


A Comparison of Unification Policies of South and North Korea



**National Unification Board
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I. Foreword

Throughout their 45-year division, South Korea and North Korea have maintained different ideologies and systems. Nonetheless, both have invariably voiced the need for national unification.

This is rather natural given the facts that the Koreans are a homogeneous people who have lived in a single state for the past 5,000 years and that division was forced upon them by external forces in the process of handling post-World War II issues rather than by their own decision.

When it comes to policy goals and methodology, however, the two sides show a substantial disparity, leading to a state of acute confrontation.

And, given the behavior patterns of the governments of the two sides, it appears extremely difficult for them to find things in common in the future as well.

This disparity in policy goals and methodology might have derived from the fact that each side has maintained and developed its own ideology and system. More basically, however, its source may well be the deep-rooted mutual distrust caused largely by the fratricidal Korean War.

North Korea bases its unification policy on the unchanging logical armament of "communization of the entire Korean peninsula."

In promoting its unification policy, therefore, the North places greater weight on propaganda attached to excuse and logic than on practicability.

Since a unification policy falls in the realm of government policies, its feasibility has to be determined on the basis of an accurate analysis of essential matters involved and on whether or not the policy is capable of resolving realistic issues.

If unification remains a far-off issue and is not closely related to the daily lives of the members of a nation, a unification policy may be able to earn public support depending on the extent of its appeal and logicity.

However, under the present circumstances, with significant environmental changes taking place at home and abroad over the issue of peace and unification of the Korean peninsula and with the people's mounting desire for unification, a unification policy has no choice but to be evaluated not by its logicity but by its practicability.

At this time, moreover, with the complete unification of East and West Germany and of South and North Yemen, the Korean people have now come to regard

unification as a realistic possibility.

The new universal trend toward openness and reform has finally begun to reach the Korean peninsula. the governments of both the South and the North have come under pressure for more realistic and practicable unification policies.

With the birth of the sixth Republic and the progress of democratization, the South altered perception and ideas about inter-Korean relations and, thus, has begun to prepare itself for the positive accommodation of such pressure.

In the following pages, an attempt will be made to review the unification policies of South Korea and North Korea based on the judgement that the possibility of unification has been growing in line with rapid changes taking place in the unification environment both at home and abroad.

Such a review, made amidst a changing unification environment, must be a fresh and realistic under-taking, although the unification policies of both sides were compared on a number of occasions in the past.

II. Reality of South-North Relations

1. Social Breakup and Deepening Heterogeneity

When American and Soviet troops landed in the southern and northern regions of Korea across the 38th Parallel at the end of World War II, most Koreans, regarded it as a temporary action and never thought it would become a barrier blocking the travel of people and the flow of goods between the two sides, much less cause the suspension of communications.

However, the Soviet forces who entered northern Korea before the American troops landed in the southern area,¹⁾ cut off the Kyongwon Railroad Line at the 38th Parallel on August 24, 1945, forcing south-bound trains to turn around at Chonkok, just north of the parallel. On August 25, they banned travel and flow of goods across the parallel. Further, on September 6, the Soviets severed the trans-Korean telephone and telegraph lines in the Haeju area and suspended postal services between the two areas.

The U.S. forces, were embarrassed to see that the

38th Parallel had been turned into a *de facto* national boundary.

At a preliminary meeting of the Joint US-USSR Committee, held at Toksu Palace in Seoul on January 29, 1946, the U.S. military authorities proposed that the administrative aspects of North Korea and South Korea be integrated immediately, with the 38th Parallel functioning only as a boundary between the U.S. and Soviet forces.²⁾

Further, the U.S. military authorities proposed that the operation of railroads, electricity and communications of the two sides be integrated, that the two sides use a single currency system and that travel between the two sides be liberalized under specific procedures to be agreed upon by both sides.

The Soviet authorities, however, responded passively, presenting a plan to allow barter trade between the two sides. The plan covered the exchange of specific commodities and facilities, and the limited integration of railroads and automobile traffic. However, even such limited exchanges could not be instituted due to the breakup of the Joint US-USSR Committee.

Although the peninsula was divided, more than 3.5 million North Koreans escaped to the South before the Korean War, in spite of the fact that many were killed

near the 38th Parallel. Still, the mass migration indicated there were some loopholes along the "iron curtain."

These loopholes allowed limited and unofficial exchanges of personnel and materials, called "38 trade" and "38 post." The Korean War, however, completely sealed even these loopholes. The war brought a total separation of the two societies.

With the social breakup, heterogeneity began to progress between South and North Korea. The South has grown into a free, open society based on the political order of liberal democracy while the North has been transformed into a uniform society which has wholly rewritten or altered national history, based on the materialistic class view.

From the time of its founding, South Korea in the face of the unabated aggressive attempts of North Korea to communize the entire peninsula by means of a violent revolution or armed conquer, and the Cold War mechanism that had persisted until recently, has had to place special emphasis on national security.

This was, understandably, inevitable in the fight for survival. On the other hand, this also served as the reason or excuse for many restrictions. The society of the South had to go through many trials and errors before it managed to root solidly the ideology of liberal

democracy.

Basically, however, the South has been an open society and has never given up liberal democracy. Since the late 1980s, when democratization solidly set sail, the South has enjoyed social stability and prosperity though it has encountered some persisting pains.

In contrast, North Korea, since the establishment of its regime, has developed in a unique manner. Its uniqueness comes from the fact that, under the superficial excuse of “constructing a Communist society”, politics has been geared to ensure Kim Il-Sung’s absolute power and to facilitate a hereditary system of power succession.

In this process, the North Korean authorities thoroughly impersonalized their people by reforming their way of thinking through extensive ideological control. The North tightened ideological integration and unity among the people by resettling, purging or interning, in “special dictatorial districts,” those branded as ideologically “reactionary” or “unreliable.” Recently, the North has adopted the concept of “*juche*” (self-reliance) in an attempt to beautify such integration.

In this way, the North Korean people have been trained to “think the way the Great Leader thinks” and to regard this as a “glory even if they die in the course

of fulfilling the instructions of the Great Leader.” Lately, moreover, campaigns have been launched to deify Kim Jong-il, Kim Il-sung’s son and heir apparent.

Thus, for part of the national society, national history was interrupted and traditional culture almost obliterated. There ensued the destruction of the national homogeneity of the Korean peninsula: South Korea tried to retain the nation’s historical continuity by allowing the flower of liberal democracy to blossom fully, on the basis of the proper inheritance and development of national culture, and North Korea degraded the legacies of national culture to a superficial level and strove to replace its essential value with that of communism.

If this national heterogeneity is left unchecked, the two societies will become so different from each other that the people of the two sides will feel hardly any brotherhood when they happen to meet.

2. Differences in Economic Systems and Growing Economic Gap

Before the division of the peninsula, northern Korea was economically much better off than the rest of the country. Southern Korea was a predominantly agricultural area with some light industries. In contrast, mining

and heavy manufacturing industries were developed in the northern region. Northern Korea had most of the natural resources and industrial facilities while two thirds of the total population lived in the southern region.³⁾ Consequently, the South had a very weak economy from the time of liberation to the early 1960s ; so weak that it couldn't sustain even food self-sufficiency. Without the help of foreign grants, South Korea's economy could hardly have survived.

Beginning in the 1960s, however, the South has experienced an epochal economic development. Thanks to the successful implementation of the first five-year economic development plan, begun in 1962, the South registered a 7.8% growth rate per year during the period of the plan. The second plan period (1967-71) recorded a 9.6% expansion rate ; the third plan period (1972-76) saw a 9.8% growth rate ; the growth rate for the fourth plan period (1977-81) was 5.8% ; and the expansion rate for the fifth plan period (1982-86) was 8.7%.⁴⁾ A 7% growth rate is envisioned for the sixth plan period (1987-91). In addition, South Korea began to register a trade surplus in 1985, which reached 11 billion in 1987 alone.

However, this remarkable growth and prosperity was not due to effective economic planning. As far as eco-

conomic planning was concerned, the North far outdid the South, introducing economic plans as early as 1947. The problem was the efficacy of the economic system. In South Korea, the government, upholding the principle of industrial freedom, assisted key industries and other major sectors, thereby expanding social overhead capital to foster an environment advantageous to private industries.

In addition, the South introduced foreign capital to raise necessary investment funds smoothly while concentrating on the expansion of international cooperation and exports through the positive pursuit of an open policy.

Due to the continued pursuit of an export-oriented open economic system and the principle of industrial freedom, the South has been able to build up its national strength so much that it was able to host the Asian Games in 1986 and the Olympics in 1988.

On the other hand, North Korea has pursued a socialist revolution and construction under the guise of securing a material base for the "liberation of South Korea." However, since they sought development only within the framework of the concept of a limited value, the North failed to take proper advantage of the economic superiority they enjoyed over the South at the time of

division.

The reversal of economic superiority began in the late 1960s, when the South took a striking lead over the North.⁵⁾ In 1989, the South's GNP stood at \$220.1 billion and the per-capita GNP at \$4,968 whereas the North's was \$21.1 billion and \$987, respectively.⁶⁾

The poor performance of the North Korean economy is attributable to the fact that in the North private ownership of production means has been banned in favor of social or cooperative ownership. On this basis, a planned economy has been instituted in which all production, distribution and consumption activities are undertaken on orders from authorities.

In North Korea, agrarian reforms were effected in March 1946 during the Soviet military rule, prior to the establishment of the Communist regime. In August of the same year, major industries such as important manufacturing plants, transportation, communications and banking facilities, began to be nationalized. Thus, there began the establishing of a foundation for public ownership of all assets.

After the Korean War, from 1953 to 1958, agriculture was collectivized and the private sectors of commerce and industry were socialized. 1958 saw the obliteration of private ownership of all production means in favor of

overall social ownership in all economic areas. The only private ownership in the production area allowed was the products which farmers obtained through the cultivation of 66 square meters of land around their houses and through other businesses they operated during their off-duty hours.⁷⁾

This planned economy was relatively effective for post-war rehabilitation and early-stage industrialization. With the progress of industrialization, or the rooting of Kim Il-sung's monolithic system, the planned economy began to backfire, and its reverse function has since deepened.

The economic gap between the two sides of Korea arises from the disparity in the bases of their respective economic policies, and the fact that the bases of their policies, in turn, stem from differences in their economic systems. In other words, the reason for the growing economic gap may well lie in the fact that whereas the South has left its economy to follow the principle of economic development, North Korea has subjugated its economy to such political goals as the unreasonable communization of their society, schemes to communize the South, and Kim Il-sung's idolization.

3. Arms Race and Persisting Military Tension

When the Korean War ended in an armistice in 1953, North Korean troops numbered 284,500.⁸⁾ Once, in the late 1950s, the North reduced their military manpower by about 50,000. The purpose of the reduction, however, was to secure labor that was needed in the post-war rehabilitation programs, and also to make the armed forces more elite. During this period, the North's introduction of modern weapons and equipment from China and the Soviet Union increased sharply. When their post-war rehabilitation was almost completed, North Korea adopted the "four major military policies" at the fifth session of the fourth Party Central Committee, in December 1962, to embark on full-fledged arms buildup programs.

Since then, North Korea has pursued a heavy-industry-first policy with emphasis on the munitions industry to bolster their military capability, even going to the extent of revising their first seven-year economic plan. Budgetary references the North itself made public indicated that the share of military expenses in their total state budget increased significantly from 5.8% in 1964 to 8% in 1965, to 10% in 1966, to 30% in 1967, to

32.4% in 1968, to 31% in 1969, to 31% in 1970 and to 30% in 1971.⁹

This North Korean policy of giving priority to military buildup contrasted sharply with South Korea, which concentrated all its energies on economic construction which began in 1961 under the slogan of "construction first and unification later."

Yet, the South could not remain with its arms folded in the face of the military balance of the two Koreas tilting in the North's favor.

Beginning in 1966 when its economic construction was well under way, the South began bolstering the Armed Forces largely through equipment modernization. Since 1971, when one of the two U.S. army divisions in Korea was withdrawn, arms modernization programs have been undertaken in earnest, with the share of military outlays in GNP exceeding the 4% level. For instance, military expenditures accounted for 5% of the GNP in 1975 and 6% in 1976.

Moreover, as the size of the economy grew quickly, the amount of military investment began to swell significantly in the South. For example, as recently as 1971, military expenditures totaled \$440 million in the South, a little more than one half of the North's \$749 million. However, the situation began to reverse in 1977 when

the South spent \$2,030 million to the North's \$1,920 million.

Table 1 Military Expenditures in South Korea and North Korea

In billion dollars									
Year Classification	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988
South Korea	3.46	4.4	3.97	4.4	4.5	4.4	4.85	5.11	5.73
North Korea	1.3	1.47	1.7	1.9	2.03	4.2	4.27	4.22	4.13

Source : IISS, *The Military Balance 1980-81* and *1988-89*.

Since 1985, South Korea and North Korea have used more than \$4 billion a year for military purposes. This amount represented 5.7% to 8% of the GNP in the South and 20% to 25% in the North.¹¹⁾ As a result, the military strength of both South and North increased remarkably, as can be seen in Tables 2 and 3 below.

Today, military troops of South Korea and North Korea number 1,500,000. The positioning of 1,500,000-strong troops along the truce line itself points to the existence of an alarming military tension between the two sides. More importantly, however, is the fact that despite the steady expansion of military strength in the South, there is no military equilibrium on the Korean peninsula. The North decisively has the up-

per hand over the South. Of course, combined with the U.S. military presence, the South manages to maintain a viable war deterrence against the North. Yet, a sizeable military gap still exists between the South and the North.

The persisting military tension is, in large measure, due to the North's acts of armed provocation against the

Table 2 Military Strength of South Korea and North Korea : 1981-1982

Classification	South Korea	North Korea
Troops	650,000	782,000
Tanks	860	2,650
Armored personnel carriers	196	1,000
Field guns	2,014	4,000
Mortars	5,300	11,000
Submarines	—	23
Destroyers	10	—
Missile boats	8	17-19
Patrol boats	60	300
Amphibious ships	24	94
Bombers	—	90
Fighters	300	610
Helicopters	100	65

Source : IISS, *The Military Balance*, 1981-82.

Table 3 Military Strength of South Korea and North Korea : 1987-88

Classification	South Korea	North Korea
Troops	650,000	830,000
Tanks	1,500	3,500
Armored personnel carriers	1,500	1,960
Field guns	4,000	7,800
Mortars	5,300	11,000
Submarines	(miniature)3	23
Destroyers	29	2
Missile boats	11	30
Patrol boats	94	106
Amphibious ships	52	126
Bombers	—	83
Fighters	457	907
Helicopters	314	170

Source : IISS, *The Military Balance*, 1987-88.

South. North Korean provocations such as infiltration by armed agents and an attempted raid on Chong Wa Dae in 1966 and 1968, and the seizure of the U.S.S. Pueblo naturally led the South to heighten its military distrust against the North.

Military political distrust and enmity increased further between the two sides with the discovery of several

tunnels which the North had dug across the Demilitarized Zone, evidently for invasion purposes, during the period of the inter-Korean dialogue in the early 1970s. These tunnels were proof that the North was seeking a chance to unleash an armed invasion of the South under the guise of a South-North dialogue.

These, coupled with the terrorist bombing in Rangoon in October 1983 and the mid-air bombing of a KAL airliner in December 1988, require a considerable amount of time for the two sides to promote the building of confidence in the military area.

Of course, there exists the need to reduce arms in both sides of Korea. Military reduction is needed to prevent the waste of national energies and to consolidate peace. Moreover, both sides find it difficult to raise further funds for military purposes.

The current US-USSR relations and the recent arms reduction in Europe clearly indicate that military reduction should be preceded by confidence building in the military area first. Military tension and the ever-present danger of war should be removed once and for all in the interest of national unification. Yet, this question cannot be resolved with only a "declaration" or an "agreement." It can be solved only when it is buttressed

by surveillance and an international guarantee. To this end, therefore, there can be no other means but a phased approach.

4. Characteristics of South–North Relations: Disparity between Perception and Reality, Justification of the Need for Unification

The reality of inter–Korean relations, characterized by social fragmentation, deepening heterogeneity, differences in economic systems, growing economic gap and persisting military tension, incorporates both the cause and the consequence of the advent of two completely different systems and social organizations in the more than 40 years of division.

In fact, governments with exclusive sovereignty exist both in the South and the North. Neither recognizes the other as legitimate. Internationally, however, each has obtained recognition from more than 100 countries, and not a few countries have recognized both.

Both governments function, in effect, as complete entities under their respective control and maintain armed forces of their own, regardless of legal compe-

tence toward each other. Not only are they two separate states under international law, but the South and the North also show separate systems and patterns in terms of values and culture.

Nonetheless, the presiding thought among Koreans is that South Korea and North Korea are still a single nation. Of course, since population structure changes with the lapse of time, those who regard North Korea as a foreign country increase as generations get younger.¹²⁾ However, the majority of the people of both nations regard each other as fellow compatriots, though they cannot have physical contact, and believe that unification should be achieved by any means.¹³⁾ In consequence, South Korea and North Korea remain a "single society" in terms of law, politics and thinking. In reality, however, two independent state societies exist.

In other words, South-North relations function amidst a serious disparity between "perception" and "reality." Attempts at resolving the issue of unification should begin with the overcoming of such disparity.

Neither South Korea nor North Korea is in a position to give up such efforts. To both sides, achieving unification has become a "historical mission" or "paramount national task" for at least two reasons: unification has become an irrevocable must to both sides, and the

Koreans' expectations of the real gains that unification will supposedly bring are extremely high.¹⁴⁾

In South Korea and North Korea, unification is being regarded as a must originating from aesthetic aspects, a must that does not require any theoretical explanation or justification. In Korea, nationalism can be meaningful only when linked with unification. Nationalism has become a public concern simply because of unification, and it is generally understood that only when unification is accomplished can the primary task of nationalism be fulfilled.

However neither the South nor the North has made nationalism a single political ideology. It would be more proper to say that nationalism, as yet, remains in the aspect of the national conscience centered around the "sentiment" intertwined with such things Korean as the language, culture, way of thinking, history, and blood and local relations.

Nonetheless, nationalism functions as an ideological system that binds the South and the North together. For this reason, both sides find it difficult to justify their regimes with political ideologies if they disregard unification and nationalism. Herein lies the very reason why both sides use the words "nation" and "unification" so often.¹⁵⁾

Both the South and the North, but especially the South, greatly miss the opportunity cost caused by division. In other words, both have extremely high expectations of the gains they will obtain when unification is achieved. The need for unification goes deeper than even resolving of the pain of families separated by the national division. It is believed that unification will result in substantial benefits such as diplomatic advantages and freedom from the fear of war. It is for this reason that the governments of both sides cannot but deal with the unification question positively.¹⁶⁾

Despite the social breakup, deepening heterogeneity, growing economic gap amidst different economic systems and the unabated military tension due to the continued arms race, both the South and the North speak loudly of the "nation" and "unification." This is because their power cannot be justified without bolstering their determination for unification in ideological and policy aspects. The very reason the Korean people cannot give up unification, whose chance may appear slim due to the conflicting ideologies and systems of the two sides, is that they are aware of the vigorous sway dwelling in unification itself.

References

- 1) Soviet forces landed in Kyonghung, Hamkyongbuk-do, on August 8, 1945, and entered Pyongyang on August 22 after the Japanese surrendered on August 15. U.S. troops landed in Inchon on September 8, 1945.
- 2) U.S. State Department, *Korea's Independence*, Publication 2993, Far Eastern Series 18 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1947), pp. 3–4.
- 3) According to statistics on mineral products on the Korean peninsula in 1945, 86% of iron ore, 87% of anthracite coal and more than 90% of bituminous coal produced were obtained in northern Korea. This was true also of manufactured goods. For instance, iron and steel production amounted to 1 million tons in North Korea while it was only 20,000 tons in the South. Similarly, production of cement totaled 1,660,000 tons in northern Korea and 180,000 tons in southern Korea. For details, see *Sonjin Hankook (Advanced Korea)* (Seoul: Democratic Republican Party, 1978), pp. 454–455.
- 4) See *Comparison of the Economic Situations of South and North Korea* (Seoul: National Unification

- Board, December 1989), p. 28.
- 5) Ibid., pp. 36–37.
 - 6) *General Evaluation of North Korean Economy* (Seoul: National Unification Board, September 1990), p. 29.
 - 7) See Article 22 of the Constitution of North Korea.
 - 8) For the strength of the North Korean forces during and at the close of the Korean War, see Kang In-dock (ed.), *Compendium of North Korea* (Seoul: The Institute of East Asian Studies, 1974), Vol. II, pp. 80–88.
 - 9) Ibid., p. 51.
 - 10) See the ACDA Report appearing in the Seoul Shinmun, July 26, 1978.
 - 11) These ratios of military outlays cannot be anything but a big economic burden to both South Korea and North Korea. Iran and Iraq spent more than 30% during their war. Syria and Israel, both in a state of quasi-war, used 11.9% and 6.6%, respectively, while Ethiopia, involved in a civil war, spent 8.5%. Compared with 1.0% for Japan, 4.6% for Taiwan, 4.7% for Great Britain, 3.0% for West Germany and 4.0% for France, the military outlays of South Korea and North Korea were excessive. See ACDA, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1988* (Washing-

ton D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), pp. 32-68.

- 12) This phenomenon was shown expressly in a sample survey held in 1986. In the survey conducted toward people between the ages of 18 and 65, as much as 22.4% of the respondents said that if they met North Koreans, it would be like meeting foreigners. See Rhee, Sang-woo, *Security Environment of Korea* (Seoul: Printing Department, Sogang University, 1986), Vol. II, p. 687.
- 13) Rhee, Sang-woo (ed.), *Search for Unified Korea* (Seoul: Pakyongsa, 1987), pp. 3-4
- 14) Ibid., p. 5.
- 15) See Chong, Se-hyon, Internal Factors and Problems of South and North Korea Affecting the Course of Unification, *Prospects for Unification on the Korean Peninsula: Feasibility and Limitation* (Seoul: Institute of East Asian Studies, Kyongnam University, 1985), pp. 89-90.
- 16) Rhee, Sang-woo, *Search for Unified Korea*, p. 6.

III. Comparison of Bases of Unification Policies of South Korea and North Korea

1. Meaning of inter-Korean Unification

In the wake of World War II, there were four divided countries on the earth. Today, however, only the Korean peninsula and China remain divided, Vietnam was unified under communism, and East Germany and West Germany have just accomplished political unification, after going through economic integration first. However, the case of divided Korea differs from that of other divided countries in several aspects.¹⁾

First, the Korean peninsula is similar to Germany in that they were both divided as part of post-World War II arrangements, regardless of the will of the peoples of the lands, and that governments subscribing to conflicting ideologies have been established in the divided areas.

However, they differ in that East Germany and West Germany did not experience civil war and, thus, did not build up mutual distrust and enmity ; Korea, as a result

of a tragic fratricidal war, built up a great amount of distrust and enmity.

Second, the case of the Korean peninsula is comparable to that of China in that they both had mutually antagonistic governments and experienced an extreme split due to civil wars. The two are similar also because both experienced fierce struggles over historical continuity, and propaganda wars featuring proposals and counter-proposals over the issue of unification. The only difference is that, unlike the Korean peninsula, China was divided not by alien forces but in-power struggles between two political groups which had once collaborated with each other.

Third, the Korean peninsula is similar to Vietnam because both were divided into north and south, and there raged a confrontation between communism and democracy. Vietnam is different from the Korean peninsula because it was generally assumed that the historical continuity of Vietnam lay, from the beginning, in North Vietnam which was controlled by the Communists.

On the Korean peninsula, however, the historical continuity of Korea lay in the South, from the outset. In the wake of national liberation, most independence fighters, including the leaders of the Korean Provisional Government in Shanghai, returned to Seoul. However, in the

North, a group of second-generation Korean residents in the USSR, led by Kim Il-sung, a Soviet army intelligence officer, established a Communist regime.

Seen thus, the meaning of unification of South Korea and North Korea may well carry a uniqueness which cannot be generalized in the context of the simple unification of divided countries. This does not mean, however, that Korean unification would lack the universal meaning inherent to the unification of ordinary divided countries.

Since South Korea and North Korea, are basically divided states, they seek reunification instead of merely pursuing the integration of states²⁾ (where two or more states are simply integrated into one). Primarily, therefore, the two sides of Korea, want to see the generation of a sense of community among the members of the state, where two sovereign entities become one. Both sides would also like to see the creation of an organization which will be able to make peace when misunderstandings or differences arise.

South Korea and North Korea are divided countries featuring unique experiences and conditions. A series of developments have prompted the meaning of Korean unification to be regulated in a unique manner. These developments include the adoption, by the two sides, of

conflicting ideologies and the resultant political enmity and distrust, deepening national heterogeneity and the process and time needed in the restoration of homogeneity, and the arms race and persisting military confrontation despite calls for peaceful unification.

In the eyes of the people of both nations, a single sovereign entity, a sense of community, and the establishment of an organization for the coordination of misunderstandings and differences would represent a unification in legal form only. It would be proper to say that they actually hope for a more concrete unification both in form and in substance.

For instance, the members of the Korean nation will believe that Korea is unified only when land is integrated and they have complete freedom in traveling and living anywhere they wish. Of course, there should be a single sovereign government and a single military. In other words, the people would regard a unification as having been accomplished only when they can benefit from unification regardless of their past roles or the location of their residences, and national homogeneity is restored, putting an end to the emotional pains that resulted from the division.

In short, unification of the divided Korean peninsula will be complete only when the two sides become one

in all aspects-state, nation and system.³⁾

First, in the aspect of the state, there should be a single state under a single constitution which, with a single military, can exercise a single sovereignty at home and abroad. Second, in the aspect of the nation, the shattered national community should be restored and developed so as to create, in the long run, a political community as well as social, cultural and economic communities. Third, in the aspect of the system, there should be literally "one nation, one state and one system" instead of the unreasonable contention of "one nation, one state and two systems" despite the reality of "one nation and two states."

It goes without saying that the promotion of the Korean unification as part of the reunification of divided states does not premise a reactionary tendency. To achieve unification, the two sides of Korea have to overcome heterogeneity to restore homogeneity. To this end, competition between North and South will only increase as each tries to prove its own superiority, resulting in further heterogeneity. At this time, nearly half a century after division, no unification of a reactionary nature can or needs to be achieved. Today, South Korea and North Korea use the word "unification," but they, in effect, try to forge a new country, that is, a new

Korea.⁴⁾

2. North Korea's View of Unification and Basis of Its Unification Policy

a. North Korea's View of Unification

The preamble of the platform of the (North) Korean Workers' (Communist) Party, the supreme norm of the North Korean society, describes the immediate and ultimate objectives of the Workers' Party as follows:

The immediate objective of the Korean Workers' Party is to achieve a complete victory of socialism in the northern half of the (North Korean) Republic and accomplish national liberation and people's democratic revolutionary goals across the country. The ultimate objective is to turn the entire society into that of "*juche*" ideology and construct a Communist society.⁵⁾

A similar phrase can also be seen in Article 5 of the North's Socialist Constitution.⁶⁾ It is understood that the words "across the country" mean "across South Korea and North Korea" while the words "national liberation" and "people's democratic revolution" indicate "driving

American forces out of Korea and the establishment of a pro-Communist regime in the South.” Similarly, the phrase “to turn the entire society into that of ‘*juche*’ ideology and construct a Communist society” is taken to suggest unification of the Korean peninsula under Communism. Due to the very existence of these phrases and the pursuit of policies based thereon, the South could not accept the North’s offers, or contentions, at face value in the past inter-Korean contacts and dialogues.

However, North Korea may not be in a position to delete such phrases on their own. Doing so would hardly be possible under the Kim Il-sung system because the system is a one-man dictatorship and tries to justify the hereditary power succession system with the excuses of “liberation of South Korea” and “unification of the Korean peninsula under communism.” On June 26, 1950, one day after the North’s invasion of the South, Kim Il-sung asserted in a radio broadcast:

The Korean people... should destroy the traitorous puppet regime established in the southern half, liberate the southern half of our fatherland from the reactionary rule of the Syngman Rhee clique, restore people’s committees, the genuine government of the people, in the southern half, and accomplish the great task of unifying

the fatherland under the banner of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.⁵¹

Here, we can glimpse North Korea's early view of unification. According to their original scenario, a "Korean revolution" should have been accomplished all across the peninsula simultaneously. Their theory states, however, that due to objective limits such as the presence of U.S. forces in the South in the post-liberation days and the debate on general elections held in both areas under the supervision of the United Nations, a "revolution" had to be staged in the North first, with the southern area remaining as a "non-liberated zone."

Here, the North Korean strategy was that, not content with a "half-country revolution," they would consolidate the North Korean area, where a revolution had been accomplished, into a "democratic base". Based on this the South Korean area would be "liberated" to accomplish nation-wide communization.

This unification policy, called "road of democratic base," was not devised by Kim Il-sung. The policy road, aimed at realizing the communizing of the entire peninsula on the strength of a strong political, military and economic revolutionary base created in the North, was nothing more than the Korean version of Stalin's Com-

munist expansion policy.⁸⁾ Stalin used this policy to establish Soviet satellite countries in areas under their control, and used such satellite countries in expanding Soviet control to the areas of respective countries.

Seen from the viewpoint of the “road of democratic base,” the aggression the North perpetrated against the South during the Korean War was a basic condition for unification under communism. To North Korea, from the time of liberation to the period of the Korean War, unification was synonymous with the annexation of the South by force of arms.

Because North Korea could not “liberate” the South in the Korean War, the North altered its unification policy.

It now distinguished the stage of revolution for the “northern half” from that of the one for the “southern half.” Deciding to embark on full-fledged communization programs first in the northern area only, North Korea switched its revolutionary stage from a people’s democratic revolution to a socialist revolution beginning in August 1953.

At the same time, the North set forth socialist reforms as a revolutionary task. For the southern area, they produced the stages of “national liberation” and “people’s democratic revolution” on the grounds that basic

tasks had not been accomplished in the South. They called for the completion of “anti-imperial national liberation” and “anti-feudal people’s democracy” in the task of “revolution in South Korea.”

It should be noted here that although revolutionary stages were different for the two sides, there was no change in the North’s policy of making the northern area a firm base for “revolution in South Korea.”⁹⁾

At this point, some doubt arises as to the North’s policy for “revolution in South Korea.” It can be seen, of course, that by deciding to make the North a “base” for a “revolution in South Korea,” the North intends to instigate and control a “revolution in South Korea.” However, no express inter-relationship, and things in common or difference, have been revealed between a “revolution in South Korea” and “unification of the fatherland.” Here, an analysis of one of Kim Il-sung’s secret instructions is needed. In the instruction made on July 8, 1968, entitled “Concerning Mutual Relations between Unification of the Fatherland and a Revolution in South Korea,” Kim Il-sung said, in part:

Unification of the fatherland does not mean the simple reintegration of the divided land and nation but is a pan-national challenge to accomplish an anti-imperial

national liberation and a people's democratic revolution all across the country with a revolution in South Korea in mind. A revolution in South Korea is part of a whole-Korea revolution designed to accomplish unification of the fatherland. Unification of the fatherland and a revolution in South Korea are in mutually inseparable relations.¹⁰⁾

In other words, he meant to say that both a "revolution in South Korea" and the "unification of the fatherland" are part of a "Korean revolution," and, therefore, struggles to promote unification of the fatherland constitute the very struggles to promote a "revolution in South Korea." Since staging a "revolution in South Korea" will bring the time of unification of the fatherland closer, according to him, the two are in an inseparable inter-relationship. Kim Il-sung was stressing that communization of South Korea should be a prerequisite to the unification of the fatherland that he seeks.

Kim Il-sung then explained differences and things in common between the two.¹¹⁾ First, a "revolution in South Korea" and the "unification of the fatherland" have many things in common since they both contribute to a "Korean revolution" and are revolutionary struggles which regard the U.S. forces in Korea and the anti-

–Communist regime in Seoul as targets to be destroyed, and which use Kim Il-sung's '*juche*' ideology as a guiding principle. Second, it has been pointed out that a "revolution in South Korea" and the "unification of the fatherland" differ when it comes to the extent of the areas they cover and the subjects and methodology by which they are promoted. In other words, a "revolution in South Korea" is supposed to be carried out in the South Korean area with violence by underground cells and "workers and peasants allied forces" and people of all layers and strata who rally around the underground cells. On the other hand, "unification of the fatherland" should be accomplished in the whole area of Korea through "peaceful procedures of collaboration" between the "people's regimes" of the South and the North under the leadership of the Korean Workers' party.

Meanwhile, "Theories on Revolution in South Korea and Unification of the Fatherland on Basis of '*Juche*' Thoughts", published in North Korea in 1975, regulates the nature of unification by quoting Kim Il-sung as having said:

Struggles to achieve unification of the fatherland constitute pan-national struggles against the American imperialists and, at the same time, fierce class struggles

between socialism and capitalism and between revolution and counter-revolution.¹²⁾

Peaceful unification, too, can be attained only on a principle that suits the interests of workers, farmers and other broad-ranging working people.¹³⁾

This indicates that North Korea is not interested in a national unification that enables the members of the divided nation to be reunited, but pursues a unification where the workers and farmers' class of both sides can be "liberated" and a class society be created for a "proletariat dictatorship" perpetrated under their name.

In other words, North Korea aims to obtain unification among classes in class liberation achieved through class struggles. But, this sort of unification cannot be unification in the real sense. This type of unification will only result in dividing again the members of the nation, but in the name of unification.¹⁴⁾

Thus, it can be seen that there is a discrepancy, at least on the surface, between the North's view of unification before and after the Korean War. In other words, North Korea originally saw unification as a means to extend their political and economic systems to the southern area with a single stroke, by force of arms. After the Korean War, however, their definition of uni-

fication changed to the establishment of North Korean style political and economic systems in the entire area of the peninsula by using the method of “peaceful collaboration” between the “people’s regimes” of the two sides, after a “people’s regime” was set up in the southern area through a “revolution.”¹⁵⁾ In content, however, there was no change. North Korea continues to remain a “base” for a “revolution in South Korea” and their version of the unification idea calls for the introduction of a system in the North Korean style after unification.

The fact that the North’s view of unification, a view which began to change after the Korean War and which was theorized in the mid-1960s, remains unchanged to date, can be evidenced by the idea of a Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo. This idea is a unification formula to which the North has adhered since 1980, and calls, as prerequisites, for the withdrawal of American forces from Korea, the destruction of the anti-Communist regime of the South, and a South-North political conference.

b. Basis of North Korea’s Unification Policy

As discussed earlier, the North views and deals with unification in the context of a revolution by insisting, for

instance, that a “revolution in South Korea” should come before “unification of the fatherland” and that a “revolution in South Korea” lies in the stage of “national liberation and people’s democratic revolution.” It can be said, therefore, that their unification policy is synonymous with their strategy to engineer a “revolution in South Korea.” In short, the unification policy of North Korea represents a master plan to achieve revolutionary goals by pooling together available people of all layers and strata in a bid to overthrow the incumbent system of South Korea.

Under this strategem, North Korea unfoundedly brands the South as a colonial vassal state of the United States and Japan, employing both peaceful and non-peaceful means of promoting “national liberation and people’s democratic revolution.”¹⁶⁾ At the first session of the fourth Supreme People’s Assembly on December 14, 1963, Kim Il-sung said:

We must positively support the anti-American struggles by the South Korean people both materially and spiritually... We must regard a revolution in South Korea and the task of unification of the fatherland as the primary revolutionary duty of our own. The people of the northern half should be strongly prepared ideologically

so that when struggles occur in South Korea and an atmosphere ripens for a revolution and when they ask for our support, we can rise up at any time in a decisive fight to achieve the great task of the unification of the fatherland in concert with the people of South Korea.¹⁷⁾

These remarks prove that the North is contemplating a unification achieved by a “non-peaceful method,” that is, an armed intervention by North Korea. Here, it becomes obvious that their policy of “base for democracy” remains intact.

Meanwhile, the “peaceful method” means the realization of unification through the integration of both regimes after a people’s democratic revolution was accomplished in the South, or through the “collaboration” of the two sides after the incumbent government of the South was replaced with a pro-Communist regime.

North Korea thus conceives both “non-peaceful” and “peaceful” means for the realization of unification. At the moment, however, the North seems to be promoting the “peaceful” means by advocating the idea of “Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo” as the method of unification.

Their policy of “revolution in South Korea first and unification through South-North collaboration later,” is

linked to the very “peaceful” means. Since 1964, the so-called “strengthening of three major revolutionary abilities” has been the basic strategy behind the promotion of their unification policy.

This policy was adopted as the North’s unification policy at the eighth meeting of the fourth Workers’ Party Central Committee on February 27, 1964. The policy was concretely discussed by Kim Il-sung in a speech made at the Ali Arham Social Science Academy in Indonesia on April 14, 1965. He said, in part:

Unification of our fatherland, namely, the country-wide victory of Korean revolution, depends on the extent of preparation of three major revolutionary abilities... The first is to further strengthen our revolutionary base politically, economically and militarily by successfully carrying out the construction of socialism in the northern half of the Republic; the second is to strengthen South Korea’s revolutionary capability by politically awakening and binding strongly the people of South Korea; and the third is to strengthen unity between the Korean people and international revolutionary capabilities.¹⁸⁾

One interpretation of the policy is that to strengthen the three major revolutionary goals, the North will inten-

sify, internally, its socialist construction to bolster their ability to support a "revolution in South Korea," and to engineer a "bottom-up revolution" in the South by emphasizing the bad points of the South, and externally, to wage diplomatic struggles in order to foster an international environment ripe for unification under communism.

In the North's unification policy the task of strengthening North Korea's revolutionary capability can be said to have succeeded if the North's basic goal was to retain their system rather than to achieve unification.

Consequently, however, the policy has been degraded into a mere excuse to cheat, control and mobilize their people under the cloak of "liberation of South Korea," to force the people to practice austerities, and to retain their dictatorship and promote a hereditary power succession system.¹⁹⁾ The North's unification policy has thus become an obstacle to genuine unification.

It seems that the North met with some success in its effort to strengthen unity with international revolutionary capabilities. North Korea managed to increase the number of countries with which they maintain diplomatic relations by supporting revolutionary movement and organizing and supporting 'juche' thought study groups in the Third World. Additionally, since North Korean

delegates began to attend United Nations General Assemblies as observers in 1975, a resolution favorable to the North was adopted (though another resolution favorable to the South was also adopted at the same time), and its demand for the withdrawal of American forces from Korea and for the establishment of the Korean peninsula into a non-nuclear zone has earned some international support.²⁰⁾ The reality, however, is that the global collapse of communist ideology and the changes taking place in Eastern Europe are obliterating even this small success.

The North's self-appointed task of strengthening the revolutionary capability of South Korea was not accomplished the way they had planned. However, judging from the growth of the number of dissidents in the South, it is true that there was a noticeable achievement. It is well known that the North organized the Unification Revolutionary Party as an underground party in the South, which, however, was completely crushed by the Seoul government toward the close of the 1960s. Yet, because the North found it difficult admit to their complete failure, they had, "representatives of the Unification Revolutionary Party" attend various events in the North and even operated a black propaganda radio, called the "Voice of Unification Revolutionary Party," in

an apparent effort to make their people believe that the underground party was healthy and was still active in the South.²¹⁾

When the dissident forces of the South began to seek a so-called "road of scientific change" in the mid-1980s, North Korea asserted that it had reorganized the Unification Revolutionary Party into the "Korean Front for National Democracy (Hanminjon)" and the propaganda radio into the "Voice for Nation Saving." It does not require much scientific knowledge to determine that the "Voice for Nation Saving" is aired not from the South, as the North claims, but near Haeju, a city on the west coast, north of the sea extension of the truce line. At the same time, North Korea itself proved that the "Korean Front for National Democracy" was a ghost organization by arguing that the representatives of the "Front" could travel freely between the South and the North, and could even visit foreign countries.

Why does North Korea attempt to exaggerate things concerning the question of strengthening revolutionary capability in the South? It is because the North seeks to create a decisive time for a "revolution in South Korea" by means of a confederal system and does not rule out the possibility taking direct actions in the name of the "Korean Front for National Democracy" in order to cre-

ate that decisive time.

c. Tactical Changes in North Korea's Unification Policy

From the time of national liberation to date, North Korea has invariably called for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea and for private-level joint South-North conferences or political talks. Depending on circumstances, however, the North alternately emphasizes the calls for U.S. military withdrawal and the talks. Yet, at some times, they place equal emphasis on both. The course of such changes will be discussed in this section.²²⁾

From the time of national liberation to the outbreak of the Korean War, the North effected Communist-style political and economic reforms based on the policy of "base for democracy," while building up its military with assistance from the Soviet Union. The North adopted a two-fold strategy by engineering guerrilla warfare, military revolts, and civil commotions in Taegu on October 1 and on Cheju-do on April 3, and, at the same time, by proposing a "joint South-North political party and social organizations meeting."

The major tactical goal the North sought during these

years was the withdrawal of American forces from the South. North Korea believed that if only the American troops left the South, it could conquer the militarily inferior South with its own well-prepared military.

To this end, the North, in conspiracy with the Soviet Union, launched a peace offensive in which they had the Soviet forces in the North withdraw first in December 1948 to prompt a similar departure of the American forces in the South. Accordingly, the U.S. forces withdrew from the South in June 1949. North Korea took this opportunity to perpetrate a military invasion of the South in an attempt to extend its system to the South.

During the period from the armistice to the April 19 Student Uprising, North Korea, which had failed to “liberate” the South during the Korean War, believed that both subjective and objective conditions for a “revolution” were in recess.

Accordingly, the North, concentrated primarily on post-war rehabilitation and socialist reforms while carrying out south-ward programs by distinguishing the revolutionary stage and programs for the South from those for the North. In other words, judging that the people’s democratic revolution had been completed, a socialist revolution was promoted in the North. On the other hand, the North judged that a revolution in the

South still remained at the stage of national liberation and a people's democratic revolution, and therefore concentrated its efforts on rebuilding an underground party in the South, which had been destroyed during the Korean War.

In May 1955, the North expanded the Korean Front for Democratic Unification in Japan, a pro-North Korean organization, into the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (Chochongryon) in an apparent attempt to facilitate the repatriation of Koreans in Japan to North Korea as a means of obtaining a badly needed labor force, and to secure a circuitous base for the communization of South Korea.

Political confusion in the South following the April 19 Student Uprising could have been a rare chance for the North to invade the South again. However, the aftermath of the Korean War was too painful for the North and it could not renew an all out invasion of the South, and the capability of the underground forces in the South was too weak for an indirect invasion.

The North proposed the idea of unification under a confederation system on August 14, 1960, propagandizing it actively in an attempt to fan the political and social confusion in the South over the debate on unification. Simultaneously, the North was able to place a

large number of agents in the South to expand the pro-Communist forces.

As politics drifted aimlessly and public opinion was split over the issue of unification, a group of military officers, using the confusion as an excuse, staged a revolution on May 16, 1961. Faced with the subsequent strengthening of anti-Communist sentiments in the South, North Korea adopted four major military programs in December 1962 to build up their armed forces.²³⁾ With the bolstered military in the background, the North started to intensify violent provocation against the South in 1966.

Acts of armed provocation such as the attempted raid on Chong Wa Dae, and the infiltration of a large number of armed guerrillas to the east coast area of Uljin and Samchok, seemed designed to test the possibility of a new North Korean invasion of the South, or to fan social confusion in the South.

Of course, the North failed to attain either objective. However, it appeared that the North was heartened by the success of the deep intrusion into Seoul by their commandoes, and reached the conclusion that guerrilla infiltration would be more effective than a "peace offensive" for a "revolution in South Korea." It was around this time that the North activated the crack Eighth Spe-

cial Corps which was comprised of about 100,000 specially trained guerrillas.

As the North's attempt to communize the South by means of guerrilla infiltration throughout the 1960s failed to progress as planned, Kim Il-sung, addressing the fifth Workers' Party Congress in November 1970, emphasized the need to strengthen the revolutionary ability of South Korea, pointing out that bolstering the revolutionary base of North Korea alone would not lead to the successful accomplishment of a "Korean revolution." In short, he called for the strengthening of the autonomous revolutionary capability in South Korea and for the waging of political and economic struggles, legal and anti- or non-legal struggles, and violent and non-violent struggles.

The international situation entered a period of thaw in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Aware of this, the North tried to make the most of the opportunity for a "revolution in South Korea" by adopting the above mentioned policy, which is often called "tactics at exaltation period."

It seems the reasons why North Korea agreed without reservation to an inter-Korean dialogue in the early 1970s was because they were planning to slacken anti-Communist vigilance among the South Korean people

exactly when such a dialogue would foster an atmosphere for unification in the South, and to encourage sympathy for communism through stepped-up propaganda made legal after a dialogue was opened.

This can be proved by the fact that in the dialogue, the North produced the so-called “theory of the improvement of conditions and environment” in which it demanded the repeal of the Anti-Communist Law and the National Security Law, the release of ideological prisoners, and the participation in the dialogue of various political parties and social organizations including the ghost “Unification Revolutionary Party.”

However, the North’s absurd demands went unheeded. Seeing no chances to promote conditions and an atmosphere ripe for a “revolution in South Korea,” which is so vital to a “Korean revolution,” or “unification under communism,” the North unilaterally announced the suspension of the dialogue two years after its initiation. This, too, adds to the assessment that North Korea tactically used the South-North dialogue to promote its unification policy.

From the time of the suspension of the dialogue to the Rangoon incident, the North, persisted in rejecting the South’s idea of talks between the government authorities. While turning down, with unreasonable ex-

cuses, the talks or unification ideas the South offered, the North insisted on rally-like talks such as a “grand national conference,” “pan-national conference,” “political conference” or “joint meeting among 100 politicians.” Upon the assassination of President Park Chung Hee on October 26, 1979, the North proposed a meeting for the prime ministers, and a working-level meeting ensued. Before long, however, this overture also turned out to have been designed to cause a split in public opinion in the South and to sound out the South’s political situation.

The reason for the North’s rejection of talks between government authorities and its demand for a rally-like dialogue was because dissident forces had been expanded in the South and there was a change in the U.S. policy on the issue of the U.S. military withdrawal from Korea. As public opinion began to surge in the United States advocating the withdrawal of overseas American forces during the final phase of the Vietnam War, President Nixon emphasized the principle of the “Koreanization of the Korean question.” Later, President Carter also tried to promote the pullout of American forces from Korea. In this period, North Korea concentrated on a strategy aimed at prompting the U.S. military withdrawal.

However, as the plan of U.S. military withdrawal during President Carter's term was scrapped in the U.S., and resistance to the Yushin (revitalization) System increased in the South, the North changed its strategy and began efforts to overthrow the Seoul government.

Since the United States was sure to adopt a hard-line anti-Communist policy following the inauguration of the Reagan administration, and controversies over the legitimacy of the new South Korean government arose, North Korea temporarily shelved the issue of U.S. military withdrawal and tenaciously demanded a confederation system, turning a deaf ear to the South's call for talks between the authorities of both governments. At the same time, North Korea accelerated its offensive against the Seoul government, going so far as to perpetrate the Rangoon incident. It is believed that the North attempted to kill the President and top government leaders of the South in Rangoon, Burma, to maximize confusion and thereby create a decisive time for a "revolution in South Korea."

The Rangoon incident resulted in the North's isolation from the rest of the world, and led the South Korean government to adopt a more hard-line policy toward the North. In the South, meanwhile, campus disturbances led by student activists became leftist and violent

while labor disputes tended to become political and class struggles beyond the realm of economic struggles. At this point, North Korea proposed a “tripartite meeting” and offered relief materials for flood victims in the South as a means of recovering from its international isolation and speeding up the split in public opinion in the South.

The proposal for a “tripartite meeting” was meant to make the North appear to be seriously interested in peace on the Korean peninsula and to raise anew the issue of U.S. military withdrawal from Korea. The North apparently believed this to be the best way to make use of, and to boost the anti-government forces in the South. The provision of relief goods and the subsequent agreement with the Red Cross, and the economic talks were obviously not motivated by genuine concern but were aimed at improving South Koreans’ perception of the North, and thwarting the 1988 Seoul Olympics.

This was underscored by the fact that at the turn of 1986, the North, after suspending the on-going inter-Korean talks with the excuse of the annual Team Spirit military exercise, proposed a three-way military meeting on June 17, 1986, a high-level South-North political and military meeting on January 11, 1987, a multi-national disarmament conference on July 23,

1987, a tripartite foreign ministers meeting on August 6, 1987, a joint South–North conference on January 1, 1988, and a joint South–North parliamentary meeting on July 20, 1988, to discuss the issue of the U.S. military presence in Korea and the question of joint sponsorship of the 1988 Olympics.

As previously discussed, the basis of the North's unification policy lies in the buildup of the "three major revolutionary capabilities." As far as the North was concerned, the South's hosting of the 1988 Olympics ran diametrically counter to this policy basis.

The North strove to play up the military tension on the Korean peninsula by proposing a tripartite meeting which the South unequivocally rejected. To the North's greater disappointment, the Soviet Union's and many East European countries' participation in the Seoul Games had been confirmed. The North frantically attempted to thwart Seoul's hosting of the Olympics by demanding joint sponsorship, but this, too, ended in failure. The North translated into action their last card when it had its agents blow up the KAL Flight 858 on November 30, 1987, in mid-air.

In their tenacious scheme to obtain joint hosting of the 1988 Olympics, North Korea dragged out the preliminary talks for a South–North parliamentary meeting

until August 26, 1988, immediately before the opening of the Seoul Games, but to no avail.

On the other hand, the South had begun to reap significant gains in its "northern policy" thanks to the Special Presidential Declaration, made on July 7, 1988, and the 1988 Seoul Olympics. To recover from their relatively shrunken revolutionary capability, the North concentrated its energies on the preparation of the 13th World Youth and Student Festival, set to be held in Pyongyang in 1989, and started to fully capitalize on the democratization trend following the June 29 declaration in the South and Seoul's open-door policy toward the Communist bloc in the wake of the July 7 Special Declaration.

Although observers' views of the Pyongyang festival conflict, the festival, the biggest event since the founding of the North Korean regime, seemed successful despite its adverse impact on an already weak economy. Nonetheless, the Pyongyang festival did not serve as an obstacle to the South's promotion of its northern policy.

The North was obliged to give up efforts to secure and maintain an upper hand over the South and to work out schemes to thwart the South's superiority by inversely taking advantage of the June 29 and July 7 declarations. In other words, North Korea needed a

plan to thwart or slow down the South's superiority by strengthening the "revolutionary capabilities" of South Korea.

A series of North Korean overtures such as calls for a rally-like meeting (like the "South-North political conference" proposed by Kim Il-sung in his New Year message of 1989), a "pan-national conference" (suggested by Ho Dam in July 1989), a "national unification conference" (September 28, 1989), a "South-North high-level political conference" (suggested by Kim Il-sung on January 1, 1990), a "five-point plan for peaceful unification" (suggested by Kim Il-sung on May 24, 1990) and a "10-point arms reduction plan" (May 31, 1990)... all were apparently intended to raise the issue of U.S. military presence in Korea and to form an "anti-government united front" in the South.

As part of the North's frantic attempts to capitalize on the June 29 and July 7 declarations, in connection with their "united front" strategy, representatives of student activists and some dissidents of the South were illegally brought to Pyongyang, setting off an incident.

In summary, we have discussed how North Korea tactically staged their unification policy from the time of national liberation to date, in order to achieve "nation-wide victory of Korean revolution" through a "revolu-

tion in South Korea.” It was shown that North Korea’s unification policy has been carried out in tactical aspects under strategic guidance made at the stage of “people’s democratic revolution,” a prelude to a socialist revolution. At the same time, however, it can also be seen that the North was obliged to amend the base of its unification policy because the question of “unity with international revolutionary capabilities” was confronted with many difficulties.

3. South Korea’s View of Unification and Basis of Its Unification Policy

a. South Korea’s View of Unification

Whereas North Korea regards unification as an issue of “liberation,” “struggle” and “revolution” between classes, South Korea regulates unification as the process of forming national reconciliation and national community. North Korea views the South as an “area yet to be liberated,” instigating “anti-government” and “anti-U.S.” struggles. South Korea, however, regards itself and North Korea as “divided states” and recognizes the reality that the national society has been divided into two and there exist two governments with jurisdictional areas

and people under their respective control. On this basis, the South primarily endeavors to improve inter-Korean relations under the theory of "two systems in one nation" pending the time of unification.²⁴⁾

Of course, this has not been the South's political stand from the time of the division. Initially, South Korea viewed the North and studied the unification issue with the intention of "restoring the northern area." This theory persisted until the close of the 1960s. Underscoring this is the fact that during the general elections of 1948, one third of the floor seats were left empty for delegates from the North Korean area. The South made general elections in South Korea and North Korea, under the supervision of the United Nations, as the basis of its unification policy during the period of the Democratic Party regime and the early stage of the revolutionary military government.

However, in reality, "restoration of the northern area" was impossible, and changes took place between the two sides that made such "restoration" meaningless. North Korea, which was enlisted into the international communist bloc following division, has become the most rigidly controlled society, subscribing to Kim Il-sung's "*juche*" thought, while the South has developed into an open society committed to liberal

democracy. A discrepancy has thus become conspicuous between the two sides in terms of both the form and the nature of the systems.

On the other hand, neither side, though going its own way since division, has given up the intent of integrating the other. In other words, no matter what its basic purport and objectives might have been, each continued to maintain the determination to achieve "unification" by integrating the other's area. Therefore, the South and the North are in a unique relationship ; they are hostile to one another yet claim to share a "oneness."²⁵⁾

South Korea does not tend to interpret or explain history as North Korea does, nor does it devise policies deductively out of a closed ideological system. Because of its view of the world, in which it accepts things as they are and makes analyses and counter-actions scientifically rather than viewing things deductively based on transcendental theories, South Korea accepts the "special relationship" between the two sides of Korea as a reality and has begun to make an approach to the unification issue based thereon.

On August 15, 1970, the South Korea president, in his Liberation Day message, proposed to the North a "good-intentioned competition between the systems of

the South and the North.” This overture, in a sense, signified a change in the posture of the South. Now, it tried to tackle the unification issue based on the reality of the changes both sides had undergone, as well as their unique bilateral relations.

The proposal for the “good-intentioned competition” represented a significant chapter in the history of the South’s unification policies. Although, the word “systems” was used because of the unique relationship in which neither will recognize the other as a state, it marked the fact that North Korea was being recognized as a *de facto* state internationally.²⁵⁾ Due to the securing of a base, through the “competition” proposal for a broader realm of maneuvering, the South could take positive acts by proposing a South–North summit meeting, an alliance between the systems of the two sides, a simultaneous entry into the United Nations, and the idea of mutual recognition.

North Korea denounced, as a scheme to forge “two Koreas,” the promotion of the South’s unification policy of viewing North Korea as an independent state under international law, but not recognizing it as a state under the law of the land. However, its charge represented nothing but a logical contradiction. At the time of the issuance of the South–North Joint Communiqué on July

4, 1972, the signatories did not use their official titles, but simply the expression, "Upholding the desires of respective superiors." Since the turn of the 1980s, however, the North has used the official title of the South, "Republic of Korea," in its messages to the South in connection with a dialogue between government authorities. How can the North explain this? Doesn't this mean that North Korea also recognizes the existence of two Koreas? If so, it can be said that North Korea is simply bound by the logic that "Korea is one" outwardly, while in effect it recognizes the reality of division.

Inter-Korean relations have thus changed a great deal. Since the South views South-North relations and handles the unification issue in line with the theory of "unique relationship" and "two systems in one nation," or with the proposals for "competition between the two systems" and a "South-North summit meeting," it is obvious that South Korea regards the North simply as a "special state" where compatriots who form part of "us" live and which should be integrated one day. The South does not regard the North as the target of "liberation," "struggle" or "revolution" as the North does the South, but merely as the object of "national reconciliation," "coexistence" and "co-prosperity", or as a "partner." Such a view of unification was well expressed in the

July 7 Special Declaration and the Korean National Community Unification Formula.

b. Basis of South Korea's Unification Policy

As was discussed previously, the North's unification policy is, in fact, synonymous with a strategy for "revolution in South Korea." As methods of unification, the North conceives both "non-peaceful" and "peaceful" means. It was also pointed out that the "peaceful means" are not the kind of "peaceful unification" the South advocates, but one based on the North's policy of strengthening "three major revolutionary capabilities" and focusing on a "revolution in South Korea." It was further discussed that such a policy basis begins with the North's unfounded branding of the South as a colonial country dependent on the American imperialists and the Japanese militarists.

Until the 1960s, South Korea also, thought of the unification issue as based on the concept of "restoration", though the concept was different from the North's idea of "revolution." Beginning in the 1970s, however, the South based its unification policy on the concept of "peace first and unification later." The new policy stated that the two sides should first remove distrust and enmi-

ty and promise non-aggression against each other to consolidate peace; to seek the restoration of national trust and homogeneity while opening their respective societies to each other through dialogue, exchanges and cooperation and, based thereon, to achieve unification through free general elections. However, for the South, the order of the consolidation of peace and dialogue, exchanges and cooperation was subject to change, and could even be carried out simultaneously.

The policy of the South was that dialogue, exchanges and cooperation should begin in such non-political areas as social, culture, sports and economy, where mutual differences would not be substantial, rather than in areas like the military and politics where the two sides would find it hard to reach an accord or cooperate. The idea was that, based on achievements made in non-political areas, mutual dialogue, exchanges and cooperation would lead to the political area, step by step.

Meanwhile, the basis of the Sixth Republic's unification policy calls for an interim unification system for national integration through a phased and functional approach. This is designed to, accommodate new changes subjectively, with emphasis on feasibility and practicability, while retaining the existing basis of the

unification policy.

In other words, the new policy basis calls for the discussion of and cooperation in political and military issues, in a realistic approach, paralleled with the exchanges and cooperation made on a phased basis, to restore national homogeneity.

In contrast, North Korea demands, under the cloak of the urgency of unification, the resolution of all issues pending between the two sides on a package basis rather than through a phased approach, and through a political and military approach rather than through a functional approach. The North denounces the South's unification policy as a "policy to perpetuate division" or "delay unification." However, a brief look at the reality of South Korea and North Korea shows that a series of factors existing between the two sides which make the unification question an issue which will take a considerable length of time to resolve. These factors also make it unavoidable to lay a base for the settlement of difficult problems while first resolving those that are easier to tackle. Among these factors are the social breakup and deepening heterogeneity, disparity in economic systems and a growing economic gap, the arms race and military confrontation, fierce competition over the continuity of national history, and the unique in-

ter-Korean relations, in which both sides claim that "Korea is one" although, in reality, there are two Koreas.

No matter how urgent the task of unification may be, we should be careful not to ruin it in our haste. Similarly, no matter how crucial unification may be, we cannot pursue it without a guarantee of peace (that is, the method of resorting to war). If the proverb, "Make a detour if you are in a rush," represents man's wisdom, then unification is the very issue that can be resolved successfully only when easy areas are tackled first, on a step-by-step basis.

Peaceful unification, and exchanges and cooperation, would prove successful only when efforts are made to promote unification peacefully, without recourse to war. A base for the peaceful realization of unification can be secured solidly when a dialogue is staged between the two sides of Korea, leading to pledge of mutual non-aggression and an international mechanism guaranteeing that such a pledge is devised.

The reason why South Korea advocated constructive mutual exchanges and cooperation through a phased approach to unification is because it believes unification should be attained independently, peacefully and democratically.

If the unification the Koreans seek is not a unification of classes but of nations, then unification should be promoted with all members of the nation as unification subjects. Only when all the members of the nation become unification subjects can the principle of "national self-determination" be ensured. Accordingly, only when national self-determination is ensured can a genuine "independent unification" be assured. In the case when no mutual "peace" is guaranteed between the South and the North, their "unification" efforts are apt to lose independence amidst an international power game. An example of this argument was experienced in the Korean War. When inter-Korean enmity reached a peak, it undermined the independence of the nation, bringing about untold national sacrifice and losses.

Since the purpose of unification is national survival and prosperity, unification should be achieved peacefully. Unification through the force of arms would only bring about the nation's destruction. Even in view of the geopolitical location and other conditions of the Korean peninsula, unification between South Korea and North Korea should be realized peacefully. If national energies were expended in a fratricidal war, the nation will not be able to repel the interference of aliens even if unification were realized. Peaceful unification, thus, consti-

tutes both the condition and the results of independent unification.

Our unification must be a national unification rather than merely a territorial unification, or a class unification. National unification means the kind of unification in which all the members of the nation participate and all the members of the nation benefit from the results of unification. In the pursuit of national unification, therefore, no one specific political party, or group or class can be allowed to participate in it solely, and to benefit therefrom. Participation and unity by all of the members of the nation denote "democracy." For specific regimes or classes to make an approach toward unification without shutting off the rest of the nation, there must be an inter-Korean agreement on peaceful coexistence, and this agreement must be put into action steadily.

Presently, South Korea believes that no independence, peace or democracy can be ensured if the two sides try to resolve the unification issue while the danger of a renewed war between the two sides exists. The South knows that unification without independence, peace and democracy would be meaningless as a national unification.

In other words, the South is in such a position that, no matter how urgent the task of unification may be, it

cannot blindly pursue unification at the cost of independence, peace and democracy. The South firmly believes that only when the South and the North consolidate peace and restore and develop the Korean community, on the basis of mutual recognition and respect for each other's ideologies and systems, can the Koreans be assured of a worthwhile unification.

c. Development of South Korea's Unification Policy

Through earlier discussions, it can be seen that from the time of national liberation to date, whenever the unification issue was discussed, the North has demanded the withdrawal of American forces from Korea and the convocation of a private level North-South meeting political conference, alternating the emphasis between the two demands depending on the time and the conditions. The North used to produce absurd prerequisites to offers from the South, rejected talks between the two government authorities, and often made tactical changes in its unification policy primarily because it lacked the nation's historical continuity and has been in the challenger's position.

In contrast, South Korea has not promoted its unifica-

tion policy tactically from the time of liberation to date. The South was confident that the nation's historical continuity rested in the South, and was in a favorable international position. The South also believed in the desirability of accomplishing unification not through the weakening of the other side, but through the strengthening of its own capabilities, and achieving unification on the basis of coexistence and development of both sides rather than on the destruction of the other side.

Unlike the North, therefore, there has been almost no change in the basis of South Korea's unification policy. Rather, the South's policy has been bolstered every 10 years or so. However, there was a substantial change in the pre-1960s policy and the post-1970s policy. The change was largely due to the significant changes that took place in both the international situation and the national strengths of South Korea and North Korea at the close of the 1960s and the start of the 1970s. Features of the South's unification policy, by period, are outlined below.

From the time of national liberation to the May 16 Revolution: From the time of national liberation until the establishment of the government, some Provisional Government leaders like Kim Koo and Kim kyu-shik, sought to promote unification through a South-North

political conference. However, their idea was rejected by Syngman Rhee and other rightists, and could not muster enough public support.

At this time, the national consensus was inclined toward a unification achieved through general elections, held under the supervision of the United Nations in accordance with a United Nations resolution on the unification of Korea. The unification policy that was announced at the establishment of the government was very similar. In the policy, the South declared that the South Korean government was the sole legitimate government on the entire Korean peninsula, and retained the right to restore sovereignty in the North Korean area. It then called for the filling of 100 National Assembly seats reserved for the North through "democratic elections."²⁷⁾

This policy was slightly altered due to the Korean War. During and immediately after the war, the public demanded a change in the method of restoring sovereignty in the northern area. The idea of "achieving unification through march into the North" prevailed in the South. This concept stated that unification should be realized not through elections in the northern area but through a military thrust into the North. However, this idea had to be put aside after the Geneva conference

on the Korean armistice of April–June, 1954.

At the Geneva conference, held by the high officials of the Korean War participant nations, under Article 4 of the Armistice Agreement, South Korean Foreign Minister Pyun Yung-tai introduced a 14-point program regarding the unification of Korea, which featured: 1) the holding of free general elections in South Korea and North Korea within six months under the supervision of the United Nations and in accordance with the constitutional procedures of the Republic of Korea, 2) the conducting of a census under the supervision of the United Nations in order to determine the numbers of representatives in proportion to the population, 3) the guarantee of freedom of the press and the freedom of movement for election candidates and U.N. personnel involved in supervision, 4) the retaining of the South Korean Constitution pending its revision by the all-Korean legislature, 5) the withdrawal of Chinese forces one month prior to the election date, and 6) the completion of the withdrawal of the United Nations forces at the time when a unified government assumed control of the whole Korean peninsula, as soon as the United Nations could verify this.²⁸⁾

Of course, the Communist bloc rejected this unification policy. However, the South, which retained the

nation's historical continuity and legitimacy in international law, could not give up the idea of restoring sovereignty in the North Korean area through "general elections in South and North Korea under the supervision of the United Nations."²⁹) For this very reason, the Democratic Party government, which took power following the April 19 Student Uprising, succeeded and adhered to the Syngman Rhee government's unification policy featuring "unification through general elections in South and North Korea under the supervision of the United Nations."

From the May 16 Revolution to the close of the 1960s: The April 19 Student Uprising was followed by a period of political confusion where public opinion on unification was split. Even the idea of achieving unification through collaboration with the Communists, or through ideological neutrality, appeared. North Korea did not miss this opportunity. It set forth the idea of a South-North confederation and proposed economic exchanges. The North asserted that a confederation system should be adopted as an interim measure pending the time of unification and, if this confederation was not immediately possible, then at least economic exchanges should be made between the two sides of Korea. The North's peace offensive was thus intensified while, in

the South, various unification ideas, even those based on sentimentalism, proliferated.

Against this backdrop, the May 16 Military Revolution took place. The revolutionary government produced the “construction first and unification later” policy guideline with the emphasis on solidifying national security preparedness. It believed that national strength should be bolstered first, before discussing unification, in order to overcome the weakened anti-Communist posture and the split in public opinion resulting from the sentimental debate on unification. This concept of unification, which required strength rather than debate, remained as the main driving force of the South’s unification policy throughout the 1960s.³⁰⁾

The 1970s: On August 15, 1970, then President Park Chung Hee announced the “idea of peaceful unification.” The President, stressing the North’s abandonment of its attempt to communize the South by force of arms, which constituted a prerequisite to peaceful unification, proposed to the North that the two sides stage a “good-intentioned competition for development, construction and creation” in order to determine which of the two systems would be a better society to live in.

This overture reflected the South’s confidence in its national strength, which had been boosted by the eco-

conomic construction, a result of the 1960s policy of "construction first and unification later." More importantly, however, was the fact that the offer tacitly recognized the existence of two political entities on the Korean peninsula. Thus, a significant change was made in the South's viewpoint and policy. The proposal also suggested that the South's unification policy would be carried out positively in the future.³⁰⁾

Afterwards, the unification policy of South Korea was promoted very positively. First, the South proposed a South-North Red Cross conference on August 12, 1971, to discuss the issue of dispersed families. This was readily agreed to by the North. Beginning in the spring of 1972, a series of secret contacts between the two sides led to the issuance of the South-North Joint Communiqué of July 4, 1972 and the subsequent operation of the South-North Coordinating Committee. The epochal change in the South's unification policy was, aside from its confidence, largely due to the changing international situation characterized by the detente between the United States and the Soviet Union and the reconciliation of the U.S. and China. It is widely accepted by policy makers of the South that, at a time when relations between East Germany and West Germany has picked up speed and Washington-Beijing re-

lations have turned from hostility to reconciliation, the Korean peninsula alone cannot continue to remain under the Cold War mechanism.

In line with such changes in the international situation, the South Korean government announced the Special Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification on June 23, 1973. In the new policy, the South made public a sweeping change in the direction of its foreign policy, voicing 1) no opposition to the North's joining of international organizations, and 2) the mutual seeking of open door policies to all other countries in spite of different ideologies, including the Communist bloc. In reaction, North Korea, in a statement by Kim Young-joo on August 28, 1973, denounced the South's new foreign policy as a scheme to perpetuate division, and suspended all the on-going South-North dialogues by demanding the retraction of the policy.

To the North, the idea of simultaneous entry by South Korea and North Korea into the United Nations and of mutual opening might have seemed to conflict with the concepts of "liberation of South Korea" and "Korea is one." Yet, the ideas of "liberation of South Korea" and "Korea is one" were themselves pieces of propaganda lacking any practicability.

At this point, the South was obliged to work out and

implement policies based not on the North Korean reaction, but on the reality and trend of international politics, as well as on the desirable direction of the development of inter-Korean relations. A series of subsequent overtures such as the proposal for a South-North non-aggression agreement, made on January 18, 1974, and the announcement of three major principles for peaceful unification (August 15, 1974) served to, once again, reconfirm the policy basis of "peace first and unification later."

In particular, the three major principles for peaceful unification represented the condensation of the South's unification policy of the 1970s and, at the same time, served as the basis for the South's subsequent unification policies. The three principles were: 1) that peace should be firmly established on the Korean peninsula and, to this end, a mutual non-aggression agreement should be concluded between the South and the North; 2) that the South and the North should open their doors to each other and that mutual trust should be restored between them and, for this purpose, the two sides should sincerely carry through dialogues and multi-pronged exchanges; and 3) that based thereon, free general elections should be held throughout Korea under fair election management and supervision and in

direct proportion to the indigenous population in order to accomplish unification. The purpose of the three major principles for peaceful unification was to describe the process of peace, trust and unification and to regulate their inter-relationship, thus becoming the basis of the subsequent unification policies of the South.

On the basis of the three principles, South Korea proposed South–North dialogues on a number of occasion. However, no affirmative results were recorded in the 1970s due to the North’s belligerent policy against the South and its reluctance to have talks with the South.

1980–1987: When a political “power vacuum” occurred in the South, following the assassination of the president in October 1979, North Korea, which had rejected all dialogues in the past, proposed a South–North prime ministers’ meeting on January 24, 1980. Working–level contacts to prepare for the proposed meeting ensued ten times from February 6 through August 20, 1980. However, as the political situation of the South began to stabilize, the North suspended the contacts.

On January 12, 1981, the South Korean government, in the President’s address on state affairs, proposed mutual visits by the top leaders of the two sides in order

to: 1) discuss ways to restore trust and prevent war between the two sides, and 2) to provide an opportunity to resume the suspended South–North dialogue. Further, on June 5, 1981, the South proposed a meeting between the top leaders of the two sides, leaving the North to decide on the time and the place of the meeting.

Predictably, the North rejected the offer. On January 19, 1981, North Korean Vice President Kim Il, in his capacity as chairman of the Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland, while denouncing the proposed top leaders' meeting as a "divisive scheme to forge two Koreas," demanded as prerequisites to the resumption of the dialogue: 1) the relinquishing of power by the incumbent Seoul regime in favor of a pro–Communist regime, 2) the release of all political prisoners, 3) the repeal of all anti–Communist laws and the disbandment of all anti–Communist offices and organizations, 4) the withdrawal of the June 23 special foreign policy, and 5) the withdrawal of American forces from Korea. The North's reaction to the proposed contact between the top leaders was regative mainly because such contacts could run counter to its pet concept of "liberation of South Korea" or "revolution."

With the North's negative reaction, the South un-

ilaterally made public a unification formula which it prepared for use at a top leaders' meeting.³²⁾ The unification idea, called the "Formula for National Reconciliation and Democratic Unification," was announced in President Chun Doo Hwan's address on state affairs, made at the National Assembly on January 22, 1982. It featured:

First, that unification should be realized on the three principles of: 1) national self-determination, 2) democracy and 3) peace.

Second, that the process of unification should be to 1) form a Consultative Conference for National Reunification with representatives of the people from the South and the North, 2) draft a unified Constitution at the Consultative Conference, 3) confirm the draft constitution through a national referendum, and 4) accomplish unification by forming a unified government and a unified legislature through general elections held under the terms of a unified constitution.

Third, that a Provisional Agreement on Basic Relations between South Korea and North Korea should be concluded as a pledge that both sides, even during the process of preparing for unification, would put an end to their abnormal mutual relations in order to foster trust and national reconciliation between the two sides.

Following the announcement of the Formula for National Reconciliation and Democratic Unification, the South stepped up its overtures to the North in a bid to translate the formula into action. On February 1, 1982, the South proposed 20 pilot inter-Korean projects which could be easily undertaken even before unification. When the North offered relief goods for flood victims in the South on September 8, 1984, the South readily accepted, thus setting the stage for the resumption of the South-North Red Cross talks for the first time in 12 years, and a South-North economic meeting. In this way, the South laid the foundation for the realization of the Formula for National Reconciliation and Democratic Unification, step by step.

As a result, a limited exchange took place in 1985, when groups of hometown visitors and art troupes were exchanged between the two sides for the first time in the 40 years of division. In 1986, however, North Korea suspended the dialogue again with the excuse of the annual Team Spirit military exercise. Thereafter, the North tried to draw attention to the military area by proposing a three-way military meeting on June 17, 1986, a multi-national arms reduction meeting on July 23, 1987, and a tripartite foreign ministers' meeting on August 6, 1987.

1988—to date: Even after the South's Sixth Republic set sail in February 1988, no change was seen in the North's negativeness toward the dialogue. Instead, North Korea launched a selective dialogue offensive. It proposed a series of propaganda-oriented contacts, like a joint South–North conference, a student meeting and approaches to Chondaehyop and Chonminnyon, while remaining passive toward the existing dialogues such as the Red Cross talks, and the economic meeting.

All these indicated that the North was not willing to cooperate to resolve the Korean question on the basis of reciprocity. Nevertheless, the South, on the strength of the people's determination for a national community and of an uplifted national strength, endeavored to take steps to accommodate the North as part of the Korean national community, regardless of its response. The master plan resulting therefrom was the Special Declaration for National Self-Esteem, Unification and Prosperity (referred to as the July 7 Special Declaration) announced on July 7, 1988. The July 7 Special Declaration, made public by President Roh Tae Woo, featured a six-point policy.

First, an exchange of visits between the people of South Korea and North Korea will be actively prom-

oted. Included among the visitors will be politicians, businessmen, journalists, religious leaders, cultural leaders, academicians and students. Also, necessary arrangements will be made to ensure that Koreans residing overseas can freely visit both Koreas.

Second, even before the successful conclusion of the South-North Red Cross talks, the South will promote and actively support, from a humanitarian viewpoint, all measures which can assist dispersed families in their efforts to find out whether or not their family members in the other part of the peninsula are still alive, and their whereabouts, and will also promote exchanges of correspondences and visits between them.

Third, the South will open doors of trade between South Korea and North Korea, this trade will be regarded as internal trade within the national community.

Fourth, the South hopes to achieve a balanced development of the national economy with a view to enhancing the quality of life for all Koreans, in both the South and the North, and will not oppose the trading of non-military goods with North Korea by nations that are friendly with the South.

Fifth, the South hopes to bring to end wasteful diplomacy characterized by competition and confrontation between the South and the North, and to cooperate in

ensuring that North Korea makes a positive contribution to the international community. South Korea also hopes that representatives from both sides will contact each other freely in international forums and will cooperate to pursue the common interest of the whole Korean nation.

Sixth, in order to create an atmosphere conducive to durable peace on the Korean peninsula, the South is willing to cooperate with North Korea in efforts to improve relations with countries friendly to us, including the United States and Japan, and parallel with this, will continue to seek improved relations with the Soviet Union, China, and other socialist countries.

In the declaration, President Roh made it clear that if the North showed an affirmative response, he would take further progressive measures. The July 7 Special Declaration was so significant that it marks a new milestone in the unification issue, as well as in inter-Korean relations. First, it incorporated a change in the perception of North Korea. In the past, the South tended to regard North Korea as the object of competition, confrontation and enmity. The July 7 Special declaration, however, embodies the spirit of accommodating the North as part of the Korean nation and of restoring the

national community. Second, the July 7 Special Declaration was based on a quality change in the foundation of the South's unification and foreign policies. The South made it clear that it would help the North take part in the international community as a responsible member and would also assist in its efforts to improve relations with those countries that are friendly with the South, including the United States and Japan.

The July 7 Special Declaration contributed significantly to the successful implementation of the South's northern policy. It facilitated the participation of most of the Communist bloc nations, including the Soviet Union, China and many East European countries, in the 1988 Seoul Olympics. It also made possible the normalization of diplomatic relations between the South and a number of East European countries, and even a summit meeting with the Soviet Union. In particular, it was as a result of the July 7 Special Declaration that the 24th Olympiad, held in Seoul was the most successful in the history of the Olympics. With a firm confidence thus obtained, the South could produce more epochal proposals externally. In an address at the United Nations General Assembly on October 18, 1988, President Roh proposed the establishment of a Northeast Asia Peace Conference among South Korea, North Korea, the Un-

ited States, the Soviet Union, China and Japan. The occasion served to manifest to the rest of the world community, South Korea's determination to end the Cold War mechanism and to unfold relations based on reconciliation and cooperation.

In this and other overtures, the South displayed the ability and wisdom to correctly assess the changing international order and situation, and to progress with them, effectively and positively. The Korean National Community Unification Formula, announced on September 11, 1989, can be also taken to be a more concrete version of the policy basis of the July 7 Special Declaration.

References

- 1) See Rhee, Sang-woo, *Search for unified Korea*, pp. 2-3.
- 2) Integration of states is a concept used to explain the process, rather than the unification, of forming a single leadership system, or strengthening cooperative relations among regional countries in pursuit of political, economic and social conveniences or gains without having anything to do with national division, as is the case with the European Community or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. This concept was advanced chiefly by Ernst Haas, Amitai Etzioni, Leon N. Lindberg, Karl W. Deutsch, Johan Galtung, Michael Haas, Joseph S. Nye, Phillip E. Jacob and Henry Teune. For a brief explanation about their assertion and the contents of their works, see Rhee, Sang-woo, *Security Environment of South Korea*, Vol. I (Seoul: Sohyangkak, 1977), pp. 545-596.
- 3) Kim, Kyong-tae, Unification Policies of South and North Korea, *Concept of Democratic Unification* (Seoul: Unification Research Institute, 1990), p. 23.
- 4) Chong, Se-hyon, Op. cit., p. 75.
- 5) Preamble of North Korean Workers' Party platform, *Compendium of North Korea* (Seoul: Research Insti-

- tute on Peace and Unification, 1986), p. 339.
- 6) North Korea rewrote its Constitution in December 1972, naming it the Socialist Constitution. The text of the Constitution is contained in *ibid.*
 - 7) *Selected Works of Kim Il-Sung, Vol. I* (Pyongyang: Publishing Co. of North Korea Workers' Party, 1967), p. 275.
 - 8) For Stalin's "policy of Democratic Base," see *Comprehensive Bibliography of North Korea* (Seoul: Institute for Communist Bloc Affairs, 1969), p. 828.
 - 9) For changes in North Korea's unification policy after the Korean War and the subsequent classification of revolutionary stages and introduction of revolutionary tasks, see Ho, Chong-ho, *Theory of Revolution in South Korea and Unification of the Fatherland Based on Juche Thought* (Pyongyang: Social Science Publishing Co., 1975), pp. 21-27.
 - 10) *Naewoe Nongchong, Vol. 4* (Seoul: Institute of Internal and External Policies, 1982), pp. 118-119.
 - 11) See Chang, Su-ryon, North Korea's Strategy for Revolution in South Korea, *Theory of National Unification* (Seoul: Unification Training Institute, 1990), pp. 196-197.
 - 12) Ho, Chong-ho, *op. cit.*, p. 186.
 - 13) *Ibid.*, p. 207.

- 14) Rhee, Sang-woo, *Search for Unified Korea*, p. 114.
- 15) North Korea's adoption of such a view and the policy of phased unification seemed to have been affected significantly by North Vietnam's unification strategy. For details in this regard, see Chong, Se-hyon, *Comparison of the Unification Strategies of North Vietnam and North Korea, Peace and Unification on Korean Peninsula in Transitional Period* (Seoul: National Unification Board, 1987), pp. 255-275.
- 16) See Ho, Chong-ho, *op. cit.*, pp. 264-270.
- 17) *Collection of References on North Korean Supreme People's Assembly*, Vol. 3 (Seoul: National Unification Board, 1988), p. 85.
- 18) *Selected Works of Kim Il-sung*, Vol. 4 (1986), p. 80.
- 19) Kim, Kyong-tae, *op. cit.* dissertation, pp. 98-99.
- 20) Koh Byong-chol, *Evaluation of North Korea's Unification Policy, Prospects of Unification on Korean Peninsula Possibility and Limitation*, p. 27.
- 21) *Ibid.*
- 22) For characteristics by period, see Chang, Su-ryon, *op. cit.* dissertation, pp. 213-228.
- 23) In the background against which North Korea started to build up its arms under the "four major military roads" was, besides the bolstering of anti-

-Communist posture by the military government of the South, its belief that it could not depend on the Soviets after Khrushchev yielded to Kennedy over the Cuban missile crisis.

- 24) Lee, Hong-koo, et. al., *Division, Unification and Nationalism* (Seoul: Pakyongsa, 1984), pp. 164-165; Chong, Se-hyon, "Current State and Problems of Inter-Korean Relations as Seen by South Korea," *Today's South and North Korea* (Seoul: Koryo-won, 1983), p. 13.
- 25) Rhee, Sang-woo, *Security Environment of South Korea*, p. 464.
- 26) Lee, Hong-koo, op. cit., p. 165.
- 27) Kim, Kyong-tae, op. cit. dissertation, pp. 41-42.
- 28) Ibid., p. 42.
- 29) For the analysis of the background against which the Syngman Rhee government stuck to its pre-Korean War unification idea even at the Geneva Conference of 1954, see Han Kyo Kim, "South Korean Policy Toward North Korea," Young C. Kim (ed.), *Major Powers and Korea* (Silver Spring: Research Institute on Korean Affairs, 1978), pp. 105-125.
- 30) See Han Kyo Kim, *Evaluation of South Korea's Unification Policy, Prospects of Unification on the Korean Peninsula*, p. 6.

31) Such positive handling of the unification issue by the South Korean government seems related to preparations after the mid-1960s. An ad hoc committee in charge of the unification issue was created at the National Assembly in 1966, which held a two-day public hearing. At this hearing, speakers from the academic and press circles called for the creation of a high-level government office and the production of positive unification ideas. Consequently, the National Unification Board was established on March 1, 1969 as a government office.

32) Kim, Kyong-tae, *op. cit.* dissertation, p. 47.

IV. Comparison of Unification Formulas of South Korea and North Korea

1. North Korea's Unification Formula: "Idea of a Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo"

a. History of the Idea of Unification under Confederal System

On August 14, 1960, the eve of the anniversary of National Liberation, while South Korea was in utter confusion following the April 19 Student Uprising, North Korea first advanced the idea of unifying the Korean peninsula under a confederal system.

In a speech, Kim Il-sung, calling for unification through general elections, suggested the adoption of a confederal system as an interim step toward unification, adding that if a confederal system could not be instituted outright, then the two sides should first engage in economic exchanges.

Considering its timing the overture seemed to be strategically motivated. It had obviously been designed

to steer the South's unification fever in a direction which would be favorable to the North. However Kim Il-sung's suggestion of a "confederal system" as an interim form of unification and of a "confederal office between the representatives of the South Korean and North Korean governments," was seemingly reasonable and realistic.

However, since Kim Il-sung demanded 1) the withdrawal of American forces from Korea and 2) the replacement of the South Korean government with a people's regime as prerequisites to inter-Korean negotiations for a confederal system, it was more than natural for the South to reject the idea of a confederation.³⁾

Beginning on June 23, 1973, the North made its unification policy consistent with its unification idea. On that day, which coincided with President Park's announcement of the June 23 Declaration in the South, Kim Il-sung, in a speech at a public rally welcoming the visiting Czechoslovak Party Secretary, General Husak, set forth the so-called "five-point unification program." The five points were: 1) prior settlement of military issues, 2) multi-pronged collaboration and exchanges, 3) convocation of a grand national conference, 4) unification under a Koryo confederation system, and 5) joining the United Nations under a single ticket.

The North thus began laying down prerequisites intended, in large measure, to eliminate South Korean government authorities. The confederation system the North proposed, now given the name, "Koryo," was not a confederation between the government authorities of the South and the North, but a form of government to be adopted at a "grand national conference", to be attended by the political parties and social organizations of the two sides.

No concrete principles and other rules for the idea of a Koryo confederation system were produced at this stage. The prerequisites, also, were by no means concrete, but were designed primarily to eliminate the Seoul government authorities from talks on the Korean issue. However, in a speech at the Sixth Congress of the Workers' Party in October 1980, Kim Il-sung produced the method of "establishing a Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo," by setting forth more concrete principles for the creation of a confederal government and more complicated prerequisites. Contrary to its "South-North" confederation idea of the 1960s, a "Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo" has been advanced as the final form of unification.

Thus seen, the form and characteristics of the North's confederation idea underwent some change in 1973,

when the word "Koryo" was added to its name, and again in 1980, when the words "democracy" and "Republic" were affixed to it. This confederation idea was incorporated into its unification policy when the North announced the "five-point peaceful unification program" in 1973.

b. Contents of "Idea of a Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo"

The idea of a "Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo," which North Korea describes as the "most perfect and reasonable form of unification," was contained in Kim Il-sung's policy report made at the Sixth Congress of the Workers' Party. The part of the speech related to the idea of a confederation system consisted of three sections: 1) prerequisites to a confederation system, 2) principles for the formation and operation of a confederal government, and 3) ten major policies for a confederal government. They can be summed up as follows:

—Prerequisites

First, to realize peaceful unification of the fatherland, military fascist rule should be liquidated and the democratization of the society realized in the South so that

the present regime can be replaced with a democratic regime, voicing and defending the opinions and interests of the people.

Second, fascist laws such as the Anti-Communist Law and the National Security Law should be repealed and all tyrannical offices abolished in the South.

Third, all political parties and social organizations (including the Communist Party: writer) should be legalized; freedom of political activities by political parties, social organizations and individuals (including Communist activities: writer) guaranteed; and unduly arrested or imprisoned democratic and patriotic people (dissidents and antigovernment personages: writer) set free and all penalties against them made null and void.

Fourth, a dialogue should be realized and a peace agreement concluded between North Korea and the United States. The U.S. authorities should withdraw their troops from Korea at an early date.

Fifth, the American scheme to forge two Koreas should be thwarted in order to realize the independent unification of the fatherland, and an end should be put to the U.S.'s interference in the internal affairs of Korea.

Given these prerequisites, it becomes certain that the idea of a Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo is a unification formula that can be put into practice only

when the South Korean government is replaced with a pro-Communist regime, called a "democratic regime," acceptable to the North. While thus denying the other side in dialogue, in favor of an imaginary regime, the North shows some tolerance when it comes to the issue of formation and operation of a confederal government.

—Principles for Formation and Operation of Confederal Government

First, the most realistic and reasonable method of unifying the fatherland, on the principles of independence, peace and national unity, is for both sides of Korea to ally themselves and form a confederal state while retaining their ideologies and systems.

Second, the North and the South should form a unified national government on the basis of recognizing and tolerating the ideologies and systems existing in each other's areas as they are; a government where they shall participate as equals and where both the North and the South shall maintain their own regional autonomy, carrying equal rights and obligations.

Third, the North and the South should form a Supreme National Confederal Assembly among the appropriate number of their respective representatives and overseas delegates, under which they should create

a confederal standing organization (confederal government office: writer) to guide the regional governments of the two sides and to take charge of the overall programs of the confederal state.

Fourth, the confederal state shall be called the "Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo," named after the universally well-known unified state of our country and reflecting the common political ideal of the South and the North, democracy.

It can be easily perceived that these principles run counter to the prerequisites. Whereas the North demands the steppingdown of the South Korean government in favor of a "democratic regime," as well as a change in the South's political ideology, political system and laws, it suggests that the two sides form a confederal government as equals, retaining one's ideologies and systems and tolerating the other's as they are. The North disregards reality by arguing that the political form of the proposed confederal state should be a Democratic Republic, reflecting the common political ideology of the North and the South. This may be taken to mean that a confederal system could be adopted only when a regime pursuing the same ideology as the North's seizes power in the South.

When he discussed the principles for the formation of

a confederal government in 1980, Kim Il-sung did not produce any operational principles for the confederal system. They were laid down only in his speech at a reception held to mark the 35th anniversary of his regime, on September 9, 1983. Kim Il-sung's idea was that the two sides put up co-speakers and co-chairmen of a Supreme National Confederal Assembly and a Confederal Standing Committee, who would then operate their organizations by turn.

—Ten Major Policies for Confederal State

1) Enforcement of independent policies in all areas of state activities.

2) Implementation of democracy and promotion of national unity in all areas, throughout society and in all sectors.

3) Implementation of economic collaboration and exchanges, and guarantee of the self-reliant development of national economy.

4) Realization of exchanges and cooperation in the areas of science, culture and education, and promotion of the uniform development of science-technology, national culture and national education.

5) Connection of transportation and communications of the North and the South, and the guarantee of free

use of transportation and communications across the country.

6) Promotion of the stability of the lives of workers, farmers, other working masses and the rest of society, and elevation of the people's well-being.

7) Elimination of the state of military confrontation between the North and the South, and organization of allied national forces.

8) Support and protection of the national rights and interests of overseas Korean residents.

9) Proper handling of the external relations which the North and the South established before unification (enforcement of a confederation system: writer), and uniform adjustment of the external activities of the two regional governments.

10) Development of friendly relations with all other countries as a unified state, and implementation of peace-loving external policies.

This 10-point policy is a kind which can be translated into action not only after the implementation of a confederal system, but even before its enforcement. These points, can also be carried out, regardless of a confederal system, for the sake of unification and unity of the nation. Nevertheless, North Korea postpones any in-

ter-Korean exchanges and cooperation until after the realization of a confederal system. Its rejection, therefore, of inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation at this stage is hardly understandable.

c. Features of "Idea of a Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo"

The idea of "Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo," which North Korea boasts as the most reasonable method of unification in this period, harbors several contradictory and problematic points in terms of requisites necessary for a unification formula. The confederation idea superficially calls for peaceful unification. In substance, however, it retains the basis of the North's unification policy, that is, "revolution in South Korea first and unification under communism later." The features of the idea of "Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo" are:

First, the idea of a confederation system, in its prerequisites, denies the system of the other side in dialogue. In other words, the idea of the "Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo" is not a unification formula designed to introduce a confederal system through dialogue and negotiations between the governments now existing in

the South and the North. Inasmuch as it asserts that a confederal system could be adopted only when a regime suitable to the idea is established in South Korea, the North's idea of a confederation system is a "unification idea without any object," at least at the moment. The number one prerequisite is that the incumbent Seoul regime should step down in favor of a "democratic regime" (people's democratic regime: writer), which, in effect, means "revolution in South Korea."

Second, despite the rejections, in its prerequisites, of the ideology and system of the other side, the confederation idea, in its principles for the formation and operation of a confederal organization, calls for the introduction of a confederal system on the basis of mutually tolerating different ideologies and systems, thus leaving room for mistaking the confederation idea for a unification formula based on peaceful inter-Korean coexistence. The contradictions between its "prerequisites" and its "principles for the formation and operation of a confederal office" are obviously intentional and not the product of ignorance or mistake. This can be seen in the fact that the emphasis is placed on "principles" instead of "prerequisites" when the North propagandizes its confederation idea.

Third, one of the "principles," that "the two sides

mutually recognize and tolerate the difference in their ideologies and systems,” does not refer to tolerance and coexistence between the liberal democratic system of the South and the Communist system of the North. Instead, it implies co-existence based on the mutual recognition and tolerance of the difference between the ideology and system of the South after the “prerequisites” are fulfilled (namely, people’s democracy of the South), and the socialism of the North. Thus, as far as this is concerned, it is a hoax, but no logical contradiction exists, at least on the surface, between the “prerequisites” and the “principles.”

Fourth, the North makes it clear that the 10-point policy is for implementation after unification is achieved under a confederation system. If so, the 10-point policy cannot be a policy that has anything to do with the idea of unification. The North’s policy to engage in exchanges and cooperation, and promote grand national unity only after unification, does not conform to the procedural order of unification and runs counter even to the principle of grand national unity, one of its own three principles for unification. The South and the North should engage in exchanges and cooperation and promote unity to achieve unification. However, this is not to say that both sides should promote unification in the

interests of exchanges and cooperation. To those who view the 10-point policy without a perusal look at the procedural order of the institution of a confederal system, the policy may seem plausible. However, it should be pointed out that a pitfall exists here, a pitfall in which the procedural order of unification turns upside down.

Fifth, one of the problems of the North's idea of a confederal system is that the North has unilaterally laid down the name and form of a unified state. Such an act amounts to shutting off the channel through which the views of the members of the nation or the other side can be reflected on the promotion of unification.

Sixth, the fact that there is a difference in the description of the word "confederation" in Korean and in foreign languages, represents another indication of the double-facetedness of the idea of a "Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo."

In Korean, "confederation" is expressly defined as "federation." In substance, also, it calls for a kind of federation-style integration, under which a federal government exercises external sovereignty including military and diplomatic rights. In English and other foreign languages, however, the word "confederation" embodies the concept of the association of states and is used instead of "federation." This confusion in terminology is

obviously intentional, since the North is aware that in the international community the idea of the "association of states," rather than the more appealing "federation" as an interim stage of unification, is discussed often.

In this way, the idea of "Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo" harbors not a few problematic points: concealment of strategic goals, antinomy in prerequisites and principles, inversion of procedural order, one-sidedness of contention, and double-facetedness of the expression of the basic concept. Still, North Korea argues that the confederation idea is the most reasonable plan true to the three major principles for unification: independence, peace and grand national unity. North Korea explains the prerequisites, aimed at engineering a "revolution in South Korea," in the context of "independent unification," the principle of forming a confederation through collaboration between a "people's democratic regime" of the South and the North Korean regime, in the context of "peaceful unification," and the 10-point policy, in the context of "grand national unity," respectively.⁸⁾

d. Stratagem in "Idea of Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo"

North Korea's Glossary on Political Terminology says "the system of federation is one of the forms of association between or among nations with different languages, customs and cultures." It adds that if a "federal system" were to be formed, a "federal constitution should be established."⁹⁾ In reality, the countries which have adopted the federal system are multi-racial nations. Good examples are the Soviet Union, the United States and Switzerland. Therefore, if South Korea and North Korea were to be unified, it does not need to be under a confederal system. The Koreans are not multi-racial, nor do they have different languages, customs and cultures. However, since the political, economic and cultural systems of the two sides differ in reality, the need to have an interim stage in the course of forming a unified state exists. In this event, it is necessary to do an in-depth study to determine which—a confederation or an association of states—would be better. Under the present circumstances, it would be more realistic to precipitate a split in the Kuomintang through collaboration with the rightist party. In April 1945, the Chinese Communists had gone so far as to propose the creation of a

“coalition government.” In Vietnam, from September 1960 through the early 1970s, the North Vietnamese Communists abetted the split in South Vietnam through their persisting offer to the Saigon government for the establishment of a coalition government. Using this tactic, they finally succeeded in communizing South Vietnam. East Germany, also, proposed to West Germany, on December 1956, the idea of the association of states as an interim step pending German unification. However, this was outrightly rejected by West Germany.

In this manner, the Communists sought, successfully in some instances, to achieve their goal of communization through various forms of the tactics of association, or federations. Employing these same Communist tactics, North Korea has ceaselessly been demanding a confederation system. There are signs that shown that North Korea has particularly used Chinese and North Vietnamese tactics as a model. For example, the North’s so-called 10-point policy resembles, in substance, the “10-point nation-saving policy against Japan” which the Chinese Communists advanced in their proposal for the second collaboration with the Kuomintang, or the “10-point national liberation policy” the Vietcong offered in their call for the establishment of a coalition government in Saigon.¹²⁾

What should also be pointed out is that since North Korea started to advocate the idea of a "Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo" as a unification formula, the overtures the North has made to the South were mostly aimed at getting the prerequisites realized. For example, the North proposed mostly rally-like meetings such as a "joint conference," a "political conference" and a "pan-national conference" between political parties, social organizations and people from all social backgrounds, instead of talks between government authorities with due competence and responsibility. Similarly, rather than resuming the suspended existing dialogues such as the Red Cross, economic and sports meetings, the North advanced new meetings which were related to its call for the withdrawal of American forces from Korea, which included arms reduction talks, high-level political and military meetings, a joint parliamentary conference and a tripartite meeting.

Seen thus, the North's idea of "Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo" cannot be taken as anything but a device intended to establish a regime in the South which will be subservient to the North Korean regime.

2. South Korea's Unification Formula: "Korean National Community Unification Formula"

a. History of "Korean National Community Unification Formula"

The Korean National Community Unification Formula, which President Roh Tae Woo announced at the 147th National Assembly on September 11, 1989, has its spiritual roots in the July 7 Special Declaration (Special Declaration for National Self-Esteem, Unification and Prosperity) of 1988. In its structure, however, the formula was based on the Formula for National Reconciliation and Democratic Unification, pronounced on January 22, 1982.

The Formula for National Reconciliation and Democratic Unification was, in fact, the first comprehensive unification formula of the South and incorporated the refined versions of the various northward overtures and principles for unification which the South has put forth since the announcement of the Declaration of Ideas for Peaceful Unification, on August 15, 1970.

Accordingly, the origin of the Korean National Community Unification Formula dates back to the 1970s, a

unification formula which consistently retained the policy basis, since the 1970s, that unification should be accomplished according to procedures and methods based on the order of liberal democracy.

The essence of the Declaration of Ideas for Peaceful Unification, which the South announced on August 15, 1970, was that the two sides, rather than committing hostile acts against each other, should engage in a good-intentioned competition toward development, construction and creation, in order to determine which system was better. This competition was supposed to be premised on the co-existence of the South and the North. The July 4 Joint Communiqué, a highly significant historical document because it was the first agreement ever reached between the two sides, was a measure taken on the premise that the two sides recognize each other's entities and maintain mutual co-existence. Based on this spirit of peaceful co-existence, the South announced the Special Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification, often referred to as the June 23 Declaration (of June 23, 1973), which featured: 1) tolerance of North Korea's entry into international organizations, 2) simultaneous entry into the United Nations pending the time of unification, and 3) opening of the door of the South to all other countries including Communist bloc

nations whose ideologies and systems are different from Korea's.

On January 18, 1974, the South proposed the conclusion of a South-North non-aggression agreement. On August 15 of the same year, South Korea announced the Three Principles for Peaceful Unification incorporating the systematized overtures, declarations and agreements made in the past. The three principles were that: 1) a mutual non-aggression agreement should be concluded between the South and the North to establish peace on the Korean peninsula, 2) the two sides should open their doors to each other and restore their mutual trust, and to this end, South-North dialogues should be carried out faithfully, and multi-pronged exchanges and cooperation should be promoted, and 3) based on this, free general elections should be held throughout Korea under fair election management and supervision, and in direct proportion to the indigenous population, to accomplish unification.

The announcement of the three principles was based on the perception and judgement that since prompt unification is in effect impossible, given the reality of inter-Korean relations and the nature of international politics, the groundwork for peaceful unification, or durable peace on the Korean peninsula and the reconcilia-

tion of the Korean people, should be laid first, and on this basis, political integration should be promoted. North Korea denounced the three principles as a "scheme to forge two Koreas." However, since the existence of two political entities on the Korean peninsula is a stark reality, its recognition cannot constitute any new act of forging.

Since the turn of the 1980s, South Korea, considering its standing in the international community, proposed mutual visits between the top leaders of the two sides on January 12, 1980, and a top leaders' meeting on June 5, 1980. On the other hand, North Korea, rejected a joint meeting between political parties and social organizations. Here, the South was obliged to make public, unilaterally, a unification formula which it had prepared for discussion at a top leaders' meeting.

The idea, the Formula for National Reconciliation and Democratic Unification, announced in President Chun Doo Hwan's address on state affairs on January 22, 1982, featured the formation of a Consultative Council for National Reunification, with participants from the two sides under the principles of: 1) national self-determination, 2) democracy and 3) peace, in order to draft a unified constitution, thus making possible the accomplishment of unification through general elections held

in both sides under the terms of the constitution.

The idea of realizing unification through general elections has been the one method which the South has consistently advocated since national liberation. However, the Formula for National Reconciliation and Democratic Unification was different from past ideas in that it established a set of detailed preparatory procedures. The formula also required that the two sides conclude a seven-point Provisional Agreement on Basic Relations pending the time of unification. In fact, such an agreement is important inasmuch as the two sides should in the course of carrying out unification procedures such as drafting a unified constitution and staging general elections promote confidence-building and remove factors detrimental to unification in all the areas of national life.

North Korea's response was negative. It denounced a provisional agreement as a "political device intended to perpetuate division." In regard to general elections, the North counter-proposed a "political conference" as equals between the two sides. Since unification concerns two separate entities, a unification idea of any type can be rendered meaningless if North Korea, one of the parties directly involved, rejects it.

However, as can be seen in the case with East Ger-

many and West Germany, calls for unification are bound to end up as nothing but lip service if there does not exist a party which takes the initiative. The South cannot indulge in eye-to-eye measures only toward the North simply because North Korea, ever since national division, has sought to engineer the fall of the system of South Korea's system, rather than endeavoring to promote reconciliation and cooperation between the two sides. Furthermore, because the Cold War system is about to come to an end fostering an atmosphere ripe for the overcoming of division, and because the people's confidence has been significantly uplifted, there arose the need for a new practicable unification formula that could effectively deal with the changing situation. Around this time, President Roh Tae Woo, in his July 7 Special Declaration, stated that the South would regard North Korea not as the target of competition or confrontation, but as a member of the nation and, further, as a "good-intentioned partner" with whom a national common prosperity, based on mutual trust, reconciliation and cooperation, should be pursued.

The July 7 Special Declaration was supported extensively at home and abroad, and contributed much to the successful staging of the 1988 Seoul Olympics. It also gave a big boost to the highly successful implementation

of the South's northern policy. Here, the South Korean government, now with a greater confidence, streamlined the Formula for National Reconciliation and Democratic Unification, in line with the July 7 Special Declaration, to work out and announce the Korean National Community Unification Formula on September 11, 1989.

b. Contents of "Korean National Community Unification Formula"

The Korean National Community Unification Formula, announced in the form of a "special address" by President Roh at the regular National Assembly session on September 11, 1989, consists of: 1) principles for unification, 2) process of unification, 3) organizations and roles of an interim unification system, 4) procedures for the establishment of a unified state, and 5) the future image of unified Korea.

—Three Principles for Unification

The Korean National Community Unification Formula sets forth three principles for unification: independence, peace and democracy. The president, in announcing the formula, said, "Unification must be achieved independently in keeping with a spirit of national self-deter-

mination and under the principles of peace, non-use of military force, and grand national unity through democratic procedures,"¹⁴⁾ thus setting forth the principles of independence, peace and democracy.

North Korea, too, has laid down three principles for unification. It asserts that the principles of independence, peace and grand national unity, as appearing in the July 4 South-North Joint Communique, are its own. However, a significant disparity exists in the interpretation of the North's definition. The South takes the principle of "independence" as that of national self-determination, or a principle of valuing dialogue and negotiations between the direct parties—the South and the North. In contrast, North Korea regards it as meaning the "withdrawal of American troops." Similarly, the South takes the principle of "peace" as the principle of promoting unification without recourse to the use of arms. To North Koreans, however, "peaceful" unification means accomplishing unification through collaboration between the two sides after a "people's democratic regime" has been created in the South. South Korea interprets the principle of "grand national unity" as meaning that all the members of the nation should be united and become the joint subjects of unification, (that is, the starting point of "democratic participation" and "demo-

cratic procedures”), whereas the North uses the principle as a base for forming a “united front” among the masses, exclusive of the governments of the two sides.

—Process of Unification

The Korean National Community Unification Formula provides that the two sides go through the stage of the Korean Commonwealth as an interim stage pending unification.

In his address, President Roh said, “It is imperative for the South and the North to, based on the reality that there exist two different systems, set an interim stage toward unification in which both will recognize each other and seek co-existence and co-prosperity, and will endeavor to speed the homogenization and integration of the national community. This will require expanding openness, exchanges and cooperation between the South and the North to build mutual trust that will be the basis for integrating them into a single nation-state. If a single social, cultural and economic community is thus progressively developed, while issues pending between the South and the North are resolved one after another, conditions for political integration will ripen.”¹⁵⁾ This suggests that the two sides go through the unification process of forming, on the basis of mutual recogni-

tion, a national community first in the non-political area (such as social, cultural and economic) to foster conditions ripe for political integration, and finally a political community (unification).

Second, President Roh said, "To institutionalize such moves to speed unification, it is important to create, under a charter agreed to by both parties, a kind of commonwealth to link the South and the North together. In such a commonwealth, the South and the North would be formed into a common sphere of national life to promote common prosperity and restore national homogeneity, thereby accelerating the development of a national community. This can be taken as an interim unification system halfway on the road to complete unification."¹⁶ This implies that, together with the outer process of unification, namely, the formation of a national community and then political unification on the basis of mutual recognition, non-aggression and co-existence and prosperity, interior conditions like the formation of a common sphere of national life and the restoration of national homogeneity should also be met. The idea was that a Korean Commonwealth should be formed if only to buttress and expedite this institutionally.

Third, the president said in the address, "A South-

—North summit should take place as quickly as possible to successfully launch joint efforts to work out an agreed charter for opening an era of full-fledged inter-Korean cooperation and unification. Such a charter could contain a comprehensive package of agreement covering a basic formula for attaining peace and unification, mutual non-aggression arrangements and the founding of a Korean commonwealth as an interim stage toward unification.”¹⁷⁾ The president was emphasizing that to prepare for unification through the formation of a Korean commonwealth, a South-North summit meeting should be held as soon as possible.

In the above, the contents of the address announcing the Korean National Community Unification Formula were summed up in the order of their appearance. In short, the address laid down the phased process of unification as: 1) a South-North summit meeting, 2) adoption of a national community, 3) formation of a Korean commonwealth, 4) formation of a common sphere of national life and restoration of national homogeneity, 5) formation of social, cultural and economic communities on the basis of mutual recognition, non-aggression and co-existence and prosperity, and 6) realization of political integration.

—Organization and Role of Interim Unification System

South Korea, which suggested the creation and operation of a Korean Commonwealth as an interim stage pending the realization of a unified Korea, proposed the establishment and operation of: 1) a Council of Presidents, 2) a Council of Ministers, 3) a Council of Representatives, and 4) a Joint Secretariat, as the organizations to promote national co-existence and prosperity, homogenization of the national society and the forming of a common sphere of national life. The South also proposed the creation and operation of a "peace zone."¹⁸⁾

A Council of Presidents, or the chief executives from the two parts of Korea, would be established to function as the highest decision-making organ of the proposed Korean Commonwealth.

A Council of Ministers, to be co-chaired by the Prime Ministers of the South and the North and to be comprised of about ten cabinet-level officials from each side, would discuss and adjust all pending South-North issues and ensure the implementation of its decisions. Under the Council, five standing committees would be created to deal with humanitarian, political, diplomatic, economic, military, social and cultural affairs.

The standing committees are to carry out programs related to: 1) reunion of dispersed families, 2) easing of political confrontation, 3) prevention of costly and counterproductive inter-Korean rivalry on the world scene and the promotion of the interests of overseas Koreans, 4) opening of the South Korean and North Korean societies and promotion of multi-faceted inter-Korean exchanges, trade and cooperation, 5) development of national culture, 6) formation of a common economic sphere for co-prosperity, 7) promotion of confidence-building in the military area and arms control, and 8) replacement of the Armistice Agreement system with a peace system.

A Council of Representatives would be formed of about 100 legislators, with equal numbers representing both sides of Korea. It would provide policy advice and recommendations to the Council of Ministers and draft a unified constitution to provide the method and concrete procedures to realize unification. In the course of drafting a unified constitution, a Council of Representatives would discuss the political ideas, name and form of a unified country, the basic direction of internal and external policies of a unified country, the form of a unified government, and the method, time and procedures of general elections to form a unified legislature.

A Joint Secretariat would be created at the working level to logistically support the activities of the Council of Ministers and the Council of Representatives, to help implement agreed matters and to handle other administrative affairs. Its office would be in the Peace Zone to be established in the Demilitarized Zone. If necessary, it could dispatch "resident liaison missions" to Seoul and Pyongyang.

A Peace Zone would be created in the Demilitarized Zone to accommodate the proposed Joint Secretariat and other institutions and facilities of the Korean Commonwealth. The Peace Zone would gradually be developed into a Unification–Peace City.

—Procedures for the Establishment of a Unified State

In the Korean National Community Unification Formula, the South said, "Both the South and the North would present their own proposals for the constitution of a unified Korea to the Council of Representatives so they can be combined into a single draft. The agreed draft of the constitution of a unified Korea should be finalized and promulgated through democratic methods and procedures. General elections would then be held under the promulgated constitution to form both a unified legislature and a unified government."¹⁹ In short,

the South proposed the establishment of a unified state by: 1) drafting a unified constitution, 2) finalizing the draft constitution, 3) holding general elections, and 4) forming a unified legislature and a unified government.

—A Blueprint for a Unified Korea

The Korean National Community Unification Formula sets forth a blueprint for a unified Korea relating to: 1) the form of state, 2) the formation of a legislature, and 3) the features of a national society.

Regarding the form of state, the president said in the address, "The Korean people are one. Therefore, a unified Korea must be a single nation. This is what the Korean people long for. No system for bringing the two parts of Korea together will accomplish genuine unification so long as it is aimed at perpetuating two states with differing ideologies and political systems."²⁰⁾ He thus made it clear that a unified state should be a single nation, pointing out that the "confederate state" North Korea advocates cannot be a unified nation.

With respect to the formation of a legislature, President Roh stated, "The legislature of the unified homeland should be a bicameral parliament, composed of an upper house based on regional representation and a lower house based on population."²¹⁾ This was a sugges-

tion made in consideration of the disadvantaged position of North Korea, in terms of population.

President Roh also said, "Our unified homeland must be a single national community in which every citizen is his own master, that is to say, a democratic nation that guarantees the human rights of every individual and his right to seek happiness."²²⁾ He, thereby, produced a picture of the society of a unified nation, a highly advanced welfare society where freedom and equality are guaranteed and all the members of the nation, instead of just specific groups or classes, enjoy the fruits of unification.

By thus presenting a unified nation's policy basis, such as the form of a democratic republican system and good neighborliness with all other countries, the president clearly set forth the direction of unification that the nation should pursue. He thereby rejected the "unification first" idea and drew the realm and boundary of debate on unification.

c. Features of "Korean National Community Unification Formula"

North Korea pursues a unification policy on the premise of a "revolution in South Korea" using the logic

that "Korea is one." In the policy, which does not recognize the reality of division, the North regulates the South as a "non-liberated area" or a "colonial land dependent on the United States and Japan." Therefore, its unification policy, too, is based on a "fictitious logic."²³⁾ On the other hand, since the concept of the Korean National Community Unification Formula starts with the recognition of the reality of division, it is realistic especially in terms of methodology and procedures for the resolution of questions. For this reason, the formula differs from the idea of a "Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo." The features of the South's unification formula are:

First, whereas the idea of "Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo" is a "unification idea without object," the Korean National Community Unification Formula sets forth a method and procedures for unification on the premise of participation by the North Korean government authorities. The fact that the South's unification formula calls for the establishment of some institutes of a Korean commonwealth such as a Council of Presidents, a Council of Ministers, a Council of Representatives, a Joint Secretariat and resident liaison missions, and the manning of these institutes with the same number of members or staff from both sides, premises equal

participation by the government authorities of both sides. This overture serves as the starting point for a resolution of the unification issue through "equal participation by the North and the South on the basis of the North and the South recognizing and tolerating the ideologies and systems existing in each other's areas as they are," as the North insists.

Second, the idea of "Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo" provides for the establishment of a confederal system after a "revolution in South Korea" is completed and the South Korean society dissolved, as prerequisites. The Korean National Community Unification Formula, however, proposes the restoration and development of the national community on the premise of coexistence between South Korea and North Korea. In particular, the formula expressly regulates as the function of the Council of Ministers and its Standing Committee the tasks of dissolving political and military confrontations, promoting confidence-building in the military area and resolving pivotal matters related to the unification question such as the issue of arms reduction. This contrasts sharply with the North's unification formula, which calls for the introduction of a confederal system on the condition of prior solution of military issues. In reality, political and military issues cannot, in nature,

be resolved overnight, with a single stroke.

Third, the North's idea of a confederation system stipulates the postponement of the implementation of all exchanges and other cooperative programs between the two sides of Korea until after the institution of a confederation system, as its 10-point policy for a Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo suggested. North Korea asserts that a confederal system could be instituted if only its prerequisites such as the withdrawal of American forces from Korea, and the replacement of a Seoul government, are met. This indicates that North Korea is thinking of a unification in the sense of the restoration of territorial integration, or, unification of a spatial concept.

In contrast, the South's national community unification formula calls for the parallel promotion of the implementation of various exchanges and cooperation and the restoration and development of national community. This means that the South has been approaching the issue of unification from the aspect of the nation's future-oriented time conception. In other words, whereas the North's confederation idea emphasized space elements, the South's formula values time factors.

Fourth, North Korea maintains a confederation should be the final form of unification, while the South advo-

cates a "single nation" as the final form of a unified country. However, since a "single nation" cannot be achieved overnight, the South suggests a Korean Commonwealth as an interim stage pending the accomplishment of a "single country."

A Korean Commonwealth is not as classic a concept as a confederation or federation. This is a concept devised newly by the South, in consideration of the unique relations between South Korea and North Korea, where the two sides, in their hot race for the nation's historical continuity, are reluctant to recognize each other as states. Therefore, a Korean Commonwealth is a unique and interim form of the association of the South and the North which features unique political and legal aspects, while pursuing unification. However, the formula is not an "association of states" that denotes "two states in one nation." Classically expressed, the formula is somewhat similar to an "association between two systems within a single nation."

The focal feature of a Korean National Community Unification, which offers a Korean Commonwealth as an interim step pending unification, is for the South and the North to maintain unique intra-national, not international, relations through their alliance, coordinating inter-Korean and future national issues internally and

externally to desist from wasteful competition and promoting national interests most.

Fifth, the North's confederation idea, too, discusses the policy direction of a confederal Republic in the so-called 10-point policy. However, this is not the future picture of a unified country. In contrast, the Korean National Community Unification Formula concretely presents the future image of a unified nation by stressing that a unified state should be a highly advanced welfare society where all the members of the nation, not merely specific groups or classes, can enjoy the fruits of unification as well as liberty, human rights and happiness.

d. Justification of "Korean National Community Unification Formula"

The North Korean idea of a Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo gives, in part, the impression that the confederation method could be one way to quickly resolve the exigent national task of unification. This is because the confederation idea has been devised with emphasis on propaganda and agitation. However, a brief look reveals that it is full of contradictions and thinly camouflaged schemes to subvert the South's

system.

The Korean National Community Unification Formula, on the other hand, expressly lays down a set of reasonable methods and procedures for unification, instead of handling the unification issue for propaganda's sake. It is an irresponsible act that makes it a mockery for people to argue that unification can be accomplished only when some prerequisites are met, regardless of the distrust and heterogeneity built up over a long period of confrontation and national interruption. The complex problems pending between the two sides of Korea have, in fact, resulted from mutual distrust. The reality of division, characterized by aggravated tension, distrust, enmity and heterogeneity, has to be resolved through the competence and responsibility of the government authorities of the two sides. However, the North, while shunning any dialogue and negotiations between government authorities, indulges in propaganda and agitation in a "united front" strategy under the cloak of multi-faceted contacts and exchanges. This cannot but be an act of delaying unification, in consequence.

To resolve pending inter-Korean and future national issues substantially and effectively, there must be dialogue and negotiations between competent and responsible government authorities of the two sides. What

is important in inter-Korean contacts and dialogue is quality, not quantity. For example, durable peace on the Korean peninsula is both the basis of and a prerequisite for unification. The task of preparing its systematic apparatus falls on nothing but talks between the government authorities of South Korea and North Korea. There must be a systematic device for alliance and cooperation between government authorities in order to restore and develop the national community on the basis of peace and, thereby, accomplish political integration, namely, national unification.

In view of the reality and uniqueness of inter-Korean relations, dialogues, contacts, exchanges and cooperation of all sorts between the South and the North are hardly feasible without permission, arrangement and the guarantee of travel and safety by the government authorities of both sides.²⁵⁾ The process of integration between East Germany and West Germany clearly tells that such methodology alone can advance the time of unification.

References

- 1) See *White Paper on South–North Dialogue* (Seoul: National Unification Board, 1982), p. 223.
- 2) Kim, Hak–joon, *Confederation System as a Means of Political Integration*, Rhee, Sang–woo (ed.), *Search for Unified Korea*, p. 240; Kim, Kyong–tae, op. cit. dissertation, p. 99.
- 3) Kim, Hak–joon, op. cit. dissertation, p. 243.
- 4) See Kim, Il–sung, *Overall Report on Programs made at Party Central Committee during Sixth Party Congress, Collection of Materials on Workers' Party Congresses, Vol. 3* (Seoul: National Unification Board, 1981), pp. 57–58.
- 5) See *Ibid.*, pp. 59–60.
- 6) See *Ibid.*, pp. 60–65.
- 7) People's democracy and socialism are the same in that they are both ultimately headed for communism. However, people's democracy is a stage designed to prepare for socialism and differs slightly from socialism in property ownership, political system and the role of communism.
- 8) Kim, Kyong–tae, op. cit. dissertation, p. 104.
- 9) See "Confederation System" in *Glossary of Political Terminology* (Pyongyang: Social Science Publishing Co., 1973).
- 10) For general theories on the form of the formation of state such as "confederation," "association" and "single state," see Ivo D. Duchacék, *Power Maps*:

Comparative Politics of Constitutions (Santa Babara: American Bibliographical Center—Clio Press, 1973), Chap. 4; Kim, Hak-joon, op. cit. dissertation, pp. 234–238.

- 11) Kim, Kyong-tae, op. cit. dissertation, p. 105.
- 12) For a detailed explanation of North Korea's confederation system having been modeled after China and North Vietnam, see Lee, Chong-ha, Chong, Se-hyon, et. al., *A Review of Major Issues between South and North Korea* (Seoul: National Unification Board, 1987), pp. 86–88.
- 13) For an analysis of the background leading to the announcement of the July 7 Special Declaration, see Lee, Hong-koo, *Policy Basis and Implementation Direction of Korean National Community Unification Formula, Theoretical Basis and Policy Direction of Korean National Community Unification Formula* (Seoul: National Unification Board, 1990), pp. 11–14.
- 14) Special Address Made by President Roh, Tae Woo at the 147th Regular National Assembly, *Korean National Community Unification Formula: Basic Explanatory Materials* (Seoul: National Unification Board, 1989), p. 48.
- 15) Ibid. address, p. 49.
- 16) Ibid. address, p. 50.
- 17) Ibid. address, p. 54.
- 18) See ibid. address, pp. 50–52.
- 19) Ibid. address, pp. 52–53.

- 20) Ibid. address, p. 47.
- 21) Ibid. address, p. 53.
- 22) Ibid. address, pp. 46–47.
- 23) See Section 1, chapter 4 of this dissertation, especially (3) the Characteristics of the Idea of Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo.”
- 24) The Korean National Community Unification Formula differs, in policy basis and frame, from the Formula for National Reconciliation and Democratic Unification in that the former provides for a Korean Commonwealth as an interim stage of unification.
- 25) Kim, Kyong-tae, op. cit. dissertation, p. 62.

V. Conclusion

1. Policy Disparity Resulting from Difference in Historical Views and Perceptions

Reality is such that a look at the unification policy bases and ideas of the South and the North shows differences only, with almost nothing in common. Seen thus, it is not totally unreasonable to regard unification on the Korean peninsula as next to impossible.

However, the difference in South Korean and North Korean unification policies is not a phenomenon caused by the Koreans' "inferiority" to other peoples, like the Germans, nor is it due to the lack of interest in unification on the part of the governments of the two sides. East Germany and West Germany, also, showed many differences in their unification policies.

Rather, the root cause lies in the fact that the two sides' ideologies and systems are different; there exists a disparity in the basic frame on which each interprets history and perceives the social and international environment; and, moreover, the two sides underwent a fratricidal war which only served to deepen their mutual

distrust.

It is because North Korea interprets history from the Marxist-Leninist point of view that it pursues a unification policy based on the concept of "revolution," "liberation" and "struggles," and has been adhering, for more than 30 years, to the idea of a confederation system while insisting that peaceful unification should be achieved not between the government authorities, but under the initiative of specific classes through collaboration between the North Korean regime and a "people's democratic regime" to be created through "a revolution in South Korea." In perceiving the South Korean society and the international environment, the North maintains the viewpoint of Marxism-Leninism, or of "*juche*" thought. Its policy of strengthening the so-called "base for democracy," or the "three major revolutionary abilities," which the North itself discusses, is the exact Korean version of its attempt to export socialist revolution abroad. The North has adhered to such a subversive scheme for more than 45 years because it believes a revolution will flare up in the South sooner or later, due to the grievances of discontented workers, which are swelling, in spite of the fact that the South's national strength has grown outwardly in industrialization. In short, North Korea sticks to a unification policy based

on the concept of "revolution," "classes" and "struggles" because it believes in the inevitability of the collapse of capitalism.

South Korea dwells on diverse views of value incidental to an open society instead of a single closed view of value because it subscribes to liberal democracy as its political ideology, and maintains a capitalist system. The South is sure in the conviction that a closed society can never successfully lead industrialization and democratization, and that, therefore, the North Korean system will not be able to hold on to its closed state indefinitely.

The South believes that the senses of class, struggles and revolution on the part of the North Koreans will weaken before long, and that it is only a matter of time before the North Korean society undergoes a change as the trend of world history flows toward anti-totalitarianism. It is from this stance that the South calls for unification under a single state by holding general elections under democratic methods and procedures. The South's idea is that before accomplishing unification, a Korean Commonwealth should be created during then interim stage, through national reconciliation and the restoration of trust prompted by phased exchanges and cooperation.

Differences in ideologies and systems between the two sides thus led to a disparity in the interpretation of history, which in turn set off differences in the ways of perceiving each other's society, as well as the international society. Such differences in the ways of perception, meanwhile, have inevitably brought about a disparity in their unification policies. As a result, the reality of today's inter-Korean relations is that the disparity in their unification policies has made it impossible for the two sides to carry on their dialogue on a practical basis.

Today, world countries, transcending differences in ideologies and systems, pursue reconciliation and cooperation with one another in the direction of gaining national interests and economic prosperity. An external condition, in which a difference in ideologies and systems—a difference which has led to the contradictory nature of the two sides' unification policies—has become meaningless, and has formed a torrential stream requiring a change in the flow of the national history of Korea.

Therefore, the unification policies of South Korea and North Korea can no longer live only on the contradictions based on optimism about a change in each other's systems. Rather, they find themselves in a situation where they must readjust themselves by accommodating

such a requirement. If so, the justness and reasonableness of the unification policies of the two sides can be determined depending on which one of the two policies has positively accommodated such internal and external changes and which one is in line with the flow of world and national histories.

2. Prospects for the Resolution of Unification Issue

The reality of the international community is such that no intermediary exists who can coordinate the unification policies of South Korea and North Korea. Besides, the Koreans cannot delegate the task of unification to world powers, nor is there a party that can make a fair judgement. If there is to be any judge, then it can be the direction of the development of human history, though that may sound somewhat abstract. In other words, a unification policy has to be drawn in such a way that it will be closer to the direction of the development of mankind's history.

However, the unification policies of South Korea and North Korea will not be adjusted nor coordinated on their own, while the two sides merely wait with folded arms. Instead, the two sides, with firm confidence in the

direction of the flow of history, must first promote a stage where they can openly discuss issues, from the standpoint of brotherly love and pool their wisdom in working out an accord on matters of mutual concern.

To this end, the two sides should depart from the Cold War confrontation and promote a dialogue for co-existence and co-prosperity. At the same time, an international environment conducive thereto should persist for a protracted period.

Seen in this context, both internal and external conditions for the promotion of unification have changed greatly since the beginning of the 1990s.

Though it suffered some internal pains in the course of economic growth and political democratization, South Korea has come to harbor a firm confidence in itself, internationally, and in its system toward North Korea. This confidence arose mainly from the fact that South Korea has emerged as one of the ten major trading nations in the world, and from the consequential expansion of its national strength. North Korea with confidence in the maintenance of its system following its hosting of the world Youth and Student Festival in July 1989, also seems to be endeavoring to end its isolation from the rest of the world. North Korea, whose external debts totaled \$5.2 billion, as of 1989, spent a staggering

\$5 billion in preparing for the world festival, further burdening an already weak economy. However, it has been contended that, through the festival, the North Korean leadership was able to recover from its sense of relative inferiority which resulted from the success of the Seoul Olympics.

Lately, North Korea has been carrying out a three-year development plan for light industries (1990-92) internally, while striving to open tourism externally. It has also tried to obtain economic support from the United States and Japan. All these factors indicate that North Korea is not necessarily opposed to opening its door to the outside world. This is something to which the South should pay due attention.

Of course, today's North Korea is not in a condition to undergo resolute openness and reforms like the Soviet Union and East European countries have. We can hardly expect any radical openness and reforms because the North has yet to root a hereditary power succession system, and because of the fear of the collapse of its system as a result of sweeping openness and reforms. However, even under the hereditary power system of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il, the North Koreans' craving for better economic lives is getting stronger. To resolve the issue, there is no other choice but to

introduce both capital and knowhow from the outside world.

Under the circumstances, the North's leadership will cautiously promote openness during Kim Il-sung's lifetime, under the cover of his charisma, and thereby will try to promote public support for its hereditary power succession system. However, such guarded openness is bound to lead to sweeping openness, due to the vitality and logic of the concept of openness itself. In the aspect of the unification policy, openness would significantly undermine the basis on which the North perpetuates in political propaganda and fictitious logic.

In the international environment, meanwhile, the Cold War era, which has persisted since the end of World War II, is coming to an end. The United States and the Soviet Union, the two super powers which have led the Cold War, are now exerting joint efforts to resolve disarmament and local disputes, in a bid to liquidate their hostile relations. In this regard, they hold summits and working-level talks often. The end of the Cold War system can be ascribed to the Soviet Union's perestroika policy. It can also be said that changes in Eastern Europe, prompted by Gorbachev's reform policy, have played a significant role in the expedition of the end of the Cold War system. The termination of the

Cold War system, which also has a significant effect on the external relations of Third World and non-aligned countries, foretells the establishment of a new international order based on broader democratization, expanded independence for small countries and equality among countries.

The turn of the international situation toward a new order affects, in an absolutely favorable manner, the efforts of the Koreans to overcome their division. The international trend toward reconciliation and cooperation, transcending systems and ideologies, already necessitates inter-Korean dialogue, and exchanges and cooperation. The changes in East European countries, which are putting an end to the Communist system, demand a change, from North Korea, in its policy to strengthen the "three revolutionary abilities" and the unification policy based thereon. The end of the Cold War system on the international level demands an end to the Cold War mechanism on the Korean peninsula. The wave of reforms in the Soviet Union and in East European countries has begun to reach the closed system of North Korea. While exacting sweeping openness and reforms from North Korea, the wave is also persuading the North to practice co-existence and co-prosperity with South Korea.

In one sense, the openness of North Korea has already begun. The only thing North Korea is able to decide on by itself, under the current international circumstances, is the speed of openness. However, the pace at which international communism is being terminated is so rapid that North Korea will not be able to determine even this on its own. Thus, the North would be compelled to bring its "internal" speed into accordance with the "external" speed. In consequence, the North would find it unavoidable to effect even those reforms that are incidental to openness.

If North Korean society has no choice but to be changed in the direction of openness and reforms, the improvement of inter-Korean relations would become a matter of time. If and when inter-Korean relations improve, the unification issue will be resolved through dialogue, exchanges and cooperation on the basis of the reality of division. The fact that the openness and reforms of East Germany has made possible the rapid improvement of inter-German relations and German unification, provides the Koreans with a gunsight through which they can assess the direction of the resolution of their own unification issue.

Reference

- 1) See Rhee, Sang-woo, *Search for Unified Korea*, pp. 124–125.

