul Olympics should be not only an occasion for East-West reconciliation but also a grand festival of national harmony. Accordingly, since the 24th Olympic games were awarded to Seoul, the administration has made multi-faceted efforts through various channels to induce the north to participate in the games and thus make the Seoul Olympics a grand national festival.

Furthermore, the administration will endeavor actively and earnestly to end the south-north confrontation and lay the ground work for peaceful unification. To advance the goal of national unification, it is essential to promote an exchange of material as well as of people from all walks of life, including politicians, businessmen, journalists, artist and writers athletes, scholars and students. The administration will continue to make steadfast efforts to this end.

I appeal to my fellow citizens to understand the position of the government and lend their cooperation to the determined efforts being made to fulfill the yearning of the people for unification.

The government's announced stand on the question of unification stems from comprehensive government policies providing for the liberalization of debate on unification. This is in line with the policy of the Sixth Republic to promote democratization and vastly increase public access to data about north Korea and the rest of the Communist bloc. These actions will serve to stimulate debate on unification and thereby provide the government with a wider sampling of national opinion on which to base future unification related policies.

However, even when debate on unification is liberalized, debate conducted in disregard of existing constitutional order or in violation of law is counterproductive and should be discontinued. Additionally, debate on unification must be clearly distinguished from the actual development, implementation, and execution of unification policies.

Given the fact that north Korea maintains a controlled, monolithic system at a time when the two sides remain locked in sharp confrontation, making the government the sole point of contact with the north is necessary to thwart perfidious north Korean schemes. Further, a sole point of contact offering a solidified position is better suited to the task of bringing the north to the table for productive dialogue.

If only to materialize the “opening of the age of inter-Korea exchanges and cooperation” suggested at the birth of the Sixth Republic and in a subsequent Presidential press conference, it is desirable for delegations from the south and the north to jointly participate in the Seoul Olympics. While it is desirable to conduct exchanges of materials and people from all walks of life, it is equally desirable and realistic that all such exchanges be based on a national consensus and made solely through government coordinated programs.

Reaction at Home

As public concern grew about debate on unification in parallel with the progress toward democratization following the birth of the Sixth Republic, domestic press media showed a keen interest in liberalizing debate on unification. It was noted that free and open debate would enhance the people’s sense of participation and help forge a consensus that would serve as a propellant behind the formulation and execution of unification

policies. The media claimed that the process of unification debate should be "broadly opened to all people, systematically," adding that once debate is over, the essence of the debate should be translated into action solely by government authorities. The press further indicated that developing and forwarding of unification proposals to the north outside of established governmental channels serves no useful purpose in the efforts being made to foster healthy debate on unification.

Commenting on the June 2nd government announcement of its policy to progressively increase public access to information and data about north Korea and to assume the role as the sole point of contact for the communication of all south-north initiatives, the press said such measures should be accepted by and acknowledged as functions of government. Such actions would reduce confusion and forestall attempts by individuals or special interest groups to establish contacts with the north in circumvention of established official channels.

The media also indicated that the quintessential elements to be addressed in any debate on unification should be practicability and effectiveness. They also voice alarm at the empty, impractical ideas and radicalism that is being displayed by some people.

Reaction Abroad

Major world media spoke highly of the fact that despite north Korea's incessant acts of provocation such as the bombing of a Korean Air flight, the new President of south Korea expressed a positive plan to improve relations with north Korea. The world press also urged north Korea to adopt a more rational policy in recognition of the fact that world consensus about the 1988 Summer Olympics has already been forged in favor of south Korea.

Part II

Proposal for High-Level South-North Talks

1. Proposal

As part of the government's affirmative actions to resume dialogue with north Korea, Prime Minister Lee Hyunjae, in a message dated June 3, 1988, addressed to the prime minister of the north's Administration Council, proposed a high-level south-north meeting be held in June in either Seoul or Pyongyang. The meeting would provide an opportunity to discuss, among other things, the issue of north Korea's participation together with the south in the 24th Olympiad. Prime Minister Lee suggested that each delegation be headed by a ministry-level official

Noting in the message, it was due to mutual distrust and the failure of both the south and the north to develop a firm perception of the Korean people as a single-nation family, a family of one root that is divided in an age of pain and frustration aggravated by enmity and confrontation. The message stressed that to dispel such mistrust, it is paramount to restore trust through exchanges and cooperation between both sides of our divided nation.

In addition to the above discussed topics, as well as others that could be raised by both sides, the message also addressed the exchange of representatives from all sectors of the society and ways to make full use of existing but now unused channels of communication. In regard to opening channels of communication, the message suggested that consideration be given to reopening dialogue through the Red Cross, economic and parliamentary meetings, all of which were conducted in the past amid the high expectations of all Koreans.

Also stressed was that with the approaching 24th Olympiad to be held in Seoul, not only Koreans but all other nations of

the world are ardently hoping that the Games will serve as a catalyst to bring together not only East and West, but also the south and the north. To this end, the south will make every possible effort to persuade the north to participate with the south so that the 24th Olympiad will be a pan-national festival.

The south notified the north via the direct telephone line on March 31, 1988, that it would deliver the message through Panmunjom on June 3. However, the north refused to accept the message, obliging the south to utilize a radio broadcast to deliver the proposal.

The full text of Prime Minister Lee's message to the north was as follows:

To Li Gun-mo, Administration Council Prime Minister, north Korea:

It is heartbreaking that although it has been nearly half a century since the Korean people were divided into south and north, the ordeal of the division has yet to be ended. We are thus charged with a historic task of achieving peaceful unification at the earliest possible date. Looking back, we have lived, as the result of the division, in an age of pain, sorrow, and frustration aggravated by enmity and confrontation, which constitutes a dark spot on the 5,000-year history of the Korean nation.

I believe we must not put off any further efforts to bring the unhappy state of affairs to an end and to shape a future for Korea as a unified land.

True, the south and the north have had various forms of dialogue on a number of occasions, producing some limited results. They have, however, been far from satisfactory. I am of the opinion that the reason for this is mutual distrust and a failure to develop a firm perception of the Korean people as a

single-nation family with a common root.

To dispel the mistrust that has grown between the south and the north, it is imperative, above all, to build trust through exchange and cooperation between the divided halves of the nation. It is self-evident that increasing trust will naturally defuse tension between south and north and restore family bonds, thereby speeding the arrival of the day of unification.

The Games of the 24th Olympiad, due to take place soon in Seoul, will be the first of its kind ever to be staged in our land. Not only the Korean people, but the people of all nations of the world are ardently hoping that the Games will serve as a catalyst to bring together not only East and West, but also the south and the north.

In response to such domestic and international expectations and wishes, I believe the south must make every possible effort to see that the north participates in the forthcoming Olympics together with us so that it will be a joyful pan-national festivity.

For the above reason, I respectfully propose talks between high-level authorities of the south and the north to speedily dispel the mistrust that is now standing in the way and thus to lay the groundwork for peaceful unification.

The proposed high-level talks should be able to discuss the participation of the north with us in the Seoul Olympics, the exchange of people, including politicians, businessmen, journalists, religious leaders, artists, writers, athletes, scholars and students, ways to facilitate the resumption of the existing channels of dialogue, including the Red Cross conference, the economic talks and the interparliamentary meetings, all of which used to be conducted and in which the entire Korean people placed high expectations, and other issues raised by both sides.

If both the South and the north would just adhere to the view that they are one and the same nation, I believe that such issues can be resolved smoothly and without any difficulty, thus paving the way for unification.

I hope that the proposed talks will become a reality at an early date, preferably within June, with their first round taking place either in Seoul or Pyongyang. I should like each delegation be composed of about five officials and led by a cabinet minister as the senior delegate.

I look forward to an affirmative response from you.

June 3, 1988

Lee Hyun Jae, Prime Minister

Republic of Korea

2. Background and Purport

To meet the dictate of the age of national self-esteem and reconciliation in a circumstance where Koreans, after nearly half a century, have yet to surmount the ordeal of division, the two sides of Korea should exert more fullfledged efforts than ever to resolve the division mechanism and improve relations at an early date.

Moreover, Koreans now find themselves in a situation where they have to pave the way for improved inter-Korean relations while attempting to forge the upcoming Seoul Olympics into a great festival of national reconciliation. There is increasing need for Koreans to have a fresh understanding and ideas based on the fruits of economic development and democratization to provide a breakthrough in the effort to realize the long-cherished craving of all Koreans for peaceful unification.

It is in the very conformity of the flow of national history that President Roh Tae-woo has expressed a firm determina-

tion toward a dialogue for unification while emphasizing the need of a resolute shift in inter-Korean relations from confrontation to reconciliation through productive confidence-building.

The recent proposal to the north, therefore, can be taken as a first step toward buttressing and materializing President Roh's declaration of the unfolding of an "age of inter-Korean cooperation."

Moreover, the ruling Democratic Justice Party, calling for a basic shift in the approach toward the unification question, forwarded new ideas for unification policy, asking the government to strive positively to persuade north Korea to take part in the Seoul Olympics. A policy shift was taken amidst growing interest in unification, the appearance of diverse opinions on the north's participation in the Seoul Games, and for inter-Korean exchanges of personnel and materials to include students.

In particular, during their May 28, 1988, meeting with President Roh, the heads of the three opposition parties jointly requested that the government take positive steps to induce the north to participate in the Seoul Olympics.

The recent proposal to the north indicates the firm determination of the Sixth Republic to promote dialogue for unification, and a resolve to reflect in its policy the aspiration of the people and the opinions raised by the political parties with respect to the unification question.

Not only Koreans but all peoples of the world share the view that the Seoul Olympics should be a forum for Korean reconciliation as well as for East-West detente. In Lausanne, south-north sports talks were held under the sponsorship of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) to discuss the IOC mediatory plan to allot some Olympic events to north Korea,

but without any success because the north refused to accept the IOC plan.

As is well known, all matters related to Olympic games are subject to IOC control under the Olympic Charter. Moreover, with only about 100 days to go before the opening of the Seoul Games, in terms of time and technic, chances are slim for the implementation of the north Korean idea to co-host the Games or for the formation of a single inter-Korean delegation.

Despite these circumstances, the south made it clear by the recent proposal that it would continue to make all available efforts to persuade north Korea either to accept the IOC's mediatory plan or to at least take part in the Seoul Olympic together with other national olympic committees by accepting the IOC invitation to Seoul.

The south-north talks including the Red Cross conference, economic meeting and parliamentary talks remain suspended after north Korea unilaterally boycotted them in January 1986. In view of the lack of progress in the past, however, the inter-Korean dialogue is at a point where it could register significant achievements if only the north would display a little more sincerity.

With a view to pursuing confidence-building and national reconciliation through mutual goodwill visits, the south has already suggested mutual visits between people from various layers and strata as one of 20 inter-Korean pilot projects proposed to the north on February 1, 1982.

To unfold the age of inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation on a road to ultimate peaceful unification, the importance of personnel exchanges in the solidification of national cohesion can not be over stated and should not be delayed any longer. Additionally, personnel exchanges are in conformity with the universal trend of open-door policy and are fitting as

evidenced by the examples of exchanges in other divided countries — China and Taiwan as well as East and West Germany.

It is self-evident that once mutual visits between people from various sectors of the two sides are realized, so to will extensive material exchanges take place. This done, the predictable result would be a diminution of distrust and an end to the state of mutual discontinuation.

Therefore, if the north is genuinely interested in normalizing the inter-Korean relationship and realizing national unification, they should agree forthwith to resume dialogue. This can be best done through the use of existing channels such as the Red Cross, economic conferences, and parliamentarian meetings. Additionally, they should join in the effort being made by the south to restore national trust and achieve reconciliation by accepting the proposal for a high-level south-north meeting.

The topics put forth by the south for discussion at the proposed high-level meeting are all pending issues to which resolutions are urgently required. Such issues ought to be discussed and settled through direct consultation between authorized government representatives from both sides.

Moreover, inasmuch as the south indicated in its proposal a willingness to discuss any and all issues raised by either side, the proposed high-level meeting would certainly be an appropriate forum for frank and productive dialogue.

3. North Korean Reaction and Evaluation

a. Gist of North Korean Reaction

Reacting to the south's proposal for a high-level authorities

meeting, north Korea on June 6, 1988, in effect rejected the offer by insisting, in a statement issued by the so-called Northern Preparatory Committee for Joint South-North Conference, that “we can consider a south-north authorities meeting in the form of a preliminary meeting to prepare for a joint south-north conference.”

It was noteworthy that the north was trying to exploit the expanding debate on unification among some political and student sectors in the south for their own political gains. Their reaction was aired in a statement signed not by their prime minister to whom the south’s proposal was addressed, but by a bogus organization claiming to be the Northern Preparatory Committee. Additionally, they insisted that all the issues pending between the two sides should be resolved not through dialogue between government authorities but through political talks taking the form of a “joint conference” participated in by people from various layers and strata.

The gist of the statement by the Northern Preparatory Committee to Prepare for joint south-north Conference was as follows:

- The proposal for a south-north meeting of high-level authorities stems from a bad idea to monopolize dialogue and debate on unification. Even if a meeting of authorities were held, no basic problems could be solved between cabinet members.
- If the south and the north were to have a genuine dialogue to resolve problems, a broad forum for negotiation such as a joint conference should be chosen so, along with government authorities, people from various parties, factions, and strata could participate.
- If only a joint south-north conference were held, the ques-

tion of resuming the suspended channels of dialogue could be resolved. Personnel exchanges, too, could be realized by themselves as joint conferences would be held alternately in Seoul and Pyongyang.

- Though the proposal made by the south Korean authorities was unreasonable, we can consider it as a preliminary meeting to prepare for a joint south-north conference. At such a meeting, various procedural matters related to the holding of a joint conference and other working-level matters could be discussed.
- If the south Korean authorities cannot agree to a joint south-north conference at this time, they should not attempt to obstruct bilateral or multilateral contacts and talks between the representatives of various parties, factions, and strata prior to the joint conference.

b. Analysis of the North Korean Refusal to Talk

In their reaction, the north seems to be trying to demonstrate an air of flexibility with respect to the form and topics of the high-level talks proposed by the south. This was done by offering that they could consider the talks as a “preliminary meeting to prepare for a joint south-north conference” or that once a joint conference was held, the issues of co-hosting the Seoul Olympics, resuming the suspended talks, and promoting personnel exchanges would be resolved. However, their call for new channels of dialogue such as a “joint south-north conference” and “student talks” while turning a deaf ear to the resumption of existing dialogue that has already reached a point of near agreement, only serves to highlight their insincerity toward dialogue.

Looking back over the past, the inter-Korean dialogue re-

mains stalemated since north Korea unilaterally suspended the then on-going south-north economic meetings, Red Cross talks, and parliamentary level contacts on January 20, 1986, sighting the annual Team Spirit military training exercise in the south as the causative factor.

Since the turn of 1988, however, the north has proposed a joint south-north conference and south-north student talks, a move taken in an attempt to capitalize on the changing political situation in the south. This action is, of course, a deceptive peace offensive intended to lessen or neutralize international censure of their involvement in the bombing of a Korean Air flight, and an attempt to drive a wedge into public opinion in the south in an effort to foment social unrest.

A review of the list of proposals made by the north in the past clearly illustrates their utterly insincere attitude toward dialogue.

Despite repeated calls by the south for the resumption of the suspended dialogue, north Korea continues to reject the resumption of all talks while at the same time calling for solutions to priority military issues through their proposal for a "tripartite military meeting" on June 17, 1986, and a high-level south-north political and military meeting on December 30, 1986.

Going a step further, in a statement released by an Administration Council spokesman on April 24, 1987, the north formally declared an overall end to the existing dialogue, and on July 23, 1987, proposed a "multilateral military reduction meeting" among south and north Korea and the United States, an offer aimed at bringing about their direct negotiations with the United States. They thus continue their call for the resolution of military issues on a priority basis.

Even when the south proposed a south-north foreign

ministers meeting on August 30, 1987, to comprehensively discuss the issues pending between the two sides such as the ones on the resumption of the suspended talks and the conclusion of a south-north non-aggression agreement, north Korea rejected the proposal in their adherence to the idea of a tripartite meeting among south and north Korea and the U.S.

The north has thus persisted in its intransigence culminating in the atrocity of bombing a Korean Air passenger plane in November 1987.

Their perpetration of the atrocious bombing together with their terrorist bombing in Rangoon, Burma, an incident which led to the branding of north Korea as an "international terrorist group," bears testimony to the fact that they are bent on increasing tension on the Korean peninsula with a view to obstructing the Seoul Olympics.

This indicates that the north is only interested in generating confusion in the south rather than in the resumption of the suspended dialogue. It is for the same purpose that north Koreans have continued a series of "letter offensives" on the south since early 1988.

In his New Year's message, Kim Il-sung proposed a joint south-north conference. Subsequently on January 14 and again on March 8, north Korea called for a preliminary meeting to prepare for the joint conference in letters addressed to the Prime Minister, heads of political parties, leaders of religious and social organizations, and other individuals in the south who were unilaterally selected by the north.

The joint conference suggested by the north is basically nothing more than a redressed version of the meetings they have been proposing since the early 1970s. The only discernible difference being the changing of the titles. The veritable objective of the talks, however, remains the formation of a pro-

communist “united front.” Among such meetings were: a south-north political conference, proposed on April 16, 1973; a grand national conference, (June 23, 1973); and a joint south-north conference of 100, (February 10, 1982). As with all of their other overtures, the latest proposal represents but another page in their deceptive peace offensive, this one aimed at splitting public opinion and fomenting political and social unrest in connection with the ongoing enlivened unification debate in the south.

It also seems clear that by launching their letter drive, propaganda campaign before January 15, 1988, when the south announced the truth about the north Korean terrorist bombing of a Korean Air passenger plane, the north hoped to bolster their tarnished image in the south prior to the truth of their involvement in the bombing being announced. It was also a step taken to shun or cushion the international censure of their continued barbarous actions.

If one considers the chronology of the actions taken by the north — their “letter drive,” their proposal for a joint conference to discuss the suspension of large-scale military exercises, the joint hosting of the Olympics just two weeks before the January 15 invitation deadline date, and then their announcement on January 12, 1988, that they would boycott the Seoul Games — it is clear that these actions were all part of their machination to shift the blame for mounting tension on the Korean peninsula to the south and to establish an excuse to boycott the Games.

Reacting to the north’s ulteriorly motivated proposal, a spokesman for the south, in a January 15 statement, charged that the north Koreans had advanced the idea of a joint south-north conference as a treacherous overture intended only to cloak their anti-national atrocity of bombing a Korean Air

passenger plane. Further, the spokesman demanded that the north help cultivate an atmosphere ripe for dialogue by making an open apology for the plane bombing and by punishing those responsible for the atrocity.

The statement by the government spokesman in response to the bombing was as follows:

The government joins all the people in condemning, with utmost consternation and anger, north Korea for having engineered the barbarous bombing of a Korean Air 858 jet liner in which 115 precious lives were lost.

Still vividly remembering the north Korean terrorist act at the Martyr's Mausoleum in Rangoon, Burma, in 1983, we cannot but be acutely resentful about their latest atrocity, the innumerable kinds of which have been perpetrated by north Korea since the Korean War.

The government demands that north Korea, the mastermind of the airliner bombing, immediately confess to having carried out this terrorist act and make a public apology. We also demand that north Korea sternly punish all those implicated, including those who gave the orders and those who assisted in carrying them out.

Needless to say, this demand is the minimum required in view of the surging nationwide fury and shock. The government sternly warns that north Korea will not be able to get away with its barbarous terrorism without receiving appropriate punishment, including retaliation commensurate with the gravity of the deed.

Moreover, on January 14, north Korea proposed a joint south-north conference to discuss so-called multinational arms reduction, etc. But, such a conspicuous sham will never whitewash the anti-national act of mass murder. The proposal, in which they only paid lip service to the alleviation of tension provoked by such an appalling atrocity, cannot but be a malignant

act of deception with a hidden dagger.

If north korea is really interested in south-north dialogue, they should return to national conscience, admit their wrongdoing, make a public apology, and punish those responsible. The government wishes to emphasize that these steps are essential to the restoration of an atmosphere for meaningful dialogue.

We appeal to all countries subscribing to freedom, peace, and respect for the value of human life, and to all relevant international organizations to pass fair judgement on, and appropriately condemn, this barbarous and inhuman act of terror, so as to help eradicate such acts of terrorism against mankind forever.

Once again the government expresses deep condolences to the bereaved families and other relatives of the KAL 858 bombing victims and also appeals to all the citizens for even keener vigilance against the north.

In addition, north Korea agitated anti-U.S. and antigovernment struggles among the people by setting forth 107-items, so called "slogans for struggles against the south in 1988" on February 4 in the name of a group called the Central Committee of the Front for Korean Nationalism and Democracy. The items featured "anti-U.S. struggles," "convocation of a joint south-north conference," and "opposition to the Seoul Olympics." More recently, the north launched positive propaganda and agitation campaigns against the south. These campaigns were timed to take advantage of demands being made by some students in the south for "student talks."

In a so-called "message to the south Korean students" on May 18, 1988, north Korea, laying combative slogans, made a thinly veiled attempt to link the idea of student talks to the logic of a Communist revolution in the south. The message contained such slogans as: "let us carry high the banner of struggles;" "our meeting at Panmunjom comes through strug-

gles and so does the success of our talks through struggles;” and “let us achieve our meeting with struggles and usher in the dawn of unification with struggles.”

This belligerent move by north Korea was clearly made to take advantage of the ongoing democratization in the south to subvert the Seoul Olympics and exacerbate anti-government and anti-U.S. struggles- all under the guise of respectable debate on unification.

Such schemes are not unprecedented. In the wake of the April 19, 1960, Student Uprising, the north moved quickly to accept on May 13, 1960, a proposal by Seoul National University students for south-north student meetings. Again on the heels of the hectic student demonstrations against Korea-Japan talks on June 3, 1966, the north proposed an exchange of student tourists between the two sides on August 19, 1966. These actions are consistent with the north’s policy to attempt to take advantage of every opportunity to exploit student movements in the south for the creation of a pro-Communist front for unification.

Their rejection of the demands made by the south for an open apology for the bombing of the KAL plane and the punishment of those responsible for the atrocity, and their persistent agitation of anti-government and U.S. struggles through a series of letter campaigns pressing for a joint south-north conference and south-north student talks, are obviously part of their united front strategy. A strategy clearly calculated to set off heated debate on unification among the political parties, religious organization, and on the campuses. It is equally clear that their objectives are to cause a split in public opinion, create social unrest, and further obstruct the successful staging of the Seoul Olympics.

In this light, it is easy to understand north Korea’s refusal

of the south's proposal for high-level south-north talks. Notwithstanding the north's continued lack of sincerity, however, the south remains firm in its resolve to foster a unification atmosphere befitting the new age through the joint participation in the Seoul Olympics, and expanded exchanges and mutual visits between the two sides of Korea.

Reaction at Home

Commenting on the south's proposal for a high-level south-north meeting of authorities, major domestic press media described the offer as a "practical and forward-oriented proposal different from past methods." The press then editorially urged north Korea to accept the overture.

In particular, the press pointed out that the proposal was highly significant in that it was the first official proposal for dialogue made following the birth of the Sixth Republic, and also because it was made at a time when unification debate was being liberalized and amid surging public concern about the unification question. They spoke highly of the offer, saying that it demonstrated the government's firm determination to provide a "forum for grand national reconciliation."

At the same time, the press stressed that if north Korea was really interested in moving toward the unification question, they should, instead of seeking to foment social unrest by taking advantage of and stimulating dissident activities in the south, accept the south's proposal if only to remove the barrier of distrust and thereby provide added momentum for mutual confidence-building.

SOUTH-NORTH DIALOGUE IN KOREA



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Part I

July 7 Special Presidential Declaration for National Self-Esteem, Unification, and Prosperity

1. Background and Contents of the Special Declaration

On July 7, 1988, President Roh Tae Woo announced a special declaration to set forth the basic direction of the Sixth Republic's unification and foreign policies. The declaration embodies the determination and vision to provide an epochal turning-point in inter-Korean relations and the nation's northward diplomacy.

The declaration was significant in that it was intended to forge a new age of national self-esteem, unification, and prosperity by positively accommodating matured conditions, namely, favorable changes in the atmosphere for unification and new developments in the inter-Korean relationship, which stem from the trend toward international detente and reconciliation.

In his first post-inauguration press conference on April 21, 1988, President Roh stated that he would dedicate the rest of his term of office to paving the way to peaceful unification through the promotion of reconciliation and cooperation between the two Koreas. To back up the presidential intent, the government, among other steps, liberalized debate on unification and opened reference materials to the public on the Communist bloc, including north Korea.

Also during his talks with the heads of the opposition political parties held at Chong Wa Dae on May 28, 1988, the President made it clear that the government would pursue a unification policy in a way that would help create a national community in which all Koreans could live well.

The special declaration was the manifestation of the presidential intent to take a series of one-sided measures to contribute to national reconciliation and cooperation through

the establishment of such a policy foundation and thereby to resolutely terminate the unproductive inter-Korean relations characterized by about 40 years of confrontation and competition.

The South has steadily accelerated its economic growth and democratization through the strength of the united and fervent determination of the people. As a result, South Koreans have developed a firm confidence in the future of the nation.

Besides, Korea's national pride soared in response to the increasing trust and standing the nation had earned through its efforts to broaden avenues of international cooperation with countries with which it previously had no exchange, at a time when the 1988 Seoul Olympics, the first festival of mankind in Korea's history and the biggest of its kind in the history of the Games, was just around the corner amidst a growing mood of international detente.

The national confidence and pride were developing into expectations and aspiration for national unification, which in turn led to calls for a new recognition and a change in ideas on the issues of unification.

Today, Koreans should together forge a new age of reconciliation and cooperation, turning away from the long quagmire of enmity and national self-injury. To this end, each side should stop considering the other as an adversary bent on competition and confrontation, and together pave the way to cooperation and co-prosperity.

In today's international society, the new wave of openness and exchange transcends national boundaries, even of those having vastly different cultures and historical backgrounds. The prevailing world trend is thus to seek reconciliation and cooperation, transcending both ideologies and systems.

The United States and the Soviet Union, both of which

have something to do, directly or indirectly, with Korean dilemma, have entered a phase of detente, and even China and the Soviet Union with which South Korea maintains no diplomatic relations, have shown signs of supporting the alleviation of the long-standing tension on the Korean peninsula.

Koreans now find themselves at a historic crossroad requiring the intense promotion of this wave of international detente and cooperation in order to make it reach every corner of the Korean peninsula, and thereby provide a breakthrough in efforts to overcoming division and bring about unification based on a spirit of national self-esteem.

If in the process, the South can carry the closed and isolated North into the international community as a responsible member, it would eliminate the waste of national resources and promote a balanced development of the Korean peninsula amidst the current international flow toward the "construction of better countries." Ultimately, this could lead to easing tensions and ensure a durable peace on the Korean peninsula.

The full text of the Special Declaration was as follows:

My dear 60 million compatriots,

Today, I am going to enunciate the policy of the Sixth Republic to achieve the peaceful unification of our homeland, a long-standing goal dear to the hearts of the entire Korean people.

We have been suffering the pain of territorial division for almost half a century. This national division has inflicted numerous ordeals and hardships upon the Korean people, thus hindering national development.

Dismantling the barriers separating the South and the North and building a road to a unified and prosperous homeland is a duty history has imposed on every Korean alive today.

The South and the North, divided by different ideologies and political systems, have gone through a fratricidal war. The divid-

ed halves of the single Korean nation have distrusted, denounced, and antagonized each other since the day of territorial partition and this painful state has yet to be remedied.

Even though the division was not brought about by the volition of the Korean people, it is our responsibility to achieve national unification through our independent capabilities.

We must all work together to open a bright era of South-North reconciliation and cooperation. The time has come for all of us to endeavor in concert to promote the well-being and prosperity of the entire Korean people.

Today, the world is entering an age of reconciliation and cooperation transcending ideologies and political systems. A brave new tide of openness and exchange is engulfing peoples of different historical and cultural backgrounds.

I believe we have now come to a historic moment when we should be able to find a breakthrough toward a lasting peace and unification on the Korean peninsula which is still fraught with the danger of war amidst persisting tension and confrontation.

My fellow compatriots,

The fundamental reason that the tragic division is yet to be overcome is because both the South and the North have been regarding the other as an adversary, rather than realizing that both halves of Korea belong to the same national community. As such, inter-Korean enmity has continued to intensify.

Having lived in a single ethnic community, the Korean people have shaped an illustrious history and cultural traditions, while triumphing over almost ceaseless trials and challenges with pooled national strength and wisdom.

Accordingly, developing relations between the South and the North as members of a single nation community to achieve common prosperity is a short cut to realizing a prosperous and unified homeland. This is also the path to national self-esteem and integration.

Now the South and the North must tear down the barrier that

divides them and implement exchanges in all fields. Positive step after positive step must be taken to restore mutual trust and strengthen bonds as members of one nation.

With the realization that we both belong to a single community, we must also discontinue confrontation on the international scene. I hope that North Korea will contribute to the community of nations as a responsible member and that this will accelerate the opening and development of the North Korean society.

South and North Korea should recognize each other's place in the international community and cooperate with each other in the best interest of all Koreans.

Sixty million fellow compatriots,

Today, I promise to make efforts to open a new era of national self-esteem, unification, and prosperity by building a social, cultural, economic, and political community in which all Koreans can participate under the principles of independence, peace, democracy, and welfare. To that end, I declare to the nation and to the world that the following policies will be pursued:

1. We will actively promote exchange of visits between the people of South and North Korea, including politicians, businessmen, journalists, religious leaders, cultural leaders, academics and students, and will make necessary arrangements to ensure that Koreans residing overseas can freely visit both Koreas.

2. Even before the successful conclusion of the South-North Red Cross talks, we will promote and actively support, from a humanitarian viewpoint, all measures which can assist dispersed families in their efforts to find out whether their family members in the other part of the peninsula are still alive and their whereabouts, and will also promote exchanges of correspondence and visits between them.

3. We will open doors of trade between South and North Korea, which will be regarded as internal trade within the national community.

4. We hope to achieve a balanced development of the national economy with a view to enhancing the quality of life for all Koreans in both the South and the North, and will not oppose nations friendly with us trading non-military goods with North Korea.

5. We hope to bring to an end wasteful diplomacy characterized by competition and confrontation between the South and North, and to cooperate in ensuring that North Korea makes a positive contribution to the international community. We also hope that representatives of South and North Korea will contact each other freely in international forums and will cooperate to pursue the common interest of the whole Korean nation.

6. To create an atmosphere conducive to durable peace on the Korean peninsula, we are willing to cooperate with North Korea in its efforts to improve relations with countries friendly to us including the United States and Japan, and in parallel with this, we will continue to seek improved relations with the Soviet Union, China, and other socialist countries.

I trust that North Korea will positively respond to the measures outlined above. If the North shows a positive attitude, I will make it clear that even more progressive measures will be taken one after the other. I hope that this declaration today will serve to open a new chapter in the development of inter-Korean relations and will lead to unification. I believe that if the entire 60 million Korean people pool their wisdom and strength, the South and the North will be integrated into a single social, cultural and economic community before this century is out.

I am confident that on this basis we will accomplish the great task of unifying into a single national entity in the not so very distant future.

2. Significance of the Special Declaration

The special declaration was to stress that the South, starting

from the awareness that the South and the North are a single nation though they have different political systems, would accommodate North Korean compatriots as members of the Korean nation and positively promote mutual trade and exchange, thereby paving the road to the alleviation of tension between South and North Korea and further to peaceful unification.

In a realistic sense, the declaration marked a switch in the unification policy of the South in favor of positive policy providing conditions favorable to unification by, say, prompting the openness and development of the North Korean society, departing from the passive policy of blockading an already isolated and closed North Korea.

The July 7 declaration, which brought a big change in the perception of the unification issue, is highly significant largely in the two following areas.

Change in the Recognition of North Korea

The special declaration can be taken to have brought a significant change in the South's relations with the North as the South came to accommodate the North now, instead of treating the North as a hostile adversary amid competition and confrontation. The North is now viewed as a member of the same national community pursuing co-prosperity based on mutual trust, reconciliation and cooperation.

The time has come for the South and the North to restore, at an early date, a sense of being part of a single national community, sharing a common ethnic blood line, history, and culture.

This is especially important due to the fact that continued self-injurious conduct resulting from the mutual counter-

productive actions and distrust can only lead to additional waste of national resources and further damage national self-esteem.

In fact, if the South and the North continue to distrust and defame each other and indulge in mutual mud-slinging in the international arena, it will stand in stark contrast with the level of development in the South and the matured public sentiment and pride of the people hosting the Olympics.

Therefore, the prime objective of the declaration may well be to actually recognize the existence of North Korea and adopt the premise that there are in fact two systems of government within the single nation of Korea, and therefore seek national integration through the promotion of mutual understanding and cooperation.

In other words, the declaration means that the South intends to regard, in a temporary measure pending actual unification, inter-Korean relations as a special relationship within a national community instead of that of two independent countries.

This was expressly evident in the phrase indicating that the South would promote trade with the North on an intra-country rather than inter-country basis.

With respect to a concrete and realistic approach to national unification, the declaration forwards a principle of unification calling for the two existing systems of government to dismantle the barrier, and integrate themselves into a single social, cultural, and economic community. The declaration calls for this to be done through positive exchanges, openness, and cooperation. And in the long run, it calls for the development of a political community to lead the way to the unification of the country.

Even the European Community (EC), comprising countries

of different histories, cultures, and ethnic origins, remains a single-minded community despite their different backgrounds and irrespective of national boundaries. The EC is now in the process of developing a political community.

In light of the accomplishment of the EC under such adverse conditions, it is not unrealistic to expect Korea, having been a single community throughout its time-honored history, to achieve unification. This is especially true when one stops to consider that throughout her history of trials and adversities, Koreans have never lost the bonds of national unity. Even when divided by conflicting ideologies, the roots that unite all Koreans have not withered.

Both Koreas are now faced with the task of rapidly unfolding a new age of national self-esteem, unification, and prosperity, an age in which all Koreans can live well through the restoration and development of the national community it once enjoyed and presently seeks to regain.

To make this new age a reality, both sides must take positive measures to restore mutual confidence and strengthen patriotism based on reciprocal recognition, and establish a bilateral partnership in regaining national unification.

Change in the Basis for Unification and Foreign Policies

The special declaration represents a switch in the unification and foreign policies of the South. The new policy calls for the South to cooperate with the North in its participation in the international community as a responsible member, and even go as far as to support their efforts to improve their relations with the U.S., Japan, and other allies of the South. The new policy replaces the past policy aimed at isolating the North from the rest of the world and thereby prompt change from within.

Such a positive policy, paving the way for the North to advance into the international community, incorporates the intent, within the capabilities and confidence of the South, to improve conditions for unification by helping realize the international development of the North.

As excessive economic disparity or an imbalance of power would be detrimental to unification efforts, the South should be prepared to help improve the quality of life for the people of the North and foster a balanced development of its economy.

Through the positive promotion of personnel and material exchanges with and extending brotherly love and assistance to the North, the South will be contributing to the wellbeing of the people of the North, improving inter-Korean relations and fostering the cause of a durable peace.

The proposed free travel by Korean residents overseas to both North and South Korea, which also represents a sweeping policy change, would go a long way in resolving such humanitarian issues as hometown visits and reunions between blood relatives. It would also serve to accelerate the opening of the closed society of the North.

In fact, it would be unrealistic for the South to continue its policy of blocking the advancement of the North into the international community, while at the same time seeking to improve relations with the Soviet Union, China, and other Communist-bloc countries through a positive northward policy.

Considering the South's superior national strength and international standing, the North's inroads into the international community can no longer pose any threat to the South. Nor can the success of the South's northward policy be considered a prerequisite to improvement in relations between the North and the countries of the West.

Meanwhile, the policy switch calling for the South to end

opposition to its allies trading non-military goods with the North is also expected to prompt sweeping changes in relationships between the countries of the world and the North. This should also accelerate internal change and openness in the North.

In essence, the special declaration served to clearly highlight the magnanimity of the South. This is highly significant in that it provides the groundwork for the South to end the wasteful policies toward the North characterized by competition and confrontation, while at the same time maximizing the common national interest in the international community.

3. Significance of the Six-Point Policy

Pursuit and Principles of the New Age

The special declaration codifies the basic need for both Koreas to unfold a new age of national self-esteem, unification, and prosperity by creating social, cultural, economic, and political communities in which all Koreans participate under the principles of democracy, independence, peace, and well-being.

It is in this spirit that the six-point policy will be pursued. If and when North Korea makes an affirmative response, more progressive steps could then be taken in same direction.

The principles of democracy, independence, peace, and wellbeing which underlie the special declaration involve the following:

«Principle of Democracy»

- Creation of a community in which all Koreans participate of their own free will.
- Exclusion of monopolistic pursuits by special interest groups.

«Principle of Independence»

- Independent and direct resolution of the unification issue by South and North Korea.
- Open and cooperative participation as members of the international community in the pursuit of national interests.

«Principle of Peace»

- Joint pursuit of peace between the South and the North, as well as the furtherance of peace in the region.
- Switch from the deterrent-oriented peace existing since the Korean War truce to a peace with a more positive perception for the establishment of a unification-oriented, inter-Korean relationship based on the alleviation of tension and the realization of a more durable peace.

«Principle of Wellbeing»

- Promotion of the wellbeing of all Koreans of the South and the North as well as those residing overseas.
- Enhancement of the quality of life, especially of Koreans in the North, and promotion of balanced development of the national economy.

**Positive Promotion of Constructive Exchanges
(Item No. 1 of the Declaration)**

The basic reason for the failure to overcome the nearly half century state of nation division rests in the mutual distrust that

developed between the two sides. This distrust all but totally blocked the development of a sense of national unity of a people sharing common historical roots.

What is important in the process of dispelling such distrust and setting the stage for national integration, therefore, is for the two sides to promote mutual understanding and elevate the sense of national cohesion through exchange and cooperation as a people united.

The government has proposed a meeting of high level government authorities to discuss the issue of exchanges of people from various sectors such as politicians, business persons, journalist, religious leaders, writers and artists, athletes, and scholars and students. The government made it clear that it would positively strive to realize such personnel exchanges through negotiations between the government authorities of the two sides.

The South-North personnel exchanges envisaged in the special declaration were in step with this series of government policies.

Opening the Door for Free Travel by Overseas Koreans (Item No. 1 of the Declaration)

Since the kind of unification and prosperity the South pursues can be attained only through the creation of a national community in which all those who regard themselves as Koreans can participate and lead better lives, it cannot precipitate problems in any areas where the members reside.

However, the fierce inter-Korean confrontation resulting from the protracted division has led to mutual distrust and suspended contacts, even between overseas Koreans, a state which has effectively denied overseas Koreans all access to

North Korea.

Presently, there are about 2 million Koreans living in Western and Third World countries and another 2.2 million are known to be living in Communist-bloc nations. It goes without saying that both sides of Korea, entrusted with the task of forging an age of South-North reconciliation and cooperation, have the duty to ease the pains of our overseas compatriots.

The Seoul government has already opened the door substantially to visits to South Korea by Korean residents in Japan affiliated with Chosoren, an organization of pro-Pyongyang Korean residents. If other overseas Koreans also are able to travel freely to both South and North Korea as suggested in the special declaration, it will surely contribute much to quelling distrust and restoring mutual understanding between the South and the North.

Humanitarian Aspects of the Six-Point Policy (Item No. 2 of the Declaration)

Those who suffer most from the pain and misfortune of the 43-year division are the roughly 10 million dispersed family members. It is therefore an important duty of both the South and the North to take definitive actions to dispel that suffering.

It is with this awareness that the government of the South has done all it could since 1971 to resolve the question of separated families through inter-Korean dialogue. One achievement of these efforts was the exchange of dispersed family hometown visitors and art troupes in the autumn of 1985.

However, north Korea refuses to resume the Red Cross talks despite the fact that the talks had reached a point where if both sides had made but a little more effort, an accord could have been reached on such issues as determining the fate and

whereabouts of separated families, the exchange of letters, and even mutual visits.

The declaration served in part as a means for the government to express its unswerving intent to resolve the problem of dispersed families through all available means on a top priority basis.

In the future, the government will provide both direct and indirect assistance through such means as making travel arrangements between the two sides, creation of a reunion center to facilitate the collection and dissemination of information related to missing family members, the exchange letters, and arranging mutual visits and meetings.

Opening the Door for South-North Trade (Item No. 3 of the Declaration)

For the South and the North to share common prosperity as a single nation, they must first evaluate both the size and quality of the national economy, a step furthered by restoring and developing an economic community.

In fact, the two sides have already set a precedent for the practice of mutual assistance with the delivery and receipt of relief goods for flood victims. Further, five rounds of the South-North economic meeting have resulted in agreement, in principle, on trade and other economic cooperation. The economic meeting itself progressed to the point where agreement on minutes was at hand.

The opening of the door to inter-Korean trade announced in the special declaration calls for the South to regard the inter-Korean relationship not as being between independent countries but as a "transitory, special relationship" oriented toward reciprocal integration, and regarding inter-Korean trade itself

as inter-Korean business dealings within the nation. This means that no duties in the form of tariffs would be imposed on goods shipped to the South from the North.

In his first press conference after his inauguration, President Roh Tae Woo expressed his strong determination to bring about inter-Korean cooperation to lay the groundwork for peaceful unification. His recent declaration was based on such progress in inter-Korean economic talks and reflects his determination to promote cooperation between the two sides of Korea.

No Opposition to Non-Military Trading by Allies with North (Item No. 4 of the Declaration)

In the past, South and North Korea were locked in fierce confrontational struggle for national strength. And while the South far surpassed the North in terms of economic ability, posting a gap of 6-to-1, it had asked its allies to refrain from trading with North Korea. Today, the volume of trading between the North and the South's allies totals no more than US\$500 million per year.

However, it cannot be denied that Koreans can expect mature conditions for national prosperity and unification only when the quality of life for all members of the national community is advanced and the balanced development of the national economy ensured.

The policy position expressed in the special declaration provides that the government in Seoul cease its opposition to trade conducted between its allies and the North, provided such trade would contribute to the stabilization of the livelihood of the North Korean people and enhance their wellbeing.

It is reasonable to expect that such measures would prompt

North Korea to participate in the international community, accelerate its openness, and contribute to the easing of tensions and thus brighten prospects for unification.

**Free Inter-Korean Contacts and Cooperation
on a Global Basis
(Item No. 5 of the Declaration)**

At present, South and North Korea are pursuing a fiercely competitive and confrontational brand of diplomacy. This is clearly evident within Third World countries, the United Nations, and other international organizations where both sides engage in slandering and heated propaganda attacks. This has resulted in the self-inflicted defacement of national self-esteem and prestige and is undermining efforts to broaden national interest.

The South, which has opened its doors even to those nations with different ideologies and systems of government, plans to redirect its diplomatic efforts to the task of maximizing the common interest of the Korean people by accepting and accommodating, with dauntlessness and maturity, the North as the object of cooperation.

Accordingly, the South will desist from engaging in diplomatic confrontation with the North at such international arenas as the United Nations and the Non-Aligned Movement. Instead, it will encourage their entry into world organizations and support their bid for selection as an executive member country of world bodies. The South will also foster conditions in which delegates from both sides can meet freely and exchange opinions anywhere in the world and take the lead in directing the current world flow of detente and openness.

**Efforts to Improve Relations between the North
and Allies of the South
(Item No. 6 of the Declaration)**

To establish an atmosphere ripe for unification and durable peace on the Korean peninsula, the South has, since the birth of the Sixth Republic, pursued a northward policy with an eye to improving relations with the northern continental countries with which the South does not currently maintain diplomatic relations.

In this context, and based on the overall balance between the South and the North the special declaration expresses the progressive position calling for the South to cooperate with the North in efforts to improve its relations with allies of the South, including the United States and Japan.

The new stand was also intended to promote independent diplomacy by both Koreas. This is in line with the current trend of detente among countries having a stake in the Korean peninsula and will further serve to buttress efforts being made to achieve peaceful unification.

More Progressive Steps in Return for Affirmative Response

The declaration illustrates the South's strong determination to take and carry out all available measures to overcome and end the discontinuation and confrontation existing between the South and the North.

The declaration was made with an expectation that the North would make an affirmative response. In return for such response, the South promised to take even more progressive steps.

In short, the declaration is a manifestation of the deter-

mination of the Sixth Republic to vigorously enforce a comprehensive and progressive unification policy so as to forge a new age of national prosperity for all Koreans.

4. Reaction from the North

On July 11, North Korea rejected the special declaration in a statement released by the Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland.

In the statement, the North asserted that the July 7 declaration was nothing more than a “redressed version” of the Formula for National Reconciliation and Democratic Unification and the idea of cross contacts. “The declaration was nothing worth studying and contains nothing new,” the statement said, and went on to reiterate their demand for prior resolution of military issues, insisting that disarmament must first be realized to ease tension.

North Korea turned down the South’s proposal for exchanges and cross contacts as a “theory of gradation” and a “policy to firm up division,” arguing that if the South were interested in dialogue and unification, it should agree to their idea of a joint South-North conference and guarantee the realization of a South-North student meeting slated for August 15.

The gist of the statement by the Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland was as follows:

- ° The so-called July 7 Special Declaration is nothing more than a different version of an old document, produced by

changing some words and expressions of the Formula for National Reconciliation and Democratic Unification and the ideas of cross contacts, namely the idea to perpetuate the division of Korea, which his predecessor put forth in a scenario worked out by the United States.

- The South Korean Special Declaration, most of all, disregards fundamental issues essential to the resolution of the unification question.
- If South-North relations are to be improved and a road explored for unification, problems should be settled beginning with the question of dispelling tension and removing the danger of war.
- We cannot but pay special attention to the fact that the July 7 Special Declaration began with and passes through the divisional gradation theory and concluded with the idea of cross contacts.
- All indications are that so long as the American imperialists remain in South Korea carrying out their colonization, the South Korean authorities can hardly depart from a two-Korea policy or have a firm determination toward unification, nor should it be expected that they could put forth any wise unification policy.
- We urge that if the South Korean authorities are really interested in dialogue and unification, they should respond affirmatively to our call for a joint South-North conference.

North Korea delivered their negative reaction to the July 7 Special Declaration in the name of the Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland, a mere auxiliary organization of the Worker's (Communist) Party, instead of the government authorities, suggesting that north Korea in effect shuns substantial contacts and talks between government authorities

of the two sides.

The North branded the South's ideas of personnel and material exchanges and Red Cross contacts as a gradation theory and an attempt to perpetuate the division, and continued to demand a joint South-North conference. This may well be part of their political propaganda designed to give the impression at home and abroad that their ideas are "unification oriented," and also to cause a split in the public opinion in the South, taking advantage of the open unification debate in the South.

5. Reaction at Home and Abroad

Editorializing on the Special Presidential Declaration on National Esteem, Unification, and Prosperity, major domestic newspapers welcomed the declaration as having set forth the basic direction of the unification and foreign policies of the new Republic. The editorials said that it represented a step forward in the nation's policy for South-North peaceful co-existence and national unification, which, they remarked, is based on the South's growing confidence. The newspapers then called for North Korea to make a sincere response to the declaration.

In particular, the editorials pointed out that the Special Declaration represented a new concept for unification and established a concrete policy to accommodate North Korea as a member of the national community. At the same time, the press said, it called for the setting aside of ideological differences and an end to the practice of regarding the North as a rival in confrontation and competition, and for the ultimate

realization of unification while pursuing co-prosperity.

The media also observed that the declaration embodied the determination of the new government to terminate the past age of South-North confrontation and instead induce North Korea to become a good-intentioned partner by helping it open its closed society, renew severed relationships, reestablish exchanges, and to end confrontation in favor of cooperation. They thus spoke highly of the declaration, commenting that it is of historic significance in that it represents an “epochal breakthrough” in the inter-Korean relationship.

The newspapers urged North Korea to discard their unrealistic and anachronistic idea of making direct contact with the people of South Korea, and make a sincere response to the South’s reciprocal and realistic overture in conformity with the flow of the times in which all peoples of the world crave unification.

At the same time, the governments of the United States, Japan, and other allies of the South and major foreign newspapers evaluated President Roh’s Special Declaration as a “constructive, forward-looking, and flexible” proposal. They further expressed the hope that with the overture as momentum, dialogue would be spurred on between South and North Korea and other relevant countries, contributing much to the success of the Seoul Olympics, a durable peace on the Korean peninsula, and to a general stability in Asia.

In particular, they observed that a switch in the policy toward North Korea from that of “dialogue with confrontation” to that of “dialogue with a good-intentioned partner” was the most in depth of the North-ward proposals made by President Roh. They also saluted the Special Declaration as the “second Roh Tae Woo declaration” following his June 29 Declaration of last year.

They further noted that although North Korea may not respond with an immediate, favorable reaction, the North would not be able to be totally unresponsive to it without risking isolation from the rest of the international community.

Part II

Measures to Embody the Basic Spirit of the Declaration

The July 7 Special Declaration was the expression in the form of a declaration of the government's positive will to establish a new turning-point both in the inter-Korean relationship and its northward policy for realizing national integration and prosperity through South-North reconciliation and cooperation.

The government of the Republic of Korea has steadily taken a series of follow-up measures of its own consistent with the spirit of the declaration. These actions were taken with the awareness that the unconditional and resolute implementation of programs substantially conducive to the improvement of the inter-Korean relations would be one way to sustain the basic spirit of the declaration.

At the same time, and as some of the programs will work only when North Korea joins in, the South has taken a number of steps to ensure that the true intent of the declaration is clearly understood by the North.

1. Proposal for Working-Level Red Cross Meetings

a. Proposal

Kim Sang-hyop, president of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross (ROKNRC), calling for the early resumption of the suspended South-North Red Cross Conference, proposed on July 13, 1988, that a South-North working-level meeting be held. The stated purpose of the requested meeting was to discuss programs such as the second exchange of hometown visitors. This type of program can be realized through the efforts of working-level contacts, and they are

urgently needed to resolve the pains of dispersed families even before resuming the stalled Red Cross talks.

In a telephone message addressed to Son Sung-pil, chairman of the Central Committee of the North Korean Red Cross, Kim suggested that a Red Cross working-level meeting be held at Panmunjom before the close of July. He said the proposed talks could discuss:

- The question of exchanging letters of inquiries and replies regarding the information as to the fate and whereabouts of dispersed families;
- The question of arranging for the exchange of letters between families whose fate and whereabouts were determined through mutual Red Cross organizations as a result of the exchange of groups of dispersed family hometown visitors in 1985;
- The question of providing opportunities for overseas dispersed families to determine the fate and whereabouts of their missing family members, and the exchange of letters between them to realize reunions; and
- The question of promoting a second exchange of groups of dispersed family hometown visitors before the end of this year.

Also in the message, the ROKNRC president assured the North that if dispersed families in the North wish to visit areas of the South to meet with their dispersed family members, the South would guarantee their personal safety and provide them with all necessary conveniences.

He further disclosed that under the basic spirit of the July 7 declaration, the ROKNRC was earnestly reviewing various practicable projects to resolve the dispersed family question on

a priority basis.

The full text of ROKNRC President Kim's telephone message to the North was as follows:

To Son Sung-pil, Chairman of the Central Committee, North Korea Red Cross;

I deeply regret that the 11th full-dress South-North Red Cross meeting failed to be held to date, three years after the 10th meeting was held in Seoul on December 3, 1985.

As you remember, the South and North Korean Red Crosses, in their seven rounds of talks in the 1970s and three rounds in the 1980s, registered substantial progress in the discussion on the projects envisioned in the five topics. Moreover, we realized the exchange of groups of dispersed family hometown visitors and art troupes for the first time in 40 years, thus brightening prospects for the further of the dispersed family programs.

It is the inherent duty of the Red Cross to determine the whereabouts of the families and relatives dispersed in the South and the North and to facilitate their free reunions. Considering the cravings of dispersed family members, this is a most pressing task that cannot be put off any further for any reason.

A look at the proposals our two sides produced at the 10th Red Cross meeting shows that although there were some differences in the format of agreement and in some contents, the two sides neared an accord on basic issues. I am thus positive that if we will have only a couple more meetings, the full-dress talks could be successfully concluded.

It was under the spirit of the need to resolve the pains of dispersed families on a priority basis that our government, in the July 7 Special Presidential Declaration, said it would arrange and support efforts to determine the fate and whereabouts of displaced families in the South and the North as well as the exchange of letters and mutual visits even before the South-North Red Cross

Conference was resumed.

In this context, I once again urge that the suspended South-North Red Cross talks be resumed at an early date.

At the same time, I courteously propose to you that the following programs be implemented to ease the pains of dispersed families as soon as possible.

First, when elderly dispersed family members wish to obtain information about missing blood relatives before they die, and as such forward a letter requesting information as to the fate and whereabouts of their family members and/or relatives residing in the North, the South shall deliver such letters to you. Upon receipt, your side can process the request and provide the reply through the ROKNRC. When your side receives a similar request, you can deliver same to the ROKNRC. We will then process the request and provide you with all relevant information as to the conditions of their family members located in the South. To this end, the Red Cross liaison office in Panmunjom can be used.

Second, the exchange of letters be arranged between dispersed families who met at the time of the exchange of dispersed family hometown visitors and art troupes in September of 1985. Further, letters also be exchanged between dispersed families whose status and whereabouts were determined as a result of letters of request processed by the two Korean Red Cross organizations. The exchange of these letters can also be processed through the Panmunjom liaison office.

Third, opportunities be provided for dispersed families residing abroad to find out the fate and whereabouts of missing blood relatives, to exchange letters, and to meet. If necessary, the assistance of international Red Cross organizations can be sought to facilitate such actions.

Fourth, we hope that the second exchange of dispersed family visitors will be realized before the close of this year.

Believing that such projects can be effectively implemented

through working-level consultations rather than full-dress meetings, I propose that a South-North working-level Red Cross meeting be held at Panmunjom on a date of your choosing before July 30.

In addition, if any dispersed families in the North wish to visit their blood relatives located in the South, we shall, from a humanitarian standpoint, warmly receive them in the spirit of brotherly love. We make it clear that we will guarantee their personal safety and will provide all other conveniences.

I look forward to your affirmative response.

July 13, 1988

Kim Sang-Hyop

President

Republic of Korea National Red Cross

b. Significance of the Proposal

The South-North Red Cross Conference can be said to have reached a stage where, with a little additional effort by both sides, a successful conclusion is at hand. A look at the suggestions put forth by the two sides in the course of the ten full-dress meetings, shows that, despite some differences in the format of the agreement and its contents, the two sides neared an accord on basic matters such as the method of implementation of the five-topic projects.

At the 10th meeting held in Seoul, in particular, the two sides reached an agreement in principle on the five-topic package resolution and free travel between the South and the North. They failed to reach a complete accord simply because of differences related to the preparation of an agreement.

Five-Topic Package

1. The question of ascertaining, and informing thereof, the fate and whereabouts of dispersed families and relatives in the South and the North.
2. The question of facilitating free mutual visits and meetings among dispersed family members and relatives in the South and the North.
3. The question of facilitating free exchange of mail among the dispersed families and relatives in the South and the North.
4. The question of facilitating free reunions of dispersed families.
5. Other humanitarian problems to be settled.

In the first ever successful achievement of the South-north Red Cross Conference, groups of dispersed hometown visitors and art troupes consisting of 151 individuals from each side (50 hometown visitors, 50 art troupe members, and 51 press members and others) were exchanged in September of 1985. Although the number of people involved was small, it was significant in that it marked the first such exchange in the 40-year division of Korea.

Among the hometown visitors, 35 persons from the South met with 41 family members and relatives living in the North. At the same time, 30 people from the North met with 51 family members and relatives living in the South.

It is both obvious and natural, even when viewed from a humanitarian or from a brotherly love point of view, that the paramount task to be resolved in forging the "age of national self-esteem, unification, and prosperity," is to ease the pain of

the more than 10 million displaced family members living in the South and the North.

In this context, the sensible offer made by ROKNRC President Kim represented a follow-up action embodying the true spirit of the July 7 Special Presidential Declaration. It clearly reflected the importance of inter-Korean personnel exchanges in the settlement of the dispersed family issue.

The spirit of the declaration was further reflected in the South's offer to ensure the personal safety and provide all conveniences for any persons from the North wishing to visit family members and/or relatives living in the South. This explicitly reflected the determination of the South to take steps to foster conditions for peaceful unification, even in the face of the existing confrontation and tension and irrespective of the absence of an affirmative response from the North. The overture might have well constituted the first step toward realizing free travel between the South and the North. Of course, it will depend in large part on what action the North takes in the matter.

In particular, the proposal was meant to provide a breakthrough in the dispersed family issue by implementing projects that can be put into action at the working-level of the Red Cross. While such actions can be carried out through working-level contacts, it is not intended that working-level meetings debase or replace full-dress Red Cross talks. Rather, they are proposed to fill the void resulting from North Korea's opposition to the resumption of full-dress talks. An ancillary benefit of successful working-level projects is the potential for discovering ways to break the deadlocked inter-Korean relations.

c. Receipt of Application for Family Search

On August 11, 1988, ROKNRC President Kim Sang-hyop issued a special statement in observance of the 17th anniversary of his Red Cross's proposal calling for a South-North Red Cross meeting to launch a campaign to search for the 10 million dispersed family members in the South and the North.

The statement called on the North Korea Red Cross to agree to resume the suspended South-North Red Cross Conference at an early date. The statement also disclosed that the ROKNRC would accept applications from dispersed families in the South requesting information as to the fate and whereabouts of missing families and/or relatives in the North. The applications will be accepted from August 12 through November 12, 1988.

Kim indicated that the collection of the applications is part of the program to accumulate letters requesting information as to the status of separated families that will be sent to the North as part of a family search project to be undertaken under an agreement between the two Red Crosses.

The text of the ROKNRC statement was as follows:

With the initiation of the South-North Red Cross Conference at a Republic of Korea National Red Cross proposal on August 12, 1971, to discuss the question of dispersed families in the South and the North, the hearts of the families and relatives dispersed in the South and the North were throbbing with expectations for reunion with missing blood relatives, and the nation divided into the South and the North were full of the hope for unification.

The whole nation prayed in oneness for the successful pro-

gress of the South-North Red Cross Conference. However, the South-North Red Cross talks, begun with national exhilaration and support, are yet to come away from the state of suspension, unable to reap the hoped-for achievement to date, 17 long years later.

The Red Cross talks were suspended after seven full-dress meetings held in Seoul and Pyongyang by turn in 1972 and 1973. The talks were resumed in May 1985 for the first time in 12 years after the delivery and receipt of flood relief materials between the South and North Korean Red Crosses. Three major full-dress meetings were held in the resumed talks. In the course, the two sides neared an accord on basic issues such as the method of carrying out the projects envisaged in the five topics and even the epochal pilot project of the exchange of dispersed family hometown visitors and art troupes was undertaken. Yet, the talks again ended in deadlock, unable to register any further progress to our great regret.

The project for determining the fate and whereabouts of families and relatives dispersed in the South and the North, and arranging for the free exchange of letters, meeting, and reunions between them should be put into action at an early date. In this sense, the stalled South-North Red Cross Conference should be resumed without any further delay.

The resolution of the issue of dispersed families in the South and the North becomes all the more exigent when one consider the fact that aged dispersed family members who, following the initiation of the South-North Red Cross talks, were impatiently looking forward to the time of family reunion, but they pass away with the passage of time with their cherished dream dying with them.

On the occasion of the 24th Olympics in Seoul, countless people from all over the world are assembling in our country to cement harmony and peace among all mankind, transcending ethnic difference, nationality, systems and ideologies. Yet, we

find ourselves faced with a situation in which we are unable to restore our own severed national artery. In fact we are not even able to coordinate the simple exchange of a single letter of personal inquiry. This abnormal, but all too real quandary should be surmounted as soon as possible, even if only for the sake of national pride and brotherly love.

Last July 13, I urged the North Korean Red Cross to agree to the unconditional resumption of the full-dress South-North Red Cross conference. I also proposed that even before the resumption of full-dress talks, the status and whereabouts of dispersed families in the South and the North be determined; arrangements be made for exchanging letters of personal inquiry; and that opportunities be arranged for dispersed families overseas to find out the fate and whereabouts of their missing families and to provide a means for them to exchange letters and meet. Finally, I urged that the second exchange of dispersed family hometown visitors be exchanged within the year. I offered that to discuss these issues, a South-North Red Cross working-level meeting be held.

On this significant day of the 17th anniversary of the proposal for South-North Red Cross Conference, I firmly believe that the talks will soon be resumed and that the long-cherished happy day will surely come when dispersed families will be able to exchange letters and embrace each other.

To prepare for that day, the Republic of Korea National Red Cross would like to receive applications requesting a search for dispersed families in the South and the North beginning today. The receipt of the applications is part of the preparatory steps to expeditiously carry out various programs under an inter-Korean Red Cross agreement to be reached in the future. I hope that dispersed family members at home and abroad will respond to this program in a composed manner.

Following the issuance of the Red Cross president's state-

ment, the main and provincial offices of the ROKNRC began receiving applications from Koreans at home and abroad whose families and/or relatives are thought to be in North Korea.

d. Reaction from the North

In a telephone message on July 16, 1988, Son Song-pil, chairman of the North Korean Red Cross, in effect rejected the ROKNRC proposal for a working level-meeting. Son argued that the "South-North Red Cross Conference has been suspended due to the South's anti-Communist confrontation policy and war fuss," insisting that "all elements standing in the way to the resumption of the Red Cross talks should be removed."

The gist of the North Korean telephone message was as follows:

I regret that you hastily called for the resumption of the Red Cross talks and proposed a South-North Red Cross working-level meeting without paying attention to the fierce confrontation that characterizes the inter-Korean relationship and to the inhumane actions of your authorities in their obstruction of humanitarian programs.

We cannot believe that your call for a working-level Red Cross meeting stems from a sincere posture to resolve problems in earnest.

In particular, we cannot find any credibility in your offer for the exchange of letters between hometown visitors.

Your demand for a working-level meeting without any justification or any competency to resolve issues, instead of showing

interest in the removal of obstacles to the talks, which is a prerequisite to resuming the South-North Red Cross Conference, cannot but be taken as an attempt to deny the significance of the full-dress Red Cross meeting and postpone its resumption indefinitely.

The sudden making of an unreasonable proposal at an improper time did not stem from the genuine intent to ease the pains of the families dispersed in the South and the North but from an impure attempt to calm the unification movement of the South Korean people, youths, and students with fake humanitarianism and play a part in overcoming internal political confusion and crisis, having been exploited by the July 7 divisional declaration by your authorities.

If your side is truly interested in resolving humanitarian issues, your side should make joint efforts together with us in convening a joint South-North conference.

The renewed North Korean demand for a joint South-North conference, repeal of the anti-Communist posture, and the settlement of military issues as prerequisites to the resumption of the Red Cross talks, represents their scheme to use the humanitarian Red Cross talks for their political purposes.

In the past, North Korea often made a habit of delaying or suspending the Red Cross talks on the grounds of political and military issues that had nothing at all to do with the Red Cross meeting. Among these were calls for the repeal of the anti-Communist posture, withdrawal of U.S. forces and the suspension of the Team Spirit training exercise. By simply renewing their intransigent attitude despite the South's repeated calls for the resumption of the dialogue, the North demonstrated that they have no interest in resolving the dispersed family issue.

2. Proposal for South-North Education Officials Meeting

a. Proposal

Minister of Education Kim Young-sik proposed in a message to North Korea on July 15, 1988 that a South-North education officials meeting be held at Panmunjom before July 30, 1988, if possible, to discuss ways to implement student exchanges, including grand pilgrimages across the homeland and goodwill athletic meets to be held alternately in the South and the North.

In the message addressed to Pyon Yong-nip, chairman of the Education Commission of the North Korean Administration Council, Kim suggested that the size of the pilgrimage be around 1,000 from each side, and that students from the South journey from Panmunjom to Mt. Paektusan, while the students from the North journey from Panmunjom to Mt. Hallasan. He said that the first of such pilgrimages could be held within the year. The South Korean minister also suggested that for the exchange of goodwill sports matches, each delegation be composed of about 200 persons and would include the sports of soccer, man's and women's table tennis, and man's and women's volleyball. It was suggested that the first meet be held in Pyongyang in October of this year and the second in Seoul in April of next year.

Minister Kim said that if the pilot project were successful, performances and exhibitions could be exchanged in such cultural areas as music, art, concert and dance, and school excursion teams could also be exchanged. The later would provide an opportunity for students to visit scenic and historic

sites like Mt. Kumkangsan and Kyongju.

The proposal was significant in that it was designed to restore a sense of national trust and integrity among the younger generation and to prepare a base for the expanded implementation of multi-pronged personnel exchanges. The overture fully incorporated those student opinions raised in the past in connection with South-North student talks.

The text of Minister Kim's message was as follows:

To Pyon Yong-nip, Chairman of the Education Commission, Administration Council;

Today, 43 years after the division into South and North, we find ourselves at a juncture where we can no longer ignore the entire nation's craving for national self-esteem, unification, and prosperity.

Especially in the light of the worldwide trend toward reconciliation and co-prosperity despite differences in ideologies and systems, this is a time when we the Korean people, too, should strive together to promote national interest.

For us to uncurtain a new horizon of peace and unification in line with the flow of the times, it is most important to restore and develop the national community as members of the same ethnic group by actively promoting exchanges and corporation in sectors such as politics, economy, social, culture, and sports.

In the past, we set a precedent for mutual assistance by delivering and receiving materials for flood victims, and have seen, thanks to the exchange of dispersed family hometown visitors and art troupes, private citizens traveling between the South and the North for the first time in 40 years.

Such precedent and experience should be cultivated like a valuable bud.

In a message from our Prime Minister on June 3, it was pro-

posed that the two sides discuss the personnel exchange question. Again on June 9, the National Unification Minister expressed the willingness to discuss the issue of student exchanges on a priority basis.

We take note of the fact that the North, too, has recently recognized the need for a many-sided exchange of personnel between the South and the North, and, in particular, have taken a positive posture toward the question of student exchanges.

I expect that student exchanges at this time when inter-Korean dialogue remains suspended would be highly significant in itself, serving also as a stimulant in realizing exchanges in other areas.

Here, I courteously propose that a South-North education officials meeting be held at an early date to discuss and resolve the issue of promoting exchanges between South and North Korean students.

The meeting could discuss the issues of promoting grand pilgrimages across the country and exchanging goodwill sports meets, on which the two sides are of the same opinion, and other problems related to the promotion of student exchanges.

The grand pilgrimages across the country can be managed by a Homeland Pilgrimage Promotion Committee that can be formed in the South and the North, respectively. It would be good for students from the South to journey to Mt. Paektusan from Panmunjom while students from the North journey from Panmunjom to Mt. Hallasan and return. This would eliminate the need for students to travel through their own area before meeting at Panmunjom.

The size of the pilgrimage team can be about 1,000 persons from each side. It is desirable that the exchange be made simultaneously as was the case with the exchange of dispersed family hometown visitors and art troupes made in September of 1985.

The time and schedule of the homeland pilgrimages can be determined through consultation between the South and the

North. But, we foresee the staging of the first pilgrimage this year and increasing the frequency to about their times a year beginning next year.

The exchange of goodwill sports meets can be managed by the college sports committee of both sides. It would be good if each delegation be formed with about 200 persons and would initially include the sports of soccer, man's and women's table tennis, and man's and women's volleyball. The number of sports can be steadily expanded.

I consider it desirable to hold the good-will exchange meets on a regular basis in the spring and autumn. It is suggested that the first meet be held in Pyongyang in October of this year and the second in Seoul in April of next year, with each meet lasting about five days.

If and when these exchange programs prove to be successful, exchanges could be expanded to include performances and exhibitions between students in the areas of music, art, concert and dance, as well as the exchange of school sojourn teams in which students could tour scenic and historic sites like Mt. Kumkangsan and Kyongju.

The issues of transit procedures, provisions of various conveniences and guarantee of personal safety necessary for the smooth and orderly implementation of exchange programs, can be easily resolved if we follow past procedures.

Wishing that a South-North education officials meeting to discuss the issue of student exchanges can be held at an early date, I hope that first meeting will take place at Panmunjom on a date of your choosing before July 30, if possible. It would be good if each delegation consist of five officials with a vice-ministe-level official as chief delegate.

I am positive that if the proposed meeting were successfully held and South-North student exchanges realized, they would serve as a foothold on which the younger generation responsible for the future of our nation will gain a sense of national trust and

integrity. Further, they may provide a basis for the establishment of many additional personnel exchanges between the South and the North in the future.

I look forward to your affirmative response.

July 15, 1988

Kim Young-sik
Minister of Education
Republic of Korea

b. Purport and Background of Proposal

Purport

Brisk exchanges between people of various walks of life of the South and the North of Korea are essential to removing the barrier of long-accumulated distrust and misunderstanding and to realizing national reconciliation through mutual understanding. It was for this reason that President Roh Tae Woo, in item 1 of his July 7 Special Declaration, called for the positive promotion of exchanges of people including politicians, business persons, journalists, religious leaders, artists and writers, athletes, scholars and students.

Accordingly, the proposal by the Minister of Education, calling for a South-North Education Officials Meeting, can be taken as a manifestation of the strong determination of the government of South Korea to realize personnel exchanges in line with the basic spirit (reconciliation and cooperation) of the Special Presidential Declaration.

In fact, one of the basic reasons for the failure to overcome the nearly half-century of national division is that both sides let their mutual distrust accumulate, and thus were unable to develop a firm sense of the South and the North being a national community of the same roots.

Since neither side can develop a clear understanding of the other under the present conditions of disruption and closed societies, it is critically important that each side opens its society to the other. In the process, each can regain the feeling of national sameness as a part of a national community.

However, it is particularly difficult to promote multifaceted exchanges and cooperation under the present circumstances where even dialogue has been all but suspended. The proposal for a South-North Education Officials Meeting embodied a plan to promote student exchanges as a pilot project, an undertaking that even North Korea had shown as affirmative reaction, and was forwarded in an effort to establish a wide range of personnel and material exchanges.

In particular, a basis for peaceful unification could be further consolidated if students of the South and the North who were born subsequent to the Korean War were, through first-hand experience, able to observe the conditions of the other and thus establish a sense of national bond.

It was based on this very recognition that the South proposed that in the exchange of student pilgrimages participating students tour each other's area instead of their own.

Background of Proposal

The proposal for a South-North Education Officials Meeting was made at a time when a number of students had begun to take concrete actions to press ahead with an "August 15 South-North Student Meeting" which they tried recklessly to realize despite their failure to hold a "June 10 South-North Student Meeting."

At the time, public opinion called for the students to exercise self-restraint, expressing a fear that it was an act in disregard of the reality of the national division for students

from the South to hold talks with the students of the monolithic system of the North. It was felt that students of the South were ill-prepared to discuss the issues and would fall pray to the exploitation strategy of the North.

As North Korea, which rejected all talks between government authorities, promptly showed a positive response only to the idea of student talks and set about instigating student political struggles through their propaganda machinery. This caused the people to recall the situation of 1960 after the April 19 Student Uprising when North Korea had gone all out to provoke South-North Student Talks to capitalize on the confusion in the South at that time.

The students insisted that they could discuss and resolve political and military issues along with the problem of dispersed families and even the question of co-hosting the Olympics. The public consensus, however, was that vital problems affecting the future of the nation could not be resolved through an impromptu meeting by any specific group or class in total disregard to the role of government.

The government has made clear its consistent policy of supporting and cooperating in any proposal for contact with the North if such contact is based on national support and consensus and could be helpful to the improvement of the inter-Korean relationship.

Accordingly, the government has reviewed student exchanges as a positive part of a multifaceted personnel exchange program between the South and the North. The desired goal was to satisfy student passion for unification with government backing under the principle of democratic procedures.

In connection with the question of South-North student meetings, President Roh said on June 8, 1988, that "...if the young people's passion for unification were genuinely

motivated, the government would accommodate it.” He then indicated that it would be desirable to hold student marches across the country and goodwill sports matches under the guarantee of South and North Korean government authorities.

On the following day, June 9, National Unification Minister Lee Hong-koo said that “...as North Korea authorities agree in principle to student exchanges, the government is willing to hold a High-Level South-North Officials Meeting to discuss preferentially the contents, method, and scope of student exchanges...” He further indicated that the meeting could be used to discuss relevant matters such as procedures for student travel between the two sides, personnel safety guarantees, and the provision of various conveniences. Minister Lee said he would strive to have negotiations with the North so as to realize South-North student exchanges at an early date while having broad-ranging dialogues with students and other people of various walks of life.

The proposal by the Minister of Education was thus aimed at promoting student exchanges under an arrangement by government authorities within the framework of the efforts to forge an age of inter-Korean reconciliation and cooperation. The prompting of such exchanges would contribute to the improvement of the South-North relationship and peaceful unification.

c. Reaction from the North

Despite the fact that the North was notified via the direct South-North telephone line that a message from Education Minister Kim Young-sik would be delivered on July 15, North Korea sent a telephone message to the South on July 14, saying that they would not accept Minister Kim’s message. The North

Korean message was signed by Pyon Yong-nip, chairman of the Education Commission of the North Korean Administration Council.

In the telephone message, the North charged the Seoul government with “obstructing” the student talks, arguing that “we see no reason why government authorities should step in belatedly and interfere...”

Again on July 17, North Korea formally rejected the offer for a South-North Education Officials Meeting. In a statement issued by a spokesman for the Administration Council, the North asserted that “the question of student exchanges is an issue which the students themselves should discuss and resolve, and in which government authorities can in no circumstances interfere” and that “the South proposed a South-North Education Officials Meeting not to resolve the question of student exchanges but to block the August 15 student talks, overcome a political crisis, and force through the unilateral staging of the Olympics.”

The gist of the statement issued by the spokesman of the North Korean Administration Council was as follows:

The South Korean offer, made in a so-called message, for a South-North Education Officials Meeting to discuss the issue of South-North student exchanges, has no validity at all and therefore is an absurd one which can enlist no one's support.

The issue of South-North students exchanges is a problem to be discussed and resolved by the students themselves. It is by no means anything in nature in which government authorities can take a hand.

What government authorities can do is only to provide necessary conditions so that students could successfully resolve

their problems.

Their absurd attempt to take charge of student talks whereas they did not try to take in the Red Cross talks or Parliamentarians meeting, does not stand to reason.

As to the question of providing various conveniences and guaranteeing personal safety in connection with South-North student exchanges, there is no need for government authorities to bother to have a separate meeting to resolve them.

In reaction to the North Korea statement, a spokesman for the Ministry of Education of the South expressed regret in a comment made on July 20, saying that the South's proposal for an education officials meeting was motivated by an educational consideration. He explained that the overture was meant to contribute to restoring national trust and homogeneity by giving an opportunity for students to witness and experience firsthand the true conditions of each other's side.

The spokesman charged that while the South proposed practical and proper exchanges for students, the North, insisting on student talks involving but a small number of students, agitated for an August 15 student meeting, denounced as "anti-national" the Seoul Olympics, which had nothing to do with the student exchanges, and demanded the release of arrested students. This attitude of the North only shows that North Korea, without any interest in actual student exchanges, merely attempts to use the assertions of a few radical student activists to drive a wedge between the government and the students. It is thus all too clear that the North was simply exploiting the student talks for political propaganda purposes.

It seems only reasonable to assume that their ulterior motive for rejecting the South-North Education Officials Meeting, while simultaneously agitating for student struggles in

favor of student talks, was to fan the fires of social unrest in the South through possible clashes between radical students trying to force through the talks and the government determined to block them, and thereby thwart the successful staging of the Seoul Olympics.

With illusionary expectations for an eruption of reckless student activities over the South-North Student Meeting, the North intensified its agitation for student anti-government struggles. They went so far as to suggest that during the proposed student meeting at Panmunjom on August 15, a memorial service be held for students who had died in their struggles for democratization.

The North Korean scheme, however, met with little success in the face of the government's forward-looking efforts including the proposal for the education officials meeting, broad dialogue among various social sectors, the August 4 Public Hearing on South-North Student Talks under the sponsorship of the Ad Hoc Committee of the National Assembly on Unification Policy, and firm public opinion advocating the use of the government as the sole conduit for contacts with the North.

3. Announcement of the Forward-Looking Policy toward North Korea

a. Contents of the Policy

On July 16, 1988, Minister of Foreign Affairs Choi Kwang-soo announced the following diplomatic policy that the government would pursue as a follow-up measure to the July 7 Special Presidential Declaration with a view to easing tension and con-

solidating peace on the Korean peninsula and improving the inter-Korean relationship.

Gist of New Diplomatic Policy

We shall not oppose our allies, including the United States and Japan, trading non-military materials with North Korea under their laws and policies. Non-military materials here refer to general commodities and technical materials not included in the COCOM (Coordinating Committee for Export to Communist Area) list.

We shall not oppose the travel of private individuals back and forth between our allies and North Korea to make business negotiations or for other purposes to facilitate such trade. We shall not oppose our allies establishing branch offices of trading companies in North Korea for such trade.

We shall recognize North Korea's standing in the international community, hoping that North Korea will contribute to world peace and the development of mankind in accordance with the spirit and principle of the United Nations Charter. We shall cooperate in North Korea's participation in the international community as a responsible member.

We shall desist from engaging in wasteful confrontational diplomacy toward North Korea, and shall not oppose North Korea normalizing its relations with Non-Aligned and Third World countries.

We urge North Korea to agree that South and North Korea, as a national community, should stop waging unproductive arguments of levelling defamation or slander against each other in diplomatic arenas such as international organizations and meetings.

We shall deal with matters related to North Korea with emphasis on confirming or finding out the truth.

We are willing to cooperate in North Korea's participation in

all subordinate organizations and specialized agencies of the United Nations and inter-governmental regional cooperation and development organizations.

We welcome North Korea's participation in all cultural, art, academic and sports events anywhere in the world. At all international meetings attended by both South and North Korean delegations, we shall make positive approaches so that mutual contacts and dialogue can be made. Efforts shall also be made at other cultural, art, academic, and sports events to have inter-Korean contacts and dialogue. In countries where both South and North Korea maintain diplomaic missions, we shall endeavor to use all oppourtunities to promote diplomatic contacts and talks between diplomats of both sides.

We shall not oppose our allies including the United States and Japan making private exchanges with North Korea in the areas of culture, art, academic studies and sports. If necessary, we are willing to cooperate in such exchanges. We shall not oppose the American and Japanese diplomats having contact or dialogue with North Korean diplomats in third countries or at neutral settings.

At the same time on July 9, 1988, Foreign Minister Choi Kwang-soo announced a follow-up measure to facilitate free tavel to South and North Korea by the 4,500,000 Korean residents overseas.

The gist of the announcement was as follows:

Those Koreans who reside abroad with denizen rights and who, with Korean resident passport, have acquired long-stay rights equivalent to a denizen abroad, shall be allowed to visit North Korea. Free visits to the homeland by those Koreans overseas with North Koreans nationality shall be guaranteed.

The issue of visits to North Korea by Koreans who reside in Free World countries with foreign nationalities shall be left to the policies of the country of their citizenship. Free visits to the homeland by our compatriots residing in the Communist bloc shall be guaranteed.

In this connection, we propose to North Korea that discussions be held between the authorities of South and North Korea on the guarantee of personal safety of those overseas compatriots visiting South and North Korea.

Inasmuch as no agreement has been reached between South and North Korea for the personal safety of visitors, overseas compatriots wishing to visit North Korea are required to report to our missions in the areas of their residence before and after their visits for personal safety and travel convenience, and to take particular care of themselves for their safety.

b. Significance and Effect of the Announcement

The new foreign policy was intended to bring about the improvement of the inter-Korean relationship in international diplomatic arenas, improvement of relations between the South's allies and North Korea, and improvement of relations between South Korea and Communist-bloc countries, including China and the Soviet Union. In short, the announcement was aimed at promoting a durable mechanism for South-North co-prosperity and stability on the Korean peninsula through balanced cross contacts and exchange.

Presently, the Republic of Korea maintains diplomatic relations with 130 countries and North Korea with but 99. Of these countries, 69 maintain tie with both South and North Korea. It is true, however, that there has been considerable damage to national self-esteem as well as spiritual and material losses due to excessive confrontational diplomacy such as competition for

legitimacy within the international community.

The time has come when we should rectify such wasteful diplomatic efforts and enhance the pride of the Koreans who have just hosted the Olympics by helping North Korea become a responsible member of the international community.

The policy not to oppose trading of non-military goods and travel by private individuals between North Korea and the South's allies including America and Japan, serves to pave the way, for instance, for America, consistent with its own trade laws, to trade with North Korea. At this time, there is no trade being conducted between the U.S. and North Korea due to the fact that all trade is restricted to cases having Presidential permission under the Trade with Hostile Countries Law and the Export Control Law.

The new foreign policy provides a basis on which the United States can ease its sanctions against North Korea and promote a steady improvement of its relations with the North.

At the same time, the government is trying to induce North Korea to participate in the international community as a responsible member by taking a flexible position that it would not oppose North Korea's diplomatic normalization with Non-Aligned countries currently maintaining formal relations only with South Korea.

Also by saying "we shall welcome North Korea's participation in all cultural, art, academic, and sports events anywhere in the world," the announcement inferred a call for North Korea's participation in the Seoul Olympics, and expressly laid a base for joint South-North participation in international events. It also made it clear that the South does not oppose sports exchanges between North Korea and Japan or the U.S.

Moreover, by expressing a willingness to cooperate in non-political exchanges between North Korea and the allies of the

South, the government was showing its diplomatic confidence stemming from its expanded national strength.

The government announcement, of course, serves to free our allies from the burden of considering the inter-Korean relationship when participating in various cultural events that may be held in the North.

In addition, the statement that the South intends to promote contacts between South and North Korean diplomats at every opportunity in those countries where both maintain diplomatic missions, can be taken to mean that our diplomats may freely contact those of the North so long as such contacts are not counter to nation's common interest.

The South's position is that it won't oppose diplomatic contacts between North Korea and the allies of the South, initially in third countries or neutral settings. It is felt that in light of the fact that the brakes have been applied to all such contacts in the past, the new policy offers the possibility for improved relations between the North and the South's allies. It will simultaneously serve as a basis for improved relations between the South and Communist-bloc countries such as China and the Soviet Union. What should be noted here, however, is that maintenance of a balance of power on the Korean peninsula is the quintessential consideration during all attempts to improve relations between the North and the South's allies, especially overtures made by the United States or Japan.

China, the Soviet Union, and other Communist-bloc countries can make profitable use of the South's new policy to dissuade North Korea from standing in the way of improved relations with the South. At the same time, the South is now free to expand its contacts with Communist-bloc countries.

Meanwhile, the South's proposal for consultations between the authorities of the South and the North on the issues of free

visits to both South and North Korea by Koreans residing overseas, and the opening of the doors to homeland visits by overseas residents, were justifiable measures in view of the expanded national strength of the South. Such steps were also necessary to open the way for improved relations between the South and the Communist-bloc countries.

The new policy measures, which were announced by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, are in line with the spirit of the July 7 Special Presidential Declaration and are of special significance in that they represent the unilateral effort of the South.

The new diplomatic policy establishes conditions through which the inter-Korean relationship can develop into that of a national community within the international society. Depending on the response of the North, the policy would serve to expedite the opening of the northern society and contribute to the balanced development of the nation as a whole. The policy would thus be conducive to peace and a new air of reconciliation on the Korean peninsula, paving the way for national unification.

4. Suspension of Slanderous Broadcasts

In accordance with the basic spirit of the July 7 Special Presidential Declaration calling on South and North Korea to pursue a single national community in favor of co-existence and co-prosperity, effective July 19, 1988, the government of South Korea suspended all accusatory broadcasts against North Korea. Accusatory and slanderous broadcasts over the public address systems were stopped in the front line areas, and

personal attacks against specific North Korean figures such as Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il were suspended from socio-educational programs of KBS radio. Accusatory broadcast by South and North Korea against each other were suspended in the early 1970s under the provisions of Article 2 of the July 4 South-North Joint Communique of 1972. The communique stipulated that “the two sides shall not slander each other in order to foster an atmosphere for trust.” However, the stoppage of slanderous broadcasts was short lived because of North Korea’s one-sided breaching of the agreement.

The recent unilateral cessation of slanderous broadcasts against the North by the South was a prelude to the opening of contacts and visits to the North by Koreans residing abroad, which are expected to be spurred by the July 7 declaration. Moreover, the action was all the more justifiable when one considers that continued slandering at a time when efforts are being made to form a national community could be a national shame before the eyes of the world.

North Korea persists in its slanderous broadcasts against the South, demanding “... prior resolution of political and military issues.” In fact, however, the liquidation of such legacies of hostile relations such as slanderous broadcast would be a very step elementary and conducive to expediting the resolution of the political and military issues in question.

The South is intent of going a step further by steadily taking a series of measures without any strings attached to unfold an age of reconciliation and cooperation, addressing a positive message of peace to North Korea.

5. Permission to Publish Works of Defectors

On July 19, 1988, the government of South Korea announced its decision to permit the publication of works written before national liberation by writers who subsequently defected to North Korea.

The permission, being a follow-up measures of President Roh's July 7 Special Declaration which set forth, among other things, the "... principle of cultural exchanges and openness," marked another milestone in the government's positive policy toward North Korea, a policy focused on surmounting the state of national division.

The new measure not only gives public access to the pre-liberation works of about 120 writers who defected to the North, but it also facilitates the filling of a literary vacuum for the period from the 1920s when Korea's new literature reached its peak to the time of national liberation.

The works of defector-writers were blacklisted in 1954 immediately after the Korean War truce. The criterion for the prohibition of such works was not the contents of the works, but rather, the whereabouts of the author.

In the past, the government feared that publication of such works would lead ideological confusion. The ban was lifted, however, based on a confidence in the superiority of the political system in the South, on the need for change in the recognition of North Korea, and from a cultural standpoint, a gesture embodying the basic spirit of the July 7 declaration.

Following the removal of such literary works from the blacklist, the government plans to study the possibility of staging exhibitions of works of other artists in other areas such as fine arts, music, drama, and motion pictures who either

defected or were kidnapped to North Korea. These forward-looking measures are expected to contribute much to the development of the sense of a national community through cultural exchange between the South and the North.

6. Opening of Information Material on North Korea and Other Communist-Bloc Countries

On September 3, 1988, Minister of Culture and Information Chung Han-mo announced that in line with the open-door policy of the July 7 declaration, the "government has decided to make informative material on North Korea and other Communist-bloc countries available to the public with a view to concretely translating the open-door policy toward North Korea into action."

Under the new measures, heretofore "tabooed" material such as the North Korean newspaper Rodong Shinmun, television and other visual material have been made available to the public.

The decision to allow public access to informative material on North Korea and other Communist-bloc countries was significant in that it serves to meet the growing demand for such information caused by the stepped-up exchanges with Communist-bloc countries. Additionally, it is helpful in efforts to more effectively carry out the northward policy, and by providing a more accurate picture of the true conditions in the North and the rest of the Communist-bloc, the people can be better informed and thus are better able to engage in the unification debate.

In the new policy, the government drastically narrowed the

scope of classified material and decided to authorize the publication of all but the following:

- Primary material directly prepared by anti-state 'organizations such as North Korea and Chosoren, a pro-Pyongyang organization of Koreans in Japan for propaganda purposes; and
- Material that, in nature, runs counter to the provisions of the Constitution, such as those which deny the legitimacy of the Republic of Korea, or those that praise or propagandize North Korea, anti-state organizations or their members, or the ideology, system, or activities of communism.

In addition, the procedures for the use of classified material were greatly simplified. Such material is now made available to any person who produces his or her Resident Card and who gives a justifiable reason for the use of such material. Loaning of material is now possible for up to 30 days, even reproduction can be permitted when the head of an office or an authorized user so request.

Under the new policy, the offices authorized to handle such special material as the Rodong Shinmun of North Korea, which include the National Unification Board and college libraries, would make them available to the public. In particular, the government has decided to make public visual material produced by North Korea from time to time to the extent that such action would serve to provide the people with a more realistic perception of actual conditions in the North.

Moreover, material prepared by state and public research offices and analytical material about North Korea and other Communist-bloc countries, excepting classified material on national security and diplomatic strategy, would be distributed

to various social offices and organizations. It was also decided to establish a Comprehensive North Korean and Communist-bloc Material Center at the National Unification Board so that people having a need for such material will have easy access to it. Another material center is set to be created within the Korea Trade Promotion Corp. (KOTRA), which would specialize in material on trade with Communist-bloc nations.

Specific provincial public libraries will be authorized to open similar material centers. Material to be open to the public will be freely sold at book stores. Further, the government now permits newspapers and other fourth estate publications to quote the Rodong Shinmun. It is provided, however, that such quotations shall not be intended to merely praise or encourage north Korea. The use of pictures, even of Kim Il-sung and his sons, may be used if such pictures are provided by the Seoul government.

The substance of the announcement of the decision to make information on North Korea and other Communist-bloc countries available to the public was as follows:

Gist of the Announcement

As part of efforts to concretely implement the open-door policy toward North Korea in line with the July 7 Special Presidential Declaration and to promote mutual cooperation with China, the Soviet Union, and other Communist-bloc countries, the government has decided to allow very substantial public access to information and data about North Korea and the other communist-bloc countries, the access to which has been restricted in the past owing to the unique security situation on the Korean peninsula.

This measure has been taken on the strength of the expanding national capabilities thanks to the hard work of my fellow countrymen, as well as of the mature civic spirit of the Korean people as displayed during the hosting of the Seoul Olympics. The following are the basic ground rules for allowing public access.

- All informative material about the Communist-bloc, except for that published by North Korea, Chosoren (a pro-Pyongyang organization of Koreans in Japan) and other anti-state organizations for propaganda purposes which clearly violate the Constitution, will be made accessible to the public.
- The newspaper Rodong Shinmun and visual material produced by North Korea will be made available for public view on a selective basis so that the realities of the North can be accurately perceived.
- Even informative material which will continue to be withheld from general public access will be made more readily accessible to those who need such information for academic research and the like by simplifying the procedure for viewing or borrowing such material.
- Information and data in the hands of government agencies and public research institutes will be supplied to all segments of society to the maximum possible extent. At the same time, there are plans to establish a comprehensive information center so that material can be more easily utilized.

In line with the age of international openness, the measures are also designed to increase the general availability of information needed to promote exchanges with the Communist-bloc in all fields to include cultural, economic, political, and social.

I appeal to you, my countrymen, to exercise a mature civic spirit and to cooperate in harvesting the intended benefits of the government's open-door policy. In so doing, I solicit the general public not to be deceived by any subversive group that may attempt to take advantage of the information liberalization

measures to mislead the public or to undermine public peace and security.

Part III

Proposal for a South-North Summit Meeting

1. Proposal

In his August 15, 1988, message on the anniversary of national liberation, President Roh Tae Woo proposed that he and President Kim Il-sung of North Korea meet as soon as possible to discuss practical ways to promote the integration of the Korean nation in response to the yearning of Korea's 60 million citizens.

President Roh especially stressed that "neither the venue nor the agenda nor the procedures should be an obstacle to the meeting of the top leaders of the South and the North designed to open-heartedly discuss the future of the nation."

Pointing out that a South-North Summit Meeting would be the most effective and quickest way to resolve all issues between the two parts of Korea, President Roh indicated the realities both of the domestic and international situations and the wishes of the Korean people call for a South-North Summit Meeting without further delay.

"I hope that North Korea will respond positively to my proposal so that a new page can be turned in our national history,..." said the President.

President Roh further called for the unfolding of an age of democracy, prosperity, and unification on the strength of the achievement and confidence the Korean people have so far made and also of the enhanced national self-esteem of the people who successfully staged the Olympics with the blessings of the whole world.

Parts of President Roh's Liberation Day message related to the proposal for a South-North Summit Meeting were as follows:

... A new horizon is opening in which we will unfold an age of goodwill and cooperation together with all other countries of the world.

Rapid changes are taking place even in the world order of the East-West Cold War system, a system which had given us the pains of division without even allowing us time to rejoice over national liberation and which prompted the waging of an appalling fratricidal war on this land.

Stupendous changes are also occurring in the relations among the big powers surrounding the peninsula and in our relations with those countries.

A new wave of openness and cooperation is now sweeping the world community. On the strength of our expanding democratic capabilities and heightening national self-esteem, we shall exploit the domestic and external circumstances on our own to shape a new era of national integration...

My dear fellow compatriots at home and abroad;

Today, I would like to appeal to all my fellow countrymen, in the South and the North, to join hands to open an epoch of grand reconciliation leading to a unified and prosperous homeland at the earliest possible date.

The time has come for both the South and the North to translate into action the conviction that not through confrontation and conflict but through reconciliation and cooperation will we be able to overcome the pain and ordeal of division and achieve genuine national progress and unification.

Last July 7, I declared that the South and the North must now set about forging relations as members of a single national community designed to seek prosperity for all. The barrier that has been dividing us, who are one and the same people, for over 40 years must now be dismantled through openness, exchanges, and cooperation. In this way, we should be able to create and ripen conditions leading to a breakthrough to unification.

To this end, it is imperative for the top leaders of the South

and the North to meet in dialogue. This would be the most effective and quickest way to resolve all issues between the two parts of Korea. The realities both of domestic and international situations and the wishes of our people call for a South-North Summit without further delay.

Today, on the occasion of the 43rd anniversary of national liberation, I propose to Kim Il-sung of North Korea to meet with me for talks at the earliest possible date to work out practical ways to bring about national integration in response to the yearning of our 60 million compatriots.

Neither the venue, agenda, nor procedures should be an obstacle to the leaders of the South and the North meeting to discuss the future of the nation in a frank and honest manner. It is my fervent hope that North Korea will make a positive response to my proposal so that a new page can be turned in our national history.

Sixty million compatriots at home and abroad;

At this juncture as we celebrate the 40th anniversary of the founding of the government, we must firmly open a new epoch of democracy, prosperity, and unification on the strength of the great achievements and confidence we all have made this far and also of the elevated self-esteem of the people who have successfully staged the Olympics with the blessings from the whole world.

This is the road to a new liberation for the present generation. That is the building of an independent nation that our patriotic forbears so courageously pursued even through her darkest hours. Building a prosperous and unified nation is the only way to accomplish in our time the yet-to-be-finished task of complete national liberation.

Let us now liquidate with our own self-reliant efforts the history of suffering in which we, as a peripheral country of the world, have had to swallow national division imposed upon us by others.

Let us thereby build a proud country with our own strength, a country which, standing in the center of world history, will play a dignified role for peace and the wellbeing of mankind.

2. Significance of the Proposal

Laying Solid Groundwork for a New Epoch of Democracy, Prosperity and Unification

In his Liberation Day message, President Roh, predicting that with the Seoul Olympics as a momentum, Korea would be converted from a trouble spot of the world into a land that promises peace, stressed that Koreans should embark on the full-fledged preparation for national integration on the strength of national confidence and in keeping with the world order overflowing with a wave of openness and cooperation.

President Roh has already declared that he would make the rest of his five-year term of office a period for exploring peaceful unification through reconciliation and cooperation between the South and the North. The President recognizes the question of bringing about durable peace and peaceful unification on the Korean peninsula as a national yearning that cannot be pushed aside any further.

The recent proposal for a South-North Summit Meeting was in keeping with the new flow of overall national history and, at the same time, represented part of the President's long-term preparation for his intended laying of solid stepping stones along a road leading to national unification.

Even before his election, President Roh strongly advanced the idea of a South-North Summit Meeting as a means of

resolving inter-Korean issues. During his visit to the United States in September of 1987, President Roh, then head of the Democratic Justice Party (DJP), stated, in his September 15 press conference at the U.S. National Press Club, that he would "... endeavor to realize the exchange of mutual visits by the top leaders of South and North Korea to Seoul and Pyongyang." He reaffirmed this as one of his campaign pledges in the subsequent presidential election.

In his inaugural address on February 25, 1988, President Roh again said, "I am prepared to go anyplace on earth for a sincere dialogue with anyone..." if it is helpful in exploring a road to peace and national reunification on the Korean peninsula.

Again in his Samil Independence Day message on March 1, 1988, President Roh stressed, "The age of national self-esteem which we have uncurtained, is a period of preparation for the march onward toward unification. To explore the road to national unification, I will meet with anyone, at anyplace, and at any time. No matter how thorny it may be, I will follow this path without hesitation or fear."

At his first press conference on April 21, 1988, after his inauguration, the President continued to emphasize the necessity of a South-North Summit Meeting. He said, "Many of the people tend to think negatively of unification. They should now entertain a positive thought on unification. A period for full-fledged preparation for unification would come before long. There would be many ways to promote unification. But, I think the method is to resolve problems through a South-North Summit Meeting."

As President Roh disclosed in his Liberation Day message, overall circumstances now buttress the feasibility of a South-North Summit Meeting. And, the self-esteem and maturity of

the nation calls for such a summit meeting without delay. Therefore, the recent proposal may well differ from past proposals in that it represents the translation into action the resolute determination to forge a new age of national integration based on feasibility and justness.

Initiative Embodiment of the Basic Spirit of the July 7 Special Declaration

In his Special Declaration, President Roh disclosed his intent resolution to liquidate the relations of mutual distrust and confrontation between the South and the North, and to pursue the prosperity of the whole of the nation under the recognition that Koreans, being the same nation, belong to a national community.

However, North Korea has yet to make an affirmative response to the genuine manifestation of brotherly love and the forward-looking posture with which the South has taken in its efforts to bring about sweeping change in its recognition of and policy toward the North.

At this time, the South is steadily carrying out follow-up measures one by one to embody the basic spirit of the July 7 Special Presidential Declaration, and, at the same time, making multifaceted efforts to communicate to the North the genuine intent of the South.

The fact that President Roh referred to the North Korean leader the same way he is addressed in the North, "President Kim Il-sung," might have well derived from the recognition of North Korea in the relationship of "bona-fide partners," a relationship indispensable to the formation of a national community, rather than from the vague protocol need as in the past.

In this sense, the proposal amounted to a manifestation of the determination to engineer, from the position of top leader, the advent of an age of national reconciliation, unification, and prosperity.

If and when a South-North Summit Meeting were held, the basic spirit of the July 7 Special Presidential Declaration would be accurately conveyed to the North and the meeting itself would serve as momentum for the North to come forward and join in the creation of a national community.

Epochal Momentum for Improvement of Inter-Korean Relations

Considering the fact that the relations of confrontation and enmity have persisted between the South and the North for 40 years, the most pressing task facing the two sides is to promote confidence and restore and develop a sense of national bond through multifaceted exchanges and cooperation. If the leaders of the two sides meet in a summit conference without burden or precondition and open-heartedly discuss issues related to the future of the nation, it would certainly lead to the removal of mutual misunderstanding and distrust. Such a meeting could also prove to be a decisive breakthrough in mutual exchanges and cooperation, and serve to open the way to expedite productive dialogue in many areas.

As was experienced in the course of past dialogue, it is true there are some problems that can hardly be resolved by working-level contacts. These are the problems that constitute a decisive obstacle to the improvement in inter-Korean relations.

Moreover, easing tension and consolidating peace on the Korean peninsula is an exigent problem requiring a basically

political decision by the top authorities of the two sides. Historical examples indicate that open-hearted discussion between top leaders is the most effective and expeditious way of resolving hostile relations.

In particular, compared with the process of the multi-channeled, inter-Korean dialogues, including the preparatory contacts for a South-North Parliamentary Meeting where lingering controversy over format and agenda topics could be resolved at a summit meeting on a package basis. This is due in large part to the fact that there is no question of venue, agenda topics, or procedural matters to block the conduct of a summit meeting.

Therefore, a South-North Summit Meeting would be the most appropriate forum for discussion of even highly political issues like the question of non-aggression and disarmament where the interest of each side presents serious conflicts, and for the resolution of issues of national interest which do not offer as great a level of disparity.

3. Reactions at Home and Abroad

Commenting on President Roh's proposal for a meeting with President Kim Il-sung of north Korea, domestic press observed that the offer is noteworthy in that it differed from past proposals in background and nature.

Press comments pointed out that whereas the 1981 proposal for a South-North Top Leaders Meeting was chiefly aimed at reducing the level of distrust between South and North Korea, the recent proposal envisioned a clear objective of paving the way for unification by restoring a national community based

on the basic spirit of the July 7 declaration.

In fact, a look at the various past proposals in reference to inter-Korean relations, shows that they seemed designed more for propaganda purposes than for actual implementation. Thus seen, the latest proposal might well have given a fresh impression because “high feasibility and strong will power served as the basis for its implementation.”

Under the conditions of the current inter-Korean relationship, it was natural for President Roh to propose a South-North Summit Meeting inasmuch as “a summit meeting is the most efficient and time-saving method of resolving complex and important problems to surmount hostile relations.”

The media observed that the proposal for a summit meeting, advanced at a time when the Seoul Olympics were just around, was all the more significant because President Roh has constantly emphasized the importance of a South-North summit meeting since he entered politics as the president of the DJP.

4. Reaction from North Korea

North Korea's first reaction to the proposed summit meeting came on September 8 when Kim Il-sung personally touched on the issue in a report during a “congratulatory report session” held on the eve of their regime's anniversary.

Despite the seemingly significant reaction to the proposal and the fact that President Kim used the phrase, “peaceful co-existence,” he attached a precondition to a summit meeting by saying, “We welcome it if he (President Roh) visits Pyongyang with a willingness to adopt a non-aggression declaration or

agrees to the establishment of a confederal government of unified state or to the creation a 'peaceful unification committee' for the establishment of such a confederal government."

In particular, Kim Il-sung held fast to his previous demand for the priority resolution of military issues. He said in the report, "To guarantee peace on the Korean peninsula, a peace agreement should be concluded between North Korea and the United States; a non-aggression declaration adopted between the South and the North; American forces and nuclear weapons withdrawn from South Korea; and the South and the North should make gradual but drastic arms reductions."

Despite these prerequisites to a summit meeting, the Seoul government plans to carefully review the North's reaction since President Roh was the first to propose South-North summit talks and because the South believes that issues of agenda topics, venue or procedural matters should not stand in the way of summit talks.

The gist of Kim Il-sung's remarks with regard to the proposed summit meeting was as follows:

The ultimate method for realizing the great task of unifying the fatherland based on the principles of independence, peaceful unification, and grand national unity is to establish the Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo.

The Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo is the most reasonable format of a unified state which can realize national unity on the basis of common national needs and interests while transcending different thoughts and systems.

In order to realize unification of the fatherland in a circumstance where realistic but different thoughts and systems exist as found in the South and the North of our country, a single unified

state should be created by modifying our two systems and combining the two autonomous governments under the principle of co-existence in which neither side takes over or is taken over by the other or overwhelms or is overwhelmed by the other.

Today, the people of the South are on the right track toward national liberation by staging struggles for anti-fascist democratization and fatherland unification in close linkage with anti-U.S. independence struggles.

To ensure peace on the Korean peninsula, a peace agreement should be concluded between us and the United States; a non-aggression declaration should be adopted between the South and the North; American troops and nuclear weapons should be pulled out of South Korea; and the South and the North should gradually but drastically reduce armed forces.

In South-North dialogue, issues should be resolved beginning with fundamental matters for unification. The act of shunning political and military issues designed to lay down basic conditions for unification, and putting forth secondary issues instead, should be condemned as a scheme aimed at misleading domestic and external opinions while at the same time obstructing and delaying unification.

As to the issue of top-level meetings between the South and the North, this is an idea which we advanced earlier. Our position toward this issue is crystal-clear. At a South-North High-Level Meeting, the issues of adopting a non-aggression declaration between the South and the North without being bound or influenced by any other person and establishing a confederal government of a unified state under the condition of maintaining the autonomy of the two systems, or creating a Peaceful Unification Committee to realize such a government, should be discussed and resolved prior to all other matters.

We would welcome it if he (President Roh) comes to Pyongyang to meet us with a genuine intent of resolving these problems blocking the unification of the fatherland.

There is no need, however, for anyone to come here seeking to discuss problems only to eternally split Korea into two or one having no authority to independently discuss and resolve basic issues.

The problem is that conditions should be made ripe so that a South-North Top-Level Meeting could be realized and end with a genuine success. To this end, South Korean authorities should abandon their dependence on forces alien to the peninsula and join the nationwide movement for the independent unification of the fatherland.

These remarks were made before a group of invited foreign guest in Pyongyang on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of their regime. It seems clear that they were designed to reap the multiple propaganda effects of fronting a “peace loving” image to their visitors, softening the pressure being brought to bear by the Soviet Union and China for them to enter into talks with the South, distracting international attention away from the Seoul Olympics, letting their people outwardly unwind their discontent with economic difficulties, and buoying some South Koreans who side with the North Korean cause.

Kim Il-sung’s remarks can also be taken as a sort of counter-proposal intended to head off international pressure growing from the expanding support for President Roh’s July 7 Special Declaration from not only Free World countries but also from the Soviet Union, China, and many East European countries. They were also to counter the impact of the September 13, 1988, agreement between South Korea and Hungary to exchange permanent missions.

Despite Kim Il-sung’s preconditions and insistence that a summit meeting discuss only the issues of creating a confederal republic as a means of unification, his response was noteworthy in that it was the first time he personally spoke of the

issue of a South-North summit meeting.

Meanwhile, commenting on the North's remarks, the South's Minister of National Unification Lee Hong-koo said on September 10, "It is noted that the top official of North Korea showed a reaction to the proposal for the South-North Summit Meeting offered by President Roh in his Liberation Day message last August 15."

Minister Lee indicated that it was regrettable that the North insisted on prerequisites to the realization of a summit meeting. "However, we want to take note of the fact that North Korea hinted at the feasibility of such a meeting. The government will carefully study ways from many angles to realize a South-North summit meeting,..” Minister Lee said.

Part IV

Preparatory Contacts for South-North Parliamentarians Talks

1. Background

The preparatory contacts for the proposed South-North Parliamentarians Talks began after Kim Jaisun, speaker of the Republic of Korea National Assembly, sent to Yang Hyongsop, chairman of the Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly of North Korea, on July 18, 1988, a message containing the Resolution Calling for Participation by North Korea in the Seoul Olympic Games. The resolution was unanimously adopted on July 9 by the 20th plenary session of the 142nd Extraordinary Assembly.

The text of the resolution was as follows:

Resolution Calling for Participation by North Korea in the Seoul Olympic Games

The Republic of Korea National Assembly;

Noting that the 24th Olympic Games, a festival of all mankind, is scheduled to be held in Seoul of the Republic of Korea with the fervent support from and participation by 161 countries,

In keeping with the yearning of all Koreans for the peaceful unification of the homeland and with the expectations of all the peoples of the world aspiring for a durable peace on the Korean peninsula,

Expressing the firm determination to make the Seoul Olympics a success by all means in the unswerving conviction that the historical, great festival would advance the time of unification,

Strongly calling for North Korea's sincere and positive participation,

Hereby resolves the following:

- The Republic of Korea National Assembly, hoping that a large

number of North Korean athletes will participate in the historical Seoul Olympics opening on September 17, 1988, urges the North Korean authorities to render positive cooperation in line with the recognition that their cooperation would serve as momentum facilitating grand national reconciliation;

- The Republic of Korea National Assembly urges the North Korean authorities to render support and efforts so as to develop the Seoul Games into a proud event where the Korean nation can display before the whole world their homogeneity and superiority, taking note of the fact that the whole world is watching the attitude and relations of South and North Korea;
- The Republic of Korea National Assembly hopes that North Korean athletes and compatriots will freely travel back and forth between the North and the South under the guarantee that they would be enabled to visit anywhere in the South for a considerable time around the Olympic period and use the occasion as an opportunity to dismantle the barrier of division; and
- The Republic of Korea National Assembly sincerely proposes that the South and the North will exert their maximum efforts in mutually positive and forward-looking attitudes positively carrying out exchanges and contacts in all layers and strata and in all walks of life starting with the Seoul Olympics so as to achieve unification, the ultimate wish of the people.

July 9, 1988

Republic of Korea National Assembly

In response to the resolution, North Korea sent a letter to the South on July 21, suggesting that a first Joint South-North Parliamentary session be held in August in Pyongyang. Signed by Yang Hyong-sop, chairman of the Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly, the letter contained a draft Joint Declaration on South-North Non-Aggression.

The gist of the North Korean letter was as follows:

Even if exchanges or trade were made, the South and the North, with a demarcation line between them, can never become a harmonious national community unless the issue of easing tension is resolved.

A joint South-North conference is regarded as a reasonable forum for the alleviation of tension. But, even before such a joint meeting is convened, a South-North parliamentarians meeting will be the most ideal medium in which to discuss a joint declaration on non-aggression.

South-North parliamentarians talks can be held in various forms. But the most reasonable form is to convene a joint session between the delegates of our Supreme People's Assembly and the members of the South's National Assembly without going through preliminary contacts.

«Contents of the Discussion»

- The question of announcing a Joint Declaration on Non-Aggression between the South and the North.
- Questions raised by the South which can be conducive to easing tension and ensuring peace.

«Method of Operation»

- Assembly speakers of the two sides shall serve as co-chairmen.
- Chairman of the Supreme People's Assembly shall preside over meetings held in Pyongyang, and the speaker of the National Assembly of the South shall chair the meetings held in Seoul.
- At meetings all attendees shall freely discuss the issues introduced.
- As for the method of decision, the number of northern delegates shall be equal to that of the southern delegation, and decisions shall be made with the approval of the majority by a mixture of voting and a show of hands.

«Venue and Time»

- Meetings shall be held in Pyongyang and Seoul by turn.
- The first meeting shall be held in Pyongyang in August. The opening of Joint Parliamentary Sessions shall pave the way for multifaceted contacts and dialogue among various parties, factions, and layers and strata, and shall serve as momentum promoting the resumption of the suspended Red Cross and economic talks.

«Draft Joint Declaration on Non-Aggression»

- 1) Non-use of arms against each other and non-invasion of each other by force of arms under any circumstances.
- 2) Pending the time of complete unification, mutual differences and disputes shall be peacefully resolved through dialogue and negotiations.
- 3) Non-participation or cooperation in alien aggression toward or armed interference with each other.
- 4) The boundary line of the non-aggression shall be the Military Demarcation Line drawn under the Military Armistice Agreement of July 27, 1953.
- 5) Phased, mutual reductions in armed forces and a step by step withdrawal of foreign forces and nuclear weapons.
- 6) The present Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) shall be made a buffer zone, where supervisory forces of neutral nations shall be maintained to forestall armed disputes.
- 7) A Joint Non-Aggression Declaration shall not be bound by any treaty or agreement concluded by either of the two sides with a foreign country.

At the same time, in a letter sent to Speaker Kim Jaison of the South on July 26, Yang Hyong-sop, chairman of the Standing Committee of the North's Supreme People's Assembly, proposed that the question of inviting North Korea to the Seoul Olympics and the idea of co-hosting the games be discussed as an emergency agenda topic at a joint session of the South and North Korean legislatures.

In response to the North Korean proposal, Speaker Kim Jaison suggested in an August 1 message to the North that preparatory contacts be held to discuss the issue of materializing the proposed South-North Parliamentarians Talks during August.

In the message, Speaker Kim indicated that 15 members of the National Assembly would be sent to Panmunjom on a date of the North's choosing during the week of August 8-13 for the purpose of making preparatory contact.

The full text of the Speaker's message to the North was as follows:

To Yang Hyung-sop, chairman of the Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly of North Korea;

With reference to my message of July 18 in which I called for the participation of North Korean athletes in the Seoul Olympics, your July 26 reply to the message and your July 20 message on South-North Parliamentarians Talks, I propose the following and look forward to your early affirmative response.

I will send 15 members of our National Assembly to Panmunjom on a date of your choice in the second week of August to make preparatory contact so as to realize within August South-North Parliamentarians Talks which you mentioned in your July 20 letter.

Therefore, I hope that you will let us know your choice of day as soon as possible, and that your side will also send the same size delegatin.

August 1, 1988

Kim Jaison

Speaker

Republic of Korea National Assembly

As the South thus showed a positive response to the realization of South-North Parliamentarians Talks, North Korea, in their third letter on August 9, suggested that a working-level contact be held at the Tong-ilkak in the northern sector of Panmunjom at 11:00 a.m., August 17 with three to five legislators from each side to prepare for a “joint session of the South and North Korean legislatures.”

The gist of the third North Korean letter was as follows:

If the South-North Parliamentarians Talks which the South discussed were to be in the form of a meeting between a limited number of several persons while excluding the representatives of other political parties and social organizations and individual persons from various strata, then we cannot recognize such a format as suitable to the reality of the situation.

Since the South did not mention about agenda topics, we cannot help but believe that the South has no particular objection to the agenda topics set forth in our two earlier letters.

In an effort to open a joint South-North legislature session and taking note of the fact the South agreed in principle to a meeting between the South and North Korean legislatures, we plan to attend a meeting with the South to prepare for a joint session as follows:

- *Time: 11:00 a.m., August 17, 1988*
- *Venue: Tong-ilkak in the northern sector of Panmunjom*
- *Number of Delegates: 3 to 5 Parliamentarians*
- *Topics:*
 - *The question of holding the first meeting of the joint session of the South and North Korean Legislatures in Pyongyang or Seoul for four nights and five days beginning August 26.*
 - *The question of working-level procedures related thereto*

(the venue and time of joint session, procedures for passage through Panmunjom, personal safety, guarantee for conveniences, etc.)

We believe that no lengthy time will be required for the discussion of the question of working-level procedures. We feel that a single meeting will suffice.

In a message to the North on August 12, the South counter-proposed that the contact be held on August 19. The South notified the North of its delegates in a telephone message on August 17. On August 18, the North notified the South of its delegates. Thus, an official meeting between South and North Korean parliamentarians was set to be held for the first time since September 1985.

List of Delegations to the Preparatory Meeting

For the South

Chief Delegate:

Park Chun-kyu (Democratic Justice Party)

Delegates:

Lee Han-dong (Democratic Justice Party)

Kim Bong-ho (Party for Peace and Democracy)

Park Kwan-yong (Reunification Democratic Party)

Kim Yong-hwan (New Democratic Republican Party)

For the North

Chief Delegate:

Chon Gum-chol (Korean Workers Party)

Delegates:

An Byong-su (Korean Workers Party)

Li Dong-chol (Korean Workers Party)

Li Chu-wung (Korean Socialist Democratic Party)

Pak Mun-chan (Chongdokyoo-Chongwu Party)

2. Basic Positions

a. The South

In view of the nature of parliamentary politics incorporating and representing the opinions of the people, it is proper in every respect that the legislatures of South and North Korea discuss the pending and future problems of the two sides. The proposed South-North Parliamentary Talks were somewhat encouraging in that it offered hope that the legislatures of the two sides could, through talks, urge the government authorities to resolve substantial issues. This in turn could provide momentum advancing the resolution of the unification issue.

The consistent position of the South is that in keeping with the basic spirit of the special declaration announced by President Roh on July 7, 1988, the South should resolve to terminate the competition, confrontation and enmity that have characterized the inter-Korean relationship for the past 40 years and explore "good-intentioned partnership relations" especially with North Korea. The South has reached the conclusion that it should exert positive efforts to provide a breakthrough in the strained South-North relations.

Also because of the importance of enabling North Korea to take part in the Seoul Olympics and thereby drawing momentum from the Games toward national reconciliation and unification, the South tried to accommodate North Korean assertions and to compromise as much as possible.

In the conviction that the proposed parliamentary talks should be successful if only to give hope to the compatriots, the South endeavored in many ways to jointly explore areas of

mutual agreement, producing various productive compromise plans, and ways of dealing more flexibly with the North than in the past.

Especially in view of time pressure as the deadline for final Seoul Olympic entries was just around the corner, September 2, cultural Olympics had already begun, and athletes and officials from many countries had begun to arrive in Seoul, the South even proposed that the first South-North Parliamentarians Meeting be held on August 29 with the Olympic issue as the sole agenda topic.

b. The North

It seems that North Korea had proposed a joint South-North parliamentary session and agreed to preparatory contacts merely as a perfunctory gesture in conformity with the flow of the situation surrounding the Korean peninsula. In particular, their overtures were in response to calls from China and the Soviet Union for the resumption of the South-North dialogue, and their desire to sound out the South's new National Assembly to learn how the inter-Korean issue would be handled under the four-party system.

By continuously resurrecting the issue of non-aggression, the North seeks to play up tensions on the Korean peninsula both at home and abroad and create conditions for "anti-fascist democratization struggles" in the South. By so doing, the North hoped to obstruct the successful staging of the Seoul Olympics and establish an excuse to boycott the Games.

The three letters from the North, and the attitude they assumed throughout the course of the preparatory contacts, indicate that the North still adheres to their idea of a joint meeting between the political parties and social organizations

of the South and the North. They insisted that 50 representatives from such groups and separate individuals from each side should attend the proposed parliamentarians talks in addition to the entire membership of the South and North Korean legislatures.

At the fourth preparatory contact, the North offered a seemingly modified proposal, saying they were withholding the idea of participation by representatives of political parties and social organizations. However, by arguing that the issue of their participation should be discussed at the proposed main talks, the North in effect continue to demand a joint session in the format which they have constantly pursued.

In this connection, it should be noted that in their third letter, the North denounced the South's idea calling for meetings of select delegates, "If the parliamentarian talks your side discussed mean a meeting between several select delegates and excludes representatives of political parties and social organizations and people from various layers and strata, then it cannot be recognized as a proper meeting format suitable to reality."

Moreover, at the second preparatory contact, North Korea asserted that a meeting attended by all members of the South and North Korean legislatures is the "minimum-size acceptable meeting," thus, expressing a strong opposition to the idea of a "select delegates meeting."

Judging from the series of joint meetings north Korea has been demanding since 1984, it can be seen that the kind of meetings they want is a sort of multitude meeting not designed to seriously discuss and resolve problems but to forge a consensus through hand-clapping and cheers in a rally-like atmosphere.

Even at the preliminary contacts for the South-North Parliamentarian Talks of 1985, North Korea offered the forms

of both joint sessions and delegate meetings, elaborating on the need for a joint session in which about 100 North Korean representatives would join the plenary session of the South's National Assembly.

As can be seen here, the joint session North Korea advocates is no more than a sort of joint multitude meetings as they sought in the South-North Political Conference offered in April 1973, Grand National Conference (June 1973), and the Joint Meeting of South and North Korean Politicians (February 1982), all of which the North demanded basically with a view toward forming a united front through alliances among Communist elements. The North Korean idea of joint meetings, therefore, is part of their deceptive peace offensive aimed at splitting public opinion with regard to the issue of unification and further at fomenting political and social confusion in the South.

Thus viewed, it can be easily seen that North Korea, while rejecting a bilateral meeting between the two legislatures representing the opinions of the people, intended to push through their ideas under the majority rule method at a multitude meeting attended by pro-North Korean forces who simply echo the voice of Pyongyang.

Additionally, as was well shown during the course of the preparatory contacts, the North sought to make the non-aggression declaration the only agenda topic of the main talks, holding fast to their long-held principle of "prior solution of military issues."

In particular, North Korea asserted that they would discuss the issue of inter-Korean personnel and material exchanges only when a Joint South-North Conference is held to discuss the issues of a non-aggression declaration and the Olympic Games.

The draft Joint Declaration of Non-Aggression which the North prepared showed that North Korea emphasizes the “importance” of the withdrawal of alien forces and nuclear weapons and arms reduction. The North, on the other hand, rejects the South’s suggestion that since the right to conclude a non-aggression agreement lies in the hands of the government authorities of both sides, the proposed parliamentary talks would take up the topic of “advising government authorities to conclude a non-aggression agreement.”

The North’s insistence on the adoption of a non-aggression declaration at a joint parliamentary session while opposing the conclusion of a non-aggression agreement between government authorities, may well stem from their scheme to drive a wedge between the National Assembly and the government by taking advantage of the reality of the new National Assembly under the four-party system. This parallels their on-going efforts to reap a propaganda effect from such issues as the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea. This attempt can be seen even in their demand for open meeting unlike in the past.

Along with the offer for a joint session between the South and North Korean legislatures, North Korea proposed to the United States on July 21, 1988, a meeting between the legislatures of the United States and North Korea, asserting that the offer was an “important peace proposal.” This was an attempt to realize a tripartite meeting of a dual nature, actually a meeting between South and North Korea and another between the U.S. and North Korea. Through this attempt, the North sought to engineer the pullout of U.S. forces and nuclear weapons from Korea under the pretext of alleviating tension and consolidating peace on the peninsula.

The gist of the North Korean message in which it proposed

a U.S.-North Korean Parliamentary Conference was as follows:

«Agenda Topics»

- The question of taking measures through which the two legislatures can cooperate in changing the Armistice Agreement into a Peace Agreement.
- Various questions of mutual concern in improving the North Korea-U.S. relations and easing tension on the Korean peninsula.

«Composition of Delegations»

- Each delegation shall consist of seven to nine persons with a vice-speaker-level official as chief delegate.

«Working-Level Contacts»

- If necessary, working-level contacts shall be held among legislators appointed by the Speakers to prepare for the proposed conference.

«Venue»

- Pyongyang or New York. A third country, too, will be alright.

«Time»

- The sooner it takes place, the better it will be.

3. Course of Preparatory Contacts

a. First Preparatory Contact

The first preparatory contact for the South-North Parliamentarians Talks was held from 11:00 a.m. to 1:45 p.m., Friday, August 19, 1988, with the participation of five delegates from each side. The contact, open to the public, took place at Tong-ilgak in the northern sector of Panmunjom.

In the keynote speech, North Korea's Chief Delegate Chon Gum-chol repeated the contents of their three letters to the

South and suggested that the proposed Joint South-North Parliamentary Meeting be held in the form of a “joint conference” attended also by the representatives of political parties and social organizations and even individual persons from various layers and strata. He said the agenda topics of the proposed talks should be 1) the question of announcing a joint declaration on South-North non-aggression and 2) the question of the 24th Olympics and other questions raised by the South to ease tension. Chon then introduced a unilaterally prepared draft agreement on the opening and operation of a Joint South-North Parliamentary Conference for review.

The gist of the North’s keynote speech was as follows:

The large armed forces of the North and the South remain pitted against each other across the Military Demarcation Line. Today’s extremely unstable situation has reached a highly precarious point where war may break out even over a trivial accidental factor.

The issue of the Olympic Games which is only a month from now, cannot be a mere sports question but a serious political issue related to the future of unification of our split country. It should be resolved at an early date in conformity with the common national interest and aspirations for unification.

Truly the issue of non-aggression and that of the Olympics are most grave national questions along the road toward unification, which are exigent tasks that cannot be put off even for a moment.

At this crucial juncture that may well decide the destiny of the nation, the politicians of the North and the South should end such unfortunate conditions of confrontation, tension, and armed clashes, making instead a new start in favor of reconciliation, trust, peace, and unification.

If and when a Joint Declaration of Non-Aggression is adopted and the question of the Olympics resolved in a manner conforming to the common interest of the nation, it would no doubt serve to uncurtain an epochal phase for national reconciliation, unity, peace, and unification.

We believe that through the letters exchanged and policy announcements made by political parties, the two sides have in principle reached an accord on the format, etc., of the South-North Parliamentary Conference.

Under the circumstances, the issues that have to be discussed and resolved at today's meeting can be working-level procedural matters related to the opening and operating the first joint meeting between the South and North Korean legislatures. We already disclosed working-level procedural matters for the opening of the first Joint South-North Parliamentary Meeting.

(Draft)

**Agreement on Opening and Operating Joint
South-North Parliamentary Meeting**

1. Agenda Topics of Joint Meeting

The agenda topics of the joint meeting shall be the question of announcing a Joint Declaration on South-North Non-Aggression and the question of the 24th Olympic Games. Additionally, questions raised by the South that can contribute to easing tension and guaranteeing peace in the country shall also be made agenda topics.

2. Venue of Joint Meeting

The joint meetings shall be held in Seoul and Pyongyang on a rotating basis. The first joint meeting shall be held in Pyongyang.

3. Scope of Attendees

The Joint meeting shall be attended by the entire legislators of

the two sides plus 50 representatives of political parties having no floor seats and social organizations and individual persons in various circles from both sides.

4. Time and Duration of the First Joint Meeting

The first joint meeting shall be held on August 26, 1988, and its duration shall be four nights and five days.

5. Procedures for Passage through the Military Demarcation Line at Panmunjom

- 1) The list of participating parliamentarians, representatives of other political parties and social organizations, individual persons, attendants, and members of the press, reflecting the name, sex, and occupational position, shall be forwarded to the other side three days before the date of entry.
- 2) Persons who travel to the other's side in connection with the joint meeting shall carry letters of credence or identification cards issued by the legislature or the relevant speaker.
- 3) The points of passage along the Military Demarcation Line shall be buildings at Panmunjom under the control of the hosting side.
- 4) Travellers of each side shall follow the guidance and orders of the hosting side during their stay.

6. Guarantee of Personal Safety

- 1) Both sides shall guarantee the personal safety and inviolable rights of the people of the other side during their stay in their respective areas.
- 2) As a guarantee of such rights, relevant offices shall issue an appropriate official statement, a copy of which shall be furnished to the other side.

7. Guarantee of Conveniences

The hosting side shall guarantee all conveniences for personnel visiting for the purpose of the joint meeting. Such conveniences shall include transportation, communications means, and boarding, etc.

8. Operational Procedures

- 1) A joint meeting shall, in principle, be open to the public. If necessary, it may be held behind closed doors.
- 2) Participant-qualification for the joint meeting shall be checked by a Joint Qualification Screening Committee comprising three members from each side.
- 3) A Joint Steering Committee, comprising five members from each side, shall be formed to ensure the smooth operation of the meetings.
- 4) The meetings shall be co-chaired by the Speakers of the southern and northern legislatures, each Speaker presiding over sessions held on their respective side.
- 5) A report or a bill may be introduced by the representatives of either side or by a political party of either side, providing such political party holds a seat in their respective legislature.
- 6) Free debates may be held by any participant under the principle of democracy. It is provided, however, that there shall be an equal number of debaters on each side.
- 7) The decision on a bill that has been debated shall be made based on a majority rule as expressed through an actual vote or by a show of hands.
- 8) The number of legislators participating in the decision process shall be equal for each side, with the chairman not taking part in the voting.
- 9) To calculate the results of a decision process, a Joint Calculation Committee shall be formed with five members from each side.

9. The recording of the proceedings of a meeting shall be made in the form as may be convenient to each side, such as tape-recording, videotaping, or stenographing. The hosting side shall ensure the other side has necessary taperecording cables.

10. Other issues to be raised shall be determined between working-level officials prior to the opening of a meeting.

Following the North's keynote speech, the South's Chief Delegate Park Chun-kyu, in his keynote speech, called for the systematic discussion of the format and agenda topics, composition of delegations, and the time, venue and procedural matters of the talks.

The text of the Mr. Park's keynote speech was as follows:

Delegates of the Supreme People's Assembly;

I am very pleased that legislators from the South and the North have gotten together to start a new dialogue today for the first in a long time. In the name of the delegation of the Republic of Korea National Assembly, I extend greetings to you who represent the Supreme People's Assembly of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Looking back, today's meeting of South and North Korean politicians is the first since the second preliminary contact for South-North Parliamentarians Talks held on September 25, 1985. We cannot but be moved by deep emotion.

As your side, too, knows, this year marks the 43rd anniversary of the liberation of our homeland, and the 40th anniversary of the founding of the governments of the South and the North. Over the course of time, our people, while overcoming numerous tribulations and difficulties, have achieved both mental and material growth, making it possible for us to raise our national

self-esteem and a dash onward toward peaceful unification. Nonetheless, South-North relations have yet to depart from the abnormal and unfortunate state of disruption and confrontation. In the midst of the international trend toward reform and openness, we now should effect a drastic change in our thinking and perception about national issues.

It is really fortunate that at this time we politicians are able to come together for dialogue in such an amicable atmosphere. This cannot but be a very encouraging sign for the future of the nation.

Before it is too late, we should resolve to terminate the mutual distrust and confrontation which has persistently characterized our relationship and instead should stride shoulder to shoulder toward reconciliation, cohesion, prosperity, and the unification of the nation in the spirit of a national community, the spirit that all Koreans are a single ethnic family sharing the same bloodline.

Delegates,

A look at the history of the South-North relationship makes me think that today's meeting is by no means accidental but is the result of the patient efforts of both sides.

Reexamining the historic significance of the fact that the Seoul Games of the 24th Olympiad, a festival of peace and friendship for all mankind, will take place in this land, the Republic of Korea National Assembly came to the conviction that this must be made into an excellent opportunity to promote South-North reconciliation leading to unification. Thereupon, our Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution on July 9 calling for your athletes to participate in the Olympics. The resolution was subsequently delivered to your side.

Furthermore, the representatives of the political parties in the National Assembly have met to earnestly study the contents of the letters your side sent us. We are not entirely without objections to your contentions. But, we have reached the conclusion

that starting a dialogue with North Korean politicians would help to provide a breakthrough in the currently deadlocked South-North relationship. At the proposed South-North Parliamentary Meeting, we, politicians, should contribute our share to improving or resolving the problems facing the nation now and in the years to come. Because the legislators are in a position to better communicate with and speak for the people of our respective areas, the parliamentarians meetings should be held in a manner that respects and meets public wishes to the greatest possible extent.

Today all people ardently desire that the South and the North of Korea will open their doors to each other in pace with the worldwide trend of openness, will restore trust and ease tension through exchanges and cooperation, and thereby advance toward national prosperity and peaceful unification. We, the parliamentarians, should humbly turn an attentive ear to those wishes and the expectations of our people and endeavor to make the South-north Parliamentary Meeting bear rich fruit. At the same time, both sides should approach the parliamentarians meeting in a way becoming our intrinsic duties as representatives of the people.

Among the things pending between the South and the North, there are some which can be directly undertaken by legislators, some which must be done by government authorities, and some that can be dealt with best by social organizations and individuals. Therefore, we should prudently study and decide the areas where we parliamentarians can make a direct contribution.

Noting that we have ascertained, through our correspondence, that both sides agree on the need to hold South-North parliamentarians talks, I believe that this contact today should discuss and decide the format of such talks, the makeup of the delegations, the agenda, the rules of operation, time and place for the talks, and other procedural matters.

Accordingly, I would like to set out our position in the con-

viction that we, the legislators, should make the parliamentarians talks a success by all means in keeping with a keen awareness of the momentous national and historical mission and obligations imposed upon us. In that way, we must give hope to our brethren.

First, the format of the South-North Parliamentary Meeting shall be a meeting between select delegates.

Second, delegations to the South-North Parliamentary Meeting shall each consist of 20 delegates, a 40-member support staff and 50 members of the press. The chief delegate shall be a senior legislator, appointed by the speaker.

Third, the agenda of the South-North Parliamentary Meeting shall consist of the following five topics:

- (1) The participation of northern athletes in the 24th Seoul Olympics.*
- (2) The acceleration of the exchange of personnel and goods and cooperation between the South and the North.*
- (3) The question of recommending a non-aggression agreement between South and North Korean government authorities.*
- (4) The question of urging the resumption of the South-North Economic Meeting.*
- (5) The question of recommending a South-North summit meeting.*

Fourth, accords reached at the South-North Parliamentary Meeting shall be embodied in a joint agreement and should then be made public. To ensure the effective operation of the talks, an executive panel shall be formed with five delegates from each side.

Fifth, the first meeting of the South-North Parliamentary Meeting shall be held within August in Pyongyang and the second meeting in October in Seoul.

Sixth, the period a delegation stays in the other's area shall be

three nights and four days.

Seventh, the precedent set in the past travels back and forth between the South and the North shall apply, with appropriate modifications, to all procedural matters, such as procedures for passage between the South and the North, the guarantee of personal safety, procedures for passage through Panmunjom, schedules for the stay in each other's area for meeting, insignia, equipment and personal belongings, transportation, communications and liaison methods, facilities at the conference site, the recording of the meeting, whether to open a meeting to the public, the proceedings of the meeting, programs of activities outside the conference sites, and various other conveniences. Detailed matters related to these procedures shall be discussed and decided by a joint, two-man working-level delegation.

In the belief that our proposal will live up to the domestic and international expectations for the smooth operation and conclusion of the South-North Parliamentary Meeting, I will further elaborate on our proposal.

As to the format of the South-North Parliamentary Meeting we think that delegates talks are the most reasonable and proper type. A delegates meeting would ensure the efficiency and effectiveness of the conference. Furthermore, this is the method agreed on between the two sides during the 1985 preliminary contacts for a South-North Parliamentarians Conference, and, at the same time, is in line with the precedent set in all past bilateral South-North talks.

The South-North Parliamentary Meeting is not intended to be an occasion to bring large numbers of people together to have them endorse what the two sides have already agreed on, but rather to focus on, discuss, and resolve, in a sincere manner, the question of Olympic participation and many other issues pending between the South and the North. It is obvious that a delegates meeting is most appropriate for that purpose.

In this connection, I think the suggestion your side made in

your letters for the involvement of representatives from political parties and social organizations and individuals from various walks of life in South-North Parliamentary Meeting is not desirable in view of the nature of the meeting.

Since legislators represent, as a matter of course, the people of our respective areas and, at the same time, the political parties, I believe there is no need to have separate delegates from the political parties and social organizations or individual citizens at the meeting. The National Assembly is the sole deliberative body representing all the people. Can there be any need for the participation of any other representatives from political parties or other organizations in a meeting between such legislators?

I shall now discuss the question of agenda. Our side has suggested the question of participation of your athletes in the Olympics as the first topic of the proposed meeting because, as our National Assembly resolved on July 9, the Seoul Olympics should provide great momentum toward national reconciliation and cooperation.

The 24th Olympiad will become a great festival for the reconciliation of mankind, with a record 161 countries participating, transcending ideologies and political systems. It is truly regrettable, therefore, that to date, less than one month before the opening of the Games, your side, who are one people with us, has not expressed any willingness to participate. Our side has made multifaceted and sincere efforts to facilitate your athlete's participation in the Olympics. At the Lausanne South-North sports meeting, we even discussed the idea of staging several sports in North Korea. In view of the lack of time, however, even such an idea has realistically become difficult. The deadline for the final entries to the Seoul Olympics is just around the corner, September 2, and the Cultural Olympics has already gotten under way.

Under the circumstances, the only way for the two sides to cooperate with each other in the cause of the 24th Olympiad is

for your athletes to take part in the Games with our athletes.

How regretful it would be if our nation, already suffering from the division of the homeland, must see even the Olympics cause a split between Seoul and Pyongyang! We desire that the South and the North will take this rare occasion to get together in Seoul and turn the Olympics into a national festival for unification.

If, during the opening and closing ceremonies, South and North Korean athletes march in together, carrying their respective flags preceded by the Olympic flag, that in itself would serve to demonstrate the oneness of our people before the whole world.

Our side will keep the door of the Olympics open to you until immediately before the opening of the Games. If and when your side expresses a willingness to participate, we shall warmly welcome you with brotherly love and shall guarantee the maximum security and conveniences through the entire period of the Games. In fact we have already arranged for your national flag to be raised and your national anthem to be played at the entry of your athletic team and in awarding medals to your athletes. We have also reserved accommodations at the Olympic and press villages and hotels for your sportsmen, journalists and officials. We have thus perfected arrangements for your participation in the Olympics.

For the South-North Parliamentary Meeting to deal with the question of accelerating the exchange of personnel and goods and cooperation between the South and the North will be crucial not only for the restoration of national homogeneity and the promotion of mutual prosperity but also to dissipate distrust, which is the root cause of the tension between us. As long as deeply rooted distrust, misunderstanding and tension persist between the South and the North, we cannot live in peace nor can we move even a step closer to peaceful unification.

The exchange of personnel and goods and cooperation be-

tween the South and the North will serve as a short cut to restoring mutual trust and removing tension. This will also help form a social, cultural, and economic community to solidify national ties and lay the groundwork for unification. To this end, exchanges of politicians, businessmen, journalists, religious leaders, writers, artists, athletes, scholars, and students should be actively promoted. Doors should also be thrown open for free travel to South and North Korea by overseas Koreans.

Furthermore, if Korea is to emerge as an advanced nation and enhance the well-being and quality of life of everyone in both the South and the North in the face of ongoing global competition for development, we must help each other through trade and economic cooperation with the goal of clearing the way for unification.

In pace with the change and development in relations even between countries with different political and social systems, characterized by the setting up of trade missions to ensure smooth economic cooperation, the South and the North, too, should open an age of economic cooperation within our nation by establishing trade missions in Seoul and Pyongyang and by taking other necessary steps. To this end we, legislators, should, as a matter of course, show an interest in resuming the suspended South-North economic talks.

Furthermore, our call for the resumption of the suspended Red Cross Conference is in line with the national aspiration for the reuniting of dispersed families.

In view of the reality that the aged persons impatiently looking forward to a reunion with their missing relatives are passing away without being able to fulfill their wish, a resolution of the issue of dispersed families cannot be put off even for a moment.

In the rest of the world, many people travel back and forth between countries with different ideologies and systems. Our people are one and yet are unable to be reunited with loved ones nor can they even exchange letters of personal inquiry because of

the barrier of division. This tragic state of affairs should be overcome immediately. From this standpoint, I believe that we who are legislators should actively support the resumption of the Red Cross conference to end the pain of the dispersed families.

Moreover, we suggested placing the recommendation of a non-aggression agreement between the South and the North to our governments on the agenda of the South-North Parliamentary Meeting basically because of the need to quickly create an effective apparatus to ease tension and prevent the recurrence of war, while promoting trust through mutual exchanges and cooperation.

As you know well, already 14 years ago, in 1974, the government of the Republic of Korea began proposing the conclusion of a non-aggression agreement between the South and the North and has since renewed the proposal on a number of occasions. We have thus urged your government to agree to prepare an institutional device for the alleviation of tension and prevention of war. These initiatives include the proposal of January 18, 1974, for negotiations on a South-North non-aggression agreement; the proposal made by the Foreign Minister on May 13, 1976, for the conclusion of a South-North non-aggression pact; the proposal for the conclusion of a Provisional Agreement on Basic Relations between South and North Korea on January 22, 1982; the proposal for 20 pilot projects of inter-Korean cooperation on February 1, 1982; and the proposal for a foreign ministers meeting to discuss the conclusion of a South-North Non-Aggression agreement among other topics on August 3, 1987. This year also, our government proposed at the Third United Nations Special Assembly on Disarmament held on June 10, the conclusion of a South-North non-aggression agreement to prevent the recurrence of hostilities.

In this context, I cannot help but pay keen attention to the fact that in the letter which your Supreme People's Assembly sent us on July 20, it "recognized the need and urgency for a

non-aggression declaration to be jointly issued by South and North Korean authorities."

Therefore, we feel that at the South-North Parliamentary Meeting, the two sides should affirm the significance of the need for the South-North non-aggression pact, while leaving concrete and practical matters to government authorities of the two sides, and urge them to expeditiously conclude such an agreement. I think this conforms not only with the view of your side, but also with the intrinsic function of the legislatures of the two sides.

Lastly, to effectively resolve the question of a non-aggression agreement and other important issues which require a political decision, a South-North summit meeting should be held as soon as possible. If and when the top leaders of the South and the North meet without any prerequisite or precondition and open-heartedly discuss pending issues and future problems facing the nation, it would serve to create decisive momentum toward improved inter-Korean relations leading to peaceful unification. The leaders of both the South and the North have the obligation to the nation to meet as soon as possible in the interest of national reconciliation and unification.

Delegates,

Whether the South-North Parliamentary Meeting, on which the whole people's attention is focused, can be realized at an early date hinges on the efforts and cooperation on the part of the delegates of both sides.

I believe that we must start from a realization that we are a single people, and then we must fulfill the responsibility and mission imposed on us, displaying a spirit of mutual understanding and compromise. I hope that this preparatory contact today will thus result in the early realization of parliamentary talks. I look forward to your affirmative response to our position.

The two keynote speeches show that while the two sides agree on the holding of the first meeting in Pyongyang in

August, they nevertheless differ seriously on the format and agenda for the proposed meeting.

North Korea unilaterally concluded as if the two sides agreed, through the exchange of letters, on holding the proposed talks in the form of a joint session, and wanted the discussion only of operational and procedural matters, making the form of a joint session a *fait accompli*.

In a message to the North on August 12, the South, while reminding the North that the two sides differed on several issues though they agreed in principle on the talks, made it clear that the preparatory contacts should be used to discuss and resolve the format and agenda topics, and all other related matters on which differences of opinion existed.

However, as the two sides discussed these matters, the logic behind the North's initial rejection of the need for a preparatory contact was not all clear. As a result the first contact saw little more than the two sides putting forth their respective positions.

As to the format of the proposed talks, the South stressed that in the interest of efficiency and productivity the form of select delegates meeting was the most appropriate and most consistent with principles of representative politics. As such, the inclusion of other participants as suggested by the North was neither desirable nor appropriate for parliamentary meeting.

On the issue of agenda topics, the South indicated that in light of functions of the legislature, it was well within the scope of the meeting to recommend a non-aggression agreement. The North, however, showed no sign of backing down from their demand as indicated in their "draft agreement."

In view of the importance and urgency of the agenda topics, the South proposed a second preparatory session be

held at 11:00 a.m. August 20, to which the North agreed.

b. Second Preparatory Contact

The second preparatory session was held at the Peace House in the southern sector of Panmunjom from 11:00 a.m. to 1:35 p.m. August 20 (Saturday), 1988. Discussion centered on the issues of format and agenda topics on which differences were again encountered.

In his first speech, the South's chief delegate offered a compromise plan accommodating the North's contentions. Regarding the format of the talks, the South again stressed the appropriateness of the select delegates format for discussion and settlement of the numerous and complex problems facing the two sides. The South offered that as agreements were reached at the meeting, they may be endorsed by the two respective legislatures or a joint legislative session could be held to confirm such agreements.

As to the issue of agenda topics, the South set forth the following modified items in consideration of the North Korean contentions:

- 1) The question of the 24th Olympic Games.
- 2) The question of personnel and material exchanges.
- 3) the question of South-North Non-Aggression.
- 4) The question of resuming the Red Cross Conference and the South-North Economic Meeting.

The South's new plan of agenda topics did not merely represent only the South's ideas but it also duly reflected the opinions of the North. In particular, the idea of making the non-aggression issue the "question of South-North non-

aggression” was motivated in part by the efforts to explore tasks that can be taken up at both legislatures.

Especially emphasizing the Olympic issue as the most exigent question that had to be resolved at the parliamentary meeting, the South stressed that the proposed talks should be held within the month of August by all means.

On the other hand, North Korea aired the same contentions as at the first session, arguing that since both the non-aggression and Olympic issues are the exigent questions, they should be taken up at the joint parliamentary sessions at the same time. The North rejected the South’s compromise plan as “hardly being anything that can be helpful to resolving problems.”

With regard to the format of the talks, the North insisted that a joint session of the South and the North Korean legislatures attended by all 954 members of both legislatures is the “minimum necessary session.” At the same time they maintained the need for the additional participants as indicated in the first session.

Toward the close of the second session, North Korea advanced a new plan of agenda topics, which comprised 1) the question of non-aggression, 2) the question of the 24th Olympics, more specifically the question of the South’s invitation of their athletes to the Games and the question of co-hosting, and 3) the question of multifaceted exchanges and cooperation between the South and the North. But the North asserted that the issue of exchanges and cooperation can be discussed only when the non-aggression and Olympic issues are debated at a joint session.

The South suggested that the non-aggression-related topic be changed to make it a “question of concluding a non-aggression agreement and making a non-aggression declara-

tion.” The North turned down even this modified offer.

Inasmuch as the opening of the Olympics was imminent, the South made an emergency proposal that a South-North parliamentarians meeting be held on August 28 to explore possible means of expeditiously resolving the Olympic issue. While shunning any direct reaction to the offer, North Korea insisted on the idea of a joint session. As such, no agreement was reached during the session.

During the session, the North abruptly made an issue of a KBS report on the “Break Down of the Talks,” demanding an explanation from the South. They thus drove the second session to near disruption before agreeing to a third session to be held at Tongilkak in the northern sector of Panmunjom on August 22.

c. Third Preparatory Contact

The third contact was held as scheduled and lasted from 11:00 a.m. to 1:25 p.m. Unfortunately, no agreement was reached on the format and agenda topics, reflecting the continued wide disparity in the positions of the two sides.

Unlike the first two sessions, North Korea tended to concentrate on propagandizing their idea for a “joint session,” while trying to check the South’s efforts to broach the pressing Olympic issue.

Regarding the format issue, the South stressed that its compromised plan was designed to ensure the effectiveness of the talks, and that it took into account the North Korea idea of a joint session.

It was also emphasized that the plan represented a sincere effort by the South to minimize mutual differences on the format issue.

With respect to agenda topics, the North was reminded that the modified topic agenda presented by South was offered in the hope of surmounting difficulties stemming from differences and thus winding up the preparatory talks at an early date.

The South then expressed the hope that the proposed South-North Parliamentary Meeting would be held in August so that the participants could fully discuss issues pending between the two sides such as:

- 1) The question of the 24th Olympic Games;
- 2) The question of personnel and material exchanges, including the issue of resuming the South-North Red Cross and Economic Meetings;
- 3) The question of South-North non-aggression; and
- 4) The question of holding a South-North Summit Meeting.

The southern delegation indicated that its proposal for an Emergency South-North Parliamentary Meeting in Pyongyang on August 29 to discuss and settle the urgent issue of the 24th Olympics as a sole emergency topic, was meant to facilitate both South and North participation and thereby a sweeping breakthrough in efforts to bring about national unification.

The North, meanwhile, clung niggardly to their call for meetings to be held in the form of a joint session of the South and North legislatures. On the issue of agenda topics, the North obstinately argued that they could not agree to the South's original or modified proposals with regard to the non-aggression issue. Their position was that "question of advising government authorities to conclude a non-aggression agreement," as proposed by the South, should be scrapped in favor of "question of adopting a joint declaration of non-

aggression.”

The North also rejected the South’s call for an Emergency Parliamentary Meeting to resolve the time-sensitive Olympic issue, asserting that the proposed talks would be better used to resolve both the Olympic and non-aggression issues together.

Responding to an apparent fear that the South’s call for an emergency meeting limited to resolving the Olympic issue would lead to an undermining of the question of a joint declaration of non-aggression, the North shunned further discussion of the agenda issue, concentrating their efforts instead on propagandizing their joint session proposal. In so doing, the North again demonstrated their lack of interest in realizing parliamentarians talks prior to the Olympics.

In light of the looming deadline for resolving the Olympic issue and noting that the open sessions had deteriorated to little more than a forum for propaganda-oriented, pontifical practice, the South suggested that the two chief delegates meet privately to determine various issues prior to holding the next contact.

Reacting to the proposed private session, the North indicated that they would respond later to the South’s suggestion and hastily ended the third Contact.

d. Private Session between the Chief Delegates

In response to the call for a private session between the chief delegates the North suggested in a telephone message around 10:20 a.m. the following day, August 25, that the chief delegates meet behind closed doors at 11:00 a.m. the same day. The North was giving but a 40-minute advance notice and while they did suggest a closed-door session, they requested the presence of a recorder and two attendants.

Faced with an unreasonably short notice, the South counter-proposed the meeting be held at 11:00 a.m. August 24, and that each chief delegate be accompanied by but one attendant.

The meeting was finally held on the 24th at the Peace House. It lasted from 11:00 a.m. to 12:55 p.m. and was attended by the two chief delegates and a recorder for each side.

Throughout the session, the South tried to determine just what the North's intentions were with regard to their participation in the Olympic Games. The North, however, argued that their basic position was to prepare for a joint session, and they demanded that the South present yet another modified plan.

The northern chief delegate continued to push the North's call for a joint session format, claiming that select delegates meetings were "old fashioned," and he indicated that the proposed talks should be a plenary session. He further maintained that the joint session format would facilitate unanimous agreement on positions developed by subcommittees. He indicated that he would give the format issue further consideration prior to the fourth preparatory contact.

The North suggested that the fourth contact be held the following day at the same location. The South, believing that the special session was unproductive, agreed to hold a fourth session, but proposed in a subsequent telephone message that the date be slipped to the 26th.

e. Fourth Preparatory Contact

The fourth contact was held as agreed and lasted from 11:00 a.m. to 2:10 p.m.

Pointing out that the two sides shared the recognition that

the Olympic issue was the most pressing question, the South reiterated its call for an Emergency South-North Parliamentary Meeting on August 29 to focus on the Olympic issue.

Regarding the format issue, North Korea introduced a modified plan featuring the replacement of a joint session with a combined meeting and the withholding of the bid for the participation of other representatives as contained in their original proposal. The North, however, wanted the issue of such participation to be a topic of discussion once the talks were convened. Notwithstanding the outward appearance of an easing in their position, closer examination indicates that the North had held fast to the idea of a multitude meeting of the entire 954 legislators of the South and the North where decisions would be made under the majority rule. On the issue of non-aggression, the North simply repeated their call for both the Olympic and non-aggression issues to be addressed as a single agenda topic.

Despite the South's reminder that the deadline for Olympic entries, one week away at that time, constituted an urgent need for an Emergency South-North Parliamentary Meeting to open-heartedly discuss and resolve the Olympic issue, the North insisted that the issue should be resolved under the method of majority rule at a combined meeting of the entire legislative bodies of the two sides.

The South, realizing that the North had no interest in resolving the Olympic issue, proposed that a fifth preparatory contact be held in early October following the Games. While effectively tabling the Olympic issue, the South was quick to point out that the door to the North's participation in the Olympics would remain open, and that the South would willingly resume contacts at any time if they agreed to hold the proposed August 29 Emergency South-North Parliamentary Meeting.

The North shunned the Olympic issue and proposed a fifth preparatory contact be held on October 13. The South accepted the proposal, and it was mutually agreed that the session would be held at Tong-ilkak in the northern sector of Panmunjom.

4. Intermediate Review

At all four of the preparatory sessions, the southern delegation made every sincere effort to bring about South-North Parliamentarians Meetings to improve inter-Korean relations and establish conditions for the resolution of the unification issue.

In particular, the South introduced three compromise plans and one emergency proposal with regard to the format and agenda topics, taking into full account the North Korean position. In so doing, the South made every possible concession and displayed its flexible stand in a bid to make possible the proposed parliamentary meetings.

As to the issue of format, the South stressed that a meeting of select delegates was the most appropriate format. This position is in line with the principle of parliamentary politics and is better suited to address the full range of complex problems existing between the South and the North. The South allowed that as long as the nature of the meeting was retained, the name could be changed to a "Meeting of South and North Korean Legislatures" as demanded by the North. The South even went as far as to offer that if pending problems were resolved at a meeting of select delegates, a joint meeting of the entire South and North Korean legislatures could be held to endorse items that had been agreed on by the select delegates.

Moreover, as both sides had squandered so much time haggling over such wording as “agreement” versus “declaration” and “advising” versus “delegating,” the South introduced a compromise list of agenda topics incorporating the opinions of both sides in hopes of bringing the proposed talks to an early fruition. For instance, the South proposed as a topic the “question of South-North Non-Aggression” embodying both the South’s “question of advising the South and North Korean authorities to conclude a non-aggression agreement” and the North’s “question of announcing a joint declaration on South-North non-aggression.”

Additionally, considering the time sensitivity of the Olympic issue and the need for a resolution of the issue within the month of August, the South made a proposal for an Emergency South-North Parliamentarians Meeting be held to in Pyongyang on August 29 to discuss the issue on a priority basis.

The true intention of the South was clearly reflected in the unanimous resolution of the National Assembly calling for the participation of a North Korean delegation in the Olympic Games. This also reflected the hope that their participation would serve to raise the national self-esteem and the sense of national community.

To this end, the South attended the preparatory sessions with the firm determination to realize the proposed talks, if only to give hope to the people, by making every possible concession in search of common ground between the two sides.

Despite the sincerity displayed by the South and the keen public interest in the preparatory efforts, North Korea deliberately delayed the proposed talks and held fast to the position specified in their keynote address during the first session. In fact, their position became more intransigent as the sessions continued.

Regarding the format issue, the North insisted on a joint session. They clung to the core of their idea until the fourth session when they demanded that though the title could be changed from a "joint session" to a "combined meeting," the talks should be attended by the entire 954 legislators of both sides and decisions be made with the approval by a majority of the attendees.

On the agenda issue, too, the North asserted that their idea of the "question of announcing a joint declaration on non-aggression" was a line from which they could make no concession under any circumstances, insisting that the seven points of their draft declaration should be the core of the joint declaration to be adopted by the two sides. They were thus demanding a one-sided concession from the South, which ultimately drove the four preparatory sessions to a deadlock.

At the second session, the North, as if to make a concession, indicated that they could consider adoption the "question of realizing multifaceted cooperation and exchanges between the North and the South" but only on the condition that the South accepts their two agenda topics.

In their second letter dated July 26, North Korea suggested that the Olympic issue be discussed as an emergency topic. Even during the preparatory sessions, the North seemed to recognize the urgency of the issue by describing it as "a most pressing and grave national affair" and indicating that "the question cannot be put off even for a moment." In reality, however, they only shunned discussion of the issue. During the fourth session, they didn't even bother to hide their indifference to the Olympic issue.

It is more than natural that inter-Korean talks should be in the form of bilateral meetings because problems pending between the two sides have to be seriously discussed before any

agreement can be reached. Nonetheless, ignoring such reality, the North rejected the South's call for a bilateral meeting and insisted that problems should be resolved with the approval of attendees at a sort of multitude meeting of all legislators of the South and the North.

Though the North spoke of making decisions under the principle of majority rule, this method is not workable because the two sides are under different constitutional systems. If such a format were adopted, the principle of proportion of population would have to be taken into consideration.

As observed by one of the delegates from the South, the North's continued call for the participation of a number of non-parliamentarians stems from their failure to abandon an illusory expectation.

Expecting much from same voices in the South for the withdrawal of U.S. forces and nuclear weapons, the North attempted to have non-parliamentarians attend the proposed talks so as to adopt decisions against the will of the South under the principle of majority rule.

In light of the distrust and disruption that have persisted between the two sides over a long period of time, any declaration of non-aggression itself can hardly be expected to work. There must be concrete practical measures taken to buttress the will to achieve non-aggression.

Thus seen, it is proper to the parliamentary function that the legislatures of the two sides affirm the necessity and significance of non-aggression, discussing the issue carefully and then leave concrete and realistic matters regarding non-aggression to be decided in an agreement between the respective government authorities.

To keep the sessions alive in the face of such an intransigent attitude on the part of the North, the South withheld the

use of such words as “declaration” or “agreement” and offered instead “question of South-North non-aggression.”

Due in large part to the North’s passive and evasive attitude, the four preparatory contacts ended without any substantive achievements. Still, it can be said that at least the doors to inter-Korean dialogue were not allowed to close.

The South hopes that the North will change their posture and come forward to the table for productive dialogue, and that they will thus become a good-intentioned partner in the forging of an age of inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation. It is also hoped that the politicians of the South and the North will continue to discuss various issues pending between the two sides.

5. Reaction at Home and Abroad

Major press media of the South reported that the four preparatory sessions failed to register and progress, with the fifth contact slated for October after the Olympics, due to North Korea’s intransigence. They commented that during the sessions, the first such held in two years and eight months, the South was very flexible, presenting several compromise offers, where as, they said, the North demonstrated an all but total lack of flexibility throughout the talks.

The press further charged that the North’s continued call for participation of non-legislative individuals was unreasonable and failed to reflect the fact that the select delegates format was agreed to in similar contacts in 1985. It was also pointed out that the North’s demand for a declaration of non-aggression was basically intended to neutralize the South’s na-

tional defense capability as it was meant to bring about the withdrawal of U.S. forces and nuclear weapons from Korea and the scrapping of the Korea-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty.

Noting that in the past North Korea has always come to the table for dialogue whenever there was a change of government in the South in an obvious attempt to test the new government's policy line. Press reports also indicated that the North's coming to the table this time seemed to be a clear attempt to find an excuse to boycott the Olympics and to block the proposed parliamentarians talks while shifting the blame to the South. It was also indicated that the North sought in part to use the meetings to split the four-party system of the National Assembly, using the Olympics as a rally point to foment confrontation between the new government and students activist and dissidents. They thus provided clear indication that there has been no change whatsoever in their attitude of using even inter-Korean dialogue for their united front strategy.

Meanwhile, major world press, though they foresaw rough sailing, generally welcomed the signs of progress. They observed that "the North's coming to the preparatory sessions was to test the changing political situation in the South featuring the domination of the National Assembly by the opposition parties, as well as to find an excuse to stay away from the Seoul Olympics."

Noting that North Korea stuck to their ideas for a non-aggression declaration and a joint session, the world press said the chances of the North participating in the Seoul Olympics were pessimistic. While expecting some progress in inter-Korean dialogue following the Olympics, the world press, nevertheless, opined that North Korea would continue to make an issue of the non-aggression question.

SOUTH-NORTH DIALOGUE IN KOREA



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Part I

Development of Various Dialogues

1. Preliminary Meetings for High-Level Officials Talks

a. Initiation

Preliminary meetings for South-North high-level Officials talks materialized after Prime Minister Kang Young-hoon proposed the talks in a message sent to Yon Hyong-muk, North Korea's Administration Council prime minister, on December 28, 1988.

In the message, Prime Minister Kang proposed to hold a South-North high-level meeting of a seven-member delegation from each side, with the prime minister as senior delegate, to comorehensively discuss and resolve matters related to confidence-building and the alleviation of tension between the South and the North. He also suggested that preliminary meetings be held between five-member delegations headed by vice-minister-level officials to discuss procedural matters for the proposed talks.

As the topics of the talks, Prime Minister Kang proposed the issues of suspending mutual slander and defamation, of mutual respect and non-interference in each other's internal affairs, of multi-pronged exchanges and cooperation, of promoting trust in the military sector, and of holding a South-North summit meeting. He said that other issues raised by North Korea to help build confidence and alleviate tension could also be discussed.

The proposal was intended as a breakthrough in the dialogue between the government authorities of the South and the North, thereby facilitating the substantial improvement of inter-Korean relationships. The overture illustrated that, as opposed to the North Korean demand for the prior re-

solution of political and military issues, the South is willing to act positively by suggesting that military questions be discussed along with the issues of exchanges and other forms of cooperation.

If and when the proposed high-level talks are realized, it will certainly serve to lay the foundation for multi-pronged exchanges and cooperation between South and North Korea. It would also contribute much to the eventual holding of a South-North summit meeting.

The text of Prime Minister Kang's message to the North was as follows :

It cannot but be heart-breaking to see that to date, 43 years after the division of our homeland, our nation has not been able to put an end to the pains stemming from national division.

Today's international situation is such that even those nations with different ideologies and systems must coexist peacefully in order to insure their mutual prosperity. The development of exchange programs will bring about the openness that makes this peaceful coexistence possible.

Nonetheless, the South and the North, despite their being the same nation, have failed to resolve the enmity and confrontation resulting from their tragic history. Not even a single letter can be exchanged between separated families.

We must resolutely surmount this problem putting an end to old-fashioned confrontation and friction, and should instead unfold an age of national self-esteem and prosperity through reconciliation and cooperation.

As you know, our side has consistently done all in our power to promote the reconciliation of and cooperation between the South and

the North in order to encourage both sides to form a single national community. The measures included the opening of our doors for inter-Korean personnel and material exchanges, suspension of slanderous broadcasts against the North and the cessation of diplomatic confrontation at international stages.

These measures stemmed from our desire to hasten national reconciliation, prosperity and unification based on our national self-esteem and capability. We have made clear that if your side shows a corresponding attitude, our side would take more positive steps.

I think that the basic cause of South-North confrontation and friction lies in the fact that mutual distrust has built up over a protracted period of time due to our different ideologies and systems. Therefore, as your side, too, pointed out, it is self-evident that so long as distrust and misunderstanding persist no substantial progress will ever be achieved, no matter how often dialogues take place.

To eliminate mutual distrust and restore confidence between the South and the North, the two sides should, first of all, have a dialogue on the basis of their recognition of each other's ideology and system and the principles of mutual respect and non-interference. Pending the time of unification, the two sides should develop their cooperative relations based on reciprocity.

The two sides can solidly cement a foundation for national reconciliation and peaceful unification by taking steps to build confidence and ease tension in the areas of humanity, politics, diplomacy, economy, society, culture and the military.

From this standpoint, I would like to discuss our side's position with respect to your side's letters of last November 16 and December 20.

As your side, too, pointed out, a productive dialogue should be realized between the South and the North in the first place to provide a turning-point in the effort to secure national self-esteem and

promote peaceful unification.

The question of peace and unification is our primary national issue.

This is why our side had consistently maintained that any resolution of this question must directly involve only the parties who are most concerned with it, North and South Korea. We believe that this posture is one way to meet our whole people's expectations of peaceful unification.

In consideration of your side's proposal and looking forward to the new horizon of national unification, I propose to hold a South-North high-level meeting to comprehensively discuss and resolve the question of confidence building and the alleviation of tension between the South and the North.

It would be good that each delegation to the meeting be formed of seven delegates with the prime minister as senior delegate, and that the meeting be held with delegates traveling back and forth between Seoul and Pyongyang on such topics as the suspension of mutual slander and defamation, the question of mutual respect and non-interference, multi-pronged exchanges and cooperation, building confidence in the military sector, and the question of holding a South-North summit meeting.

Once a South-North summit meeting is held, other measures which your side may raise to build confidence and alleviate tension could also be discussed.

I also suggest that to discuss procedural matters related to the holding of a South-North high-level meeting, preliminary talks between five delegates from each side be held at Peace House at Panmunjom in early February next year.

It would be good if vice-minister-level officials serve as chief delegates to the preliminary meeting.

I hope that along with the effort to hold a high-level meeting, the

South-North Red Cross meeting and the South-North economic meeting will be resumed at an early date. I think it would be good to hold the sixth South-North economic meeting in late February next year and the 11th Red Cross meeting in late March next year, at the latest.

To restore trust and ease tension between South and North Korea, separated families and other personnel should be allowed to travel back and forth between the South and the North freely, and economic exchanges and cooperation should be undertaken as quickly as possible. This is our national wish and dictate of our times, and it cannot be delayed any longer.

I am convinced that once a South-North high-level meeting, as well as dialogues and exchanges in many areas, are held a ground-work would be laid on which the South and the North could develop a single national community and on its horizon would appear peaceful unification.

I look forward to your favorable response.

Reacting to the proposal for a South-North high-level meeting, North Korea called for a "tripartite meeting" among South and North Korea and the United States, and, at the same time, proposed a South-North high-level political and military meeting in Seoul and Pyongyang between seven-member delegations headed by the prime ministers and including top-level military leaders. The North made the overture in a message signed by Yon Hyong-muk, Administration Council prime minister, on January 16, 1989.

North Korea also suggested that to prepare for a South-North high-level political and military meeting, a prelimi-

nary meeting be held between five-member delegations headed by vice-minister-level officials at Peace House at Panmunjom on February 8, 1989. The North thus agreed to the South's call for a preliminary meeting but only within the framework of a South-North high-level political and military meeting.

However, North Korea, while agreeing to a preliminary meeting, held fast to the idea of a tripartite conference and demanded the suspension of the Team Soirit military exercise as a step necessary to foster an atmosphere ripe for dialogue. This indicates that North Korea intended to set public opinion against the Team Soirit exercise by using the talks to take advantage of anti-American sentiments that have arisen in the South, and also to foster an air for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea.

This ulterior motive was behind both of their proposals, one made on November 16, 1988 for a South-North high-level meeting and the other on December 20, 1988 for a tripartite meeting among South and North Korea and the United States.

Earlier on June 3, 1988, Prime Minister Lee Hyon-jae of the South proposed a South-North high-level meeting to discuss the question of North Korea's participation in the 1988 Seoul Olympics and the issue of realizing multi-pronged personnel exchanges between the South and the North.

The North responded negatively to the overture, even refusing to accept a message containing the offer before November 16, 1988 when North Korea, in a message signed by Li Gun-mo, Administration Council prime minister, proposed to the South to hold a South-North high-level

political and military meeting. The message contained a “comprehensive peace idea for the acceleration of independent peaceful unification of Korea” which a joint session of the Central People’s Committee, the Standing Council of the Supreme People’s Assembly, and the Administration Council adopted on November 7, 1988.

The gist of the North Korean proposal for a high-level political and military meeting was :

- Composition of delegations : Seven to nine high-powered political and military delegates from each side, with a deputy-prime-minister-level official as chief delegate and a military chief-of-staff-level officer as deputy chief delegate.
- The time and place of the first meeting : Tong-ilkak, Panmunjom in mid-December 1988.
- Topics : Measures to ease the state of political and military confrontation between the South and the North, as envisioned in the “comprehensive peace idea.”

※ Measures to ease the state of political and military confrontation as set forth by North Korea :

- (1) Alleviation of political confrontation.
 - (a) Suspension of mutual slander and defamation, including :
 - Personal attacks through name-calling.
 - Slander and defamation regarding ideologies and systems.
 - Scattering of leaflets, propaganda through public address system along the truce line, etc.

- (b) Suspension of political activities slandering the other side, agitating for confrontation, repeal of laws denying the system of the other side.
- (c) Realization of multi-pronged collaboration and exchanges.
 - Bilateral and multilateral contacts between political parties, social organizations and individual persons, and free passage back and forth across the truce line.
 - Joint exploration and use of resources, and commodity exchanges.
 - Cooperation and exchanges in the areas of education, science and technology, culture and art, public health and sports.
 - Suspension of confrontation and competition, and joint cooperation in international stages.
- (2) Alleviation of military confrontation.
 - (a) Transformation of the Demilitarized Zone into a peace zone.
 - Deployment of neutral nations' supervisory forces formed among the military personnel of the member nations of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission.
 - (b) Suspension of large-scale military exercises.
 - Suspension of military training exercises conducted jointly among large-size units or with foreign forces.
 - (c) Suspension of any military action on land, sea and air in areas along the Military Demarcation Line.
 - (d) Installation of a hotline between high-level military authorities to prevent inadvertent clashes.

The North Korean offer, which in effect represented the

combination of Kim Il-sung's December 30, 1986 proposal for a "South-North high-level political and military meeting" and the overture made by the North's Administration Council on July 23, 1987 for "multi-national disarmament talks," focused their assertion that the answer to Korean reunification lies in the "withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea" and disarmament between South and North Korea.

The North Korean offer could be taken as a counteraction directed against the South's initiatives toward Korean reunification, such as the President's July 7 Declaration, the President's policy statement of October 4 and the President's address made at the United Nations General Assembly on October 18. The overture was also regarded as part of their scheme to ease the pressure from countries around the Korean peninsula which aspire for detente on the peninsula and to slow the growing pro-Seoul trend among their fellow Communist-bloc countries.

At the same time, the North Korean proposal showed some signs that they were flexibly coping with their internal and external policy needs as the offer contained some of the ideas the South had originally set forth such as the suspension of slander and defamation between the South and the North, transformation of the Demilitarized Zone into a peace zone, and the installing of a hotline between high-level military authorities.

On December 20, 1988, North Korea, in a message signed by Yon Hyong-muk who assumed the duty of Administration Council prime minister at the fourth session of the eighth Supreme People's Assembly on December 12, 1988, proposed a tripartite meeting among South and North Korea and the United States separate from a South-North

high-level political and military meeting.

To discuss the opening of a tripartite meeting, the North proposed to hold a working-level delegates meeting among the three parties in December in Geneva or another, third country's city. They suggested that the working-level delegation could be headed by the respective vice foreign ministers.

Again on December 6, 1988, North Korea sent a so-called "comprehensive peace plan" to the United States in a message signed by Foreign Minister Kim Young-nam, renewing their offer to hold a tripartite meeting to discuss U.S. military withdrawal from Korea and military reduction in South and North Korea.

The ulterior motive behind their reiteration of the idea of a tripartite meeting which they first advanced in January 1984, seemed to be to direct the hope of the countries surrounding the Korean peninsula for the alleviation of tension toward debate on military issues, and also to enter into full-fledged contacts with the United States with the excuse of a "peace agreement."

The South decided to accommodate some aspects of the North Korean proposals under the principle of resolving the Korean question through dialogue between the direct parties involved, namely, South and North Korea. In this connection, it should be noted that the South took a forward-looking policy posture in the July 7 Special Declaration and expressed its willingness to deal actively with even military issues such as disarmament between the South and the North in the address made by President Roh before the U.N. General Assembly on October 18, 1988.

Here, there were some differences over the name and

topics of the proposed meeting. The South, in a message signed by Prime Minister Kang Young-hoon, agreed on January 23, 1989, to the North Korean call for a preliminary meeting. A meeting between the government authorities of South and North Korea was set to be held for the first time in nine years after a working-level meeting was held in 1980 to prepare for a South-North prime ministers' meeting.

Prior to the first preliminary meeting, the two sides exchanged the lists of their delegations to the preliminary meeting on February 4, 1989. The lists were as follows :

South Korea

Chief delegate: Song Han-ho, Vice National Unification Minister

Delegate : Kim Sam-hoon, Director-General, Information and Cultural Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Delegate : Yong Young-il, Director-General, Joint Chiefs of Staff Bureau, Ministry of National Defense

Delegate : Kang Kun-tak, Secretary, Office of Policy Consultant to the President

Delegate : Kim Po-hyon, Deliberation Official, Office of Administration Coordination, Office of the Prime Minister

North Korea.

chief delegate : Paek Nam-jun, Councillor, Administration Council

Delegate : Yu Song-chol, Director, Administration Council

Delegate : Choe Wu-jin, Director-General, Foreign Ministry

Delegate : Choe Song-ik, Director, Secretariat, Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland

Delegate : Kim Yong-chol, Deputy Director-General, People's

Armed Forces Ministry

b. First Preliminary Meeting

The first preliminary meeting was held at Peace House in the southern sector of Panmunjom from 10 a.m. to 12:12 p.m. February 8, 1989. It was opened to the public. But, the meeting failed to register any progress as the North demanded as preconditions the "suspension of the '89 Team Spirit exercise" and "stoppage of the control of North Korean publications in the South," both having nothing to do with the meeting's purpose, which was to discuss procedural matters necessary for the proposed meeting between the two prime ministers.

In their respective keynote speeches, both sides set forth concrete ideas with respect to the title of the proposed talks, composition of delegations, agenda topics and operational procedures of the talks, giving rise to the expectations that they could come near an accord. But, the two sides could not even enter debate on the procedural matters as the North Korean delegation concentrated on the issue of the Team Spirit military exercise.

Pointing out that discussion of the other side's internal matters in itself constituted an act undermining a harmonious atmosphere between the South and the North, the South's delegation tried to have the North come back to the discussion of the procedural issues. But, the North Koreans still insisted on using the meeting as an arena for their propaganda against the Team Spirit military training exercise.

Despite the South's repeated urging that there shouldn't be any prerequisites and that the two sides should enter the discussion of procedural matters promptly, North Korea persisted in avoiding the discussion of procedural issues by consistently demanding the "suspension of joint military training with the United States," "decrease of size" and "change in title."

In his first speech, the South's chief delegate took a flexible position saying that, for instance, it would be alright with the South if the title of the proposed talks were changed from a South-North high-level meeting to a South-North prime ministers meeting if it would help to realize the meeting. On the other hand, the chief North Korean delegate used two thirds of his speech in disputing the Team Spirit military exercise and some of the South's internal matters.

The gist of the first speech made by Song Han-ho, the South's chief delegate, was as follows :

The members of our delegation intend to do all we can to work out a satisfactory agreement based on the letters exchanged between the two prime ministers so that a South-North high-level meeting can be held at an early date, as all our brethren expect.

In his July 7 Declaration last year, President Roh Tae Woo stressed that "the South and the North should terminate the present confrontation, full of mutual distrust and slander and the looking upon each other as enemies," saying that "the South and the North must develop a partnership with the two sides cooperating with each other for prosperity as a single nation."

Again in his address at the United Nations General Assembly

last year, President Roh said that "the Republic of Korea will not use the force of arms first against the North even without the declaration of non-aggression between the South and the North." The President then proposed that a South-North summit meeting be realized early to "discuss sincerely all the issues raised by the two sides including military matters, such as a systematic apparatus that would facilitate a durable peace on the Korean peninsula, ideas to realize unification, exchanges and cooperation between the South and the North, and military reduction."

Lately, overseas compatriots in the United States, businessmen, journalists and religiously active persons from our side visited Pyongyang individually, and your side's materials and commodities have been brought into our side's area.

I hope that these constructive and hopeful moves will contribute toward changing the inter-Korean relationship from one of confrontation to one of reconciliation and cooperation.

To dismantle the 40-year-old structure of confrontation and unfold a new cooperative age of national development, we must work towards agreement and assistance between the responsible authorities of the South and the North, along with private contacts and exchanges.

For the government authorities of the South and the North to respect each other, mutually cooperate and strive for prosperity, is the indispensable process that sows the seeds of trust for national reconciliation and development.

Regarding the issue of the name of the proposed high-level officials meeting, your side said in your letter that the name should be "South-North high-level political and military meeting." But, our side considers it proper to make it "South-North high-level officials meeting." The reason is that since it will be a meeting between the prime ministers and other high-level officials of the two sides, discussion cannot be limited only to political and military issues but should

cover various other issues, too, such as those related to mutual exchanges and cooperation and the promotion of confidence-building.

However, since we cannot waste time over the issue of the name of the meeting, we think that in consideration of both sides' positions, we won't object it if the name were made "South-North prime ministers meeting."

It would be good that each delegation be composed of seven delegates with the prime minister of each side as chief delegate and including a chief-of-staff-level military officer, and that a delegation be accompanied by 40 attendants and 50 press members.

The proposed talks could be held within one month after the end of preliminary meetings in Seoul and Pyongyang by turn.

To do away with attritional confrontation at an early date and move onward in a productive and constructive direction, we must first stop slandering and defaming each other and committing other acts of harm to our national self-esteem. We must not interfere with each other and should respect each other mutually.

To achieve multi-pronged exchanges and cooperation between the South and the North is a step indispensable to changing the relationship of confrontation into that of cooperation. We believe that along with exchanges and cooperation, measures must be taken to promote confidence-building in the military area as well.

Moreover, a South-North summit meeting should be held as soon as possible to further accelerate inter-Korean reconciliation and cooperation. Your side, too, does not deny this.

When a South-North summit meeting is held, all the issues raised by the two sides could be sincerely discussed and resolved. Such issues may include the question of realizing unification, the issue of our national future, those issues related to declaring non-aggression and preparing a systematic apparatus for durable peace on the Korean peninsula, and some military questions like the issue of military re-

duction.

Therefore, the agenda topics of the proposed meeting should be the following six items :

- (1) *The issue of the stoppage of mutual slander and defamation.*
- (2) *The issue of mutual respect and non-interference.*
- (3) *The issue of carrying out multi-pronged exchanges and cooperation.*
- (4) *The issue to promoting confidence-building in the military area.*
 —*Installing of a hot-line between high military authorities of the South and the North.*
 —*Disarming and peaceful use of the Demilitarized Zone.*
 —*Mutual exchange of military personnel.*
 —*Advance notification of, and invitation of observers to, large-scale training exercises.*
- (5) *The issue of holding a South-North summit meeting.*
- (6) *Other issues raised by the two sides.*

The operational procedures of the proposed meeting shall be as follows :

- (1) *The meeting shall in principle be held behind closed doors. However, it may be opened to the public through mutual agreement.*
- (2) *Protocol issues shall be discussed and settled through separate contacts between the working-level delegates of the two sides.*
- (3) *Precedents set in the past South-North dialogue shall, with necessary modifications, be applied to the operational procedures for passage, personal safety and the provision of conveniences.*

There are some differences between the two sides over the name of the proposed meeting and agenda topics. But, I am sure that they can be resolved easily if only we handle the issues with the perception that the proposed meeting should materialize as soon as possible.

The South then pointed out the inconsistency of linking the Team Spirit military exercise to the meeting. It recalled that the Team Spirit is an annual defensive exercise, to which North Korean observers were invited, and that South-North talks were held on many occasions during the periods of the Team Spirit in the past. The South's delegation also noted that the North often rejected dialogues at times when the Team Spirit was not under way.

The first preliminary meeting ended without any tangible results due to a controversy that developed over the Team Spirit military exercise. Still, the meeting drew much attention at home and abroad inasmuch as it took place at a time when the mood for inter-Korean exchange and cooperation had increased, and as it could take up such sensitive issues as political and military questions.

In fact, there was room for progress depending on the attitude of North Korea since the ideas suggested in their respective first speeches included many which could be agreed on without much difficulty.

The two sides decided to hold the next preliminary meeting at Tong-ilkak in the northern sector of Panmunjom on March 2.

Comparison of Ideas Offered by the South and the North

Classification	The South	The North
Title	South-North high-level officials meeting South-North prime ministers meeting may be accepted as a compromise plan	South-North high-level political and military meeting
Composition of delegations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Delegates : Seven with prime minister as chief delegate and including chief-of-staff-level officer ○ Attendants : 40 ○ Press members : 50 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Delegates : Seven with prime minister as chief delegate and including about two top-level military officers ○ Attendants : 20 ○ Press members : 50
Time and place of talks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Within one month after end of preliminary talks ○ Seoul and Pyongyang by turn * 1st meeting in Seoul 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Within one month after end of preliminary talks ○ Pyongyang and Seoul by turn * 1st meeting in Pyongyang
Topics	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Six topics ① Issue of stoppage of mutual slander and defamation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Single topic “Question of removing the state of political and military confrontation

	<p>② Issue of mutual respect and non-interference</p> <p>③ Issue of multi-pronged exchange and cooperation</p> <p>④ Issue of building confidence in the military area</p> <p>-Installing of a hotline between high military authorities</p> <p>-Disarming and peaceful use of the Demilitarized Zone</p> <p>-Mutual exchange of military personnel</p> <p>-Advance notification of, and invitation of observers to, large-scale military exercises</p>	<p>between the South and the North ”</p> <p>* Seven steps to ease the state of political and military confrontation were already raised on November 7, 1988</p> <p>① Stoppage of mutual slander and defamation</p> <p>② Suspension of political activities designed to denounce the other side and agitate for confrontation, and repeal of laws and systems that deny the system of the other side</p> <p>④ Realization of multi-pronged collaboration and exchange</p>
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	<p>⑤ Issue of holding a South-North summit meeting</p> <p>⑥ Other issues raised by both sides</p>	<p>⑤ Suspension of large-scale military exercises</p> <p>⑥ Suspension of all military activities on land, sea or air along the Military Demarcation Line</p> <p>⑦ Installing of a hotline between high military authorities</p>
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c. Second Preliminary Meeting

The second preliminary meeting was held at Tong-ilkak in the northern sector of Panmunjom from 10 a.m. to 12:40 p.m. March 2, 1989.

At the second meeting, the South called for the discussion of procedural matters to realize the proposed talks, pointing out that the first meeting failed to achieve any progress because of the North's raising of issues not related to the meeting. Nonetheless, North Korea again demanded the suspension of the Team Spirit exercise as a prerequisite to the discussion of procedural issues, prompting the second preliminary talk also to end without any progress.

In particular, North Korea set forth a "three-point emergency proposal" in connection with the Team Spirit exercise, demanding its prior settlement. They also charged that the failure to hold a working-level meeting with Chonminnyon, a dissidents organization in the South, to prepare for a "pan-national conference," was an "anti-dialogue and anti-unification" act on the part of the South. The North thus showed signs of trying to make the preliminary meeting an arena for their own

In his first speech, the South's Chief Delegate Song Han-ho called on the North to show a more sincere attitude. He said that since the two sides' ideas had many points in common, problems could be resolved easily at the second meeting if only the two sides discuss matters in the spirit of mutual respect and compromise. He then suggested in substance that :

First, since the North did not oppose inter-Korean ex-

changes and cooperation and the resolution of the issue of separated families and because of the need to discuss various issues pending between the two sides of Korea at the proposed talks, the name of the talks should be either a South-North high-level officials meeting or a South-North prime ministers meeting as the South had suggested.

Second, regarding the issue of the composition of the delegations to the proposed meeting, the two sides shared the view that each delegation be composed of seven delegates with the prime minister as chief delegate, and that each delegation be accompanied by 50 press members. With regard to the issue of military representation, the rank of military delegate should be clearly defined as “military chief-of-staff level” instead of using the ambiguous expression of “military officers with power” as the North wanted. And, so far as the South was concerned, one military officer would be enough.

Third, the two sides shared the view that the meeting should be held within one month after the end of preliminary talks and that the meeting be held in Seoul and Pyongyang by turn. The first meeting should be held in Seoul.

Fourth, regarding the agenda topics of the proposed talks, the South proposed six items whereas the North put forth a single topic. To eliminate the trouble of discussing and agreeing on detailed topics again at the proposed meeting and to operate the meeting effectively and productively, the topics should be itemized as much as possible and described concretely. Therefore, it would be good for the North to agree on the concrete 6-item topics the South produced.

Fifth, the operational matters of the proposed talks such as 1) format of the meeting, 2) adoption of an agreement, 3) recording of the meeting, 4) press reports, 5) marking of the

venue of the meeting, 6) guarantee of personal safety, 7) procedures for passage through Panmunjom, 8) itinerary for visiting delegation, 9) guarantee of conveniences, 10) direct telephone line, and 11) protocol, could be resolved promptly if only the precedents set in the past dialogue were applied with necessary modifications since there is no substantial difference between the two sides regarding them.

However, the North's chief delegate Paek Nam-jun, despite the South's repeated calls for discussion of the business at hand, again raised the issue of the Team Spirit exercise, arguing as if the people of the South were asking for the suspension of the annual military training exercise.

In particular, North Korea produced the following three-point emergency proposal demanding the South take emergency steps with respect to the Team Spirit exercise for the sake of the productive progress of the preliminary meeting.

Three-Point Emergency Proposal of North Korea

- (1) Immediate stoppage of '89 Team Spirit exercise or the official announcement of a plan to suspend the exercise.
- (2) Immediate return to their home bases of all the combat troops, weapons and equipment mobilized for the Team Spirit military exercise.
 - Withdrawal of combat troops, weapons and equipment brought in from abroad to areas outside the boundary of the Korean peninsula.
 - Immediate stoppage of the arrival of those overseas U.S. Army, Navy and Air Force units, weapons and equipment ready to be mobilized for the exercise on the Ko-

rean peninsula.

—Return of the combat troops, weapons and equipment mobilized in South Korea to a pre-Team Spirit state.

- (3) Reduction of the size of military training (excluding foreign troops) and a change in the title of the Team Spirit military exercise.

As for procedural matters, they simply reiterated the assertions they made at the first preliminary meeting, showing that they were interested more in propaganda gains than in the proposed talks.

On the issue of the title of the talks, North Korea offered a "South-North high-level political and military meeting with prime ministers as chief delegates," thus feigning an accomodation of the South's idea of a prime ministers meeting. In essence, however, the North adhered to their idea, a political and military meeting.

As for the issue of agenda topics, North Korea kept insisting that the proposed talks would have a single topic, "Concerning the resolution of the state of political and military confrontation between the South and the North." They refused even to mention other related matters.

The South made it clear that the joint Team Spirit military exercise constitutes defensive training prepared against emergency. It noted that the exercise has been held annually since 1976. The South said that the size, time and areas of the annual exercise have been made public and that North Korea has always been notified of the exercise plan in advance and asked to send observers to the exercise.

The South's delegation stressed that the continued arms buildup by North Korea, characterized by the staging of all

military training exercises in secrecy and the massing of heavily armed units in the forward area, has made it absolutely necessary for the South to conduct a defensive military exercise.

It said that if the North genuinely wants to see the Team Spirit exercise suspended, then they should make efforts to eliminate that which has made such an exercise unavoidable.

The South's delegation said that the dialogue policy of North Korea lacks consistency pointing out that some South-North talks were held even during the Team Spirit periods in the past. It also noted that while shunning economic and Red Cross talks, the North was positive toward promoting a dialogue with some dissidents in the South who were without any representation or any authority. It said that because of such inconsistency, the people of the South were dubious of, and disappointed in, the North's dialogue posture.

South-North Meetings Held During Team Spirit Periods in the Past

Exercise Period	Meetings Held
March 1-17, 1979	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ South-North Table Tennis Meetings <ul style="list-style-type: none"> —Second Meeting, March 5, 1979 —Third Meeting, March 9, 1979 —Fourth Meeting, March 12, 1979 ○ Contacts between Seoul-Side Coordination Committee delegates and

March 1-April 20, 1980	<p>the North's Front for Fatherland delegates</p> <p>—Second contact, March 7, 1979</p> <p>—Third contact, March 14, 1979</p> <p>○ Working-level Delegates' Contact for South-North Prime Ministers' Talks</p> <p>—Third Contact, March 4, 1980</p> <p>—Fourth Contact, March 18, 1980</p> <p>—Fifth Contact, April 1, 1980</p> <p>—Sixth Contact, April 18, 1980</p>
February 1-mid-April, 1984	○ First South-North Sports Meeting, April 9, 1984

Meanwhile, despite the fact that the North, in their three-point emergency proposal, made the “suspension of the Team Spirit exercise” a de facto prerequisite to the progress of the preliminary meeting, North Korea, when asked by the South if their demand was a prerequisite, avoided any clearcut answer, simply saying that the “suspension of the exercise is necessary for the progress of the meeting.” This was part of their attempt to avoid their responsibility for the deadlock of the dialogue.

Despite the argument over the Team Spirit exercise, the two sides decided to hold the next preliminary meeting at Peace House in the southern sector of Panmunjom on April 12, 1989. While the South's delegation was discussing its position about the Team Spirit exercise, the electricity went out for a while, interrupting the meeting.

2. South-North Sports Meeting

a. Initiation

The 24th Olympic Games held in Seoul were a monumental festival that gave all of mankind a message of hope that a magnificent future of harmony and peace could be forged. The event also fully displayed the Korean people's wisdom and ability to the world.

The unfolding of a chapter of grand harmony transcending differences in ideologies and systems in the earth village through the successful hosting of the Seoul Olympics was the result of the concerted effort of the all Koreans. It was a feat of which Koreans can truly be proud.

Yet, it was truly regrettable that the North Korean people who are of the same blood as the South Koreans failed to take part in the Seoul Games.

In fact, from the time Seoul was given the right to host the 24th Summer Olympics, the South exerted all efforts to enable the North to participate in the Olympics. For a long time, the South had positively hoped that along with goodwill matches and the exchange of sports personnel, single inter-Korean teams would be formed for various international sports events.

So far, the South and the North have held about ten rounds of talks to form single South-North delegations for international matches. The meetings were :

- (1) South-North sports talks to form a single South-North delegation for the 1964 Tokyo Olympics.

—First meeting, Lausanne, January 24, 1962

- Second meeting, Hongkong, May 17-June 1, 1963
- Third meeting, Hongkong, July 26, 1963
- (2) A meeting between the South and North Korean table tennis associations to form a single team for the 35th World Table Tennis Championships in Pyongyang.
 - First meeting, Panmunjom, February 27, 1979
 - Second meeting, Panmunjom, March 5, 1979
 - Third meeting, Panmunjom, March 9, 1979
 - Fourth meeting, Panmunjom, March 12, 1979
- (3) South-North sports talks to form single teams for international games and to promote South-North sports exchanges in connection with the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics, 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Seoul Olympics.
 - First meeting, Panmunjom, April 9, 1984
 - Second meeting, Panmunjom, April 30, 1984
 - Third meeting, Panmunjom, May 25, 1984
 - ※On June 2, 1984, North Korea announced their boycott of the Los Angeles Olympics.
- (4) South-North Sports talks in Lausanne under the sponsorship of the IOC in connection with the 1988 Seoul Olympics.
 - First meeting, Lausanne, October 8-9, 1985
 - Second meeting, Lausanne, January 8-9, 1986
 - Third meeting, Lausanne, June 10-11, 1986
 - Fourth meeting, Lausanne, July 14-15, 1987
 - ※On September 2, 1988, North Korea announced their boycott of the Seoul Olympics.

Looking back, however, it is an obvious fact that North Korea tried to use these sports talks for their political purposes and deliberately interfered with the progress of such

meeting.

As were the cases with the table tennis talks in february 1979 and the 1984 sports talks over the Los Angeles Olympics, North Korea proposed talks at times when it was virtually impossible to work out single teams due to the lack of time.

This was an obvious attempt to find excuses to boycott the games. In the case of the table tennis talks, the North proposed the talks only one month before drawing for the determination of the list of matches, and in the Los Angeles Olympics barely two months before the deadline for entries.

If South and North Korea could take part in international games under a single delegation, it would provide a rare opportunity for the two sides to demonstrate before the world their outstanding sports skills and unity, and also to pave the way for broader exchanges and cooperation between them, thus contributing immensely toward improving inter-Korean relations and promoting national harmony.

Inasmuch as the formation of a single team would inevitably entail exchanges between sports personnel such as the selection of qualified athletes and training of selected athletes, the creation of a single delegation would serve as a spontaneous occasion to promote inter-Korean sports exchanges and cooperation in earnest, apart from the results of any dialogue.

In this respect, it might well be an affirmative overture in view of the trend of internal and external situations, and of the wish of the Korean people, that North Korea proposed South-North sports talks about one and a half years,

before the 11th Asian Games in Beijing.

In a letter sent to the Korean Olympic Committee (KOC) President Kim Chong-ha on December 21, 1988, Kim Yu-sun, president of the North Korean Olympic Committee, suggested the formation of a single inter-Korean delegation for the 11th Asian Games taking place in Beijing in September 1990. He then proposed that to discuss the matter, five delegates from each side, headed by an Olympic Committee vice president, meet at Panmunjom in late February 1989.

In response, KOC President Kim, in a message to the North on December 30, 1988, agreed to the North Korean offer and proposed that a South-North sports meeting be held at Peace House in the southern sector of Panmunjom on March 9 with a five-member delegation led by a vice Olympic Committee president attending. In the message, Kim Chong-ha stressed that the formation of a single team is the wish of all the Korean people and also a proposal which the South had consistently made.

The two sides exchanged the lists of their respective delegations to the sports talks on March 7, thus setting the stage for the first inter-Korean sports meeting since the Lausanne talks two years earlier.

Lists of the Delegations

The South

Chief delegate : Chang Chung-sik, KOC vice president

Delegate : Lee Hak-rae, KOC standing member

Delegate : Im Tae-sun, KOC member

Delegate : Chang Byong-jo, KOC member

Delegate : Park Su-chang, KOC member

The North

Chief delegate : Kim Hyong-jin, NKOC vice president

Delegate : Chang Woong, NKOC chief secretary

Delegate : Kim Se-jin, NKOC member

Delegate : Ho Hyok-pil, NKOC member

Delegate : Kim Sang-bu, NKOC member

b. First Meeting

The first South-North sports meeting, designed to discuss the formation of a single South-North delegation for the 11th Asian Games in Beijing, was held from 10 a.m. to 12:10 p.m. at Peace House in the southern sector of Panmunjom.

It was not that the South was not skeptical about the North Korean overture in view of past experiences, but it attended the meeting in a flexible frame of mind, hoping to promote reconciliation and cooperation between the two sides and, further, to restore and develop the national community through the formation of a single inter-Korean delegation.

The South attached particular importance to the sports talks since the meeting between South and North Korean sports personnel itself could serve as a factor conducive to bringing on the "age of South-North reconciliation and cooperation," and since the participation in the Beijing Asian Games under a single inter-Korean delegation would

serve as a precedent for future international games.

At the first meeting, both sides, in their respective first speeches, set forth concrete ideas on the formation of a single team and immediately entered their discussion. The debate was centered chiefly on such issues as the name, flag and anthem of a single team and the selection of athletes.

In particular, the two sides agreed to use "Arirang," one of Korea's traditional folk songs, as sung in the 1920s, as the anthem of such a delegation. They also agreed that the flag of a single delegation would be a Korean map drawn on a white background.

As the same time, the two sides shared the view that, in principle, the best qualified athletes would be selected for a single delegation.

As to the name of a delegation, the two sides failed to reach an accord. Whereas the South suggested that the title should be "KOREA" in Roman letters and "Nambuk Tanil Team (Single South-North Team)" in Korean taking into account the North's position, North Korea insisted that it should be "Koryo" in both Korean and English. The North Koreans were rejecting the title, "Korea," the universally accepted name of the Korean nation, on the ground that it is the proper name of South Korea.

As to the color of the Korean map to be used in the flag, the South suggested green while the North insisted on yellow.

With regard to the pivotal issues of the selection and training of athletes, the two sides agreed at the moment to the principle of selecting the best qualified athletes. However, signs were shown of North Korea trying to equally divide the athletes of a single delegation instead of selecting

them through joint South-North selection matches, under the label of “national reconciliation and unity” and “maintenance of balance between South and North Korea.”

The major ideas the two sides’ chief delegates proposed in their respective first speeches at the first meeting can be compared as follows :

Comparison of Two Sides’ Ideas for Formation of single Delegation

Classification	The South	The North
Name	Korea(Nambuk Tanil Team)	KORYO
Flag	Korean map in green color on white background with the inscription of “KOREA” below the map.	Korean map in yellow color on white background with the inscription of “KORYO” below the map either in green or red color.
Anthem	Arirang	Arirang as sung in the 1920s
Composition of officials of delegation	To be determined in proportion to the number of athletes selected.	Co-heads system
Uniform	To be determined with advice from experts.	To be determined at a Joint Secretariat.

Selection of athletes	Selection of athletes first, joint training later	Joint training first and selection of athletes later
Training	To be conducted with athletes traveling back and forth.	To be conducted with athletes traveling back and forth.
Personal security	Exchange of memorandums on guaranteeing personal security.	Exchange of memorandums on guaranteeing of personal security.
Expenses	Expenses for games participation to be born in proportion to athletes, and expenses for training to be born by the hosting side.	Expenses for games participation to be born jointly, and expenses for training by the hosting side.
Implementation office	Formation of joint committee with joint secretariat under it.	Creation of joint secretariat.

What was noteworthy at the meeting was that the North did not mention the issue of the Team Spirit military exercise which they had raised at every meeting with the South in the past. It was with the excuse of the Team Spirit exercise that North Korea suspended preparatory contacts for a South-North parliamentary meeting and the preliminary talks to prepare for a South-North high-level officials meeting, and kept turning a deaf ear to the South's call for the resumption of the South-North Red Cross and economic meeting.

Their taking of a seemingly positive position, in which they, for instance, set forth concrete times for the selection and training of athletes without raising the issue of Team Spirit, appears to have stemmed from the need to avoid censure, at home and abroad, that they were using the South-North dialogue for political propaganda, and also to cope with the apparent surge in the sports ability of South Korea at the Beijing Asian Games.

At the first meeting, the two sides came close to an accord on such issues as the flag and anthem of a single delegation, personal security, expense sharing, and creation of a joint office. Even on the question of selecting athletes, which was regarded as the most difficult task, much room existed for mutual compromise as North Korea suggested selection matches in score-deciding sports, agreeing to the principle of the selection of the best-qualified athletes.

The two sides agreed to hold the second meeting at Tong-ilkak in the northern sector of Panmunjom on March 28.

c. Second Meeting

The second South-North sports meeting was held at Tong-ilkak in the northern sector of Panmunjom for about two hours and 50 minutes from 10 a.m. March 28, 1989.

With regard to the issue of the selection and training of athletes, the South, pointing out that the two sides reached an accord on the selection of the best qualified athletes, offered a compromise plan featuring a joint training, selection matches and intensified training, which accommo-

dated the North's idea of "joint training."

In the composition of a single team, too, the South, taking into account the North's position, suggested that a single delegation be composed in a way that won't sizably lack balance between the two sides, and, in a progress-oriented gesture, concretely proposed that a joint team be formed by June 22, 1990, the deadline for entries.

The substance of the compromise plan which the South's Chief Delegate Chang Chung-shik newly offered in his first speech at the meeting dealing with the selection and training of athletes and the formation of a single delegation, was as follows :

Compromise Plan Regarding the Issues of Selecting and Training Athletes and Forming a Delegation

1. Selection of Athletes
 - a. The best qualified athletes shall be selected in all sports.
 - b. For the selection of athletes, joint training shall be conducted, and athletes to participate in the Games shall be selected through selection matches.
 - c. Selection matches shall be held more than once, by sport, in the areas of the South and the North, such as Seoul and Pyongyang, on which the two sides agree.
 - d. In the event either side has no athletes or qualified athletes in a specific sport or sports, the side which has athletes shall select athletes.
 - e. Other detailed matters, such as the concrete method of the selection of athletes, times of selection matches,

sports tools for matches, rules of matches and selection of judges, shall be discussed and determined by a Joint Committee for Single South-North Team.

2. Joint Training

- a. The athletes to take part in joint training shall be selected by the South and the North, respectively. The number of such athletes shall be about the same as the quota of participants to be determined by the Beijing Asian Games Organizing Committee. However, the number may be readjusted through mutual discussion depending on the characteristics of the sports.
- b. During the period of joint training, participation athletes may be replaced.
- c. Joint training shall begin in October 1989, by sport.
- d. For joint training, the existing facilities of the South and the North shall be used, with athletes traveling back and forth between the two sides. If necessary, third places and facilities may be used.
- e. Other detailed matters related to joint training shall be discussed and determined at a Joint Committee for Single South-North Team.

3. Formation of Delegation

- a. A delegation for the Games, comprising athletes and officials, shall be formed before June 22, 1990, the deadline for preliminary entries.
- b. The composition of athletes and officials shall be in accordance with the OCA charter and the regulations of relevant international sports federations.
- c. The head of a delegation shall be from the side which has more selected athletes, and the deputy head from the other side.

- d. As for sports officials, the side which has more selected athletes in each sport shall produce a manager and the other side a coach. Headquarters officials shall be selected in proportion to the number of athletes of both sides. However, the concrete number of officials shall be determined through mutual agreement.
 - e. The delegation to take part in the Games shall be composed in a way that, so far as possible, visibly upset the balance between the two sides.
4. Intensive Training
- a. Intensive training shall be conducted from the time of the formation of a delegation to departure for the Games.
 - b. Intensive training shall be held with athletes traveling back and forth between the South and the North.
 - c. Detailed matters regarding intensive training shall be discussed and determined at a Joint Committee for Single South-North Team.

Meanwhile, saying it would be good for the two sides to set the order of discussion, Kim Hyong-jin, the North's chief delegate, rearranged their ideas into ten items :1) name of a single team, 2) flag of a single team, 3) anthem of a single team, 4) method of selection of athletes, 5) training, 6) composition of a delegation, 7) expenses, 8) personal security, 9) creation of a permanent joint office, and 10) other issues.

But, for the sake of swift and meaningful progress, the South suggested that the two sides first discuss and resolve easily-solvable matters such as the selection of athletes and the composition of a single delegation while putting off the

debate of those issues whose settlement appeared not easy, such as those of the name and flag of a single delegation. Still, the North Koreans insisted on the resolution of the matters one by one based on the order of the issues they had set.

Regarding the issue of the flag, North Korea suggested that the color of the Korean map be blue and that no inscription be given in foreign letters beneath the map. As for the name of a single delegation, the North, while adhering to "Koryo" in Korean, agreed to use the word "KOREA" in English instead of "KORYO" as they suggested at the first meeting.

But, the North insisted that the issues of "KORYO" and "KOREA" could not be discussed separately in their nature. This suggested that the North's agreement seemed to have been designed to prompt the South to agree to "KORYO" in Korean as they suggested.

With respect to the selection of athletes, the South proposed to hold selection matches in all sports. But, North Korea maintained that selection matches should be held only in record-deciding sports where the North believed they could outdo the South and that in the rest of the sports, athletes could be selected through mutual negotiations in a manner that would maintain balance between the two sides.

However, the two sides reached a general accord on holding selection matches after a joint training to be participated in by about the same number of athletes as the quota for the Beijing Asian Games from each side.

Ideas produced at the second meeting for the formation of a single team can be compared as follows :

Comparison of Two Sides' Compromise Ideas

Classification	The South	The North
Name	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Korean : Nambuk Tanil Team ○ English : KOREA ※ Same as the 1st meeting 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Korean : Koryo ○ English : KOREA
Flag	○ Korean map in yellow color on white background. The map is to be framed with green color.	○ Korean map in blue color on white background.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Joint training → selection matches → intensified training. ※ The idea of joint training advanced by North Korea at the first meeting. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Joint training → selection matches ○ Sports were classified into record-deciding and direct competition matches. ※ Same as at the first meeting.
Period of joint training	○ October 1989	○ September 1989 ※ Same as at the first meeting.
Time of composition of delegation	○ To be completed by June 22, 1990	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Team sports : by May 1990 ○ Individual sports : by July 1990 ※ Same as at the first meeting.

At the second meeting, too, North Korea did not raise the issue of the Team Spirit exercise and other questions not related to the meeting, thus allowing the talks to be carried out smoothly. At the meeting, the two sides agreed 1) not to inscribe the name of a delegation on its flag, 2) to select athletes through joint training, 3) to set the number of the South and North Korean athletes taking part in a joint training at about the quota for the Beijing Asian Games, but to readjust the number according to the particular nature of some sports, and 4) to delete the clause of the principle of the selection of athletes suggested by the North at the first meeting on the condition that the two sides would agree on the principle verbally.

It was decided that the third meeting would be held at Peace House in the southern sector of Panmunjom on April 18.

Meanwhile, emerging from the meeting, Chang Chung-shik, the South's chief delegate, evaluated positively the progress of the sports meeting. He added, however, that the South would have to review the North's idea of "Koryo" as the name of a single delegation since it would have an effect on non-sports issues, too.

3. Preparatory Contacts for South-North Parliamentary Meeting

a. Past Contacts

A total of six preparatory contacts were held to prepare for the proposed South-North parliamentary talks after the first contact was held on August 19, 1988.

Agreements and Differences Agreements during the Past Contacts

Classification	Agreements
Format of talks	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) The talks shall proceed in the order of an opening meeting, a meeting to discuss agenda topics and a closing meeting. 2) Opening and closing meetings shall be joint sessions attended by the entire legislators of the South and the North. 3) An executive setup and a joint operational committee shall be established at a meeting to discuss agenda topics.
Place and time of talks	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) The opening meeting shall be held in Pyongyang within one month after the end of preparatory contacts, and the closing meeting in Seoul, within one month after the end of the meeting to discuss agenda topics.
Operation of talks	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) The opening and closing meetings shall be held under the co-chairmanship system. They shall be presided over by the co-chairman of the hosting side. 2) The method of decision making at the executive setup shall be the system of mutual agreement.

Number of delegates	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) The meeting to discuss agenda topics shall be attended by 50 delegates from each side. 2) The joint operational committee shall consist of five delegates from each side.
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Differences

Classification	The South	The North
Format of talks	○The meeting to discuss agenda topics shall be a “select delegates meeting” in the form of bilateral meeting.	○The meeting to discuss basic topics shall be a “select delegates meeting” in the form of joint meeting.
Method of decision	○Decisions at “select delegates meeting” shall be under the system of “unanimous decision.”	○Decisions at “select delegates meeting” shall be under the system of “concurrence.” ※Under this system, a decision is to be made if an absolute majority concur while an extremely small number oppose.

Agenda topics	1) The question of personnel and material exchange and cooperation between the South and the North, including the issue of the resumption of Red Cross and economic talks.	1) The question of announcing a joint declaration on non-aggression. 2) The question of conducting multifaceted cooperation and exchange between the South and the North. ※Refuses to specify Red Cross and economic talks
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All these indicate that the proposed South-North parliamentary talks could materialize if only the two sides would compromise a little more in the spirit of mutual recognition of reality and non-interference. Thus, internal and external expectations were high from the seventh contact.

The seventh contact was set to be held on December 15, 1988 as agreed on at the sixth contact. But, the time had to be readjusted because of a change in the status of the South's chief delegate Park Jun-kyu and delegate Lee Handong.

In a telephone message to Yang Hyong-sop, chairman of the Standing Committee of the North Korean Supreme People's Assembly on December 13, 1988, National Assembly Speaker Kim Jaison notified him that his delegation had decided to postpone the contact due to the situation of the

South's delegation. He suggested that the seventh contact be held either on December 29 or a later date as designated by the North.

North Korea agreed to hold the seventh contact on December 29, and the South notified the North of a change in the list of its delegation on December 26. The new lineup of the South's delegation was as follows :

Chief delegate : Chae Mun-shik, Democratic Justice Party

Delegates : Kim Hyon-wuk, Democratic Justice Party

Kim Bong-ho, Party for Peace and Democracy

Park Kwan-yong, Reunification Democratic Party

Kim Yong-hwan, New Democratic Republican Party

b. Seventh Preparatory contact

The seventh contact was held at Tong-ilkak of Panmunjom for three hours from 10 a.m. to 1 p.m. December 29, 1988.

In his first speech, the North' chief delegate Chon Kum-chol, while saying that it was a substantial achievement for the two sides to reach an accord on several issues in the past contacts, nevertheless used two thirds of his speech denouncing the Team Spirit military exercise and demanding that the issue of the Team Soirit exercise be discussed as the primary topic. They thus threw cold water upon public expectations.

Chon showed no change from his past position by contending that the meeting to discuss agenda topics should be a "select delegates meeting" in the form of a joint conference and that the topic should be the "question of making a joint declaration on non-aggression" involving the issues of military reduction and the phased withdrawal of alien forces.

The North's demand for the discussion of the issue of Team Spirit as a primary topic was obviously aimed at swaying public opinion in favor of suspending the annual exercise, taking advantage of liberalized debate on unification in the South by propagandizing that the "Team Spirit exercise is the biggest obstacle to the improvement of inter-Korean relations and also to the South-North dialogue." The demand was thus intended ultimately to engineer the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea and to foster an atmosphere for struggles against the United States and nuclear arms.

On the other hand, the South's chief delegate Chae Mun-shik set forth a concrete draft agreement, calling for the early conclusion of the preparatory contacts. He recalled that in the past six contacts, the two sides agreed on or came close to an accord on not a small number of items.

In his first speech, Chief Delegate Chae said that in consideration of the North's position, the word "multi-pronged" might well be used to make topic No. 1 "the question of multi-pronged exchange and cooperation between the South and the North including the issue of resuming the South-North Red Cross Conference and the South-North economic meeting.

Chae said this was the second compromise plan offered

by the South. He noted that at the sixth contact, the South offered to modify the "question of non-affression" to the "question of non-aggression declaration."

As to the nature of the meeting to discuss agenda topics, over which differences remained between the two sides, the South's chief delegate stressed that since the issues which the two sides wished to discuss at the proposed parliamentary talks were in fact bilateral matters that ought to be discussed and resolved between the South and the North, and since the 50 delegates to attend the meeting to discuss agenda topics are the representatives duly delegated by the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea and the Supreme People's Assembly of North Korea, it is reasonable and realistic to hold the meeting to discuss agenda topics in the form of a select delegates meeting of the nature of bilateral talks rather than of the nature of a joint conference where each attendee exercises the right of representation.

The South also suggested that to ensure the effective operation of the meeting to discuss agenda topics to be attended by 100 people, differences in opinion should be ironed out at an executive section to be organized by the select delegates meeting, with five delegates from each side, and that when a joint agreement is prepared through mutual agreement, it would be affirmed and adopted by the select delegates meeting.

Chief Delegate Chae then called for the smooth progress of the proposed talks, invoking the principle of reciprocity with respect to the operation of the talks, such as the mutual recognition of the reality, mutual respect, mutual non-interference and the application of mutual equality in the proceeding of the talks.

The draft agreement the South produced on the holding of the South-North parliamentary talks was as follows :

Agreement on Holding South-North Parliamentary Talks (Draft)

The delegation of the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea and the delegation of the Supreme People's Assembly of the democratic People's Republic of Korea held seven preparatory contacts at the Peace House and Tong-ilgak at Panmunjom from August 19 through December 29, 1988, to prepare for South-North parliamentary talks and agreed as follows on the holding of the South-North parliamentary talks.

1. Agenda and Format of Talks

- a. The agenda of the South-North parliamentary talks shall be the following three points :
 - (1) The question of multi-pronged exchange and cooperation between the South and the North, including the issue of resuming the South-North Red Cross conference and the South-North economic meeting.
 - (2) The question of South-North non-aggression declaration.
 - (3) The question of holding a South-North summit meeting.
- b. The South-North parliamentary talks shall be held in the order of an opening meeting, a select delegates meeting to discuss agenda topics (hereinafter referred to as "select delegates meeting") and a closing meeting.
- c. The opening and closing meetings shall take the form of

joint session which the entire South and North Korean legislators shall attend.

- d. The select delegates meeting shall take the form of a bilateral meeting to be attended by 50 delegates from each side. There shall be an Executive Section formed of five delegates from each side and a Joint Steering Committee formed of five delegates from each side.
2. Operational Procedures of the Talks
- a. The South-North parliamentary talks shall in principle be held in the spirit of reciprocity in accordance with the principles of mutual respect, non-interference and mutual equality.
 - b. The opening meeting shall be held in Pyongyang within one month after the end of Panmunjom preparatory contacts.
 - c. At the opening meeting, various matters agreed on between the two sides at the preparatory contacts shall be affirmed, the delegates selected to discuss agenda topics shall be introduced, opening speeches shall be made by the speakers, and congratulatory speeches by senior legislators of the two sides shall be exchanged.
 - d. The first select delegates meeting shall be held in Seoul within one month after the opening meeting. The second shall be held in Pyongyang within one month thereafter, and the third and later meetings in Seoul and Pyongyang, by turn, at one month intervals.
 - e. The select delegates meeting shall operate under the system of mutual agreement. There shall be no voting.
 - f. The Executive Section, with authority delegated by the select delegates meeting, shall discuss and adjust the differences raised at the select delegates meeting, and shall

- prepare a Joint Agreement under mutual agreement.
- g. The Joint Agreement prepared by the Executive Section shall be affirmed and adopted by the select delegates meeting.
 - h. The Joint Steering Committee shall handle working-level matters related to the operation of the talks such as the preparation of schedules for proceedings.
 - i. The closing meeting shall be held in Seoul within one month after the end of the select delegates meeting.
 - j. At the closing meeting, the Joint Agreement agreed on and adopted at the select delegates meeting shall be affirmed and made public, closing speeches made by the speakers and congratulatory addresses by senior legislators of both sides shall be exchanges.
3. Other Procedures for Proceedings
- a. The opening and closing meetings shall be held under the co-chairmanship system. The meetings shall be presided over by the co-chairmen by turn.
 - b. The select delegates meeting and the Executive Section shall be jointly presided over by the chief delegates of the two sides. The Joint Steering Committee shall be jointly presided over by the delegates nominated by the chief delegates.
 - c. The opening and closing meetings and the select delegates meeting shall in principle be opened to the public. The meetings of the Executive Section and the Joint Steering Committee may be held behind closed doors.
 - d. Free press coverage shall be guaranteed in travels between the South and the North for the South-North parliamentary talks.
 - e. The duration of stay in each other's areas for the opening

meeting, select delegates meeting and closing meeting shall be four nights and five days.

- f. A delegation visiting the other's area to attend an opening meeting, select delegates meeting or a closing meeting shall be accompanied by about 150 support personnel and about 200 press members.
- g. Precedents set in the past travels back and forth between the South and the North shall apply, with appropriate modifications, to all procedural matters, such as procedures for passage between the South and the North, the guarantee of personal safety, procedures for passage through Panmunjom, schedules for the stay in each other's area and for meeting, insignia, equipment and personal belongings, transportation, communications and liaison methods, programs of activities outside the conference sites, provision of various conveniences, and other working-level procedural matters. Detailed matters related to these procedures shall be discussed and decided on by one working-level delegate from each side.

As to the North Korean demand for the discussion of the issue of the Team Spirit training exercise as the primary topic of the proposed parliamentary talks, the South asked for the withdrawal of the demand, pointing out that to raise a new issue which had nothing at all to do with the meeting, especially at a time when the meeting is in the process of yielding fruition, represented a deliberate sabotage of the meeting.

At the same time, noting that the Team Spirit exercise is an annual and defensive military practice, to which North

Korea was invited to send observers, the South urged that inasmuch as the authorities of the South and the North were preparing to hold a meeting to discuss the issue of promoting confidence-building in the military area, the two sides ought to conclude the preparatory contacts at an early date by discussing such essential matters as the format and topics of the talks.

However, North Korea, turning a deaf ear to the South's urging, only repeated their demand for the suspension of the Team Spirit exercise, causing the contact to fail to achieve any progress.

The two sides agreed to hold the eighth preparatory contact at Peace House in the southern sector of Panmunjom on February 10, 1989.

c. Suspension of Meeting by the North

In a statement issued by a spokesman for its delegation to the preparatory contacts for South-North parliamentary talks on February 8, North Korea unilaterally announced that it had decided to postpone the eighth preparatory contact set to be held on February 10 until after the end of the Team Spirit training exercise.

At the first preliminary meeting for South-North high-level officials talks also, held on the same day, February 8, North Korea demanded the suspension of Team Spirit as a prerequisite to the materialization of the high-level officials meeting.

In the statement that was made public three hours after the end of the first preliminary meeting, the North tried to

shift the blame for the failure to hold the eighth contact as originally scheduled to the South, charging the South with “pursuing war and confrontation while paying only lip service to dialogue and the alleviation of tension.”

The North’s postponement of an agreed-on contact indicated that the North Koreans were not interested in the early materialization of the proposed South-North parliamentary talks.

In fact, this was not the first time the North unilaterally put off an agreed-on meeting. They committed the unreasonable act of postponing scheduled meetings unilaterally on a number of occasions in the past.

Examples of Unilateral Postponement or Suspension of Talks by North Korea

Examples	Remarks
○ 2nd South-North economic meeting slated for November 28, 1984	The North postponed the meeting while trying to switch the blame for a Panmunjom shooting incident to the South.
○ 2nd South-North economic meeting slated for January 17, 1985, and 8th full-dress Red Cross meeting slated for January 23, 1985	The North postponed them with the excuse of the Team Spirit exercise.

<p>○ 6th South-North economic meeting (January 22, 1986), 3rd preliminary contact for parliamentary talks (February 18, 1986) and 11th full-dress Red Cross meeting (February 25-28, 1986)</p>	<p>The North postponed them with the excuse of the Team Spirit exercise (the meetings failed to resume as of June 1989.)</p>
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At the seventh contact, held after the two sides partially agreed, through the past six contacts, on the format, time and place of the talks and the number of delegates, with differences remaining over the method and topics of the talks, North Korea, out of nowhere, demanded the discussion of the issue of "suspending the Team Spirit exercise" as the primary topic of the proposed talks, thus sabotaging the progress of the meeting.

However, the South, assuming that the North agreed to the time of the eighth contact aware of the projected Team Spirit exercise, did not rule out the possibility of holding the the proposed talks through mutual agreement and compromise, looking forward to a sincere attitude on the part of the North.

Nonetheless, North Korea showed no signs of any reconsideration of their decision to put off the contact. This act of ignoring even an elementary agreement with the excuse of the Team Spirit exercise cannot but be taken as part of their political machination to shift the blame for tension on the Korean peninsula to the South and the United States, while attempting to foment an internal split in the

South

On February 9, Chae Mun-shik, the South's chief delegate to the preparatory contacts, issued a statement to urge the North to return to the table of dialogue. Chae said in the statement that "if the North were truly interested in the realization of South-North parliamentary talks and in national reconciliation and unification, they would return to the table of the preparatory contact for South-North parliamentary talks instead of postponing, to the disappointment of their Korean brethren, the agreed-on preparatory contact on the ground of the Team Spirit issue." The text of Chief Delegate Chae's statement was as follows :

My delegation made sincere efforts in the course of the past seven preparatory contacts, setting forth compromise plans many times in consideration of the North's position on the issues of the format and topics of the proposed talks, etc.

However, North Korea has announced that it has decided to postpone the eighth preparatory contact slated for February 10 until after the end of the Team Spirit exercise, arguing that no preparatory contact could be held in a circumstance where the joint Korea-U.S. Team Spirit training exercise was underway.

We, together with the rest of our Korean brethren, aspiring for the progress and fruition of South-North parliamentary talks and other South-North dialogues, utterly regret the measure.

As is well known, the preparatory contacts for parliamentary talks are now at a concluding stage where, if only a little more discussion were made of the issues of the format and topics of the proposed talks which have yet to be settled, an agreement could be reached.

It is hard to understand why North Korea suddenly raised the

issue of the Team Spirit exercise, which they did not mention during the discussion of the issue of topics in the past, demanding the adoption of the issue as Topic No.1 of the proposed talks. Their purpose was obviously to sabotage the progress of the meeting by postponing the already agreed-on contact.

It cannot be a proper dialogue attitude for North Korea to unilaterally suspend, in January 1986, the preliminary contacts for inter-Korean parliamentary talks which had been held since July 1985, with the excuse of the Team Spirit exercise, and again announce the unilateral postponement of the preparatory contacts for South-North parliamentary talks.

In fact, the South has made it clear that the Team Spirit training exercise is an annual field maneuver held openly and for defensive purposes by notifying the North of the planned exercise beforehand and inviting them to observe it.

Team Spirit differs in nature from the secret military exercises which North Korea holds jointly with alien forces and in other manners. And, it runs counter to the principle of reciprocity that North Korea demands the one-sided suspension of military exercises in the South.

The fact that dialogue continued in the past at times when the Team Spirit and North Korean military exercises were held, well indicates that military exercises have nothing directly to do with South-North dialogue.

Moreover, the faithful implementation of what have been agreed on between the two sides would be helpful to the improvement of the inter-Korean relations.

In this respect, we urge that if the North is genuinely interested in the realization of South-North parliamentary talks and national reconciliation and unification, they should return to the table of the preparatory contacts for South-North parliamentary talks at an early

date instead of putting off, to the disappointment of their Korean brethren, the already agreed-on preparatory contact because of the Team Spirit exercise.

As Chief Delegate Chae pointed out, the Team Spirit military exercise is a peace-keeping maneuver held annually since 1976 for defensive purposes. It is an open exercise whose size, time and area have always been made public.

There were many times when the two sides of Korea held talks, regardless of the Team Spirit exercise in the past. The nature of the annual exercise is well-illustrated by the fact that every time a Team Spirit exercise is held, the South notifies the North about it and even invites their observers to the maneuver.

In fact, Team Spirit is an act of self-defense designed to cope with threats from the North. It is natural that any country in the world maintaining armed forces conduct military exercises.

North Korea argues as if the root source of tension on the Korean peninsula lies in military exercises in the South. But, they never mention anything about their own military exercises, much less the arms buildup they pursue.

The North's military manpower is known to have increased from 430,000 in 1976 to more than 1,000,000 lately. They have amassed their troops along the truce line and maintain 100,000 special warfare troops to pose an added military threat to the South.

North Korea conducts regimental and division-level field maneuvers, joint tri-service exercises and joint naval maneuvers with the Soviet Union from time to time. The North Koreans have not notified the South or made any

public announcements about them.

This offensive posture of North Korea represents the factor that makes unavoidable the defensive military exercises of the South. Thus seen, it expressly runs counter to the spirit of reciprocity for North Korea to demand the suspension only of the Team Spirit exercise.

Tension between South and North Korea by no means derives from the South's military exercises, as the North claims, but is the result of the mutually hostile relationship that has been building over some 40 years. To resolve the tension, there should be a dialogue between the two sides of Korea in the first place.

What is essential to the successful implementation of the South-North dialogue is mutual trust and confidence building, which can arise from the faithful implementation of what has already been agreed on between the two sides.

The North Korean act of unilaterally postponing the eighth preparatory contact to which they themselves agreed, aware of the forthcoming annual Team Spirit exercise, can by no means be justified.

Part II

Developments Related to South-North Dialogue

1. Proposal for Talks for Student Exchanges

a. Proposal and Purport

Chong Yong-sok, chairman of the Committee for Promotion of South-North Student Exchanges, in a message to the North on March 13, 1989, proposed that a meeting for South-North student exchanges be held to discuss South Korean students's participation in the World Youth-Student Festival in Pyongyang, to which the North invited South Korean students. The message was addressed to Choe Ryong-hae, chairman of the North Korean Preparatory Committee for the 13th World Youth-Student Festival, and Kim Chang-ryong, chairman of the North Korean Students Committee.

The gist of chairman Chong Yong-sok's proposal was as follows :

This committee is a purely private organization founded for the purpose of advancing the time of unification, the wish of all our Korean brethren, by providing opportunities for the young college students of the South and the North, the masters-to-be of a unification generation, to restore the sense of national homogeneity and trust as the same people through mutual exchanges between South and North Korean students.

This committee has positively accepted your side's invitation of our side's students to the 13th World Youth-Student Festival, and is seriously studying various issues related thereto. Presently, letters and statements about the 13th World Youth-Student Festival and issues of other South-North student exchanges have been received from our stu-

dent organizations like the National Student Representatives Council (Chondaehyop) and the National Student Federation for National Movement.

This committee, having reviewed our students' requests, hereby proposes a meeting for South-North student exchanges.

—Time of meeting : A date between the end of March and early April as North Korea wishes.

—Place of meeting : Peace House in the southern sector of Panmunjom.

—Composition of delegations : Seven delegates from each side (three students and four Committee delegates).

—Topics of meeting : Question of South-North student exchanges such as the issue of participation in major events hosted by the two sides including the 13th World Youth-Student Festival, the issue of promoting homeland pilgrimage by South and North Korean students, and the issue of exchanging goodwill sports matches between South and North Korean students.

Active personnel exchanges are desirable, most of all, in order to remove the barrier of distrust and misunderstanding that has built up between the South and the North and to realize national reconciliation through mutual understanding.

Yet, any dialogue and exchange should be promoted in a national consensus on the basis of the unique reality of the inter-Korean relationship in a manner that contributes to confidence building between the two sides and to the restoration and development of national community.

Moreover, given the unique situation of South and North Korea where there inevitably arises the issue of per-

sonal security and the provision of conveniences in inter-Korean talks, all dialogues and contacts between the South and the North need to be held in close consultation with respective governmental authorities beforehand.

When North Korea extended a selective invitation to Chondaehyop in December 1988 to take part in the World Youth-Student Festival in Pyongyang, Chondaehyop, welcoming it, openly proposed to hold a South-North student working-level meeting without any consultation with the government and tried to press ahead with the proposed meeting.

In reality, the World Youth-Student Festival is a highly politically-oriented event designed for Communist-bloc and socialist Youth-Student organizations to renew their vanguard role in the international Communist movement.

In particular, Chondaehyop, oblivious of its being a student organization, vowed to discuss even political and military issues such as the adoption of a "joint declaration for joint struggles for peace and unification on the Korean peninsula."

Such reckless attempts to have dialogue with North Korea can hardly be in keeping with the genuine meaning of the July 7 Declaration nor can it be of any help to the improvement of the inter-Korean relationship.

However, the government, in a policy to materialize student exchanges by all means and thereby help them restore their national homogeneity and trust, has inaugurated the Committee for Promotion of South-North Student Exchanges and has studied the issue of South Korean students' participation in the World Youth-Student Festival in a forward-looking manner.

The Committee's proposal was significant in that, despite the limited nature of the Youth-Student Festival, it was designed to pool opinions of students and the rest of the people, and to enable as many students as possible to take part in inter-Korean student exchanges and thereby to advance South-North reconciliation and the age of inter-Korean reconciliation.

Since the proposal was meant in part to accommodate even the position of Chondaehyop, that student organization should explore a reasonable and practicable means of student exchanges including the question of participation in the Youth-Student Festival in consultation with the Committee for Promotion of Exchanges.

b. Background

On January 12, 1989, Education Minister Chong Wonshik disclosed a plan to create a private-level council among such educational organizations as the University Sports Committee, Korean Youth Organizations Federation and the Korean University Educational Council plus student organizations to promote the issue of South-North student exchanges in a forward-looking manner.

The decision to turn the task of promoting South-North student exchanges over to private organizations was made to positively accommodate the views of students and people over inter-Korean student exchanges, and to enable many students to take part in such exchanges, and, for the parties involved, namely, educational and student organizations, to participate in dialogue directly to facilitate substantial ex-

changes.

Under the decision, the Committee for Promotion of South-North Student Exchanges was inaugurated under the aegis of the Advisory Committee of the Council for Promotion of South-North Professors and Student Exchanges on January 27. The Committee had the immediate duty of promoting student homeland pilgrimages, exchange of student goodwill matches and the issue of participation in major events held in South and North Korea including the 13th World Youth-Student Festival.

As part of its program to promote inter-Korean student exchanges, the Committee studied positively the issue of South Korean students' participation in the Youth-Student Festival opening in pyongyang in July 1989 and various offers advanced by student organizations including Chondaehyop and the National Student Federation for National Movement,

The question of participation in the Youth-Student Festival was initiated when the North Korean Preparatory Committee for 13th World Youth-Student Festival and the North Korean Student Committee on December 26, 1988, jointly sent a letter of invitation to Chondaehyop, and Chondaehyop, on January 20, 1989, asked the Republic of Korea National Red Cross to convey its letter accepting the North Korean invitation to the North.

In the letter of invitation, the North said it heartily supports and welcomes the move of Chondaehyop to participate in the Pyongyang festival, a move which it described as the "revelation of a firm determination to comply with the dictate of the times." The letter said that it was inviting "patriotic South Korean students who pursue alliance

against imperialism, peace and friendship, and who aspire for national unification without interference by alien forces” to the 13th World Youth-Student Festival opening in Pyongyang in July 1989.

North Korea then proposed to hold a South-North student meeting attended by nine to 11 delegates in early March 1989 at Panmunjom to discuss working-level matters related to the North’s invitation.

With the successful Seoul Olympics in mind, North Korea has been clamorously preparing for the Youth-Student Festival by mobilizing their whole people despite their lingering economic difficulties. And, with the Pyongyang festival as incentive, the North has intensified political propaganda against the South with a view to forming a united pro-North front in the South.

The North’s invitation of Chondaehyop might have stemmed from the scheme to drag Chondaehyop into their propaganda war against the South so as to deepen frictions and public split within the South, as can be seen in their assertions that “this festival will serve to greatly encourage the South Korean youths, students and people who are forcefully staging struggles against fascists and the United States and for independence, democratization and the independent peaceful unification of the homeland.”

North Korea also seemed trying to re-enact the controversy over the abortive South-North student meeting originally set to be held on June 10 and then on August 15, 1988, in the hope of fomenting unrest in the South.

A reply from Chondaehyop was delivered to the North on February 24, 1989 by the Committee for Promotion of South-North Student Exchanges.

Chong Yong-sok, chairman of the Committee, said that his Committee had decided to deliver the reply to the North inasmuch as his Committee has selected the issue of participation in the Pyongyang festival as its primary project and in a gesture to substantially promote South-North student exchanges which he said are expected to grow brisk in the future. Chong added that he truly hopes that the delivery of the reply to the North would serve as an occasion to instill much hope in the minds of the youths and students of the South and the North.

Despite this sincere effort on the part of the Committee, Chondaehyop refused to cooperate with the Committee. On February 13, acting Chondaehyop chairman Im Jong-sok pronounced that his organization would determine all matters related to its participation in the Pyongyang festival on its own.

Again on February 23, Chondaehyop decided to form a preparatory committee for its participation in the World Youth-Student Festival, and publicly proposed to hold a South-North student working-level meeting attended by 11 delegates from each side at Panmunjom on March 16. Chondaehyop suggested that the proposed meeting could discuss the issue of holding joint academic, cultural and art events between the youths and students of the South and the North, the issue of adopting a joint declaration of South and North Korean students for peace and unification on the Korean peninsula, the issue of exchanging sports matches between South and North Korean youths and students, and the method of Chondaehyop's participation in the Pyongyang festival and other necessary matters.

Reacting to Chondaehyop's decision, a government

spokesman said in a statement on February 28 that the government won't tolerate any attempt to contact North Korea without any consultation with the government.

On April 26, Education Minister Chong Won-shik issued a statement in which the Minister, stressing that South-North exchanges and contacts should always be made under legal procedures and with government approval, urged Chondaehyop to suspend its own contacts with the North and instead join the Committee for Promotion of South-North Student Exchanges so as to handle the issue of participation in the Pyongyang festival under legal procedures.

c. Reactions from Chondaehyop and North Korea

North Korea, which initially kept quiet about the February 24. message from the Committee for Promotion of South-North Student Exchanges, sent a telephone message to the South on March 15 rejecting in effect the Committee's proposal for a meeting to promote South-North student exchanges.

In the letter jointly signed by Choe Ryong-hae, chairman of the North Korean Preparatory Committee for 13th World Youth-Student Festival, and Kim Chang-ryong, chairman of the North Korean Student Committee, and addressed to Chong Yong-sok, chairman of the South's Committee for Promotion of South-North Student Exchanges, North Korea proposed to hold the suggested meeting either toward the end of March or early April on the condition that a working-level South-North student meeting

would be held with Chondaehyop on March 16 as scheduled.

In the telephone message, the North, asserting that the Committee for Promotion cannot represent the opinions of Chondaehyop, insisted that no meeting for South-North student exchanges could be held unless the proposed meeting with Chondaehyop materialized.

These North Korean assertions expressly indicated that they were denying the competency of the South's Committee for Promotion of South-North Exchanges, as was claimed in a daily Rodong Shinmun commentary on February 15: "The issue of whether South Korean students should participate in the festival is entirely up to Chondaehyop, the party invited by the festival preparatory committee."

Another telephone message from the North, this one sent to Chondaehyop on the same day, March 15, said they were accepting Chondaehyop's proposal for a South-North working-level student meeting, informing the students body of the list of their 11 student delegates, thus making it clear that they would deal only with Chondaehyop concerning the festival participation issue.

Meanwhile, Chondaehyop, in a change in the direction of their struggles, told a press conference on March 15 that they were postponing the time of a working-level South-North student meeting until after mid-April, and would notify the North of an exact time later. Thus, a working-level student meeting slated for March 16 failed to take place.

On April 19, Chondaehyop publicly proposed to North Korea that a working-level South-North student meeting be held on April 28. North Korea, in an April 22 telephone

message signed by the North Korean Student Committee, accepted the Chondaehyop offer, saying they would send 11 delegates to Panmunjom on that day. North Korea also requested on April 25 that message from the North Korean Preparatory Committee for World Youth-Student Festival be delivered to individual recipients in the South.

But, the North Korean messages were not received by the Republic of Korea National Red Cross in accordance with its April 24 policy not to receive the kind of North Korean letters apt to cause unnecessary ill feelings or political disputes between the two sides.

If North Korea were truly interested in South-North student exchanges and in inviting South Korean students to the Pyongyang festival, there can be no reason why they cannot agree to a meeting for South-North student exchanges.

But, their policy to deal only with specific organizations cannot but be taken to represent their scheme to use South Korean students in their political operations against the South as was the case with Chonminnyon, Chonnohyop and National Writers Conference.

d. Nature of Youth-Student Festival

The World Youth-Student Festival is an international "event for struggles against imperialists" which is jointly sponsored by the World Democratic Youth League and the International Student League, both the vanguard organizations of the Soviet Communist Party. North Korea says that the purpose of its hosting of the festival is to "demon-

strate the united ability of, and promote goodwill among, the youths and students of socialist countries and the world progressive youths and students who are struggling for peace and democracy, national independence and socialism” (Encyclopaedia, North Korea, 1983 Edition, p.102).

First begun in Prague, Czechoslovakia, in 1947, the festival has been held irregularly at two to seven year intervals. Participated in by Communist-bloc countries and some leftist student organizations of Third World and Western nations, the festival comprises political forums, art performances, sports competitions, exhibitions, etc. Beginning with the 10th festival in 1973, the event has concentrated on political events.

Participants include, in addition to students, workers, farmers, soldiers, artists and athletes. Though gold, silver and bronze medals are awarded to the most outstanding performers by sector, the festival is not so much a sports-cultural event as a political-oriented event designed to promote goodwill among socialist organizations and solidify their socialistic revolutionary alliance.

To offset the surging international prestige of the South resulting from the successful hosting of the 1988 Seoul Olympics and to set the stage for their propaganda on Korea-related issues such as their calls for the withdrawal of U.S. forces, military reduction and the suspension of the Team Spirit military exercise, North Korea has been preparing for the festival at a huge cost which has been detrimental to their economy. They have been going all-out to entice many participants, create a mood for the event and launch extensive propaganda activities.

Arguing that the upcoming festival would “display to

the whole world the superiority of the socialistic system," North Korea defined the festival as a "great political meeting" of the progressive youths and students of the world. Especially influenced by the Seoul Olympics participated in by a record number of countries including China, the Soviet Union and other Communist-bloc countries, North Korea has not spared manpower and materials in their all-out preparation for the festival which, they boast, is the "first ever to take place in Asia," "the greatest feat of the Korean people" and "festival comparable to the Olympics."

At the same time, North Korea used the occasion to further agitate for anti-U.S. and anti-government struggles in the South, arguing that the Pyongyang festival would serve as an occasion to exhibit the "great potentials of the North Korean economy" to the South Korean people and would contribute much to providing a shortcut to "destroying machinations to create two Koreas."

To underscore their operation against the South, North Korea had intensified political agitation and propaganda against the South throughout the "grand national festival" period from November 15, 1988 to April 30, 1989, in which they openly staged rallies of students to "support and encourage the South Korean youths and students struggling against the United States and for independence and national unification."

Discussing the significance of the Pyongyang festival, Radio Pyongyang said in a commentary on September 23, 1988, "the festival will enable the South Korean people to correctly realize the great economic potentials and the justness of our revolutionary tasks, and will serve to further encourage their struggles for national unification and the

democratization of their society.” The commentary argued that “an anti-American and unification mood has risen sharply to a new dimension in the South with the South Korean youths, students and people positively struggling for the realization of inter-Korean contacts, carrying the banner of alliance with Communism and North Korea.”

This indicates that the North’s invitation of Chon-daehyop to the Pyongyang festival was intended to further fan some pro-North Korean and -communist movements and anti-American campaigns in the South.

2. The North’s Proposal for South-North Political Conference

a. Proposal and Evaluation

In his New Year’s message on January 1, 1989, North Korea’s Kim Il-sung, arguing that “support for a confederation system prevails in the South lately,” proposed a South-North political conference to seriously discuss the unification idea of a confederation system.

The gist of the part of Kim Il-sung’s message related to the proposal was as follows :

In South Korea today, struggles for unification of the fatherland have turned into a collective popular movement, developing into struggles for unification under a confederation system.

The idea of a Democratic Confederated Republic of Koryo is the best method of resolving the Korean question most expeditiously under

the present conditions of our country.

I propose that a South-North political conference be held in Pyongyang in the near future among leading figures from all parties, sects, layers and strata of the South and the North to discuss the method of unification under a confederation system. To this end, I invite the presidents of the Democratic Justice Party, Party for Peace and Democracy, Reunification Democratic Party and the New Democratic Republican Party, Cardinal Suhwan Kim, Rev. Moon Ik-hwan and Mr. Paek Ki-wan.

The leading figures of the South and the North can have not only multilateral talks but also bilateral talks within the framework of a political conference. I will welcome it if leading South Korean figures visit the North with constructive unification ideas.

The invitation by Kim Il-sung of the heads of the four political parties and three dissidents was apparently designed as a cushion against the mounting pressure at home and abroad for progress in the substantial dialogues such as a South-North summit meeting, and, at the same time, represented their policy to hold fast to the method of joint conference and the prior discussion of military issues in political talks with the South.

In fact, Kim Il-sung's offer for a South-North political conference was no more than a re-dressed form of the joint South-North conference which the North proposed time and again in some changed forms and under different titles after they first proposed a joint meeting among the representatives of all Korean political parties and social organizations in April 1948.

Examples of North Korean Offers for Joint South-North Conference

Time	Overture	Remarks
June 1950	Conference among the representatives of political parties and social organizations of South and North Korea	Intended to smokescreen the impending unleashing of Korean War
Early 1960	Conference among the representatives of all political parties and social organizations	Intended to take advantage of confusion after the April 19 student uprising
January 1973	Pan-national conference	
June 1973	Grand national conference	
February 1982	Joint conference among 100 South and North Korean politicians	
January 1983	Joint conference of the political parties and social organizations of South and North Korea	
January 1988	Joint South-North conference	

The North insists that a joint South-North conference should in essence be led by those other than government authorities. In short, through a joint conference, the North Koreans seek to foment a split in public opinion of the South rather than to resolve problems.

Therefore, the latest proposal for a political conference among leading figures of the South and the North, is simply another form of their stereotypical call for a joint South-North conference sans government authorities, as can be seen in their invitation of President Roh Tae Woo simply as one of the heads of the political parties rather than as the President of the South.

The proposal, however, instead of inviting a multitude of people, 50 to 100 persons, as in the past, limited the number of invited to seven "leading figures" and the topics of the meeting only to the idea of unification under the confederation system. The North thus sought to encourage debate on a confederation idea at some sector of the South.

Also by proposing both bilateral and multilateral talks in the proposed conference, the North schemed to engineer a split in the South's political circles through "bilateral talks" which refer to individual contacts by invited people from the South with Kim Il-sung.

In short, the latest North Korean proposal was intended to touch off frictions among the four parties of the South over the question of unification and to induce positive intervention by dissidents in the unification issue, thus causing political unrest in the South over the unification question.

Moreover, by inviting President Roh Tae-Woo not as the President of the South but simply as one of the invited persons, North Korea sought to undermine the prestige of

the Republic of Korea government. Similarly, by naming some dissidents in the same category as the heads of the four political parties, the North wanted to elevate the influence of dissident forces over the unification issue.

In addition, Kim Il-sung's claim that the idea of a Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo is the best available unification formula, and his proposal to hold a South-North political conference were one-sided offers that ignored the existence of the other side.

Since the formula of peaceful unification is the most important issue where the nation's survival and future are at stake, any idea should be the kind which both sides can accommodate and put into action. Therefore, any unification plan should be worked out through mutual consultation and compromise based on their respective ideas.

And, an organization for the promotion of unification should be formed and concrete unification procedures worked out on the basis of the opinions of all the members of the nation after a basic agreement is reached on the system of peace and unification through South-North summit meeting. Under no circumstance can the North's one-sided formula be discussed and adopted by several individual people.

All in all, Kim Il-sung's latest proposal for a South-North political conference was no more than part of their multi-pronged dialogue offensive launched on the basis of their belief that a situation favorable to their strategy to create a united front had been developing in the South.

The ruling and opposition political parties alike in the South invariably rejected the proposal made by Kim Il-sung. The gist of the reactions the four parties made to Kim

Il-sung's overture was as follows :

The Democratic Justice Parth — A mere scheme to jeopardize the South's government-led promotion of a unification policy and to cause a split in public opinion.

The Party for Peace and Democracy — The offer does not suit the reality of Korea, and violates the international practice by one-sidedly naming the delegates of the other side.

The Reunification Democratic Party — The offer was intended to block a summit meeting and to cause split and confusion in the four party-oriented political circles.

The New Democratic Republican Party — The old-fashioned offer that reminds us of the fact that we shouldn't be too expectant of improvement of the inter-Korean relationship.

As Rev. Moon Ik-hwan and Mr. Paek Ki-wan agreed to the proposal despite its rejection by the heads of the four parties and Cardinal Suhwan Kim's dismissal of it in silence, the North sent letters with slightly different contents to the heads of the four parties and the individual persons on January 30, 1989. The letters were signed by Ho Dam, chairman of the Preparatory Committee for a Political Conference of South and North Korean Leading Personages.

The gist of the contents of Ho Dam's letters was as follows :

Letters to the Heads of the Four Political Parties

Kim Il-sung has proposed a South-North political conference. We remember that you have wanted to visit Pyongyang for a long time. Our understanding is that a confederation system is widely supported in the South. We want you to

carefully study the proposal for a political conference once again and show an affirmative response.

Letter to Cardinal Suhwan Kim

Kim Il-Sung has invited you to Pyongyang. We are optimistic about the future of a political conference as many people welcomed the proposal.

We expect that you will do your utmost to help open a political conference at an early date. If you visit Pyongyang together with many other leading figures, we will heartily welcome you as a valuable delegate.

Letters to Moon Ik-hwan and Paek Ki-wan

The contents of the letters were almost same as those of the letter to Cardinal Kim, with the addition of the following.

We are pleased to note that you have showed a favorable response to the proposal for a political conference. We express our respect to you for making this heroic decision.

These letters of Ho Dam were intended to elevate the position of Mook Ik-hwan and Paek Ki-wan who supported the idea of a South-North political conference, and, at the same time, to cause a split in public opinion and encourage anti-U.S. and anti-government struggles in the South.

b. Illegal Visit to North Korea by Moon Ik-Hwan

Kim Il-sung's call for a political conference with the heads of political parties and some individual figures without any government officials was part of their South-ward

propaganda strategy to form a united front with dissident and anti-government forces of the South in the long run.

This can be seen in the fact that Kim Il-sung proposed a political conference only to discuss his idea of a confederation system and that he himself handpicked the South's delegates on his own.

In all countries, governments retain the exclusive authority and competence so far as external policies are concerned. In the South, too, the implementor of unification policies is naturally the government as its Constitution expressly provides that the President is responsible for matters related to national unification.

Therefore, unilateral contacts by any private organization or individual person with North Korea over the heads of the government not only represents the violation of relevant laws but also serves to do favor to the North's South-ward operation to the detriment of the inter-Korean relationship.

It is obvious that Mr. Moon Ik-hwan's visit to North Korea did not constitute any act of individual private exchange but was the result of the North's political operation. This is all the more obvious in view of the fact that North Korea provided a special plane for Moon's visit, Kim Il-sung personally met with him during his stay in Pyongyang, North Korean authorities arranged a press interview for Moon in Beijing, and Moon's North Korean counterpart in a Joint statement released in Pyongyang was the head of the Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland, a key Workers' (Communist) Party organization in charge of operations against the South.

The Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland is in effect an executive organization responsible for the

overall strategy and tactics of the North in the South-North dialogue. It is a well-known fact that the key members of the Committee have been among the North's delegates to various meetings of the South-North dialogue such as the preliminary meetings for South-North high-level officials talks, preparatory contacts for South-North parliamentary talks, South-North sports meetings, and working-level delegates contacts for pan-national conference.

Despite the North's ulterior motives, Moon Ik-hwan, one of the individuals the North invited to Pyongyang for a political conference, illegally entered North Korea on March 25 to discuss with the North Korean authorities a unification plan and issue a statement whose contents ran counter to the policies of the South, thus committing anti-state acts.

Timed with Moon Ik-hwan's visit to the North, the Workers' (Communist) Party and 23 other political parties and social organizations of North Korea issued a joint statement called "Concerning Many-Sided Development of South-North Dialogue" on March 27, in which Pyongyang argued that South-North dialogue should be carried out simultaneously at governmental and private levels, and that voluntary dialogue offers made by the private sector should be encouraged and accommodated. The statement further said that North Korea welcomes the visit to the North by South Korean and overseas individual persons at any time to discuss matters of common concern of the nation.

The joint statement could be taken as a united-front-type scheme to neutralize the South's policy to use single conduit for inter-Korean contacts and exchanges and thereby undermine the authority of the Seoul government, justify Moon Ik-hwan's illegal visit to the North, and to induce dissi-

dents' visits to the North to produce the second and third Moon Ik-hwan's.

Reacting to the political operation North Korea perpetrates under the cloak of "unification," National Unification Minister Lee Hong-koo expressed, in a statement, on March 29, regret over the North's operation against the South, saying, "North Korea's plan to induce some of the dissidents to the North to discuss with them unification issues under the cloak of a political conference, cannot but be taken as an attempt to derail our government's efforts to promote national reconciliation and peaceful unification as well as the true meaning of the opening of debate on unification, and thereby to cause a split in our public opinion."

Also in the statement, Minister Lee pointed out that "the act of the top North Korean leader to contact a few of our dissidents over the heads of government negotiations, was tantamount to obstructing the improvement of the inter-Korean relations and threatening the future of peaceful unification." The Minister warned that "if North Korea continues to respond to the South's sincere efforts to promote peace and unification with its evil political operation against the South, North Korea will be unable to avoid the responsibility for all the consequences resulting therefrom."

Nonetheless, the North leveled more vicious slander at the South and went so far to make the threat that "we won't sit idly by if the South deals legally with Moon Ik-hwan." The threat was made in a statement issued by the Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland.

On April 2, Ho Dam, chairman of the Committee for Peaceful Unification, issued a joint statement with Moon

Ik-hwan, arguing that the North's idea of a confederation system, the suspension of the Team Spirit exercise and the rejection of the singularization of dialogue conduits should be the basis of all future official dialogues and consultations between the South and the North.

They were brazen enough to urge the government authorities, political parties and social organizations of the South and the North to take measures to translate the contents of the joint statement into action.

The following day, April 3, the Seoul government, in a comment, said that the "contents of the joint statement were a mere repetition of the North's consistent unification strategy which runs expressly counter to the policy of the Republic of Korea." Saying that the joint statement represented another case of the wicked use of the South's dissidents in the North's political operation against the South, the government comment said that together with all the people, the government could hardly control anger at the attempt of the North Koreans to exclude the Seoul government authorities with the actual responsibility and competency to settle inter-Korean issues and to buoy some pro-Pyongyang elements in the South in a scheme to foment a split and confusion in the South.

The comment strongly urged the North to stop committing impure aggressive acts against the South and return to national conscience and take a sincere position toward peace and unification. It then warned that if North Korea continued to perpetrate acts of aggravating the inter-Korean relations, there exists the danger that a grave phase may arise in the overall South-North relations.

As can be seen in the foregoing, North Korea showed

its intention to exploit the sincere effort of the South to improve the South-North relationship through, for example, the July 7 Special Declaration, making evident by their own words that their proposal for a South-North political conference was designed not to resolve the Korean question but to serve their propaganda, aims of causing confusion in the South.

3. The North's Proposal for Working-Level Contacts for Pan-National Conference

a. Contents and Promotion

In an open letter to the "Headquarters for the Promotion of Pan-National Conference" on December 9, 1988, the North's Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland said it was positively welcoming the proposal for a pan-national conference, suggesting that a preliminary contact be held among the working-level delegates of the South, the North and the Korean community abroad to prepare for the conference.

In the letter, the North asserted that "if a pan-national conference were convened and all our Korean brethren join in the anti-war, anti-nuclear and peace movement in concert, it would unfold an epochal phase for the realization of durable peace and unification on the Korean peninsula." North Korea claimed that the idea of a pan-national conference is in complete accord with the North's policy ideas such as a joint conference among all political parties and social organizations.

The North suggested that the proposed pan-national conference be held at the soonest possible date, even in January 1989 at Panmunjom or in a third country with the broad participation of the representatives of South and North Korean social organizations and overseas Korean organizations.

The idea of a pan-national conference was, in fact, raised first on August 3, 1988 when Mintongryon and some other dissident organizations formed the Headquarters for the Promotion of a Pan-national Conference with a view to diluting the then festive mood of the Seoul Olympics.

On August 3, 1988, the Headquarters for the Promotion of a World Congress for Peace and Unification on the Korean Peninsula and a Pan-national Conference, formally announced a plan to hold a pan-national conference. On September 22, Mintogryon and 20 other dissident organizations called for the preparation of a pan-national conference.

However, a joint South-North art festival and a pan-national conference for the reunion of separated families, which were planned to be held during the Olympic period from September 17 to October 2, 1988, failed to take place due to conflicting views among promoters themselves and student activists' passivity.

Despite the indifference showed by the South Korean people toward the idea of a pan-national conference, North Korea raised the issue anew in an apparent attempt to avoid a normal South-North dialogue and instead to seek to drive a wedge into public opinion of the South, taking advantage of democratization programs and the opening of debate on unification.

As was indicated in the defining of a pan-national con-

ference in their open letter, the North's eager response to the call for a pan-national conference was to encourage the dissidents' movements in the South and secure a ground for their propaganda on political and military issues, thereby fomenting an atmosphere for U.S. military withdrawal and anti-American sentiments.

In response to the North's proposal for a working-level contact for a pan-national conference, the Alliance of National and Democratic Movements (Chonminnyon), which was inaugurated with the slogan of "struggles for anti-U.S., independence and anti-fascist democratization," welcomed the North Korean offer in a comment made by its subordinate organization, Committee for Homeland Unification, and made the following concrete offer :

- Time and place: -12 noon, March 1, 199, Peace House at Panmunjom
- Delegation: -Less than 10 persons from all walks of life
- Topics of working-level contact:
 - Composition of delegations to the conference
 - Selection of topics for the conference
 - Preparation for the conference
 - Preparations for inter-Korean exchanges at private level

This proposal of Chonminnyon was in response to the North's open letter dated December 9, 1988.

Meanwhile, North Korea, in a February 15, 1989, message from Ahn Byong-soo, chief secretary of the Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland, to Lee Bu-young, co-chairman of Chonminnyon, accepted Chonminnyon's January 21 proposal for a working-level delegates

contact and counter-proposed that working-level delegations be composed of five members from each side.

Subsequently, Chonminnyon and the Committee for Peaceful Unification formed and announced the lists of their delegations to the working-level contact.

Lists of Delegations to Working-Level Contact

Conminnyon

Chief delegate : O Chung-il, Chonminnyon co-chairman

Guidance members : Kye Hun-je, Chonminnyon advisor

Park Hyong-kyu, Chonminnyon advisor

Spokesman : Lee Jae-o, chairman, Chonminnyon Committee for
Homeland Unification

Workers' representative : Lee So-son, advisor, National Labor
Movement Organizations Federation

Farmers' representative : Chong Song-hon, secretary general,
Catholic Farmers Society

Academic representative : Park Sun-kyong, professor, Mokwon
University

Cultural and artistic circles' representative : Kim Kyu-dong,
poet

Buddhist representative : Priest Bobsong

Regional representative : Han Sang-yol, co-chairman, Cholla-
buk-do National Democratic Movements Alliance

Committee for Peaceful Unification

Chief delegate : Yun Ki-bok, vice chairman, Committee for

Peaceful Unification

Delegates : Yo Yon-ku, chairman, Democratic Front for Unification of the Fatherland

Kim Yong-nam, vice chairman, Vocational League

Hyon Sok, vice chairman, Socialist Working Youth League

Lee Jong-won, vice chairman, Farm Workers League

Ko Ki-jun, chief secretary, Christians Federation

Choe Jin-hyok, dean, Undergraduate School, Kim Il-sung University

Hwang Yong-jun, responsible councillor, Committee for Peaceful Unification

Cha In-dok, director, Educational and Cultural workers Vocational League

Kim Kwang-shik, director, Unification Affairs Institute

b. Evaluation of the North's Posture

A look at the developments related to the promotion of a pan-national conference shows that North Korea seemed interested not in the resolution of pending inter-Korean issues through dialogue between government authorities but in coming in contact with some select dissident organizations of the South such as Chonminyon and Chondaehyop which called for the suspension of the Team Spirit exercise and the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea.

On February 8, the North broke up the first preliminary meeting for South-North high-level officials talks with their criticism of the Team Spirit exercise. They also suspended

the eighth preparatory contact for a South-North parliamentary meeting on the same date, barely two days before the eighth contact, February 10, with the excuse of Team Spirit.

Moreover, answering to a message of January 24 from Kim Sang-hyop, president of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross, in which he called for the resumption of the 11th full-dress Red Cross meeting, North Korea rejected the offer also on the ground of Team Spirit.

Contrary to this rejection of the Red Cross talks, expressed in a February 15 letter to Kim Sang-hyop from his North Korean counterpart, Son Sung-pil, another North Korean letter to the South, this one from the Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland to Chonminnyon, showed their willingness to talk with Chonminnyon, thus expressly shedding light on the doublefacedness of the North.

The gist of the North Korean Red Cross letter was as follows :

As we have stressed time and again, it would be meaningless to resume the Red Cross talks at a time when a large-scale military exercise like Team Spirit is underway and a perilous situation has developed where such an exercise could turn to a real war at any moment.

The resumption of the Red Cross talks is important. But, the most exigent humanitarian issue to which we should pay our prior attention at the moment is to save our brethren from the danger of a war, a nuclear war.

In particular, the forwarding, together with the letter, of a so-

called "list of persons to be traced" gives us ample grounds on which to suspect your genuine intent.

This kind of reckless conduct which runs counter to the agreed matters reached between the two sides and to elementary protocol, can be of no help to our joint tasks.

At the moment, the issue of resuming the Red Cross talks hinges on whether the Team Spirit exercise is suspended or not.

Reacting to this blatant political maneuver on the part of North Korea, a spokesman for the Ministry of Culture and Information on February 16 issued a comment, in which he urged the North to abandon their doublefacedness with which they accepted a Chonminnyon offer while rejecting with a nonsensical excuse a humanitarian meeting and instead show sincerity toward improving inter-Korean relations.

The gist of the comment by the spokesman of the Ministry of Culture and Information was as follows :

While rejecting the January 24 proposal of the Republic of National Red Cross for the holding of the 11th full-dress Red Cross meeting in Pyongyang on March 28 with the excuse of the Team Spirit exercise, North Korea notified the South that it had agreed to the proposal made by Chonminnyon in its inaugural meeting on January 21 that a working-level meeting for a pan-national conference be held at Peace House at Panmunjom on March 1.

Despite the fact that the North had unilaterally suspended preparatory contacts for South-North parliamentary talks, demanding the suspension of the Team Spirit exercise as a prerequisite to the re-

sumption of the contacts and again rejected the call for the resumption of the Red Cross talks, they have readily agreed to promote a meeting with Chonminnyon. We cannot but be worried about the ulterior motives of the North Koreans.

We feel obliged to guard against this doublefacedness of the North. They rejected a humanitarian meeting with a nonsensical excuse while wholly agreeing to a Chonminnyon proposal. We urge North Korea to abandon their dishonest posture and instead show genuine sincerity toward improving the inter-Korean relationship.

The Republic of Korea National Red Cross (ROKNRC), too, expressed regret over the North Korean rejection of its call for the resumption of the suspended Red Cross talks. Pointing out that North Korea has in effect shunned the resumption of the humanitarian talks despite the ROKNRC's repeated efforts to resume them after North Korea unilaterally suspended the 11th full-dress Red Cross meeting, the ROKNRC said in a comment on February 17 that the Team Spirit training exercise, the suspension of which North Korea demanded as a prerequisite to the resumption of the talks, was an open and defensive exercise which had nothing to do with the South-North dialogue at all.

The ROKNRC said that as a Red Cross organization, it could not understand the North Korean denouncement of the inclusion of the "list of persons to be traced" in its January 24 message to the North, adding that the list was based on the requests for tracing separated families received from dispersed families in the South. The ROKNRC stressed that if the North were truly interested in the solution of

the separated family issue, they should unconditionally return to the table of talks under the humanitarian spirit of the Red Cross. The ROKNRC comment further said that even before the resumption of the talks, all available steps should be taken to ease the pains of separated families.

The North Korean policy to have a dialogue with Chonminnyon, only one of many organizations of the South, while turning a deaf ear to a humanitarian meeting which should be held on a top priority basis between the two sides of Korea, seems to show the North's intention to use the South-North dialogue only as a foothold in creating a united front sympathetic to communism in the South.

In the South, no national consensus has been formed as to the convocation of a pan-national conference, nor has Chonminnyon any national representation to play host to such a meeting.

Nonetheless, the North tried to choose Chonminnyon as the other party in a dialogue in an apparent attempt to avoid dialogue between the government authorities and to strengthen the position of dissident forces in the South.

In connection with the move to promote a pan-national conference, a government spokesman said in a statement on February 28 that "for Chonminnyon to try to discuss with North Korea such an important issue as the unification question in a circumstance where North Korea has suspended inter-Korean parliamentary talks, would only result in furthering North Korea's strategy to disturb the South."

Saying that "Chonminnyon or any other organization will not be allowed to come in contact with North Korea unilaterally without consultations with the government," the spokesman warned that "if Chonminnyon tries to force

through a working-level contact with the North, the government would be obliged to take steps to counter it.”

Despite the warning, Chonminnyon tried to send a delegation to Panmunjom while North Korea dispatched their delegates to Panmunjom on March 1. Here, the government prevented Chonminnyon’s delegation from reaching Panmunjom, thus blocking a working-level contact for a pan-national conference.

4. The North’s Unilateral Postponement of Talks

After they unilaterally suspended a preparatory contact for South-North parliamentary talks, North Korea made unveiled attempts to have talks with some dissident organizations of the South only.

Even during the period of the Team Spirit training exercise, with the excuse of which they suspended normal talks with the South, North Korea showed a double-faced attitude by positively promoting a working-level contact for a pan-national conference with Chonminnyon, a contact with Chondaehyop over the issue of South Korean students’ participation in the Pyongyang Youth-Student Festival, a South-North writers meeting with Minyechong, and a South-North workers working-level contact with Chonnohyop.

In addition, the North went so far as to agitate for the overthrow of the Seoul government in connection with the incident of Moon Ik-hwan’s illegal visit to North Korea, to the anger and deploration among many South Korean people.

Nevertheless, the Seoul government resolved to carry on scheduled meetings with the North in a move to retain consistency in its efforts to improve the inter-Korean relations and to keep the South-North dialogue alive under all circumstances in accordance with the basic spirit of the July 7 Special Declaration.

However, as Mr. Moon Ik-hwan was questioned by government authorities after his return from Pyongyang, North Korea in no time postponed unilaterally all the channels of the dialogue over a long period of time.

On April 11, only one day before the scheduled third preliminary meeting for a South-North high-level officials meeting, the North's Chief Delegate Paek Nam-jun notified the South that it was postponing the preparatory meeting until April 26 for no apparent reason. Again in a telephone message on April 17, the North notified the South they were putting off the meeting further until July 12 with the excuse of some of the South's internal affairs like the arrest of Mr. Moon Ik-hwan.

Furthermore on April 17, the North's Chief Delegate Kim Hyong-jin to the South-North sports meeting unilaterally informed the South that the third South-North sports meeting, slated for April 18, be postponed until July 18 with the excuse of the arrest of Moon Ik-hwan, an issue that had nothing to do with sports issues

Together with the preparatory contact for South-North parliamentary talks suspended by the North on February 8, all dialogue channels between the South and the North were suspended with the inter-Korean relations having entered a cooling-off period

Substantial progress can be assured in the South-North

dialogue and exchanges only when the two sides respect each other's systems and legal orders based on their recognition of reality. Herein lies the very significance of the July 7 Special Declaration.

Therefore, for the North to put off the scheduled meetings on the ground of Moon Ik-hwan's case runs counter to the principle of such mutual respect in the first place.

Faithful observance of mutual agreements is essential to building up mutual trust. To unilaterally scrap the agreed-on times of talks cannot but be the discourteous act of ignoring the other side in a dialogue.

The unilateral postponement by North Korea of dialogues was apparently motivated by an attempt to play up their distorted assertions that the South's legal action against Moon Ik-hwan was not justified, and thereby to encourage struggles to free Moon Ik-hwan and cause confusion in the South.

Another motivation was to avoid an unfavorable situation, assuming that if the meetings were held as planned, they would be surely held accountable for their political maneuvering in connection with Moon Ik-hwan's visit to Pyongyang.

The obvious policy of North Korea is to watch the development of labor disputes and campus disturbances in the South and to buy time to devote themselves in the preparation of the Pyongyang Youth-Student Festival slated for July.

In comments made on April 17, the South expressed regret over the North's insincere attitude towards dialogue and urged the North Koreans to return to the dialogue table in a sincere manner instead of using the South-North dia-

logue for their political operation. The comments were by Song Han-ho, chief delegate to the preliminary talks for a South-North high-level officials meeting, and Chang Chung-shik, chief delegate to the South-North sports meeting. The gist of the comments by the South's chief delegates was as follows :

Gist of Comment by chief Delegate to Preliminary Meeting for South-North High-Level Officials Talks

The government has proposed a preliminary meeting for South-North high-level officials talks from the standpoint that what is most important to hasten the time of national reconciliation and unification is to lay the groundwork for cooperation through dialogue between the responsible authorities of the South and the North.

However, North Korea, which had posed obstacles in the past meetings by insisting on undue prerequisites such as the suspension of the Team Spirit training exercise, notified us of their decision to postpone the third preliminary meeting originally slated for April 12 until April 26 for no justifiable reasons. Again today, the North informed us that they were again putting off the meeting until July 12 with the excuse of the legal action taken against Moon Ik-hwan.

We deeply regret such an arbitrary and unfaithful attitude of North Korea.

By bringing Moon Ik-hwan into Pyongyang, North Korea committed blatantly hostile act against our government. And, despite our government's warning, North Korea sought to cause a split in public opinion and social confusion in the South, and perpetrated acts of interference in our internal affairs demanding the repeal of some of our

laws and the release of arrested people. They had gone so far as to agitate for the overthrow of our government.

It is just like a thief complaining about the act of thievery that North Korea, which ought to make an apology to the South over the case of Moon Ik-hwan, directed slander and defamation at our government in their telephone messages.

North Korea had behaved as if they were interested in a South-North high-level officials meeting. But, for the North to put off a preparatory meeting no fewer than twice constituted an act of turning a deaf ear to the wish of all the people aspiring for the improvement of the inter-Korean relations and of ignoring the other side in a dialogue, an act which makes us doubt if they were truly interested in a dialogue between government authorities.

Confident, however, that the first step toward peace and unification of this land lies in the South-North dialogue, and that unification policies should be promoted by the government authorities of the two sides based on national consensus, we shall continue to exert sincere and consistent efforts to realize a South-North high-level officials meeting.

We urge the North to come back to the table of dialogue between government authorities in a sincere manner instead of committing, any further, anti-dialogue and anti-unification conducts that would only aggravate the inter-Korean relations and intensify tension.

Gist of Comment by Chief Delegate to South-North Sports Meeting

South and North Korean sports people, agreeing to field a single inter-Korean delegation to the Beijing Asian Games slated for

September next year, have had relatively smooth discussion through two rounds of talks in the past.

But, we were dumbfounded at the fact that North Korea not only unilaterally postponed the South-North sports talks, for which all the people had such high expectations, barely one day before the scheduled meeting, but also attempted to shift the blame for the postponement unfoundedly to the South.

As for the incident of Mr. Moon Ik-hwan, it has become evident that the North Korean authorities had engineered the incident to shatter the atmosphere for inter-Korea dialogue and to commit a serious provocation against the South.

By seducing Moon Ik-hwan into Pyongyang, even mobilizing a special plane, North Korea used his visit in its hostile political propaganda against the South, a provocation that ran counter to the South-North dialogue.

The unilateral North Korean act of postponing the meeting leads me to deeply worry about the future of the meeting. Even if the meeting were resumed in the future, I cannot but doubt about their position and sincerity.

I think it is not proper sports people's conduct for the North Korean sports officials to postpone the issue of promoting inter-Korean sports exchanges and forming a single South-North sports delegation. I expect that North Korea will rectify their attitude and return to the table of talks at an early date.

Meanwhile, North Korea, which had unilaterally closed normal channels of dialogue, notified the South on April 22 that they would send a message from the North Korean Student Committee to Chondachyop to express their agree-

ment to a South-North student meeting on April 28 and other messages from the North Korean Preparatory Committee for 13th World Youth-Student Festival to some individual figures of the South.

Here, the ROKNRC sent a telephone message to the North on April 24 asking them to reconsider their plan to send messages to the South. the ROKNRC rightly believed that the sending of messages to some dissidents and dissident organizations in the South would not conform to the Red Cross spirit and gives rise to the possibility of political controversy.

In the telephone message, ROKNRC President Kim Sang-hyop expressed regret over the North's use of the inter-Korean Red Cross hotline for purposes other than the Red Cross talks. "I think it is not proper to use the inter-Korean direct telephone line in the delivery of the kind of letters or telephone messages that can cause unnecessary ill feelings or give rise to political disputes," said the ROKNRC president.

As North Korea tended to use the South-North hotline often as the means of liaison with dissidents of the South, the Red Cross has inadvertently come to be involved in political issues, finding it difficult to keep intact its inherent status.

Here, the ROKNRC has decided not to relay any letters that do not fit to the Red Cross principle and that are apt to touch off political disputes around their addressees.

In fact, North Korea used the South-North hotline for political operation purposes no fewer than 16 times since March 1988 to date.

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Part I

Korean National Community Unification Formula

1. New Approach toward Unification : Commemorative Address on the 44th Anniversary of National Liberation

a. Background

The government of the Sixth Republic has made practical efforts towards improving inter-Korean relations and towards the realization of national unification in the long run. As was made known in the July 7th Special Presidential Declaration and the President's address at the United Nations General Assembly on October 18, 1988, the government has pursued a progressive unification policy in a manner that accommodates North Korea as a member of the national community. This change in the Republic's policy basis was attributable in a large measure to the overall changing conditions for unification.

Internally, in the midst of an energetic debate on unification and the outpouring of public interest in and craving for unification, the people themselves have come to have confidence in the nation's ability to promote unification. This is a result of the successful hosting of the 1988 Seoul Olympics and the tangible achievements of the northern policy.

Externally, a basic change is seen in the world order itself as is characterized by East-West detente and the trend of the Communist-bloc countries toward reforms and openness. Waves of detente, reconciliation and cooperation are surging in upon the Korean peninsula, too.

As far as inter-Korean relations, North Korea has yet to abandon its strategy to communize the South. However,

a situation may develop where a change would inevitably occur within North Korea.

It was against this backdrop that President Roh Tae Woo, in a policy address on October 4, 1988, disclosed a plan to prepare a new unification concept by accommodating debate on unification made at the various walks of life.

Subsequently, in his commemorative address on the 44th anniversary of national liberation on August 15, 1989, President Roh discussed the features of the new unification formula such as the principles for unification, creation of an interim stage in the process of unification, and the image of a unified state as confirmed in the course of accommodating public opinion on unification.

Meanwhile, because North Korea was capitalizing (as a part of their united front strategy) on the positive efforts of the Republic of Korea to pursue reconciliation and cooperation from the perception of a national community, President Roh served them a warning calling for a change in their policy direction.

It is a well known fact that, since the spring of 1989, North Korea has selectively called in some pro-Pyongyang figures from the South in a persistent attempt to undermine the government of the Republic of Korea and to cause a social lift in the South.

Expressly pointing out that such a posture and conduct on the part of North Korea constitute a major obstacle to improving inter-Korean relations, President Roh, in his commemorative address, set forth the minimum required conditions for the full-fledged promotion of the task of national unification.

The part of the address that related to inter-Korean relations was as follows:

Fellow countrymen,

Even though we were unable to prevent our territorial division with our own means, we must independently accomplish unification on our own according to the will of our people. Unification can in no way be achieved by war or by the overthrowing of one part of Korea by the other. Unification must only be brought about by peaceful means.

All of our 60 million citizens must be the masters of a unified Korea, which in turn must be a democratic country guaranteeing individual freedom, human rights and the right to seek happiness. Clearly, unification, on which the nation's destiny hinges, must be achieved according to democratic principles and procedures.

Accordingly, unification must be realized independently based on a spirit of national self-determination and through peaceful means, never by the force of arms. And unification must be achieved through grand national reconciliation in a truly democratic fashion.

The reality of today, however, is that it is impossible to realize unification without removing the barrier of deep distrust and long-standing confrontation and enmity that stands between the South and the North with their differing ideologies and political systems.

It is therefore imperative that we establish an interim stage toward unification in which the South and the North should, first of all, seek co-existence and co-prosperity on the basis of mutual recognition. They should restore and develop a single national community through a mutual opening-up of their borders as well as through exchanges and cooperation.

While the two parts of Korea are thus building a single social, cultural and economic community, they should also create conditions favorable to

political integration, leading to the achievement of unification so as to merge into one single country.

The July 7th Declaration that I issued last year was a progressive step toward the opening of an era of South-North reconciliation and cooperation leading to unification in accordance with my aforementioned idea of how to merge the two parts of Korea. Although North Korea has yet to change its attitude, we will consistently pursue the spirit of the July 7th Declaration with the aim of promoting change in the North.

Fellow countrymen,

As the reaction to my speech before the United Nations General Assembly last autumn testifies, the progressive policy of the new Republic toward reconciliation and unification on the Korean peninsula is receiving worldwide support and affirmative response.

On the strength of that, we are forging positive relationships even with socialist countries. Moreover, it will only be a matter of time before North Korea also changes, so long as the wave of openness and reform continues its impact on the Communist world and the new tide of global reconciliation rises further and further. We will, therefore, strive to prod North Korea into opening up by dint of our strengthened cooperative ties with our traditional friends, while actively pursuing our northern policy.

Of course, it will not be feasible to improve overnight the relations between South and North Korea which have been in a state of persistent and unremitting confrontation and hostility for 40 long years. That task requires even firmer consolidation of our national capabilities, even greater patience and even more intensive efforts.

What is still blocking progress in inter-Korean relations despite the significant changes taking place in the world and the situation enveloping the Korean peninsula? It is none other than North Korea's unaltered adherence to a policy of unification through communization of the South. Moreover,

such an illusion is being abetted by certain forces within our own society.

If genuine peace is to be established in this land and the way to unification is to be paved, North Korea must abandon its policy of achieving unification by the communization of South Korea, and desist from all acts of provocation and terrorism against us. They must cease their attempt to overthrow our society.

Further, North Korea must guarantee freedom and human rights for our brethren in the North. Only when our North Korean brothers and sisters are guaranteed human dignity, that universal prerequisite that must be guaranteed in any country and under any political system, will it be possible to restore the homogeneity of our single national community.

In order to pursue in earnest the task of unification that cannot be put off any longer, I urge North Korea to take such steps expeditiously. When North Korea accepts our calls, we will take truly epochal steps in creating conditions conducive to peaceful unification, thus opening a new chapter of inter-Korean reconciliation and cooperation. The South and the North should now hold up the torches of peace and amity and join forces in shaping a new era.

If North Korea now turns its back on its duty in overcoming the grim state of our division, they cannot avoid being held responsible internationally for the continuing split of our national community.

I take this opportunity to urge North Korea to rectify the misconceived attitude they have taken so far toward inter-Korean dialogue. North Korea should in good faith generate an atmosphere conducive to immediately normalizing all channels of dialogue that are now suspended.

Only when there is unfaltering preparedness supported by a genuine desire to improve inter-Korean relations and work further toward unification, will it be possible for the South-North dialogue to move forward.

North Korea must realize that the only thing they can gain by agitating the extremists and radicals within our society and by enticing a few of

them to secretly visit Pyongyang with the aim of creating disturbances in the South is the abhorrence of our people.

I sincerely hope that multi-faceted measures will soon be set in motion to promote exchanges and to improve relations in all spheres of human activity based on agreements reached through dialogue between the responsible authorities of the South and the North through normal diplomatic channels.

We now have only 10 years to go before entering the 21st century during which our greatly elevated national ideals and extended capabilities should be brought to blossom not only in this land, but also on the world stage.

We are now about to enter this century's last decade during which we must crown with glory the 20th century that opened with the inflicting of tribulations and hardships upon the Korean people.

We must march forcefully into the era of democracy that we have just opened with the goals of building a free country that guarantees the dignity of all, a prosperous country that will stand out in the world with its self-esteem and ability to support itself, and a unified country that will answer the mandate of our national history.

This will be the way for us to complete the national liberation which our patriotic ancestors dreamed of achieving by dedicating their all to resisting and defying oppression by a foreign people.

b. Major Contents and Significance

Presentation of Basic Idea of Unification

In his commemorative address marking the 44th anniversary of national liberation, President Roh Tae Woo set forth three principles—*independence, peace and democracy*—for the

realization of unification. In particular, the principle of democracy, as it is premised on grand national unity, serves to reaffirm the agreement envisaged in the South-North Joint Communiqué of July 4, 1972.

The principle of democracy was emphasized in the new concept to, in a sense, eliminate the danger of the phrase “grand national unity” contained in the Joint Communiqué being interpreted as signifying that “unification has to be realized under whatever ideology or political system.” The new idea of unification thus exhibits the must that unification should always be materialized under democratic procedures and methods.

In his commemorative address, President Roh also suggested the need to create an interim stage in the process of realizing unification.

To eliminate the state of inter-Korean confrontation, the South and the North should develop their relationship into one of co-existence and cooperation while recognizing and respecting each other’s respective system.

Therefore, it is necessary to create an interim stage for the restoration and development of the national community. This is the ideal way to peacefully unify South and North Korea with their conflicting ideologies and systems.

North Korea adheres to the idea of a “Koryo confederal system,” an alleged package method of unification. However this idea is in disregard of the reality of inter-Korean relations and is prone to perpetuate national division as it calls for an interim stage as the final format of a unified state.

As the future image of a unified state, President Roh made it clear that “a unified country should be a democratic

state where all of the 60 million citizens must be their own masters and which can guarantee individual freedom, human rights and the right to seek happiness." This represents the manifestation of the President's determination not to sacrifice liberal democracy, even for unification.

Needless to say, the kind of unification the South pursues is the one where the principles and values of liberal democracy are practiced, one where the individual lives of all the citizens of the nation become more affluent than they were, and one where a homeland based on national self-esteem and dignity can be constructed.

Thus viewed President Roh's unification idea, which took complete shape in the Korean National Community Unification Formula announced on September 11, 1989, accommodates the July 4th South-North Joint Communiqué and the Unification Formula for National Reconciliation and Democratic Unification. At the same time, the formula succeeds in the spirit of the July 7th Declaration.

Urging of Policy Change by the North

In his commemorative address, President Roh urged North Korea to renounce its policy of achieving unification through the communization of the South and to assure the North Korean people of freedom and human rights.

Today, the key factor that stands in the way of an improved inter-Korean relationship and unification, is, of course, the illusion North Korea entertains about the "liberation of South Korea."

For the South and the North to unfold an age of genuine reconciliation and cooperation, they should abandon the confrontational posture in which they seek to shatter and overthrow the other side's system.

And, unless freedom and human rights are guaranteed for all the nation's citizens, a grave obstacle will arise in the restoration and development of the national community that will result in the distortion of the will of the nation's citizens.

Today freedom and human rights constitute the universal values of mankind. Even Communist-bloc countries are concerned about the human rights conditions in North Korea. *Therefore, it is the due right and obligation based on brotherly love, for the South to ask the Pyongyang authorities to rectify their present state of oppression and human rights violations. This is natural even in light of the future image of a unified state the Koreans have to pursue.*

The Presidential call for a change in the North Korean posture toward the South does not mean any backdown from the July 7th Declaration. It is rather the manifestation of a firm determination to positively embody the basic spirit of that Declaration. As evidence, the President expressed his willingness to take epochal steps to improve inter-Korean relations if North Korea would accept his concept of unification.

Urging of Rectification of the North's Dialogue Posture

Also, in his commemorative address, President Roh urged the North to rectify their unreasonable dialogue posture.

While turning a deaf ear to the normal South-North dialogue, North Korea has perpetrated its political maneuvering by clandestinely calling in some of the South's clergymen, politicians and a student for use in their propaganda ploys.

Moreover, the North turned Panmunjom, the place that ought to be the gateway to peace and unification, into a staging ground for their political propaganda and rallying. Also, despite repeated warnings from the South, North Korea arbitrarily allowed Lim Soo-kyong and Moon Kyu-hyon to pass through the Military Demarcation Line at Panmunjom to commit the provocation of violating the Armistice Agreement.

The South-North dialogue should always be carried out between the responsible authorities of the two sides on the basis of recognizing and respecting their mutual systems.

Substantial progress can be made in the dialogue only when the two sides have the genuine determination and sincere attitude to contribute to the improvement of inter-Korean relations and peaceful unification.

In this context, President Roh, in his Liberation Day address, called on North Korea to show sincerity and agree to normalize the suspended South-North dialogue at the earliest possible date.

Continuous Implementation of July 7th Declaration

The July 7th Declaration was significant in that it heralded the start of a new effort to expedite the openness of, and a change in, North Korea from the perception that reconciliation and cooperative relations should, first of all, be finalized in order to advance the time table of peaceful unification.

Some unwelcome events that occurred in inter-Korean relations, such as the secret visit to North Korea by some individual persons, had nothing at all to do with the July 7th Declaration. Therefore, there should be no reason why the Declaration has to be changed due to such phenomena. Although North Korea now rejects and makes ill use of the July 7th Declaration, it is certain that a time will come when the North won't be able to resist the universal flow of openness and reconciliation any further.

In his commemorative address, President Roh emphasized again that he would consistently exert efforts with patience to improve inter-Korean relations and promote unification based on the July 7th Declaration.

2. Announcement of Korean National Community Unification Formula

a. Efforts for National Consensus

President Roh announced the Korean National Commu-

nity Unification Formula in his special address made at the opening session of the 147th regular National Assembly on September 11, 1989.

The Constitution of the Sixth Republic, in Article 4, stipulates requirements for the establishment and promotion of peaceful unification policies, and, in Article 66, regulates the faithful duty of the President to promote such peaceful unification.

Herewith, the government of the Sixth Republic has made positive efforts, by sampling the opinions of the people from all walks of life, and establishing a unification formula that conforms to social development and changes both at home and abroad. At the same time, the government, setting "national self-esteem, unification and prosperity" as one of its major policy goals, has endeavored to open a new horizon for peaceful unification. It announced the July 7th Declaration and a series of other conciliatory steps toward North Korea.

The masters of unification should be all the citizens of the nation. Also, the format of a unified state should be determined by the will of the entire people under all circumstances. In this respect, a unification formula should not be exclusive to any individuals or groups, but instead be based on a national consensus.

Given the uniqueness of inter-Korean relations, the efficacy of a unification formula can hardly be expected unless it is buttressed by solid national consensus.

In the preparation of the Korean National Community Unification Formula, the government took into account the three factors of justness, feasibility and national consensus. Of these, national consensus was given the most emphasis

in a bid to make this formula highly workable.

Here, the government, in keeping with the democratic development of the various social sectors, liberalized debate on unification, allowed materials on the Communist bloc and North Korea to be made available to the public, and took some other steps to broadly sample public opinion.

To assess public opinion for use in the preparation of the new unification formula, the government held a total of 250 seminars and panel discussions among opinion leaders from all walks of life in Seoul and 10 other major cities. The participants represented the academic, press, religious, cultural, economic, educational, legal, female and student body sectors of society.

Through public hearings sponsored by the Special Committee on National Unification Policy of the National Assembly, opinions of seven social organizations (including some dissident organizations) and the press were sampled along with the views of the political parties with floor seats.

Besides, opinion surveys were held from among a total of 16,801 people from various walks of life including overseas residents under a multi-stage random sampling method.

In addition, a total of 426 cases of policy platforms and key speeches of political parties, unification-related ideas and offers to the North made by individual persons or organizations, and relevant editorials, features and commentaries appearing in major dailies, were analyzed as part of the policy to make the utmost effort to sample the people's determination toward, and opinions on, national unification.

Thus seen, the Korean National Community Unification Formula is not only the Sixth Republic's new unification

idea reflective of its determination to open a new chapter in the national history of unification based on the present mature national capabilities and on confidence in the affirmative environmental changes both at home and abroad, but also the “unification formula of the people” based on a broad national consensus.

b. Contents of Unification Formula

In short, the Korean National Community Unification Formula is a concept for the construction of a single national state through the interim stage of the Korean Commonwealth under the three principles of independence, peace and democracy on the basis of an approach toward unification through the restoration and development of national community.

In other words, as national division has now persisted for more than 40 years amidst hostility and confrontation and, as a result, the national community itself is now prone to be defaced, the new formula calls for the restoration of national homogeneity on the basis of co-existence and co-prosperity between the South and the North, creation of a single national society, and the ultimate accomplishment of national unification.

The full text of the special address of President Roh, in which the Korean National Community Unification Formula was announced, was as follows:

The Honorable Speaker and esteemed members of the National Assembly,

I heartily congratulate you all on the opening of the 147th regular session of the National Assembly. I believe you are meeting in a very significant regular session of the legislature that will wind up the 1980s which has been checkered with upheavals and accomplishments and usher in the '90s of hope. I am sure that the new session of the National Assembly will come up with many accomplishments in response to the wishes of the people. Today, in this hall of the popular will where the representatives of the people have gathered together, I consider it very meaningful for me to outline a formula for achieving national unification, in answer to the call of our national history and the yearning of our people.

Esteemed members of the Assembly,

We are now about to enter the last decade of this century during which we must crown with a glorious finale the 20th century that began for us with the ordeal of the loss of our national independence. At the beginning of this century, we gradually lost our national sovereignty, due largely to our insufficient ability to cope with the changing situation enveloping this part of the world. Though the nation was eventually liberated, misfortune persisted, culminating in the staggering tragedy of territorial division followed by fratricidal war.

Those of us who are living today must pool all our wisdom and energies to dismantle the barrier of national division and clear the way for unification, no matter how difficult that may be. We must not allow the painful separation of our land and people to extend into the next century nor let the next generation suffer the consequences. In response to the will and yearning of the people, we shall now raise the torch of unification high and with all our might, cut a path to unification.

I am convinced that the coming decade will be a momentous era during which it will be possible to open a path to unification by virtue of our

expanding national capabilities. Politically, economically and in all other respects, we have now developed the formidable wherewithal to unify our homeland on our own and are determined to carry that out.

Rising from the ashes of a conflagration caused by an all-out invasion from North Korea, we have achieved one of the fastest economic growth in the world, transforming the Republic into a newly industrialized country, ranking among the 10 largest trading nations in the world. Last year, with new vitality stemming from democracy, we staged the most magnificent Olympics ever right here in Seoul. Young people from 160 countries from all corners of the world—East, West, North and South—came together in Seoul, transcending ideological, political, racial and religious barriers. We Koreans, who were once viewed as a passive people, outside the international mainstream, pulled off a great feat by hosting such a grand festival of global harmony and thus taking the lead in promoting a global wave of reconciliation. Such an achievement is aiding our efforts to create the proper conditions for unification: We have managed to cultivate positive relations with socialist countries leading to increasing exchanges and cooperation with them. This is extending our diplomatic horizons.

The world is now engulfed in a maelstrom of change. The currents of openness and reform now sweeping the Soviet Union, China and the East European socialist countries are causing changes not only in their internal politics and policies but in the international order in general. The world order and the power structure that imposed national division on us and that have prolonged it for over 40 years are now undergoing fundamental change.

I have endeavored positively to cope with and adapt to such enormous changes in the world around us with the goal of breaking through to unification. In July last year, I proclaimed a policy of developing a partnership between South and North Korea in the interest of common prosperity, rather than allowing hostility and confrontation to continue any longer

between the two parts of Korea. Again, in a speech before the United Nations General Assembly last October, I outlined to the entire world my initiative for reconciliation and cooperation between South and North Korea intended to lead to durable peace on the Korean peninsula in particular and in Northeast Asia in general. Both the East and the West have extended support and encouragement to our policy of inducing North Korea to end its self-imposed isolation and instead to pursue openness so that reconciliation and peace can be achieved on the Korean peninsula, creating the necessary conditions for unification.

Esteemed members of the Assembly,

Even though we ourselves, as well as the world in general, have undergone tremendous changes over the last four decades or so, a major obstacle that has refused to change still stands in the way of unification. This is the unrelenting tension and confrontation embodied in the fact that the world's two densest concentrations of military might are pitted against each other across the Demilitarized Zone that cuts across the Korean Peninsula. This is so because the rigid system that has been ruling North Korea has not changed at all—it is still resisting the massive wave of change—even though the 10-year period during which even mountains and rivers are supposed to change has repeated itself four times over since its beginning. There has been no change yet in North Korea's basic strategy of unification by communizing the South nor in the regimentation of its own society. Our passion for unification is burning bright but the reality of division facing us is as cold and stark as ever.

Squaringly facing such a situation, I am nevertheless confident that although North Korea may turn out to be the last shore that the massive wave of global change will reach, it will not be able to resist it forever. With its isolationist policy now pushing against the limits, North Korea will

sooner or later find it advisable to swim with the current of change, thus eventually opting for openness and cooperation. We will attempt to help and guide them in this process so that such a day will come sooner. No matter how much sweat, patience, wisdom and united might of the people this may require, we will devote our body and soul to inducing them to join us in a journey to unification.

Distinguished members of the Assembly,

On October 4 last year, I promised in this hall to present, in due course, a feasible and reasonable formula for peacefully unifying our homeland in response to the will of our people and in keeping with newly changing circumstances. The administration has since worked out a new unification formula to fulfill the popular yearning. It is based on an extensive pooling of the views and wisdom of citizens from all walks of life, including experts, and on the outcome of hearings conducted by the National Assembly.

In line with the solemn duty that the Constitution imposes on the President, I am going to outline the Korean National Community Unification Formula. It calls for the merger of South and North Korea, under the principles of independence, peace and democracy, in a unified democratic republic, which is to be built upon a Korean Commonwealth to be formed in an interim stage.

Distinguished members of the Assembly, fellow countrymen at home and abroad,

Our unified homeland must be a single national community in which every citizen is his own master, that is to say, a democratic nation that guarantees the human rights of every individual and his right to seek happiness. The entire Korean people have long craved a democratic republican

system which will assure every citizen the right of participation as well as equal opportunity and under which diverse creeds and opinions can be freely voiced and represented. This is the only choice for a unified Korea if it is to achieve grand national unity.

Accordingly, a unified homeland must not tolerate special privileges, dominant positions or the usurping and wielding of dictatorial powers by any specific individual, group or class. A unified homeland should be the kind of nation that promotes welfare for all and guarantees permanent national security, while maintaining good neighborly relations with all nations and contributing to world peace and global well-being.

The Korean people are one. Therefore, a unified Korea must be a single nation. This is what the Korean people long for. No system for bringing the two parts of Korea together will accomplish genuine unification so long as it is aimed at perpetuating two states with differing ideologies and political system. Indisputably, unification must be achieved independently in keeping with a spirit of national self-determination and under the principles of peace, non-use of military force, and grand national unity through democratic procedures.

Esteemed members of the Assembly,

Unification should be achieved as quickly as feasible. However, the reality is that it will be impossible to achieve unification overnight without ending the long-standing deep distrust, confrontation and antagonism that have been built up between the South and the North over the past 40-odd years since the partitioning of the land into two halves committed to different ideologies and political systems.

For millenniums until that partitioning, we had lived in a single national community which evolved on the Peninsula, cemented by common ethnic origin and common language, culture and traditions. This national heritage

still binds our people together, even though we are forced to live in a divided land. It is the reason why the Korean people must become one again. It is the ultimate guarantee that we will succeed.

Our territorial division has deepened into a national schism due initially to bloody rightist-leftist clashes in the wake of liberation and subsequently to the savage fratricidal war sparked by North Korea's invasion of the South on June 25, 1950. Having thus lived for nearly half a century in a land divided into two hostile polities, Koreans in the South and the North have come to follow different lifestyles and different values. As long as our national community remains so deeply divided and differentiated, it will be impossible to re-form a single country. Properly restoring and developing our national community is the key to realizing unification at the earliest possible date.

It is thus imperative for the South and the North to set an interim stage toward unification in which both will recognize each other and seek co-existence and co-prosperity, irrespective of the existence of different political systems and will endeavor to speed the homogenization and integration of the national community. This, of course, will require expanding openness, exchanges and cooperation between the South and the North to build mutual trust that will be the basis for integrating them into a single nation-state. If a single social, cultural and economic community is thus progressively developed, while issues pending between the South and the North are resolved one after another, conditions for political integration will ripen.

To institutionalize such moves to speed unification, I propose to create under a charter agreed to by both parties, a kind of commonwealth to link the South and the North together. In such a commonwealth, the South and the North would be formed into a common sphere of national life to promote common prosperity and restore national homogeneity, thereby accelerating the development of a national community.

I propose that the Korean Commonwealth have a Council of Presidents.

or chief executives from both parts of Korea, as the highest decision-making organ. There would be a Council of Ministers, composed of delegates from both governments, and a Council of Representatives to be composed of members of the legislatures in both the South and the North.

To logistically support the activities of the Council of Ministers and the Council of Representatives, to help implement agreed matters and to handle other administrative affairs, the South and the North would set up a joint secretariat and exchange resident liaison missions to each other's capital, namely Seoul and P'yongyang. I propose that the joint secretariat and other institutions and facilities of the Korean Commonwealth be established in a Peace Zone to be created within the Demilitarized Zone. The Peace Zone should gradually be developed into a City of Unification and Peace.

The Council of Ministers would be co-chaired by the Prime Ministers of the South and the North and would comprise around 10 cabinet-level officials from each side. Under the council, a number of standing committees could be created to deal with humanitarian, political, diplomatic, economic, military, social, cultural and other affairs. The Council of Ministers would discuss and adjust all pending South-North issues and national problems and would ensure the implementation of its decisions. Among other things, it could work on the following agenda, with assistance from its standing committees in relevant areas:

In the humanitarian field, the Council of Ministers should solve the issue of reuniting dispersed families, whose members are estimated to total 10 million.

In the political and diplomatic fields, the Council of Ministers should take measures to ease political confrontation between the South and the North, prevent counterproductive inter-Korean rivalry on the world scene that only wastes national energies, promote the interests of overseas Koreans and otherwise advance national interests jointly.

In the economic, social and cultural fields, that Council should accelerate the opening of South and North Korean societies, promote multi-faceted inter-Korean exchanges, trade and cooperation and jointly foster national culture. The formation of a common economic zone to achieve mutual prosperity would facilitate the development of both the South and the North, thereby enhancing the quality of life for all.

In the military field, measures should be taken to build confidence and control arms with the goal of ending the costly arms race and confrontation between the two parts of Korea. Replacing the current armistice agreement with a peace agreement could also be on the Council's agenda.

The Council of Representatives should be composed of around 100 legislators, with equal numbers representing the two parts of Korea. It should draft the constitution of a unified Korea, develop methods and procedures to bring about unification and advise the Council of Ministers at its request.

In drafting the constitution of a unified nation, the Council of Representatives should discuss and agree on the political ideals, name and form of government for a unified Korea, its basic domestic and foreign policies and the methods, timing and procedures for a general election to constitute its legislature. Both the South and the North would present their own proposals for the constitution of a unified Korea to the Council of Representatives so they can be combined into a single draft.

The agreed draft of the constitution of a unified Korea should be finalized and promulgated through democratic methods and procedures. General elections would then be held under the promulgated constitution to form both a unified legislature and a unified government.

I suggest that the legislature of the unified homeland be a bicameral parliament, composed of an upper house based on regional representation and a lower house based on population.

In the manner I have just described, it should be possible to establish a unified democratic republic, thus accomplishing the momentous task of

unification.

Distinguished members of the National Assembly,

I am convinced that the Korean National Community Unification Formula represents a most rational and realistic route to unification in compliance with the ideals and wishes of our people. Ever since the birth of the Sixth Republic, I have repeatedly emphasized that the most effective way to make a decisive move toward South-North reconciliation and unification is through a summit meeting between Seoul and P'yongyang. I hope that a South-North summit will take place as quickly as possible to successfully launch joint efforts to work out an agreed charter for opening an era of full-fledged inter-Korea cooperation and unification. Such a charter could contain a comprehensive package of agreement covering a basic formula for attaining peace and unification, mutual non-aggression arrangements and the founding of a Korean commonwealth as an interim stage toward unification.

I look forward to the preparation and promulgation of such a charter of the Korean national community at the earliest possible date. And I hope that a breakthrough to peace and unification between South and North Korea will be found by August 15 next year—the 45th anniversary of the partitioning of Korea. In that way, we should be able to accomplish the mission that history has imposed on our generation of Koreans to open a new era of national unification.

Distinguished members of the Assembly, fellow countrymen at home and abroad,

You may recall that the European nations which experienced two horrible

World Wars are now in the process of successfully consolidating the European Community, thus ushering in an era of increasing common prosperity. The members of the EC, including Britain, France, West Germany and Italy, have transformed their past confrontation and hostility into a thriving partnership for peace and prosperity and are now moving forward to form a fully-integrated single European market by 1992. Moreover, efforts are being made to achieve political integration also. For us Koreans who managed to preserve a single national community even while we were under foreign domination, there is no reason why it is impossible to tear down the barrier of division and restore that community which had evolved over millenniums.

Esteemed members of the Assembly,

Today, even socialist countries are moving to expand the domain of freedom and human rights and recognize multiple party systems intended to represent diverse views. This is because freedom and human dignity are universal values that no ideology and no political system can ignore.

To achieve national reconciliation. I strongly urge P'yongyang to guarantee our North Korean brethren freedom and human rights. Until and unless they take steps to that end, they will not be able to embark on a path to openness. Nor will it be realistically feasible for them to be earnestly involved in exchanges, cooperation and political association with us, thereby joining us in a national community. Rather than merely paying lip service to unification, North Korea must genuinely abandon its policy of unification through communization of the South. Otherwise, it will not be feasible to open an avenue toward independence, peace and democratic unification.

As I made clear in my recent Liberation Day address, I am prepared to take a series of measures to usher in a new epoch of inter-Korean relations, if North Korea lives up to such minimum necessary conditions

for peacefull unification.

Esteemed members of the National Assembly, fellow Koreans at home and abroad,

Just as the barrier of division is tall and thick, so the path to unification is steep and rugged. Just as the great tragedy of division is unbearably painful, so we are required to muster even greater energies, wisdom and patience in endeavoring to end that tragedy.

Any illusion about an easy way out by disregarding all the hard and cold facts of life will only add to the nation's tribulations, rather than facilitating the unification of our homeland. As far as the issue of achieving unification to resolve painful national problems is concerned, our internal differences, strife, antagonism and divisions should be smelted down in the huge melting pot of democracy in order to create a steel-like national will for unification.

When our capabilities to achieve unification grow further on the strength of democracy and prosperity combined, the barrier of division will crumble and the united might of our people will draw the day of unification closer and closer. Just as the most magnificent Olympics ever unfolded right in this land to everybody's credit, thanks to the glorious past, so unification is bound to materialize through the dedication of the entire people to that goal.

Today, having just enunciated a unification formula embodying the yearning of all our people, I join you and all 70 million compatriots in pledging even more vigorous efforts to usher in the glorious day of unification.

Thank you.

The contents of the Korean National Community Unification Formula can be summarized as follows:

(1) Principles for Unification

Independence: Independently under the spirit of national self-determination.

Peace: Peacefully without resorting to the use of arms.

Democracy: Democratically through the promotion of grand national unity.

(2) Process of Unification

- The South and the North shall form a commonwealth on the basis of co-existence and co-prosperity in pursuit of a single national society—construction of a single national state (unified democratic Republic).

(3) Interim Unification System

Name: The Korean Commonwealth

Nature: Interim stage pending the realization of a unified state.

Role: Co-existence and co-prosperity, homogenization of the national community, formation of joint national living sphere.

Organizations:

- Council of Presidents: The highest decision-making body.

- Council of Ministers:

- To be formed with co-chairmen (the prime ministers of the South and the North) and about 10 cabinet-level officials from each side.

- To discuss and adjust all pending South-North issues and national problems, and to ensure the implementation of its decisions.
 - To establish five standing committees-humanitarian, political-diplomatic, economic, military, and social-cultural areas.
 - The issue of the reunion of displaced families.
 - The issue of the alleviation of political confrontation.
 - The issue of the prevention of the waste of national energies in the international society and of the promotion of the rights of Koreans residing overseas.
 - The issue of developing the national culture.
 - The issue of forming an economic sphere for common prosperity.
 - The issue of promoting the openness of the South and North Korean societies, and multi-faceted exchanges, trade and cooperation.
 - The issue of promoting confidence-building in the military and arms control areas.
 - The issue of replacing the existing Armistice Agreement with a peace treaty.
- Council of Representatives
- To consist of around 100 legislators, with equal representation from the two parts of Korea.
 - To advise the Council of Ministers, and to draft the Constitution of a unified Korea and develop methods and procedures to bring about unification.

- Joint Secretariat

- To support the business of the Council of Ministers and the Council of Representatives, and to take charge of working-level matters including the execution of matters agreed upon.

- Resident Liaison Missions: Dispatch of respective liaison delegates to Seoul and Pyongyang.

Peace Zone

- To be established inside the present Demilitarized Zone.

- Institutions and facilities of the Korean Commonwealth to be established.

- To eventually be developed into a Unification-peace City.

(4) Procedures for Establishment of Unified State

- Adoption and promulgation, through democratic methods and procedures, of the draft constitution of a unified Korea prepared by the Council of Representatives.

- Holding of general elections under the terms of the Constitution of a unified Korea to form a unified legislature and a unified government.

(5) Future Image of a Unified Korea

- A single national community where all of its citizens become their own masters. A democratic state which guarantees each member of the nation liberty, human rights and the pursuit of happiness.

Form of State: Single state

Composition of Legislature: Bicameral system (upper house — regional representation, lower house based on population)

Policy Basis:

- Democratic Republican system (guarantee of participation and equal opportunities for all citizens of the nation, free expression of ideologies and ideas).
- Promotion of well-being of all the people of the nation.
- Eternal guarantee of national security and contribution to world peace.
- Maintenance of good neighborly relations with all other countries.

(6) Adoption of National Community Charter

- Governing of comprehensive agreements between the South and the North, such as basic ideas for peace and unification, matters relating to mutual non-aggression, and the establishment and operation of the institutions of the Korean Commonwealth.
- Preparation and promulgation of the Charter through a South-North summit meeting.
- * It is hoped that the date of August 15, 1990 will see a new beginning for peace and unification.

*c. Highlights***Approach toward Unification from Viewpoint of National Community**

Looking back over the major flow of history, the Korean people, before the existing division, had lived in a single community sharing the same blood vein, the same language and the same cultural tradition.

However, due to the fratricidal war that followed national division, the Koreans' national heterogeneity has deepened as they continuously live different lives under different systems. If national division continues further, there may emerge the danger of the national society itself being permanently split.

A nation realizes its ideals, broadens its realm of interests, and establishes self-esteem through its community. Therefore, unless the national community is restored and developed, more political integration is infeasible nor does it carry any significance even if it is realized. In other words, there can be no country without its society.

There is no other course but to pursue unification through the formation of social, cultural and economic communities by promoting the joint interests and reconciliation of the nation. Any approach of a package resolution based on ideological and political aspects can hardly be effective in view of the experiences gained in the 40-odd years of national division. Such an approach may indeed rather lead to a delay in unification.

In this respect, the basis of the new unification formula

has due feasibility as it is designed to realize a single national society while going through the restoration of national homogeneity and creation of the nation's joint living sphere through mutual co-existence between the South and the North. Based thereon, it will ripen conditions for political integration to construct a single national state.

Creation of Interim Unification System

Koreans pursue unification because they are in a state of national division. Therefore, the question of unification must begin with the cool recognition of the reality of this division. Between the South and the North, there still exists political and military confrontation and frictions along with mutual distrust.

To achieve peaceful unification under these circumstances, efforts will be needed, as an interim stage, to ease and remove the aforementioned factors detrimental to unification through openness, exchanges and cooperation while co-existing and co-prospering on the basis of recognizing each other. The Korean National Community Unification Formula calls for the establishment of the Korean Commonwealth as an interim stage pending unification, in which the South and the North would recognize each other's unique situation temporarily and promote joint interests under the single roof of the national community while moving toward the direction of unification.

Any attempt to comprehensively integrate the political systems of the two sides without going through such an interim stage, will be nothing more than an unrealistic theory

lacking any substance.

Under the Korean Commonwealth, the South and the North will have intra-national relations rather than inter-state ties. The two sides would pursue national interests while discussing and adjusting their mutual relations internally and desisting from wasteful competition externally.

Therefore the Korean Commonwealth is not the textbook concept of an association of states or a confederal state. Functionally speaking, the Korean Commonwealth, in nature, is more like the European Community or the Nordic Council under which a number of countries move toward ultimate political integration through the formation of single living spheres.

Flexibility toward North Korea's Demand

In its new unification formula, the South does not persist in only its own ideas nor does it urge the North to accept its formula blindly. Rather, the South duly took into account the North's position under the basic spirit of reconciliation and cooperation so as to make the formula more practical.

It is true that the North's demand is unrealistic and has ulterior motives. Still, the South expresses in the new formula its willingness to resolve even political and military issues on the strength of the people's matured capabilities and increased confidence.

The Korean National Community Unification Formula stipulates that 1) matters relating to mutual non-aggression be included in the Korean National Community Charter designed to inaugurate an interim system, and 2) a standing

committee be created in the military area under the Korean Commonwealth so that it could discuss and adjust such issues as the "question of confidence building in the military sector and of arms control" and the "question of replacing the existing Armistice Agreement with a peace agreement."

Meanwhile, it also reflected the policy of positively considering the North's position that the new formula provides for the composition of a Council of Representatives, which would play the role of a sort of promoters' conference for the creation of a single state, with the same number of legislators from each side.

Presentation of Concrete Future Image of Unified Democratic Republic

Unification is the supreme task facing the Korean people. Still, the invariable national consensus is that no unification can be accepted that is achieved at the cost of liberty and democracy.

It is dangerous to demand unification unconditionally without regard to the meaning of unification. A unified homeland that Koreans pursue should be a single national community where all the citizens of the nation are their own masters, a democratic Republican system which guarantees participation and equal opportunities for all of the people and where various ideologies and ideas can be expressed freely.

The pursuit of democracy has been the consistent flow of world history, and is the universal value of mankind. Even in totalitarian Communist countries today, changes are gradually taking place for freedom and democracy, proving that

the artificial oppression of human yearning for liberty can never succeed.

And, in light of national tradition and the reality of inter-Korean relations, a unified Korea cannot remain incomplete in the form of two governments for a single nation as the North's idea of a confederation system calls for. A unified state, that is to be formed through an interim stage, should always be a single national country. Only in this way can the Korean people materialize their ideals through the complete restoration of their national community.

In addition, as the new unification formula calls for a bicameral parliament composed of an upper house based on regional representation and a lower house on population, the formula pays due attention to a proper balance among whole regions and participation by all the people of the nation.

Idea of Peace Zone

The new unification formula also proposed the creation of a Peace Zone within the Demilitarized Zone with a view to manifesting the Koreans' determination toward peace and unification and carrying out various joint projects to restore and develop the national community.

The Joint Secretariat and other institutions of the Korean Commonwealth as well as various conference rooms could also be established in the Peace Zone. This zone would additionally function as a pilot area which would serve as a conduit for diverse inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation and where various facilities could be built for joint use between

the South and the North.

For example, such facilities could include a unified railway station along the Seoul-Shinuiju Line, a reunion square for dispersed families, a national culture hall, a trade center and a stadium. Under mutual agreement, the Peace Zone could be steadily developed into a Unification-peace City.

d. Reactions to Unification Formula

(1) Reactions at Home and Abroad

Major domestic press media mainly exhibited an affirmative reaction to the new unification formula, calling it a reasonable and realistic idea fully reflecting objective conditions for unification. They described the formula, drafted after long and careful preparation, as the product of work that accommodated public opinion from all walks of life.

In particular, the press observed that the introduction of the interim unification system of the Korean Commonwealth pending the realization of unification, a point lacking in the previous Formula for National Reconciliation and Democratic Unification, added much to the realistic aspect of the new formula.

The press expressed total concurrence in the fact that the new formula expressly described the future image of a unified Korea as “a democratic state guaranteeing liberty, human rights and happiness for all the members of the nation” in keeping with the flow of world history, and that it placed emphasis on the procedures and methods of creating a unified state based on the liberal democratic value system.

The media also hailed as epochal progress the fact that

the new formula broadened the realm of agreement with the North. They noted that the formula called for the composition of all the institutions of the Korean Commonwealth with the same number of persons from each side, and showed the positiveness to discuss even political and military issues together with the questions of exchanges and cooperation.

The press then pointed out that since the announcement of the new unification formula alone does not mean any immediate improvement in inter-Korean relations or paving of the way to unification, more sincere efforts should be made to help North Korea come out of its self-imposed exile and isolation. The press also called for North Korea's affirmative response to the new unification formula.

Meanwhile, the United States, in a State Department release, described the new formula as a "practical and far-reaching idea to realize unification of the Korean peninsula." Japan, Finland and other friendly countries, too, expressed their support.

The foreign press, too, said in general that the new unification formula featured the presentation of a concrete process leading to unification," adding that the new formula, embodying the unification strategies of the past administrations of South Korea, would serve as a scaffold in the restoration of South Korea's integrated capabilities.

In particular, the foreign press said that the new formula represented a step forward in that it allowed for the same number of members or delegates between the two sides for the proposed Council of Ministers and Council of Representatives in a gesture of concession to North Korea, and included a call for the resolution of military issues as demanded

by North Korea. The press said they were watching reactions from North Korea.

On the other hand, China showed a negative response to the formula, saying, "observers believe that the formula, running counter to North Korea's idea of a Koryo confederal system, is intended to impose the South's present system upon the North." But, the Soviet Union showed an understanding attitude toward it, by stating, "the formula seems to contain reasonable elements and has some concepts similar to the North's ideas."

In particular, Radio Moscow reported on October 10th that the new formula is constructive to a certain extent as "it contains ideas that took Pyongyang's position into account" and "it promises that the South is willing to have multi-faceted talks with North Korea on many issues including those related to the alleviation of military tension."

(2) Reaction from North Korea

On September 11, 1989 when the new unification formula was announced in the South, North Korea, in a commentary appearing in the Rodong Shinmun, the daily organ of the Workers' (Communist) Party, emphasized the "justness" of their idea of a Koryo confederal system. Again on September 12th, the North, this time in Radio Minminjon, alleged that the new formula is a "machination intended to cover up the truth of the South's divisionism, with the theory of an interim stage being a scheme to perpetuate the present state of division so as to forge two Koreas."

On September 14th, the Rodong Shinmun formally rejected the new formula, describing it as a "second divisionistic

plan to firm up division in favor of two Koreas and drag on the issue of unification indefinitely,” and also as an “empty logic of the idealists who disregard the political reality.”

Thereafter, North Korea has been going all-out to denounce the South’s new unification formula, trying to block the spread of its support both at home and abroad. Stressing that the idea of a Koryo confederal system is the “best idea” for unification, North Korea asserted that the “Korean Commonwealth as an interim stage was patterned after the method of East and West Germany where the two states stand legalized.” They said that “unification based on a single system is totally infeasible unless one side takes over the other.”

Meanwhile, On September 28, 1989, North Korea proposed a so-called national unification conference. In that offer, the North showed a seemingly softened position saying that if the proposed conference were held, the new unification formula could be discussed as one of many unification ideas of the South. However, this offer stemmed simply from their strategy to scale down the Korean National Community Unification Formula. (See reference material in Chapter III)

Part II

Resumption of South–North Dialogue

1. Background

After North Korea suspended all channels of the South-North dialogue, the government of the Republic of Korea time and again urged the North to be sincere in its attitude toward the dialogue. North Korea torpedoed the preparatory contacts for South-North parliamentary talks in 1988 on the grounds of objections over the annual Team Spirit military exercise. They even suspended the preliminary meeting for South-North high-level officials talks and the South-North sports meeting in February and March, respectively, with the excuse of objecting to the legal actions being taken against Rev. Moon Ik-hwan.

Despite the South's urging, North Korea, while turning a deaf ear to the existing channels for normal dialogue, indulged only in pursuing the "united front" tactics of seeking to drive a wedge into the public opinion of the South by attempting to court some specific individuals or organizations of the South in what is called "private-level contacts and dialogue."

Such political maneuvering reached a peak around the time of the 13th World Youth-Student Festival held in Pyongyang in July 1989. The North sent invitations to 55 persons from various walks of life in the South, and proposed a South-North student meeting to discuss South Korean students participation in the festival, a South-North workers delegates working-level contact, a South-North history scholars meeting, a South-North religiously active persons meeting, and a total national meeting.

Moreover, North Korea contradicted themselves when

they launched a multi-pronged dialogue offensive toward specific figures and organizations in the South after they had suspended the on-going normal dialogue with the excuses of the Team Spirit military exercise and the legal action taken against Rev. Moon Ik-hwan. This two facedness may indicate that the North is not interested in the genuine improvement of inter-Korean relations.

The proposals North Korea made around that time for so-called "private-level dialogue" which was actually intended to cause confusion in the South, were as follows :

Time	Proposal
February 17	Central Committee, North Korean Writers League, agrees to South-North writers meeting. ○ Place: Japan or Panmunjom
March 15	North Korean delegation to South-North students talks agrees to South-North students working-level talks. ○ Notification of list of delegates
March 16	Chairman, Chondokyo-Chongwudang, invites the head of South Korea's Chondokyo. ○ Discussion of unification issue between South-North Chondokyo members, and invitation of Chondokyo head Oh Ik-je.
April 10	North Korean Vocational League proposes to Chonnohyop to have a working-level

- contact between South and North Korean workers' delegates.
- May 24 ○ Willing to accept it if Chonnohyop suggests the time and place of such contact.
 North Korean History Society proposes South-North history scholars talks.
 ○ Discussion of the issue of joint protest over the U.S.'s "distortion" of Korean history, etc.
 ○ Delegates: three to five persons
 ○ Place: Conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission at Panmunjom or either Tongilkak or Peace House
- June 2 North Korean Religious Leaders Association proposes to South Korean Religious Leaders Association to hold a South-North religious meeting.
 ○ Delegates: Seven persons from each side
 ○ Time and place: Late June 1989, Panmunjom, Seoul or Pyongyang
- July 9 Ho Dam, chairman of Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland, proposes a pan-national conference.
 ○ A pan-national conference be convened at Panmunjom on August 15, 1990, among South and North Korean people and Korean residents abroad.
-

In addition, it was belatedly learned that North Korea had secretly called in Rep. Suh Kyong-won for use in their political operations against the South.

Going one step further, North Korea allowed Miss Lim Soo-kyong, who illegally entered the North to take part in the Pyongyang World Youth-Student Festival, to return to the South through Panmunjom on August 15 to deliberately commit a violation of the Armistice Agreement.

This North Korean attitude may well indicate that the North does not yet to have a political and social basis on which they can agree to normal inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation, and that they have mistakenly understood, from the concept of their southward strategy, the changes taking place in the South that has accomplished democratization and openness.

The South has steadily urged the North to alter their dialogue posture and agree to resume the suspended dialogue with a consistent policy of resolving the various issues pending between the two Korean sides through dialogue between the duly responsible and competent authorities and offices of the two governments.

Here, time-wasting attacks and counter-attacks were exchanged through letters and telephone conversations for a while between the two sides over the issue of correct dialogue posture. After a nearly six-month-long follow-up cooling-off period, a South-North Red Cross working-level contact was held in September 1989 as a result of the South's sincere efforts. On the heels of this contact, preliminary talks for a South-North high-level officials meeting, a sports meeting, and preparatory contacts of inter-Korean parliamentary talks

were held in succession.

2. Red Cross Working-Level Delegates Contacts

a. Initiation

Since they had unilaterally called off the 11th full-dress Red Cross meeting set to be held in Pyongyang under mutual agreement following the 10th meeting held in Seoul in December of 1985, North Korea had rejected the South's repeated calls for the resumption of the meeting.

As recently as July 13, 1988, the South proposed a Red Cross working-level meeting to discuss the question of resuming the Red Cross talks and making the second exchange of dispersed family hometown visitors. On January 24, 1989, the South called for the holding of the 11th Red Cross meeting and sent a total of 4,346 letters of inquiry into missing persons to the North.

North Korea turned down all of these until May 31, 1989 when, from out of nowhere, the North proposed a South-North Red Cross working-level delegates contact to discuss the issue of a second exchange of hometown visitors and art troupes.

Making the offer, the North asserted that they were offering the proposal not as part of the projects of the Red Cross talks, but rather the offer was based on a joint statement issued between Rev. Moon Ik-hwan and the North's Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland.

Here, Kim Sang-hyop, president of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross (ROKNRC), suggested in a message

to the North on June 12 that the 11th full-dress Red Cross be held in Pyongyang on July 12 and that the issue of the second exchange of hometown visitors and art troupes be discussed together with other questions at the 11th meeting.

In their letter of June 22 however, the North insisted on a working-level delegates meeting, asserting that the issue of resuming the full-dress Red Cross meeting could be discussed there.

The South decided to hold these working-level delegates talks in a policy to use all available opportunities to ease the pains of dispersed families, although the North showed no change in their unreasonable attitude of linking the proposed working-level talks to an agreement between Rev. Moon and Pyongyang's Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland. The South proposed on July 12, 1989 that a working-level delegates contact be held on August 2.

However, as the North turned Panmunjom into a propaganda arena over the issue of the return of Miss Lim, Sookyong who secretly entered the North to take part in the Pyongyang World Youth-Student Festival, and made an unveiled attempt to use the humanitarian Red Cross talks for their propaganda purposes, trying, for instance, to prompt the Red Cross's intervention in Miss Lim's case, the ROK-NRC notified the North on July 29 that it would postpone the planned working-level delegates contact until a later date.

A statement issued by ROKNRC President Kim Sanghyop on July 29 in connection with the postponement was as follows:

To pave the way to reunion between the 10 million dispersed family members in the South and the North is one of the missions of our Red Cross workers, and also is a crucial task—a cherished desire of dispersed families and all of the other Korean people—that cannot be delayed any further.

Our Republic of Korea National Red Cross has exerted all possible efforts over the past 18 years to ease the misfortune and pain of the dispersed families of the South and the North. We believe that the early resumption and resolution of the suspended South-North Red Cross talks constitutes a short cut to realizing the reunion of dispersed families.

At the 10th full-dress South-North Red Cross meeting in 1985, our side produced a comprehensive draft agreement to resolve the five agenda topics of the meeting. These were: the finding out of the fate and whereabouts of missing families, mutual visits and meetings, exchange of letters, reunion, and other humanitarian issues.

Afterwards, we have continuously called for the early holding of the 11th full-dress meeting that was called off one-sidedly by North Korea.

At the same time, we also proposed to North Korea a second exchange of dispersed family hometown visitors and art troupes to ease even a little the pain of the families and relatives dispersed in the South and the North.

However, North Korea has rejected all of these offers and efforts of the South, demanding as prerequisites the elimination of the Team Spirit military exercise and the holding of a South-North political and military meeting that have nothing to do with Red Cross programs.

Suddenly, last May 31, however, North Korea proposed a South-North Red Cross working-level delegates meeting to discuss a second exchange of hometown visitors and art troupes under what it called an "agreement" reached between their Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland and Rev. Moon Ik-hwan who illegally visited North Korea.

Here, the South asked North Korea not to link specific organizations

or individuals to humanitarian projects for political purposes and to show their express position toward the issue of holding the suspended 11th South-North Red Cross meeting. The South then suggested that a working-level delegates contact be held at Panmunjom on August 2 to discuss this issue.

But, turning a deaf ear to the South's justifiable demand, the North Korean Red Cross continued to emphasize the agreement reached between a specific person who violated the statutory order of the South and one of their non-Red Cross organizations. By so doing, they themselves disregarded the efforts the two Red Cross societies have made in connection with the promotion of the dispersed family issue.

Moreover, the North Korea Red Cross threw all sorts of insulting words to the Republic of Korea National Red Cross on the grounds that the Republic of Korea National Red Cross did not cooperate in the passage of Miss Lim Soo-kyong through Panmunjom as they had demanded. This was an act that ran counter to the basic protocol that Red Cross societies have to maintain toward each other.

In addition, a political rally held at Panmunjom with the participation of Miss Lim Soo-kyong and Father Moon Kyu-hyon and a series of actions the North took to use the rally for their political propaganda, only served to further cloud over the atmosphere for contacts between the two sides' Red Cross working-level delegates.

We believe that it is difficult to hold working-level delegates contacts under such circumstances. Even if they were held, no productive results could be expected. Therefore, we hereby disclose that we are obliged to postpone the working-level delegates contact originally slated for August 2 until a later date.

We expect that the North Korean Red Cross will return to its inherent Red Cross duty and agree to the early resumption of the South-North Red Cross talks for the resolution of the dispersed family question.

We shall continue to exert all available efforts with patience to realize

by all means the reunion of dispersed families in the South and the North.

Meanwhile, in a statement issued by the ROKNRC president on August 11 to mark the 18th anniversary of the ROKNRC's proposal for South-North Red Cross talks, the South urged the North to alter their dialogue posture and contribute to improving the conference atmosphere so that the postponed Red Cross contact could be held in September at the latest.

On September 5, the South again proposed that a South-North Red Cross working-level delegates contact meeting be held on September 27, which the North accepted, thus setting the stage for contact again between the South and North Korean Red Cross societies for the first time in nearly four years.

List of the Delegations

The South

Chief delegate: Song Yong-dae, member of Disaster Relief Committee, ROKNRC

Delegate: Lee Jun-hee, consultant for social services, ROKNRC

Delegate: Lee Byong-wung, director, Planning and Management Department, ROKNRC

The North

Chief delegate: Pak Yong-su, standing member, Central

Committee, NKRC

Delegate: Kim Kwang-su, member, Central Committee,
NKRC

Delegate: Chong Dok-ki, responsible guidance member,
Central Committee, NKRC

b. First Contact

The first South-North Red Cross working-level delegates contact to discuss the issues of holding the 11th South-North Red Cross meeting and of making the second exchange of hometown visitors and art troupes was held at the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission at Panmunjom from 10 a.m. to 12: 16 p.m. September 27, 1989. It was opened to the public.

In his keynote speech, the South's Chief Delegate Song Young-dae, who spoke first, said that in order to resolve the dispersed family question, the two sides should be faithful to the genuine Red Cross humanitarian spirit. Therefore, it was unreasonable for the North Korean Red Cross to discuss the dispersed family issue based on an "agreement" reached between a law violator of the South and one of the North's non-Red Cross organizations in disregard of the efforts the two Red Cross organizations had made in the past.

The South's chief delegate said that in order to basically and broadly resolve the misfortune and pain of the 10 million dispersed family members, the projects envisaged in the five agenda topics of the full-dress meeting—finding out of fate and whereabouts, realization of visits and meetings, exchange

of letters, reunion, and other humanitarian issues—should be translated into action. To this end, he said, the suspended 11th full-dress meeting should be held at an early date.

Recalling, in particular, that an agreement on the first exchange of dispersed family hometown visitors and art troupes in 1985 was reached through working-level delegates contacts based on an accord made in principle at the eighth full-dress Red Cross meeting, and that the agreed matters were reaffirmed at the ninth meeting, the South's chief delegate said that it was reasonable to discuss the issue of a second exchange of hometown visitors and art troupes together with the projects envisaged in the five agenda topics at the 11th full-dress Red Cross meeting. However, he said that the South was willing to discuss the two issues in a gesture of making the most of all the given opportunities.

The South's suggestion made at the working-level delegates contact with respect to the issue of holding the 11th full-dress Red Cross meeting and the question of making the second exchange of dispersed family hometown visitors and art troupes was as follows:

Question of Holding the 11th South-North Red Cross Meeting

- (1) The 11th South-North Red Cross meeting shall be held in Pyongyang on November 1, 1989.
- (2) The agenda topics of the full-dress meeting, composition of delegations, operational procedures of the meeting, method of travel by delegations, and other matters related to the proceeding of the full-dress

meeting, shall be settle in accordance with past practices.

- (3) At the 11th Red Cross meeting, matters agreed upon at a South-North Red Cross working-level delegates contact with respect to the second exchange of dispersed family hometown visitors and art troupes shall be confirmed.

Question of Second Exchange of Dispersed Family Hometown Visitors and Art Troupes

(1) Size of Visiting Groups

- Delegation chief: One top official from each Red Cross
- Hometown visitors: 300 from each side
- Art troupes: 50 members from each side
- Press members: 100 persons form each side
- Support personnel: 100 persons from each side
- * A total of 501 persons from each side

(2) Places of Visit and Performances

- Dispersed family hometown visitors shall be enabled to directly visit their respective hometwons to meet their families and relatives, and to visit their ancestral tombs.
- Art troupes shall perform in Seoul and Pyongyang.

(3) Time and duration of visits

- The exchange of hometown visitors and art troupes shall be made from December 8 to December 13, 1989 (five nights and six days).

(4) Composition of Hometown Visitors' Groups

○Hometown visitors' groups shall be formed from those dispersed families whose hometowns are in the other side's area of the South and the North. However, those dispersed families, the whereabouts of whose missing blood relatives have been confirmed, shall be included on a preferential basis.

(5) Various other matters such as the name of the visiting groups, method of visits, scope of meeting, frequency of art performances, contents of performances, duration of performances, advance steps relating to performances, guarantee of personal safety, transportation, communications service, press coverage, method of passage, discussion of itineraries, identification cards, etc. shall all be settled in accordance with precedents.

In his keynote speech, the North's Chief Delegate Pak Yong-su suggested that the issue of resuming the full-dress Red Cross meeting be discussed and resolved together with the second exchange of hometown visitors and art troupes. But, he insisted that the question of hometown visitors was a highly practical issue that could be implemented even very shortly because there is a good precedent. He thus made it clear that their policy was to promote the exchange of hometown visitors and art troupes first and discuss the issue of resuming the suspended full-dress Red Cross meeting later.

The gist of the North Korean suggestion was as follows:

Project of Second Exchange of Hometown Visitors and Art Troupes

(1) Composition, Places and Time of Visits

- The composition of the second group of hometown visitors and art performers shall comprise 671 persons in all—300 art performers, 300 hometown visitors, 40 attendants and 30 press members with the deputy heads of the two Red Cross societies as the heads of the visiting groups.
- The places of visit by the second group of hometown visitors and art performers shall be Pyongyang and Seoul.
- The time of visit by the visiting groups and the duration of their stay in the other side's areas shall be three nights and four days from November 8 to November 11, 1989.

(2) Exchange Performances by Art Troupes

- The frequency of performance by an art group in the other side's area shall be four times and the duration of each performance shall be two to three hours.
- To guarantee the successful performance by art troupes, the hosting side shall provide the other side with a place complete with performing facilities.
- For the advance inspection of performance sites, advance teams composed of two Red Cross officials and three experts each shall be dispatched to each other's areas.

- The time of the dispatch of advance teams shall be two nights and three days from October 30 to November 1, 1989.
 - The contents of performances and the introduction to the repertoires of performances shall be made as the side presenting performances pleases. However, they shall be prepared in a way that in principle won't slander or irritate the other side.
 - Performance brochures may be prepared by the side presenting performances beforehand for distribution to the audience.
 - The hosting side shall broadcast live the performances by the other side's art troupe on television and radio.
- (3) Exchange of Hometown Visitors
- Hometown visitors shall be chiefly those whose hometowns are Pyongyang or Seoul.
 - The meetings shall be between family members at the time of separation and their children, up to third cousins on the father's side and first cousins on the mother's and wife's side. Depending on the visitor's wishes, other relatives may be included.
 - Materials on hometown visitors shall be delivered to the hosting side through the Panmunjom liaison missions 20 days before departure.
- (4) Guarantee of Safety and Conveniences
- For the personal safety of the second groups of hometown visitors and art performers, and their families and relatives, the relevant offices of each side shall issue statements guaranteeing personal

safety, the original copies of which shall be exchanged seven days before the visit to the other side's areas through the Panmunjom liaison mission.

- From the moment the second group of hometown visitors and art performers crosses the Military Demarcation Line at Panmunjom, all conveniences such as boarding and lodging, transportation and medical service shall be provided free of charge by the hosting side in a responsible manner.
- To guarantee communications during the stay of the second group of hometown visitors and art troupers in the other side's areas, the Red Cross direct telephone line existing between the South and the North shall be used.
- The hosting side shall furnish all conveniences so that the press members of the other side can freely cover the activities of hometown visitors and art troupe members.

Proposal on Issue of South-North Red Cross Talks

(1) Place of Full-Dress Talks

The 11th full-dress Red Cross meeting shall be held in Pyongyang and the 12th meeting in Seoul.

(2) Composition of Delegations

Delegations to the full-dress meetings shall, as in the past, be headed by the deputy heads of the two Red Cross societies and will be comprised of seven delegates, seven consultants, 20 attendants and 50 press

members each.

(3) Times of Full-Dress Meetings

The 11th full-dress meeting shall be held on December 15, 1989, and the 12th meeting on January 18, 1990.

(4) Other procedures

Procedures for the full-dress meetings shall be as agreed on in the past.

The proposals put forth by the two sides featured that, whereas the South wanted the 11th full-dress Red Cross meeting to be held first, which would confirm the matters agreed upon at a Red Cross working-level delegates contact on the second exchange of hometown visitors and art troupes, and then the visiting groups could be exchanged, North Korea maintained that hometown visitors and art performers must be exchanged first.

Moreover, the south's position was that the visiting groups should naturally be formed with emphasis on hometown visitors in view of the wish of the 10 million dispersed family members, while North Korea argued that the visiting groups should include the same numbers of hometown visitors and art performers. In addition, the South stressed that hometown visitors should be enabled to visit their hometowns directly, whereas the North wanted to limit the places of visits to Seoul and Pyongyang only.

The purpose of the hometown visiting and art performance project is to ease the pain of dispersed families. Therefore, it is enough if art troupes consist of a size that can serve to celebrate the hometown visiting and to help foster an

atmosphere of reconciliation.

Any full-fledged exchange of art troupes cannot be the inherent business of the Red Cross, but should rather be promoted as part of cultural and art exchange programs between the two sides of Korea. It runs against the Red Cross humanitarian spirit for North Korea to, nevertheless, attempt to place the same weight on hometown visiting and art performances by insisting that they be formed with the same numbers of participants.

Differences in the two sides' ideas were as follows:

Classification	The South	The North
Time and place of 11th full-dress Red Cross meeting	November 1, 1989 (Pyongyang)	December 15, 1989 (Pyongyang) * 12th full-dress meeting in Seoul on January 18, 1990
2nd exchange of hometown visitors and art troupes		
(Duration of visits)	December 8-13, 1989 (5 nights, 6 days)	November 8-11, 1989 (3 nights, 4 days)
(Size)	501 persons each	671 persons each

- Top Red Cross official
 - 300 hometown visitors
 - 50 art performers
 - 100 press members
 - 50 support personnel
 - Second-ranking Red cross official
 - 300 hometown visitors
 - 300 art performers
 - 30 press members
 - 40 attendants
- (Places of visits and performances)
- Visitors: Direct visits to hometowns to meet blood relatives and visit ancestral tombs.
 - Art troupes: Seoul and Pyongyang
 - Seoul and Pyongyang
- (Others)
- North Korea urged to send replies to the South's inquiries into 4,346 persons made to the North on January 24, 1989.
 - Urging of the exchange of letters between the family members who met during
 - Live television and radio coverage of art performances.
 - Free press coverage to the extent of not making slanders and defamations.

the first exchange
of hometown vi-
sitors.

Meanwhile, despite the South's urging the North not to raise issues that had nothing to do with the talks, the North extensively discussed the cases of Moon Ik-hwan and Lim Soo-kyong, contending that the incidents constituted a major obstacle to the progress of the talks. The meeting thus failed to enter substantial discussion and ended without any particular agreement.

Still, the North Koreans did not make the resolution of the incidents a prerequisite to the progress of the talks. And, the two sides produced their respective concrete ideas and shared an accord on the carrying out of the 11th full-dress Red Cross meeting and the second exchange of hometown visitors and art troupes within the year, casting a bright prospect on the future of the Red Cross programs.

c. Second Contact

The second Red Cross working-level delegates contact was held at the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission from 10 a.m. through 12: 23 p.m. October 6, 1989. It was held this time behind closed doors. The two sides agreed at the first contact that they would meet behind closed doors starting from the second contact.

At the second contact the South put its detailed ideas in order and produced them in the form of a draft agreement. It called for the early holding of the 11th full-dress meeting, stressing that the resumption of the suspended full-dress talks and the package resolution and implementation of the projects envisaged in the five agenda topics are the only short cut to basically resolving the dispersed family issue.

The South also said that since the basic purpose of the exchange of dispersed family hometown visitors and art troupes is to give the joy of reunion between as many dispersed families as possible, the size of visiting groups and the places of their visits should be determined with emphasis on hometown visitors. It maintained that it is reasonable to promote the exchange of art troupes separately as part of South-North cultural exchanges.

Accordingly, the South suggested that each side's visiting group be composed of 300 hometown visitors and 50 art performers, and that hometown visitors, as their description indicates, should be enabled to visit their respective hometowns directly so as to meet their family members and relatives and visit their ancestral tombs.

On the other hand, the North Koreans, from the beginning of their keynote speech, raised the issues of Moon Ik-hwan, Lim Soo-kyong and Moon Kyu-hyon, maintaining that their questions should be resolved from a humanitarian approach. They then continued to demand that the Republic of Korea National Red Cross take proper steps to obtain their release, thus making it doubtful that they did not have an ulterior motive behind the working-level delegates contact.

However, the South, in a bid to realize the resumption

of full-dress talks and the exchange of hometown visitors and art troupes, refrained from retorting against the unreasonable North Korean demand and guided the North into a substantial discussion of the issues of resuming the full-dress talks and exchanging hometown visitors and art troupes. However, the two sides failed to narrow their differences.

Arguing that present circumstances were not ripe for a full-dress meeting, North Korea insisted that visting groups be exchanged first if only to foster a ripe atmosphere. As for the size of the visiting groups, the North also asserted that hometown visitors and art performers should be in the same numbers in consideration of the wish of artists.

Meanwhile, prior to entering business talks, the North denounced the South for the refusal by the Republic of Korea National Red Cross to accept the letters the North was sending through the Red Cross hotline to government authorities, political parties and some social organizations in connection with their idea of a "national unification conference."

In reaction, the South stressed that the Red Cross hotline is for humanitarian purposes only and cannot be used for political purposes other than those intended to improve inter-Korean relations. It said that if messages of such nature were to be exchanged, the North should agree to conclude an agreement on communications and passage between the two sides of Korea as the South has suggested.

d. Third Contact

The third South-North Red Cross working-level delegates

contact was held at the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission from 10 a.m. through 12:22 p.m. October 16, 1989. It also took place behind closed doors.

After the North briefly touched on the South's internal affairs concerning the incidents of Lim Soo-kyong and Moon Ik-hwan that had nothing to do with the talks, the two sides began to have substantial discussion for the first time. Discussion was centered on the three issues of the times of the full-dress Red Cross meeting and the exchange of visiting groups, places of visits and the size of visiting groups.

As to the times of the full-dress meetings and the exchange, the South made a revised offer suggesting that the second exchange of hometown visitors and art troupes be made on December 8 and the 11th full-dress Red Cross meeting be held on December 19. The South explained that it still believed that it was more reasonable and realistic to hold the Red Cross meeting first and make the exchange later. But, in a move to conclude working-level contacts at an early date to conform to the expectations of all the people and to contribute to the elimination of the pain of dispersed families, it was changing the order of the times of the full-dress meeting and the second exchange. When the North counter-proposed that the 11th full-dress meeting be held on December 15, the South accepted. The two sides thus reached an accord on the issue of the times of the full-dress meeting and the second exchange of the hometown visitors and art troupes.

Regarding the question of the places of visits, the South emphasized that hometown visitors should be enabled to

proceed directly to their respective hometowns and visit their ancestral tombs. North Korea, however, insisted that the places of visits by hometown visitors should be limited to Seoul and Pyongyang in the second exchange, arguing that the exchange would be a "pilot project." For, they asserted, the issue of dispersed families visiting their respective hometowns is supposed to be discussed and resolved at the full-dress Red Cross talks.

With respect to the size of visiting groups, the South expressed the view that in keeping with the purpose of the dispersed family home-town visiting project, visiting groups should be formed with emphasis on home town visitors. The North, however, reiterated its position that both hometown visitors and art performers should be in the same numbers. Of special note, concerning the number of art performers, the North suggested that their art troupe comprise 300 members and the South's 50 as they desire, an idea which runs counter to the principle of reciprocity.

The agreement between the two sides on the times of the full-dress Red Cross meeting and the second exchange of hometown visitors and art troupes, represented a striking achievement of the third contact. Yet, many other issues such as the size of visiting groups, places of visits, duration of visits, contents of art performances, and whether to broadcast art performances live, remained unsettled.

e. Fourth Contact

The fourth working-level delegates' contact was held at the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory

Commission from 10 a.m. to 12: 16 p.m. November 8, 1989. This meeting was also held behind closed doors.

At the fourth contact, the South produced a new draft agreement designed to smoothly wind up working-level delegates contacts. The draft agreement, prepared in consideration of both sides' positions and practicability, accommodated most of the North Korean demands.

Regarding the issue of the size of visiting groups, the South proposed that the number of hometown visitors be 300 as previously suggested, while the number of art performers be increased twice from 50 to 100, and those of press members and support personnel be 30 and 40, respectively, as the North so desired.

The South also suggested that matters other than the size of visiting groups, such as the places and duration of visits, the rank of the heads of visiting groups, methods of meeting, contents of art performances, and detailed implementation procedures, be resolved on a package basis and in accordance with the precedents set at the time of the first exchange.

Here, the issue of the places of visits, on which the two sides widely differed, was resolved as the two sides virtually agreed to limit the places to Seoul and Pyongyang.

However, the North insisted that the size of art troupes should be set somewhere between 50 and 300 on the principle of mutual convenience, disclosing a plan that they would send a 300-member troupe. They thus showed no intention of adjusting the size of their art troupe to a reasonable level.

The South emphasized that the exchange of hometown visitors and art troupes should naturally be focused on hometown visitors under the Red Cross humanitarian spirit, and

should also be carried out with the same sizes based on the principle of reciprocism.

The North Koreans, on the other hand, kept insisting that the exchange should be made with emphasis on art performers and that art performances should be covered live by both television and radio. It was doubtful if they had any willingness to carry out the proposed second exchange within this year.

By agreeing to increase the number of art performers by two times and to limit the places of visits by hometown visitors to Seoul and Pyongyang in a show of concession, the South was full of determination to realize the second exchange within this year by all means necessary.

The only modification the North showed throughout the four contacts was that instead of insisting on the same numbers of hometown visitors and art performers, they offered to reduce the number of art performers by 50. It is no exaggeration to say that they showed no sincerity at all for the conclusion of the working-level contacts.

Meanwhile, the South stressed that the 11th full-dress Red Cross meeting should be held on December 15 as agreed upon at the time of the third contact regardless of the realization of the second exchange of hometown visitors and art troupes. On the other hand, the North asserted that the issues of the second exchange and the resumption of the full-dress Red Cross talks should be resolved on a package basis.

The two sides agreed to hold the fifth working-level delegates contact on November 13.

3. Preliminary Meetings for High-Level Officials Talks

a. Course

The two preliminary meetings to prepare for the proposed South-North high-level officials talks, held on February 8 and March 2, 1989, failed to register any progress as the North raised the issues of the Team Spirit military exercise and of the control of pro-Pyongyang publications in the South while turning a deaf ear to the discussion of procedural matters necessary for the materialization of the full-dress talks. North Korea went so far as to one-sidedly call off any further preliminary talks.

On the grounds of objecting to the fact that the South had taken legal action against Rev. Moon Ik-hwan, the North unilaterally postponed the third preliminary meeting originally slated for April 12 until April 26 and again until July 12 while at the same time undertaking political operations toward specific organizations and individuals in a scheme to cause confusion and split of public opinion in the South.

Here, the South's Chief Delegate Song Han-ho, in a telephone message to the North on July 10, 1989, said it was not proper to hold the preliminary talks at a time when North Korea maintained a two-faced stance shunning dialogue between the regular government authorities of the two sides.

A statement made by Chief Delegate Song in connection with the notification was as follows:

For the South and the North to transform their relations of enmity and confrontation into those of reconciliation and cooperation, they should, first of all, promote dialogue between responsible and competent authorities based on the spirit of the recognition of reality and mutual respect.

In this context, the South has been promoting preliminary meetings to prepare a South-North high-level officials meeting with the prime ministers of the two sides as chief delegates. We have exerted sincere efforts so as to materialize the proposed talks at an early date.

The basic mission of the preliminary meetings is to discuss and resolve such working-level procedural matters as the composition of delegations, time and place of the proposed talks, agenda topics and operational procedures, and thereby to realize the South-North high-level officials meeting at an early date.

Regrettably, however, North Korea, without showing any sincerity toward the discussion of such procedural matters at the two preliminary meetings, only stood in the way of any progress of the talks by raising such issues as the Team Spirit military exercise and the control of some unlawful publications which had nothing to do with the talks.

Moreover, by one-sidedly postponing the third preliminary contact initially slated for April 12, North Korea has to date shunned the talks.

While talks were under way between the authorities of the two sides, the North Korean side called in Rev. Moon Ik-hwan to perpetrate political maneuvering against the South. They went to the extreme of using the issue of legal action taken against Rev. Moon as an excuse for their one-sided postponement of agreed-upon talks.

Lately, moreover, it has been made known that North Korea secretly called in a certain South Korean legislator for sinister purposes, and even induced a coed to go to Pyongyang for use in anti-South propaganda, causing shock and disappointment to the people hoping for the improvement of inter-Korean relations and national reconciliation.

If a dialogue between the authorities of the South and the North is to proceed normally, the two sides must respect matters agreed upon between them and stop engaging in political maneuvering or propaganda agitation intended to subvert and overthrow the other side's system.

The fact that North Korea one-sidedly postponed the talks and committed the two-faced act of attempting to subvert the South by use of certain specific organizations or individuals from the South as the objects of their political operations, well indicates that the North is not interested at all in dialogue between the normal authorities of the two sides.

So long as North Korea continues to maintain such a posture of confrontation, no substantial progress can be expected even if a South-North high-level officials meeting were held.

The South urges North Korea to abandon their anachronistic political operations forthwith and show a serious and sincere attitude toward a productive dialogue.

The South expects that North Korea will display a sincere posture toward dialogue for the improvement of inter-Korean relations and the alleviation of tension so that the third preliminary meeting for the South-North high-level officials talks can be held at an early date.

Following their initial call for the resumption of the preliminary talks made on July 20, North Korea again on September 1 asked for the early holding of the third preliminary meeting. On September 16, the South proposed to hold the third meeting on October 12, hoping that the North would cooperate in progressing the talks in a constructive manner instead of committing any acts that would build up confrontation and tension any further. The North accepted the offer, and the stage was thus set for the resumption of preliminary meetings for the South-North high-level offi-

cial meeting for the first time in seven months.

b. Third Preliminary Meeting

The third preliminary meeting for the proposed South-North high-level officials talks was held at Peace House in the southern sector of Panmunjom from 10 a.m. to 1:07 p.m. October 12, 1989. It was opened to the public.

There was a change in the list of the South's delegation. Delegates Yong Young-il and Kang Kun-tak were replaced with Park Jong-keun, bureau director of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Ministry of National Defense, and Yom Hong-chol, a political secretary to the Secretariat of the Office of the President.

The North's Chief Delegate Paek Nam-jun, in his keynote speech, demanded the elimination of the Team Spirit military exercise and the release of Moon Ik-hwan, Lim Soo-kyong and Moon Kyu-hyon, as well as the convocation of a national unification conference. Paek, in particular, asserted that the case of Moon Ik-hwan and Lim Soo-kyong was directly related to the materialization of the proposed talks.

The South's Chief Delegate Song Han-ho, in his first speech, called for the immediate initiation of substantial discussions, emphasizing the importance and urgency of the high-level officials talks.

However, the North Koreans persistently discussed the case of Moon Ik-hwan and Lim Soo-kyong throughout the meeting. Here, the South demanded that the North stop committing political operations against the South, give up their strategy to prompt a Communist revolution in the

South, and change their Workers' (Communist) Party Platform's unification policy calling for the communization of the South. The South also emphasized that in the North there should be a change to liberal democracy of a degree comparable to that of the changes taking place in East Europe.

Chief Delegate Song charged the North with unduly raising the issue of the Team Spirit military exercise at the first and second preliminary meetings and thereby suspending the talks over a protracted period of time. He then urged the North to alter their dialogue posture.

The South's chief delegate also criticized the North for committing a series of provocative acts and political operations against the South such as the secret calling in of some specific persons from the South for their political purposes, for their undiplomatic interference in the statutory order of the Republic of Korea, and for agitating anti-government struggles.

As the North raised issues not related to the talks from the beginning, the third meeting consisted of only the exchange of verbal attacks without any substantial discussion.

With respect to the issue of holding the proposed high-level officials talks, the South set forth its stand over the name, topics, composition of delegations and so forth, and stressed that to ensure the safe passage between the two sides, a "general agreement on passage and communications between the South and the North" should be prepared at an early date. The South also suggested that this be discussed and resolved as a priority task at the time when Topic No. 3, the "question of carrying out multi-faceted exchanges and cooperation," is taken up. North Korea held fast to their

previous stand except for agreeing that the first meeting of the proposed talks be held in Seoul and that they were also willing to increase the number of attendants from the original 20 to 30.

The ideas the two sides produced at the first three preliminary meetings in connection with the question of holding the proposed high-level officials talks, can be compared as follows:

Classification	The South	The North
Name of proposed talks	“South-North high-level officials meeting” or as a compromise “South-North prime ministers meeting”	“South-North high-level political and military meeting with the prime ministers of the two sides as chief delegates”
Topics	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Issue of suspending mutual slanders and defamation 2) Issue of mutual respect and non-interference 3) Issue of multi-faceted exchanges and cooperation 4) Issue of confidence-building in the military area 	“Concerning the removal of the state of political and military confrontation existing between the South and the North”

	5) Issue of holding a South-North summit meeting	
	6) Other issues to be raised by the two sides	
Time	Within one month after the end of preliminary meetings	Within one month after the end of preliminary meetings
Places	Seoul and Pyongyang by turn *1st meeting in Seoul	Seoul and Pyongyang by turn *1st meeting in Seoul
Composition of delegations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Delegates: Seven persons with prime ministers as chief delegates and including a military chief-of-staff level officer ○ Attendants: 40 persons ○ Press members: 50 persons 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Delegates: Seven persons with prime ministers as chief delegates and including two military officers with power. ○ Attendants: 30 persons ○ Press members: 50 persons
Format of talks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ In principle, behind closed doors 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Open to the public or behind closed doors

*Open to the public
under mutual agree-
ment

As can be seen in the above table, the two sides had slight differences in the name and agenda topics of the proposed talks. However, none of these had been unsolvable if only the two sides had conducted the talks in a sincere manner based on the spirit of reciprocity.

In fact, what constituted a basic obstacle to the progress of the talks was that North Korea, while turning a deaf ear to substantial discussion, attempted to use the talks between the authorities of the two sides as a scene for their anti-South propaganda and agitation such as their demand for the release of Moon Ik-hwan and propagandization on their idea of a national unification conference.

It isn't going too far to say that any progress of the preliminary meetings and realization of the proposed talks will depend on whether or not the North will alter their dialogue posture.

The two sides agreed to hold the fourth preliminary meeting at Tongilkak in the northern sector of Panmunjom on November 15, 1989.

4. South–North Sports Meeting

a. Course

To discuss the question of fielding a single inter-Korean delegation to the 1990 Asian Games set to be held in Beijing, the two sides met twice on March 9 and March 28, 1989, to have detailed discussions on such matters as the name, flag and anthem of a single team and the composition of delegations.

As a result, the two sides agreed to use “Arirang” as it was sung in the 1920s as the anthem of a single team, and a blue Korean map on a white background without any description in Roman letters as its flag. They also agreed to select athletes through joint training and to set the number of the athletes taking part in joint training at around the quota to be determined by the Beijing Asian Games Organizing Committee.

However, with the legal action taken against Rev. Moon Ik-hwan as an excuse, the North unilaterally postponed the third meeting initially slated for April 18 until July 18. They thus linked even sports discussions to political issues. In the past, the North had seemed to refrain from making political remarks at sports meetings.

On July 15, three days before the scheduled July 18 third sports meeting which the North had set up unilaterally, the South’s Chief Delegate Chang Chung-shik, in a telephone message to the North, pointed out that the North Korean delegation had defended the sinister machinations of their authorities against the South without any interest in the suc-

cess of the talks, and notified the North that it was not proper to hold the third meeting under these circumstances unless the North rectified their unreasonable posture.

In reaction, North Korea, in a statement issued on July 23 by the North Korean delegation and a telephone message from the North's Chief Delegate Kim Hyong-jin on August 8, tried to shift the blame for the suspension of the talks to the South, demanding the early holding of the 3rd meeting. On August 9, the South again urged the North to show sincerity toward laying an atmosphere ripe for talks.

The text of a statement issued by the South's Chief Delegate Chang Chung-shik in this connection was as follows:

With a view to contributing to the promotion of reconciliation and unity between the South and the North and also externally manifesting a united look and the outstanding skills of the nation through participation in the Asian Games slated for September of next year in Beijing under a single delegation, the South and the North had two rounds of sports talks.

However, at a time when a dialogue was going on between the two sides, the North Korean authorities committed the act of throwing cold water on the effort to promote reconciliation and unity by secretly bringing certain specific persons from the South to Pyongyang for use in their political operations. Even the North Korean delegates to the South-North sports meeting defended such wicked machinations.

On April 2, the North Korean delegation to the sports talks joined the so-called "joint statement by the North's delegations to South-North talks," which denounced the South while trying to justify the schemes of the North Korean authorities perpetrating acts of political operations.

Moreover, the North's delegation to the sports talks, in effect deadlocked the talks by postponing, for no shorter than three months, the third meeting

set to be held on April 18 through mutual agreement on the grounds that a "dialogue atmosphere was not good."

Here, the South's delegation to the South-North sports talks, in a telephone message to the North on July 15, 1989, urged the North to reflect on their actions. The delegation disclosed its position that unless the unreasonable posture of the North is rectified, it would be improper to hold the third South-North sports meeting.

Regrettably, however, North Korea, rather than altering their dialogue posture, issued a statement on July 24 under the name of their delegation to the sports talks to try to justify a series of wicked machinations committed by the North Korean authorities, describing them as the products of "patriotic passion to expedite unification". They also slandered and defamed the delegation from the South.

Even in their telephone message sent to the South on August 8, the North reiterated what they claimed in the July 24 statement, showing no sign of self-reflection or of altering their position.

This attitude of the North made it doubtful that they had come to the table of the South-North sports talks to really sincerely discuss the issue of forming a single inter-Korean delegation.

If the North were truly interested in the success of the sports talks, they should, rather than paying only lip service to the resumption of the talks, stop attempting to justify and defend their acts of political operations and instead, show sincerity toward laying an atmosphere ripe for the discussion of the question of forming a single inter-Korean team at an early date.

On September 1, North Korea again proposed that the third sports meeting be held on September 13. Taking note of the fact that the North expressed the hope that progress would be made in the discussion of the issue of forming

a single team, the South, on September 12, suggested that the third meeting be held on October 20, which the North accepted. The stage was thus set for the third South-North sports meeting.

b. Third Meeting

The third South-North sports meeting was held at Peace House in the southern sector of Panmunjom from 10 a.m. through 1: 50 p.m. October 20, 1989, for the first time in seven months after it had been suspended. This meeting was opened to the public.

There was a change in the list of the South's delegaton. Delegate Chang Byong-jo was replaced with Cho Young-sung, a member of the Korean Olympic Committee.

As North Korea didn't raise issues such as the cases of Moon Ik-hwan and Lim Soo-kyong that had nothing to do with the sports talks, discussion of substantial issues was conducted smoothly in general.

In his keynote speech, the South's Chief Delegate Chang Chung-shik, expressing regret over the suspension of the third meeting over a protracted period of time, emphasized that as the time left was not long enough for the composition of a single inter-Korean team the two sides should do their best in the discussion of substantial issues.

Chief Delegate Chang also set forth as follows a 10-point draft plan for the formation of a single delegation to the 11th Asian Games in Beijing, a version of the newly adjusted position of the South based on the results of discussions made at the first and second meetings:

Draft Plan for the Formation of a Single Delegation to the 11th Asian Games in Beijing

1. Name of Delegation

The name of a single delegation shall be “Han Nara” in Korean and “KOREA” in Roman letters as broadly used internationally and as agreed upon by the South and the North.

2. Flag of Delegation

The flag shall be a Korean map in a single color on a white background. The color of the map shall be blue.

3. Anthem of Delegation

The anthem shall be “Arirang,” one of the Korean national folk songs, as it was sung in the 1920s.

4. Selection of Athletes

a. For the selection of athletes, joint training shall be conducted, and athletes to participate in the Games shall be selected through selection matches.

b. Selection matches shall be held more than once, by individual sport, at areas in the South and the North, such as Seoul and Pyongyang, on which the two sides agree.

c. In the event either side has no athletes or qualified athletes in a specific sport or sports, the side which has athletes shall select athletes.

d. Other detailed matters, such as the concrete method of the selection of athletes, times of selection matches, sports tools for matches, rules of matches and

selection of judges, shall be discussed and determined by a joint implementation organization for a single South-North delegation.

5. Training of Athletes

- a. Training of athletes shall be classified into joint training for the selection of athletes and intensive training for the athletes to take part in the Games.
- b. The athletes to take part in joint training shall be selected by the South and the North, respectively. The number of such athletes shall be about the same as the quota of participants to be determined by the Beijing Asian Games Organizing Committee. However, the number may be readjusted through mutual discussion depending on the nature of the sport.
- c. During the period of joint training, participating athletes may be replaced.
- d. Joint training shall begin at the soonest possible date.
- e. For joint training, the existing facilities of the South and the North shall be used, with athletes traveling back and forth between the two sides. If necessary, third party locations and facilities may be used.
- f. Other detailed matters relating to joint training shall be discussed and determined at a joint implementation organization for a single South-North delegation.
- g. Intensive training shall be conducted from the time of the formation of a delegation to the departure for the games, with athletes traveling back and forth between the South and the North.

h. Detailed matters relating to intensive training shall be discussed and determined by a joint implementation organization for a single South-North delegation.

6. Formation of Delegation

a. A delegation for the Games, comprising athletes and officials, shall be formed before June 22, 1990, the deadline for preliminary entries.

b. The composition of athletes and officials shall be in accordance with the OCA charter and the regulations of relevant international sports federations.

c. The head of a delegation shall be from the side which has more selected athletes, and the deputy head from the other side.

d. As for sports officials, the side which has more selected athletes in each sport shall produce a manager and the other side a coach. Headquarters officials shall be selected in proportion to the number of athletes of both sides. However, the concrete number of officials shall be determined through mutual agreement.

e. The delegation to take part in the Games shall be chosen in a way that, so far as possible, won't visibly upset the balance between the two sides.

7. Expenses for Delegation

a. Expenses for the composition and fielding of a delegation shall be in principle born jointly by the South and the North in proportion to the composition of athletes and officials.

b. For selection matches and training, the hosting side

shall furnish necessary expenses and conveniences in its area under the principle of reciprocity.

8. Guarantee of Personal Safety

The two sides shall exchange memorandums on guaranteeing the personal safety of the other side's members of a delegation who have entered their respective areas for selection matches and training, under which they shall guarantee their personal safety and return.

9. Joint Implementation Organization for Single Delegation

a. The two sides shall establish and operate a Joint Committee for a South-North Single Team (hereinafter referred to as "Joint Committee") in order to concretely promote the question of forming and fielding a single team.

b. The Joint Committee shall be formed within one month after an agreement is reached on the formation of a single delegation.

c. The Joint Committee shall be formed with about 10 representatives from each side's Olympic Committee and sports organizations.

d. The Joint Committee shall study and determine the following matters with its members traveling back and forth between Seoul and Pyongyang:

(1) Matters relating to the selection and training of athletes.

(2) Matters relating to the composition and management of a delegation.

(3) Matters relating to participation in various meetings held during the period of the Games

- and to the selection of judges for the Games.
- (4) Matters relating to participation in various cultural events.
 - (5) Various other matters relating to the composition and fielding of a single delegation.
- e. To ensure the smooth operation of the Joint Committee, joint secretariats shall be established in Seoul and Pyongyang, respectively.
- The two sides shall assign an optimum number of liaison personnel to the joint secretariats, and install and operate a direct telephone line.

10. Other Issues

The uniform of a delegation and other matters necessary for the formation and fielding of a single delegation shall be discussed and determined by the two sides. However, detailed matters shall be delegated to a joint implementation organization for a single delegation.

The proposal by the South of "Han Nara" as the name of a single delegation in Korean, a point which was disputed in the past, was based on an opinion of the Hangul (Korean alphabets) Society. "Han" is a pure Korean word denoting oneness, unification, largeness or greatness, "Nara" meaning a country.

And, an agreement was completely reached on the issue of a flag for the delegation when the South accepted the North Korean idea as it was, that was, a blue Korean map on a white background.

In contrast, the North's Chief Delegate Kim Hyong-jin held fast to the ideas offered at the time of the first and

second meetings. Regarding the Korean description of a single team, they simply reiterated their past demand that it be "Koryo." In the course of debate, however, they made a revised offer that the Korean name be "Korea" as it is pronounced in English.

As the two sides stuck to their respective ideas of "Han Nara" and "Korea", as the Korean name of a delegation although they agreed on the use of "KOREA" in Roman letters, they decided to discuss the issue further at the next meeting and went ahead with other issues such as the method of selecting athletes.

As for the method of selecting athletes, the South suggested that selection matches in the form of evaluation games be held in Seoul and Pyongyang by turn. But, the North was cool towards this idea. They maintained that joint training of athletes should be held among athletes without any distinction between the two sides and that qualified athletes be selected in the same numbers between the South and the North.

North Korea also proposed that separate working-level contacts be held to determine the method of selecting athletes by individual sport, etc. The south stated that as they had already reached an accord, the two sides should wind up discussion of basic matters and form a joint implementation organization for a single delegation to discuss working-level issues.

The South and the North thus agreed on the flag and anthem of a single delegation and neared an accord on such detailed matters as the formation of a joint implementation organization for a single team, exchange of memorandums

on personal safety, and the sharing of necessary expenses. Yet, they still had many differences on the key issues of the name of a single delegation and the method of selecting athletes.

The two sides agreed to hold the fourth sports meeting at Tongilkak on October 16, 1989.

5. Preparatory Contacts for Parliamentary Meeting

a. Course

A total of seven contacts between the South and North Korean legislatures were held at Peace House in the southern sector of Panmunjom and Tongilkak in the northern sector by turn from August 19 through December 29, 1988, to prepare for the proposed South-North parliamentary talks.

At the preparatory contacts the two sides neared an accord on the holding of the proposed talks in the order of an opening meeting, a meeting to discuss agenda topics and a closing meeting, as well as on the composition of delegations and the time of the talks. However, they showed conflicting opinions on the issues of whether to hold the talks in the form of a select delegates meeting of a bilateral nature or in a delegates conference in the nature of a joint meeting, and also of agenda topics.

At the seventh contact meeting, the North deadlocked the meeting by demanding that the "issue of suspending the joint Team Spirit military exercise" be adopted as the first topic of the proposed talks. Finally on February 8, 1989,

the North unilaterally suspended the talks by announcing that they were postponing the eighth preparatory contact set to be held on February 10 under mutual agreement until after the end of the Team Spirit training exercise.

In a statement issued on February 9 by its chief delegate to the preparatory talks, the South urged the North to agree to resume the suspended talks at an early date. On May 26, the South, also in a message to the North, proposed the holding of the eighth contact in mid-June.

The full text of the message to the North from the South's Chief Delegate Chae Mun-shik was as follows:

I regret deeply that the eighth contact has not been held to date, five months after the seventh contact for the proposed South-North parliamentary talks was held at Tongilgak, Panmunjom, on December 29 last year.

On February 8, your side abruptly issued a statement to announce one-sidedly that your side would postpone the eighth contact which was set to be held at Peace House on February 10 under mutual agreement reached at the seventh contact until after the end of the Team Spirit military exercise conducted by our side.

Our side's delegation, in a statement on February 10, called for the early holding of the eighth contact, pointing out that the joint Korea-U.S. Team Spirit training exercise is a defensive exercise held annually and openly, which has nothing to do with the progress of the South-North parliamentary talks.

Given the fact that the South-North parliamentary talks are a dialogue between the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea and the Supreme People's Assembly, your side's suspension of the preparatory contact again this time, following a similar suspension early in 1986, makes it doubtful that your side is truly interested in the improvement of South-North relations.

At the seven preparatory contacts held so far, the two sides neared an accord on the format, agenda topics, etc. of the proposed talks. If only discussion had progressed a little more, the proposed South-North parliamentary talks could have been held by now with legislators traveling back and forth between the two sides.

The questions of inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation, declaration of non-aggression, a South-North summit meeting, etc., which were discussed at the preparatory contact as the topics of the proposed talks, were intended to ease tension and restore trust between the South and the North, and also to advance the time of peaceful unification of the homeland. These are the tasks whose urgency and importance are duly recognized by both sides.

If either side turns a deaf ear to these important issues that have a profound impact on the present and future of the nation, it will amount to the giving up of its responsibility and mission to the entire nation.

Moreover, your side's attempt to have talks only with certain specific organizations on our side while disregarding talks between the legislatures representing the opinions of the people, cannot be anything but an act of undermining the authority of the parliamentary structure of our side.

Today, our people's craving for unification is more acute than at any other time in the past. Significant changes are taking place in the situations surrounding us, too.

I think that for South and North Korean legislators representing the opinions of residents to conform at this juncture to the nation's craving and expectations for peace and unification, they should hold a South-North parliamentary meeting at an early date and discuss and resolve the important pending issues.

In this context, I, representing the South's delegation to the preparatory contacts for South-North parliamentary talks, courteously propose to hold the eighth preparatory contact at Peace House in Panmunjom in mid-June.

I look forward to your side's affirmative response.

Reacting to this offer, North Korea, in a belated reply on June 20, suggested that the eighth preparatory contact be held on June 28. The South, however, expressing regret over the North's attempt to shift blame for the suspension of the preparatory contacts to the South, proposed on June 26 that the eighth preparatory contact be held on July 11.

But, after it was learned that North Korea had called Rep. Suh Kyong-won to Pyongyang on August 19, 1988, the very date when the first preparatory contact meeting was held, the South, in a telephone message to the North on July 6, expressed regret over the North Korean act that so shook the minimum necessary trust for the success of the talks and notified them that it was postponing the eighth preparatory contact until a later date. The South expressed the hope that the North would duly reflect upon its acts and show sincerity toward fostering an atmosphere ripe for the resumption of the contacts.

In their delegation's statement on July 18 and telephone message of August 25 by the North's Chief Delegate Chon Kum-chol, North Korea called for the early holding of the eighth preparatory contact. On September 18, the South proposed the holding of the eighth contact on October 25, which the North accepted on October 21. The stage was thus set for the resumption of South-North parliamentary preparatory contact for the first time in nearly 10 months.

b. Eighth Preparatory Contact

The eighth preparatory contact to prepare for the proposed South-North parliamentary talks was held at Peace House in the southern sector of Panmunjom on October 25, 1989. Among the South's delegates, Delegate Kim Yong-hwan was replaced with Lee Hui-il of the New Democratic Republican Party.

At the contact that lasted nearly four hours from 10 a.m. through 1:58 p.m., the North focused their discussion on the issue of Team Spirit, the cases of Moon Ik-hwan, Lim Soo-kyong and Suh Kyong-won, the question of the National Security Law, etc., touching off disputes about the other sides' internal affairs. The eighth contact meeting thus ended without any achievements as no discussion of substantial relevant matters was made.

In his keynote speech, the South's Chief Delegate Chae Moon-shik reiterated his position over the format and agenda topics of the proposed talks, and partially revised the draft agreement on holding South-North parliamentary talks which had been produced at the seventh contact.

In the revised draft agreement, the South changed one of the agenda topics suggested at the seventh contact, "the question of multi-faceted exchanges and cooperation between the South and the North including the issue of resuming the South-North Red Cross conference and the South-North economic meeting" into "the question of multi-faceted exchanges and cooperation between the South and the North" in consideration of the fact that the two sides had already agreed on the resumption of the full-dress Red Cross confe-

rence. The South suggested that there be three topics “the question of declaring South-North non-aggression” and “the question of holding a South-North summit meeting” in addition to “the question of multi-faceted exchanges and cooperation between the South and the North.”

As to the format of the proposed talks, the South proposed that the talks be held in the order of an opening meeting, a select delegates meeting to discuss agenda topics, and a closing meeting, and that the opening and closing meetings be held in the form of joint meetings where the full team of legislators from the South and the North would meet while the select delegates meeting be in the form of a bilateral meeting attended by 50 delegates from each side. The South also suggested the creation of an executive section and a joint steering committee formed with five delegates from each side, respectively.

Regarding the nature of the meeting to discuss agenda topics the South emphasized in particular that it should be operated under the method of a bilateral meeting rather than a joint meeting because the proposed talks reflect the relationship of bilateral talks based on the mutual recognition of the reality of inter-Korean relations inasmuch as the preparatory contacts themselves are held on the basis of equal footing between the two sides. The South noted that the two sides agreed at the sixth contact to set the number of each side's delegates to the meeting to discuss agenda topics at 50 to 50, adding that the topics the two sides could raise should be of a bilateral nature.

In their keynote speech, the North first extensively discussed the issue of Lim Soo-kyong and Moon Ik-hwan and

their idea of a national unification conference, questions that had nothing to do with the meeting, and demanded that the issue of holding a South-North summit meeting be excluded from the list of topics, arguing that if a national unification conference were convened, a summit meeting could be held within the framework of the unification conference. On the other hand, the North conceded that the two sides had neared an accord on the question of declaring South-North non-aggression and the issue of multi-faceted exchanges and cooperation.

Moreover, the North said that they would for the time being withhold the question of suspension of the Team Spirit exercise, an issue which they had offered as Topic No. 1 at the seventh contact. However, they made it clear that if the training exercise continued to be staged, they would take up the issue again.

Regarding the format of the proposed talks, the North also reiterated their previous position that it should be a joint meeting where all delegates would attend with equal capacity.

However, as the North, following their keynote speech, tried to shift blame to the South for the suspension of the preparatory contacts, asking that the South's legislature exercise its influence for the early resolution of the cases of Moon Ik-hwan, Lim Soo-kyong and Suh Kyong-won, heated verbal attacks were exchanged between the two sides over these issues.

Stressing that neither one of the two sides should interfere in the other's system or internal affairs in order to have satisfactory progress of the preparatory contacts, the South

strongly denounced the North for their unreasonable dialogue posture. It also asked the North to guarantee liberty and human rights of the North Korean people and renounce their scheme to instigate a Communist revolution in the South, attacking the dictatorial nature of the North Korean system.

On the issue of the Team Spirit training exercise, the South said that it is an open field exercise whose time, size and contents have always been conveyed to the North, and that even North Korean observers had been invited to the training exercise. The South then pointed out that the cause of the tension between the two sides lay instead in the military exercises the North holds secretly, as well as in the buildup of their offensive arms capabilities.

Regarding the issue of Moon Ik-hwan and Lim Soo-kyong, the South made it clear that they were being handled by the South's judicial authorities under due legal process, strongly urging that the North desist from perpetrating acts of political operations forthwith.

On the North Korean idea of a national unification conference, the South said that the idea was simply a redressed version of the South-North joint conference which the North has persistently demanded for some 40 years as part of their "united front" strategy. The South stressed that the North should stop attempting to foment confusion in the South.

In addition, pointing out that the North violates the human rights of the North Korean people by maintaining the only closed system in the world under the slogan "let us live the way of our own," the South urged that the North guarantee the liberty and human rights of the North Korean

people, adding that this is a time when the North should renounce their anachronistic policy to communize the South and should stop committing all acts of political operations and terrorism.

The North Koreans protested to the South over its call for the openness of the North Korean society and guarantee of human rights, which they described as “an act of major provocation.” They also demanded that the South apologize for calling the North a “dictatorial society.”

The fact that at the seventh preparatory contact, despite the South’s persuasion, the North extensively took up issues that had nothing to do with the talks such as the South’s internal affairs and the idea of a national unification conference while turning a deaf ear to substantial discussion, may well indicate that the North had schemed to hold the preparatory contacts for the purposes of their propaganda and agitation to foment a disturbance in the South and thereby delay the realization of the proposed parliamentary talks.

Part III

Major Developments in Inter-Korean Relations

1. Establishment and Operation of Council for the Promotion of South-North Exchanges and Cooperation

a. Nature and Function of Council

On March 31, 1989, the government established the Council for the Promotion of South-North Exchanges and Cooperation with the duty of deliberating and adjusting major policies relating to mutual exchanges and cooperation between the South and the North. This Council, chaired by the National Unification Minister, is composed of not more than 13 vice-minister-level officials of relevant ministries and offices.

The creation of the Council can be viewed as a follow-up step of the policy envisaged in the July 7th Declaration to positively promote exchanges between the people of the South and the North and open the door to inter-Korean trade from the perception that in order for the South and the North to dispel distrust and move toward reconciliation and cooperation, they should, first of all, promote mutual understanding and a sense of national bond through exchanges and cooperation.

The government's basic stand toward inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation is that exchanges and cooperation should be carried out from many angles, but in a manner that conforms to the nature and status of the various sectors involved. These exchanges and cooperation should begin in areas where agreement can be reached and implemented easily, with the realm of exchanges and cooperation being expanded step by step.

In this context, the government introduced to the National Assembly a special bill on exchanges and cooperation between the South and the North with a view to promoting inter-Korean exchanges and unification policies more effectively by pooling together certain functions and roles that had been scattered in the past inasmuch as inter-Korean relations and the unification issue remain a matter of great concern to the people. In order to systematically endorse exchanges and cooperation between the South and the North even before the bill passes through the Assembly, the government inaugurated the Council for the Promotion of South-North Exchanges and Cooperation under a Presidential decree.

The function of the Council is to deliberate, establish and adjust major policies and basic principles relating to South-North exchanges and cooperation; major items regarding the implementation of South-North exchanges and cooperation; support for the expedition of South-North exchanges and cooperation; matters requiring inter-ministry cooperation with respect to South-North exchanges and cooperation; and other matters which the chairman may raise in connection with South-North exchanges and cooperation.

The spirit of the July 7th Declaration is that in the interests of national reconciliation and unification, the South and the North should restore and develop the national community through exchanges and cooperation oriented toward co-existence and co-prosperity on the basis of recognizing and respecting their mutual individual systems.

Inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation should be promoted based on this spirit of the July 7th Declaration and on the basis of the basic order of liberal democracy and

national consensus in a manner that contributes to the promotion of the wellbeing of the people on both sides, restoration of national homogeneity and peaceful unification.

In addition, South-North exchanges and cooperation should be promoted under the arrangement and permission of government authorities and on a groundwork where the principle of reciprocity is respected. Acts of contacts and exchanges made arbitrarily without any advance consultation with the government can hardly be tolerated.

b. Operational Achievements of Council

On June 12, 1989, the Council for the Promotion of South-North Exchanges and Cooperation prepared its Basic Guidelines for South-North Exchanges and Cooperation with a view to governing various matters relating to the promotion of South-North exchanges and cooperation pending the legislation of a Special Law on South-North Exchanges and Cooperation and the streamlining of related laws. To govern matters necessary for their implementation, the Detailed Implementation Guideline for South-North Exchanges and Cooperation has been in force since July 21, 1989.

With these guidelines, a person wishing to come in contact with a North Korean person or his proxy at Panmunjom or a third country for a visit to North Korea or for the promotion of a cooperative project in the areas of culture, sports or economy, would have to obtain advance permission from the government. If and when a person casually comes across a North Korean person at a sports event, etc. or meets a North Korean person for trade negotiations, he

may do so with advance or post-factum notification to the concerned authorities.

Mutual visits between the people of the South and the North would have to be reviewed by the Council for the Promotion of South-North Exchanges and Cooperation and approved by the Minister of National Unification. In the case of a cooperative project, it may be undertaken only after advance approval from a relevant ministry. The System of Operating South-North Material Exchanges, announced by the Ministry of Trade and Industry on October 18, 1988, is to be applied to material trade as it is.

The government decided to omit procedures envisioned in the guidelines in case there is a separate agreement reached between the South and the North, and if necessary, to delegate to a private office or organization matters related to the promotion of South-North exchanges and cooperation.

Concerning the Basic Guidelines for South-North Exchanges and Cooperation, implementation procedures by area are as follows:

- (1) Contacts between South and North Korean People
 - (a) Permission of Contacts between South and North Korean People
 - A person wishing to make contact with a North Korean person or his proxy in an area other than North Korea for the purpose of personal travel or any other purpose(excepting material trade and cooperative project) shall apply to the Minister of National Unification for permission.

- A person wishing to make contact with a North Korean person or his proxy in an area other than North Korea for the purpose of a cooperative project shall apply for permission to the head of the concerned office in charge of business related to giving permission of such a project.
 - The head of the concerned office shall determine whether to give advance permission in consultation with other relevant offices, and shall notify the applicant of the result of its decision.
 - A person wishing to make contact with a North Korean person in an area other than North Korea for the purpose of South-North material trade shall notify the head of an overseas mission or the Minister of Trade and Industry thereof in advance of or after such contact has taken place.
- (2) Personal Travel
- (a) Application for Permission of Visit to North Korea
 - A person wishing to visit North Korea shall apply for permission to the Minister of National Unification after going through a relevant office depending on the purpose of his visit not later than four weeks before his planned visit.
 - Procedures for application for permission of visit to North Korea and documents required for such application shall be determined by the

Minister of National Unification.

(b) Handling of Application for Permission of Visit to North Korea

- The Minister of National Unification shall introduce such an application to the Council for the Promotion of South-North Exchanges and Cooperation, and determine whether to permit it depending on the results of deliberations by the Council.
- The Minister of National Unification shall issue a certificate of visit to a person whose application for permission to visit North Korea has been granted.

(c) Invitation of North Korean Person

- A person wishing to invite a North Korean person shall apply to the Minister of National Unification for such permission.
- A person wishing to invite a North Korean person for the purpose of material trade or cooperative project shall apply to the Minister of National Unification after going through the concerned office.
- The Minister of National Unification shall introduce such an application to the Council for the Promotion of South-North Exchanges and Cooperation, determine whether to permit the invitation, and notify the applicant of his decision.
- Procedures for application for the permission of invitation of a North Korean person and

documents required for such application shall be determined by the Minister of National Unification.

(d) Application for Permission of Visit to South Korea by North Korean Person

- A North Korean person wishing to visit South Korea shall apply to the Minister of National Unification for permission of his visit.
- The Minister of National Unification shall introduce the application to the Council for the Promotion of South-North Exchanges and Cooperation and determine whether to permit the visit depending on the results of deliberations by the Council.
- The Minister of National Unification shall issue the certificate of visit to a person whose planned visit to South Korea has been permitted.
- Application for permission of visit to South Korea by a North Korean person may be made by proxy by his host in South Korea.
- Procedures for application for the permission of visit to South Korea by a North Korean person and documents required for such application shall be determined by the Minister of National Unification.

(3) Material Trade

(a) Application for Permission of Material Trade

- Anyone who has obtained a trade business license under the External Trade Law, wishing to ship materials from South Korea to North Ko-

rea or from North Korea to South Korea, shall apply for permission to the head of the office in charge of business relating to the issuing of an export-import permit.

(b) Handling of Application for Permission

○ The head an office in charge of business related to the issuance of such a permit shall determine whether to allow it under criterion which the Minister of Trade and Industry has established separately through deliberations by the Council for the Promotion of South-North Exchanges and Cooperation.

○ The head of an office in charge of business related to the issuance of such a permit shall issue to the applicant a certificate of permission marked "Goods Subject to South-North Trade" in the event permission for carrying in or out of goods has been granted.

(c) Non-Imposition of Tariffs and Defense Tax on Trade Goods.

○ No tariffs and defense tax shall be imposed on goods directly traded between South and North Korea including those traded via a third country with such trade being regarded as an intra-country shipment of goods.

○ In case the North Korea goods that were brought into South Korea after they were exported to a third country, are subject to re-import tariff reduction or exemption under the provisions of Article 34 of the Tariff Law, the same provi-

sions shall be applied.

(4) Cooperative Projects.

(a) Advance Permission of Cooperative Projects

- A person wishing to promote a South-North cooperative project shall, prior to entering negotiations, obtain advance permission from the concerned office in charge of business related to issuing permission of such a project.
- The head of the concerned office shall determine whether to give advance permission in consultation with the Minister of National Unification and the heads of other related offices, and will notify the applicant thereof.

(b) Application for Permission of Cooperative Projects

- A person wishing to carry out a South-North cooperative project shall apply to the head of the concerned office for permission with the description of the following items:
 - Contents and method of cooperative project.
 - Expected period of project.
 - Manpower necessary for cooperative project.
 - Funding plan.
 - Letter of consultation with North Korean project partner (letter of intent).
 - Description of North Korean project partner.
 - Letter of affirmation by North Korean authorities.
 - Other items which the head of the concerned office deems necessary for the deliberation

of cooperative project.

(c) Handling of Application for Permission

- The head of the concerned office shall introduce the application for permission of a South-North cooperative project, with his written opinion attached thereto, to the Council for the Promotion of South-North Exchanges and Cooperation. The Council shall deliberate it based on the following criteria:
 - The feasibility and practicability of the project.
 - Business performance or activities of the applicant in relation to the planned cooperative project.
 - Other criteria established through a decision by the Council.
- The head of the concerned office shall determine whether to permit an application depending on the results of deliberations made by the Council for the Promotion of South-North Exchanges and Cooperation, and notify the applicant thereof.

The applications for South-North exchanges and cooperation received and acted on under these guidelines as of November 13, 1989, were as follows:

- The number of applications for travels and contacts

	Permitted	Rejected
Visit to North Korea	1	7
Invitation	2	
Contact	11	3
Total	14	10

- * Overseas Koreans who notified authorities of their visits to North Korea: 300 (including 34 with foreign citizenship)

- Material Trade

	Items	Amount (\$ 1,000)
Introduction	39	19,220
Shipment	1	69
Total	40	19,289

- Cooperative Projects

— Advance permission: One case (a plan by the Korean Olympic Committee to form a single inter-Korean team for the Beijing Asian Games)

As for travels, the Council for the Promotion of South-North Exchanges and Cooperation on June 21st rejected applications by some Chondaehyop students and journalists for permission of their planned visits to North Korea on the occasion of the 13th World Youth-Student Festival. On July 20th, however, the Council approved an application by

Rev. Lee Dae-kyong residing in Japan for permission to visit North Korea, which was the first permission ever granted under the Basic Guideline for South-North Exchanges and Cooperation.

In addition, the Council approved plans by the History Department of Kyunghee University to send a study team to examine Koguryo relics in North Korea and also of Professor Won Byong-o of Kyunghee University to go to North Korea to observe the situation of wild birds there.

This permission was granted under the South's policy of positively promoting South-North exchanges and cooperation for the sake of the improvement of inter-Korean relations unless such exchanges and cooperation lead to political controversies between the two sides or are used for political purposes by either of the two sides.

Meanwhile, some typical cases of invitation of North Korean persons approved by the Council were those applied in connection with the 44th International Eucharistic Congress held in Seoul October 4-8 and the Han River Lotus Lantern Buddhist Prayer Session for Korean National Reconciliation on October 14.

The Council also approved applications for a working-level contact for the invitation of North Korean scholars to an international seminar sponsored by Wonkwang University, a contact for the invitation of North Korean scholars to an international seminar sponsored by the Biological Engineering Society, and a contact for the invitation of three North Korean scholars to a seminar jointly sponsored by the daily Dong-A Ilbo and Berkeley University of the United States.

(1) Development over Eucharistic Congress

The Council for the Promotion of South-North Exchanges and Cooperation on September 25, 1989, approved a plan to invite North Korean Catholic followers to the 44th International Eucharistic Congress to make it the first case of invitation of North Koreans to the South ever approved under the Basic Guideline for South-North Exchanges and Cooperation.

Cardinal Kim Su-hwan, chairman of the Preparatory Committee of the Eucharistic Congress, planned to invite Pak Kyong-su, head of the Changchung Cathedral of Pyongyang, and about 20 other North Korean Catholic followers to the 44th International Eucharistic Congress and a pilgrimage to Catholic relic sites in the South.

The approval of the plan by the Council was significant in that it manifested the government's positive determination toward South-North exchanges and cooperation, and also in that it set forth a criterion and direction for future private-level South-North exchanges. It also served to emphasize that representation and purity of purpose are the most important things in exchanges between the two sides.

By approving the plans of invitation, the government reaffirmed its policy to positively support private-level South-North exchanges if they are in keeping with the spirit of the July 7th Declaration and the new unification formula, and if they are for the purpose of purely non-political exchange and are promoted through required procedures.

As North Korea failed to take part in the Seoul Olympics in 1988, the Catholic Church in the South believed that if the Catholic followers of both the South and the North

attended the Seoul Eucharistic Congress together, it could serve as a rare occasion to exhibit the look of national reconciliation of the Koreans before the entire world. The Catholic Church planned that if North Korean Catholic followers, chiefly those of the Changchung Church, would attend the Eucharistic Congress set to be held on Yoido square, they could then take the occasion to make a pilgrimage to Choldusan and some other Catholic relic sites in South Korea.

However, North Korea showed no response at all to an invitation sent to them by the Eucharistic Congress Preparatory Committee through the Vatican and did not attend the 44th Eucharistic Congress, thus shattering the expectation that North Korean people could visit the South privately for the first time since the truce of the Korean War.

(2) Development over Lotus Lantern Prayer Session

On September 29, 1989, the Concil for the Promotion of South-North Exchanges and Cooperation deliberated and approved an application filed by Suh Ui-hyon, head of the Chokye Order of Korean Buddhism and also chairman of the Association of Korean Buddhist Denominations and of the Council for South-North Buddhist Exchanges, for permission to invite North Korean Buddhists.

By approving, on the heels of its approval of a plan of the Catholic Church to invite North Korean catholic followers, the Buddhist plan to invite North Korean Buddhists, a plan "whose representation was valid, which was genuinely motivated, and which went through required procedures," the Council for the Promotion of South-North Exchanges and Cooperation was establishing the principle of approval

of South-North religious exchanges.

Upon the approval of the Council, the Association of Korean Buddhist Denominations on October 5th sent a telephone message to the North Korean Buddhist Association, notifying them that the Association would send an invitation at 10 a.m. on October 7th at Panmunjom to invite Pak Tae-ho, chairman of the North Korean Buddhist Association, and about 30 other North Korean Buddhists to the Han River Lotus Lantern Prayer Session slated for October 14th.

However, no North Koreans showed up at the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission where the invitation was supposed to be delivered. On noon of October 7th, North Korea, in a statement issued not by the chairman of the North Korean Buddhist Association but by its spokesman and broadcast to the South, indirectly rejected the invitation.

In this statement, North Korea, while shunning any response to the South's invitation, proposed a South-North Buddhist conference, asserting that all Buddhist denominations should be allowed to attend the conference regardless of their creeds and that the issue of national unification should be added to the topics of the Buddhist conference. It seemed that the North had made its proposal, not to discuss purely religious matters, but to have a political conference between the Buddhist leaders of the two sides.

The topics suggested for a South-North Buddhist conference that the North offered included the issue of invitation to the Han River Lotus Lantern Prayer Session. But, it was apparent that what was lurking under their offer was that "South-North contacts not for a conference on the unifica-

tion question, but merely for participation in the Han River Lotus Lantern Prayer Session are insignificant.”

As soon as the North Korean statement was broadcast, the government notified the Association of Korean Buddhist Denominations thereof, suggesting that even though the initial North Korean reaction was negative, it would be good to send liaison officials of the government and Buddhist circles to Panmunjom to discuss with the North procedures for passage and other working-level issues in case the North showed any willingness to take part in the Lotus Lantern Prayer Session.

Here, the Association of Korean Buddhist Denominations, in a telephone message sent to the North on the morning of October 13th, proposed that a South-North Buddhist working-level contact be held at the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission at 4 p.m. on the same date to discuss the issue of North Korean persons' passage through Panmunjon, personal safety and other procedural matters in connection with the invitation of North Korean Buddhists to the Han River Lotus Lantern Prayer Session. The Association sent Lee Hong-pa, secretary general of the Association, and Park Wan-il, chairman of the Laymen's Society, to Panmunjom for the contact.

The South also took all steps to prepare for North Koreans' participation in the Han River Prayer Session. For instance, the Home Affairs Minister issued a statement guaranteeing the personal safety of participating North Korean Buddhists.

However, North Korea did not send delegates to Panmunjom. They simply reiterated their demand for a South-North

Buddhist conference, asserting that a dissident Buddhist organization in the South, should also be allowed to attend the conference.

Though the private-level South-North exchanges sought by the Catholic Church and Buddhist circles failed to materialize due to the North's shunning of them, the South intends to continue to promote exchanges between South and North Korean religious leaders.

2. Issue of Illegal Visits by Lim Soo-Kyong and Moon Kyu-Hyon to North Korea

a. Course

On June 29, 1989, the Chondaehyop (Association of National Student Representatives) announced that Miss Lim Soo-kyong, a student of the Hankook University of Foreign Studies, was staying in East Berlin on her way to North Korea to attend, as a Chondaehyop delegate, the 13th World Youth-Student Festival opening in Pyongyang on July 1. It said Lim would arrive in Pyongyang the following day, June 30.

The shock and anger among the people was further deepened due to her conduct in the North, and reached a peak as she, along with Father Moon Kyu-hyon, returned home through Panmunjom.

Initially, the government was not negative toward students' participation in the Pyongyang festival. Rather, it positively reviewed their participation as part of multi-faceted personnel

exchanges between the two sides.

Although the Pyongyang festival was a political gathering of an anti-U.S. and-Seoul nature, the government, in a policy to positively embody the basic spirit of the July 7th Declaration, originally resolved to study students' participation affirmatively from the context of overall South-North student exchanges such as "South-North students homeland pilgrimage" and "exchanges of goodwill sports games between South and North Korean students."

The government then exerted much efforts in this connection, helping establish the South-North Student Exchanges Promotion Committee, a purely private organization.

It was part of such efforts that the government proposed to North Korea on July 15, 1988, a South-North education officials meeting, and that on March 13, 1989, the chairman of the South-North Student Exchanges Promotion Committee proposed a meeting on South-North student exchanges including the issue of South Korean students' participation in the Pyongyang festival.

North Korea, however, rejected overall exchanges between South and North Korean students. Instead, the North sought to offer the Pyongyang festival itself as a cause of South Korean students' struggles against the government by, for instance, unilaterally hand-picking the Chondaehyop, an organization of student activists, as the sole South Korean student body invited to the festival. This way, the North carried on a series of operations intended ultimately to form a united front for collaboration with communism in the South.

On the other hand, the Chondaehyop, in disregard of the government effort to materialize student exchanges bet-

ween the two sides of Korea, even rejected negotiations with government authorities, and went so far as to not hesitate to serve as a front for the North, using the Pyongyang festival as an excuse in their struggles against the government.

On April 26, the Education Minister of the South issued a statement stressing that "exchanges and contacts between South and North Korea should be made under legal procedures and government approval." The statement then urged the Chondaehyop to stop trying to come in contact with the North arbitrarily and instead join the Student Exchanges Promotion Committee and thereby handle the issue of participation in the Pyongyang festival legally through negotiations for a reasonable method of linkage with South-North student exchanges.

Despite the government call for self-restraint, the Chondaehyop attempted to have talks with the North at Panmunjom on April 28th. On May 11th, too the Chondaehyop in a rally resolved to carry on struggles to participate in the Pyongyang festival. On June 17th, about 10 days before the opening of the Pyongyang event, the Chondaehyop asserted that they would not take part in political events even if they participated in the Pyongyang festival and that they were willing to discuss with government authorities procedural matters.

This seemingly modified posture of the Chondaehyop did not mean any substantial change in their posture. It only represented a tactical change intended to shift the blame of their failure to take part in the Pyongyang festival to the government authorities.

On April 28th, meanwhile, North Korea asserted that they

were sending invitations to 55 South Korean people as "honorable guests" to their festival, making public the contents of the letters of invitation and the list of the 55 recipients. On May 4th, North Korea proposed to hold a meeting of six organizations of the two sides to discuss and resolve the issue of South Koreans' participation in the Pyongyang festival. The six organizations they mentioned were the North Korean Preparatory Committee of the World Youth-Student Festival, North Korean Student Committee and the Central Committee of the North Korean Socialist Working Youth League from the North, and the Chondaehyop, Association of the Representatives of National Youth Organizations, and the Exchanges Promotion Committee from the South.

The North Korean machinations did not end here. On June 18th, the North, in a statement issued by the Preparatory Committee of the World Youth-Student Festival, said that they would one-sidedly open the northern sector of Panmunjom beginning on June 23rd stating that they hope to invite about 500 South Korean youth and students (including Chondaehyop members) to the Pyongyang festival.

The North Korean announcement of the opening of Panmunjom, which came around the time that Chondaehyop expressed its willingness to join the South-North Student Exchanges Promotion Committee, was a sort of psychological machination designed to shift the blame for the lack of South Koreans' participation in the Pyongyang festival to the South Korean government at a time when participation became almost impossible due to the lack of time, and also to further heat up a controversy over the Pyongyang festival in the South so that the Chondaehyop and other student activists

could step up their struggles against the government.

As the Pyongyang festival was drawing near, the Chon-daehyop expedited its seditious attempts. Here, the Council for the Promotion of South-North Exchanges and Cooperation, on June 21, 1989, decided not to permit any application for permission of participation in the Pyongyang festival based on the judgement that the Pyongyang event cannot serve affirmatively the government's basic unification policy.

The Council made it clear that the decision did not constitute any backdown from the spirit of the July 7th Declaration or from its own policy to positively promote inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation. The Council reaffirmed that it would continue to endeavor to see to it that the government would positively support and guarantee exchanges and cooperation in many areas between the two sides.

It goes without saying that any dialogue and exchanges between the South and the North should be made under legal procedures and with advance approval from the government authorities, and that in dialogue and exchanges, the principle of reciprocity should be respected.

The attempted participation in the Pyongyang event failed to obtain public support. It was a well-known fact that the majority of the people were worried about possible student participation in the Pyongyang festival.

Nevertheless, the Chon-daehyop, in a meticulous plan worked out over a long period of time, illegally sent Miss Lim Soo-kyong to North Korea to cause a shock and sense of betrayal among the people.

b. Conduct in North Korea and Return through Panmunjom

After arriving in Pyongyang on June 30th via East Berlin, Lim Soo-kyong attended the opening ceremony of the Pyongyang festival on July 1st. In a series of welcoming rallies, press conferences and a reception hosted by Kim Il-sung throughout the festival period until July 8th, Lim Soo-kyong demanded the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea, repeal of the National Security Law, etc., denouncing the South Korean government and siding with the unification policy of North Korea.

On July 7th, she signed the so-called Joint South-North Student Declaration that embodied the North's propaganda stance against the South, took part in an International Peace March July 20th-27th, and entered a hunger strike at Panmunjom beginning on July 27th.

This illegal visit by Lim Soo-kyong to the North became a new source of dispute between the South and the North as she, together with Father Moon Kyu-hyon, a Korean resident in the U.S., attempted to return to the South through Panmunjom on July 27th and as the North demanded their personal safety.

On July 28th, the South, in a statement by the spokesman of the National Unification Board, condemned the North's provocative acts in connection with the Panmunjom incident of July 27th.

The text of the statement was as follows:

North Korea perpetrated another act of provocation by sending Lim Soo-hyong, Moon Kyu-byon and other participants in the so-called International Peace March to Panmunjom to use them in a scheme to justify their political operations.

Panmunjom should always be a gateway to the improvement of the inter-Korean relations as well as to peaceful unification. It cannot be used in the destruction of the other side's system.

However, North Korea, as all of our people had feared, committed the brazen-faced act of turning Panmunjom, the site of talks, into a site for their provocative political propaganda and now into a site for a hunger strike.

Lately, behind the South-North dialogue, North Korea secretly brought into Pyongyang a certain legislator, religiously active persons and a writer for use in their political operations. Moreover, through a ridiculous cash offer, the North was learned to have attempted to buy over a South Korean person. They have thus driven inter-Korean relations more in the direction of acuter tension and confrontation than at any other time in the past.

Such a double-faced act of North Korea constitutes naked treacherousness toward the other side in a dialogue, a behavior which clearly shows that they have no interest in any normal dialogue with the South.

What is most important to improving inter-Korean relations is the posture in which the two sides seek to resolve issues through dialogue between responsible authorities on the basis of the spirit of recognizing and respecting each other.

However, North Korea has deliberately stood in the way of any smooth dialogue. Moreover, they have responded with enmity and confrontation to the South's call for their self-reflection and sincerity.

It would be a big mistaken belief on their part if they think they can smokescreen the act of their nasty double-facedness attempting to trample on peace in the name of "peace" and destroy the South's system under

the cloak of "private-level dialogue."

If North Korea is truly interested in the improvement of inter-Korean relations and peaceful unification, they should apologize before the nation for turning Panmunjom into an ugly propaganda site and should abandon their wrongful illusion to defame and overthrow the other side in a dialogue.

North Korea is strongly urged to stop committing the inhumane act of making one of our students a political sacrifice, aware that if they continue to try to capitalize on the South's peaceful unification efforts for their political operations, it would only lead to expediting their own destruction.

At the same time, we wish to emphasize once again that Panmunjom, laden with our people's deep regret, should not be left to be the scene of any further tragedy and instead should become the symbol of hope oriented toward national self-esteem and unification.

Lim Soo-kyong, and Moon Kyu-hyon withdrew from Panmunjom after ending their hunger strike on August 1st and entered the South through Panmunjom with help from the North on August 15th.

Meanwhile, North Korea, through the Armistice Commission on August 13th, demanded that the United Nations Command guarantee the personal safety of Lim Soo-kyong and Moon Kyu-hyon and assure them of all necessary conveniences when they return to the South through Panmunjom. Additionally, the chief secretaries of the Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland and the Democratic Front for Unification of the Fatherland issued statements on August 13th in support of Lim and Moon, while a send-off reception was held for the pair on August 13th under the joint sponsorship of the North Korean Socialist Working Youths League

and the North Korean Student Committee, and a Pyongyang citizens' send-off rally for Lim Soo-kyong on August 19th.

During her hunger strike, Lim Soo-kyong sent letters to the legislatures, governments and political parties of various countries in the world and also to the presidents of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross and the International Committee of Red Crosses, asking for their cooperation in her return to the South through Panmunjom. In their departure statements on the day of their return to the South on August 15th, Lim Soo-kyong and Moon Kyu-hyon furiously denounced the government authorities of the United States and South Korea as "anti-unification forces."

It was an act of grave provocation that jeopardized the Korean armistice system itself that North Korea brought in some South Korean people for their political operations and had Lim Soo-kyong and Moon Kyu-hyon arbitrarily return to the South through the Military Demarcation Line at Panmunjom.

Paragraph 7, Article 1 of the Armistice Agreement clearly stipulates, "No military serviceman or private person shall be allowed to pass through the Military Demarcation Line without specific permission from the Military Armistice Commission."

Accordingly, it goes without saying that the passage through Panmunjom without any permission from the Military Armistice Commission represented a violation of the Armistice Agreement.

Travels back and forth through Panmunjom in the past were made under procedures in which the government authorities of the two sides first agreed on them and then

asked for and gained approval from the Armistice Commission. The procedures were applied to the travels by delegates to South-North dialogues and the exchange of hometown visiting groups. Therefore, unless the government authorities of the South and the North reach an accord on a passage, the Military Armistice Commission refuses to allow passage through Panmunjom by private person.

Panmunjom should be used as a conduit contributory to the improvement of South-North relations and peaceful unification. Neither the South nor the North should attempt to use Panmunjom for the purpose of opposing or overthrowing the political system of the other side.

c. Major Movements in South and North Korea

The illegal visits by Lim Soo-kyong and Moon Kyu-hyon to North Korea were in express violation of the positive law of the land. Therefore, it is only natural that the pair were to be dealt with by legal actions. So, North Korea has no grounds whatsoever to interfere in the issue of legal actions to be taken against them after their return to the South.

Nevertheless, the chairmen of the North Korean Red Cross and the Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland sent telephone messages to Kim Sang-hyop, president of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross, and National Unification Minister Lee Hong-koo, respectively, on July 20th asking for their cooperation in Lim Soo-kyong's passage through Panmunjom and her personal safety after her return to the South.

On July 26th, ROKNRC president Kim Sang-hyop notified the North that "Lim Soo-kyong's case is an issue which the Red Cross cannot step into." However, North Korea renewed their demand in a statement by the spokesman of the Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland on July 26th and also in a statement by the spokesman of the North Korean Red Cross on July 27th.

Again on July 30th, the North, in the name of the Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland, called for the resolution of Lim Soo-kyong's issue.

On August 3rd when Lim Soo-kyong ended her sit-in at Panmunjom, Son Sung-pil, chairman of the North Korean Red Cross, proposed South-North Red Cross working-level delegates contacts to discuss the issue of Lim Soo-kyong's passage through Panmunjom. Additionally, An Byong-su, chief secretary of the Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland, proposed to National Unification Minister Lee Hong-koo similar working-level officials contacts between his Committee and the Unification Board.

In reaction, ROKNRC President Kim Sang-hyop again emphasized on August 10th that the Red Cross cannot meddle in the issue, urging the North Korean Red Cross to stop siding with the sinister political cause of the North Korean government authorities and instead to return to its inherent Red Cross duties.

On August 12th, the National Unification Board, in a comment by its spokesman, branded the August 8th proposal by the Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland for working-level officials contacts of using Lim Soo-kyong for their political propaganda. The comment also said that

the "utterly nonsensical and undiplomatic act of the North sending a telephone message in the name of a bureau director of one of their organizations to a minister of the Seoul government, clearly shows how insincere their dialogue attitude is."

On August 15th, however, North Korea, through a statement issued by the spokesman of the Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland renewed their demand for the guarantee of Lim Soo-kyong's return and personal safety.

On August 16th, one day after the return to the South through Panmunjom by Miss Lim Soo-kyong and Father Moon Kyu-hyon, National Unification Minister Lee Hong-koo said in a statement that "the arbitrary passage by the pair through the Military Demarcation Line at Panmunjom was a shocking provocative act which, an extreme case of the North's political maneuvering against the South, endangers even the armistice system of Korea itself." The statement said that "the acts of North Korea using South Korean people for their political operations and turning Panmunjom into a site for political propaganda, represented their shunning of the normal dialogue between the South and the North." Minister Lee then warned that "if the North continues to perpetrate such acts of political operations, they won't escape blame for aggravating the South-North relationship."

Minister Lee went on to say in the statement that "those who violate the statutory order of the South will be handled under the legal procedures of the Republic of Korea, a law-governed country, a business which North Korea cannot dispute or step into." The Minister then stressed that North Korea should abandon their wild illusion about communiza-

tion of the South through revolution and instead return to national conscience and affirmatively respond to the South's efforts to resume the suspended South-North dialogue and improve the inter-Korean relations at an early date.

However, North Korea has only reiterated their contentions in a series of statements issued by the Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland, Central Committee of the North Korean Catholic Followers Association, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Democratic Front for Unification of the Fatherland, etc. Even at the first and second South-North Red Cross working-level delegates contacts, the third preliminary for South-North high officials talks, and the eighth preparatory contact meeting for the South-North parliamentary talks, the North raised the issue of Lim Soo-kyong and Moon Kyu-hyon while shelving business discussions making their dialogue posture questionable.

For North Korea to make undue demands even to the Red Cross entrusted with humanitarian programs let alone the government authorities of the South, was nothing but an act of naked violation of the principle of reciprocity and of further aggravating South-North relations.

If North Korea is genuinely interested in the improvement of inter-Korean relations and peaceful unification, it shouldn't commit any further acts of political operations toward specific individuals or organizations and should stop perpetrating its provocative acts of undermining the armistice system and interfering in the other side's internal affairs.

3. North Korea's Proposal for National Unification Conference

a. Contents of Proposal

On September 28, 1989, North Korea held a so-called joint meeting of Pyongyang government authorities, political parties and social organizations, at which they proposed a national unification conference and adopted letters containing the offer to the South.

The contents of the letters boiled down to:

— Scope of participants

Representatives of government authorities, major political parties and social organizations of the South and the North, and individual persons both at home and abroad.

— Number of participants

About 60 persons in all, equal numbers from the South and the North.

— Format of meeting

The method of multilateral round-table conference where all delegates would attend on the same footing without any distinction between the South and the North.

— Topics

Unification ideals produced by the government authorities, political parties and social organizations of the South and the North.

Question of announcing a joint national declaration.

Other constructive proposals helpful to the expedition of peaceful unification.

— Time and place of meeting

To be held in Seoul and Pyongyang by turn, with the first meeting being held in Pyongyang on February 20, 1990.

To this end, bilateral or multilateral contact meetings (preliminary talks) are to be held between the government authorities, political parties and social organizations of the South and the North between November 1989 and January 1990.

On September 29, North Korea, in a telephone message, notified the South that it would send the letters in the name of the executive section of the joint meeting to the South's government authorities, political parties and social organizations on October 3rd. Here, the South told the North that it would accept only those letters addressed to government authorities on October 4th.

However, North Korea in a radio broadcast on October 3rd one-sidedly made public the contents of the letters, asserting that "it became impossible to deliver letters to the South." They asserted that they would mail the letters to the South by international mail.

The list of the would-be recipients of the letters as disclosed by the North was as follows:

1. Prime Minister
2. Democratic Justice Party
3. Party for Peace and Democracy
4. Reunification Democratic Party
5. New Democratic Republican Party
6. Alliance for Progressive Politics
7. Chonminnyon
8. Council of National Labor Organizations

9. Federation of Korean Trade Unions
10. Alliance of National Farmers Movement
11. Chondaehyop
12. Council of Korean Women's Organizations
13. Alliance of Korean Women's Organizations
14. Alliance of Korean National Artists
15. Federation of Artistic and Cultural Organizations of Korea
16. National Council of Churches in Korea
17. Council for Catholic Social Movement
18. Council for Buddhist Movement for Independent National Unification
19. Central Bureau of Chondokyo

b. Evaluation of North Korea's Attitude

The North's idea of a "national unification conference" may well be a counter-proposal to the South's call, made in the Korean National Community Unification Formula, for the adoption by August 15, 1990, of National Community Charter at a South-North summit meeting.

The suggestion by the North in their offer that the national unification conference could broadly discuss various unification ideas produced by the government authorities, political parties and social organizations, was intended to scale down the Korean National Community Unification Formula into one of many unification ideas aired in the South rather than to receive the formula as the unification idea of the Republic of Korea.

Additionally, the assertion that the top leaders of the two

sides could meet at any time within the framework of the national unification conference, suggests that they had yet to prepare themselves for a South-North summit meeting.

On the other hand, the North's contention that the national unification conference should be held under the method of multilateral round-table meetings with delegates on the same footing without any distinction between the two sides indicates that the idea of the national unification conference was simply a redressed form of their oft-proposed grand national conference or joint South-North conference.

On this issue, the spokesman of the National Unification Board issued the following comment on September 29th:

The latest North Korean proposal offered nothing new at all as it was a repetition of the "South-North political conference" which Kim Il-sung emphasized in his New Year message this year. However, we notice that the North proposed the "national unification conference" right on the heels of the announcement of the Korean National Community Unification Formula that our government announced.

The North argues as if there are a number of unification ideas in the South whereas theirs have only one, the idea of a Koryo confederation system. It is intolerable that they attempt to regard our Korean National Community Unification Formula merely as one of many ideas in the South.

Despite the fact that a dialogue on the unification issue must be held between government authorities, the North proposed a political conference among the representatives of various layers and strata of society at this time also. This cannot but be taken as an expression of their intent of rejecting any constructive dialogue.

This intent was evident with their assertion that only when a joint South-North conference, a method of meeting lacking any practicability

and feasibility, is held can they have various dialogues, exchanges and cooperation with the South.

It is highly regrettable that at this time when Red Cross working-level delegates contact meetings and preliminary meetings for high-level officials talks resume between the South and the North, North Korea attempts to use their old-fashioned united front strategy against the South.

If the North were truly interested in the improvement of the inter-Korean relationship, they should refrain from shattering this rare dialogue and an atmosphere ripe for exchanges and instead return to a realistic and justifiable manner.

Meanwhile, the North unilaterally selected and announced the list of delegates from the South. As can be known in the list of the would-be recipients of their letters, 14 of the 19 recipients were private or dissident organizations, the five others being the Prime Minister and four major political parties. This means that North Korea wanted to have the so-called national unification conference between the satellite organizations of the Workers'(Communist) Party and the South's private and dissident organizations, an attempt intended to foment the schism of national opinion and social confusion capitalizing on liberalized debate on the unification issue and also to form a united front in collaboration with Communists in the South.

Moreover, North Korea unfoundedly propagandized as if the South refused to receive their letters. The truth, however, was that the date on which they wanted to deliver the letters was one of the public holidays of the South, and that, therefore, the South simply suggested that it would receive the letters on the following day, October 4th, as

there were no precedents for exchanging letters or telephone messages between the two sides on public holidays.

At the same time, the South let it be known that the system of direct telephoning and the exchange of letters between the two sides should be operated in a manner that can contribute to liaison programs related to inter-Korean talks as well as to the improvement of inter-Korean relations in other ways, and also that the resolution of issues pending between the two sides and the unification question should be sought through dialogue and negotiations between the government authorities with due responsibility and competence.

In order to remove mutual distrust and the sense of confrontation between the South and the North and prepare a groundwork for reconciliation and cooperation, North Korea should return to the table of normal dialogue in a sincere manner instead of demanding rally-like conferences or making an "offensive letter" to the South, which can only have an adverse impact on the atmosphere for the existing dialogue.

The political or joint conferences North Korea has suggested since 1980, which were similar to their latest offer of a national unification conference, were as follows:

Name	Contents	Remarks
Political conference and government officials	This offer was made in separate letters signed by Administration Council Premier Li Jong-ok and Kim Il, chairman of Committee for Peaceful	Part of political propaganda designed to capitalize on the South's political unrest following the assassination of

- meeting (January 11, 1980) Unification of the Fatherland. President Park Chung Hee in October 1979.
- Discussion of matters relating to the holding of a South-North political conference, government officials meeting, high-level officials meeting, and various issues related to peaceful unification.
 - Time and place: the sooner the better, Panmunjom, Seoul, Pyongyang or a third country.
 - Would-be recipients of letters:
 - Li Jong-ok's letter: Prime Minister Shin Hyon-hwak
 - Kim Il's letters: Kim Jong-pil, Kim Young-sam, Chung Il-kwon, Yang Il-dong, Kim Chol, Yoon Po-son, Kim Dae-jung, Ahn Pil-su, Ham Sok-hon, Kim Su-hwan, Lee Hui-song

* The South took the letter to the Prime Minister alone as signifying their willingness to hold a dialogue between government authorities, and accordingly counter-proposed a South-North prime ministers meeting. Ten working-level delegates contacts were held in a period from February 6 to August 20, 1980.

Joint meeting among 100 South and North Korean politicians (February 10, 1982)

Proposes to hold a 100-man joint meeting among 50 individual politicians concerned about unification and nation-saving from each side.

* Exclusion of government officials and members of political parties and organizations.

○ Topics: Discussion of all unification ideas that can be raised, including the idea of

○ Some of the 50 delegates of the South, whom the North unilaterally selected and announced, included anti-Seoul and pro-Pyongyang figures abroad, prisoners and people of ghost organizations.

—Choi Hong-hi, Pae Dong-ho (representative of Hanmintong),

the Koryo Confederation system, and the issue of realizing collaboration and exchanges between the South and the North.

Lee Chong-sang (representative of ghost Unification Revolutionary Party).

Joint South-North conference (January 14, 1988)

- Proposes to hold a joint South-North conference among government officials, representatives of political parties and social organizations, and persons of various circles of the two sides.
- Topics: Issue of suspending Team Spirit exercise, issue of multinational arms reduction talks, issue of jointly hosting the 24th Olympics, issue of suspending mutual slanders and defamation.
- Places: Seoul and Pyongyang by turn.
- North Korea unilaterally selects 50 persons of the South.
 - Prime minister, heads of eight political parties including Democratic Justice Party, representatives of 35 religious and social organizations, and six individual persons.
- Intended to foment split in national opinion and social confusion by setting off reckless debate on unification taking advantage of a political transitional period in the South characterized by

- peaceful change of power and general elections.
- To secure excuse to boycott Seoul Olympics.
 - To shun or tone down censure for KAL plane bombing.
- South-North political conference (January 1, 1989)
- Proposes to hold South-North political conference to discuss the idea of unification under confederation system.
 - Invite the heads of the four major political parties, Cardinal Kim Su-hwan, Moon Ik-hwan and Paek Ki-wan to Pyongyang to hold a South-North political conference.
 - Intended to apply a brake to the South's new unification formula, and instigate debate on confederation idea among some sectors of the South.
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SOUTH-NORTH DIALOGUE IN KOREA



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Part I

President Roh's New Year Press Conference

1. Basis for Operation of State Affairs

In his New Year press conference held on January 10, 1990, President Roh Tae Woo, describing the 1990s as a “Decade of Hope” and a “Decade of Fruition,” comprehensively set forth a vision and clear direction of preparation for the 21st Century.

With regard to unification and dialogue policies, in particular, President Roh laid down practicable and concrete ideas with the firm conviction that a decisive time for unification may come within the next 10 years, making clear his determination to carry on policies continuously to promote reconciliation between South and North Korea.

This embodied the President’s policy intent of positively coping with the process of reorganization of the international order which began with the rapid changes, including reforms and openness, which are sweeping the Soviet Union and other East European countries, thereby contributing to a global mood of detente and the unfolding new chapter in South-North reconciliation.

In a series of proposals he made to North Korea in his Inaugural Address, July 7th Special Declaration, Address to the U.N. General Assembly, Korean National Community Unification Formula, and others, President Roh has urged that the two sides in Korea should terminate their relations of confrontation, a Cold War era holdover, and instead initiate together a period of South-North reconciliation and unification on the basis of mutual trust and cooperation.

At the same time, the President has conducted many-sided efforts in a bid to induce North Korea to come out of their xenophobia and isolation and into the worldwide trend toward openness.

In his New Year press conference, President Roh also again asked the North to agree to a South-North summit meeting and proposed the conclusion of an inter-Korean travel and communication agreement, the formation of an economic community through, for instance, the joint development of tourism resources including Mt. Kumgangsan (the Diamond Mountains), and the scaling down of the joint Korea-U.S. Team Spirit '90 military exercise.

These forward-looking proposals represent the manifestation of the President's accommodative policy to promote inter-Korean policies in full consideration of the North's position and in a way that won't irritate the North, based on optimistic prospects for inter-Korean relations. They are all practical ideas that can be put into action forthwith if only North Korea would agree.

Meanwhile, President Roh, pronouncing that the days are gone when the South regarded the North as a rival, called upon the Korean nation to strive to realize democracy, prosperity and unification and embark on a grand march of reconciliation toward establishing a unified, democratic welfare state before the close of this century.

The following is part of the policy statement relating to the issues of unification and dialogue, made by President Roh at his press conference:

Thanks to the successful staging of the Seoul Olympics as a grand festival of the East-West communities and also to the fruitful pursuit of our northern policy, we have been able to positively cope with world changes. The Republic of Korea has thus assumed a well-defined new international role in facilitating global reconciliation, rather than perpetuating Cold War con-

frontation.

On the strength of the even closer and more solid ties that we have forged with our traditional friends in the Asia-Pacific region, especially the United States and Japan, and also with our old friends in Europe, we will implement our northern policy, already on a fast track, even more effectively.

We will deepen and broaden our newly established diplomatic relations with Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia and will pursue formal relations with other Socialist countries in Eastern Europe. These days, more than 20,000 people travel between our country and the People's Republic of China each year, while our country's airliners have begun to fly over the Soviet Union on their way to Europe.

Such things were unimaginable only a short time ago. We can now effectively cultivate ever more substantial relations with China, the Soviet Union — with which we have recently opened consular relations — and other Socialist countries, especially as far as economic cooperation.

The East European wave of reform toward freedom and prosperity is also bound to reach North Korea before too long. We hope similar changes will take place in the North in an orderly and peaceful fashion. All-out efforts will be made to convince North Korea — part of our single national community which ought to be sharing prosperity with us — that it should join the trend of world history and open up its borders.

Gone are the days when North Korea was our rival. Now that the division of our land is about to become a half century old, the two parts of Korea should together open an era of national unification through dialogue, exchanges and cooperation based on mutual trust.

In my Inaugural Address in February 1988 and again in my speech before the United Nations General Assembly, I emphasized that South and North Korea must form a single national community by dismantling the dividing barriers to allow free inter-

Korean travel and to completely open the political, economic, civic and cultural fields to each other.

My July 7th Special Declaration and the Korean National Community Unification Formula, too, were intended to form a national community covering all areas through mutual opening and exchanges between the two parts of Korea. In this connection, I welcome the proposal made by the top North Korean leader on New Year's day for free travel and total opening between the South and the North, even though hard-to-understand preconditions were attached to it.

These issues, central to national integration, can be resolved through talks between the authorities of the South and the North — especially at the highest level. I reaffirm my conviction that a South-North summit should be held as quickly as possible to that end. I once more urge North Korea to positively respond to this.

The stark reality today is that not a single letter nor a single telephone call can cross the armistice line that divides South and North Korea, let alone home visits by members of dispersed families.

If it takes time for the two parts of Korea to agree to free travel and full opening, then exchanges of correspondence and telephone calls and free home visits by dispersed families should first be implemented. If it is difficult at present to allow free travel to all, then those dispersed family members aged 60 or older should be promptly permitted to visit their native homes.

We urged North Korea to show sincerity toward resolving these issues. We will seek the conclusion of an inter-Korean travel and communication agreement. For the South and the North to pursue cooperative projects profitable to both with a spirit of mutual help and assistance would be a practical way to improve inter-Korean relations.

If only North Korea is agreeable, we are ready to embark on joint development projects, especially in tourism, including the development of Mt. Kumgangsan (the Diamond Mountains). We

will continue to pursue inter-Korean merchandise trade and take other practical steps to form an economic community with the North.

At present, we are engaged in inter-Korean sports talks with the goal of forming a single delegation to compete in the Asian Games to be held in Beijing in September of this year. I believe such efforts should not merely end in the creation of a single team, but should lead to further inter-Korean sports exchanges, which should, in turn, spur mutual opening and cooperation.

To show our sincerity toward South-North dialogue and the easing of tension on the Korean peninsula, the Republic of Korea and the United States have agreed to reduce the scale of the Team Spirit '90 joint military exercise. In an environment where military tension on the peninsula continues without letup, we have taken this initiative in the hope that North Korea will take a corresponding step.

We invite North Korea, China and the four member countries of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission to send observers to the Team Spirit '90 exercise to verify the defensive nature of the exercise. At the same time, we urge North Korea to take similar measures so that we could observe the military maneuvers North Korea conducts.

Despite our efforts toward peace and reconciliation, the reality of the Korean peninsula remains cold and grim. Unfortunately, North Korea has not yet changed its attitude and continues to adhere to a rigid policy line.

In fact, the more external pressure North Korea undergoes for change, the further the uncertainties mount on the Korean peninsula. We will strengthen our national security preparedness and firmly maintain the Korea-U.S. security cooperation system to safeguard peace under all circumstances.

2. Highlights

a. Renewed Call for South-North Summit

President Roh Tae Woo, for the moment, expressed his welcome to North Korea's raising of the issue of free inter-Korean travel and complete opening in Kim Il-sung's New Year's Day message. (For Kim Il-sung's New Year's Day message, see Part III of this booklet.)

However, the President stated that "it is hardly understandable" that North Korea has produced deceptive propaganda logic claiming that, as a prerequisite to free travel and opening, the South should remove "concrete walls" south of the Military Demarcation Line. President Roh made it clear that such an issue can never be resolved under the method of a political conference that North Korea advocates.

The issue of free travel and total opening between South and North Korea should always be resolved through talks between the government authorities of the two sides, especially between the top leaders with the responsibility and competence to resolve all the issues pending between the South and the North.

Ever since his inauguration, President Roh has time and again called for the early holding of a South-North summit meeting. In his address before the United Nations General Assembly, he even set forth concretely the extent of the issues to be taken up at a summit meeting.

The manifestation in the press conference of his positive response to the North Korean offer despite its obvious ulterior motive, stemmed from the President's bid to bring the North to a genuine forum of dialogue by all means, a bid buoyed by solid confidence in the South's superior national strength.

Meanwhile, President Roh, in his Samil Independence Day message on March 1, 1990, once again urged North Korea to agree to a South-North summit meeting at an early date so as to discuss all the issues pending between the two sides without any limit, including political and military questions.

b. Proposal for Travel and Communication Agreement

President Roh emphasized that if it takes time for the two sides to agree to free travel and full opening, then exchanges of correspondence and telephone calls and free home visits by dispersed family members should be implemented first, adding that if it is difficult to allow free visits to all dispersed people, then those aged 60 or older should be promptly permitted to visit their native homes.

The President said that to facilitate this, he would promote the conclusion of an inter-Korean travel and communication agreement.

In fact, free travel and full opening between the South and the North are prerequisites to transforming the 40-odd-years-long hostility and confrontation into a relationship of reconciliation and cooperation, normalizing inter-Korean relations and expediting conditions for peaceful unification.

This is why the South has steadily called on North Korea to agree to free travel and full opening, and has taken various legal and systematic steps after the July 7th Special Declaration to promote personnel and material exchanges and cooperation, as well as free travel, between the two sides.

However, North Korea has continued to turn a deaf ear to the South's consistent call. The North has instead increased its control of people's travel within their own land and showed no sincerity at all toward the confidence building necessary for

inter-Korean free travel.

The reality, accordingly, is that not a single letter or a telephone call can be exchanged between the same people to date, and the pains and misfortune of the 10 million dispersed family members worsen.

To realize free travel for meeting or contact between dispersed families in the South and the North, and to bring about the full opening of the two societies, the two sides should first conclude an inter-Korean travel and communication agreement, which the government authorities of both sides should duly guarantee.

President Roh's recent call for the conclusion of a travel and communication agreement and for hometown visits by elderly dispersed family members is the most crucial and practicable minimum necessary proposal. North Korea, given either the humanitarian need to ease the pains of dispersed families even a little bit at this juncture of nearly half a century after national division or the current universal trend toward openness, won't be able to ignore this issue any longer.

c. Efforts to Form Economic Community

President Roh made it clear that he would promote mutually beneficial cooperative projects between the two sides in the spirit of mutual assistance; endeavor to substantially improve South-North relations; and take substantial steps such as material trade in order to form an economic community.

Specifically, the President discussed the issue of the joint development of tourism resources, including the Kumgangsan Mountains, as part of a series of inter-Korean cooperative projects.

As the two sides have already discussed the joint develop-

ment of the Kumgangsan Mountains initially during the visit to the North by Chung Ju-yung, honorary chairman of the Hyundai Business Group, in January 1989, the Kumgangsan project is highly feasible depending on North Korea's attitude.

Already in his July 7th Special Declaration, President Roh disclosed his intent of promoting the restoration and development of an inter-Korean economic community through the opening of trade doors between the two sides and the balanced development of the national economy.

Again in his Korean National Community Unification Formula, President Roh called for the ultimate accomplishment of national unification by forming a joint national living sphere and social, cultural and economic communities through mutual exchanges and cooperation implemented on the basis of recognizing and respecting each other's ideologies and systems.

Accordingly, the government positively promoted material trade based on the spirit of mutual interests by, for instance, allowing private firms to engage in the trade of North Korean commodities and taking other steps of economic opening to North Korea such as non-imposition of tariffs on commodities being traded with North Korea directly or indirectly.

Expanded economic exchanges between the South and the North would have a substantial effect in helping North Korea surmount its economic difficulties and in enhancing the economic inter-supplement of the two sides. They would also play an important role in restoring the sense of national community as they would serve to help open up the North Korean society.

Moreover, steady development of inter-Korean economic cooperation would be highly significant in that it, unlike political and military issues, could be instrumental in finding a breakthrough in the efforts to improve inter-Korean relations

without offending North Korea. This is consistent with the existing position of the South.

It was to accelerate the efforts of the South to form an economic community that President Roh, in his Samil Independence Day message last March 1, 1990, stated, "We are prepared to begin, even now, a meeting between relevant officials of the South and the North to discuss economic cooperation such as the trade or donation of materials needed by each side, development of tourism and lands, and the construction of plants."

d. Scaling Down of Team Spirit Exercise

President Roh said that in a show of the South's sincerity toward South-North dialogue and for the alleviation of tension on the Korean peninsula, the scale of the Team Spirit '90 military exercise would be reduced. He expressed the hope that North Korea would take corresponding measures.

The President invited North Korea and China, both direct parties to the Korean Armistice Agreement, and the four member countries of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission — Switzerland, Sweden, Poland and Czechoslovakia — to observe the annual exercise. He also urged North Korea to take steps so that the South could observe military maneuvers held in the North.

The President's personal proposal for the reduction of the size of military training exercises, etc. was significant in that it served to reaffirm the position of the South which has been positive toward political and military issues pending between the South and the North.

In fact, Team Spirit has been an open military exercise held annually since 1976. North Korea has always been notified

about the exercise in advance and even invited to observe it.

The Team Spirit exercise is a defensive maneuver intended to safeguard the South against military threat from the North. Inasmuch as all countries in the world conduct military exercises necessary for bilateral or collective self-defense actions in emergency, the Team Spirit military exercise cannot, in nature, be interfered in or disputed by the North.

Nevertheless, North Korea disputed the Team Spirit exercise and linked it to South-North dialogue, using it as an excuse to block the normal progress of various inter-Korean talks.

The President's disclosure of the unilateral reduction of the scale of the military exercise was part of the South's sincere effort to conform with the universal trend toward the alleviation of tension and peace and to promote confidence-building in the military area between the South and the North.

Given the fact that North Korea has deployed large military forces in its forward areas and conducts all military maneuvers in secrecy, North Korea ought to take corresponding steps and thereby help lay the groundwork for mutual confidence-building.

Part II

Progress of South-North Dialogue

1. Preliminary Meetings for High-Level Officials Talks

a. Fourth Preliminary Meeting

The 4th preliminary meeting to prepare for the proposed South-North High-Level Officials Talks was held from 10 a.m. to 12:17 p.m. November 15, 1989 at Tongilkak in the northern sector of Panmunjom. The meeting was opened to the public.

In his first speech, the South's Chief Delegate Song Han-ho expressed regret over the fact that the past three meetings had failed to register any progress due to issues not related to the purpose of the meetings. He then urged the North to be sincere toward the discussion of procedural matters for the opening of the proposed talks.

At the same time, the South showed its willingness to make a sweeping concession in favor of the early realization of the proposed high-level officials talks. In consideration of the North's insistence on a single agenda topic for the proposed talks, the South set forth a single topic incorporating the six agenda topics it suggested previously and offered to change the suggested number of attendants to "30 or so."

With regard to the issue of agenda topics, the South emphasized that there was no change in its position that the six-point topics it introduced at the first preliminary meeting — 1) the issue of suspending mutual slanders and defamation, 2) the issue of mutual respect and non-interference, 3) the issue of multi-faceted exchanges and cooperation, 4) the issue of confidence-building in the military area, 5) the issue of holding a South-North summit meeting, and 6) other issues to be raised by the two sides — were reasonable, having reflected the ideas

of both sides. The South said it was nevertheless changing the suggested topics to “the issue of multi-faceted exchanges and cooperation and elimination of the state of political and military confrontation” to accommodate the North’s call for a single comprehensive topic in an effort not to allow any further delay of the proposed talks simply because of the issue of agenda topics.

The offer change reflected the sincere posture of the South in trying to materialize the proposed talks at an early date by all means. It also stemmed from a positive determination to facilitate the parallel discussion of the issue of exchanges and cooperation and the North’s idea of political and military issues, and thereby systematically resolve the travel, communication, trade and various other issues that would inevitably arise in the course of exchanges and cooperation accompanied by the alleviation of tension.

At the same time, the South emphasized that inasmuch as the proposed talks were supposed to be a meeting between high-level officials of the two sides, the composition of delegations should be discussed in a way that would facilitate a broad debate on various issues pending between the two sides. It then produced a 16-point detailed operational procedure for the proposed talks covering such matters as the format of the talks, adoption of an agreement, minutes of the talks, press reporting, guarantee for personal safety and protocol.

At this meeting, North Korea, unlike its actions at many past sessions, superficially seemed to agree affirmatively to the discussion of procedural matters without raising issues out of context such as the Team Spirit exercise and the judicial handling of Moon Ik-hwan and Lim Su-kyong.

But, while showing a general welcome to the South’s revised single topic, describing it as being close to their own version,

“the issue of removing the state of political and military confrontation between the South and the North,” the North objected to the inclusion of the words, “exchanges and cooperation,” in the topic, arguing that the issue of “exchanges and cooperation” was already contained comprehensively in their idea, “the issue of removing the state of political and military confrontation.”

Moreover, North Korea insisted on the prior resolution of so-called political and military issues with the unreasonable logic that “the kernal knot, namely, the issue of fierce political and military confrontation should be resolved first to bring about the alleviation of tension and the removal of distrust” or that “if political and military issues were resolved, exchanges and cooperation would be realized by themselves.”

In addition, they simply repeated their past contention that the name of the proposed talks should be a “North-South high-level political and military meeting” saying that the meeting should be so named as to be linked to its topics. They also insisted that each delegation should include two senior military officers with power.

As a result, the fourth meeting, too, failed to register any progress as North Korea, despite the South’s call for a productive debate, shunned substantial talks by simply setting off a dispute over the issue of the principles of “exchanges and cooperation” and “political and military issues.”

The intransigency showed by the North at the fourth meeting despite the South’s accommodation of their idea of a single agenda topic, the biggest issue to settle before the opening of the proposed talks, proved that the North was yet to have any positive interest in the realization of the proposed high-level officials talks.

b. Fifth Preliminary Meeting

The 5th preliminary meeting, opened to the public, was held at Peace House in the southern sector of Panmunjom from 10 a.m. to 12:15 p.m. December 20, 1989.

At the 5th meeting, the North Korean delegation, which spoke first, appeared to be responsive to substantial discussion by producing their version of an agreement without raising out of context issues such as they had done at prior meetings.

Here, the two sides could, for the first time since the start of the preliminary meetings, discuss procedural matters in earnest with the two sides compromising the issues of the name and topic of the proposed talks and the composition of delegations. Compared with the past meetings which registered little progress, the 5th meeting thus recorded considerable progress.

The matters on which the two sides reached or neared an accord at the 5th meeting were:

First, regarding the issue of the name of the proposed talks, the South stressed that the name should be either "South-North prime ministers' meeting" or "South-North high-level authorities' meeting" so that the prime ministers of the two sides could meet and broadly discuss matters to improve South-North relations. The North, on the other hand, adhered to their idea of a "South-North high-level political and military meeting" before they offered to change it to a "South-North high-level meeting," to which the South agreed. The two sides thus agreed to make the name of the proposed talks "South-North high-level meeting."

Second, with regard to the issue of the agenda topics of the proposed talks, the South again urged that North Korea agree to the idea that the South had offered as its revised plan at the

4th meeting, “the issue of multi-faceted exchanges and cooperation and the elimination of the state of political and military confrontation between the South and the North,” saying that it, in effect, accommodated the North’s idea and that North Korea itself did not oppose exchanges and cooperation between the two sides.

At first, North Korea kept arguing that the issue of exchanges and cooperation was involved in their idea of “the issue of the elimination of the state of political and military confrontation.” Afterwards, they offered a compromise idea, “regarding the elimination of the state of political and military confrontation and the realization of multi-faceted exchanges and cooperation between the South and the North.”

In response to the North’s revised offer, the South made a concession, suggesting that since the “issue of exchanges and cooperation” and the “question of the elimination of the state of political and military confrontation” should be discussed in parallel, the two sides phrase the topic as they please. However, the North stuck to their idea. The two sides, thus, were unable to reach an accord on this matter.

Third, regarding the composition of delegations, the South suggested that since one chief-of-staff-level officer would be enough as the representation of the military so far as the South was concerned, the North could include two military delegates in its delegation if they so desire. Here, the North changed its position and offered that the two sides include up to two military delegates if they so please on the condition that the delegate or delegates should be of chief-of-staff level. The two sides thus reached an accord on the number of military delegates, and also agreed that each side would carry 33 attendants to support their delegations.

Accordingly, the two sides agreed on the name, time and

place of the proposed talks and the composition of delegations. And, even though the two sides showed a difference on the phrasing of the agenda topic, they shared the view that the issue of multi-faceted exchanges and cooperation and the question of the elimination of the state of political and military confrontation should be discussed in parallel.

The progress made at the 5th meeting heightened public expectations for the realization of a South-North high-level meeting. The North's positive attitude toward substantial discussion and their agreement to the South's ideas seemed intended to soften up the critical view of their closed system both at home and abroad in this time of the accelerating trend of East Europe toward reforms and openness.

c. Sixth Preliminary Meeting

The 6th preliminary meeting was held at Tongilkak in the northern sector of Panmunjom from 10 a.m. to 1 p.m. January 31, 1990. It was opened to the public.

The South attended the meeting with the intent of successfully winding up the year-long preliminary talks so as to realize the proposed high-level talks at an early date and thereby provide historical momentum for unification. The South expected that the North would show a correspondently sincere attitude.

In his first speech, the South's Chief Delegate Song Han-ho observed that at the past five meetings, the two sides, despite some difficulties, had reaped substantial achievements by reaching or nearing an accord in many areas. With regard to the issue of phrasing the agenda topic that so far remained unsolved, Song stated that, as there were no basic differences on the contents of the topic, the two sides could phrase it the way they each please. He then suggested that the South phrase it "the

issue of multi-faceted exchanges and cooperation and the elimination of the state of political and military confrontation between the South and the North,” and the North “the question of the elimination of the state of political and military confrontation between the North and the South and the issue of multi-faceted exchanges and cooperation,” so that the issue of phrasing the topic could be resolved.

The South also produced a “draft agreement on holding a South-North high-level meeting” which it had prepared based on both sides’ ideas and matters agreed on at prior meetings, suggesting that if the two sides could only successfully resolve the issue of phrasing the topic, then the two sides could arrange the wording of the draft agreement at separate working-level contacts before having it signed and exchanged at the 7th preliminary meeting.

However, North Korea, contrary to the positive attitude they had displayed at the 5th meeting, refused to enter substantial discussion by first demanding the “removal of concrete walls” which Kim Il-sung had first mentioned in his New Year message, calling for a conference between government authorities and political party leaders between the two sides, and raising the issue of a joint Korea-U.S. military exercise. They thus caused the meeting to end without any progress.

The North Koreans persisted in their deceptive political propaganda, incorrectly describing the South’s anti-tank barriers as anti-personnel walls that, like the Berlin Wall, stand in the way to free travel and opening between the South and the North.

Also asserting that the Team Spirit military exercise held annually in the South cannot be compatible with the South-North dialogue, the North demanded the prior discussion of a so-called three-point emergency measure — 1) immediate suspension of the Team Spirit ’90 military exercise, 2) withdrawal of

U.S. troops and military equipment mobilized for the Team Spirit '90 exercise, and 3) conducting of military exercises among South Korean troops only. They also denounced the political realignment that has taken place in the South as a "political conspiracy" intended to form a "one-party fascist dictatorship."

The South expressed regret over the North's deceptive propaganda offensive and also over their unreasonable action in obstructing the progress of the meeting again with matters not related to the purpose of the meeting. The South time and again urged the North to agree to begin discussing substantial issues.

Also blaming the North for demanding, as a prerequisite to the progress of the meeting, the removal of "concrete walls" and the suspension of the Team Spirit exercise, the South emphasized that their demand was simply part of a deceptive scheme to deliberately set up an obstacle to the on-going dialogue in an attempt to avoid the materialization of a high-level meeting and inter-Korean exchanges and to shift to the South the blame for the failure to realize free inter-Korean travel and opening.

Noting that the so-called "concrete walls" are none other than anti-tank barriers having nothing to do with free travel as press members both at home and abroad had confirmed, the South charged that their demand for the removal of such military facilities may indicate their intent of clearing planned invasion corridors of any barriers in preparation for another aggressive act against the South.

The South also pointed out that the Team Spirit exercises were devised because of growing misgivings on the part of the South about the North which holds secret offensive military maneuvers and which has moved large numbers of military personnel to areas close to the truce line. It then stressed that if the

North were interested in free travel and opening between the two sides of Korea, they should first be sincere in their attitude towards a dialogue between government authorities.

In particular, when the South, reacting to the North's denouncement of the merger of three political parties in the South, made it clear that it was the North that has been under a one-man dictatorship for some 40-odd years, the North called this comment a "grave provocation" and demanded the retraction of the remarks as a detriment to the conference atmosphere.

The two sides agreed to hold the 7th preliminary meeting on March 7, 1990. However, the North asserted that they had agreed to the date on the condition that the South would notify them of the suspension of the planned Team Spirit exercise, thus suggesting that they would suspend the 7th meeting.

2. Preparatory Contacts for Parliamentary Talks

a. Ninth Preparatory Contact

The 9th preparatory contact to prepare for the proposed South-North parliamentary talks was held at Tongilkak in the northern sector of Panmunjom from 10 a.m. til 12:30 p.m. November 29, 1989.

In its first speech, the North's delegation denounced the Team Spirit military exercise and the judicial actions being taken against illegal visitors to the North such as Moon Ik-hwan and Lim Soo-kyong, demanding that the South take "appropriate steps" to foster an atmosphere conducive to inter-Korean dialogue. However, the tone of their statement was not strong, giving the impression that they did not want to see external issues unrelated to the talks become matters of dispute. The

North agreed to discuss procedural issues.

However, as to the format of a delegates meeting to discuss agenda topics, North Korea unreasonably insisted that the fact that the South had agreed on the formation of an executive department and a joint steering committee at the time of the 6th preparatory contact, was tantamount to agreeing to the format of a delegates meeting in the nature of a joint conference as they suggested.

Regarding the issue of agenda topics, the North agreed only to the second item, the question of the declaration of South-North non-aggression, from among the three-point topics the South had suggested at the 8th contact as a revised idea of topics. On the remaining two items, the North insisted that in the first item concerning the issue of multi-faceted exchanges and cooperation between the South and the North, the word "cooperation" should be placed before the word "exchanges," and that the third item, the question of a South-North summit meeting, should be removed from the topics altogether.

The South's Chief Delegate Chae Mun-shik, in his first speech, expressed regret over the fact that North Korea interfered in the internal affairs of the other side and had raised issues of extraneous matters at the eighth contact, causing the meeting to end without any progress. He urged the North to agree to discuss procedural matters in earnest so that the proposed meeting could be held at an early date.

At the same time, he stated that the legislators from the South and the North should fulfil their due responsibility and roles in conformity with the wishes and expectation of the people who are longing for the unfolding of a hopeful new chapter of reunification, emphasizing that they should negotiate in the manner of understanding and compromise and in the determination to realize the proposed talks by all means.

As to the format of the talks, the South maintained that a meeting to discuss agenda topics should be a select delegates meeting of a bilateral nature. It pointed out that at the preliminary contacts held in 1985 to discuss the holding of a South-North parliamentary meeting, the two sides had agreed to hold it in a delegates talks format. The South also stressed that the proposed parliamentary talks are supposed to be a meeting between the organizations representing the two systems of the South and the North, and that the preparatory contacts themselves have been held as bilateral talks. Moreover, the topics that the two sides had already agreed to discuss at the proposed talks are of a bilateral nature.

Regarding the issue of topics, the South's delegation emphasized that in view of parliamentary function and the fact that the top leaders of the two sides have on many occasions recognized the importance and necessity of a summit meeting, there should be no reason why North Korea should oppose the adoption of the issue of a South-North summit meeting as one of the agenda topics.

When North Korean delegates made extraneous remarks trying to avoid the essence of the reforms and openness sweeping East European countries, the South said that North Korea should keep in step with the universal flow of detente and cooperation such as that in the Soviet Union and East European countries now undergoing reforms and openness, reminding them that this would be one sure way to advance the timetable for unification. It then called for the North's openness in the areas of politics, economy, society and culture by adopting, for instance, multi-political party and free election systems.

In response to the South's call for the opening of the North, North Korean delegates first reacted strongly, insisting that the South's openness is an "openness toward alien forces" and that

the South should remove “concrete walls.” However, as disputes over the two systems were about to get heated, the North hastily put an end to the debate.

At the 8th contact, the South strongly urged the North to renounce its aggressive schemes against the South, open itself up and guarantee the freedom and human rights of the North Korean people, in reaction to which the North’s Chief Delegate Chon Gum-chol demanded that the South make an “apology.” At the 9th contact, however, the North did not show as strong a reaction as it showed at the 8th contact apparently because they had judged that an escalated debate would not serve their interests, reflecting that the wave of reforms and openness has already seriously affected the North.

But, in a press conference after the 9th contact, the North’s Chon Kum-chol made hawkish remarks, saying that “the contacts would be suspended if the Team Spirit exercise were held as planned,” hinting that they would again raise issues out of context to the matters at hand at the next contact, too.

The two sides’ positions expressed throughout the nine contacts can be compared as follows in substance:

—Matters of difference

Classification	The South	The North
Format	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Meeting to discuss agenda topics should be a select delegates meeting of a bilateral nature. (System of bilateral agreement) * The executive department, also, should be under the system of bilateral agreement. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Meeting to discuss basic issues should be a delegates conference of a joint meeting in nature. (System of concurrent agreement) * The executive department should be under the system of unanimous agreement.

Classification	The South	The North
Topics	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Issue of holding South-North summit meeting. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Opposition to inclusion of issue of summit meeting in the list of topics. * Issue of the suspension of the Team Spirit exercise to be raised again if the exercise were held in the South.

— Matters of concurrence

- Format of the talks: To be held in the order of an opening meeting, a select delegates meeting to discuss agenda topics, and a closing meeting.
 - Opening and closing meetings: Joint sessions (attendance by entire legislators), co-chairman system.
 - Meeting to discuss agenda topics: To be attended by 50 delegates from each side (Executive department and joint steering committee to be formed with five members from each side, respectively).
- Agenda topics:
 - (1) Question of multi-faceted exchanges and cooperation between the South and the North.
 - (2) Question of declaration of non-aggression pact between the South and the North.
 - * The order of the words “exchanges” and “cooperation” and the order of phrasing concerning the entire range of topics were not agreed upon.
- Meeting locations: Opening meeting in Pyongyang, closing meeting in Seoul, meetings to discuss agenda topics in Seoul and Pyongyang by turn with the first meeting to be held in Seoul.

b. Tenth Preparatory Contact

The 10th preparatory contact for the proposed South-North parliamentary talks was held at the newly built Peace House in the southern sector of Panmunjom from 10 a.m. til 12:10 p.m. January 24, 1990. The meeting was opened to the public.

The new Peace House, dedicated on December 19, 1989 after one year and four months' work, is symbolic of the Seoul government's determination to bring about a historic turning point in inter-Korean relations and its northern policy, as well as to positively prepare for the possible envigoration of inter-Korean dialogue, exchanges and cooperation in the 1990's.

The South's Chief Delegate Chae Mun-shik, noting that the contact was the first meeting ever held at the new building, called for the successful discussion of the remaining issues under the spirit of mutual respect and reciprocity, with both sides duly recognizing the historical meaning and importance of the proposed parliamentary talks.

With regard to the format of a meeting to discuss agenda topics on which the two sides differed, the South once again urged the North to agree to the format of a select delegates meeting. Chae pointed to the unreasonableness of the joint meeting method the North demanded, reasoning that a joint meeting is the kind of format feasible only between organizations operating under the same political or legal system. He noted that all the talks held between the South and the North heretofore had been held under the bilateral meeting method, and the topics to be discussed between the two sides, too, are bilateral in nature.

Regarding the issue of agenda topics, the South also stressed that it is the natural duty of South and North Korean politicians

to discuss the issue of holding a South-North summit meeting. The South's chief delegate said it could not be understood why North Korea should avoid an inter-Korean summit meeting when they themselves had recognized the need for it.

In his first speech, however, the North's chief delegate persisted in demanding the removal of the alleged "concrete walls" and holding a "conference of high government and political party officials of the South and the North," without mentioning any thing about procedural matters. The North also demanded discussion of the issue of "suspending the Team Spirit military exercise" as an emergency topic prior to the discussion of procedural items. The North thus again made another unveiled attempt to turn the 10th preparatory contact into a forum for their political propaganda.

As the North Korean delegation was busy slandering the other side in dialogue, oblivious of their inherent duty, the South strongly urged the North to stop trying to make the contact a propaganda show and instead agree to enter into the discussion of procedural matters.

At the same time, the South stressed that, in fact, the North had no right to discuss free travel and openness in view of the fact that the North had torpedoed Red Cross talks blocking even hometown visits by dispersed family members. It then challenged the North to display sincerity, if it had any, by normalizing the multi-channeled dialogue between the South and the North at an early date.

South Korean delegates pointed out that what stands in the way of free travel and openness between the South and the North is not anti-tank barriers as the North claims, but instead the state of mutual distrust and confrontation that stems from the North Korean goal of communizing the entire Korean peninsula.

Despite the South's repeated calls for the continuation of discussion of unresolved issues in a manner befitting the duty imposed on delegations, the North Korean delegation refused to the end to enter into any business discussions, thereby causing the 10th contact to end without any progress.

As to the time of the 11th contact, the North agreed to hold it on February 22, 1990 as the South suggested, but only on the condition that the Team Spirit exercise be suspended. Their behavior again proved that they were little interested in the realization of the proposed parliamentary talks.

3. Red Cross Working-Level Delegates' Contacts

a. Fifth Working-Level Delegates' Contact

The 5th South-North Red Cross working-level delegates' contact, designed to discuss the issue of holding the 11th full-dress South-North Red Cross meeting and the question of exchanging second dispersed family hometown visitors and art troupes, was held at the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission at Panmunjom from 10 a.m. to 12:11 p.m. November 13, 1989. The meeting was held behind closed doors.

At the contact, which proceeded without chief delegates' keynote speeches, the South's Chief Delegate Song Young-dae stated that it would be reasonable to set the number of each side's hometown visitors at 300 and art troupe at 100 since, he said, the proposed second exchange of hometown visitors and art troupes was primarily designed to ease the pains and misfortune of dispersed families, with the visit of art troupes being a secondary project. Song said that the 100-member scale of an

art troupe was in keeping with international practices, and represented the consensus among artists and dispersed family members in the South.

The South set forth a compromise plan that accommodated most of the North Korean contentions over the size of the visiting groups and the issue of live television coverage of art performances, the major questions among those that remained unsettled, in a bid to bring about a package agreement at the 5th contact so as to materialize the exchange of hometown visitors on December 8th as had already been agreed upon between the two sides.

In other words, the South offered a compromise plan suggesting that the size of an art troupe may be 120 persons and accepting the North Korean idea of live television and radio coverage of art troupe performances.

However, the South made it clear that in art performances the two sides should follow the precedent that repertoires should be mostly Korea's traditional songs and dances of a nature that does not offend or slander the other side and that the contents of repertoires should be exchanged in advance.

This way, the South set forth all available compromise plans in expectation of a corresponding measure from the North. But, the North showed no compromise at all.

North Korea, at first, insisted that they couldn't reduce the size of an art troupe to less than 200. Later, however, the North Koreans offered a revised plan in which they suggested that the total number of a visiting group be 571 persons including 40 support personnel, 30 press members and one group leader and that the numbers of hometown visitors and an art troupe be set the way each side pleases within that total ceiling. In other words, North Korea's idea was that the South set the number of hometown visitors at 400 and that of their art troupe at 100

while they would set the numbers of their hometown visitors at 300 and art troupe members at 200.

This, in fact, was an idea that violated the principle of reciprocity applied theretofore to all inter-Korean dealings as a custom, and, at the same time, reflected their persistent position that each art troupe should consist of 200 members.

Meanwhile, the South noted that there was not enough time left for the preparation of the exchange of visiting groups set for December 8th since the lists of visitors had to be exchanged before November 8th and hotel accommodations must be prepared in haste. It suggested that talks be held that afternoon, also, and if the North Korean situation did not allow it, then the 6th contact could be held right away the next day. But, the North persisted in its passive posture, suggesting a later date for the 6th contact with the excuse of local council elections, thus beclouding the prospects of the exchange of hometown visitors within the year.

This attitude of North Korea gave rise to the suspicion that the North had come to the table of working-level delegates contacts only with the intent of justifying a series of their political operations against the South such as the issues of Moon Ik-hwan and Lim Soo-kyong without any interest in the resumption of the full-dress Red Cross talks or in the exchange of hometown visitors right from the beginning.

b. Sixth Working-Level Delegates' Contact

The 6th working-level delegates' contact was held at the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission at Panmunjom on November 21, 1989. The contact, where both sides' keynote speeches were omitted, lasted five hours and 10 minutes. A morning session from 10 a.m. to 1 p.m. was follow-

ed by an afternoon session from 3 to 5 p.m.

In a bid to engineer a total accord at the 6th contact and thereby materialize the second exchange of visiting groups and the 11th full-dress Red Cross meeting within the month of December, the South showed a positive posture fully accommodating the North Korean idea that the total size of a visiting group be set at 571 and the size of hometown visitors and art troupe be determined in numbers convenient for each side.

Here, the two sides agreed that the South's visiting group would be comprised of 350 hometown visitors, 150 art troupe members, 30 press members, 40 attendants and one group leader, while the North's group would include 300 hometown visitors, 200 art troupe members, 30 press members, 40 attendants and one group leader.

And, in the expectation that the two sides could reach a complete accord at the 6th contact since the South had accepted the North Korean ideas on such matters as the places to be visited, issue of live television coverage and the size of visiting groups and since other procedural matters like the contents of art performances, press activities, procedures for passage and the preparation of the list of visitors, could be resolved based on past precedents, the South laid down a draft Agreement on Resumption of South-North Red Cross Conference and Second Exchange of Dispersed Family Hometown Visitors and Art Troupes, urging that the two sides promptly start adjusting the wording of the draft agreement.

North Korea showed the position that the draft agreement produced by the South was in accord with their ideas. Still, they began to deliberately set forth obstacles, raising issues out of such matters as the frequency and duration of art performances, scope of hometown visitors, status of group leaders and contents of art performances.

Regarding the contents of performances, North Korea from out of nowhere offered the principles that 1) the contents of a performance should be nationalistic, 2) the contents should be sound in nature, and 3) the contents should not be of a kind that slanders or defames the other side. The North also demanded that repertoires include only songs, dances and operas.

The South, recalling that at the time of the first exchange of hometown visitors the two sides agreed that “the contents of art performances shall be mostly traditional songs and dances, which shall not be of the kind that offends, slanders or defames the other side,” accepted the North Korean suggestion in the understanding that the essence of this agreement was incorporated in the North Korean proposal.

As to the issue of group leaders, the North insisted that the deputy heads of the two Red Cross societies should be group leaders, even rejecting the South’s compromise idea that each side use either the Red Cross head or deputy head as its group leader as it sees fit.

Regarding the scope of hometown visitors, the South suggested that hometown visitors be selected without any limit to areas since if they were selected only from among those hailing from Pyongyang and Seoul, it would be an inhumane act going against the principle of equal opportunity, especially at this time when so many dispersed families aspire to visit their hometowns. However, the North insisted that hometown visitors should be selected mostly from among those hailing from Seoul and Pyongyang.

In connection with the frequency and duration of art performances, the South offered the compromise that given the duration of the planned visit, each art troupe present three 150-minute performances whereas the North refused to back down from their idea of four three-hour performances.

Moreover, the North made it clear that the long duration of the performances was to facilitate the presentation of their revolutionary operas such as "A Flower-Peddling Girl" or "Sea of Blood." They thus unveiled the ulterior motive with which they had come to the table of working-level delegates' contacts.

North Korea's so-called revolutionary operas are full of political propaganda intended to agitate people for revolutionary or class struggles. Their insistence on the presentation of such operas in the South couldn't be anything but an act running counter to the basic purport of the exchange of art troupes designed to promote mutual understanding. They are also ignoring the basic spirit of Red Cross humanitarian projects.

Moreover, it was clear that, as these operas feature the praising of specific persons and the rejection of the system of the other side, their presentation in the South would only abet distrust and confrontation between the South and the North thereby resulting in the aggravation of inter-Korean relations.

The fact that, despite the South's acceptance of the North's ideas on the size of visiting groups and several other procedural matters, the North has shunned the adoption of an agreement and has disclosed beforehand that the repertoire of their performance would be "A Flower-Peddling Girl" or "Sea of Blood," might well be part of their attempt to prompt the South to reject their plan, thus delaying the exchange of hometown visitors, and ultimately shifting the blame for the failure to make the exchange to the South.

In short, whereas the South showed flexibility throughout the six contacts, agreeing to North Korean ideas on such matters as the time of the exchange, places to be visited, issue of live television coverage of performances, the numbers of press members and attendants, size of visiting groups and the principle of the contents of performances, the North only held fast to

their own position.

As can be seen in their abrupt disclosure of a plan to stage one of their revolutionary operas in the South, the intransigency of the North Korean position spoke for itself that, from the beginning, they had not been interested in the exchange of hometown visitors within the year.

c. Seventh Working-Level Delegates' Contact

The 7th South-North Red Cross working-level delegates' contact was held for three hours from 10 a.m. to 1 p.m. November 27, 1989 at the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission at Panmunjom. It was held behind closed doors.

The South expressed regret over the fact that at the 6th contact, the North had disclosed a plan to present revolutionary operas such as "A Flower-Peddling Girl" and "Sea of Blood" in the South, causing a delay in the conclusion of working-level talks.

The South strongly urged the North to withdraw their plan to stage a revolutionary opera in the South, pointing out that such performances run counter to the purport of the exchange of visiting groups and the principle of Red Cross neutrality and that "the Red Cross cannot meddle in any political or ideological disputes," as well as restating the principle of the contents of art performances agreed on between the two sides, namely, "the contents of performances shall not be of the kind that slanders or defames the other side."

In addition, the South stressed that even if it would be difficult to materialize the second exchange of visiting groups within the year due to a delay in agreement, at least the 11th full-dress Red Cross meeting should be held in Pyongyang on

December 15th as had already been agreed upon.

However, North Korea simply repeated their position, arguing that the presentation of a revolutionary opera in the South would be in accordance with the principle of performances. The North even went so far as to claim that the two sides never reached an accord on the fact that “the contents of art performance shall not be of the kind that offends the other side.” They rather concentrated on trying to shift the blame for the failure of the contact to the South.

Even on the issue of holding the 11th full-dress Red Cross meeting on December 15th, the North contended that they had agreed on the date of the 11th full-dress meeting only on the condition that the meeting could be preceded by the exchange of visiting groups, thus making it uncertain whether the 11th full-dress meeting could be held as planned.

Regarding the issue of the next contact, the North proposed a separate meeting between the two sides’ chief delegates behind closed doors. The South replied that it was prepared to meet the North Koreans at any time in whatever form if only the North expressed the willingness to change the contents of their art performances. The two sides agreed to determine the method and time of the next contact through telephone conversation at a later date.

The fact that North Korea proposed a closed separate meeting between the chief delegates despite the fact that they themselves kept the 7th delegates contact from registering any progress by indulging in the propagandization of a revolutionary opera without showing any response to the South’s call for the final wording of a draft agreement, was part of their attempt to jointly share the blame for the failure to materialize the exchange of visiting groups while delaying the total breakup of the contacts until December 8th when the exchange was suppos-

ed to have taken place.

d. Exclusive Contact between Chief Delegates

In a telephone message sent to Song Young-dae, the South's chief delegate to the South-North Red Cross working-level delegates' contacts, on December 2, 1989, the North's chief delegate Pak Yong-su, while blaming the South for the deadlock of the contacts, proposed to hold an exclusive chief delegates' contact on December 4th making himself appear as if he were prepared to change the contents of their art performances.

Accordingly, an exclusive chief delegates' contact was held from 10 to 10:50 a.m. December 4, 1989, at the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission at Panmunjom.

Pointing out that the exchange of visiting groups failed to take place due to the North Korean plan to stage a revolutionary opera in the South, the South's chief delegate emphasized that even though the exchange of visiting groups could not be realized within the year, the 11th full-dress Red Cross meeting should be held in Pyongyang on December 15th as had been agreed upon between the two sides.

However, the North's chief delegate reaffirmed that there was no change in their plan to stage a revolutionary opera in the South, repeating their position that the 11th full-dress Red Cross meeting could be held only after the exchange of visiting groups had been realized.

In addition, the North made a fait accompli the failure to realize the exchange of visiting groups within the year by suggesting that the two sides refrain from discussing the issue of responsibility for the failure of the exchange any further and in-

stead continue to discuss the issue of the exchange by holding the eighth working-level delegates contact on January 22, 1990.

Pointing out that any working-level delegates' contact would be meaningless unless there was a change in the North Korean plan to stage a revolutionary opera, the South suggested that the two sides discuss the time of the next contact over the direct telephone line. The North agreed to this suggestion and thus the exclusive chief delegates contact ended without any result.

e. Developments following Exclusive Chief Delegates' Contact

As nothing was heard from North Korea after the exclusive contact between the chief delegates to the Red Cross working-level talks, ROKNRC President Kim Sang-hyop and Chief Delegate Song Young-dae issued a statement and made a telephone call to the North on December 7th in which they expressed regret over the failure to materialize the second exchange of hometown visitors and art troupes on December 8th as had been originally agreed upon between the two sides. They urged the North to show sincerity toward holding the 11th full-dress Red Cross meeting on December 15th.

The gist of the statement and telephone messages was as follows:

Statement by the ROKNRC President

Throughout the seven working-level delegates' contacts held between the South and North Korean Red Cross societies since last September, our side exerted all available efforts to realize the

second exchange of hometown visitors on December 8th and the 11th full-dress Red Cross meeting on December 15th as had been agreed upon between the two dies.

Our side positively accommodated North Korea's position with regard to the issues of the time and places of hometown visits, live television coverage of art performances, and the size of hometown visiting groups and art troupes. However, the North, preoccupied only with art performances, turned a deaf ear to our side's sincere efforts and the wishes of dispersed families. In the final stage, moreover, they insisted that they would stage one of their so-called revolutionary operas in Seoul.

To make the exchange of art troupes helpful to Red Cross humanitarian projects and serve the purpose of the promotion of mutual understanding, art performances should, needless to say, be staged in a way that is mutually acceptable.

The ardent wish of dispersed families to visit their hometowns to meet their blood relatives and visit their ancestral tombs should never be blocked by the issue of the exchange of art troupes.

Although in reality the realization of the second exchange of hometown visitors and art troupes within the year has become impossible, the ROKNRC intends to exert all possible endeavors to fulfil the wishes of dispersed families by all means next year.

At the same time, we plan to do our utmost to ensure the holding of the 11th full-dress Red Cross meeting. We expect North Korea to show sincerity toward this end.

Telephone Message by the Chief Delegate to Red Cross Working-Level Delegates' Contacts

It is regrettable that despite the fervent longing of dispersed families and all other people, the second exchange of visiting groups failed to materialize on the date agreed upon by the two sides. This project should be realized by all means since this is an

undertaking which the Red Cross officials of the South and the North have promised to do in front of the whole nation.

To this end, there should first be a change in the contents of your side's art performances, the contents due to which the recent working-level delegates' contacts failed to reach an accord. The contents of both sides' art performances should be of the kind that will be mutually acceptable in all respects such as the principle of the Red Cross and the purport of the exchange of art troupes.

In this respect, we are willing to resume the working-level delegates' contacts at any time to carry on efforts to realize the second exchange of visiting groups if only your side is prepared to readjust the contents of your side's performances.

The 11th full-dress Red Cross meeting ought to be held in Pyongyang on December 15th as originally agreed on between the two sides. It is not reasonable to link the Red Cross meeting to the second exchange of visiting groups, and doing so runs counter to an agreement reached between the two sides. Therefore, your side, as the hosting side for the 11th full-dress Red Cross meeting, should fulfil your due responsibility.

As I hope that the full-dress meeting will be held as planned and the second exchange of visiting groups realized in the near future to give joy and hope to dispersed families, I look forward to your side's affirmative response.

Meanwhile, in a deceptive propaganda statement issued by the spokesman of the Central Committee of the North Korean Red Cross, the North attempted to shift the blame to the South for the failure to realize the exchange of visiting groups.

Here, the ROKNRC sent another telephone message to the North in the name of the chief delegate to the working-level delegates' contacts, expressing regret over the North's refusal to hold even the 11th full-dress Red Cross meeting.

The message also stressed that the North should not turn a deaf ear to the wish of dispersed families over the issue of the contents of art performances if they wanted to ease the misfortune and pains of dispersed families even a little. It then urged the North to change the contents of their art performances to those that are mutually acceptable.

4. Sports Talks

a. Fourth Meeting

The 4th South-North sports meeting, designed to discuss the issue of fielding a single South-North delegation to the Beijing Asian Games, was held at Tongilkak in the northern sector of Panmunjom from 10 a.m. to 1:45 p.m. November 16, 1989. The talks were opened to the public.

In his first speech, the South's Chief Delegate Chang Chung-shik noted that the two sides had registered substantial progress in their past three meetings, reaching or nearing an accord on some of the ten items related to the composition and fielding of a single inter-Korean delegation. He urged the North to agree to discuss some essential issues such as the composition of a joint delegation and the establishment of joint implementation organizations on which the two sides differed but had yet to enter into discussion about.

The South's chief delegate stressed that inasmuch as the remaining issues purely concerned sports, the two sides should work out grounds for mutual agreement in the spirit of mutual reciprocity and compromise, thereby helping pave the way to national reconciliation and unity.

In consideration of preparatory works necessary for the fielding of a single delegation and for the sake of the effective proceedings of the talks, the South offered revised plans on two of the 10 items it had laid down at the time of the 3rd meeting — the issue of the name of a single delegation and the method of selecting athletes.

In its revised plans, the South classified sports events into four categories in connection with the issue of selecting athletes — record, score, contest and ball events, offering the concrete method of carrying out selection matches in accordance with the nature of each event. The South also suggested that such detailed matters as the concrete method and time of selection matches, sports equipment to be used, game rules and the selection of judges be discussed and determined by a joint implementation office for the single inter-Korean delegation.

Meanwhile, regarding the issue of the name of a single delegation, the South offered the name “KOREA” in Roman letters and “Korea” in Korean letters as it is pronounced in English, and to describe it in Chinese characters the way it is pronounced in English, thus in effect accepting the North Korean idea that the name of a single delegation be described as “Korea.”

North Korea, unlike in inter-Korean talks in other areas, did not raise issues out of context at the sports talks and, at least on the surface, affirmatively responded to the discussion of substantive matters thereby trying to demonstrate their “eagerness” to realize a single inter-Korean delegation.

North Korea even laid down a draft “Agreement on the Composition of a Single South-North Delegation” covering ten items including the already-agreed-upon issues of the flag and anthem of a single delegation and others that still needed further discussion such as the description in Korean of the name of a

single delegation, selection of athletes, composition of a single delegation and the issue of forming joint implementation offices.

In the discussion of the issue of how to spell the name of a single delegation in Korean letters as “Korea” is pronounced in English, the North adhered to its own version before they agreed to the South’s version as it is more accurate according to the usual English pronunciation. In the description of the name in Chinese, the two sides also shared the view that the word “Koryo” would not be used.

However, the two sides decided to further discuss at the 5th meeting the question of adopting the method of the description of the name in Chinese characters and producing it as a single plan to the Beijing Asian Games Organizing Committee.

Differences were thus all resolved on issues of a political nature that have so far been the focal point of discussions. What remained to be resolved were only sports issues.

As to the issue of the head of a joint delegation, the South emphasized that for the effective management of a delegation according to given international practices, the side which would have the most participating athletes should put up a delegation chief and the other side a deputy chief. The North, however, kept demanding a co-chief system, making it impossible to settle this particular issue.

On the question of the establishment of a joint secretariat, too, the South suggested that it be set up in Seoul and Pyongyang, while North Korea wanted Panmunjom as its location.

Regarding the issue of the selection of athletes, the North shunned discussion on this subject contending that the two sides had already reached an accord at the 3rd meeting in that “the two sides shall see to it that no balance is shaken between the South and the North so far as is possible in the composition of a

delegation.” It then argued that matters related to the form, method and time of selection matches should be taken up by a joint implementation organization.

Throughout the course of the discussion of substantive issues, North Korea persisted in maintaining an ambiguous posture. The North was busy trying to give the impression that the two sides had reached an accord on basic matters related to the composition of a single delegation by striving to write off as matters agreed upon those on which the two sides had neared an accord or had similar views, while arguing that detailed technical matters such as the issue of selecting athletes ought to be left up to a joint implementation organization.

On the other hand, the South, pointing out that the question of selecting athletes would be a pivotal issue that would determine the success of the sports talks, emphasized that the two sides should first reach a concrete accord on this and other basic issues at the sports talks inasmuch as the time left for the composition of a single delegation before the June 22, 1990, deadline for entries for the Beijing Asian Games, was short, and in order to ensure the effectiveness of the operation of the proposed joint implementation organizations.

The fact that North Korea superficially behaved as if they were positive toward the formation of a single inter-Korean delegation by, for instance, producing a draft agreement while in effect shunning substantial discussions, might well have stemmed from their attempt to engineer a general agreement initially on basic issues so that they could announce the decision to form a single inter-Korean delegation for the Beijing Asian Games around the time of an Olympic Council of Asia (OCA) meeting slated for December 12th for their propaganda purposes.

b. Fifth Meeting

The 5th South-North sports meeting, which was opened to the public, was held at the Peace House in the southern sector of Panmunjom from 10 a.m. til 2:10 p.m. on November 24, 1989.

In its first speech, the North, arguing that the two sides had already agreed on a guideline for the selection of athletes that "in the composition of a single delegation, a balance between the South and the North shall be ensured so far as is possible," repeated their idea that athletes be selected from among those participating in joint training without any distinction between the two sides. They also contended that detailed matters related to the selection of athletes be discussed by a joint implementation committee.

Meanwhile, the South's Chief Delegate Chang Chung-shik, in his first speech, explained his side's position toward the formation of a single inter-Korean delegation based on a general review of the results of discussions made in the past four meetings, setting forth a detailed time schedule for the composition of a single team covering such matters as the time of the completion of the sports talks, inauguration of joint implementation organizations, joint training and selection of athletes, composition of the delegation, and the duration of intensive training for selected athletes.

The schedule let the North Korea know expressly that the two sides would be able to field a single delegation to the Beijing Games only when the sports talks were successfully wound up by the end of January 1990 at the latest.

In addition, the South proposed working-level delegates contacts between three of each side's delegates so as to iron out differences early on unsettled issues based on the results of the

general discussions of the 10-point items.

Now that the issues of the flag and anthem of a single delegation and the question of how to describe the name of a single team in Korean and Roman letters — all sensitive issues of a political nature — had been settled, the two sides began to discuss at the 5th meeting the issue of how to describe the name of a single delegation in Chinese characters for use by the Beijing Asian Games Organizing Committee, and also other sports-related technical matters related to the selection of athletes, which were regarded as essential to the formation of a single delegation.

In accordance with a decision made at the 4th meeting to discuss the issue of the description in Chinese characters of the name of a single delegation at the 5th meeting, the South offered two versions, suggesting that one of the two be chosen for notification to the Beijing Asian Games Organizing Committee. However, North Korea refused to produce their idea on this matter and even avoided discussing it, contending that since the Chinese description of the name of a single Korean delegation would be the inherent duty of the Beijing Organizing Committee, in cannot, in nature, be discussed at the South-North sports talks.

Regarding the selection of athletes, the South proposed that selection matches be held openly more than once in areas located in the two sides such as Seoul and Pyongyang by turn at the final stage of joint training among those who took part in the training. It maintained that such open selection matches would be not only desirable for South-North sports exchanges, but also a must in the aspects of “psychological fitness” and “potential physical strength.”

The South stressed that for the promotion of an atmosphere for national reconciliation based on the purport of the fielding

of a single inter-Korean delegation, selection matches should be opened to all the Korean people rather than being held behind closed doors.

On the other hand, North Korea adhered to their opposition to open selection matches with the nonsensical excuse that “holding selection matches in public would undermine national unity and reconciliation and aggravate South-North confrontation.” They also again argued that the issues of the places and frequency of selection matches ought to be discussed by a joint implementation committee.

At the 5th meeting, the two sides agreed only to hold closed-door working-level delegates contacts to ensure the effective progress of the sports talks while failing to have substantial talks on various other issues due to the North’s adamant rejection of the idea of open selection matches.

It may be presumed that the reason they were against open selection matches was that they would suffer a setback in their basic plan to obtain a “guarantee for balance between the South and the North” in the composition of a single team if and when their inferior sports ability surfaced during the early stage of the composition. Besides, the North did not want to link the issue of athletes selection to South-North sports exchanges out of the fear that open selection itself may work as a pressure factor for the opening of North Korea and South-North exchanges.

Even on the issue of determining the time of the talks, the North indulged in a lengthy wasteful dispute despite the fact that the time of the next meeting should naturally be determined based on the contents and results of the planned working-level delegates contacts. Finally, the two sides agreed to hold a working-level delegates contact meeting at the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission at Panmunjom on December 1, 1989, and the 6th sports meeting at Tongilkak

in the northern sector of Panmunjom on December 22, 1989.

c. First Working-Level Delegates Contact

The 1st working-level delegates contact of the South-North sports talks was held in the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission at Panmunjom from 10 a.m. til 1:10 p.m. on December 1, 1989. The discussion, held behind closed doors, was attended by three of the delegates to the sports meetings from each side as had been agreed upon at the 5th meeting.

The two sides' delegates to the working-level delegates contacts were:

The South

Im Tae-sun, member of the Korean Olympic Committee
 Cho Young-sung, member of the Korean Olympic Committee
 Park Su-chang, member of the Korean Olympic Committee

The North

Chang Wung, Chief Secretary of the North Korean Olympic Committee
 Kim Se-jin, member of the North Korean Olympic Committee
 Huh Hyok-pil, member of the North Korean Olympic Committee

By producing a table of comparison of the ideas the two sides had offered through five sports meetings in the past with respect to the issue of fielding a single inter-Korean delegation to the Beijing Games, the South suggested that the two sides omit

the presentation of their keynote speeches and begin directly to discuss substantive matters. The North agreed and the two sides began to discuss 10 issues one at a time.

At the first working-level delegates contact, substantial discussion was made concerning four of the 10 issues.

Regarding the issue of the description in Chinese characters of the name of a single delegation, the South, offering two versions of the Chinese description, suggested that one of the two be sent to the Beijing Asian Games Organizing Committee. The North, however, insisted that the issue of the name of a single delegation had already been resolved, attempting to make the "resolution" of the issue of the delegation name, along with those of its anthem and flag, a fait accompli.

Whereas the South, emphasizing that the issue of selecting athletes was essential to the composition of a single delegation, urged that this question must be resolved on a package basis at sports meetings for inclusion in an overall agreement, the North agreed only to the holding of selection matches in Seoul and Pyongyang by turn and on the selection of athletes for team competition in cycling, rowing, canoeing, yachting, and those ball games requiring team work. They said other detailed matters should be turned over to a joint committee.

On non-sports procedural matters like expenses and guarantee of personal safety, North Korea agreed rather blindly to the South's ideas without careful review. On the substantial issues of whether to open selection matches to the public, composition of a delegation, delegation head and a joint implementation organization, however, they held on to their original position. The two sides were thus unable to iron out their differences.

Comparison of Major Differences Expressed at First Working-Level Delegates Contact

Classification	The South	The North
Name of Delegation (Chinese character description)	Presentation of two optional versions.	Agreement on Chinese character description not necessary.
Method of selection matches	To be held openly between South and North Korean athletes at final stage of joint training.	To be discussed and determined at joint committee. * Opposition to open selection matches between South and North Korean athletes.
Method of selection of athletes of score events	If more than two athletes are to take part in an event, at least one athlete from each side should be included.	This method should be applied to all events.
Head of delegation	Head: To be put up by the side with more selected athletes. Deputy head: To be put up by the side with less selected athletes.	Co-head system
Headquarters officials	To be formed in proportion to the numbers of the selected athletes of the two sides.	Balance between the two sides should be guaranteed.
Joint secretariat location	Seoul and Pyongyang * An optimum number of personnel to be dispatched to joint secretariat in the other side's area.	Panmunjom

d. Second Working-Level Delegates Contact

The 2nd working-level delegates contact of the South-North sports talks was held in the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission from 10 a.m. until 12:50 p.m. December 6, 1989. It took place behind closed doors.

At the 2nd contact, the two sides concentrated on the discussion of the issues of training and the composition of a delegation.

As to the question of training athletes, the North agreed to classify training into both joint training and intensive training as suggested by the South.

Regarding the definition of joint training, however, the South stressed that the word "joint training" meant to include open selection matches at the final stage of joint training, whereas North Korea insisted that training was one thing and selection matches were another.

On the issue of the head of a single delegation, the South said that the side which would have more selected athletes should provide the head of a single delegation while the side with less selected athletes the deputy head. It said that this was in conformity with the regulation of the Olympic Charter and the precedent set in the composition of a single delegation between East and West Germany, adding that this method would be proper even for the effective operation of a single delegation.

North Korea, in contrast, held fast to a co-head system. This was an attempt to forestall the selection of a delegation head from among South Korean officials as they knew that in general the sports ability of the South was superior to theirs.

At the same time, the South again asked the North to make express their position over the issues of the Chinese characters

description of the name of a single delegation and of open selection matches. However, the North persisted in an evasive attitude as they had done at the 1st contact. The North agreed only to the numbers of athletes and officials participating in joint training, method and time of joint training and the provision of conveniences as the South had proposed.

What was unusual over the progress of the talks was that, whereas the South called for the confirmation and review of all the ideas advanced by the two sides, the North basically only expressed their concurrence with or opposition to the South's suggestion, without indicating their overall ideas. Here, the South asked the North to lay down their concrete ideas at the time of the next contact.

e. Third Working-Level Delegates Contact

The 3rd working-level delegates contact of the South-North sports talks was held in the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission from 10 a.m. til 1:47 p.m. December 15, 1989.

The two sides carried on discussion of those items out of the 10-point issues related to the composition of a single team, which had yet to be discussed in earnest — the method of composing a single delegation, expenses for delegation, guarantee of personal safety, and the issue of joint implementation organizations.

At first, the South asked the North to agree to the opening of selection matches and also to produce their idea on the issue of the Chinese character description of the name of a single delegation, issues on which the two sides had differed at the previous contact.

Regarding the issue of whether or not to open selection

matches, the North kept insisting that they be held behind closed doors before they offered a compromise plan that they be held either in public or behind closed doors. In the final stage of discussion, however, the North agreed to open selection matches as had been suggested by the South.

On the issue of the Chinese character description of the name of a single delegation, the North did not offer their idea, simply saying that what was needed was simply to notify the Beijing Asian Games Organizing Committee of the fact that the two sides of Korea had decided to describe the name of a single Korean delegation not as “Koryo,” but rather as the way “Korea” is pronounced in English.

With regard to the question of composition of a delegation, the North agreed to the South’s plan for deadline for the composition of a delegation and the composition of headquarters officials, managers and coaches under the principle that “a delegation shall be formed in a way that can ensure balance between the South and the North so far as is possible.” Still, they stuck to their co-head idea.

And, when the South suggested that at least one athlete from each side be included for each of the score events if two or more athletes are to participate in it, the North kept insisting that at least one athlete from each side should be selected for all the sports events.

Regarding the issue of forming joint implementation organizations for a single delegation, the South maintained that joint secretariats should be established in Seoul and Pyongyang so as to effectively support joint training, selection matches and intensive training which were set to be held in Seoul and Pyongyang with athletes and officials traveling back and forth between the two sides. It also suggested that the two sides advance their ideas on joint organizations at the next meeting in accord-

ance with the mutual accord that detailed regulations on the composition of a joint committee and joint secretariats would be determined through separate discussion.

North Korea first asserted that a joint secretariat should be established at Panmunjom before they offered a revised plan suggesting that "there should be one joint secretariat which shall operate in Seoul and Pyongyang by turn." Later, however, they agreed to discuss this issue, together with detailed rules on the establishment of a joint committee and joint secretariats, again at the 6th meeting.

At the 3rd working-level delegates contact, the North appeared positive, agreeing to the South's ideas on open selection matches and on most of the basic 10-point items except the issues of selecting a delegation head and forming joint implementation organizations.

This attitude was part of their attempt to make the composition of a single delegation a fait accompli by prompting an overall agreement on the composition of a single delegation at the 6th meeting slated for December 22nd with detailed issues to be left up to the joint implementation organizations.

f. Sixth Meeting

The 6th South-North sports meeting, which was opened to the public, was held at Tongilkak in the northern sector of Panmunjom from 10 a.m. to 2 p.m. on December 22, 1989.

In his first speech, the South's Chief Delegate Chang Chung-shik spoke highly of the progress made at the past five meetings and three working-level contacts on the issue of fielding a single inter-Korean delegation to the Beijing Asian Games. Pointing to the six items on which the two sides continued to differ, he stressed that the two sides should do all they

could to discuss and resolve these remaining issues.

The six items still at issue with respect to the question of fielding a single delegation to the Beijing Games were:

1. The issue of the Chinese character description of the name of a single delegation.
2. The issue of including at least one athlete from each side for each score event where two or more athletes were to be participating.
3. The issue of whether to adopt one delegation head or a co-head system.
4. The issue of the location of the joint secretariat.
5. The issue of separate regulations on the composition and operation of joint implementation organizations for a single delegation.
6. The issue of the faithful implementation of matters agreed upon with respect to the composition and fielding of a single delegation.
 - Definition of the words of agreed matters.
 - Respect for timetable for the composition and fielding of a single delegation.
 - Non-linkage of extra-sports issues.
 - Measures to be taken against either side's failure to carry out agreed matters.
 - Exchange of memoranda on guarantee by the government authorities of the two sides.

The South first presented its position concerning the issues given above, and said it would wholly accept the North Korean opinion regarding the issue of athletes for score events. It then called for discussion of separate rules on the establishment and

operation of joint implementation organizations, whose need was recognized by the two sides at the time of the 3rd working-level contact, and also of the issue of guaranteeing the faithful implementation of matters agreed upon.

In their first speech, however, the North tried to justify their position over the issues of delegation head and the site of the joint secretariat. On the other hand, they, unlike their passive attitude in the past, produced two versions of the Chinese character description of the name of a single delegation and also detailed draft rules on the composition and operation of a joint committee.

In the course of discussion, the North agreed to establish joint secretariats in Seoul and Pyongyang as the South had suggested and to also adopt the South's version of the Chinese character description of the name of a single delegation. As to the issue of the delegation head, the North initially suggested a rotation system under which South and North Korean officials would take turns serving as the delegation head, then a system of honorary head in addition to delegation head, and finally the method of singling out a specific person, Mr. Sohn Ki-jong, as delegation head, before they finally agreed to the South's idea that a delegation head be selected based on the numbers of the athletes selected from the two sides.

Thus a general concurrence was reached between the two sides on the 10-point basic issues regarding the composition and fielding of a single delegation. Regarding the issue of separate regulations on the formation and operation of joint implementation organizations, the North showed the abnormal and insincere act of agreeing blindly to the South's idea despite the fact that they themselves had prepared their own version of such regulations.

Besides, when the South suggested that to make sure of the

implementation of matters agreed upon, the two sides agree on respect for timetable for the composition of a single delegation, non-raising of extra-sports issues, and on measures to be taken if and when either side failed to carry out agreed matters, and that the government authorities of the two sides guarantee the implementation of these, the North agreed in principle, but demanded that the South agree to publicly announce that the two sides had reached an agreement on the 10-point basic items on the composition of a single delegation and on the operation of joint implementation organizations.

Here, the South made it clear that the 10-point basic items couldn't be said to have been agreed upon at a time when no concrete discussion was made on the issue of guaranteeing the faithful implementation of matters agreed upon and when the two sides had yet to reach an accord on detailed regulations on the composition and operation of a joint committee and joint secretariats. The South emphasized the need for guarantee of the faithful implementation of matters agreed upon, citing an example in which North Korea, by insisting on the presentation of a revolutionary opera in the South, had broken up Red Cross talks on the second exchange of hometown visitors and art troupes when a complete agreement on the exchange had seemed imminent.

It only added to suspicion about their attitude toward a single delegation that at the 6th contact, the North readily agreed to the South's ideas, in particular to a draft plan on the formation and operation of joint implementation organizations without any review. North Korea apparently wanted to publicly announce the two sides' agreement on the fielding of a single delegation before the close of 1989 so that they could use it for their own political purposes.

The two sides agreed to hold the 7th meeting on January 18,

1990, and the 4th working-level delegates contact before the 7th meeting to discuss measures to guarantee the implementation of matters agreed upon and the adjustment of the wording of a general agreement.

g. Fourth Working-Level Delegates Contact

The 4th working-level delegates contact of the South-North sports talks was held in the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission at Panmunjom from 10 a.m. to 1:27 p.m. January 10, 1990. It was held behind closed doors.

Recalling that at the 6th meeting, the two sides had shared a view on the need of a device to guarantee the implementation of matters agreed upon, the South produced a basic draft agreement including a 10-point addenda and four draft supplementary agreements on the formation and operation of a joint committee, exchange of goodwill matches and facilities inspection teams, exposition of terminology, and the issue of sending messages to the Beijing Asian Games Organizing Committee and the Olympic Council of Asia. The South then urged the North to agree to begin reviewing the wording of an agreement on the formation of a single inter-Korean delegation.

The draft addenda proposed by the South included those on the non-raising of extra-sports issues in linkage with the composition and fielding of a single delegation, observance of timetable for the implementation of projects, exchange of memoranda between the two sides' government authorities guaranteeing the implementation of matters agreed upon, and a clause that an agreement would be nullified if either side failed to carry out matters agreed upon.

In contrast, North Korea did not offer any idea for a device to guarantee the implementation of matters agreed upon despite

an earlier promise that they would present one at the 6th meeting. The North only repeatedly demanded the review of the wording of a 10-point basic agreement and a detailed operational plan for joint implementation organizations, without trying to study the ideas offered by the South.

However, the North expressed the view that they had no objection to the full text of a draft agreement, the time of its enforcement (February 1, 1990) and the exchange of memoranda between the two government authorities guaranteeing the implementation of matters agreed upon.

In fact, the fielding of a single inter-Korean delegation to the Beijing Games can have a significant bearing only when it serves to pave the way for sports exchanges between the two sides, contributing to the improvement of overall inter-Korean relations.

In order for the South and the North, which have been under a state of mutual distrust and confrontation over the past 40-some-odd years, to participate in international games under a single delegation, an atmosphere for mutual trust should be fostered and realistic conditions provided for athletes to travel back and forth between the South and the North.

The device for the guarantee of the implementation of matters agreed upon suggested by the South, was intended to eliminate in advance any obstacles that may pop up to make impossible the fielding of a single delegation despite a mutual agreement.

There can be no reason whatsoever for the North Koreans not to agree to the South's idea if they are genuinely interested in the materialization of a single delegation.

For instance, given the fact that more than a cumulative number of 3,000 people including observers and press members, let alone athletes, would travel back and forth between the two

sides while training and selection matches were being held between the two sides, good-will matches in table tennis, volleyball, etc. would be important because they would serve to foster a good atmosphere in advance and also serve as a momentum for the two sides to prove their intent of forming a single delegation.

Nevertheless, the North persisted in an insincere attitude rejecting the suggested device for the guarantee of the implementation of matters agreed upon. Without offering any counter step, the North Koreans simply denounced the idea as an "extra-talks issue" or as having stemmed from "an ulterior aim at producing an artificial obstacle to the talks."

The two sides decided to have another working-level delegates contact prior to holding the 7th meeting.

h. Fifth Working-Level Delegates Contact

The 5th working-level delegates contact of the South-North sports meeting was held in the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission from 10 a.m. till 12:50 p.m. on January 15, 1990. It took place behind closed doors.

No progress was registered at this contact, either, as the two sides indulged in disputes, doubting each other's willingness to form a single delegation.

The South suggested that the two sides wind up discussion of a device to guarantee the implementation of matters agreed upon relating to the fielding of a single delegation, which it had suggested at the 4th contact, and start discussing the wording of a draft agreement.

However, the North insisted that the South should withdraw all of its ideas relating to a device to guarantee the implementation of matters agreed upon. They simply repeated their de-

mand that the two sides wind up working-level contacts under the condition of exchanging memoranda of intent guaranteed by the National Olympic Committees and government authorities of the two sides with respect to a 10-point basic agreement and another on the formation and operation of joint implementation organizations, so that an agreement on the fielding of a single delegation could be adopted at the 7th meeting.

Moreover, in their final statement prior to their unilateral adjournment of the 5th contact, the North spoke as if they were prepared for the breakup of the sports talks, asserting that "if a single delegation cannot be formed as a result of the South's refusal to withdraw its ideas, then the South should be held responsible for consequences resulting therefrom."

The South had set forth a device to guarantee the implementation of matters agreed upon together with a 10-point basic agreement on the fielding of a single delegation in a policy to contribute to the improvement of inter-Korean relations and to the opening of the North Korea society as well as to firmly guarantee the faithful implementation of matters agreed upon.

The call for the adoption of an agreement on the exposition of terminology was intended to eliminate beforehand any unnecessary misunderstanding or differences in the interpretation due to the ambiguity of some words used in agreements.

The proposed exchange of good-will matches and facilities inspection teams, too, was aimed at fostering an atmosphere ripe for the fielding of a single delegation to the Beijing Games and manifesting both at home and abroad the intent of the two sides to abide by matters agreed upon.

Moreover, the South's proposal that the Beijing Asian Games Organizing Committee and the Olympic Council of Asia be notified of the fact that the two sides of Korea had agreed to participate in the Beijing Games under a single delegation and

that if either of the two sides failed to abide by matters agreed upon, then the two sides would field separate delegations to the Games, can be justified by the earlier agreement between the two sides to propose how to describe in Chinese characters the name of a single delegation, "Korea," as it is pronounced in English. The proposal was also intended to make sure that the two sides would faithfully carry out what was agreed upon and to clearly establish a conduit for the execution of external functions.

However, the North persisted in slanderous remarks in violation of the principle of mutual respect, calling the South's idea an "audacious act" or an "offer based on the breakup of the talks" and demanding its unconditional withdrawal despite the fact that they, too, had recognized at the 6th meeting the need for a device to guarantee the implementation of matters agreed upon. The North simply refused to discuss the South's idea without producing any of their own with the exception of the method of exchanging memoranda between the two government authorities guaranteeing their implementation.

This attitude of North Korea has given rise to the suspicion that they had come to the table of sports talks from the beginning, not to materialize a single inter-Korean delegation for the Beijing Games, but only to keep the South from participating in the Games. In fact, this was not the first time that North Korea has used South-North sports talks for political purposes.

In the South-North table-tennis talks held before the 1979 Pyongyang World Table Tennis Championships, the North refused to recognize the participation by the South, a member of the International Table Tennis Federation, thus preventing the South from taking part in the Pyongyang championships to the end.

In another instance, only a few months before the opening

of the Los Angeles Olympics in 1984, North Korea abruptly proposed sports talks to discuss the issue of fielding a single delegation to the 1984 Olympics. Afterwards, however, North Korea joined the Soviet bloc in boycotting the Los Angeles Olympics.

Again, in an attempt to obstruct the 1988 Seoul Olympics, North Korea perpetrated all sorts of machinations, proposing the co-hosting of the Seoul Games before they later announced their boycott of the Seoul Olympics.

As the two sides failed to agree on another working-level contact, the 7th meeting was set to be held on January 18, 1990 as had been agreed upon at the 6th meeting.

i. Seventh Meeting

The 7th South-North sports meeting was held at Peace House in the southern sector of Panmunjom from 10 a.m. till 12:35 p.m. on January 18, 1990. It was opened to the public.

In its first speech, the South, expressing the hope for an early conclusion of the sports talks, laid down a new draft agreement featuring a significant compromise in consideration of the North's position, namely, the elimination of three of the 10-point implementation guarantee measures — the exchange of good-will matches and facilities inspection teams, use of one's own transportation means in the area of the other side, and non-linkage of extra-sports issues.

On the other hand, the North insisted that a 10-point draft agreement should be signed right on that date after adjusting of the wording. They argued that the issues of the exposition of terminology, observance of timetable for the composition of a single delegation, adoption of messages to the Beijing Asian Games Organizing Committee and the Olympic Council of Asia,

and other measures to guarantee the implementation of matters agreed upon, ought to be handled in their nature by a joint implementation organization.

The South emphasized that to ensure the smooth promotion of the fielding of a single delegation, the two sides should make express the definition and scope of those words whose interpretation is apt to be disputed between the two sides. It also maintained that the issues of sending messages to the Beijing Asian Games Organizing Committee and the Olympic Council of Asia and of respecting the timetable for the composition of a single delegation, are a must for ensuring the faithful implementation of matters agreed upon.

However, the North refused to discuss the method of guaranteeing the implementation of matters agreed upon, in an apparent attempt to torpedo the talks and shift the blame for the breakup to the South.

Whereas the South showed a flexible attitude at the meeting by producing a new draft agreement that incorporated the North's demand, the North, as if they didn't expect the new compromise plan offered by the South, persisted in a demand for the withdrawal of an idea about the guarantee of the implementation of matters agreed upon before they hastily proposed to end the meeting.

As the North wanted to quickly adjourn the meeting, the South urged the North to carefully study the South's new draft agreement before coming to the next working-level delegates contact.

The two sides agreed to hold the 6th working-level delegates contact on January 22, 1990 and the 8th sports meeting on January 29, 1990, respectively.

j. Sixth Working-Level Delegates Contact

The 6th working-level delegates contact of the South-North sports meeting was held behind closed doors in the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission from 10 a.m. till 12 noon on January 22, 1990.

Despite its being a closed meeting, the North, in their first speech, was busy trying to shift to the South the blame for the likely breakup of the talks, denouncing the South for “showing no interest” in the formation of a single delegation and “committing treacherous acts.”

At the same time, the North strongly demanded that the South withdraw its suggested device for the guarantee of the implementation of matters agreed upon, threatening that unless it is withdrawn, “there would be no need to have any further contact.”

The South, pointing out that the adoption of such a device had already been agreed upon at a past meeting, stressed that it was absolutely necessary to ensure the faithful implementation of such matters agreed upon as respect for the timetable for the composition of a single delegation and sending of messages to the Beijing Asian Games Organizing Committee and the Olympic Council of Asia. It then charged that the North’s refusal even to discuss and review the idea indicated that they were not interested in the formation of a single delegation.

Besides, the South showed a progressive posture, suggesting that if only the North showed a genuine willingness to carry out matters agreed upon, the South would not stick to the contents and format of a guarantee device it had suggested. It said that, for instance, a separate memorandum of agreement may do instead of the form of addenda to a general agreement. But, the

North rejected even this without showing any sign of compromise. The 6th working-level delegates contact thus ended without any achievement.

When the South proposed to hold another working-level delegates contact on January 25th, the North rejected this, insisting that there would be no need of any further contact under a circumstance where the idea of a device for the guarantee of the implementation of matters agreed upon was not withdrawn.

This intransigent attitude of the North seemed to have been derived from the judgement that they couldn't attain their original goal to use the issue of a single inter-Korean delegation as a propaganda ploy. Their behavior made it clear that they had come to the table of the sports talks, not to materialize a single delegation for the Beijing Games, but to prevent the South from participating in the Games with its own delegation.

The two sides decided to hold the 8th meeting on January 29, 1990, as had been agreed upon at the time of the 7th meeting.

k. Eighth Meeting

The 8th South-North sports meeting was held at Tongilgak in the northern sector of Panmunjom from 10 a.m. til 12:20 p.m. on January 29, 1990. The meeting was opened to the public.

In its first speech, the South expressed regret over the failure of the sports talks to register any significant progress due to the unreasonable posture of North Korea, and again renewed its flexible stand that it won't stick to its idea of the format of guarantee if only the purport of the proposed guarantee of the implementation of matters agreed upon can be expressly endorsed in writing. The South then urged the North to show sincerity

toward dialogue.

The South also charged the North's delegation to the sports talks with joining the so-called "joint statement by North Korean delegations to the South-North talks" on January 24th, in which the northern delegation to the sports talks, unfoundedly denounced the South over issues not related to sports. It pointed out that it was a case of self-contradiction that the North, in the "joint statement," spoke of free travel and total opening at a time when they turned a deaf ear to the idea of a device to guarantee the realization of sports exchanges between the South and the North.

On the other hand, the North indulged only in propaganda remarks against the South, unfoundedly arguing that "the South's idea of guarantee device was a brake intended to produce an obstacle to the composition of a single delegation." The North thus tried to shift the blame for the failure of the talks to the South while trying to engineer the sports talks toward a total breakup.

Regarding the issue of sending messages to the Beijing Asian Games Organizing Committee and the Olympic Council of Asia, the North asserted that "if there should be any device of guarantee, it should be that neither of the two sides should participate in the Beijing Games with their own separate delegation under any circumstances." They thus unveiled expressly that what they had sought to gain at the sports talks was to keep the South from participating in the Beijing Games on its own.

Throughout the 8th meeting, the North endeavored to secure clues to shift blame to the South with the failure to form a single inter-Korean delegation for the Beijing Asian Games in mind. The North's Chief Delegate Kim Hyong-jin went so far as to declare that "we cannot make any more compromises," claiming that the sports talks had arrived at a point of breakup.

When the South suggested that the next meeting be held on February 7th due to the lack of time, the North unlike in the past, offered a later date, indicating that they had no interest in the discussion of the issue of fielding a single delegation any further.

At the end, the two sides agreed to hold the 9th meeting on February 7, 1990.

1. Ninth Meeting

The 9th South-North sports meeting was held at Peace House in the southern sector of Panmunjom from 10 a.m. to 12:15 p.m. on February 7, 1990. It was opened to the public.

In its first speech, the North, arguing that the South had brought the South-North sports talks to a state of disruption, set forth its so-called three-point principles as a prerequisite to the progress of the talks, the principles being 1) that the two sides agree and announce at home and abroad that they would participate in the Beijing Asian Games under a single delegation under any circumstances instead of fielding their own separate delegations, 2) that the South shall admit to its responsibility for a delay in talks and completely withdraw the idea of guaranteeing the implementation of matters agreed upon, and 3) that the South shall retract the remarks by a responsible sports official about participation in the Beijing Games under its own delegation. The North thus tried to lead the sports talks toward a total breakup.

Rejecting this absurd demand of the North, the South said the North's assertion stemmed from its attempt to simply repeat its past practices in which it had sought to keep the South from participating in the 1979 Pyongyang World Table Tennis Championships and the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics

through South-North sports talks supposedly to discuss single inter-Korean delegations for the international games.

The South called for the discussion of substantive matters, stressing that if the North were truly interested in the fielding of a single delegation, they should withdraw the so-called three-point principles and show sincerity toward the discussion of the issue of guaranteeing the implementation of matters agreed upon.

However, the North, while charging that "it was due to the divisive policy of South Korean authorities that the talks have come to a state of breakup," unilaterally announced the disruption of the talks, asserting that no further progress of the talks would be needed if the three-point principles were not accepted.

Due to this unfaithful and unsportsmanlike posture of North Korea, the South-North sports talks held amidst much public expectations to discuss the fielding of a single inter-Korean delegation to the 11th Asian Games in Beijing were in effect broken up after nine full-dress meetings and six working-level delegates contacts.

A look at the course of the sports talks shows that from the beginning the North sought to obtain a superficial agreement on the formation of a single delegation for use as a propaganda device both at home and abroad instead of being interested in the fielding of a single delegation to the Beijing Games.

However, it seemed that they later chose to break up the talks altogether as things did not go as they had hoped because of the South's demand for the guarantee of the implementation of matters agreed upon.

In fact, the issue of working out a device to guarantee the implementation of matters agreed upon was duly agreed to at the 6th meeting, as an issue so vital as to determine the materialization of a single delegation.

It appears that North Korea had refused to accept the idea of a guarantee at the cost of the sports talks themselves because they believed that if they accepted the idea, it would lead to a consequence quite contrary to what they had originally planned, that was, to keep the South from participating in the Beijing Games on its own and to externally bolster their propaganda logic that "Korea is one."

Besides, it is not that their breakup of the sports talks was not related to the North Korean policy to shun any further dialogue with the fictitious excuse of "concrete walls" because they have yet to prepare themselves for the rapid changes in the international situation shown by the universal trend toward reconciliation and cooperation and the reforms and openness sweeping the Soviet Union and East European countries and because they couldn't stand the extensive exchanges, cooperation and the opening of their society that would inevitably ensue from the successful conclusion of a South-North dialogue.

Given the fact that the success of the South-North sports talks would directly lead to the exchange of joint secretariats and large-scale exchanges of sports personnel between the two sides, it was not totally incomprehensible that North Korea broke up the talks with the excuse of the issue of guaranteeing the implementation of matters agreed upon, an issue indispensable to the composition of a single delegation.

Despite the ulterior motive on the part of the North, the South had been sincere and positive throughout the sports talks toward the materialization of a single inter-Korean delegation, exerting all available efforts not to repeat the past instances in which inter-Korean agreements became impractical and powerless, by trying to forestall, through the introduction of a guarantee device, problems apt to arise after the conclusion of an agreement.

Although the South-North sports talks were broken up due to the intransigent posture of North Korea, the talks were highly significant in that the two sides laid a groundwork for future inter-Korean sports exchanges by reaching an accord on the 10-point basic items including such politically natured matters as the name, flag and anthem of a single delegation.

The South intends to exert sustained efforts in the days ahead to realize single inter-Korean delegations for international games so as to manifest the Korean nation's united look and outstanding ability both at home and abroad, promote exchanges and cooperation in the area of sports, and contribute to laying a foundation for national reconciliation and peaceful reunification.

m. Developments after Breakup of Sports Talks

In a statement issued on February 8, 1990, Kim Chong-yul, president of the Korean Olympic Committee (KOC), expressed regret over the breakup of the South-North sports talks aimed at fielding a single delegation to the Beijing Asian Games, pointing out that the cause of the breakup lied entirely with North Korea which, he said, shunned inter-Korean sports exchanges and attempted to use the sports talks for their political propaganda.

The KOC president urged the North to abandon their unreasonable posture and show sincerity toward inter-Korean sports exchanges so that they could contribute to the improvement of inter-Korean relations and peaceful reunification.

The gist of the statement of the KOC president was as follows:

Through the nine full-dress meetings and six working-level delegates contacts, the South and the North reached an accord on the 10-point basic items on the composition and fielding of a single inter-Korean delegation and the method of composing and operating a joint committee. A progress of magnitude unprecedented in the history of sports talks was thus registered.

Regrettably, however, North Korea broke up the sports talks in the end. They set forth absurd three-point prerequisites including the one that the two sides should agree and publicly announce that they won't participate in the Beijing Asian Games separately under all circumstances. They asserted that if the South did not agree to the prerequisites, then there wouldn't be any need to carry on the talks.

For the two sides to reach an agreement on the composition and fielding of a single delegation and to implement it successfully, there should follow firm determination on the part of both sides to faithfully carry out matters agreed upon.

Prior to the 1979 World Table Tennis Championships in Pyongyang, North Korea proposed South-North table tennis talks to discuss the composition of a single inter-Korean delegation and used the talks to keep the South from taking part in the Pyongyang championships. In another instance, North Korea, while signing a boycott manifesto among Communist-bloc countries in Prague against the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics at a time when South-North sports talks were going on to discuss a single delegation for the Los Angeles Olympics, absurdly demanded during the sports talks that the South should not take part in the Games separately in favor of a single delegation.

The North Korean demand that the South, above all, agree to announce that it won't participate in the Beijing Asian Games with its own separate delegation, proved that from the beginning the North was not interested in the composition of a single delegation, but was instead intent on blocking the South's separate participation by any and all means.

Moreover, such a demand of the North was tantamount to calling for a "joint boycott" of the Beijing Asian Games for the reason of Korea's internal issues, an act ignoring the position of China, the host country, and going against international practices.

The South made multi-pronged efforts to firmly guarantee the realization of a single delegation if only to forestall the advent of an unfortunate event where the South would not be able to take part in the Beijing Games and not to repeat past practices where no single delegation was ever formed despite South-North sports talks on a number of different occasions.

While the South-North sports talks were going on, the North Korean delegation to the talks joined the so-called "joint statement by northern delegations to South-North talks," making such non-sports demands as "free travel" and "total opening" of the two societies on the condition of the removal of what they called "concrete walls."

Given the fact that extensive sports exchanges such as travel back and forth between South and North Korean sports people would inevitably ensue from the process of composing a single inter-Korean delegation, the behavior of the North only served to add to the suspicion about their posture toward the implementation of matters agreed upon.

The responsibility for the breakup of the sports talks rests entirely with North Korea which has shunned inter-Korean sports exchanges and has instead attempted to use the sports talks for their political propaganda.

We urge the North to give up their sinister scheme to simply repeat past precedents and instead show sincerity toward inter-Korean sports exchanges so that our sports people can contribute to the improvement of South-North relations and peaceful reunification.

In reaction to the KOC president's statement, North Korea

sent a telephone message to the South on February 12th in the name of Kim Hyong-jin, the North's chief delegate to the South-North sports talks, in which they blamed the South for the breakup of the sports talks, demanding that the South accept their three-point principles.

Retorting the brazen-facedness of the North which was wholly responsible for the failure of the talks, the South's Chief Delegate Chang Chung-shik, in a telephone message to the North on February 14th, pointed out that the talks had broken up because the North had tried to use the talks for their political strategy insisting, for instance, in unreasonable demands. Chang urged the North to agree to a device to guarantee the implementation of matters agreed upon not later than February 20th because of the lack of time for the promotion of a single delegation.

However, in their reply telephone message of February 19th, the North remained intransigent, sticking to their so-called three-point principles. Thus, despite much expectations and support from among the entire Korean people, the proposed fielding of a single inter-Korean delegation to the Beijing Asian Games failed to be materialized.

Part III

Major Developments in Inter-Korean Relations

1. Suspension of South-North Dialogue

a. The North's Notification of Unilateral Postponement of Talks

In a so-called joint statement issued on February 8, 1990, by their delegations to the South-North talks — the preparatory contacts for South-North parliamentary talks, preliminary meetings for South-North high-level officials talks and South-North Red Cross working-level delegates contacts, North Korea announced their unilateral suspension of the on-going South-North dialogue with the excuse of the annual Team Spirit military training exercise in the South.

The gist of the joint statement of the North Korean delegations to the South-North dialogue was as follows:

The enforcement of the joint Team Spirit military exercise is an open challenge to the new idea of peaceful reunification we produced recently and also to our side's sincere efforts to realize it. It is a grave act of shattering the dialogue, an act which made all the talks that had been in the stage of conclusion end in vain.

The joint Team Spirit military exercise constitutes a naked act of treachery to the other side in our dialogue and an anti-national act of destroying dialogue and obstructing reunification.

The Team Spirit military exercise cannot be compatible with South-North dialogue under any circumstances. Amidst the danger of war that might break out at any moment, no dialogue can be held and even if it were held, no achievements can be expected.

The northern delegations taking part in South-North dialogue hereby solemnly state that we shall not go to the table of dialogue

at Panmunjom throughout the period of the Team Spirit military exercise beginning now.

The responsibility for the suspension of multi-pronged South-North dialogue rests entirely with the South Korean authorities as well as with the United States.

In fact, this was not the first time that North Korea had unilaterally postponed inter-Korean talks in violation of mutual agreement for the reason of the defensive and open military training held annually in the South. Only in early 1989, had North Korea suspended for a long period many-channeled talks between the two sides with the excuse of the Team Spirit exercise and legal actions being taken against those who had illegally visited the North.

However, despite the unreasonable posture of the North, the South has made steady efforts to bring about national reconciliation and improve South-North relations. As a result, Red Cross working-level delegates contacts and other channels of dialogue were resumed in September of 1989.

For a while thereafter, inter-Korean talks were held briskly — a total of 28 meetings in four areas. In particular, the preliminary meetings for high-level officials talks and the preparatory contacts for parliamentary talks arrived at a point where they could be successfully concluded if only the two sides made a little more effort in the spirit of mutual respect and compromise.

The two sides expressly agreed to hold the 7th preliminary meeting for high-level officials talks on March 7th and the 11th preparatory contact for parliamentary talks on February 22nd, respectively. Nonetheless, North Korea unilaterally scrapped the agreed-upon schedules and suspended talks over issues not related to the topics of the talks. This was an act disregarding

basic etiquette toward the other side in dialogue, a proof that the North handles inter-Korean dialogue as a material for their political propaganda purposes.

On the other hand, the North must have taken into account the fact that they would inevitably suffer the risk of the opening of their society due to personnel and material exchanges that would inevitably come about if the South-North dialogue were a success. This was something they couldn't tolerate especially at this time when they were going all-out to minimize the impact the reforms and openness now sweeping the Soviet Union and East European countries would have upon their struggles to retain their dictatorial system.

So, it was apparent that North Korea judged that any further dialogue would not serve their interests and accordingly suspended the talks with the excuse of the Team Spirit exercise.

At the same time, their suspension of the dialogue using the Team Spirit exercise as an excuse seemed to have been intended in part to, be timed with active debate in the South on the issue of the U.S. military presence, foster public opinion at home and abroad against the Team Spirit exercise and in favor of the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea by giving rise to the false impression that the Team Spirit exercise is a "major cause of tension on the Korean peninsula."

In a statement issued by the spokesman of the National Unification Board on February 9th, the South charged that "rather than engaging in inter-Korean dialogue with good faith, the North has unilaterally scrapped even agreed upon schedules for talks, and yet they impute the responsibility to the South. This is a preposterous and brazen act that in no way can be justified." He then urged the North to show good faith toward the South-North dialogue in conformity with the people's yearning and expectation of improved inter-Korean relations

and peaceful unification.

The text of the statement of the National Unification Board spokesman was as follows:

The North Korean delegations to inter-Korean talks held a joint meeting yesterday and issued a joint statement on their decision to unilaterally suspend all channels of dialogue between the South and the North.

The North Koreans threw up an obstacle to all channels of South-North dialogue by demanding the removal of what they called "concrete walls." Finally, following their announcement of the breakup of the South-North sports talks on February 7th, the North, to our shock and disappointment, perpetrated their old-fashioned conduct by suspending the dialogue again with the excuse of our defensive and open military exercise.

We join the entire Korean people, who yearn for genuine progress and positive results in inter-Korean dialogue, in profoundly regretting the fact that North Korea broke off all talks with us, even arbitrarily nullifying all agreed upon dates for our next meetings, at a time when various forms of inter-Korean talks appeared to be making good progress, most of them nearing what seemed to be a successful conclusion.

In view of the confrontation and mistrust that have persisted between the two parts of Korea for more than 40 years, it is imperative that the two sides earnestly promote dialogue in a spirit of mutual recognition and respect, if trust is to be restored between the South and the North and inter-Korean relations are to be improved.

And yet, North Korea has suspended all channels of dialogue using the Team Spirit military exercise as an excuse. This only proves that even today, the North is using dialogue only as an instrument of their struggle against the South.

Even when Team Spirit exercises were held in the past, South-

North dialogue continued on many occasions. And, we always inform the North of training plans in advance and even invite them to observe the annual exercise.

Should the North be genuinely interested in easing tension and resolving military confrontation on the Korean peninsula, it ought to cease, first of all, threatening and provoking us by deploying massive military forces in forward areas and by continuing to build up its arms stockpiles. The North should show sincerity by themselves toward fostering a circumstance where there would be no further need for the training exercise.

Rather than engaging in inter-Korean dialogue with good faith, the North has unilaterally scrapped even agreed upon schedules for talks, and yet they attempted to impute the responsibility to the South. This is a preposterous and brazen act that in no way can be justified.

The North Koreans have slighted our side in dialogue and have attempted time and again to interfere in our own internal affairs. They thus have used dialogue with the South only for their own self-serving political purposes. North Korea must not again repeat such trickery which will only aggravate inter-Korean relations.

It is our conviction that South-North dialogue must be carried on under all circumstances in response to the people's yearning and expectation for improved inter-Korean relations and peaceful reunification. We strongly urge North Korea to promptly discard its negative attitude and earnestly resume already-scheduled meetings with the South.

b. The South's Call for Resumption of Dialogue

In a telephone message sent to his North Korean counterpart, Chon Gum-chol, on February 21st, the South's Chief Delegate Chae Mun-shik to the preparatory contacts for South-North parliamentary talks, called for the early holding of the

11th preparatory contact which North Korea had suspended unilaterally in a statement issued by a so-called joint meeting of the northern delegations to the inter-Korean talks.

In the telephone message, Chae expressed regret over the failure to hold the 11th preparatory contact for South-North parliamentary talks due to the unreasonable attitude of North Korea, a contact which he said the two sides had already agreed to hold on February 22nd. He urged the North to agree to hold the 11th contact at an early date so as to materialize the proposed talks.

The gist of the telephone message of Chief Delegate Chae was as follows:

I deeply regret it that your delegation has unilaterally suspended the 11th preparatory contact for South-North parliamentary talks, which the two sides agreed to hold on February 22nd, Thursday.

As your side also is aware, the preparatory contacts reached a point where they could be successfully concluded if only the two sides made a little more compromise on the format, and some of the topics, of the proposed talks.

Nevertheless, your side, at the time of the 10th contact, obstructed the progress of the contact by concentrating only on issues not related to the talks. Again this time, your side suspended the scheduled 11th preparatory contact with the excuse of the Team Spirit exercise, delaying the realization of the proposed South-North parliamentary talks.

The whole world knows that the Team Spirit training exercise our side has been holding openly is a defensive and peace-keeping training. The fact that it cannot be a reason for the suspension of talks can be expressly evidenced by the talks held during the Team Spirit exercise in the past.

I urge that your side stop committing the undue act of linking the Team Spirit exercise to the talks, and agree to hold the 11th preparatory contact at an early date.

At the same time, the South's Chief Delegate Song Han-ho to the preliminary talks for the proposed South-North high-level officials meeting, also sent a telephone message to his North Korean counterpart, Paek Nam-jun, on March 6th, expressing his regret over the failure to hold the 7th preliminary meeting due to the North's unilateral suspension of the talks with the excuse of the Team Spirit exercise.

Song denounced in the message the North in connection with one of their invasion tunnels uncovered a short time before, saying that the uncovering of the tunnel has given both astonishment and shock to the peace-loving peoples of the world let alone the Korean people aspiring for peace and reunification.

This message also challenged the North to end forthwith such an undue act of deliberately setting an obstacle to the South-North dialogue and fomenting distrust and hostile sentiments between the same people, and instead return to a sincere manner and resolve inter-Korean issues and the question of the national future through dialogue. The South urged the North to agree to hold the 7th preliminary meeting as soon as possible.

The gist of the telephone message of Chief Delegate Song was as follows:

The South and the North had agreed to hold the 7th preliminary meeting on March 7th. However, in the so-called "joint statement of the northern delegations to the South-North dialogue," your side announced the unilateral suspension of the

dialogue. As a result, the 7th preliminary meeting failed to be held on a date agreed upon between the two sides.

Between the South and the North today, there are countless issues that have to be resolved between the responsible high-level authorities of the two sides. No excuses or reasons can warrant the shunning of dialogue.

Recently, moreover, another of your side's invasion tunnels across the truce line was discovered to much astonishment and shock among the peace-loving peoples of the world let alone the Korean people longing for peace and reunification.

The fact that your side has suspended the on-going South-North dialogue demanding the removal of fictitious "concrete walls" and the suspension of the joint Korea-U.S. military training exercise, cannot have any persuasiveness and indicates that your side is not interested in genuine dialogue and reconciliation.

The act of fomenting such distrust and hostile sentiments between the same people, runs counter to the flow of history especially under the present circumstances where the trend of the world is towards reconciliation and cooperation.

I hope that your side will return at an early date to a posture aimed at resolving the issues pending between the two sides and the question of national future through dialogue, and urge that your side should show sincerity toward holding the 7th preliminary meeting for South-North high-level officials talks as soon as possible.

Despite these calls of the South for the resumption of the suspended talks, North Korea showed no change whatsoever in their intransigence. Rather, in a telephone message by the North's chief delegate to the high-level officials preliminary talks on March 9th, North Korea made stereotyped propaganda allegations against the South, claiming that "the South has raised the issue of tunnels to further aggravate South-North rela-

tions.” Thus, no early resumption of the South-North dialogue could be expected.

2. Development Regarding the North’s Proposal for Conference between the Government Authorities and Political Parties of the South and the North

In his New Year message on January 1, 1990, North Korea’s Kim Il-sung, asserting that “decisive nation-saving measures should be taken to facilitate unification,” insisted that “concrete walls” south of the Military Demarcation Line should be removed to realize free travel and called for the complete opening of the South and the North. He then proposed to hold a conference between the highest-level government authorities and top leaders of political parties to discuss this issue.

By emphasizing that “no matter whatever wind may blow in the days ahead, we must carry on our struggles to accomplish the great task of ‘juche’ revolution to the end with the party trusting the people and the people the party.” He thus made it clear that despite the global waves of openness and reconciliation, he would hold fast to his closed-door policy, beclouding the prospects of improved inter-Korean relations.

Part of Kim Il-sung’s message relating to inter-Korean relations can be summed up as follows:

The superiority of the socialistic system can be exhibited highly when the people fulfil their responsibility and roles under the correct leadership of the party.

We must further strengthen the party, ceaselessly heighten the leading role of the party, and thoroughly establish “juche” in all walks of life, upholding high the catchword that “let us live our own way.”

In order to bring about a basic turning-point in the resolution of the unification issue, it is important to take decisive nation-saving measures.

We call for free travel and complete opening between the South and the North, beginning, above all, with the removal of the concrete walls erected south of the Military Demarcation Line.

Workers, farmers, youths and students, politicians, businessmen, artists, religiously active persons and other people of every layer and stratum of the South and the North, should be allowed to come in contact with each other and behave without any restriction.

To discuss these issues, I propose to hold a conference of government authorities and leaders of various political parties to be attended by the highest officials of the South and the North.

It is the rule of history that imperialism will fall and socialism will prevail. Socialism is the greatest achievement ever made by mankind.

People should at no time deviate from the basic principle that they should oppose imperialism in favor of socialism.

No matter whatever complex conditions and environment may be formed, we shall firmly maintain the posture of self-reliance without any change and safeguard the eastern outpost of peace and socialism.

As can be seen in the foregoing, Kim Il-sung allotted more than one third of his speech to emphasizing the “superiority” of the socialistic system and the importance of unity around the party.

This suggests that North Korea is faced with a serious threat

from the rapid changes taking place in the Soviet Union and East European countries, and that the North has chosen no alternative but to retain the Kim Il-sung one-man system continuously.

Therefore, the North's call for free travel and total opening between the South and the North was to cope with external pressure for their opening and reforms, and also part of their political offensive toward the South which has steadily called for the North's opening and the promotion of freedom and human rights of the North Korean people.

In particular, their treacherous allegation that anti-tank barriers were the walls which, like the Berlin Wall, blocked free travel and opening between the South and the North, apparently stemmed from their intent of shifting to the South the blame for tension and the mechanism of confrontation on the Korean peninsula and of using the "concrete walls" as an excuse to reject free travel and total opening between the South and the North.

Besides, the North's call for a conference between high-level South and North Korean government authorities and political party leaders may give the superficial impression that the North had accepted the idea of a South-North summit meeting. Basically, however, it was no more than another repetition of their past call for a joint South-North conference, being a deceptive offer intended for them to escape criticism for their shunning of an inter-Korean summit meeting.

All in all, Kim Il-sung's New Year message suggested that the North would further tighten the grip of ideological control of their people and use the South-North dialogue as a stage for their political propaganda over such issues as the "concrete walls," maintaining a conservative and stiff posture at least for the time being.

b. The North's Proposal for "Conference between Government Authorities and Political Parties of the South and the North"

- (1) Letters from First Joint Meeting of Government Authorities and Representatives of Political Parties of North Korea

North Korea held a so-called joint meeting of government authorities and the representatives of political parties on January 9, 1990, where they adopted letters to their counterparts in the South. These letters, along with those from their State Council premier, were sent to the President, the Prime Minister and the heads of the three major opposition parties — the Party for Peace and Democracy, National Reunification Party and the New Democratic Republican Party — on January 13th.

In a scheme to dramatize the process of the delivery of the letters for use in their propaganda and agitation against the South, the North asserted that they would send two liaison officials to Seoul to personally deliver the letters to those to whom they were addressed. They then suggested that a working-level contact between the two sides be held on January 12th to discuss the dispatch of the two liaison officials. The South, however, rejected the North Korean offer as being against past practices, and instead received the letters through Panmunjom as they had in the past.

The gist of the message allegedly adopted by the "joint meeting" of the North was as follows:

In his New Year message, Kim Il-sung disclosed epochal nation-saving measures to dismantle the wall of division and to realize free travel and total opening between the South and the North. He proposed a conference between the highest-level government authorities and political party leaders of the South and the North.

As the first step toward opening the door of unification, the concrete barriers erected south of the Military Demarcation Line should first be removed.

The issues of free travel and total opening are political questions that ought to be realized through decisions on the part of the responsible politicians of the two sides before their being administrative issues to be resolved between the government authorities of the two sides.

It is proposed that to discuss the holding of a conference between top government authorities and political party leaders of the South and the North, a preliminary contact be held at Panmunjom in early February between five delegates of government authorities and political parties from each side.

As can be seen in the foregoing, the letters from the North were simply for the party and the administration to reiterate what Kim Il-sung had offered in his New Year message.

Regarding Kim Il-sung's New Year message in which he proposed a South-North conference between highest-level government authorities and political party leaders, the South, through President Roh Tae-woo's New Year press conference on January 10th, expressed welcome to the North's call for free travel and total opening despite the prerequisites attached thereto, and proposed that these important issues be discussed and resolved through a meeting between the two sides' top leaders with due responsibility and competence to resolve the reunification issue.

Nevertheless, the North launched an extensive propaganda offensive against the South in a series of statements issued by the heads of various organizations and public rallies held in support of Kim Il-sung's New Year statement.

Thus viewed, the letters from the joint meeting were intended only to foment political confusion in the South under a four-party system and foment a split in opinion over the issue of national reunification.

At the same time, the North Korean proposal for a South-North conference, only a redressed form of the "South-North political conference" which the North has persistently proposed as part of their united front strategy ever since the establishment of their regime, seemed to have been conceived to give the impression that they were responsive toward the South's proposal for a South-North summit meeting. It was also designed for use as a means of tightening their internal control in preparation against the waves of the reforms and openness now sweeping the Soviet Union, East European countries and many other countries.

These ulterior motives can be seen by the fact that as their letters themselves indicated, the North wanted to resolve the issue of removing "concrete walls" as the first thing to be done if and when a "South-North conference" was held as they demanded.

On the same date the North Korean letters were received, the South, in a comment by the spokesman of the National Unification Board, pointed out that the North Korean overture was a mere repetition of their call for a South-North political conference, charging that there must be an ulterior political motive in their latest proposal as they demanded talks between political parties over the heads of the normal dialogue channels.

In its comment, the South also urged North Korea to show

sincerity toward concluding the on-going preliminary meeting for the proposed South-North high-level officials talks at an early date so as to bring the high-level officials talks to the full track early.

Meanwhile, the South's Prime Minister Kang Young-hoon disclosed the South's basic position over these issues in his reply to the North Korean State Council premier on February 1st.

In his letter, Prime Minister Kang pointed to the unreasonableness of their call for a "South-North conference" and the removal of "concrete walls," emphasizing that to facilitate free personnel and material exchanges between the South and the North and the opening of the two sides' societies, there should be mutual agreement and other substantive measures between the responsible authorities of the South and the North over the issues of guaranteeing travel, communications and trade, and of promoting confidence-building in the military area.

The Prime Minister urged the North to be sincere toward the existing dialogue, the normal dialogue channels, and to agree to hold a South-North summit meeting at an early date to resolve issues pending between the South and the North.

Prime Minister Kang's message to the North can be summarized as follows:

I consider it fortunate that your side showed interest in the issues of free travel between the South and the North and opening the societies of the two sides, issues which the government of the Republic of Korea has already raised in the July 7th Special Declaration and the Korean National Community Unification Formula.

However, it is extremely difficult to understand that as the format of talks to resolve these issues, your side again produced the unrealistic "conference," and that your side, while discussing

so-called “concrete walls” that do not exist in our side, argued as if obstacles to free travel and total opening were raised by our side.

To realize free travel and total opening in a circumstance where no exchange of a single letter or telephone call or hometown visits is allowed between the South and the North, it is important that the responsible authorities of the two sides agree on fundamental matters guaranteeing at least free travel, communications and economic exchanges and cooperation.

To ease tension, the South and the North should also take substantive steps to promote confidence-building in the military area, and we expect that your side, too, will take corresponding steps in keeping pace with our side’s decision to scale down the size of this year’s Team Spirit military exercise.

The “conference” your side proposed, in essence, is not different from the political conference or the joint South-North conference your side has demanded in the past.

The duties of government authorities are one thing and those of political parties are another. Still, your side ignores their separate and respectively unique competence and responsibilities, trying to mix them without principle at the single table of negotiations. This can hardly be regarded as a posture to resolve inter-Korean issues reasonably and normally.

If your side is genuinely interested in free travel and total opening, I think your side should be sincere toward the existing dialogue and agree to hold a South-North summit meeting at an early date.

(2) Letters from the Second Joint Meeting of the North

Despite Prime Minister Kang Young-hoon’s message to the North, in which he pointed to the unreasonableness of the North’s demands and urged it to be sincere toward the South-

North dialogue, the North sent letters again from the second joint meeting of their government authorities and political parties to the South through Panmunjom on February 15th. The addressees were President Roh Tae Woo, top leader of the Democratic Liberal Party; Prime Minister Kang Young-hoon; and Kim Dae-jung, president of the Party for Peace and Democracy.

Regarding the issues of concluding an agreement on travel, communications and trade, and of South-North economic exchanges, which Prime Minister Kang had proposed in his message to the North, North Korea rejected them, asserting that “concrete walls” should be removed first before the tackling of such issues. The North also asked the South to accept a so-called five-point task to facilitate their idea of “South-North conference.”

The gist of the North’s second set of letters to the South, dated February 14th, was as follows:

- *Those political parties which would emerge newly as a result of political realignment in the South, should naturally be entitled to be parties to a “conference.”*
- *We produce a five-point task to facilitate a South-North conference between the highest-level government authorities and political party leaders:*
 - *First, the South should, without delay, announce its willingness to remove concrete walls to realize free travel and total opening.*
 - *Second, our side’s position is that a meeting between the highest authorities of the two sides may be arranged within the framework of a “conference.”*
 - *Third, if necessary, we shall have separate or collective contacts with your side’s authorities and the representatives of*

political parties.

- *Fourth, we shall open the door to conference to whatever political parties that would be inaugurated in the future.*
- *Fifth, the Team Spirit '90 should be suspended at an early date.*

That North Korea raised the five-point issues such as the question of “concrete walls” in a more stiff manner than in its January 9th letters, might have well reflected its attempt to shift to the South the blame for the failure to realize free travel and opening between the South and the North, and to hold fast to their closed system despite pressure for reforms and openness.

In the latest batch of letters, the North hinted at a possible exclusive contact between the top leaders of the two sides by asserting, “A meeting between the highest authorities of the two sides may be arranged within the framework of the conference.” But, as the North suggested a top leaders meeting only on the condition of holding a conference they proposed, they in effect rejected the South-North summit meeting the South has proposed.

And, the claim that they would entitle even those political parties that would emerge newly to participate in the “conference” and that they would meet the representatives of South Korean political parties at any time and any place, represented their attempt to appeal to dissidents in the South in a bid to solicit their support for the “conference” and thereby carry on an abnormal dialogue based on their “united front” strategy.

In reaction to the North’s second set of letters, Prime Minister Kang Young-hoon, in his message to the North on March 3rd, expressed regret and concern about the North’s raising of five-point issues including the one about non-existent “concrete walls.” He emphasized that to resolve issues pending

between the two sides and the nation's future question, the North should stop committing its old-fashioned act of engaging in a treacherous propaganda campaign over unreasonable ideas like a "conference" and of suspending the on-going dialogue, and should instead agree to resume the suspended talks such as preliminary contacts for the proposed South-North high-level officials meeting.

The gist of Prime Minister Kang's second message to the North was as follows:

I deeply regret it that despite the fact that in my February 1st message, I expressly presented our side's position, your side sent us letters again from the "joint meeting" in disregard of the reality of South-North relations.

Moreover, your side, while calling for free travel and total opening between the South and the North, again raised the issues of fictitious "concrete walls" and an unrealistic "conference." To our utter disappointment, your side went so far as to unduly dispute our side's self-defense military training exercise.

As your side also knows, free travel and total opening between the South and the North are indispensable, more than any other things, to the early normalization of South-North relations and paving the way to peaceful unification.

That is why our side has taken every opportunity to call upon your side to agree upon these steps. Especially after the July 7th Special Declaration, we have steadily taken measures in the hope of realizing them.

Nonetheless, your side has showed no interest or concern about the restoration of mutual trust necessary for free travel and total opening between the South and the North.

Your side's attempt to mislead public opinion at home and abroad in your fictitious propaganda over "concrete walls," gives

rise to the suspicion that your side wants to shun substantial dialogue and exchanges between the two sides.

If your side is genuinely interested in free travel and total opening, your side should agree to hold a meeting between the two sides' government authorities with due competence and responsibility to resolve them.

In particular, to fundamentally resolve various issues pending between the two sides and future questions, a meeting between the top leaders of the two sides should be realized in the first place.

It is incomprehensible that your side expresses interest in a South-North summit meeting, recognizing its need, but, at the same time, demands a "conference" not fitting to the reality of South-North relations as a prerequisite to a summit meeting.

As our side has discussed time and again, there cannot and should not be any prerequisite to a South-North summit meeting.

Our side has disclosed a plan to scale down the size of this year's Team Spirit military exercise. Part of our sincere efforts to promote confidence-building in the area of the military between the two sides, this measure has been conceived in full consideration of your side's position.

However, your side simply repeated your old-fashioned act of unilaterally suspending the on-going dialogue rather than taking affirmative corresponding steps. Going a step further, your side recently placed your entire armed forces and quasi-military organizations on full military alert.

Your side should no longer carry on the undue act of fueling confrontation instead of easing tension and deepening distrust instead of pursuing reconciliation. I urge your side to be sincere toward the existing dialogue including the preliminary talks for the proposed South-North high-level officials meeting.

(3) Third set of Letters from the North's Joint Meeting

Despite the fact that the South has twice pointed to the

unreasonableness of the “conference” and urged the North not to repeat their undue act of fomenting confrontation and distrust any further, North Korea again sent letters to the South almost identical in content to their letters of March 23rd. This time, the contents of the letters addressed to the President (concurrently the top leader of the Democratic Liberal Party) and the Prime Minister were in part different from those of the letter addressed to Kim Dae-jung, head of the Party for Peace and Democracy. They were signed by the joint meeting of the representatives of their government and political parties.

In these letters, North Korea made express their rejection of the South’s call for the conclusion of a South-North travel and communications agreement as well as a South-North summit meeting. Instead, the North made an absurd proposal that a joint survey team be formed with personnel including representatives of government authorities and political parties of the two sides to determine the existence of “concrete walls.”

The gist of the March 22nd North Korean letters was as follows:

Letters to government and Democratic Liberal Party leaders

- *The South’s call for the conclusion of a travel and communications agreement with the “concrete walls” unremoved amounts to an attempt to do partial and limited exchanges under control and surveillance by government authorities.*
- *The demand for a top leaders meeting, also, is a mere excuse to reject the idea of a “South-North conference.” The proposal for a “conference” which sets the stage for a meeting between the highest-level officials of the South and the North should be carefully studied and accepted.*

- *We cannot but make an issue of the fact that the South has raised an issue out of the question of a tunnel to sharply build up tension in inter-Korean relations. The South should stop making such poorly conceived fabrications.*
- *We propose that in a circumstance where the South denies the existence of “concrete walls” itself, a joint survey team be formed among South and North Korean people including the representatives of government authorities and political parties for an on-the-spot survey.*
 - *Time of joint survey: 10 a.m. March 30, 1990*
 - *Composition of survey team: About 100 persons including 10 representatives of government authorities and political parties, military experts, press members, etc. (North Korean side)*
 - *Method of survey: Survey is to be made with participating personnel moving from west to east aboard North Korean helicopters.*
 - *Working-level contact:*
 - Time: 10 a.m. March 28, 1990*
 - Place: Conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission at Panmunjom*
 - Delegates: About three to be sent by government authorities and political parties from each side.*

**Letter to Kim Dae-jung, head of the Party
for Peace and Democracy**

- *The call for the conclusion of a travel and communications agreement or for a top leaders meeting represents an extremely sinister attempt to exclude even a legitimate opposition party from dialogue and the resolution of the unification question and to carry on a split policy.*
- *The unification issue stands above ideologies and systems. The*

government authorities and political parties of the South and the North all have an unavoidable and important responsibility.

- *We hope that you will exert due efforts so that a conference between the highest-level government and political party officials can be realized at an early date.*

* The letter also contained a demand for a joint survey of “concrete walls” whose contents were the same as those of the letters to government leaders.

The North’s persistent propaganda on the anti-tank barriers which were shown to and confirmed by both local and foreign press members including a Soviet correspondent from Tass on many occasions, and their call for the composition of a joint survey team, seemed to have been motivated by a scheme to escape an awkward position caused by the discovery of the fourth North Korean invasion tunnel and to ease mounting pressures for openness and reforms.

It was in this scheme that they demanded a joint survey on the surface only, a survey which, according to their scenario, would actually be a one-sided check made by their side’s personnel only.

Meanwhile, it is highly worth noticing that North Korea, which seemingly recognized the need of a South-North top leaders meeting, denounced the South’s call for a summit meeting as a product of split policy, and called on the head of an opposition party to agree to their idea of a “conference” at an early date.

This was yet another sinister attempt of theirs to drive a wedge between the government and opposition parties with the recent realignment of the political circles in the South in mind and thereby foment political confusion in the South.

The attempt by the North to draw public attention to the issue of “concrete walls” while calling for a “conference,” regardless of the existing normal dialogue channels, seems to have derived from their policy to shun the substantial improvement of inter-Korean relations for the time being and to find an excuse to reject a South-North summit meeting.

In reaction to the latest North Korean overture, Prime Minister Kang Young-hoon, in a message to the North on April 7th, pointed out that the North’s adherence to its unrealistic and wild demands cannot be of any help to the improvement of inter-Korean relations. He stressed that a South-North high-level officials meeting should be held early so as to explore practical ways to guarantee free travel and communications between the people and ease military tension.

In particular, Prime Minister Kang said that anti-tank barriers are peace-keeping military facilities and that the passage between the two sides by dialogue personnel and the exchange of hometown visitors and art troupes in the past did not suffer any inconvenience due to the barriers in question. The Prime Minister urged the North to take corresponding steps in response to the efforts and sincerity of the South to unfold a new age of reconciliation and cooperation in keeping with the new international flow.

The gist of Prime Minister Kang’s message was as follows:

It is unreasonable for your side to demand a survey of what has been confirmed repeatedly by both local and foreign press members as anti-tank barriers.

I make it clear that your side’s continued adherence to unrealistic and nonsensical demands cannot be of any help to the promotion of cooperation between the South and the North.

Anti-tank barriers are peace-keeping facilities designed to prevent another fratricidal war. The demand by your side, which has massed offensive forces in the frontline area, for the removal of these barriers amounts to demanding our side's total disarmament.

The passage by dialogue personnel between the two sides or the exchange of hometown visitors and art troupes in the past has never been impeded by these military facilities.

If your side is genuinely interested in free travel and the opening of the two societies, your side should agree to hold a high-level officials meeting at an early date so as to guarantee free travel and communications between the people and take substantial steps to ease military tension.

At the same time, we cannot but be astonished at the fact that your side, rather than admitting to and apologizing for the fourth invasion tunnel, has tried instead to cover it up by asserting that it was a fabrication wrought by our side.

It is due to your side's unreasonable attitude of covering up or distorting even crystal-clear facts that the Korean peninsula alone remains within the boundary of the Cold War.

Toward our side's efforts to unfold an age of reconciliation and cooperation in keeping pace with the new international flow, your side, also, should take corresponding measures.

I expect that instead of wasting time trying to make pretexts and shift blame to our side, you will display sincerity so that a South-North high-level officials meeting can be held at an early date to facilitate a meeting between the prime ministers of the two sides.

c. The North's Proposal for Invitation of Observers to "Concrete Walls"

On February 19th after they unilaterally suspended the South-North dialogue, the North, in a telephone message to the

South, proposed the creation of an observation team among workers, farmers and youths and students of the South and the North to determine the existence of so-called "concrete walls."

In the message signed by the chief secretary of the Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland, a propaganda organization placed directly under the Workers' (Communist) Party, and addressed to National Unification Minister Lee Hong-koo, the North suggested that to this end, about 100 collegians and farmers of the South each be sent to the North through Panmunjom on February 26th.

The North Korean proposal can be taken as part of their propaganda campaign to mislead public opinion at home and abroad and give the false impression that "walls actually exist in the southern sector to block free travel between the South and the North," as they were apparently emboldened by rising international concern about the issue of "concrete walls" fueled in part by remarks made by Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze about the "concrete walls."

In other words, their ulterior aim was to categorize anti-tank barriers as "walls of division" of political dimension timed with the Team Spirit military exercise and thereby to agitate for anti-government and anti-U.S. struggles chiefly among workers, farmers, youths and students.

The proposal was also apparently aimed at shifting to the South the blame for the failure to materialize free travel and opening between the South and the North and thereby to retain their system in the midst of the growing impact the reforms and openness sweeping the Soviet Union and East European countries are having on North Korea.

In fact, it is the case of self-contradictoriness for the North to discuss free travel at a time when they block even free intra-country travel and the freedom of movement of residence

among their own people. And, it was a naked act of provocation for them to demand the removal of military facilities while they themselves have moved massive offensive forces to areas closer to the truce line.

Rejecting the deceptive North Korean propaganda campaign, the South, in a statement by the spokesman of the National Unification Board on February 21st, charged that their attempt to mislead public opinion over their allegation which expressly turned out to be false through on-the-spot observation by home and foreign press members, bears testimony to their adherence to the daydream of engineering a Communist revolution in the South. The spokesman stressed that a substantial obstacle to free travel between the South and the North lay in a political barrier stemming from the North's intransigent and hostile posture.

He also urged that if the North were genuinely interested in free travel and mutual opening between the South and the North, they should forthwith stop committing the act of political propaganda that only makes a mockery of public expectations at home and abroad, and should instead faithfully agree to the efforts of the South to improve South-North relations.

3. Developments Regarding Discovery of Fourth Invasion Tunnel

In a press conference on March 3rd, Defense Minister Lee Sang-hoon announced that another invasion tunnel dug by North Korea had been discovered south of the Military Demarcation Line 26 kilometers northeast of Yangku-kun, Kangwon-do in the eastern frontline area.

The Defense Minister said the newly discovered fourth tunnel was one of some 20 tunnels North Korea has dug along the entire stretch of the truce line. The arched tunnel, similar in size to the other three tunnels uncovered in the 1970s, measured about 2 meters high and wide. It is about 145 meters beneath the surface and extends 1,052 meters south of the Demarcation Line, the Minister said.

In his statement, Minister Lee said the North's digging of the tunnel through south of the truce line was a grave violation of the Military Armistice Agreement and an express act of aggression, which can never be tolerated. He then urged the North to give up their aggressive schemes against the South and disclose and voluntarily close down all of the tunnels they have dug across the truce line for aggressive purposes.

The uncovering of the fourth tunnel, that follows the discovery of the first tunnel on November 15, 1974, the third tunnel on October 17, 1978, and the second tunnel on March 19, 1975, proves that the North has dug invasion tunnels all along the truce line.

The history of the North Korean digging of invasion tunnels dates back to September 25, 1971 when Kim Il-sung issued the so-called "September 25th Battle Order," in which he said "a single tunnel would be more effective than 10 atomic bombs and be the best method of breaking through the heavily fortified existing frontline."

It is believed that the North Korean invasion tunnels were designed to clandestinely infiltrate a large number of light infantry and commando units at the beginning of a war to quickly neutralize the South's major frontline units, maximize the effect of their surprise pre-emptive attack, cut off supply routes between the frontline and rear areas, and to create a second front to turn the entire land of the South into a battle field.

The gist of Defense Minister Lee's statement was as follows:

Another tunnel dug by North Korea for aggressive purposes has been discovered south of the Military Demarcation Line in the eastern area.

North Korea has been digging invasion tunnels along the truce line since the early 1970s. The tunnels are believed to number about 20. The recently discovered tunnel was the fourth following the three discovered in the 1970s.

The digging of some 20 tunnels by the North was part of their aggressive scheme to infiltrate a large number of troops to the South clandestinely at the beginning of a war so as to turn both the frontline and rear areas into a battle field simultaneously.

The digging by the North of an invasion tunnel south of the truce line constitutes a grave violation of the Armistice Agreement and an act of express aggression.

North Korea should give up their schemes to communize the Korean peninsula and lay bare and voluntarily close all the invasion tunnels they have dug.

We urge the North to abandon their adventurous aggressive schemes and take faithful steps to ease tension between the South and the North, instead of unilaterally suspending the South-North dialogue with the excuse of so-called "concrete walls" and the Team Spirit military exercise.

Meanwhile, the spokesman of the National Unification Board issued a statement on March 5th in connection with the uncovering of the fourth tunnel, saying that "the fourth tunnel well bears testimony to the fact that North Korea has yet to abandon their aggressive schemes against the South." He warned that the sinister act of North Korea digging invasion tunnels while at the same time carrying on the South-North dialogue cannot be tolerated any longer. The spokesman urged the North

to agree to resume the suspended South-North dialogue forthwith instead of going against the universal flow of reforms and openness.


He also pointed out that their suspension of the on-going dialogue under the fictitious propaganda logic of “concrete walls” and with the excuse of the joint Korea-U.S. military exercise can no longer be persuasive to any one.

On the other hand, in a statement issued by the spokesman of the People’s Armed Forces Ministry on March 6th, North Korea feigned ignorance of the tunnel, alleging, “we haven’t dug the tunnel. This is a fabrication wrought by the South Korean authorities to rationalize their war and confrontation policies.” The North was busy launching propaganda tirades to attack the announcement by the South of the discovery of one of their invasion tunnels.

Moreover, the North claimed that the tunnel at issue was dug by the South for the purpose of invading the North, despite the fact that the direction of drilling holes, crossties and wires and other objective evidence pointed clearly to their digging of the tunnel.

The North’s denial and cover-up of even this stark fact seem intended to escape criticism for their unabated aggressiveness against the South and rather to use the incidence in enhancing the sense of confrontation among the North Korean people in favor of the continued maintenance of their dictatorial system.

SOUTH-NORTH DIALOGUE IN KOREA



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Part I

July 20th Proclamation of “Grand National Exchanges” and Related Developments

1. Special Presidential Announcement of “Grand National Exchanges”

a. Contents of July 20th “Grand National Exchanges”

In a special announcement made on July 20, 1990, President Roh Tae Woo proclaimed the five-day period from August 13 to August 17, 1990, as a period for “Grand National Exchanges,” proposing that the people of South and North Korea be allowed to visit each other’s areas through Panmunjom without any restrictions during the period.

President Roh said he would guarantee the personal safety and safe return of all North Korean visitors to the South, and would provide them with all available conveniences including, if necessary, room and board. The President then urged the North to take corresponding measures by following the South’s example.

President Roh said that if the proposed exchanges could be carried out successfully, he would make routine mutual exchanges on and around such national holidays as Chusok, Solnal and Hanshik. He said that even if North Korea cannot agree to mutual exchanges at this time for some unavoidable reason, the South would completely and unilaterally open its side to the North Korean people.

President Roh’s Declaration of “Grand National Exchanges” was an epochal proposal derived from his firm determination to materialize inter-Korea travel and exchanges by all means possible at this juncture when the nation marks the 45th anniversary of its division.

The full text of the declaration was as follows:

My 70 million fellow countrymen:

I hereby announce a decision to promote exchanges of people between the Southern and Northern sectors of our land with a view towards achieving peaceful unification at the earliest possible date, now that the world is undergoing momentous changes that highlight the end of the Cold War confrontation and the emergence of a new state of detente.

Through my special declaration on July 7, 1988, I enunciated a policy of ending confrontation between the people in the South and the North and of forging partnership and cooperative ties between our two sides.

On October 18th of that year, I went before the General Assembly of the United Nations and in my speech, proposed that the barrier dividing the Korean peninsula into southern and northern sectors be dismantled to permit free exchanges in all areas, with the aim of realizing peace and the unification of our land.

Two years later, the old world order is now being fundamentally transformed. A tide of openness and reconciliation has torn away the Iron Curtain separating the East and the West and is now shaping a new world in which nations are cooperating with each other regardless of differences in their ideologies and political systems. This tide of reform has collapsed the Berlin Wall and is moving West and East Germany towards unity.

The time has now come to end the total division and Cold War confrontation on the Korean peninsula, too. Korea should not remain the world's only land still partitioned by Cold War politics.

The fact that compatriots in the South and the North are still unable to visit each other is a shame on us, a proud people with a rich cultural heritage that has evolved over many millenniums. Such a state of affairs should not continue any longer.

We must achieve peaceful unification during the 1990s so that the 21st Century will be an era of glory for our people. Both the

South and the North should boldly do what needs to be done to reconcile each other's grievances and integrate our people into one nation again.

I hereby proclaim a five-day period of grace in commemoration of the 45th anniversary of National Liberation on August 15th, a time for grand inter-Korean exchanges of people. Beginning on August 13th, we will keep Panmunjom open as the point of exchange and will accept our brethren from the North without restrictions. We will allow them to freely visit any place in the South and to meet with anyone whom they wish to meet. We will provide all possible manner of convenience to our brethren visiting the South and will, if necessary, also furnish room and board.

We will additionally take steps to allow any of our citizens to visit North Korea through Panmunjom without restrictions. We will guarantee North Koreans visiting the South their personal safety and safe return home. We expect North Korea to take reciprocal measures.

I hope that North Korea will open, not only the northern portion of Panmunjom, but its entire territory as well to permit people from the South to freely visit any place in the North. I also hope that like us, the North will accept without restrictions brethren in the South who wish to visit North Korea.

If we can successfully implement exchanges of our compatriots on Liberation Day this year, we should be able to normalize routine mutual visits on and around other such national holidays as Chusok, Solnal and Hanshik. We should build upon such exchanges of holiday visitors to clear the way for future free mutual visits at any time.

Mutual visits and exchanges between our compatriots in the South and the North are an indispensable step toward unification.

On January 1st of this year, President Kim Il-sung of North Korea also proposed that South and North Korean societies be

completely opened and free travel be allowed between the two parts of Korea. In this context, I am convinced that there will be no obstacle to the realization of exchanges of our compatriots, and the full opening of both the South and the North on Liberation Day of this year. Even if North Korea cannot agree to mutual exchanges at this time for some unavoidable reason, we will completely and unilaterally open our society to our North Korean brethren.

In the near future, we will also permit foreigners to freely travel between South and North Korea through Panmunjom. The government will take all necessary measures and make all necessary preparations to implement what has just been announced.

Fellow countrymen at home and abroad,

It is high time that the South and the North embarked on a genuine effort to integrate the Korean people by transcending ideology and politics. Consider how magnificent and great an age the 21st century could be for us if only our country is unified and the 70 million Koreans become one nation again.

With such a vision, let us all participate in this endeavor to fulfill our national yearning.

b. Background and Significance of July 20th Declaration of "Grand National Exchanges"

Historical Decision for National Reconciliation and Unification

August 15, 1990 marks the 45th anniversary of the liberation of the Korean people and also the 45th anniversary of national division.

Yet, the nation is still in a pitiful situation where not even a single letter can be exchanged between the two divided sides

much less exchanges of people.

The world has already abandoned the East-West Cold War mechanism that lasted from the end of World War II, and has begun to create a new order of openness and reform. At a time when East and West Germany, once divided like Korea, are about to reunify, only South and North Korea remain in a state of division and Cold War confrontation.

President Roh Tae Woo made the July 20th declaration with a view to terminate such an unfortunate situation at an early date, and instead pave the way to reconciliation and unification through exchanges and mutual travel between the South and the North. The President has the firm conviction that the 21st century will be a glorious one for Korea.

In his July 7th Special Declaration, address at the 43rd United Nations General Assembly, and also in the Korean National Community Unification Formula, President Roh has repeatedly called for the development of a cooperative partnership relationship between the two Koreas.

The latest declaration stemmed from the President's historical decision, based on the direction of these series of policy announcements, that the nation should endeavor to remove the tension and distrust that has accumulated between the same people in the past, and instead restore and develop the national bond and homogeneity.

Determination to Improve Inter-Korean Relations

Ever since its inauguration, the government of the Sixth Republic has steadily made efforts to usher in an age of reconciliation and cooperation between South and North Korea.

In order to ultimately promote the opening and reconciliation between the two sides of Korea, South Korea has

established diplomatic relations with six Socialist countries in East Europe and has held a summit meeting with the Soviet Union.

However, unless there are exchanges and cooperation between the South and the North, there is no possibility for national reconciliation and unification.

Free exchange of people, goods, and ideas between the South and the North is the only means of promoting mutual trust and understanding and connecting the severed national arteries. This is a necessary process the nation has to go through before achieving unification.

The July 20th declaration is significant in that it was intended to effect travel between South and North Korea even for a limited time, thereby providing epochal momentum to overcome national division and laying a solid foundation for free travel and openness between the two sides.

It was through this spirit that the latest declaration expanded the scope of exchanges to include all of the Korean people and proposed that visitors be allowed to freely go anywhere in each other's territory. Moreover, the South displayed its affirmative posture by stating unilaterally that even if the North cannot agree, the South alone would transfer its offer into action.

The proposed "Grand National Exchanges" should, therefore, be a challenge to develop a good relationship between North and South Korea not just around August 15th, but for the future days to come.

Ending the Pain and Misfortune of Disjointed Families

Those who have lived with more heartache and misfortune than any others during the 45 years of Korea's division are the

10 million separated family members.

With no news as yet from their missing members, these families' only desire is to meet their relatives and visit their hometowns before they die. Most of them are aged and, pass away one by one with their cherished wish left unfulfilled.

Even from a humanitarian standpoint, paving the way to their reunion and unrestricted hometown visits is now a pressing task that cannot be delayed any longer.

The July 20th declaration expressed the urgency of easing the pain and misfortune wrought upon these estranged families by all means available and an offer to use this as a catalyst to promote the exchange of people and things between the South and the North.

The July 20th declaration was preceded by the commission of a legal and systematic apparatus endorsing inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation through the Law on South-North Exchanges and Cooperation. This was passed by the National Assembly on July 14th, and set the stage for the systematic implementation of unification policies under such a legal framework.

c. Reactions at Home and Abroad

The July 20th special declaration was received at home and abroad as a pivotal measure intended to overcome national division.

The Korean media especially welcomed the special declaration because multi-faceted exchanges, in particular contacts and travel between South and North Korea, represent the first step toward reunification. They stressed that North Korea could not have any reason to reject the declaration since they themselves had proposed free travel between the two sides and

the opening of the northern sector of Panmunjom.

Major foreign media organization also observed that North Korea, under outside pressure to liberalize its policies, would find it hard to reject the overtures contained in the declaration, adding that the declaration stressed the South's confidence in its northern policy and economic superiority to the North.

Nonetheless, North Korea in effect rejected the offer mere eight hours after President Roh's special declaration was made.

Immediately after the announcement of the special declaration, Prime Minister Kang Young-hoon sent a telephone message to the North's Administration Council Prime Minister Yon Hyong-muk, proposing to hold contacts between the government authorities of the two sides to discuss working-level matters needed to bring to fruition the proposed grand national exchanges from August 13th through the 17th.

Prime Minister Kang expressed the hope that the first contact be comprised of three delegates from each side led by a vice-minister-level official, to be held at 10 a.m. on July 30th at Panmunjom.

While making no response whatsoever to this suggestion, North Korea, in a radio broadcast at 4 p.m. on the same day, announced a statement from the Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland in which they made a three-point demand for the removal of "concrete walls," repeal of the South's National Security Law, and release of some political implicated prisoners, as well as a guarantee for the staging of a "Pan-National Conference." The North then reiterated its assertion that the issue of free travel and total opening between the two sides of Korea is a question to be resolved at a meeting of the two sides' government and political party leaders.

The unusually prompt reaction from the North might have well stemmed from their plan to keep the July 20th special

declaration from becoming an issue supported both at home and abroad.

The absurd prerequisites the North attached to the implementation of free travel and total opening of the border seemed intended as an excuse to wholly reject the South's proposal and also to force a "Pan-National Conference" possibly with the aim of fomenting dissension in the South.

It is believed that North Korea, which has lately been intensifying ideological indoctrination and control of its people under the slogan, "Let us live our own way," has no real intent to exchange people or open its society, nor is it yet prepared for any inter-Korean undertakings.

On July 23, the North sent additional letters to President Roh Tae Woo, Prime Minister Kang Young-hoon, Party for Peace and Democracy President Kim Dae-jung and Democratic Party President Lee Ki-taek. The letters were signed by Prime Minister Yon Hyong-muk who allegedly has the authority of the government and political parties of the North to send such letters.

In the letters, the North, reiterating the contents of the July 20th statement by the Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland, proposed holding a South-North government and political party leaders meeting to discuss comprehensively the issue of free travel and total opening. They then suggested that a working-level contact be held between four delegates from each side at Panmunjom on July 27th to discuss the proposed government and party leaders meeting.

This move may have been designed to gain time for North Korea by diverting public attention at home and abroad from the South's offer of "Grand National Exchanges" as the North had no basis on which to reject this offer.

2. Joint Press Conference among the Three Ministers

As the North virtually rejected the “Grand National Exchanges” proposed by attaching unreasonable prerequisites to it, the South announced in a press conference on July 23rd a set of follow-up measures to make the July 20th special declaration a reality, and expressed a positive response to the prerequisites produced by the North. The press conference was a joint one held by the three ministers of National Unification, Justice and National Defense.

Among the three, the National Unification Minister, pointing out that the matters in the South which the North mentioned in their prerequisites cannot constitute any obstacle to unification, said that nevertheless, the government would discuss in a positive manner the North Korean ideas in a bid to materialize inter-Korean exchanges by all means.

Regarding the issue of a “Pan-National Conference,” the Minister expressed the willingness to agree to the idea of the conference. He said the South was willing to 1) allow North Korean delegates and overseas Koreans to attend a preliminary meeting of the “Pan-National Conference” slated for July 26th, 2) allow some South Koreans to visit the North before August 15th, 3) allow some South Koreans to attend the “Pan-National Conference” on August 15th, and 4) allow “Pan-National Conference” attendees to march from Mt. Paektu in the North to Mt. Halla in the South and some South Koreans to march from Mt. Halla to Mt. Paekdu.

The Unification Minister, however, made it clear that the “Pan-National Conference” should be participated in by people from all strata in a way befitting its name and nature instead of only by some specific organizations or individuals. At

the same time, the conference should be a genuine gathering contributory to the promotion of mutual trust and understanding as well as to the improvement of inter-Korean relations and ultimately to unification, he said.

Meanwhile, the Justice Minister discussed the North Korean demand for the repeal of the National Security Law and the release of prisoners. He said that the National Security Law is a defensive security criminal code designed to safeguard the State and people from outside aggressive forces threatening the territory and sovereignty of the Republic of Korea. He said that if there were no northern schemes to Communize the entire peninsula, there are no provisions of the law that stand in the way to dialogue and exchanges between the South and the North.

However, the Minister said, the South, in order to realize inter-Korean exchanges, was willing to have a meeting between the two sides' legal officials to discuss the issue of the South's National Security Law and prisoners, along with the question of the North's security-related criminal laws and ideological prisoners. He then proposed to hold a South-North legal officials contact at 10 a.m. on July 27th. He said each side can be represented by three delegates.

On the other hand, the Defense Minister denounced the North for insisting that the South's anti-tank barriers, expressly confirmed by both the domestic and foreign press, are "walls obstructing free travel between the South and the North." He said, however, that to promote "Grand National Exchanges," he would agree to the North's call for a joint inspection of the barriers.

The Defense Minister then stressed that under the principle of equality, the South, too, should be enabled to freely inspect North Korean facilities like infiltration tunnels. He proposed to

discuss these matters at a South-North military officials meeting at 10 a.m. on July 27th to be attended by three delegates from each side.

On July 24th, Prime Minister Kang sent a telephone message to his North Korean counterpart, Yon Hyong-muk, urging him to agree to the proposed legal and military officials contacts slated for July 27th. He added that the South's overture was a step that progressively incorporated the matters raised by the North.

Also making it clear that the issue of free travel and opening between the two sides should be discussed and resolved by the government authorities rather than at a meeting of government and political party leaders, the Prime Minister called on the North again to agree to a government officials working-level meeting to discuss steps to realize the "Grand National Exchanges."

But, the North rejected the proposals. The rejection was made in a statement by a spokesman for the Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland.

Regarding the proposed legal officials contact, the North claimed in its statement that such a contact is not necessary because there is no law like the National Security Law in the North nor are there any arrested or imprisoned patriotic people.

Rejecting the call for a military officials contact, the North insisted that the issue could be resolved if and when the South dismantles the "walls" because they exist only in the South, adding that there is nothing to inspect or confirm in the northern area.

On the other hand, the North said that they were willing to discuss the issue of "concrete walls" at a government and political party leaders meeting they proposed, demanding that

the South attend a working-level contact for the leaders conference on July 27th.

In connection with the South's demand that a "Pan-National Conference" should be attended by people from all strata and social classes, the North asserted that would-be attendees had already been reviewed and determined. They argued that if the South wanted to have people from all strata and social classes attend the conference, the South should first set free those who were arrested or imprisoned for their "calls for unification."

3. Receipt of Application for Visits to the North

Following its proposal on July 20th for a South-North government officials working-level contact at Panmunjom on July 30th to discuss procedural matters to realize the "Grand National Exchanges," the South repeatedly urged the North to accept the offer in telephone messages sent them on July 24th, 25th and 26th.

However, the North did not make any sincere response to the repeated urging. Consequently, no North Korean delegates showed up at Panmunjom on July 30th for a working-level contact.

Prime Minister Kang then sent another telephone message to the North on July 30th stressing that the North should agree to discuss procedural matters at an early date since the "Grand National Exchanges" were a crucial task that could not be delayed for any reason or excuse.

In his message, the Prime Minister said that the North should give an affirmative response by August 7th because the

proposed “Grand National Exchanges” begin on August 13th and because minimum-necessary measures and preparation should be made at least six days before the start of the exchanges.

Under these circumstances, the Unification Minister, in a press conference on August 2nd, asked the North to unconditionally guarantee the personal safety and safe return home of those who wished to visit the North during the period of the “Grand National Exchanges” on August 13th through the 17th. He said that the South, for its part, would issue visit permits to North Korean visitors to the South even when they were unilaterally selected by the North, to facilitate travel between the two sides of Korea.

Accordingly, the government resolved to receive applications from those wishing to visit the North. The government, setting the application period for August 4th through the 8th, saw to it that interested people could apply with only a minimum of paperwork required.

The positive measures taken by the government were derived from its earnest wish to realize the “Grand National Exchanges” at any cost so as to initiate inter-Korean travel and exchanges and thus to advance South-North reconciliation and cooperation.

In fact, the “Grand National Exchanges” were intended to provide the momentum to restore mutual understanding and trust through reunion of the Korean people for the first time in the 45 years since national division, in addition to spreading the joy of reunion to separated families. Therefore, any person wishing to visit the North should be allowed to do so during the period.

But, as the North tended to shun the “Grand National Exchanges,” the South had to state that it would allow any per-

son to visit North Korea if only the North guaranteed their personal safety and safe return home.

The application for visits to the North, begun on August 4th, was a touching scene indeed. Despite the scorching heat, people formed long queues from the early morning hours to apply for a visit to the North. The applicants ranged in age from youthful students to elder separated family members.

Through the hectic application scene, the nation once again demonstrated at home and abroad how pathetic is the wish of the dispersed families missing their long lost relatives and how serious is the determination of the people to overcome their national division.

On August 8th, the final date of the application period, Prime Minister Kang, in a telephone message, notified the North that he would send two liaison officials to Panmunjom at 3 p.m. August 9th and again at 3 p.m. on August 10th to hand them the list of applicants for visits to the North.

Also in the message, Prime Minister Kang suggested that, together with the receipt of the list of the South's applicants, the North forward to the South the list of the North Korean people wishing to visit the South.

Those who applied for visits to the North during the application period ending August 8th totaled 61,355 people; 44,544 men and 16,811 women. The total breakdown by age, purpose for visit, and region of origin is as follows:

By age

Teens	Twenties	Thirties	Forties	Fifties	Sixty or older
507	4,526	6,585	8,683	14,865	26,189

By purpose

Family reunion	Visits to relatives	Tourism	Cultural & religious activities	Others
37,408	5,365	13,271	1,993	3,318

By region

Seoul — 22,539	Pusan — 3,606
Taegu — 1,803	Inchon — 4,574
Kwangju — 1,076	Taejon — 1,190
Kyonggi-do — 11,549	Kangwon-do — 3,317
Chungchongbuk-do — 1,524	Chungchongnam-do — 2,189
Cholabuk-do — 1,821	Chollanam-do — 1,274
Kyongsangbuk-do — 2,177	Kyongsangnam-do — 2,275
Cheju-do — 441	
Total — 61,355	

The South wanted to deliver the list of applicants to the North on August 9th, but only a few hours before the planned delivery, the North, in a telephone message signed by Prime Minister Yon Hyong-muk, rejected a liaison officials contact to exchange the lists of visitors during the “Grand National Exchanges” period.

In fact, the North implied that they did not want any exchanges whatsoever between the South and the North. In the telephone message, the North said they were willing to consider the exchange of visitors’ lists if the South allowed their so-called “Im Soo-kyong consolation team” to meet those under

arrest such as Miss Im Soo-kyong, Rev. Moon Ik-hwan and Father Moon Kyu-hyon, and also if they formally allowed Chonminnyon and Chondaehyop delegates to attend a "Pan-National Conference," and repealed the National Security Law.

The North's refusal to exchange visitors' lists and their demand to repeal the National Security Law despite the South's disclosure of its willingness to accept the North's selected invitation of South Koreans, indicated that even their invitation of specific South Korean people might have well been a mere propaganda hoax.

At this point, the South, in a telephone message signed by Prime Minister Kang, on August 9th expressed regret over the North's refusal to accept even the list of applicants for visits to the North, notifying them that liaison officials would be sent again to Panmunjom at 3 p.m. August 10th to deliver the list.

The Prime Minister, noting that up to 70 percent of the applicants were dispersed family members, stressed that the easing of their misfortune and pains represents the fundamental duty which the government authorities of the two sides should resolve on a priority basis.

However, in disregard of Prime Minister Kang's telephone message, An Byong-su, chief secretary of the North's Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland, sent a telephone message to the National Unification Minister of the South on August 10th to simply repeat Prime Minister Yon's demand made in his August 9th telephone message for the allowance of direct meeting with arrested persons, formal permission of Chonminnyon and Chondaehyop delegates to attend a "Pan-National Conference," and the repeal of the National Security Law.

Since North Korea did not expressly state their rejection of

a liaison officials contact, South Korean liaison officials went to Panmunjom carrying with them the list of applicants for visits to the North as had been notified to the North, but no North Korean officials showed up.

As the North thus turned a deaf ear to the South's sincere efforts, it was all tremendously disappointing to the Korean people as a whole, let alone the applicants who wished to visit the North. Their intransigence again shed light on the fact that they were not interested in exchanges of people between the South and the North.

In a comment made by the spokesman of the National Unification Board, the South denounced the North for refusing even to exchange lists of visitors by producing absurd prerequisites. Nothing that the refusal was part of their sinister scheme to obstruct personnel travel and other exchanges between the South and the North and to torpedo the South's idea of the "Grand National Exchanges," the spokesman said North Korea would not be able to escape condemnation from the entire nation.

This spokesman, however, expressed the conviction that the "Grand National Exchanges" cannot be a one time affair, and the people of the South and the North would be able to visit each other's areas freely before too long if only the "Grand National Exchanges" idea were steadily promoted.

4. Permission of Visits to the North by Members of Some Specific Organizations

Contrasting their rejection of the exchange of lists of visitors, North Korea, in a radio broadcast on August 10th,

suddenly invited some members of specific organizations in the South to visit the North, proposing to hold working-level contacts among respective organizations to discuss the contacts.

In the broadcast, the "Northern Preparatory Committee for a Pan-National Conference" suggested that a working-level contact be held with Chonminnyon officials at 3 p.m. on August 11th to discuss the issue of jointly sponsoring seminars, cultural events and grand marches from Mt. Paektu to Mt. Halla in connection with the proposed pan-national conference.

The chairman of the North Korea Students Committee also proposed in a statement to hold a working-level contact at 9 a.m. on August 11th with the South's Federation of Student Organizations in the Seoul Area to discuss the opening of a unification rally in Pyongyang which the Federation earlier had suggested.

In addition, the chairman of the Catholic Association of the North, in a similar statement, proposed that a working-level contact be held between the Association and the South's Conference of Catholic Priests for Justice to discuss matters related to the realization of visits to the North by some priests of the Conference.

This series of dialogue offers was no more than a tactic aimed at shifting the blame to South Korea for the failure of inter-Korean exchanges and, at the same time, at fanning internal friction and confusion in the South over the unification issue.

A majority of the members of Chonminnyon, Priests Conference for Justice, and Federation of Student Organizations, whom the North planned to invite, were among those who applied for visits to the North during the period of August 4th through the 8th.

This meant that if the North received the list of applicants

from the South and selectively chose those they wanted to invite, offering them the guarantee of their personal safety and safe return home, then their visits to the North could have been realized.

The proposed grand exchanges were to be materialized if only the authorities of the two sides provided conveniences and personal safety guarantees to those wishing to visit each other's territory. So, there existed no need whatsoever to have separate working-level contacts between relevant organizations.

What was needed for the visits by those invited by the North were not working-level contacts, but the exchange of lists of visitors and accompanying material on the guarantees of personal security.

In fact, the North disclosed the real purpose of the working-level contacts they proposed when a statement issued by the chairman of the Catholic Association of the North said in part that when priests representing the South's Conference of Catholic Priests for Justice visit the North, they would seriously discuss the issues of removing "concrete walls," repealing the National Security Law, withdrawing American forces from Korea and achieving peaceful unification independently.

The South, in a statement issued by the spokesman of the National Unification Board on August 10th, said that the three working-level contacts proposed by the North were not necessary. However, the statement welcomed the fact that the North agreed to visits to the North by some people of the South even on a selected basis during the "Grand National Exchanges" period. It then suggested that the two sides' liaison officials contacts be held at 11 a.m., August 11th, at Panmunjom to exchange the lists of visitors and memoranda guaranteeing travellers' personal safety.

But, the North, on August 11th, rejected the offer made by the South. Moreover, none of North Korean officials even appeared at Panmunjom at the time which the North itself had suggested for working-level contacts between relevant organizations, indicating that their overture was mere lip-service.

On the other hand, the North conceded that the issue of personal security guarantees is a duty falling on government authorities when a statement by the spokesman of the Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland alleged that if the South clearly showed its willingness to allow the visit to the South by a "group of people to console arrested persons," and agreed not to interfere in the activities of private organizations, they would attend a government officials working-level contact to exchange memoranda on personal security.

Meanwhile, the Masses Party, Conference of Catholic Priests for Justice and Chonminnyon asked the government to present the North with the lists of their visitors to the North.

Under the circumstances, the South, considering the requests of these organizations and even the North's demand, indicated its determination to make inter-Korean visits possible among even limited numbers of people in order to meet the whole nation's aspiration, and to match the spirit of the July 20th special declaration.

On August 12th, the National Unification Minister announced a progressive policy in which, he said the government would allow those members of the Conference of Catholic Priests for Justice, Chonminnyon, etc. who had applied for visits to the North to do so during the "Grand National Exchanges" period.

Under this policy, the Minister proposed that a meeting of liaison officials from the government authorities of the two

sides be held at 3 p.m., August 13th to deliver to the North the lists of visitors and accompanying press members and to receive from the North a memorandum on the guarantee of their personal security.

The South sent a telephone message containing this proposal to the North on the morning of August 13th.

On the same date, the South sent several liaison officials to Panmunjom to deliver the list of visitors. But, the North refused even to receive it. The list contained the names of 30 Masses Party officials, 33 priests from the Conference of Catholic Priests for Justice, 176 Chonminnyon members and a group of press members who would accompany them. The North earlier had expressed its intentions to invite the members of these organizations.

On the other hand, the North, in statements made by various organizations involved including An Byung-su, chief secretary of the Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland, reiterated its position that there is no need to exchange lists between government authorities and that there should instead be working-level contacts between the relevant organizations.

So far it has been the customary practice in inter-Korean visits and other exchanges for responsible government authorities from the two sides to exchange lists of visitors and memoranda on the guarantee of the personal safety of those visiting the areas of the other side. In fact, the exchange of these documents is the first administrative procedure in such a case.

For the North to reject even this indispensable step represented an act of thwarting the visits of even those they themselves had invited, indicating that their "invitation" itself was a mere fictitious propaganda ploy.

The fact that they invited certain parties, but later on refused to receive the list of visitors or hand out a memorandum on the guarantee of personal security, showed that, from the beginning, they were not interested in visits to the North by anyone from the South.

Reacting to this intransigent attitude of the North, the South, in a statement by the spokesman of the National Unification Board on August 14th, strongly denounced the North for making fictitious and unreasonable demands. Urging the North to try to meet the ardent wish of separated families and the rest of the nation in recognition of the true meaning of the "Grand National Exchanges," the statement expressed expectation that the exchange of visitors would take place during the suggested period.

The "Grand National Exchanges" proposed by President Roh on July 20th for implementation during the period of August 13th through the 17th thus failed to take place due to the North's refusal.

The North Korean refusal was well suggestive of the fact that despite their lip-service to the total opening of the South and North Korean societies and free travel between the two sides, which was first proposed in Kim Il-sung's New Year message, the North does not want to see any substantial exchanges of people.

However, even though the "Grand National Exchanges" failed to occur this time, the July 20th declaration represented an important milestone on the road toward co-existence and prosperity between the South and the North.

South-North travel and other exchanges are an indispensable step for the improvement of inter-Korean relations and peaceful unification.

The receipt by the South Korean government of application

for visits to the North during August 4th through the 8th represents a procedure which the two sides must go through to pave the way for inter-Korean exchanges.

The "Grand National Exchanges" went up in smoke because the North refused to accept the list of applicants, including the names of those they themselves invited. But, the North won't be able to turn a deaf ear indefinitely to the national craving for the improvement of inter-Korean relations through enhanced mutual trust and understanding between the two sides of Korea as well as the universal trend toward openness and reconciliation.

Their receipt of applicants would surely further the prospect of inter-Korean exchanges.

Since the Seoul government has made it clear that it will continue to develop national exchange plans on such national holidays as Chusok, Solnal and Hanshik under the spirit of the July 20th special declaration, the receipt of applications for visits to the North will definitely help to further inter-Korean travel and unfold a new phase of reconciliation and unification.

5. The North's Proposal for "Consolation Visits" to Those under Arrest in the South

On August 1st, one day after they had rejected a government officials working-level contact to discuss the "Grand National Exchanges," the North notified the South that it would deliver to President Roh Tae Woo on August 2nd a message signed by Yo Yon-ku, chairman of the so-called Committee for Struggles to Obtain the Release of Im Soo-kyong.

In view of the reality and practices of inter-Korean relations, the contents and addresses of messages to be exchanged should be proper. The attempt by the North to send a message from the chief of a mere obscure organization to the Head of State of the other side, constituted an act of using even the exchange of telephone messages for their own political purposes.

Here, Kim Sang-hyop, president of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross, in a telephone message to the North, said that the South would not receive the message, following policy not to exchange messages prone to cause unforeseen circumstances or set off political disputes.

However, the North made public the contents of the message in a radio broadcast on August 2nd, maintaining that it would form a team of people to console Im Soo-kyong, Moon Ik-hwan and Moon Kyu-hyon under arrest and their families, who, it said, would visit the South for five days beginning August 14th.

They said the consolation team would comprise Yo Yon-ku, some members of the Committee for Struggles to Obtain the Release of Im Soo-kyong, the North Korean Students Committee, Youths and Students, and other people from all backgrounds. The team would be accompanied by an adequate number of press corps members, they said.

In a telephone message sent to the South from the North's Administration Council Prime Minister Yon Hyong-muk on August 4th, the North urged the South to accept the idea of the dispatch of a consolation team along with a meeting between government and political party leaders that they had proposed.

On August 6th, the South, despite the North's nonsensical and undiplomatic attitude, took their plan to send people to the South during the "Grand Natinal Exchanges" period as having accepted the spirit of the July 20th special declaration

and formally disclosed the government's willingness to welcome their visit and guarantee them their personal safety and all conveniences.

However, the South suggested that the North reschedule the visiting period since the "Grand National Exchanges" would end on August 17th and made it clear that their planned meeting with prisoners could not be allowed.

It was true that in the July 20th special declaration the South had said that when the North Koreans visited the South during the specified period, they could visit any place and meet any person freely. This did not mean, however, visits to restricted military areas or meeting specific persons under arrest, but only meant the North Koreans visit under the condition that they respected the South's system of law and order.

Free travel would of course equate to travel freedom allowed to ordinary citizens of the South, and therefore, could not involve any attempt to undermine the order of the other side or subvert its system.

Since the "Grand National Exchanges" were basically intended to ease the pain caused by division and broaden the avenue of mutual trust and understanding, it was against the spirit of the "Grand National Exchanges" for the North to try to meet prisoners.

It was for this reason that the South made it clear that it would be acceptable to visit the South and meet with the families or lawyers of prisoners, but not to meet prisoners face-to-face.

Nevertheless, the North, in a so-called telephone message addressed to President Roh, reiterated its insistence on meeting prisoners on August 6th, saying that the members of the "consolation team" would arrive at Panmunjom at 9 a.m. on August 14th, and broadcast this publicly.

Again on August 7th the North, in a telephone message signed by Prime Minister Yon, asked the South to guarantee the personal security of those visiting the South and provide them with necessary conveniences. The North specifically wanted the South to expeditiously take steps to guarantee personal security under official procedures.

In a telephone message on August 8th, Prime Minister Kang asked the North to change the time period of the visit to August 14th through the 17th and retract its plan to visit prisoners since such a meeting couldn't contribute in any way to the improvement of inter-Korean relations. He then told the North that the South would offer necessary conveniences and personal security for those North Koreans visiting the South during the "Grand National Exchanges" period.

Reacting to the North Korean demand for meeting with prisoners as a prerequisite to the exchange of the lists of visitors, which was made in a telephone message signed by Prime Minister Yon on August 9th, the South's Prime Minister, in a telephone message on the same date, reiterated the government's comprehensive policy of allowing the North Korean "consolation team" to meet the families or lawyers of those in prison.

Subsequently, the South urged the North time and again to furnish the list of the members of the "consolation team" and other North Koreans wishing to visit the South, but North Korea failed to ever provide the list.

On August 14th, they sent about 40 members of their "consolation team" to Panmunjom where they staged a political rally as they shouted slogans and sang songs.

The South, again saying it was prepared to issue the guarantee for personal security and other matters related to visits by the "consolation team," called for an immediate

liaison officials contact that day.

But, the North rejected even this, asserting that they would rather receive escort from the “Committee for Support of Im Soo-kyong.”

It was a sheer case of contradiction that the North, which earlier had asked for the guarantee of personal security, shunned substantial steps such as liaison officials contact and instead, insisted on an escort by members of a private organization.

This showed that they were little interested in the realization of South Koreans’ visits to the North much less their people’s visits to the South.

Part II

“Pan-National Conference” and Related Developments

1. Background against Which Issue of “Pan-National Conference” Was Raised

The issue of a “Pan-National Conference” was in fact raised when some members of dissident organizations of the South on August 1, 1988 initiated a plan to promote “a World Conference and a Pan-National Conference for Peace and Unification on the Korean Peninsula.” But, it earned the people’s total indifference being shadowed by the public’s excitement over the upcoming Seoul Olympics.

On December 9, 1988, however, the Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland of the North from out of nowhere expressed its support for the conference. At a time when it had suspended all the existing channels of dialogue, the North handpicked Chonminnyon, a dissident organization of the South, as the other side for dialogue, suggesting working-level talks with Chonminnyon.

In a message proposing a pan-national conference, the North made its ulterior intent known clearly when it claimed, “The idea of a Pan-National Conference is in complete accord with our efforts to promote a joint meeting between political parties and social organizations of the two sides as well as with our proposal of a comprehensive peace plan.”

In other words, the North schemed to aid dissidents in the South to cause a split in public opinion and secure a foothold to carry on their “united front” strategy against the South.

The scheme was underscored by the fact that while speaking of a “Pan-National Conference,” North Korea wanted to contact only Chonminnyon, no more than one of many social organizations in the South, and that while asserting it would be a private gathering, the northern regime had in effect added

prerequisites to it.

The chairman of the northern preparatory committee was none other than Yun Ki-bok, chairman of the Unification Policy Review Committee of the North's Supreme People's Assembly. The organization which proposed and promoted the conference was the Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland.

The Pan-National Conference which was held around August 15th was, in fact, proposed by Ho Dam, chairman of the Committee for Peaceful Unification, on July 9, 1989.

Thereafter, the conference was promoted largely by Chonminnyon officials in the South, leaders of the Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland in the North, and some anti-government dissidents abroad. In June 2 and 3, 1990, the first preliminary meeting for the conference was held in West Berlin with the attendance of North Korean delegates and some overseas Korean residents.

The first preliminary meeting adopted an 11-point agreement on the operational procedures of the proposed conference. It said the conference could be attended by representatives of those political parties and social organizations and individuals in the South, North and overseas which support the basic spirit of the July 4th South-North Joint Communiqué and which were truly interested in the unification of the homeland. It was decided to hold a second preliminary meeting in Seoul.

As can be seen here, the Pan-National Conference, in view of its basic nature and promoters, was a lopsided political event that could hardly be contributory to the improvement of inter-Korean relations.

As the "Collection of Materials on the Pan-National Conference" distributed by Chonminnyon, regulated the nature of

the Pan-National Conference as being designed to thwart the United States and the Roh regime from perpetuating national division,” the pan-national conference was basically part of the united front strategy aimed at abetting anti-U.S. and anti-government struggles in the South.

2. The National Unification Minister’s Expression of Willingness to Permit the “Pan-National Conference”

After North Korea rejected the July 20th declaration for “Grand National Exchanges” while demanding the guarantee for staging a Pan-National Conference as a prerequisite, the National Unification Minister, in a press conference on July 23rd, also attended by two other ministers, expressed his willingness to permit the Pan-National Conference from the aspect of the “Grand-National Exchanges.”

The Minister said that the government would allow the conference to take place if the meeting were to be attended not by specific organizations or individuals but rather by citizens from all backgrounds and also if the meeting’s sole purpose was to improve South-North relations and speed unification.

He added that the government would allow North Korean and overseas delegates to take part in the second preliminary meeting set to be held in Seoul on July 26th.

Meanwhile, on July 23rd, Yun Ki-bok, chairman of the Northern Preparatory Committee, sent a telephone message to the South in which he said he would deliver a letter to Chonminnyon at 3 p.m. on July 24th.

Kim Sang-hyop, president of the Republic of Korea Na-

tional Red Cross, notified the North that he would send Red Cross liaison officials to Panmunjom to receive the letter in accordance with past practices in which the Red Cross had acted as liaison in all such activities between the South and the North.

North Korea, however, insisted just 40 minutes before the time indicated for the delivery of the letter, that Chonminnyon delegates should receive the letter in person. They refused to deliver the letter to southern liaison officials who went to Panmunjom at 3 p.m. on the same day.

Under mutual agreement, all liaison activities between the two sides have been carried out by their respective Red Cross liaison officials and, if necessary, letters received are then surrendered to those to whom they were addressed.

The North's refusal to deliver the letters might well have been intended to shift the blame onto the South if the Pan-National Conference failed to take place as scheduled and also to dilute the South's progressive posture toward the Pan-National Conference.

North Korea made the letter public in a radio broadcast, saying that it would send five delegates to the second preliminary meeting.

In response to the announcement made by the National Unification Minister with respect to the Pan-National Conference, Chonminnyon officials visited the National Unification Board on July 24th and agreed to open the Pan-National Conference to any and all people in the nation.

On July 25th, the representatives of 58 social organizations formed a council to participate in the Pan-National Conference and discussed with Chonminnyon the issue of their participation on the same day.

At the meeting, Chonminnyon in principle agreed to par-

ticipation in the Pan-National Conference by all citizens, expressing the view, however, that due to the lack of time, Chonminnyon delegates alone should attend the second preliminary meeting slated for July 26th, and, therefore, joint efforts would be made to enable all social classes to be represented beginning with the third preliminary contact.

On July 25th, the North, in a letter signed by Yun Ki-bok, chairman of the Northern Preparatory Committee, and sent to Prime Minister Kang, asked the South to provide five northern delegates with conveniences and guarantees of personal security during their stay in Seoul.

In a separate message, Yun also asked for the personal guarantee of safety for 10 press corps members who would accompany the five delegates.

In a prompt reply to North Korean Prime Minister Yon, Prime Minister Kang promised the North all such conveniences and guarantees.

However, pointing out that the procedures and method of such guarantees ought to be prepared through discussion between the government authorities of the two sides, the South's Prime Minister called for a liaison officials contact to discuss such matters as procedures for the passage of the North Korean visitors through Panmunjom and their escorts.

The South then suggested sending two liaison officials to the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission at Panmunjom at 7:30 a.m. on July 26th for this discussion.

The North's Prime Minister Yon sent a message to his South Korean counterpart, agreeing to the suggestion.

Yun Ki-bok, chairman of the Northern Preparatory Committee, also sent a telephone message to Chonminnyon, disclosing the list of five northern delegates to the Seoul preli-

minary meeting and asking that Chonminnyon officials meet the northern delegates at Panmunjom at 9 a.m. on July 26th.

3. The North's Failure to Attend the 2nd Preliminary Meeting

a. Development at Panmunjom on July 26th

July 26th was a significant day with the eighth preliminary talks for the proposed South-North high-level officials meeting with the prime ministers of the two sides as chief delegates being held.

On this day, the two sides wound up their preliminary talks that had taken place over one and half a years and signed a final agreement on the planned high-level officials meeting, thus unfolding a new phase in inter-Korean relations.

However, northern delegates to the Seoul preliminary meeting for the Pan-National Conference refused to come to the southern area, again disappointing more than a few of the people.

As if to prelude their boycott, the Northern Preparatory Committee issued a statement at 6:30 a.m. well before the planned liaison officials contact took place, asserting that they were against participation in the Pan-National Conference by South Korea's "government-patronized organizations."

At the working-level contact which began at 7:30 a.m. on July 26th with two liaison officials from each side attending, the two sides reached the following eight-point agreement, making it appear that the North Korean delegates' passage through Panmunjom was imminent.

Eight-point Agreement

1. Northern participants' activities shall be based on the guidance and orders of the South.
2. All matters related to the provision of conveniences and personal security guarantees shall be determined through consultation with southern government authorities.
3. The location for lodging and meetings shall be at the Intercontinental Hotel.
4. Northern participants shall use vehicles provided by the South and a southern guide shall ride in each vehicle.
5. Lists of North Korean delegates and press corps members with their pictures attached shall be furnished to the South at the time of their passage through Panmunjom.
6. Six direct South-North telephone circuits shall be installed at the Intercontinental Hotel.
7. During their stay in the South, the conveyance of pouches through Panmunjom shall be guaranteed.
8. Itineraries in Seoul for northern participants shall be determined through consultation between the North and Chonminnyon.

However, the North, which postponed the time of their participants' passage through Panmunjom originally set for 9 a.m. until 12 noon, made a sudden about-face at the second liaison officials contact.

Despite their own request for the southern authorities' guarantee of personal security and their agreement to hold liaison officials contacts, as well as the fact that they had agreed to follow the guidance and orders of the other side as in the past, the North now rejected the southern authorities' guidance in favor of that of Chonminnyon.

On the issue of lodging, the North also insisted that they had to consult with Chonminnyon. Furthermore, they rejected

having southern government officials' ride in their vehicles.

Since lodging was directly related to their personal security, the South had decided to use the Intercontinental Hotel which was considered ideal for personal security and also for communications support such as the installing of direct inter-Korean telephone lines.

The North in the past had also selected the hotel where the Southern delegates and others would stay when they had visited the North for inter-Korean talks or family reunions.

Faced with this nonsensical demand, the South then asked the North to abide by the agreement reached at the first liaison officials contact, urging them to return to the contacts.

Chonminnyon, too, issued a statement around 3 p.m., saying that they accepted "the government authorities' position with respect to the issues of vehicles and location related to the preliminary meeting," thus removing any ground on which the North could refuse to attend the Seoul meeting.

Nonetheless, when the South tried to send a telephone message to the North around 4 p.m. urging them to agree to resume the stalled preliminary meeting, the North rejected any further liaison officials contact, again asking whether or not they would be escorted by Chonminnyon, and also whether or not they would be lodged at a hotel designated by Chonminnyon.

North Korean officials thereafter cut off the direct South-North line at Panmunjom and withdrew.

Here, the South, in a press conference held by the National Unification Minister at 7 p.m., expressed regret over the failure of the second preliminary meeting of the Pan-National Conference due to the North's intransigence despite the government's reasonable policy. The Minister stressed that if the North would only abide unconditionally by the agreement

made at the first liaison contact, the door to the South would continue to be kept wide open.

However, in a statement issued by the spokesman of the Northern Preparatory Committee for the Pan-National Conference at 10 a.m. on the same day, the North claimed that it had never agreed to receive an escort from South Korean government officials, trying to blame only South Korea for the North's failure to attend the second preliminary meeting.

Even though the South allowed three Chonminnyon delegates to proceed to Panmunjom to meet North Korean delegates, the North fabricated a deceptive propaganda triade, asserting falsely that the South had "prevented Chonminnyon officials from entering the area of Panmunjom."

The North stated that it would come to Panmunjom again at 9 a.m. on July 27th to await escort by Chonminnyon officials.

Reacting to the North's unreasonable attitude, a spokesman for the National Unification Board issued a statement at 7 a.m. on July 27th, in which he elaborated on the liaison officials contacts of July 26th, stressing that if the North were interested in the materialization of the Pan-National Conference, they should rectify their hackneyed practice of reversing themselves even on mutually agreed upon matters.

b. Development at Panmunjom on July 27th

Contacts were also made between the two sides on the following day July 27th, through direct telephone lines at Panmunjom.

Saying that it was prepared to abide by, without any conditions, matters agreed to at the first liaison officials contact, the South suggested that the two sides discuss the time of the

North Korean delegates' passage through Panmunjom. But, the North, without showing any change in their posture assumed on the previous day, insisted on liaison officials contacts only.

Around 11:30 a.m. on July 27th, the North offered an apparent plan for compromise in which they suggested that government officials escort them between Panmunjom and Seoul while Chonminnyon officials take them around in the areas of lodging and the conference room.

But, the new North Korean offer represented an insistence on the elimination of government officials rather than acceptance of the basic principle that visitors would follow the guidance and order of the other side. It was nothing more than a ploy by the North to reject government authorities' guarantee of personal security despite the North's earlier request for it.

The South kept vehicles ready at Panmunjom for use by the North Koreans and took all other necessary preparatory steps. But the North, refusing decidedly to follow agreed upon matters, left Panmunjom around 2:30 p.m.

In connection with the failure of North Korean delegates to participate in the second preliminary meeting of the Pan-National Conference, the spokesman of the National Unification Board expressed regret over the North's attempt to turn Panmunjom into a propaganda arena. He stressed that matters agreed upon by the two sides should be respected under all circumstances.

The spokesman went on to say that the South would continue to exert all efforts so that the Pan-National Conference slated for August 15th could become the catalyst to effectuate Grand National Exchanges and improve inter-Korean relations.

The failure of the North to take part in the second preliminary meeting of the Pan-National Conference was obviously unrelated to the South's "undue interference or obstruction" as claimed by the North.

It had been a customary practice in past inter-Korean personnel exchanges for the side sending its personnel to the other side to furnish a list of would-be visitors to the government authorities of the other side, asking for personal security, provision of convenience and safe return of those personnel. Usually, the government authorities from the other side granted these requests.

Given the unique relationship, distrust and confrontation that have persisted for some 40 years between the South and the North, it is more than proper for government authorities, responsible for the safety of people, to ask for proper procedures in travel between the two sides.

For the North to insist on escort by Chonminnyon officials while turning a deaf ear to established practices, was apparently designed as an excuse to shift the blame for their failure to attend the Seoul preliminary meeting onto the Seoul side as chances turned out to be slim for their original political scheme of fanning confusion and friction in the South with their participation.

4. Matters Related to the 3rd Preliminary Meeting

Despite its earlier agreement on July 27th with Chonminnyon and overseas Korean residents to hold the third preliminary meeting of the Pan-National Conference in Pyongyang on August 6th, the North, late in the evening of July

27th, openly proposed in a radio broadcast to hold the meeting on July 30th.

On the following day, Chonminnyon and overseas delegates told a press conference that they would stick to the original August 6th date elaborating that if Chonminnyon delegates' visit to the North became impossible, Chonminnyon would delegate its representation to overseas delegates.

In reaction, the North, in a radio message from the Northern Preparatory Committee and addressed to Chonminnyon, on July 30th agreed to hold the Pyongyang preliminary meeting on August 6th. In the same message, however, the North wholly rejected the South's call for the opening of the Pan-National Conference to all members of the nation.

The North asserted that "we can by no means tolerate the attempt of the southern authorities to interfere in the Pyongyang preliminary meeting by raising the idea of people of all background attending" and, "the delegates who are to attend the Pyongyang meeting have already been determined among the promoters from the North, South and abroad."

Again in a commentary appearing in the daily *Rodong Shinmun* on July 31st, the North asserted that they could not allow the 58 social organizations of the South to take part in the Pan-National Conference.

This attitude on the part of the North amounted to reversing the rules on delegates' qualification which North Korea itself had agreed upon and announced.

Moreover, it ran counter to the principle which the North's Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland had announced on July 5th. It stated in effect that "contacts and travel between the North and the South should be equally participated in without any discrimination from any political parties, social organizations or people with different ideologies,

thoughts and political views.”

This change in attitude was true also of Chonminnyon, which earlier had agreed in principle to the participation of all citizens.

Originally Chonminnyon was scheduled to meet on July 30th with six executive members of the Council of Organizations for Participation in the Pan-National Conference. But, it did not attend the planned meeting. Chonminnyon also unilaterally cancelled a rescheduled meeting for July 31st.

On the other hand, Chonminnyon officials told the National Unification Board on July 31st that their delegates alone would visit Pyongyang to attend the third preliminary meeting, showing that their remarks about participation in the Pan-National Conference by all citizens of the nation was falsehood.

Six executive members of the Council of Organizations discussed with Chonminnyon officials on August 2nd and again on August 4th the issue of participating in preliminary talks. But no agreement was reached because Chonminnyon had changed its plan to eliminate the Council delegates participation.

In the end, Chonminnyon applied on August 4th for visits to the North for 12 of its officials. But, the government rejected these, since this ran counter to the earlier agreement on participation by people of all backgrounds.

Meanwhile, North Korea, in a telephone message sent to Prime Minister Kang from Yun Ki-bok on August 1st, said that when Chonminnyon officials visited the North, Pyongyang would guarantee their personal safety and deliver a memorandum guaranteeing their personal safety at 8 a.m. on August 6th.

As the North thus insisted on participation by Chonmin-

nyon delegates alone, the South, in a press conference held by the National Unification Minister, stressed again on August 6th that the third preliminary meeting in Pyongyang, as well as the Pan-National Conference itself at Panmunjom, must be attended by representatives from all classes of society.

In particular, the Minister made it clear that since Panmunjom is a highly sensitive area, it should be used as a symbolic place for unification and as an avenue for inter-Korean travel, but never as an arena of political propaganda aimed at fanning confrontation and friction between the South and the North.

Again on August 4th, Prime Minister Kang sent a telephone message to his North Korean counterpart pointing out that to make the Pan-National Conference of August 15th a gathering truly for national harmony, it should be attended by representatives from all backgrounds.

He then urged the North to expressly guarantee personal security and safe return not only of Chonminnyon delegates but also of those of all other organizations and press corps members wishing to attend the third preliminary meeting.

Regarding the place of the pan-national conference, Chonminnyon suggested on August 4th that if the government did not permit the use of Panmunjom, then the place should be switched to Seoul and Pyongyang, holding the conference in Seoul August 14th through the 15th, and in Pyongyang August 16th through the 17th.

On the following day, however, North Korea rejected the suggestion outright, asserting, in a press conference held by the spokesman of the Northern Preparatory Committee, that the staging of the conference at Panmunjom was a matter already agreed upon at the first and second preliminary meetings.

In this way, the South exerted all efforts to facilitate the participation in the third preliminary meeting by representatives

from all backgrounds including Chonminnyon under the spirit of the “Declaration for Grand National Exchanges.” But, it was impossible because of the North’s wariness of a change in the nature of the conference and also of travel between the two sides by many people.

It can be said assuredly that the North, while rejecting the South’s call for broad participation by people from all backgrounds, sought to strictly exclude Seoul government authorities’ participation in the discussion of the conference. The North thus persisted in an attempt to promote the Pan-National Conference only as a part of their united front strategy.

In the end, the third preliminary meeting was held from August 6th through the 7th with the attendance only of North Korean and overseas delegates. This meeting decided the schedule and time of the Pan-National Conference.

5. Staging of the “Pan-National Conference” on August 15th

In a radio message sent to the South on August 10th in the name of Yun Ki-bok, chairman of the Northern Preparatory Committee of the Pan-National Conference, the North proposed holding a working-level contact with Chonminnyon officials at Panmunjom at 3 p.m. on August 11th to discuss programs to be staged in Seoul and Pyongyang in connection with the Pan-National Conference and the issue of jointly sponsoring a “grand march” from Mt. Paektu in the North to Mt. Halla in the South.

The proposal, linked to a series of propaganda overtures

such as the statements issued by the North Korean Students Association and the North Korean Catholic Association, was partly a reaction to the South's demand for the receipt of the list of would-be visitors to the North.

On August 12th, the South, in a statement issued by the National Unification Minister, said it had decided to allow the visits to the North by some members of the organizations whom the North had invited to their area on a selective basis. It then urged the North to furnish a memorandum on the guarantee of their personal security to the South on August 13th.

The North had no reason to reject the offer as the South's latest statement made possible the participation by Chonminnyon alone in the Pan-National Conference.

Despite the tolerant measure in which the South allowed the members of a specific organization to visit the North during the "Grand National Exchanges" period, the North kept demanding working-level talks with Chonminnyon while rejecting liaison officials contacts.

Ignoring the South's step to allow the members of a specific organization to visit the North, An Byung-su, chief secretary of the Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland, guaranteed in a radio broadcast the visits to the North by the members of four organizations in the South — the Masses Party, Federation of Student Organizations in the Seoul Area, Chonminnyon and the Conference of Catholic Priests for Justice, asserting that the Seoul authorities should allow the representatives of the Southern Promotion Headquarters to take part in the Pan-National Conference. These assertions, in effect, indicated that the North did not want anyone to attend.

Meanwhile, Choe Ui-wung, senior North Korean member of the Military Armistice Commission, said in a statement on

August 13th that the North “will control the entry to our sector of Panmunjom of those people who may constitute an obstacle to the successful staging of the Pan-National Conference, and we cannot guarantee the personal security of such people.”

Also by saying that the North “will allow the entry to our sector by southern people only after confirming the identity of their being delegates to the Pan-National Conference,” the North in effect withdrew their July 5th declaration that they would totally open the northern sector of Panmunjom beginning on August 15th.

Around noon on August 15th, the North issued in a radio broadcast a statement by the spokesman of the “March for the Acceleration of Unification of the Fatherland,” saying they were expecting that the South would furnish them at 2 p.m. a memorandum on the guarantee of personal security of those participating in the march.

The South had already stated in a joint press conference held on July 23rd among three relevant ministers that the government would permit a grand unification march linked to the Pan-National Conference. The South also continued to maintain the position that when northern people visit the South, it would provide all available conveniences and guarantee their personal security.

When the North asked through a direct telephone line at Panmunjom when the South would deliver the guarantees of personal security, the South replied that it could furnish them immediately.

In subsequent telephone contacts, however, the North, reversing their earlier position in which they asked southern authorities for a memorandum on the guarantee of personal security, simply repeated unnecessary question like, “Will

Chonminnyon officials deliver the memorandum?” or “Will Chonminnyon officials escort northern visitors?”

The South told the North time and again that it was ready to receive northern marchers at any time with the delivery of a memorandum on the guarantee of their personal security. However, the North, in effect turning a deaf ear to the notice, indicated it was not interested in sending marchers to the southern area.

Nonetheless, the North distorted the truth in its radio broadcasts, claiming without basis in fact that northern marchers could not enter the southern area because the southern authorities refused to furnish a memorandum on the guarantee of their personal security.

On August 15th, about 500 people, mostly overseas Korean residents, entered the northern sector of Panmunjom to stage the Pan-National Conference and other propaganda programs featuring singing, dancing and shouting of slogans from around 3 p.m. through 5:20 p.m.

Apparently to keep the participants from entering the southern area, many North Korean guardsmen and security officials stood posted along the Military Demarcation Line at Panmunjom.

As the North thus interrupted even the path of the marchers of the Pan-National Conference, the Grand National Exchanges set for around August 15th could not be realized.

Appendices

Major Related Documents

1. Texts of Announcements Made by the Three Ministers in a Joint Press Conference on July 23, 1990
 - a. Text of Announcement by the National Unification Minister
 - b. Text of Announcement by the National Defense Minister
 - c. Text of Announcement by the Justice Minister
2. Text of Announcement Made in Press Conference by the National Unification Minister in Connection with the 2nd Preliminary Meeting of the Pan-National Conference on July 26, 1990
3. Text of Announcement Made by the National Unification Minister in Press Conference on August 2, 1990 in Connection with the July 20th Special Declaration
4. Text of Announcement on Government Position toward the North's Plan to Send "Consolation Team" to the South to Meet Those under Arrest
5. Text of Statement Made by the National Unification Minister on August 12, 1990 in Connection with Government Plan to Allow Members of Specific Organizations to Visit the North

1. Texts of Announcements Made by the Three Ministers in a Joint Press Conference on July 23, 1990

a. Text of Announcement by the National Unification Minister

Last July 20th, President Roh Tae Woo made a special announcement in which he declared a five-day period around August 15 of this year as a "period for Grand National Exchanges."

At 11 a.m. on the same day, the government, in a telephone message signed by Prime Minister Kang Young-hoon and addressed to North Korean Administration Council Prime Minister Yon Hyong-muk, proposed holding a working-level contact between the government authorities of the two sides at 10 a.m. on July 30th at Panmunjom to discuss substantial matters to realize the proposed Grand National Exchanges.

Inter-Korean exchanges are a process which the two sides have to go through under all circumstances before the realization of unification inasmuch as exchanges are the only means of promoting mutual trust and understanding and of reconnecting severed arteries between the two sides.

Moreover, given the pain of the 10 million separated family members, South-North exchanges are a task which cannot be delayed any longer for whatever excuses or reasons.

We cannot turn a deaf ear any longer to today's tragic reality in which elderly separated family members, after suffering so much from separation from their blood relatives over so long a period, pass away without realizing their cherished desire. The grieving and pain of separated family members should be terminated here and now.

This is why we are promoting Grand National Exchanges be-

tween the South and the North for five days beginning on August 13th. We propose that if the exchanges were carried out successfully, we would have regular personnel exchanges around such national holidays as Chusok, Solnal and Hanshik, and thereby pave the way to free travel between the the people of the South and the North.

We proposed to the North Grand National Exchanges without any conditions, and truly expected that the North would accept this accommodative offer of our side.

Regrettably, however, the North in effect made the overture infeasible. In a statement issued by the Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland, the North asserted that they would agree to inter-Korean travel only if and when the South removed the alleged "concrete walls," repealed the National Security Law, released arrested persons, and agreed to a Pan-National Conference.

In the past, as you know, the two sides' delegates, attendants and press corps members, although their numbers were limited, have traveled back and forth between the South and the North to have talks.

In 1985, moreover, separated family members visited Seoul and Pyongyang to meet their long-lost loved ones and relatives.

These events speak well of the fact that the matters whose rectification the North demanded as prerequisites, cannot constitute any obstacle to inter-Korean exchanges.

Nonetheless, if the North shuns exchanges no matter what the excuse of any prerequisites, the South is willing to discuss with the North matters related to their demand in an effort to materialize South-North exchanges by all means.

Regarding the so-called Pan-National Conference, the government will allow it if North Korean delegates and overseas residents apply for visits to our area to attend a preliminary meeting of the Pan-National Conference on July 26th.

Also in connection with the conference, the South will allow

some of our people to visit the North before August 15th. Going a step further, the government will allow our people to attend the Pan-National Conference taking place at Panmunjom on August 15th. And, if necessary, we are prepared to offer a more convenient place other than Panmunjom.

In addition, we will welcome the pilgrimage by the attendees of the Pan-National Conference from Mt. Paektu to Mt. Halla through Panmunjom. We will also allow our people to travel from Mt. Halla to Mt. Paektu through Panmunjom.

The government expects that the North Korean authorities will allow our people's entry to the North and their pilgrimage without any conditions and will guarantee their safe return and the provision of conveniences.

In connection with the pilgrimage, we shall provide all necessary conveniences such as lodging, transportation, medicine and communications.

We believe that to make the Pan-National Conference a gathering befitting of its title and nature, it must be conducted in a manner that promotes national harmony.

To this end, the Pan-National Conference should be an occasion that is attended not only by specific organizations or people but broadly by members of the nation representing all sections of society, where no mutual slandering or offending is done and which can contribute to the improvement of inter-Korean relations and unification through the promotion of mutual trust and understanding.

The North Korean authorities should recognize our sincere efforts to realize Grand National Exchanges and thereby affirmatively respond to our proposal, agreeing to hold a working-level officials contact on July 30th.

We expect that in this way, any of our brethren in both South and North Korea will be able to meet each other freely at any place to solidify the ground for national reconciliation and unification beyond the barrier of distrust. We hope this occasion

will be expanded toward the direction of free travel and total opening between the South and the North.

The government wishes to take this occasion to disclose its intention to take various steps necessary to embody the spirit of the "July 20th Special Declaration" and will translate these into action.

b. Text of Announcement of the National Defense Minister

—Greetings—

I am the Defense Minister.

As you people are all well aware of the truth, North Korea claims that the anti-tank barriers we have set up in the forward areas for defensive purposes are "concrete walls" obstructing personnel travel, denouncing us for the barriers in linkage with inter-Korean dialogues.

They have gone so far as to demand the removal of the alleged walls as one of prerequisites to the realization of the "Grand South-North National Exchanges" President Roh has proposed.

As I will discuss later, it has been expressly determined at home and abroad that there are no walls against personnel travel. It is crystal-clear that the anti-tank barriers erected by both the South and the North cannot stand in the way to free personnel travel.

However, in order to meet the public wish that the "Grand National Exchanges" proposed by the President should be realized by all means, we have decided to agree broadmindedly to the North Korean proposal to make a joint inspection of the alleged "concrete walls." We are having this press meeting to discuss these and other issues today.

—North Korean Contention—

In Kim Il-sung's New Year message issued on January 1st of this year, the North asserted that the "concrete walls" south of the Military Demarcation Line should be dismantled so as to facilitate free personnel travel and the total opening of the two sides' societies. They claimed that in the northern area, there are only barbed wire fences marking the boundary without any barriers.

Ever since that time, the North, through Military Armistice Commission meetings, messages to the South and statements, has kept demanding a joint inspection and removal of these "walls."

—Truth—

As is well known, however, there is no need to erect walls to discourage personnel travel as the North has claimed because there is no city like Berlin along the truce line of the Korean peninsula, but rather a 4km-wide demilitarized zone in which free passage by either side people is prohibited under the Military Armistice Agreement.

When North Korean troops perpetrated an unprovoked invasion of the South spearheaded by tanks on June 25, 1950, the South without a single tank for defense witnessed its capital, Seoul, being taken by the aggressors in just three days.

Beginning in 1962, the North, having adopted the so-called four major military lines, has intensified arms buildup and war preparations, increasing the danger of surprise attack and blitzkrieg style warfare against the South chiefly through drastic expansion of its numbers of tanks and armored personnel carriers.

In the course of taking steps in the 1970s to prepare against the North Korean military buildup, the South erected anti-tank barriers under the state policy that military facilities should strict-

ly be of a defensive nature, although the South was able to increase tanks in a step of an offensive nature.

Still, such anti-tank barriers were built in areas of an easy access by armored columns in central and western zones, but never along the entire length of the truce line as the North Koreans claim. After all, there was no need to erect concrete barriers along the entire armistice line at such a huge cost.

The combined length of the anti-tank barriers the South has erected are no more than some 30km out of the 250km (155 miles) truce line. On the other hand, the North has erected anti-tank barriers totaling some 70km, more than twice as long as the South's. Besides, whereas the South's guard fences are twofold, the North has installed fivefold to sixfold electrified fences to keep their soldiers and people from defecting to the South.

It cannot but be the case of a thief denouncing his victim that the North, which has more anti-tank barriers and anti-personnel fences than the South, insists that "concrete walls" exist south of the truce line only.

We have had home and foreign correspondents including a Soviet journalist in Tokyo visit the forward area and directly observe the barriers, who expressly confirmed there are no concrete walls intended to discourage personnel travel as the North insists.

This can be underscored by the fact that a number of North Korean soldiers have defected to our side despite the existence of anti-tank barriers. Last July 19th, even Radio Moscow reported that the "concrete walls" which North Korea claimed exist in the South are in fact anti-tank barriers.

—Measures—

In messages to the National Unification Minister and the President last February 19th and March 22nd, respectively, the

North proposed forming a joint inspection team to examine our barriers only.

In reaction, our side suggested last February 21st and April 7th that matters related to the Demilitarized Zone be discussed at Military Armistice Commission meetings under the Military Armistice Agreement and other issues at a South-North high-level officials meeting. But, the North simply repeated their demand that barriers south of the truce line alone be examined jointly.

—Proposal to the North—

However, in line with the national wish that the “Grand South-North Exchanges” proposed by the President should be realized under all circumstances, we have decided to accommodate the northern offer in a progressive manner.

We propose that in the suggested joint inspection, North Koreans come and examine any area they want to, and that in return the North guarantee our side’s free inspection of the North Korean area under the principle of reciprocity.

And, we suggest that even the tunnels which the North claims were “dug by the South” be openly inspected at this time.

To this end, we propose to hold a working-level contact between three military officials from each side at the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission at 10 a.m. on July 27, 1990.

We urge the North to show a sincere response so as to help materialize the “Grand South-North National Exchanges” that the entire 70 million people wish for.

c. Text of Announcement by the Justice Minister

I am the Justice Minister.

I am going to discuss the issues of repealing the National Security Law and releasing those arrested for illegally visiting the

North, certain issues which the North Koreans demand as prerequisites to the realization of the "Grand National Exchanges" proposed by President Roh Tae Woo.

Free travel can be realized only on the basis of mutual trust and respect between the South and the North. I do not believe any legal issue or the arrest of some specific persons stand in the way to exchanges.

I never heard that in their re-integration, neither East Germany nor West Germany made an issue out of the other side's statutes of law or arrested persons.

North Korea insists that the National Security Law constitutes an obstacle to inter-Korean exchanges. But, our National Security Law is a mere defensive security criminal law designed to safeguard the state and people from those external aggressive forces threatening the territory and sovereignty of the Republic of Korea. The law is never aimed at threatening or attacking North Korea or any other country for that matter.

Therefore, if the North does not intend to overthrow the liberal democratic system of the Republic of Korea and does not persist in a scheme to communize the South, none of the National Security Law clauses can stand in the way to inter-Korean dialogue and exchanges.

Besides, the issue of an amendment to the National Security Law is being debated at the National Assembly not at the request of the North, but as a step to prepare for unification.

Lately, moreover, a legal mechanism, Law on Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North, has been legislated to facilitate the free materialization of personnel travel and material exchanges between the South and the North.

North Korea demands the release of so-called "democratic people" arrested for their illegal visits to the North. But, you people must be well aware of the fact that they were punished according to law because their visits were not for pure exchange purpose.

Therefore, it is hardly understandable that the North makes our internal statutory system and legal measures a prerequisite to exchanges.

Our government has never made an issue of the North's statutory system or their human rights situation such as the forced internment of people for ideological reasons. Now, however, we feel obliged to ask how is their security-related legal system operated and how are their ideological offenders handled?

The platform of the Workers' Party, which is the supreme statutory code of North Korea, and their Constitution expressly set forth the goal of making the whole Korean society Kimilsung-ideologized and constructing a Communist society in the long run by achieving a complete victory of socialism in the northern half of the Korean peninsula and accomplishing the revolutionary goal of national liberation and people's democracy all across the rest of the nation.

To accomplish this Communist revolutionary goal, North Korea mercilessly deals with any one opposed thereto under the provisions of anti-revolution crimes under their criminal code.

The criminal law of North Korea serves as the very tool in executing such revolutionary goals.

In this respect, the North Korea criminal law is not a mere defensive security law geared to protect their Communist system, but rather an offensive penal law intended to ferret out and crush anti-revolutionary hostile elements opposed to the so-called "struggles for the liberation of the Korean people" with a view to accomplishing a Communist revolution all across the Korean peninsula.

They call the Republic of Korea an "enemy" and execute those caught defecting to the "enemy," confiscating all the properties of those having defected.

Even when there are no express provisions on some crimes, the North allows analogical application of penal clauses on similar crimes in complete disregard of the basic principle of

modern criminal code, namely the principle of legality.

On anti-revolutionary crimes, they punish people on charges of non-reporting without any exception. They even permit the elimination of the period of prescription.

Like this, the North Korean security-related criminal laws are dreadful. But, they keep them secret lest their contents should be known externally.

According to an international human rights organization report, about 152,000 people are held in concentration camps for political reasons. It has been confirmed that these camps are near Hoeryong, Kangsong, Eunsong, Sariwon, Youngbyon and Yongkang.

It is said that among those held at these camps are former premier Li Gun-mo, former deputy premiers Hong Song-ryong and Kim Kyong-ryon, former National Security Minister Kim Byong-ha, former deputy premier Kim Chang-bong and Pak Gum-chol.

North Korea speaks as if they would agree to free travel between the two sides if only their demands were met. In reality, however, they restrict people's travel beyond the boundary of the counties they live in.

If they want to make the question of our legal system or arrested people as a prerequisite, they should first lift restriction on their people's travel, repeal their security-related laws and set free countless ideological offenders whom they have indiscriminately arrested and now hold in concentration camps.

Our government does not demand any prerequisites to inter-Korean exchanges. There cannot be any preconditions in the efforts to promote harmony and reconnect the severed arteries of Korean compatriots.

We are convinced that the question is whether the North has the genuine intent and sincerity to promote exchanges to lay a foundation for peaceful unification as the same people. But, the two sides' internal matters such as their legal systems do not con-

stitute any obstacle to exchanges.

Nonetheless, we hope that the legal authorities of the two sides meet and discuss openheartedly all pending issues if such is needed in the fostering of an atmosphere for unification and realizing of inter-Korean exchanges.

If and when the legal authorities of the South and the North meet, the issue of improving legal and systematic mechanisms can be progressively discussed to expedite South-North exchanges. The meeting may discuss the North's security-related criminal laws and the question of ideological prisoners as well as the South's National Security Law and the issue of arrested persons. If necessary, materials on legal systems, etc., can be exchanged.

I believe that to discuss these matters, there should be a South-North legal officials meeting. I propose that to discuss such a meeting, three working-level officials from each side meet at 10 a.m. on July 7th either at Tongilkak or Peace House as the North prefers.

2. Text of Announcement by the National Unification Minister on the 2nd Preliminary Meeting of the Pan-National Conference, July 26, 1990

Last July 20th, President Roh Tae Woo made an epochal special statement for unification, proclaiming five-days around August 15th as a "Period for Grand National Exchanges."

However, North Korea has in effect rejected the idea of Grand National Exchanges by demanding, in a statement issued by the Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland on the afternoon of the same day, the removal of "concrete walls," repeal of the National Security Law, release of arrested persons and agreement to a Pan-National Conference as prerequisites to

inter-Korean travel.

Nevertheless, in a bid to realize the proposed exchanges, the government, in a press conference held among three relevant government ministers last July 23rd, disclosed an accommodative posture, showing the willingness to discuss even the North-raised issues between the relevant authorities of the two sides on the principle of reciprocity. The government proposed holding working-level contacts between the South-North legal and military authorities at Panmunjom on July 27th.

Moreover, regarding the issue of staging a Pan-National Conference on August 15th, the government said it would allow it in the hope that it would be realized as part of the proposed Grand National Exchanges and would become a momentum to promoting mutual trust and understanding.

The government further said that it would provide all the necessary support to the second preliminary meeting set to be held in Seoul on July 26th.

In response, the North, in a message sent from Yun Ki-bok, chairman of the Northern Preparatory Committee of the Pan-National Conference, to Prime Minister Kang Young-hoon at 10 a.m. yesterday, requested that the South provide conveniences to their delegates to the second preliminary meeting and guarantee their personal safety.

In this connection, the government sent a telephone message signed by Prime Minister Kang to the North's Administration Council Prime Minister Yon Hyong-muk yesterday afternoon, promising personal security and conveniences for North Korean delegates and proposing to hold a liaison officials contact at 7:30 a.m. today to discuss working-level procedures related to the passage by their personnel through Panmunjom.

At the same time, the government allowed three officials of the South's Temporary Implementation Headquarters and another three Chonminnyon representatives to proceed to Panmunjom to greet North Korean delegates.

I can say that all these, based on the spirit of the Grand National Exchanges, stemmed from the government's accommodative and positive posture to help carry out the Pan-National Conference successfully.

Nonetheless, North Korea, in a statement issued by the Northern Preparatory Committee of Pan-National Conference at 6:30 a.m. today, denounced the South asserting, "it is preposterous for the South Korean authorities to attempt to have government-patronized anti-unification organizations join the sacred conference." The statement said that unless the South agreed to set free arrested persons, these organizations cannot take part in the Pan-National Conference.

As you are also well aware, the North agreed at a liaison officials contact held from 7:30 to 8:20 a.m. this morning to the principle that they would follow the guidance and orders of the other side as they had in the past. They thus agreed to use lodging, vehicles and communications as offered by the South's government authorities.

However, the North postponed the scheduled time of the passage by their delegates through Panmunjom, originally slated for 9 a.m., until around 12 noon and began to change their attitude at the liaison officials contacts held thereafter.

In other words, by turning a deaf ear to the agreement already reached between the two sides on personal security and the provision of conveniences, the North began making an absurd demand that they would follow guidance by Chonminnyon, an organization without any responsibility for the guarantee of personal safety. They went so far as to insist that they should confer with Chonminnyon on the issue of their lodging, an issue which forms the basis of the guarantee of personal security.

As the North refused to hold liaison officials contacts insisting on such absurd demands, the South tried around 4:08 p.m. today to send a telephone message to the North urging them to resume liaison officials contacts.

But, the North refused even to receive the telephone message, by simply asking if "Chonminnyon officials would escort North Korean delegates?" and if "North Korean delegates would be lodged at a place designated by Chonminnyon?" thus asserting that unless their demand was met, there would be no need of any liaison officials contacts. Therefore, the second preliminary meeting of the Pan-National Conference set for today failed to take place.

We suggested the Intercontinental Hotel as the lodging site of the North Korean delegates because the hotel was ideal for guaranteeing the personal security of their delegates and because it was easy to install direct South-North telephone lines there and the hotel was conveniently located for press corps members to cover the meeting.

Notwithstanding, the North's boycott of the hotel represented an act of disregarding the basic spirit of the hitherto well respected mutual agreement that each side's delegates would follow the guidance and orders of the other side when they are in each other's areas.

The North Korean attitude made us doubt that the North really had the intent of materializing the Pan-National Conference.

As many of our organizations wish to take part in the Pan-National Conference of August 15th, and in a bid to make the conference an occasion to improve inter-Korean relations, we shall exert efforts continuously.

We hope that the North will respect the agreement mutually reached at 7:30 a.m. without any conditions. We also make it clear that our door will always be kept open.

Today is a significant day on which the two sides exchanged a memorandum of agreement to conclude the preliminary talks of the South-North high-level officials meeting that have lasted for one and a half years, setting the stage for the proposed meeting.

Accordingly, we expect that a new chapter will unfold for the

improvement of inter-Korean relations and unification through the opening of the South-North high-level officials meeting and the realization of the Grand National Exchanges.

3. Text of Announcement Made by the National Unification Minister in Press Conference on August 2, 1990 in Connection with the July 20th Special Declaration

As you all are well aware, the special declaration made last July 20th by President Roh Tae Woo for "Grand National Exchanges," was an epochal and historical announcement for the improvement of inter-Korean relations and unification.

We all heartily expected that the proposal envisioned in the declaration would be translated into action so that separated families could be given the joy of reunion and our whole people could meet each other emotionally for the first time in 45 years.

Regrettably, however, the North, in a statement issued by the Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland on the afternoon of the same day, in effect rejected our proposal for "Grand National Exchanges" by demanding, as prerequisites thereto, the removal of "concrete walls," repeal of the National Security Law, release of arrested persons, and a guarantee for the staging of the Pan-National Conference of August 15th.

In connection with the Pan-National Conference, in particular, North Korea demanded that the South 1) should not prevent their own and overseas delegates from attending the second preliminary meeting in Seoul on July 26th, 2) allow Chonminnyon delegates to visit Pyongyang before August 15th, 3) allow Chonminnyon and Chondaehyop delegates to take part in the Pan-National Conference at Panmunjom on August 15th, and 4)

guarantee pilgrimage by conference attendees from Mt. Paektu to Mt. Halla through Panmunjom.

Notwithstanding these one-sided demands, the South, in a bid to materialize the Grand National Exchanges, proposed to hold South-North military and legal officials meetings suggesting that the two sides jointly inspect both sides' anti-tank barriers, barbed wire fences, tunnels, etc. in connection with the issue of the alleged "concrete walls," and, regarding the question of the National Security Law and arrested persons, the two sides discuss the issue together with the North's security-related criminal laws and ideological prisoners.

On the issue of the Pan-National Conference, we proposed time and again that to make the conference a gathering befitting of its name and nature, the conference should be attended not only by specific organizations or individuals but also by all interested people from all classes of society.

By its nature, the conference should not be one that one-sidedly denounces or otherwise offends either of the two sides, but should be one that is helpful to the improvement of inter-Korean relations and unification in the midst of the joy of reunion and the air of reconciliation.

The government informed Chonminnyon of this position and Chonminnyon, too, shared this view. Besides, the government allowed North Korean delegates to visit Seoul and agreed without any reservation to their request for the guarantee of the personal security of their delegates and for the provision of conveniences to them during their stay in Seoul.

On July 26th, accordingly, a liaison officials contact between the two sides was held to discuss the issue of procedures related to their delegates' visits to Seoul.

During the meeting, the North agreed to the basic principle that either side's delegates would follow the guidance and orders of the other side in each other's areas as they had done in the past. The North thus did not raise any objection to the southern

authorities' guarantee for personal safety and provision of conveniences.

With the lapse of time, however, North Korea had begun to reverse this attitude. The northern delegates, who came to Panmunjom, returned to the North on July 27th blaming the South for their failure to attend the Seoul preliminary meeting.

Moreover, North Korea, while insisting that the third preliminary meeting of the Pan-National Conference should be held in Pyongyang on August 6th, argued that Chonminnyon delegates alone should represent the South, thus rejecting participation in it by people from all levels of society.

Under the circumstances, I wish to disclose the government's position once again with respect to the issue of the Grand National Exchanges including the Pan-National Conference.

First, the third preliminary meeting taking place in Pyongyang on August 6th should be a gathering attended not only by Chonminnyon but by the representatives of all areas of society.

As the government has stated time and again, the Pan-National Conference should be held with the genuine intent of contributing to the improvement of inter-Korean relations and unification through the promotion of mutual trust and understanding.

To this end, the conference should be promoted from the aspect of national reconciliation with the broad participation by members of all layers and social strata of the nation.

This basic spirit should naturally be applied to the question of participation in the upcoming third preliminary meeting.

I understand that in this connection, talks are going on between Chonminnyon and the representatives of those organizations interested in participation. I expect that their talks will bring about good results.

Second, we will ask the North to guarantee the personal security and safe return of those wishing to visit the North during the period of the Grand National Exchanges. We will allow

without any limit any person to visit the North when they receive such a guarantee from the North.

In his July 20th special declaration, President Roh set the five days from August 13th through 17th as the period of Grand National Exchanges, suggesting that during this period, the people of the South and the North be allowed to freely visit each other's areas without any limit.

The President expected that just like the South would guarantee the personal security and safe return of those North Koreans visiting the South, the North would take corresponding measures.

Regrettably, however, North Korea has not showed any affirmative response as of this moment.

It was under these circumstances that the government, in determination to translate the proposed Grand National Exchanges slated for August 13th through the 17th into action by all means, decided to receive application on August 4th through the 8th from those organizations and individuals wishing to visit the North during this period.

Application procedures will be drastically simplified and simply filling out an application forms will do. Detailed application procedures and forms be announced separately later today.

We expect that North Korea will guarantee the personal security and safe return of those South Korean people wishing to visit the North during this period. Even when the North selects would-be visitors to the North, we will issue permits to visit the North to these people to realize inter-Korean travel.

Visits made to the North during this period will be handled according to the provisions of the Law on South-North Exchanges and Cooperation.

Third, the government wants to emphasize again the principle that the Pan-National Conference taking place at Panmunjom on August 15th should be attended not only by specific organizations or individuals but also by representatives from all levels of

society.

As mentioned before, the Pan-National Conference should be attended by the representatives of all members of society in a way that befits its name and nature.

Moreover, access to Panmunjom, located inside the Demilitarized Zone, is strictly restricted. The area is a highly sensitive zone as it is the sole conduit of inter-Korean contacts under the present state of ceasefire.

From this viewpoint, Panmunjom should remain a symbolic place for national reconciliation and unification and a conduit for inter-Korean travel. It cannot be a place for political propaganda that fans confrontation and friction between the South and the North.

Therefore, we sincerely hope that the Pan-National Conference on August 15th will be held in an orderly manner with the participation of representatives from all layers of society and thereby become a momentum to promise mutual trust and understanding.

We expect that from this standpoint the organizations and individuals wishing to take part in the Pan-National Conference will have full consultations and bring about productive results. The government, too, will not spare any necessary support and efforts.

The government expects that all people will show their warm support for and make positive participation so that the Grand National Exchanges will be realized thus contributing to the advent of a new phase for the improvement of inter-Korean relations and unification.

I now conclude the discussion of the government's position and views with respect to matters related to the July 20th special presidential declaration.

4. Text of Announcement of Government Position toward the North's Plan to Send "Consolation Team" to the South to Meet Those under Arrest

Last August 1st, North Korea asked us to send our liaison officials to Panmunjon, saying that they would deliver a message from the so-called North Korean Committee for Struggles to Obtain the Release of Lim Soo-kyong" to President Roh Tae Woo.

The Republic of Korea National Red Cross informed the North that it wouldn't receive the message according to the practice of not exchanging letters prone to bring about unnecessary circumstances or set off political disputes.

However, North Korea, while one-sidedly making public the letter in a radio broadcast on August 2nd, announced that they would send a "consolation team" to the South for five days beginning on August 14th to console Miss Lim Soo-kyong, Priest Moon Kyu-hyon and Rev. Moon Ik-hwan and their families.

In a telephone message signed by Administration Council Prime Minister Yon Hyong-muk on August 4th, the North demanded that the South agree to the dispatch of a "consolation team" as well as to their call for a "government and political party leaders' conference."

In the first place, the government cannot but express regret over their undiplomatic act of trying to have an obscure private organization called the "North Korean Committee for Struggles to Obtain Release of Lim Soo-kyong" send a message to the Head of State of the South, and, when this failed, making public the letter in a radio broadcast.

We believe that before publicizing messages from an obscure organization, the regular North Korean authorities have to come forward first.

Given the reality of inter-Korean relations and past practices, the act of giving or receiving letters should be based on decency

under the spirit of mutual respect. In particular, letters related to the issue of inter-Korean travel should be exchanged between the responsible authorities of the two sides.

Notwithstanding this North Korean act of abnormalcy and indecency, we welcome their planned dispatch of their people to our area during the period of the Grand National Exchanges as we regard this as the acceptance of the spirit of the July 20th special declaration.

As to the period of their visit, however, they suggested that the visit would be from August 14th through 18th. But, given the period of Grand National Exchanges ending on August 17th, we believe it would be more proper to make it August 13th through the 17th.

On the other hand, we make it clear that we cannot tolerate their plan to meet some of our prisoners who have violated national law in the South since this runs counter to the spirit of the July 20th special declaration and won't be helpful in any way to the improvement of South-North relations.

The basic purport of our proposal for Grand National Exchanges was to allow dispersed families and other people of the South and the North to meet each other to help ease the pain resulting from division, and to contribute to national reconciliation and unification by broadening the realm of mutual trust and understanding.

We feel like asking the North if it would tolerate us planning to visit the North and meet those in its prison and if such a meeting could be of any help to the improvement of South-North relations.

In his July 20th special declaration, President Roh said that during the period of the proposed Grand National Exchanges, the government would allow our people's visits to the North without any limit and when North Korean people come to the area of the South, they would be allowed to visit any place and meet any one freely.

The statement that they can “visit any place and meet any one” represented the government plan to permit it on the basis of their respect for our system and order just like the people of the South freely travel and meet people within unrestricted areas only. We didn’t mean to allow their visit to include, for instance, classified military areas or specific persons in a nonsensical manner.

However, we feel it would be all right for them to meet the families or lawyers of the prisoners they want to see.

We hope that the North will withdraw their plan to meet our prisoners in line with the spirit of the Grand National Exchanges. We make it clear that we will guarantee the personal security of their visitors and furnish all necessary conveniences to them.

We truly wish that the North would affirmatively respond to total travel at an early date in line with the spirit of Grand National Exchanges and thus agree to throw wide open the door of peace and unification.

5. Text of Statement Made by the National Unification Minister on August 12, 1990 in Connection with Government Plan to Allow Members of Specific Organizations to Visit the North

President Roh Tae Woo, in his July 20th special announcement, declared the five days from August 13th through the 17th as a period of “Grand National Exchanges,” proposing that the people of the South and the North be allowed to visit each other’s areas without any restriction through Panmunjom during this period.

Last August 2nd, the government, accordingly, asked the North to guarantee, without any conditions, the personal security

and safe return of those South Koreans wishing to visit the North during this period. The government also said that even if the North allowed southern people to visit the North on a selective basis, it would permit such visits.

This positive stance of the government was derived from its determination to pave the way to inter-Korean exchanges and advance the time of reconciliatory and cooperative inter-Korean relations through the materialization of the proposed Grand National Exchanges by all means.

In this connection, the government received application for visits to the North across the country from last August 4th through the 8th. The total number of people who applied to visit was 61,355.

This was an occasion which clearly showed how acute was the craving of separated families for visits to their missing hometowns and reunion with blood relatives, and also how strong was the zeal of the Korean people for unification.

On August 9th, 10th and 11th, the South notified the North that it would deliver the list of prospective visitors to the North through Panmunjom.

Regrettably, however, the North refused even to receive the list by putting forth some incomprehensible prerequisites, thus causing great disappointment to all Koreans, let alone the applicants.

Nonetheless, the North, in Radio Pyongyang broadcasts rather than through responsible official channels, repeatedly said that they would invite specific individuals or the representatives of specific organizations to visit the North, asserting that they would guarantee their personal security.

Of course, the list of the applicants included many of those whom the North had invited.

As the North thus shunned the proposed Grand National Exchanges, the government, true to the spirit of the July 20th special declaration, intends to realize travel back and forth be-

tween the two sides by even a limited number of people in keeping with the national aspiration.

The government plans to realize the visits to the North during the period of Grand National Exchanges from August 13th through the 17th by those among the members of the Conference of Catholic Priests for Justice, Chonminnyon, etc. whom the North hopes to invite, who have already applied for visits to the North.

Accordingly, I propose to the North to hold liaison officials contacts between the two government authorities to deliver to the North the list of these people plus that of the press corps members who have applied for visits to the North and to receive from the North a memorandum on the guarantee of their personal security.

We hope to hold the liaison officials contact at the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission at Panmunjom at 3 p.m. on August 13th. We plan to send two liaison officials to Panmunjom.

We expect that the North, too, will take a corresponding measure, and hope that they will deliver to us the list of those North Koreans wishing to visit the South.

Chronology of Major Related Developments (July 20-August 18, 1990)

July 20—President Roh Tae Woo, in a special announcement, declares “Grand National Exchanges.”

◦ August 13-17, 1990 proclaimed as “Grand National Exchanges period.”

July 20—Prime Minister Kang Young-hoon, in a telephone message to the North, proposes a working-level contact for the realization of “Grand National Exchanges” around August 15th.

◦ At a conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission at Panmunjom at 10 a.m. on July 30th.

◦ Three delegates from each side headed by a vice-minister-level official.

July 20—The North’s Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland issues a statement in a radio broadcast in connection with the special announcement on “Grand National Exchanges.”

◦ Demands, as prerequisites, the removal of “concrete walls,” repeal of the National Security Law, release of certain prisoners, and the guarantee of a Pan-National Conference.

July 23—The three ministers of National Unification, Justice and National Defense hold a joint press conference.

◦ To accommodate a Pan-National Conference if it is a good-intentioned meeting attended by the representatives of all levels of society.

◦ Proposes a South-North legal officials working-level contact on July 27th at either Peace House or Tongilkak at Panmunjom.

◦ Proposes a South-North military officials working-level contact on July 27th at the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission at Panmunjom.

July 23—The North's Administration Council Prime Minister Yon Hyong-muk, in a message to the South, proposes a working-level contact between the representatives of the South and North Korean government authorities and political parties.

◦ Four addressees of the message: President Roh Tae Woo, Prime Minister Kang Young-hoon, Party for Peace and Democracy President Kim Dae-jung and Democratic Party President Lee Ki-taek.

July 23—Yun Ki-bok, chairman of the Northern Preparatory Committee of the Pan-National Conference notifies the South of a plan to send a telephone message to Chonminnyon in connection with the second preliminary meeting of the Pan-National Conference.

◦ Insists that they will send the message directly to Chonminnyon at 3 p.m. on July 24th.

◦ Asks for the dispatch of persons carrying the credentials of Chonminnyon.

July 24—Prime Minister Kang Young-hoon sends a telephone message to the North in connection with the offers made in the joint press conference among the three ministers.

◦ Asks for South-North military and legal officials contacts and another working-level contacts to discuss the realization of the "Grand National Exchanges."

July 24—The spokesman of the North's Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland issues a statement in a radio broadcast in connection with the joint press conference among the three ministers.

◦ Rejects both legal and military officials working-level contacts.

July 24—Kim Sang-hyop, president of the Republic of Korea National Red Cross, sends a telephone message to the North in connection with the July 23rd telephone message from the Northern Preparatory Committee of the Pan-National Conference.

◦ It has been the customary practice that the two sides' Red Cross societies have acted as a liaison in all South-North liaison programs.

◦ Red Cross liaison officials will be sent at 3 p.m. on July 24th to receive a message addressed to Chonminnyon.

July 24—Yun Ki-bok, chairman of the Northern Preparatory Committees of the Pan-National Conference sends a telephone message to the South in connection with the second preliminary meeting.

◦ Notifies the South of a plan to deliver a message to Prime Minister Kang Young-hoon.

July 24—The North refuses to send a message to the South's Red Cross liaison officials at the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission at 3 p.m.

July 24—The Northern Preparatory Committee of the Pan-National Conference makes public in a radio broadcast the message addressed to Chonminnyon.

◦ To send five northern delegates to the second preliminary meeting.

July 24—The Northern Preparatory Committee of the Pan-National Conference makes public in a radio broadcast the list of northern delegates to the second preliminary meeting.

◦ Chon Gum-chol, Son Jong-chol, Cho Sang-ho, Kim Dong-kuk and Kang Ji-young.

July 24—The Northern Preparatory Committee of the Pan-National Conference, in a radio broadcast, denounces President Roh's special announcement and the contents of the joint press conference of the three ministers.

July 25—A message from the North's Yun Ki-bok to Prime Minister Kang Young-hoon received.

◦ Asks for the provision of conveniences and the guarantee of personal security for the northern delegates taking part in the second preliminary meeting.

July 25—Prime Minister Kang Young-hoon sends a telephone

message to the North in connection with the second preliminary meeting of the Pan-National Conference.

- Promises the provision of conveniences and the guarantee of personal security for North Korean delegates.

- Proposes a working-level contact to discuss procedural matters at the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission at 7:30 a.m. on July 26th.

July 26—The Northern Preparatory Committee of the Pan-National Conference, in a radio broadcast at 6:30 a.m., rejects any participation in the Pan-National Conference by 58 organizations of the South.

July 26—The eighth preliminary meeting of the South-North high-level officials talks held at Tongilkak.

- An agreement on the holding of a high-level officials meeting signed and exchanged.

July 26—Prime Minister Kang Young-hoon, in a telephone message, urges the North to agree to hold a working-level contact on July 30th to discuss the realization of the proposed Grand National Exchanges.

July 26—North Korean delegates refuse to cross Panmunjom to take part in the second preliminary meeting of the Pan-National Conference.

July 26—National Unification Minister Hong Sung-chol holds a press conference in connection with the North Korean delegates' refusal to attend the second preliminary meeting of the Pan-National Conference.

July 26—The delegation of the Northern Preparatory Committee of the Pan-National Conference issues a statement in connection with its failure to pass through Panmunjom.

- Asks Chonminnyon to escort them at 9 a.m. on July 27th.

July 27—The spokesman of the National Unification Board makes a comment on the statement issued by the northern delegation.

July 27—Chonminnyon and the overseas delegations announce an agreement.

- To hold the third preliminary meeting in Pyongyang on August 6th.
- July 27—The spokesman of the National Unification Board makes a comment on the refusal by the northern delegation to attend the second preliminary meeting of the Pan-National Conference.
- July 27—The Northern Preparatory Committee of the Pan-National Conference, in a radio broadcast, sends a message to Chonminnyon in connection with the third preliminary meeting.
 - Proposes to hold the third preliminary meeting in Pyongyang on July 30th through the 31st.
- July 30—Prime Minister Kang Young-hoon sends a telephone message to the North.
 - Urges the North to agree to discuss procedural matters to realize Grand National Exchanges. (Asks for reply by August 7th)
- July 30—The Northern Preparatory Committee of the Pan-National Conference, in a radio broadcast, sends a notification to Chonminnyon regarding the third Pyongyang preliminary meeting.
 - Agrees to the Chonminnyon proposal to hold the third preliminary meeting on August 6th.
 - Rules out participation by organizations other than Chonminnyon.
- July 31—The daily *Rodong Shinmun* of the North claims that 58 organizations of the South cannot take part in the Pan-National Conference.
- August 1—Yun Ki-bok, chairman of the Northern Preparatory Committee of the Pan-National Conference, sends a telephone message to Prime Minister Kang Young-hoon.
 - To guarantee the personal security of Chonminnyon delegates.
- August 1—The North Korean Red Cross sends a telephone message to the South, saying that they would deliver a message from Yo Yon-ku, chairman of the Committee for Struggles to Obtain the Release of Im Soo-kyong, to President Roh Tae Woo.

August 2—National Unification Minister Hong Sung-chol holds a press conference in connection with the July 20th special presidential announcement.

- The Pan-National Conference should be attended by representatives from all sectors of society.

- Announces the receipt of application from August 4th through the 8th for visits to the North during the period of the proposed Grand National Exchanges.

August 2—The Republic of Korea National Red Cross, in a message to the North, refuses to receive a message from Yo Yon-ku, chairman of the Committee for Struggles to Obtain the Release of Im Soo-kyong.

August 2—The North, in a radio broadcast, makes public the letter from Yo Yon-ku, chairman of the Committee for Struggles to Obtain Release of Im Soo-kyong, to President Roh Tae Woo.

- To directly meet arrested persons during their planned visit to the South on August 14th through the 18th.

August 4—Prime Minister Kang Young-hoon sends a telephone message to the North in connection with the third preliminary meeting of the Pan-National Conference.

- Asks the North to guarantee the personal security and safe return of all those South Koreans — both individuals and the representatives of organizations — interested in participation in the third preliminary meeting.

August 4—The North's Administration Council Prime Minister Yon Hyong-muk, in a telephone message, urges the South to agree to hold working-level contacts to discuss a government and political party leaders conference.

August 6—The National Unification Board announces the government's position toward the North's proposal for sending a "consolation team" to the South.

- The visit of a "consolation team" will be allowed, but not any direct meeting with arrested persons.

August 6—The third Pyongyang preliminary meeting of the Pan-

National Conference held without participation by Chonminnyon.

August 6—Yo Yon-ku, chairman of the Committee for Struggles to Obtain the Release of Im Soo-kyong, in a radio broadcast, makes public a telephone message to President Roh Tae Woo.

◦ A “consolation team” will proceed to Panmunjom at 9 a.m. on August 14th.

August 7—Prime Minister Kang Young-hoon, in a radio message to the North, proposes to hold communications and aviation working-level contacts to prepare for a South-North high-level officials meeting.

◦ Three each communications and aviation working-level officials to be sent at 10 a.m. on August 8th.

August 7—North Korean Administration Council Prime Minister Yon Hyong-muk, in a telephone message to the South, asks for the guarantee of personal security of the members of a “consolation team” visiting the South.

August 7—North Korean Administration Council Prime Minister Yon Hyong-muk sends a telephone message to the South in connection with working-level contacts to prepare for the first high-level officials meeting.

◦ Hopes to have a contact on a separate date after exchanging the names of respective responsible liaison officials.

◦ Choe Bong-chun named as the North’s responsible liaison official.

August 7—The third Pyongyang preliminary meeting of the Pan-National Conference adopts a joint communique.

◦ To stage the Pan-National Conference at Panmunjom on August 15th as originally planned.

◦ Finally decides on the place and topics of the conference and the qualification of attendees as agreed on at the first and second preliminary meetings.

August 8—Prime Minister Kang Young-hoon sends a telephone message to the North on the planned delivery of the list of those

who applied for visits to the North during the period of Grand National Exchanges.

- Liaison officials to be sent to the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission twice, at 3 p.m. on August 9th and at 3 p.m. on August 10th.

- To welcome the planned visit to the South by a “consolation team,” and asks the North to change the period of the visit to August 14th through the 17th.

August 8—Prime Minister Kang Young-hoon, in a telephone message to the North, notifies the North of the name of a responsible liaison official for the South-North high-level officials meeting, and proposes communications and aviation working-level officials contacts.

- Kim Yong-hwan named as responsible liaison official.

- Working-level contacts be held at the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission at 10 a.m. on August 10th.

August 9—North Korean Administration Council Prime Minister Yon Hyong-muk, in a telephone message to the South, refuses to receive the list of the applicants for visits to the North during the period of Grand National Exchanges.

August 9—Prime Minister Kang Young-hoon, in a telephone message to the North, again calls for the exchange of the lists of visitors during the period of Grand National Exchanges.

- To send liaison officials to the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission at 3 p.m. on August 10th.

August 9—Ho Dam, chairman of the North’s Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland, issues a statement accepting the planned visit to Pyongyang by Paek Ki-wan, consultant to the Minjung Party (provisional).

August 9—North Korea, in a radio broadcast, announces the formation of a “consolation team.”

- Thirty persons including team head Yo Yon-ku and 20 press

corps members.

August 9—Choe Bong-chun, responsible liaison official of the northern delegation to the South-North high-level officials talks, in a telephone message, notifies the South of the postponement of aviation and communications working-level officials contacts.

◦ To notify the South of an appropriate date after August 15th.

August 10—Yun Ki-bok, chairman of the Northern Preparatory Committee of the Pan-National Conference, in a radio broadcast, proposes working-level contacts with Chonminnyon to discuss the joint sponsorship of seminars, cultural events and a grand march from Mt. Paektu to Mt. Halla.

◦ At the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission at 2 p.m. on August 11th.

August 10—An Byong-su, chief secretary of the North's Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland, sends a telephone message to the National Unification Minister regarding the exchange of the lists of visitors during the period of the Grand National Exchanges.

◦ Demands permission to meet prisoners, repeal of the National Security Law and the formal permission of Chonminnyon's participation in the Pan-National Conference.

August 10—The Chairman of the North's Student Committee, in a radio broadcast, proposes a working-level contact with Sochongryon (Federation of Student Organizations in the Seoul Area).

◦ Conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission at 9 a.m. on August 11th.

August 10—The chairman of the North Korean Catholic Association, in a radio broadcast, proposes a working-level contact with the Conference of Catholic Priests for Justice.

◦ Conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission at 11 a.m. on August 11th.

August 10—The spokesman of the National Unification Board makes

a comment on the North's refusal to receive the list of applicants for visits to the North.

August 10—The spokesman of the National Unification Board proposes to hold a liaison officials contact between the two government authorities to exchange the list of those applicants for visits to the North whom the North accepts and a memorandum on the guarantee of personal security.

° Conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission at 11 a.m. on August 11th.

August 11—The spokesman of the North's Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland, in a broadcast statement, rejects a government liaison officials contact proposed by the spokesman of the National Unification Board.

August 12—National Unification Minister Hong Sung-chol, in a statement, allows the members of specific organizations to visit the North during the period of the proposed Grand National Exchanges.

° Proposes to hold a government liaison officials contact for the delivery of the list of those would-be visitors among the members of specific organizations and the receipt of a memorandum on the guarantee of personal security.

° Conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission at 3 p.m. on August 13th.

August 13—Prime Minister Kang Young-hoon sends a telephone message to the North in connection with the National Unification Minister's statement on the permission of the members of specific organizations to visit the North during the period of Grand National Exchanges.

August 13—Choe Ui-wung, senior North Korean member of the Military Armistice Commission, issues a statement in a radio broadcast.

° In effect, withdraws the earlier northern declaration that they would open the northern sector of Panmunjom.

August 13—The spokesman of the Northern Preparatory Committee

of the Pan-National Conference issues a statement in connection with the National Unification Minister's statement.

◦ Hopes to meet directly with the representatives of the Southern Promotion Headquarters at 2 p.m. on August 14th.

August 13—An Byong-su, chief secretary of the North's Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland, issues a statement in a radio broadcast in connection with the National Unification Minister's statement.

◦ The South's government authorities should not interfere in the issue of contacts and travel between private organizations.

August 13—The spokesman of the North's Social Democratic Party, in a radio broadcast, proposes a working-level contact in connection with the proposed visits to the North by Paek Ki-wan and the head of the Minjung Party (provisional).

◦ Conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission at 4 p.m. on August 14th.

August 13—The spokesman of the North Korean Student Committee, in a radio broadcast, proposes a working-level contact with Sochongryon.

◦ Conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission at 4 p.m. on August 14th.

August 13—The spokesman of the North's Catholic Association, in a radio broadcast, proposes a working-level contact with the Conference of Catholic Priests for Justice.

◦ Conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission at 11 a.m. on August 14th.

August 14—The spokesman of the National Unification Board, in a statement, denounces the North for refusing to receive the list of would-be visitors to the North.

August 14—The members of the North's "consolation team" refuse to enter the southern sector.

◦ Hold a political rally at Panmunjom.

August 14—Working-level contact delegates of four North Korean organizations, in a radio broadcast, issue a joint statement on

the failure to hold working-level contacts with their South Korean counterparts.

August 15—The spokesman of the North's "Paektu-Halla March" issues a statement in a radio broadcast in connection with passage by marchers through Panmunjom.

◦ Asks for the delivery by the South Korean authorities of a memorandum on the guarantee of personal security at the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission at 2 p.m. on August 15th.

August 15—The North refuses to receive a memorandum on the guarantee of personal security for the members of the "Paektu-Halla March."

◦ Demands the delivery of the memorandum and escort by Chonminnyon officials.

August 15—North Korea stages propaganda programs in the northern sector of Panmunjom in connection with the Pan-National Conference.

