

An Assessment of the North Korean System's Durability


■ Chon, Hyun-Joon
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KOREA INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL UNIFICATION

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The analyses, comments and other opinions contained in this monograph are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Korea Institute for National Unification.

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I . Introduction

1. Raising Questions Regarding the Sustainability of the North Korean Regime

Since the UN Security Council adopted the resolution to impose sanctions against North Korea last October 15 in response to North Korea's nuclear test on last October 9, the question of the possibility of a collapse of the North Korean regime has been raised with increasing frequency. Some specialists judged the changes such as the relaxation of internal controls, the severe food crisis, and the greater number of refugees escaping from North Korea as symptoms of a possible collapse of the North Korean system and have attempted to estimate the conditions and timing of the collapse. Other specialists argue that they cannot judge the above conditions to be symptoms of imminent collapse considering the traits of the Kim Jong Il regime.

While such directly opposing opinions are suggested, the present study argues that the scientific analysis of this issue must be settled without delay to assess Kim Jong Il regime generally and

objectively. An organization's crisis level and durability can be analyzed by reference to three factors; the power elite, the regime, and the system or state. This study focuses on the aspect of the 'regime.' This survey was based on the survey organized for the research project *The Assessment on the Crisis Level and the Prospect of Durability of North Korean Socialist System* jointly written by Sung Chull Kim, Young Tai Jeung, Seung Yul Oh, Hun Kyung Lee, and Ki Dong Lee of the Research Institute of National Unification (RINU) in 1996.¹ The study chose 15 indicators in 5 fields <see table I-1> and broke them down into 36 measurement items to assess the authorities' crisis level. The changes of Kim Jong Il authorities' crisis level over the last 10 years (1996-2005) are studied, and a forecast of Kim Jong Il regime's durability is made, based on the results of this study.

Table I -1. Indicators and Measuring Items

Field	Indicators	Measuring Items
Ideology	The function of official ideology	The binding power in everyday life Proposition of collectivism Son's inheritance of power The proposition of Kim Jong Il leadership The proposition of the superiority of 'Juche Socialism'
	The vision on the future	Hope to the future, Practical compensation
	State ideology justifying national concept	The assessment on the principle of independence The reality of independence principles

¹ Please see *The Assessment on the Crisis Level and the Prospect of Durability of North Korean Socialist System*, Sung Chull Kim, Young Tai Jeung, Seung Yul Oh, Hun Kyung Lee, and Ki Dong Lee (Seoul: Research Institute of National Unification), 1996.

Field	Indicators	Measuring Items
Elite	The morale of elite	The pride on the roles and positions Faithfulness on the socialist principles
	Conflicts between elite	The existence and nonexistence of group conflicts The existence and nonexistence of interests conflict among offices The possibility of collectivizing by cronyism
	Function of bureaucratic office	Penetration of superior authorities' instruction The willfulness of the lower branches
Economy	Private economic sphere	Occupancy of private economy
	Standard of living	Dietary Life, Necessities and Habitation The rise and fall of GNI
	International Economic Relationship	Trade, Foreign loan
Regulation	Social Regulation	The regulation of people by public security office The illegal behavior regulation of public security office, Movement The increase and decrease of refugees from North Korea
	Political Opposing	Expression of dissatisfaction The existence possibility of critical power The criticizing act against North Korean system
	The Formation of Counterculture	Juvenile culture, Religious activity Typical group consciousness
Foreign Relations	The Inflow of Foreign Information	The knowledge on South Korean changes The knowledge on China's change The knowledge on international news
	Securing of Security Resources	Grain production and external inflow Crude oil inflow
	International Criticism on the Human Right Issue	International society's question on the human right

2. Methodology and Framework of Analysis

Table I -2. Refugees' Social and Economic Background

		Frequency	Percentage
Gender	Male	55	17.5
	Female	206	65.6
	Total	261	83.1
Place of Residence	Pyongyang	3	1.0
	Nampo	2	.6
	Gaesung	2	.6
	Pyongahnnamdo	12	3.8
	Pyongahnbukdo	4	1.3
	Haamkyungnamdo	32	10.2
	Haamkyungbukdo	197	62.7
	Jakangdo	2	.6
	Yangkangdo	8	2.5
	Hwanghaenamdo	3	1.0
	Hwanghaebukdo	2	.6
	Kangwondo	9	2.9
	Total	276	87.9
Place of Birth	Pyongyang	12	3.8
	Nampo	2	.6
	Gaesung	1	.3
	Pyongahnnamdo	10	3.2
	Pyongahnbukdo	3	1.0
	Haamkyungnamdo	39	12.4
	Haamkyungbukdo	167	53.2

		Frequency	Percentage
Place of Birth	Jakangdo	4	1.3
	Yangkangdo	10	3.2
	Hwanghaenamdo	5	1.6
	Hwanghaebukdo	4	1.3
	Kangwondo	9	2.9
	China	2	.6
	Total	268	85.4
Academic Background	University	20	6.4
	Professional School	28	8.9
	Middle and high School	220	70.1
	Elementary School	2	.6
	Total	270	86.0
Occupation	Workers	154	49.0
	Farmers	31	9.9
	Intelligent People	17	5.4
	Students (university)	13	4.1
	Students (middle and high school)	19	6.1
	Soldiers (high officers)	2	.6
	Soldiers (junior officers)	5	1.6
	Soldiers (private rank)	4	1.3
	International economic officials	1	.3
	Foreign currency earning workers	2	.6
Total	248	79.0	
Classification of Social Strata	Core class	36	11.5
	Worker class	116	36.9
	Unstable class	63	20.1
	Hostile class	23	7.3
	Total	238	75.8
The member of the Korea Workers' Party or not	Member of the party	24	7.6
	Candidate member of the party	4	1.3
	Non member of the party	220	70.1
	Total	248	79.0

The main methods used to undertake the study are interviews and surveys. The interviews and surveys were not applicable to some of the indicators and items, and so for these, related statistical data was used. First, this survey was based on the survey organized for the research project *The Assessment on the Crisis Level and the Prospect of Durability of North Korean Socialist System* jointly written by Sung Chull Kim, Young Tai Jeung, Seung Yul Oh, Hun Kyung Lee, and Ki Dong Lee of the Research Institute of National Unification (RINU) in 1996.²

In the process of making the survey, we examined the survey's validity by performing a pilot study with two refugees. The survey was performed using 314 North Korean refugees undertaking educational courses at Hanawon (a settlement support facility for refugees) on August 1, and 3, 2006. The respondents' social and economic backgrounds are shown on <table I -2>.

There are a few points to note about the survey. First, the survey was performed using 314 people, but each question has a different number of respondents because extremely unreliable answers were excluded. Second, the answers might contain elements of prejudice and misunderstanding because the respondents are refugees from North Korea. Third, the views expressed cannot be representative because the numbers by each variable such as residence, sex, etc. are out of balance. For instance, females, people from Haamkyung-bukdo, non-members of the Korea Workers' Party, high-school graduates and laborers are all over-represented. These facts represent one major limitation of this study and they mean that it is unreasonable to apply the contents of responses to the whole of North Korean society as it is.

Each answer's scale of the survey is from 1 to 4. These scores have the following meanings. '1' means the North Korean system

² Ibid.

is very stable and is not in any danger. '2' means that the system is by and large stable and is not in any danger. '3' means the system is in danger but this danger is not serious. '4' indicates that the system is in a very dangerous position.

To make these changes clear, the changes by scale over the last 10 years (1996-2005) for each question are given special attention. Special attention was paid to the changes caused by the food crisis (1996), the launch of the National Defense Committee Chairman system (1998), inter-Korean Summit Meeting (2000), and the 7·1 economic reform measures (2002).

This study applied the existing analysis or statistical data and in-depth interviews to the items or the indicators which made the crisis index difficult to measure or where it was difficult to get information through the surveys. For economic issues such as the fluctuation of international economic relations, and security resources, related statistic data were used.

Describing Kim Jong Il regime's crisis level, this study assesses the regime's critical limit to be 3.0 unlike the study of the Korea Institute for National Unification, because the Kim Jong Il regime is still very much in existence now although the critical limit of 2.5 of previous years has been passed. Logically, the fact that the general crisis index passed the critical limit tells us that the Kim Jong Il regime is not in a stable position. However the regime's durability is assessed by the dynamic relationship between 'the power of dissatisfaction' and 'the power of regulation.' Until now, the regulation has surpassed dissatisfaction, therefore predictions about the regime's collapse should not be made lightly.

II. The Evaluation of the North Korean Socialist System's Crisis Level by Indicators

1. Evaluation in terms of Ideology

A. The Function of Official Ideology

(1) The Binding Power in Everyday Life

Table II-1. Observance of Kim Il Sung Ideology in Every Day Life

Gender	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Male	2.04	2.14	2.41	2.54	2.60	2.68	2.78	2.90	2.97	2.97
Female	1.60	1.90	2.12	2.23	2.35	2.55	2.70	2.90	2.99	3.11
Total	1.69	1.95	2.19	2.32	2.42	2.59	2.73	2.90	2.98	3.05

Place of Residence	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Pyongyang	1.00	2.00	2.00	3.00	3.00	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50
Haamkyungdo	1.71	1.94	2.22	2.37	2.46	2.65	2.74	2.91	3.01	3.12
Pyongahndo	1.75	1.78	1.91	1.75	1.96	2.18	2.46	2.63	2.68	2.68
Hwanghaedo	2.00	2.08	2.50	2.75	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00
Yangjakangdo	1.44	2.00	2.33	2.14	2.17	2.17	2.33	2.60	2.75	3.00
Kangwondo	1.22	1.78	1.75	2.40	2.80	3.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00
Total	1.69	1.93	2.19	2.32	2.41	2.59	2.73	2.89	2.99	3.06

Job	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Worker	1.71	1.97	2.26	2.29	2.41	2.59	2.73	2.87	3.02	3.04
Farmer	1.77	2.02	2.26	2.64	2.71	2.90	2.89	2.86	3.17	3.40
Intelligent People	1.31	1.88	2.07	1.58	1.75	2.11	2.40	2.43	2.43	2.67
Student	1.53	1.66	2.11	2.66	2.70	3.00	3.08	3.25	3.40	3.45
Officer	1.71	1.86	1.86	2.71	2.71	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.60
Soldier (private Rank)	1.50	2.25	2.25	2.25	2.33	2.50	3.00	3.50	3.50	3.50
International Officer	2.00	1.00	1.50	2.50	3.00	3.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00
Total	1.67	1.92	2.20	2.34	2.43	2.62	2.75	2.89	3.02	3.08

Classification of Social Strata	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Core Class	1.50	1.88	2.00	2.20	2.32	2.63	2.60	2.71	2.79	2.90
Worker Class	1.61	1.88	2.16	2.17	2.33	2.53	2.65	2.76	2.91	3.08
Unstable Class	1.90	2.06	2.37	2.44	2.46	2.51	2.71	2.90	3.03	3.06
Hostile Class	1.91	2.10	2.11	2.43	2.43	2.58	2.82	2.89	3.00	3.13
Total	1.70	1.95	2.19	2.29	2.38	2.54	2.68	2.81	2.94	3.04

As seen in <Table II-1>, the scale of living up to the principles of the Kim Il Sung ideology was just an average 3.05. It could be said therefore, that the people, by and large they had "a different life." As shown in the tables, Kim Il Sung's ideology has been destroyed since 2001. While severe economic difficulties weakened the trust in the Kim Il Sung ideology, people's disaffection has increased because the poor economic conditions have not improved after the official appearance of the Kim Jong Il system in 1998. The fact that trust in the Kim Il Sung ideology has weakened gradually even after the 7.1 economic reform measures of North Korean government is a noteworthy phenomenon. The following is an analysis of the result based on the social and economic background variation.

First, females displayed a higher scale than males showing 3.11 versus 2.97, so it seems that females do not live up to the Kim Il Sung ideology. The reason, we assumed, is that females suffered more in the period of poor economic conditions. Some women were even forced to work as prostitutes for a living. Another reason is that women are relatively uninterested in politics compared to men.

Second, Kangwondo province shows the highest scale of 4.00 in the analysis by region, and Pyongyang is 3.50. Kangwondo has been known as a place which has suffered from infertility and severe food shortages. Therefore the people here are dissatisfied with the workers' party and the government, and they have high levels of distrust in the Kim Il Sung ideology. The reason for Pyongyang's score of 3.50 seems to be the effects of exposure to South Koreans and other foreigners and the introduction of foreign sources of news and information.

Third, overseas workers recorded 4.00 on the analysis by occupation, and the students' scale was 3.45. It can be construed that the overseas workers had the experience of greater exposure

to overseas lifestyles and more liberal cultures, so it would be difficult for them to live up to the Kim Il Sung ideology. Students are young and they have a high tendency to act 'liberally.' North Korean authorities have placed great emphasis on ideological education for juveniles and youths.³

Fourth, among classes, the hostile class has the highest scale of 3.13. The hostile class has been discriminated against actively, so they are highly to be dissatisfied with the Kim Jong Il regime, the Kim Il Sung ideology and the Juche socialist system.

(2) The Proposition of Collectivism

Table II-2. Observance of Collectivism

Gender	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Male	2.87	2.90	3.00	3.20	3.20	3.22	3.28	3.46	3.50	3.62
Female	2.58	2.93	3.20	3.42	3.49	3.57	3.67	3.75	3.79	3.82
Total	2.64	2.93	3.16	3.36	3.41	3.46	3.53	3.64	3.68	3.74

³ Good Friends insisted that North Korea is strengthening the control on people's looks by mobilizing Guechaldae (a group organized to control public order) consisting of college students, in the big cities including Pyongyang before and after North Korean nuclear test (October 9). The main targets of regulation on looks according to 'General (Kim Jong Il-Chairman of the National Defense Commission)'s policy' are people who do not wear the portrait badge (There is Kim Il Sung's face on the badge), have long hair, wear jeans and bell-bottoms, women wearing earrings, and so on. North Korea considers these features as the 'cultural penetration' of capitalist ideology and regulates it to blockade capitalist wind. In the meantime, Rodong Sinmun ("Newspaper of the workers") (Nov. 2) sophisticated that "capitalism and imperialism have the fate of ruin, but socialism will certainly win a victory with the scientific validity and the truthfulness," and "we have to fight against imperialism with confidence on the victory of human being's independent achievement and the belief on socialism"

Place of Residence	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Pyongyang	2.00	3.33	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50
Haamkyungdo	2.62	2.92	3.17	3.35	3.39	3.46	3.55	3.64	3.68	3.73
Pyongahndo	2.61	2.75	2.81	2.93	3.00	3.21	3.23	3.42	3.50	3.67
Hwanghaedo	3.29	3.33	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00
Yangjakangdo	3.00	3.20	3.33	3.29	3.17	3.33	3.33	3.60	3.75	3.75
Kangwondo	2.13	2.25	2.29	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00
Total	2.63	2.91	3.14	3.35	3.37	3.45	3.52	3.62	3.67	3.73

Job	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Worker	2.68	3.02	3.21	3.41	3.40	3.53	3.63	3.67	3.76	3.79
Farmer	2.55	2.86	3.32	3.50	3.67	3.60	3.67	3.75	3.83	3.80
Intelligent People	1.80	2.20	2.36	2.09	2.20	2.50	2.78	3.00	3.17	3.29
Student	2.44	2.45	2.98	3.56	3.64	3.54	3.45	3.50	3.44	3.44
Officer	2.86	3.29	3.00	3.14	3.00	2.83	2.83	2.83	2.83	3.80
Soldier (Private Rank)	3.75	3.75	3.50	3.50	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00
International Officer	2.00	1.50	2.00	3.50	3.00	3.00	3.00	4.00	4.00	4.00
Total	2.59	2.88	3.12	3.32	3.35	3.42	3.50	3.58	3.64	3.72

Classification of Social Strata	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Core Class	2.00	2.42	2.60	2.82	2.89	3.05	3.13	3.25	3.31	3.69
Worker Class	2.50	2.85	3.09	3.20	3.29	3.40	3.49	3.58	3.68	3.74
Unstable Class	3.10	3.19	3.48	3.63	3.68	3.64	3.70	3.79	3.82	3.81
Hostile Class	3.35	3.50	3.39	3.50	3.64	3.67	3.83	3.90	3.89	3.89
Total	2.67	2.93	3.15	3.30	3.38	3.45	3.54	3.62	3.68	3.76

As seen on <Table II-2>, the results of our research on collectivism shows that North Korean people place a priority on 'I' and 'family' rather than the government and nation showing 3.74, which is very high. The main reason for this is economic difficulties. In spite of economic difficulties, the government and Kim Jong Il could not solve these problems, so the North Korean people's spirit and loyalty have weakened. The nation was conspicuously unable to solve people's 'clothing · food · shelter' problems, therefore, everyone began to become involved in some form of "trade." While they engage in trade, they were able to rediscover other values such as family values. The following is an analysis of collectivism by social and economic background variations.

First, females scored 3.82 and males scored 3.62. Females have more interests in the family because they have deeper affection with the family and have the responsibility of solving the 'clothing food shelter' problem, so they seem to be highly dissatisfied with the way their government, nation, and Kim Jong Il are performing.

Second, the research by region showed that Hwanghaedo and Kangwondo have the highest scale of 4.00, and people in Yangkangdo, Jakangdo, and Haamkyungdo have weak levels of collectivism. Hwanghaedo and Kangwondo had serious food problem as mountainous areas, and the government and nation could not cope with the situation adequately. Therefore the public organization's authority including the Worker's Party became weakened over time.

Third, soldiers and overseas workers recorded the highest scale of 4.00 according to the research by occupation. This could be because soldiers have complaints regarding supplies and overseas workers have more developed individualistic tendencies. Workers, farmers and junior officers are the classes which cannot receive as much, in relative terms from the distribution system, so they

have higher levels of discontent with the nation. Although farmers' situation is better than that of workers, farmers also have difficulties because the farming has been largely an unsuccessful endeavor. Naive farmers, in particular, who follow the nation's direction sticking to the Juche farming method, could not improve their standards of living. They are construed to have high levels of dissatisfaction with collectivism.

Fourth, the hostile class has the highest tendency towards individualism and familism with a scale of 3.89. It is argued that the hostile class have high levels of discontent with Kim Il Sung and Kim Jung Il, so they have high levels of aversion to collectivism.

(3) Son's Inheritance of Power

Table II-3. Recognition on the Inheritance of Power from Kim Il Sung to Kim Jong Il

Gender	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Male	2.62	2.63	2.72	2.85	2.95	3.10	3.20	3.26	3.26	3.41
Female	2.04	2.26	2.52	2.70	2.83	2.93	3.10	3.18	3.28	3.41
Total	2.16	2.34	2.57	2.74	2.86	2.98	3.13	3.21	3.27	3.41
Place of Residence	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Pyongyang	1.67	2.33	2.50	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.50
Haamkyungdo	2.14	2.34	2.61	2.75	2.86	2.98	3.14	3.23	3.28	3.42
Pyongahndo	2.24	2.27	2.33	2.46	2.69	2.67	2.82	2.90	2.90	3.20
Hwanghaedo	2.79	2.75	3.25	3.25	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00
Yangjakangdo	2.25	2.38	2.38	2.33	2.20	2.60	2.60	2.75	3.00	3.00
Kangwondo	1.63	1.88	2.14	2.75	3.50	3.67	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00
Total	2.15	2.33	2.58	2.72	2.85	2.95	3.10	3.19	3.23	3.39

Job	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Worker	2.12	2.30	2.58	2.74	2.89	2.97	3.10	3.21	3.28	3.45
Farmer	2.21	2.43	2.71	3.00	3.09	3.00	3.25	3.43	3.40	3.40
Intelligent People	1.66	1.91	2.07	2.00	2.09	2.27	2.70	2.57	2.86	3.14
Student	2.11	2.24	2.45	2.72	3.00	3.23	3.25	3.18	3.22	3.22
Officer	2.43	2.71	2.86	3.14	3.14	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.20
Soldier (Private Rank)	2.00	2.33	2.33	2.33	2.50	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00
International Officer	3.00	2.50	2.50	2.50	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00
Total	2.11	2.30	2.54	2.71	2.86	2.95	3.09	3.17	3.23	3.38
Classification of Social Strata	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Core class	1.83	2.08	2.45	2.62	2.72	2.83	3.00	3.14	3.29	3.53
Worker class	1.97	2.19	2.43	2.60	2.74	2.80	2.94	3.00	3.08	3.16
Unstable class	2.34	2.50	2.75	2.78	2.83	3.03	3.15	3.21	3.35	3.54
Hostile class	2.68	2.71	2.94	3.07	3.21	3.33	3.50	3.60	3.56	3.56
Total	2.12	2.30	2.57	2.70	2.82	2.92	3.07	3.15	3.24	3.39

Table II-4. Recognition on Son's Inheritance of Power from Kim Il Sung to Kim Jong Il

Gender	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Male	2.98	2.96	3.08	3.18	3.29	3.37	3.47	3.57	3.56	3.60
Female	2.37	2.51	2.70	2.86	2.97	3.02	3.11	3.31	3.35	3.53
Total	2.50	2.60	2.79	2.95	3.06	3.13	3.24	3.41	3.43	3.56

Place of residence	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Pyongyang	2.50	3.00	3.00	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50
Haamkyungdo	2.48	2.60	2.79	2.94	3.09	3.11	3.25	3.42	3.43	3.55
Pyongahndo	2.60	2.50	2.64	2.58	2.67	3.00	2.80	3.00	3.00	3.25
Hwanghaedo	2.71	2.67	3.25	3.25	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00
Yangjakangdo	3.00	3.00	3.00	2.86	2.67	2.83	3.00	3.17	3.40	3.40
Kangwondo	2.14	2.43	2.50	2.50	3.00	3.50	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00
Total	2.50	2.61	2.79	2.92	3.04	3.10	3.20	3.36	3.39	3.50
Job	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Worker	2.59	2.67	2.90	3.02	3.08	3.17	3.26	3.35	3.42	3.52
Farmer	2.37	2.52	2.67	3.17	3.36	3.30	3.22	3.67	3.67	3.67
Intelligent people	2.06	2.18	2.31	2.23	2.33	2.42	2.73	3.00	3.00	3.13
Student	2.28	2.44	2.50	2.69	3.00	3.20	3.33	3.50	3.33	3.43
Officer	3.00	3.40	3.40	3.60	3.60	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50	4.00
Soldier (private rank)	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	3.00	3.00	3.00
International officer	3.00	2.50	2.50	2.50	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00
Total	2.49	2.59	2.77	2.92	3.04	3.11	3.21	3.37	3.40	3.50
Classification of social strata	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Core class	2.00	2.17	2.48	2.80	2.94	3.06	3.40	3.47	3.47	3.73
Worker class	2.42	2.53	2.63	2.76	2.87	3.00	3.10	3.33	3.36	3.45
Unstable class	2.76	2.85	3.04	3.08	3.17	3.18	3.22	3.35	3.54	3.58
Hostile class	2.90	2.95	2.93	3.08	3.17	3.18	3.27	3.33	3.25	3.17
Total	2.50	2.60	2.75	2.89	3.00	3.08	3.20	3.36	3.42	3.53

As seen in <table II-3> and <table II-4>, North Korean people did not react well to Kim Jong Il's succession of power. The

research on the inheritance of power is analyzed as follows, according to variations in social and economic background.

First, in terms of females and males, both scored the same with 3.41. This seems to indicate that both males and females have negative feelings towards the succession of Kim Jong Il from Kim Il Sung. Regarding the succession of Kim Jong Il's son from Kim Jong Il, males scored 3.6 just a little higher comparing with female scores at 3.5, but for the purposes of this study they are essentially identical.

Second, the analysis by region showed that Kangwondo scored 4.00 and Pyongyang scored 3.5. Kangwondo people have high levels of dissatisfaction with Kim Il Sung and his son because of region related alienation. Meanwhile, Pyongyang people receive greater benefits in every aspect of life such as clothing, food and shelter compared with people from other regions. Nevertheless the people of Pyongyang have high levels of dissatisfaction because they seem to have a high 'relative poverty feeling.' It can be argued that this is because the levels of discontent against high officials have been increasing as the economic difficulties have become more serious, creating a rich-get-richer and the poor-get-poorer phenomenon. Regarding the succession of Kim Jong Il's son, Kangwondo has the highest scale of 4.00 compared with other areas, and the next highest region is Haamkyungdo with scale of 3.55. It also seems related to the poor economy in Haamkyungdo.

Third, the analysis by occupation showed that the overseas workers recorded the highest scale of 4.00, and the next was laborers with 3.4. Overseas workers formed negative attitudes of Kim Jong Il's succession of power because they encountered scornful attitudes from foreigners due to the son's succession of power while they were living abroad. The laborers' strong levels of discontent on this issue seem to be related to the poor economic conditions in small towns. Laborers cannot receive their wages,

and even some of them lose jobs due to the difficult economy. This indicates that these levels of discontent are on account of perceived misadministration by Kim Jong Il.

Fourth, the analysis by class showed that the hostile class has the highest level of discontent of 3.56 and the unstable class has a level of discontent of 3.54. Of particular note is that even the core class showed a scale of 3.53. This indicates the widespread distribution of discontent to the inheritance of power. The core class had strong levels of discontent at 3.73 on the succession of Kim Jong Il's son, so it seems to have been one of the reasons they delayed the succession to power of Kim Jong Il's son.

(4) The Proposition of Kim Jong Il Leadership

Table II-5. The Quality of Kim Jong Il Leadership

Gender	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Male	2.48	2.56	2.66	2.76	2.88	3.02	3.10	3.10	3.11	3.19
Female	2.15	2.28	2.50	2.69	2.81	2.86	3.03	3.23	3.33	3.60
Total	2.22	2.34	2.54	2.71	2.83	2.92	3.06	3.18	3.24	3.43
Place of residence	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Pyongyang	1.67	2.67	2.50	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	3.00	3.00	3.00
Haamkyungdo	2.19	2.30	2.53	2.72	2.87	2.97	3.11	3.19	3.23	3.46
Pyongahndo	2.41	2.40	2.47	2.38	2.46	2.58	2.45	2.90	2.80	3.00
Hwanghaedo	2.43	2.50	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50
Yangjakangdo	2.89	2.89	2.89	2.33	2.00	2.00	2.40	2.50	3.00	3.00
Kangwondo	2.00	2.25	2.29	2.50	3.25	3.33	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00
Total	2.22	2.33	2.54	2.68	2.81	2.90	3.03	3.16	3.20	3.40

Job	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Worker	2.32	2.40	2.66	2.79	2.94	2.97	3.07	3.20	3.27	3.43
Farmer	2.17	2.36	2.67	3.08	3.00	3.11	3.38	3.57	3.60	3.60
Intelligent people	1.53	1.67	1.86	1.82	2.10	2.20	2.56	3.00	3.14	3.14
Student	2.07	2.17	2.23	2.53	2.77	3.17	3.36	3.56	3.50	3.62
Officer	2.50	2.83	2.67	2.60	2.60	2.25	2.25	2.25	2.25	2.33
Soldier (private rank)	1.75	1.75	2.00	2.00	2.00	1.50	2.00	2.00	2.50	2.50
International officer	2.00	2.33	2.67	3.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00
Total	2.21	2.32	2.53	2.68	2.84	2.90	3.05	3.19	3.24	3.38
Classification of strata	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Core class	1.86	1.97	2.38	2.45	2.65	2.76	2.93	3.07	3.14	3.64
Worker class	2.06	2.21	2.38	2.57	2.67	2.83	3.00	3.15	3.19	3.29
Unstable class	2.33	2.38	2.61	2.67	2.75	2.77	2.85	3.00	3.19	3.36
Hostile class	2.82	2.91	3.06	3.00	3.13	3.15	3.31	3.50	3.44	3.57
total	2.18	2.28	2.51	2.63	2.74	2.84	2.98	3.13	3.21	3.40

As seen in <Table II-5>, the result of our research shows that amongst the classes surveyed, Kim Jong Il has low quality as a leader. An average 3.40 does not indicate that Kim Jong Il has high levels of leadership. Refugees usually viewed Kim Jong Il as a dictator or tyrant. The following is an analysis on the quality of Kim Jong Il's leadership based on the respondent's social and economic background.

First, there was big discrepancy between males and females in their evaluation of the leadership quality. While females valued

Kim Jong Il's leadership as low at 3.60, males relatively took a favorable view of it with a score of 3.19. The reason seems to be related to patriarchal attitudes.

Second, Kangwondo scored the highest at 4.00 on the analysis by region. The reason Kangwondo people valued his leadership as low is possibly because people in Kangwondo have a strong sense of alienation and lag behind other regions.

Third, overseas workers had the most negative attitudes to the succession of power with scale of 4.00 and the next highest are the students at 3.62. Perhaps overseas workers had difficulty in explaining the succession problem to foreigners while doing business abroad and they have realized that the type of succession seen in North Korea is very rare in the modern civilized world.

Fourth, the core class valued Kim Jong Il's leadership the lowest with a score of 3.64. The core class has relatively more opportunities to feel proximity to his leadership, so they might not value his leadership. This is a very noticeable result because they are the most loyal class.

(5) The Proposition of the Superiority of the 'Juche Socialism'

Table II-6. Comparison of South Korean System and North Korean System

Gender	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Male	2.43	2.43	2.65	2.76	2.98	3.05	3.24	3.40	3.46	3.50
Female	2.07	2.27	2.45	2.63	2.87	3.01	3.25	3.38	3.56	3.73
total	2.15	2.30	2.50	2.67	2.90	3.02	3.25	3.39	3.52	3.64

Place of residence	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
pyongyang	2.00	2.33	1.50	1.50	2.00	2.00	2.50	2.50	3.50	3.50
Haamkyungdo	2.15	2.33	2.55	2.72	2.95	3.08	3.29	3.41	3.53	3.63
Pyongahndo	2.17	2.00	2.06	2.14	2.50	2.62	2.83	3.18	3.36	3.50
Hwanghaedo	2.57	2.67	3.25	3.25	3.50	3.50	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00
Yangjakangdo	2.33	2.33	2.33	2.63	2.43	2.43	2.57	2.83	2.80	3.20
Kangwondo	1.38	1.75	2.00	2.33	2.67	3.50	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00
total	2.14	2.30	2.49	2.65	2.86	2.99	3.21	3.35	3.49	3.60

Job	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Worker	2.26	2.30	2.55	2.75	2.96	3.13	3.31	3.38	3.53	3.65
Farmer	2.06	2.50	2.55	2.82	3.00	2.71	2.67	3.75	3.67	3.67
Intelligent people	1.41	1.66	1.83	1.96	2.05	2.23	2.65	2.69	3.31	3.19
Student	1.77	2.20	2.26	2.47	2.85	3.00	3.29	3.25	3.39	3.39
Officer	2.17	2.33	2.67	2.67	2.83	2.60	2.80	2.80	3.40	3.75
Soldier (private rank)	2.25	2.25	2.25	2.25	2.33	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.50
International officer	2.00	1.50	1.50	2.00	3.00	3.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00
total	2.10	2.26	2.44	2.62	2.84	2.96	3.17	3.28	3.48	3.56

Class of social strata	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Core class	1.63	1.91	2.19	2.38	2.61	2.67	2.80	3.07	3.40	3.67
Worker class	1.98	2.16	2.34	2.48	2.71	2.86	3.16	3.31	3.51	3.57
Unstable class	2.51	2.58	2.75	2.87	3.09	3.06	3.24	3.18	3.40	3.54
Hostile class	2.48	2.45	2.67	3.00	3.14	3.25	3.33	3.60	3.67	3.71
total	2.12	2.26	2.46	2.63	2.85	2.93	3.15	3.27	3.48	3.59

As the result shown in <Table II -6>, North Korean people's level of trust in Juche Socialism is low a score of 3.60. The following are the results of research on a comparison of the South Korean system and North Korean system based on social and economic background. First, females took a more favorable view on South Korea with 3.73 than males at 3.50. That means females acquire external information faster, and also it produces the contrary evidence that females expect a better world. Especially as a turning point of the year 2000, North Korean people's evaluation of South Korea has improved.

Second, Hwanghaedo and Kangwondo showed a score of 4.00. Although these regions did not get much flood damage, they have the highest scale because the central government did not pay enough attention to their needs.

Third, overseas workers' scale is the highest at 4.00 and military officers' scale is 3.75. Overseas workers can obtain access to South Korean news more often than others, so they seem to admit the superiority of the South Korean system. Refugees of the former military officers are small in number so they cannot be very representative, but in terms of their symbolic position, it can be proof that the trust of military officers can change if they have exposure to information about South Korean. Of particular note

is that they have valued South Korean system highly since 2004.

Fourth, the hostile class evaluates South Korea highly with a score of 3.71. The particular fact is that this class has already evaluated South Korea highly since 1999. They have been relatively discriminated against, so they admire South Korea and hope that it can be a beacon of change for their system.

B. The Vision of the Future

(1) Hope for the Future

Table II-7. The Hope on the Future

Gender	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Male	2.60	2.69	2.92	2.93	3.08	3.24	3.34	3.50	3.50	3.58
Female	2.27	2.50	2.70	2.90	2.92	3.06	3.28	3.44	3.50	3.66
Total	2.34	2.54	2.75	2.91	2.97	3.12	3.30	3.46	3.50	3.63
Place of residence	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Pyongyang	1.33	1.67	2.00	2.00	2.00	3.00	3.00	3.50	3.50	3.50
Haamkyungdo	2.32	2.52	2.75	2.92	2.95	3.10	3.24	3.41	3.50	3.57
Pyongahndo	2.67	2.63	2.69	2.71	2.93	3.08	3.67	3.73	3.64	3.80
Hwanghaedo	2.71	2.83	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50
Yangjakangdo	2.67	2.67	2.67	2.29	2.33	2.33	2.83	3.20	3.00	3.50
Kangwondo	1.56	2.00	2.50	2.75	3.00	3.00	2.50	2.50	2.50	4.00
Total	2.33	2.51	2.74	2.87	2.91	3.07	3.25	3.42	3.47	3.59

Job	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Worker	2.50	2.63	2.91	3.07	3.06	3.22	3.28	3.45	3.52	3.63
Farmer	2.36	2.67	2.76	3.31	3.18	3.22	3.13	3.29	3.60	3.60
Intelligent people	1.69	1.88	2.07	1.92	1.91	2.30	2.80	2.87	3.25	3.38
Student	1.97	2.13	2.29	2.41	2.54	2.83	3.00	3.33	3.25	3.50
Military officer	2.33	2.50	2.50	2.67	3.17	3.20	3.40	3.40	3.40	3.80
Solider (private rank)	2.75	2.75	2.75	2.75	3.00	3.00	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50
International officer	1.50	2.00	2.50	3.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00
total	2.35	2.51	2.72	2.88	2.93	3.10	3.21	3.38	3.47	3.60

Classification of social strata	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Core class	1.85	2.09	2.38	2.57	2.67	2.88	3.13	3.43	3.57	3.80
Worker Class	2.17	2.41	2.62	2.72	2.77	3.00	3.15	3.36	3.47	3.59
Unstable class	2.63	2.74	2.89	2.98	2.97	3.07	3.15	3.20	3.35	3.46
Hostile class	2.82	2.91	2.94	3.29	3.43	3.50	3.77	3.80	3.78	3.86
Total	2.31	2.50	2.69	2.83	2.89	3.06	3.22	3.37	3.48	3.61

As seen in <Table II-7>, the scale on the hope for the future is 3.61, and this means North Korean people have almost no hope for the future. The economic slump over several decades has forced people to live in resignation. The following is the analysis on the hope for the future based on people's social and economic background.

First, females have a score of 3.66, a little higher compared with males' at 3.58. It shows females are more pessimistic. Females seem to have greater despair of the gloomy reality because they have responsibility for the family livelihood. Of particular note is that

females had higher expectations for the inter-Korean Summit Meeting on 2000. Maybe females had higher expectations for the faster unification through the inter-Korean Summit Meeting.

Second, Kangwondo scored 4.00 on the research by region. As is generally known, Kangwondo has almost no expectations towards the Kim Jong Il regime and the North Korean system. Additionally, Pyongahndo is very pessimistic about the future with a score of 3.80. The reason seems to be because the people in this area have more chances to compare North Korea with China. Of particular note is the rapid spread of the pessimistic atmosphere in Yangkangdo and Jakangdo from 2005. These regions are very barren lands, so the more time passes, the less hope there is. Although the 7.1 measures of 2002 were introduced here, the society is getting pessimistic regardless of region. It might be the North Korean authorities' fault regarding their policies or it might be the explosion of complaints and anxiety caused by the food problem which people who were so used to and dependent upon the distribution system, were forced to solve these problems through their own efforts. After the 7.1 measures, the economic conditions experienced have only been negative; inflation, shortage of food, the rich-getting-richer and the poor-getting-poorer, and an increase of bureaucratic corruption, so people seem to have lost their hope.

Third, overseas workers' scale is 4.00 according to the research by occupation. It is exceptional for overseas workers who relatively live well to answer negatively. Additionally, military officers and laborers answered that there is no hope with scores of 3.80 and 3.63 respectively. The biggest reason is the large increase of anxiety due to the increase of autonomy after the 7.1 measures. As the distribution system became weakened, the people's future became bleak and their physical situations became more dire. However, the deviation of scales between 1999 and 2000 was not big, so they seemed to have hope for the future and unification during

the inter-Korean Summit Meeting in 2000.

Fourth, among classes, the hostile class is the most pessimistic with a score of 3.86. It is strange for the hostile class to answer that there is no hope in the future even in the situation of the more liberal circumstances afforded by the 7.1 measures. It was an unusual phenomenon that the hostile class which had the greatest discontent on the regulation of the regime considered the future of society pessimistically although they witnessed the weakening of the Kim Jong Il regime. Additionally, the core class had a score of 3.80. This is proof of the weakening control of the authorities in that even the core class, the system's foundation, think of North Korea's future pessimistically.

(2) Practical Compensation

Table II-8. Fair Compensation on the Labor

Gender	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Male	3.24	3.33	3.39	3.36	3.41	3.46	3.45	3.49	3.47	3.47
Female	3.12	3.32	3.43	3.50	3.60	3.60	3.59	3.62	3.69	3.74
Total	3.15	3.33	3.42	3.46	3.54	3.56	3.54	3.57	3.60	3.63
Place of residence	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Pyongyang	2.33	2.33	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00				
Haamkyungdo	3.15	3.35	3.45	3.51	3.60	3.60	3.55	3.58	3.57	3.63
Pyongshndo	3.12	3.06	3.19	3.29	3.36	3.62	3.45	3.50	3.50	3.44
Hwanghaedo	2.71	3.00	3.50	3.50	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00
Yangjakangdo	2.67	2.78	2.78	2.86	2.83	2.83	3.17	3.25	3.67	3.67
Kangwondo	3.33	3.67	3.63	3.50	3.33	3.50	4.00	4.00	4.00	
Total	3.12	3.31	3.40	3.44	3.52	3.54	3.52	3.55	3.56	3.60

Job	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Worker	3.16	3.33	3.44	3.46	3.55	3.57	3.47	3.46	3.52	3.57
Farmer	3.17	3.50	3.59	3.71	3.67	3.60	3.44	3.50	3.50	3.50
Intelligent people	2.28	2.66	2.77	2.79	2.91	2.91	3.56	3.71	3.57	3.71
Student	3.16	3.29	3.32	3.44	3.61	3.71	3.82	3.78	3.88	3.88
Military officer	3.14	3.14	3.14	3.14	3.17	3.00	2.80	2.80	2.80	2.50
Soldier (private rank)	3.25	3.50	3.50	3.75	3.67	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00
International officer	3.33	3.50	3.50	3.50	4.00	4.00	3.00	4.00	3.00	4.00
total	3.11	3.30	3.38	3.42	3.50	3.51	3.49	3.49	3.52	3.57

Classification of strata	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Core class	2.69	2.94	3.23	3.13	3.26	3.28	3.20	3.27	3.33	3.47
Worker Class	3.10	3.35	3.39	3.42	3.49	3.48	3.48	3.45	3.53	3.63
Unstable Class	3.34	3.47	3.53	3.60	3.64	3.66	3.53	3.56	3.54	3.56
Hostile Class	3.34	3.40	3.35	3.50	3.58	3.70	3.78	3.71	3.83	3.75
Total	3.13	3.32	3.40	3.44	3.51	3.53	3.48	3.47	3.52	3.58

As seen in <Table II-8>, the scale of getting fair compensation for one's labor is around 3.60. This means that the people do not believe that their work is fairly compensated. The following is the research analysis on the issue of fair compensation according to social and economic variables.

First, the females scored 3.74, which is higher than male scores

at 3.47. It is very hard for women to get fair treatment in North Korea being until the present, a male-dominated society. Considering the average score of 3.63, it seems hard for everyone to get humane treatment in North Korea.

Second, Kangwondo recorded a score of 4.00 and Yangkangdo and Jakangdo people also showed discontent with compensation with a scale of 3.67 in the research by region. These areas are alpine regions, so natural resources are scarce. It seems hard for the people in these regions to get fair treatment in prolonged economic difficulties. In particular, the treatment became better from the turning point of the inter-Korean Summit Meeting in 2000, but the compensation became worse after the 7.1 measures in 2002. The measures of 7.1 backfired badly, and caused more inhuman circumstances rather than guaranteeing a humane life.

Third, overseas workers exhibited a scale of 4.00, students 3.88, and the intelligentsia 3.71 in the research by occupation, so high-quality human resources did not receive fair compensation and they seemed neglected. As the economic difficulties became more serious, the intelligentsia, having no business or trading experience seemed deeply frustrated and neglected by everyone. The 7.1 measures in 2002 caused a decline in the intelligentsia.

Fourth, the hostile class seemed to have the worst treatment with a score of 3.75 in the research by class. The hostile class has difficulties in getting jobs because of the uncertainty of their status. Even if they got a job, there is a high possibility of their alienation from the distribution process. Of particular note is that this treatment improved a little after the 7.1 measures. In other words, it got better with and resulted in a scale of 3.78 in 2002 and 3.71 in 2003.

C. State Ideology Justifying National Concept

(1) The Assessment on the Principle of Independence

Table II-9. Pride on the Principle of Independence

Gender	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Male	2.55	2.61	2.76	2.81	2.98	3.05	3.05	3.29	3.30	3.41
Female	2.23	2.44	2.64	2.78	2.90	3.01	3.19	3.32	3.38	3.56
Total	2.30	2.48	2.67	2.79	2.93	3.02	3.14	3.31	3.35	3.50
Place of Residence	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Pyongyang	1.33	1.67	2.00	2.00	2.50	3.00	3.50	4.00	4.00	4.00
Haamkyungdo	2.28	2.47	2.64	2.77	2.89	3.01	3.10	3.23	3.28	3.44
Pyongahndo	2.42	2.44	2.63	2.71	2.86	3.00	3.33	3.55	3.55	3.60
Hwanghaedo	2.86	3.00	3.75	3.75	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50
Yangjakangdo	2.22	2.22	2.56	2.43	2.50	2.50	2.67	3.25	3.00	3.00
Kangwondo	2.13	2.38	2.86	2.75	2.75	2.67	2.50	2.50	2.50	4.00
Total	2.28	2.46	2.65	2.76	2.87	2.98	3.11	3.27	3.31	3.47
Job	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Worker	2.24	2.39	2.60	2.70	2.78	2.88	2.97	3.09	3.15	3.34
Farmer	2.48	2.89	2.85	3.08	3.09	3.33	3.38	3.71	3.71	3.83
Intelligent People	1.94	2.19	2.27	2.25	2.27	2.55	2.80	3.38	3.38	3.50
Student	2.19	2.29	2.64	2.84	3.33	3.43	3.38	3.55	3.60	3.60
Officer	2.71	2.86	3.00	3.00	3.29	3.17	3.33	3.33	3.33	3.60
Soldier (Private Rank)	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.33	3.00	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50
International Officer	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.50	3.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00
Total	2.26	2.44	2.62	2.74	2.87	2.97	3.07	3.24	3.29	3.45

Classification of Social Strata	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Core Class	1.94	2.38	2.63	2.61	2.75	2.75	3.12	3.29	3.35	3.56
Worker Class	2.17	2.33	2.44	2.53	2.63	2.85	2.85	3.07	3.21	3.41
Unstable Class	2.54	2.64	2.81	2.88	3.11	3.14	3.21	3.46	3.48	3.60
Hostile Class	2.57	2.62	2.76	3.07	3.14	3.17	3.42	3.60	3.56	3.43
Total	2.27	2.44	2.60	2.70	2.84	2.95	3.06	3.28	3.35	3.50

As seen in <Table II-9>, there is almost no pride in independence with a score of 3.47. One reason seems to be because North Korea is getting food support from foreign countries. The following is the research analysis on the principle of independence based on people's social and economic background. First, females have less pride in independence with a score of 3.56 and males scored 3.41. There is no doubt that females have less pride in the independence because they experienced economic difficulties to a much more acute degree.

Second, in the research by region, Pyongahndo people have lower pride in the issue of independence with a score of 3.60. One reason may be because Pyongahndo suffered more from the natural disasters than any other region, so Pyongahndo people seem to have developed a serious sense of shame. Another trait is relatively high pride in the independence showed in Yangkangdo, Jakangdo, and Kangwondo. One reason may be that Kangwondo is a front-line area standing up against South Korea. Moreover, Jakangdo and Yangkangdo have more revolutionary historic places than other areas, and they are isolated from the outside world geographically, so the education effect of the North Korean state tends to be longer lasting.

Third, at the research by occupation, overseas workers and

farmers have lower pride in the independence showing scores of 4.00 and 3.83 each. Overseas workers have a lot of overseas travel experience, so it would be difficult for them to have pride in their system. The deepening economic difficulties have had a lasting negative effect upon farmers' belief systems. They have cultivated the soil following Juche agricultural method for several decades, so it was difficult for them to acknowledge the nature and depth of the food shortages problem. Therefore they have negative attitudes and resentment to the notion of independence. Of particular note in the results is that military officers and soldiers have high pride in the independence after the 7.1 measures and after the inter-Korean Summit Meeting in 2000. It can be inferred that these attitudes are the result of education within the military which labeled the inter-Korean summit meeting as 'the victory of Kwangpok (extensive magnanimity) Politics.'⁴

Fourth, in the research by class, the unstable class scored the highest with a score of 3.60. They faced the period of economic difficulties without having clear preferences regarding independence, so their lack of faith in the system became greater regarding independence.

⁴ Pyongyang Broadcasting (June 18, 2001) North Korea acclaimed the inter-Korea Summit Meeting in 2000 and 6.15 North-South Joint Declaration as 'the national historic and human historical event' and asserted that they are the fruit of Kim Jong Il's Kwangpok (Extensive Magnanimity) Politics.

(2) The Reality of Independence Principles

Table II-10. Contribution of Independence Principles

Gender	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Male	2.23	2.27	2.41	2.39	2.40	2.55	2.63	2.74	2.82	2.91
Female	2.04	2.22	2.38	2.57	2.62	2.78	2.96	3.15	3.09	3.25
Total	2.08	2.23	2.39	2.52	2.55	2.70	2.83	2.99	2.98	3.11
Place of Residence	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Pyongyang	1.67	1.67	2.00	2.50	2.50	3.50	3.50	4.00	4.00	4.00
Haamkyungdo	2.08	2.24	2.41	2.53	2.54	2.69	2.83	2.98	2.95	3.04
Pyongahndo	2.21	2.20	2.20	2.62	2.77	2.83	3.00	3.20	3.10	3.22
Hwanghaedo	2.43	2.33	3.25	3.33	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50	4.00
Yangjakangdo	2.11	2.11	2.11	1.86	2.00	2.00	2.17	2.20	2.25	3.00
Kangwondo	1.63	2.00	2.29	2.25	2.25	2.33	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00
Total	2.08	2.22	2.39	2.51	2.55	2.69	2.82	2.97	2.95	3.08
Job	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Worker	2.02	2.14	2.35	2.45	2.52	2.58	2.76	2.81	2.79	2.89
Farmer	2.36	2.52	2.60	2.92	2.82	2.89	2.88	3.43	3.33	3.33
Intelligent People	1.94	2.06	2.38	2.15	2.25	2.45	2.60	3.00	3.00	3.00
Student	1.82	2.07	2.19	2.44	2.64	2.92	2.92	3.10	3.22	3.22
Officer	2.57	2.57	2.71	3.00	3.00	3.17	3.17	3.17	3.17	3.40
Soldier (private Rank)	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.50
International Officer	2.00	2.50	2.50	3.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00
Total	2.05	2.18	2.36	2.49	2.56	2.67	2.80	2.93	2.92	3.01

Classification of Social Strata	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Core Class	1.97	2.14	2.47	2.55	2.58	2.68	2.81	3.06	3.12	3.27
Worker Class	2.03	2.17	2.31	2.44	2.50	2.69	2.83	3.00	2.97	3.13
Unstable Class	2.38	2.46	2.57	2.67	2.67	2.80	2.85	2.89	2.93	3.04
Hostile Class	1.82	1.95	2.06	2.15	2.31	2.36	2.55	2.80	2.75	2.50
Total	2.09	2.22	2.38	2.50	2.54	2.69	2.80	2.96	2.97	3.08

As <Table II-10> shows, the contribution of independence's average scale is 3.07. Therefore, North Korean people have the view that independence did not make a great contribution to the system. The main reason of such an assessment is economic difficulties. However, the evaluation on this issue is relatively lower than that of other items, and North Korean people seem to believe that independence contributed to the continuance of the system to a certain degree. The following is a research analysis on the contribution of independence principles based on social economic background variables.

First, females have a lower appraisal on the outcome of 'independence.' Female scores were 3.25 and male scores were 2.91. Females seem to suffer the side effects of 'independence' more than males. Actually the goods in the marketplace are almost all made in China, so females recognize well the fact that 'independence' is just a mere fabrication.

Second, people from Pyongyang and Hwanghaedo who often have contact with foreign cultures gave lower assessments on the outcome of independence recording 4.00 according to the research by region. This is just the valuation on the economic arena, but the critical view taken towards 'independence' after the economic

difficulties is reflected well. This has been deepened after the 7.1 measures in 2002.

Third, overseas workers recorded the highest with a score of 4.00 in the research by occupation. Overseas workers seem to feel the false nature of 'independence' most keenly through their transactions with foreign countries. Military officers ranked the next with scores of 3.40, and farmers recorded 3.33. Military officers and farmers can be said to have witnessed the worse outcomes of 'Juche' and 'independence' by confronting their consequences directly 'on the front line,' so to speak. During the 2000 inter-Korean Summit Meeting, the value placed on 'independence' improved temporarily, but it worsened again after the Summit Meeting.

Fourth, the core class has a somewhat worse evaluation of it with a score of 3.27 in the research by class. The reason seems to be the feeling that they have experienced relatively higher levels of deprivation. In other words, they had received benefits for a long time, but the governmental support decreased due to the economic difficulties. As a result, their dissatisfaction increased. Proof of this can be found in the fact that their evaluation of independence got worse after the 7.1 measures in 2002. Of particular note is that the hostile class' evaluation of independence got better after 2002 by a score of 2.50. This score can be considered as representative of a favorable evaluation considering the fact that the pressure on the hostile class has relaxed in relative terms after the 7.1 measures

2. Evaluation of the Elite

A. The Morales of the Elite

(1) Pride in one's Role and Position

Table II-11. Pride on the Roles and Positions of Government Officials

Gender	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Male	2.25	2.35	2.42	2.57	2.66	2.75	2.80	2.85	2.79	2.84
Female	2.01	2.18	2.30	2.37	2.36	2.41	2.52	2.55	2.66	2.71
Total	2.07	2.22	2.33	2.43	2.46	2.53	2.63	2.68	2.72	2.77
Place of Residence	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Pyongyang	2.00	2.33	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Haamkyungdo	2.02	2.17	2.30	2.38	2.43	2.49	2.61	2.67	2.68	2.75
Pyongahndo	2.12	2.13	2.20	2.46	2.62	2.83	2.90	2.89	3.00	2.88
Hwanghaedo	2.14	2.17	2.25	2.25	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.00
Yangjakangdo	2.78	2.78	2.78	2.57	2.50	2.50	2.67	3.25	3.33	3.33
Kangwondo	1.39	1.78	2.00	2.25	2.25	2.67	2.50	2.50	2.50	4.00
Total	2.03	2.18	2.29	2.38	2.43	2.50	2.61	2.67	2.69	2.74
Job	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Worker	2.04	2.20	2.34	2.42	2.46	2.54	2.59	2.54	2.59	2.67
Farmer	2.11	2.41	2.30	2.62	2.91	2.75	2.71	3.00	3.00	3.00
Intelligent People	1.97	2.09	2.23	2.00	2.27	2.36	2.60	2.62	2.75	2.75
Student	1.75	1.83	2.05	2.20	2.00	2.40	2.60	3.13	3.00	3.00
Officer	2.86	2.86	2.86	2.86	2.86	2.67	2.67	2.67	2.67	2.80
Soldier (private Rank)	2.25	2.25	2.25	2.25	2.33	2.50	2.50	3.00	3.00	3.00
International Officer	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	4.00	4.00	3.00	3.00	2.00	2.00
Total	2.05	2.20	2.32	2.40	2.48	2.54	2.61	2.66	2.67	2.74

Classification of Social Strata	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Core Class	1.71	1.77	2.00	2.10	2.18	2.29	2.50	2.57	2.64	2.79
Worker Class	1.83	2.03	2.14	2.20	2.31	2.46	2.51	2.56	2.63	2.66
Unstable Class	2.36	2.44	2.57	2.57	2.53	2.49	2.59	2.64	2.67	2.80
Hostile Class	2.00	2.19	2.18	2.64	2.79	2.91	3.10	3.22	3.14	2.80
Total	1.97	2.12	2.24	2.35	2.41	2.49	2.59	2.66	2.69	2.74

Government officials' pride scored 2.75 as seen in <Table II-11>, so they have a relatively high level of pride. It is difficult to consider their pride as stable because it is over 2.50, but it is relatively stable compared with other indicators. This shows that one basis of the sustenance of the North Korean system is government officials' loyalty and pride. The following is an analysis by social and economic background.

First, males are 2.84 and females are 2.71, so males valued the officials' pride at a lower level. It seems one reason is because men experienced directly the government officials' attitudes in the workplace. Although some government officials are corrupt, they are a few and others work diligently without uttering any complaints. Especially in 2000 after the inter-Korean Summit Meeting, the leaders of the Korea Workers' Party, the North Korean government, and the military seemed to set the pace. Females valued the leaders' pride as high in 2000.

Second, Kangwondo is 4.00 and Jakangdo is 3.33 in the analysis by region. The reason for a high scale in Kangwondo is possibly that the leaders in this region could not show their confidence due to the nature of the region. On the contrary, Pyongyang people gave a high valuation with a score of 1.00. Pyongyang is a relatively very rich place, so government officials have high morale. It can

be said that in Yangkangdo and Jakangdo their government officials' corruption is serious. It also reflects the effect of the Inter-Korean Summit Meeting in 2000.

Third, farmers, students, and soldiers have the highest scale at 3.00 according to the research by occupation. The government officials who they met seem not to exhibit pride in the future to the people but in fact feel that the leaders have relatively lower quality. However, overseas workers valued them highly with 2.00. Overseas workers earn foreign currency and they take pride in contributing to the national economy through their job. Particularly their role became more important after 2004, so their sense of duty is very high.

Fourth, according to the research by class, the working class gave the highest valuation with 2.66. They maintain relatively high trust in the government officials because the working class forms the basis of North Korean society. Of particular note is that all the items' scales are less than 3.0 regardless of class, so the pride of government officials was valued relatively highly. Only the hostile class valued it very negatively with a scale of 3.75. It can be deduced that social discrimination has encouraged such negative views on officials.

(2) Faithfulness to Socialist Principles

Table II-12. The Corruption Degree of Government Officials

Gender	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Male	2.92	2.97	3.13	3.26	3.39	3.53	3.54	3.54	3.59	3.64
Female	2.86	2.99	3.05	3.02	3.22	3.28	3.34	3.48	3.52	3.60
Total	2.87	2.98	3.07	3.09	3.28	3.36	3.42	3.51	3.55	3.61

Place of Residence	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Pyongyang	2.00	2.00	2.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00
Haamkyungdo	2.81	2.93	3.01	3.00	3.23	3.34	3.40	3.49	3.56	3.63
Pyongahndo	3.40	3.36	3.36	3.25	3.42	3.36	3.33	3.38	3.38	3.29
Hwanghaedo	2.57	2.83	3.25	3.25	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50	4.00
Yangjakangdo	2.67	2.67	2.89	3.00	2.83	3.00	3.17	3.50	3.33	3.33
Kangwondo	2.89	3.00	3.38	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00
Total	2.83	2.94	3.04	3.06	3.25	3.34	3.40	3.49	3.55	3.61

Job	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Worker	2.91	3.03	3.15	3.16	3.24	3.41	3.42	3.47	3.50	3.52
Farmer	3.02	3.17	3.30	3.46	3.45	3.44	3.50	3.71	3.83	3.83
Intelligent People	2.33	2.47	2.64	2.45	3.30	3.30	3.67	3.57	3.71	3.71
Student	2.38	2.46	2.52	2.56	3.00	3.09	3.09	3.67	3.63	3.75
Officer	3.17	3.17	3.17	3.60	3.60	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50
Soldier (private Rank)	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.50	3.67	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00
International Officer	2.00	2.00	2.50	3.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	3.00	4.00	4.00
Total	2.83	2.94	3.05	3.08	3.28	3.39	3.43	3.52	3.57	3.61

Classification of Social Strata	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Core Class	2.88	2.97	3.11	3.05	3.25	3.25	3.31	3.58	3.75	3.69
Worker Class	2.72	2.86	2.99	3.00	3.17	3.29	3.40	3.49	3.51	3.59
Unstable Class	2.90	2.95	3.01	3.11	3.30	3.49	3.48	3.59	3.65	3.70
Hostile Class	3.17	3.23	3.29	3.38	3.62	3.60	3.67	3.50	3.67	3.75
Total	2.84	2.93	3.04	3.08	3.27	3.37	3.44	3.53	3.61	3.66

Government officials' corruption is very serious with a score of 3.62 as seen in <Table II-12>. One reason appears to be because the central government cannot distribute anything to the lower officials due to economic difficulties. The following is an analysis of the degree of corruption of government officials by social and economic background.

First, male scores are 3.64, higher than female's at 3.60. One reason seems to be because males who go to work have by this fact experienced more corruption. Since 2002, in particular, the seriousness of corruption has decreased. The intensive control by the central government seems to be effective.

Second, Pyongahndo has the lowest score of 3.29 in the research by region. Pyongyang, Hwanghaedo, and Kangwondo have very high scores of 4.00 because it seemed that Pyongyang possess elements of liberalism common in big cities, and Hwanghaedo and Kangwondo have been blind spots, in relative terms, regarding supervision. This means that socialist principles were not followed in these areas.

Third, in terms of the research by occupation, soldiers and overseas workers have the highest scores of 4.00. Overseas workers earn foreign currency, so corruption like misappropriation of public money seems more serious to them. Soldiers felt more keenly the despotism of their officers and corruption to be embedded in their world. These evaluations have increased rapidly since 2000. It looks like the result of a slackening of mental defenses and rules as economic difficulties became ever more serious.

Fourth, in the research by class, the hostile class exhibited the highest scores of 3.75. They felt that the government officials' demands were higher compared with other classes. Additionally, the amount and frequency of bribery increased in proportion to the demands. Therefore the hostile class feels a higher degree of sensitivity to the corruption of government officials.

B. Conflicts between Elites

(1) The Existence and Nonexistence of Group Conflicts

Table II-13. Conflicts between Elite

Gender	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Male	2.55	2.60	2.79	2.80	2.88	2.88	2.88	2.85	2.94	2.93
Female	2.16	2.27	2.42	2.40	2.56	2.57	2.60	2.77	2.74	2.78
Total	2.24	2.34	2.51	2.51	2.65	2.67	2.70	2.80	2.83	2.84
Place of Residence	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Pyongyang	1.00	1.00	2.00							
Haamkyungdo	2.25	2.34	2.52	2.51	2.62	2.62	2.66	2.73	2.74	2.78
Pyongahndo	2.36	2.50	2.67	2.64	2.91	3.00	3.00	3.25	3.25	3.14
Hwanghaedo	2.33	2.00	1.67	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.00
Yangjakangdo	1.86	1.86	2.29	2.00	2.50	2.25	2.50	2.50	2.67	2.67
Kangwondo	2.44	2.72	3.00	3.25	3.25	3.67	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00
Total	2.25	2.34	2.52	2.51	2.64	2.65	2.69	2.77	2.79	2.81
Job	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Worker	2.28	2.35	2.56	2.51	2.62	2.68	2.71	2.76	2.76	2.71
Farmer	2.52	2.67	2.76	3.15	3.27	3.33	3.25	3.33	3.33	3.33
Intelligent People	2.00	2.17	2.23	2.09	2.30	2.30	2.30	2.43	2.43	2.43
Student	1.95	2.00	2.06	2.18	2.50	2.50	2.43	2.50	2.60	2.60
Officer	2.20	2.20	2.40	2.50	2.50	2.33	2.33	2.33	2.33	2.67
Soldier (private Rank)	2.33	2.33	2.33	2.33	2.67	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00
International Officer	1.00	1.00	1.50	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	4.00	3.00
Total	2.24	2.33	2.49	2.51	2.65	2.69	2.69	2.75	2.77	2.74

Classification of Social Strata	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Core Class	2.14	2.28	2.64	2.25	2.36	2.43	2.64	2.80	2.80	2.82
Worker Class	2.10	2.19	2.32	2.40	2.54	2.67	2.66	2.72	2.72	2.67
Unstable Class	2.50	2.54	2.69	2.57	2.77	2.72	2.79	2.86	2.90	3.00
Hostile Class	2.45	2.61	2.63	2.83	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.14	3.33	3.25
Total	2.24	2.33	2.50	2.47	2.63	2.68	2.73	2.81	2.84	2.83

Conflicts between elites is comparatively low with a score of 2.80 as seen in <Table II-13>. It is similar to the reality of North Korean political history and it is estimated that the possibility of group conflict between government officials in North Korea is low. The following is the research analysis of conflicts between elites based on social economic background variables.

First, males scored 2.93 and females scored 2.78, so males recognized more conflict among government officials. Of particular note is that the rate of conflict increase is not as great after 2000 compared with before 2000. This means that the conflict between elite exists but it is not deepening or otherwise worsening.

Second, the research results by region show great variations. Hwanghaedo is just 1.00, but Kangwondo is 4.00. This shows that the conflict between government officials is a special phenomenon in a particular area and a particular workplace and is not a general phenomenon in the whole of North Korea. Of particular note is that the increasing gap in terms of conflicts between government officials has not been high since the official launch of the Kim Jong Il regime in 1998. It can be construed from this that government the position and evaluation of officials by ordinary people in the given regions stabilized according to political

stabilization.

Third, farmers have the highest score of 3.33 in the research by occupation. The reason seems to be that the conflict between managers and junior secretaries is intense. Generally the increase in the gap in relation to conflict has not been that great since 1998.

Fourth, the hostile class has the highest scores of 3.25. The hostile class seems to view disagreement and conflict between government officials more sensitively than others because what could in fact just be normal competition could be seen as the conflict for position to them. However, the assessment range regarding conflict for the hostile class is not that wide. Since 2000 in particular, they have given almost the same evaluation on this issue.

(2) The Existence and Nonexistence of Conflicts of Interest among Offices

Table II-14. Interests Conflict between Common Offices and Authority Offices

Gender	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Male	2.31	2.38	2.48	2.47	2.54	2.56	2.65	2.71	2.77	2.72
Female	1.91	2.01	2.05	2.22	2.21	2.21	2.25	2.48	2.42	2.63
Total	2.00	2.08	2.15	2.29	2.32	2.32	2.40	2.58	2.59	2.67

Place of Residence	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Pyongyang	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00						
Haamkyungdo	2.00	2.08	2.17	2.30	2.31	2.32	2.39	2.54	2.55	2.66
Pyongahndo	2.00	2.07	2.07	2.25	2.33	2.36	2.44	2.87	2.75	2.71
Hwanghaedo	2.00	2.20	2.00	2.00	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.00
Yangjakangdo	2.67	2.67	2.67	2.25	2.33	2.33	2.33	2.00	2.00	2.00
Kangwondo	1.63	1.88	2.00	2.50	2.50	2.33	3.00	3.00	3.00	4.00
Total	2.00	2.09	2.17	2.29	2.31	2.31	2.39	2.54	2.54	2.64

Job	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Worker	2.02	2.07	2.16	2.27	2.30	2.34	2.40	2.50	2.47	2.55
Farmer	2.22	2.35	2.40	2.67	2.50	2.75	2.71	3.25	3.25	3.25
Intelligent People	1.75	1.94	2.13	2.08	2.18	2.18	2.30	2.29	2.29	2.29
Student	1.68	1.79	1.89	1.82	1.75	1.75	2.14	2.50	2.60	2.60
Officer	2.20	2.20	2.20	2.40	2.75	2.33	2.33	2.33	2.33	2.67
Soldier (private Rank)	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00
International Officer	1.00	1.50	1.50	3.00	3.00	3.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00
Total	2.00	2.07	2.15	2.27	2.29	2.31	2.40	2.53	2.54	2.59

Classification of Social Strata	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Core Class	1.79	1.86	1.96	2.00	2.07	2.07	2.36	2.64	2.64	2.91
Worker Class	1.90	1.97	2.02	2.21	2.25	2.34	2.32	2.45	2.43	2.48
Unstable Class	2.22	2.28	2.33	2.25	2.16	2.25	2.41	2.67	2.71	2.81
Hostile Class	2.06	2.24	2.31	2.50	2.58	2.22	2.50	2.29	2.57	1.75
Total	1.98	2.05	2.12	2.22	2.24	2.27	2.36	2.51	2.54	2.60

As seen in <Table II-14>, the conflicts of interest are not serious, having an average score of 2.60. The research analysis on the conflicts of interest among offices based on social economic background variables is as follows.

First, males felt the conflict among offices a little more seriously with a score of 2.72 compared with female's 2.63. This is because males have experienced these conflicts between offices more directly in the workplace. Of particular note is that males see a reduction in the frequency of conflict.

Second, the research by region shows Kangwondo's 4.00 and Hwanghaedo's 1.00. It is doubtful whether including these results

in the analysis or not is advisable because they indicate too great a discrepancy, but it is the proof showing a great difference of the frequency of conflict between regions and work places. Generally throughout North Korea, the conflict between offices shows that conflict as a trend is decreasing.

Third, the research by occupation showed a score of 4.00 for overseas workers and 2.00 for soldiers showing the gap between occupations is great. However, it is not at a serious level because the average score of occupations is 2.59. Overseas workers are dealing with foreign currency directly, so they might experience a high degree of pressure from the authorities. Moreover, in this process the friction between the National Security Police and the State Security Department might be shown clearly.

Fourth, the research by class showed that the core class has the highest scores with a score of 2.91. The core class has more opportunities to accumulate capital by illicit means than common people, so they have more chances to be the subject of secret investigations. Additionally, they might have a higher probability to experience the conflict between authority agencies more often and more directly.

(3) The Possibility of Collectivizing by Cronyism

Table II-15. The Existence of Cronyism

Gender	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Male	2.56	2.57	2.69	2.63	2.68	2.76	2.82	2.81	2.83	2.87
Female	2.32	2.40	2.54	2.58	2.65	2.65	2.56	2.71	2.74	2.78
Total	2.38	2.44	2.58	2.60	2.66	2.69	2.66	2.76	2.78	2.82

Place of Residence	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Pyongyang	2.67	2.33	2.00	2.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	4.00	4.00	4.00
Haamkyungdo	2.34	2.43	2.55	2.54	2.59	2.62	2.58	2.65	2.69	2.75
Pyongahndo	2.50	2.56	2.69	2.86	2.86	2.85	2.82	3.00	3.00	3.00
Hwanghaedo	2.67	2.40	1.50	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	1.00
Yangjakangdo	2.22	2.22	2.56	2.57	2.67	2.67	3.00	3.00	2.75	2.67
Kangwondo	2.44	2.44	2.88	3.50	3.50	3.67	3.50	3.50	3.50	4.00
Total	2.36	2.43	2.56	2.58	2.64	2.67	2.64	2.73	2.74	2.79

Job	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Worker	2.39	2.43	2.64	2.60	2.66	2.65	2.62	2.72	2.75	2.80
Farmer	2.52	2.65	2.65	2.75	2.70	2.88	2.71	2.67	2.60	2.60
Intelligent People	2.25	2.25	2.27	2.33	2.73	2.73	2.90	3.00	3.13	3.13
Student	2.26	2.30	2.42	2.50	2.62	2.91	2.80	3.13	3.00	3.00
Officer	2.67	2.50	2.50	2.80	2.80	2.50	2.75	2.75	2.75	2.75
Soldier (private Rank)	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.33	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00
International Officer	3.00	3.50	3.50	4.00	3.00	3.00	4.00	3.00	4.00	4.00
Total	2.38	2.43	2.57	2.57	2.66	2.69	2.68	2.77	2.80	2.83

Classification of Social Strata	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Core Class	2.22	2.25	2.48	2.33	2.67	2.64	2.27	2.45	2.55	2.73
Worker Class	2.34	2.40	2.52	2.69	2.71	2.69	2.69	2.76	2.76	2.77
Unstable Class	2.39	2.42	2.59	2.40	2.48	2.66	2.71	2.92	3.00	3.04
Hostile Class	2.74	2.83	2.78	2.92	3.08	3.00	3.00	2.86	2.67	2.60
Total	2.37	2.42	2.56	2.58	2.68	2.70	2.68	2.78	2.80	2.84

The possibility scale of collectivizing by cronyism is 2.81 as seen in <Table II-15>, so the faction in North Korea is not at a serious level yet. The research analysis on the existence of cronyism by social and economic background is as follows.

First, males scored 2.87 and females scored 2.78, so males have a slightly higher result. Males can be said to feel the existence and effects of cronyism strongly in their working life. There is an especially high preference for entering the top university in North Korea, so men pursue connections for this purpose when they meet the opportunities for promotion or transfer to another position. As a result, people who did not graduate from university cannot help but to feel an accumulation of anger and dissatisfaction when witnessing others taking advantage of cronyism and university connections.

Second, the research by region showed 4.00 in Kangwondo, and 1.00 in Hwabghaedo. The results indicate a great discrepancy, so it is difficult to generalize, but an average scale of 2.79 is not a serious level.

Third, overseas workers have the highest scores of 4.00 and the intelligentsia scores 3.13 according to the research by occupation. Generally, the higher the class, the stronger the presence and influence of cronyism. Of particular note is that farmers and laborers felt the presence and effects of cronyism less. Especially farmers' cronyism has weakened since 2001.

Fourth, the unstable class has the highest score of 3.04 according to the research by class. This reflects the difficult reality for them to raise their social position without connections, because their position is unstable. The hostile class responded that cronyism has been decreasing on a continuous basis. Kim Jong Il's notion of 'Indok' (benevolent virtue) Politics which takes position and likely reactions of the hostile class into account seems to have taken effect.

C. The Function of Bureaucratic Offices

(1) The Effectiveness of Superior Authorities' Instructions

Table II-16. Conveyance of Superior Authorities' Instruction

Gender	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Male	1.75	1.72	1.73	1.72	1.72	1.75	1.78	1.80	1.84	1.84
Female	1.60	1.67	1.72	1.72	1.78	1.82	1.78	1.81	1.83	1.88
Total	1.63	1.68	1.72	1.72	1.76	1.80	1.78	1.80	1.83	1.87
Place of Residence	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Pyongyang	1.67	1.67	1.50	3.00	3.00	3.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00
Haamkyungdo	1.61	1.67	1.71	1.70	1.71	1.75	1.74	1.77	1.80	1.81
Pyongahndo	1.42	1.38	1.38	1.43	1.57	1.69	1.55	1.50	1.50	1.67
Hwanghaedo	2.00	1.60	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00
Yangjakangdo	1.67	1.78	1.89	1.71	2.00	2.00	1.83	2.00	1.67	1.67
Kangwondo	1.44	1.56	1.63	2.00	2.00	1.50	1.00	1.00	1.00	
Total	1.60	1.65	1.69	1.70	1.73	1.76	1.75	1.77	1.78	1.82
Job	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Worker	1.59	1.65	1.67	1.67	1.64	1.71	1.69	1.71	1.73	1.79
Farmer	1.61	1.63	1.70	1.62	1.64	1.78	1.88	2.00	1.83	1.83
Intelligent People	1.31	1.38	1.53	1.42	1.45	1.64	1.80	1.88	1.88	1.88
Student	1.68	1.68	1.83	1.81	2.08	2.00	2.00	1.88	1.79	1.79
Officer	2.00	2.00	1.67	2.00	2.00	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75
Soldier (private Rank)	2.25	2.25	2.25	2.50	2.67	2.50	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00
International Officer	1.67	1.50	1.50	2.00	1.50	2.00	2.00	3.00	4.00	3.00
Total	1.61	1.65	1.69	1.70	1.71	1.75	1.76	1.78	1.79	1.82

Classification of Social Strata	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Core Class	1.29	1.42	1.56	1.56	1.53	1.53	1.50	1.55	1.55	1.73
Worker Class	1.54	1.61	1.63	1.54	1.60	1.67	1.62	1.71	1.68	1.58
Unstable Class	1.70	1.71	1.77	1.83	1.89	1.91	1.88	1.89	1.94	1.98
Hostile Class	1.95	1.89	1.88	1.92	1.86	1.80	1.89	1.86	1.67	1.75
Total	1.59	1.64	1.68	1.67	1.70	1.74	1.71	1.76	1.74	1.75

The scale of conveyance of superior authorities' instructions is under 2.00 throughout the whole country in terms of social and economic background as seen in <Table II-16>. This shows that the conveyance and implementation of instructions is working well in North Korea. The following are the results of research on the conveyance of authorities' instruction by social and economic background variables.

First, females scored 1.88 and males 1.84 according to the research by sex, in other words, females believe that the conveyance and implementation of instructions is not working well. This is because women are more conversant with the Inminban (Resident's Association) and men have few chances to receivedirections uniformly in the workplace. However the gap is so slight as to be insignificant, so the numerical gap between male and female seems not that important. The important thing is that faith in the conveyance and implementation of instructions is increasing even by an inch.

Second, Pyongyang has the highest score of 4.00 in the research by region, but other areas are less than 2.00. Therefore it is difficult to argue that there is any major problem with the conveyance and implementation of instructions in the whole of North Korea

Third, overseas workers scored 3.00, the highest among occupations. It may be because overseas workers do not follow

instruction well as well as the fact that they do not have time to attend weekly meetings (Chonghwa). Actually, overseas workers have liberal thoughts and attitudes, so the authorities are strengthening the regulation of this group. Military officers and soldiers responded that the communication of instructions and orders is working well compared with the case of overseas workers. This shows that the level of tension is getting higher in the army.

Fourth, the unstable class responded the most negatively with a score of 1.98. This seems because the unstable class has a higher frequency of movement due to economic difficulties

(2) The Willfulness of the Lower Branches

Table II-17. Irregular Application of the Lower Branches

Gender	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Male	2.53	2.52	2.59	2.66	2.74	2.82	2.97	3.03	3.06	3.06
Female	1.90	2.06	2.18	2.26	2.31	2.47	2.55	2.72	2.74	2.82
Total	2.03	2.16	2.28	2.37	2.45	2.59	2.71	2.86	2.89	2.93
Place of Residence	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Pyongyang	1.00	1.00	1.50	2.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00
Haamkyungdo	2.02	2.16	2.29	2.40	2.49	2.60	2.68	2.83	2.86	2.93
Pyongahndo	2.17	2.19	2.25	2.29	2.36	2.62	3.00	3.00	3.00	2.89
Hwanghaedo	2.33	2.00	2.33	2.50	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00
Yangjakangdo	2.33	2.44	2.44	2.14	2.00	2.00	2.20	2.75	2.67	2.67
Kangwondo	1.78	2.00	2.00	2.25	2.25	2.33	2.50	2.50	2.50	3.00
Total	2.03	2.15	2.28	2.37	2.44	2.56	2.68	2.82	2.85	2.91

Job	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Worker	2.10	2.24	2.42	2.49	2.47	2.61	2.64	2.70	2.73	2.80
Farmer	1.73	1.80	1.95	2.10	2.00	2.33	2.60	3.00	3.00	3.00
Intelligent People	1.53	1.82	2.00	1.92	2.17	2.17	2.64	2.63	2.75	2.75
Student	2.09	2.18	2.20	2.38	2.64	2.90	3.11	3.43	3.50	3.50
Officer	2.83	2.83	2.67	3.00	3.20	3.00	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.50
Soldier (private Rank)	2.00	2.00	1.75	1.75	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.50	2.50	2.50
International Officer	3.00	2.50	2.50	3.00	3.00	3.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	3.00
Total	2.04	2.17	2.30	2.39	2.45	2.58	2.71	2.81	2.84	2.90

Classification of Social Strata	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Core Class	1.74	1.84	2.15	2.21	2.31	2.44	2.69	2.77	2.67	2.75
Worker Class	1.89	2.06	2.23	2.37	2.39	2.55	2.61	2.68	2.76	2.74
Unstable Class	2.27	2.34	2.41	2.45	2.50	2.61	2.62	3.04	3.14	3.25
Hostile Class	2.32	2.36	2.31	2.50	2.75	2.70	3.33	3.29	3.33	3.20
Total	2.01	2.13	2.27	2.38	2.45	2.56	2.69	2.84	2.90	2.93

Considering the irregular application of 2.92 as seen in <Table II-17>, irregular applications are happening but are not serious. The following is the research analysis on irregular applications of the lower branches by social and economic background variables.

First, males scored 3.06 and females 2.82, so males think that there are higher irregular applications because irregular applications

usually happen at the workplace. After the economic difficulties, males engage in business instead of attending the offices or going to work for factories, and they pay money to the workplace in order to avoid having to physically attend.

Second, Pyongyang and Kangwondo are the highest with 3.00. Pyongyang gets access to overseas culture relatively quickly, so there are antisocialist behaviors more in evidence there than other places. Additionally, the cultures of China and South Korea are able to penetrate it easily, and the phenomenon of the rich-getting-richer and the poor-getting-poorer appears in Pyongyang due to increasing capital. Such a situation promotes illegal behavior, so the irregular application of the rules has increased. Kangwondo is the opposite case. Kangwondo's shortage of materials has caused an expansion of illegal activity.

Third, students and military officers both scored the highest with 3.50 according to the research by occupation. Students may have witnessed illegal activities, and military officers have engaged in irregular activities personally.

Fourth, the unstable class is the highest with 3.25 in the research by class. This class has strong tendencies to engage in irregular application of rules and regulations because they are not kindly treated and they are neglected by the state. In particular, they can be discriminated against at work in terms of position and pay, so they have the high possibility to resist first in an emergency.

3. The Assessment in terms of the Economic Sphere

A. The Private Economic Sphere

Table II-18. The Occupancy of Unofficial Area in North Korean Economy

Gender	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Male	3.44	3.43	3.53	3.49	3.58	3.61	3.63	3.62	3.60	3.61
Female	3.23	3.43	3.47	3.46	3.50	3.53	3.54	3.51	3.55	3.57
Total	3.28	3.43	3.48	3.46	3.52	3.55	3.57	3.56	3.57	3.59
Place of Residence	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Pyongyang	3.00	3.00	2.50	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00
Haamkyungdo	3.26	3.43	3.51	3.53	3.62	3.64	3.65	3.64	3.66	3.70
Pyongahndo	3.00	3.13	3.27	3.21	3.29	3.31	3.36	3.50	3.50	3.44
Hwanghaedo	3.50	3.40	3.00	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.50	1.00
Yangjakangdo	3.33	3.33	3.44	3.29	3.17	3.17	3.50	3.25	3.33	3.33
Kangwondo	3.67	3.67	3.63	3.75	3.75	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00
Total	3.27	3.41	3.48	3.47	3.53	3.56	3.58	3.57	3.59	3.60
Job	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Worker	3.29	3.46	3.55	3.49	3.54	3.58	3.57	3.61	3.60	3.62
Farmer	3.39	3.56	3.67	3.77	3.73	3.67	3.75	3.83	3.83	3.83
Intelligent People	2.88	2.94	2.94	2.85	3.17	3.25	3.36	3.13	3.25	3.25
Student	3.17	3.35	3.50	3.67	3.83	3.91	3.90	4.00	4.00	4.00
Officer	3.33	3.33	3.33	3.60	3.60	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50
Soldier (private Rank)	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.33	3.50	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00
International Officer	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00
Total	3.27	3.42	3.50	3.48	3.55	3.58	3.61	3.63	3.63	3.64

Classification of Social Strata	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Core Class	2.81	3.00	3.07	2.89	2.93	3.00	3.00	3.08	3.08	3.25
Worker Class	3.23	3.39	3.49	3.56	3.60	3.67	3.67	3.67	3.70	3.71
Unstable Class	3.48	3.61	3.65	3.60	3.66	3.65	3.69	3.69	3.71	3.74
Hostile Class	3.50	3.67	3.63	3.67	3.92	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00
Total	3.26	3.41	3.49	3.49	3.56	3.60	3.63	3.62	3.63	3.66

The occupancy of unofficial areas in the North Korean economy has a very high score of 3.62 as seen in <Table II-18>. The official sphere cannot play any role. The following is the research analysis on the occupancy of unofficial sphere in the North Korean economy by social and economic background variables.

First, males scored 3.61 and females 3.57, so males have a rather higher dependence on the unofficial economic sphere. Of particular note in the result is that the dependence on the unofficial sphere became lower after the 7.1 measures promoting the private economy. This seems to be because South Korea and China increased their support to North Korea.

Second, Kangwondo is 4.00 and Haamkyungdo is 3.70, so they both have a high dependence on the unofficial economic sphere. This is because these regions are typical of remote mountain places, so they cannot help but have a high dependence on the unofficial economic sphere. Of particular note is that Hwanghaedo, Pyongyang, Yangkangdo, and Jakangdo's dependence on the unofficial economic sphere is decreasing. It may be because the food problem is getting better due to South Korea's and the international community's support toward North Korea since 2000.

Third, students, soldiers, and overseas workers, all recorded 4.00,

so their dependence on the unofficial economic sphere is very high. In particular, their dependence on the unofficial economic sphere is high even after the 7.1 measures in 2002. This shows the lack of consideration of the government towards these people. Overseas workers showed high dependence on the unofficial economic sphere in the early days. This suggests that they solved their clothing, food, and housing problems individually without government help. Rather they have taken charge of unofficial economic support to the government officials.

Fourth, the hostile class recorded 4.00 in the research by class, so they have a high dependence on the unofficial economic sphere. They are neglected by government, so they have to solve their economic difficulties by gaining access to the unofficial economic area. This is the reason that the unstable class has a relatively high scale of 3.74.

B. The Standard of Living

(1) Dietary Life

Table II-19. Valuation on Dietary Life

Gender	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Male	3.40	3.39	3.43	3.25	3.08	2.95	2.81	2.78	2.76	2.78
Female	3.28	3.44	3.48	3.34	3.15	2.90	2.84	2.85	2.86	2.93
Total	3.31	3.43	3.47	3.32	3.13	2.92	2.83	2.82	2.82	2.87

Place of Residence	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Pyongyang	2.33	2.67	3.00	3.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00
Haamkyungdo	3.32	3.46	3.49	3.36	3.16	2.96	2.83	2.81	2.81	2.87
Pyongahndo	3.59	3.47	3.40	3.15	3.00	2.75	3.00	3.11	3.11	3.00
Hwanghaedo	3.00	3.00	3.25	3.25	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00
Yangjakangdo	2.80	3.00	3.22	2.86	2.83	2.83	2.83	2.75	2.67	2.67
Kangwondo	3.61	3.72	3.81	3.75	3.75	3.67	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00
Total	3.31	3.44	3.48	3.33	3.12	2.93	2.84	2.83	2.83	2.87

Job	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Worker	3.36	3.48	3.56	3.40	3.19	3.01	2.94	2.92	2.91	2.89
Farmer	3.48	3.63	3.71	3.69	3.55	3.22	3.25	3.17	3.20	3.40
Intelligent People	2.76	2.88	2.88	2.77	2.75	2.67	2.73	2.63	2.75	2.75
Student	3.13	3.35	3.39	3.26	3.13	2.85	2.75	3.00	3.00	2.83
Officer	3.50	3.67	3.67	3.50	3.20	2.75	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.75
Soldier (private Rank)	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.25	3.00	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.50
International Officer	3.50	3.50	4.00	3.50	2.50	3.00	3.00	2.00	2.00	2.00
Total	3.31	3.44	3.51	3.35	3.16	2.96	2.89	2.88	2.88	2.87

Classification of Social Strata	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Core Class	3.03	3.22	3.30	3.14	2.89	2.78	2.67	2.71	2.71	2.67
Worker Class	3.36	3.48	3.53	3.33	3.09	2.86	2.82	2.74	2.74	2.83
Unstable Class	3.43	3.51	3.53	3.36	3.27	3.00	2.85	2.93	2.96	2.94
Hostile Class	3.50	3.57	3.50	3.46	3.43	3.30	3.33	3.14	3.17	3.00
Total	3.34	3.45	3.49	3.32	3.15	2.93	2.85	2.83	2.84	2.84

The refugees' evaluation of dietary life was 2.87 as seen in <Table II-19>, and it is not that bad. Especially since 2002, the food problem has improved. External support and increased opportunities to purchase food at the marketplace are considered as reasons. The following is the research analysis on dietary life based on social and economic background variables.

First, females scored 2.93 and males 2.78, so females feel the food problem as being more serious. In fact females had to solve the food problem for the household, so they may indeed view it more seriously. However, the important thing is the fact that both males and females responded that the food problem has noticeably improved compared with that of 1996. Remarkably, the food situation has been improved since 1998 because the Kim Jong Il regime has taken the food problem seriously in terms of its real and potential political significance since the official launch of the regime.

Second, Kangwondo has the most serious situation with a score of 4.00. Pyongyang also has a high score of 3.00, but most regions could manage the situation in some way even at the height of the food problem, so public riots due to food shortages are not likely to happen easily. However, if South Korea and China join in applying economic sanctions against North Korea after the nuclear tests, the situation will become serious again.

Third, farmers are in the worst situation with a score of 3.40 in the research analysis by occupation. It is ironic for farmers to feel the worst of the food shortages. It can be inferred that this is because government authorities gave more support to soldiers and laborers than farmers. The authorities might have carried out such a policy believing that farmers were already able to secure their minimum requirements of food. In particular, in the research, all the occupation groups responded that the food problem has improved since 1999.

Fourth, the research analysis by class showed that the hostile class has the highest dissatisfaction with a score of 3.00. Nevertheless, they answered that the food problem has become better since 1998. The hostile class is subject to a number of disadvantages, so it is natural for them to have a high degree of dissatisfaction. The fact that even the hostile class answered positively on the food problem can be viewed as evidence that North Korean society is generally getting out of the worst situation.

(2) Daily Necessities and Accommodation

Table II-20. Necessities and Habitation Circumstances

Gender	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Male	3.04	3.08	3.10	2.95	2.83	2.78	3.43	2.61	2.59	2.72
Female	3.09	3.27	3.34	3.25	3.04	2.83	2.71	2.68	2.69	2.80
Total	3.08	3.23	3.29	3.17	2.98	2.82	2.96	2.66	2.65	2.77
Place of Residence	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Pyongyang	2.33	2.67	3.00	3.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00
Haamkyungdo	3.10	3.24	3.31	3.20	3.00	2.86	3.02	2.68	2.67	2.78
Pyongahndo	3.29	3.40	3.13	3.08	3.15	2.92	2.89	3.00	2.89	2.87
Hwanghaedo	3.00	3.17	3.00	3.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00
Yangjakangdo	2.80	3.00	3.11	2.86	2.67	2.67	2.67	2.50	2.33	2.33
Kangwondo	3.22	3.33	3.63	3.25	3.25	3.00	3.00	3.00	4.00	4.00
Total	3.10	3.24	3.29	3.17	2.99	2.84	2.96	2.69	2.67	2.77

Job	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Worker	3.12	3.26	3.34	3.21	3.01	2.86	3.20	2.70	2.73	2.76
Farmer	3.21	3.39	3.45	3.50	3.42	3.30	3.11	3.38	3.17	3.17
Intelligent People	2.53	2.71	2.88	2.85	2.75	2.75	2.73	2.63	2.63	2.75
Student	3.02	3.24	3.30	3.11	3.00	2.83	2.82	2.89	3.00	3.00
Officer	3.33	3.50	3.17	3.17	2.80	2.25	2.25	2.25	2.25	2.75
Soldier (private Rank)	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.00	2.50	2.50	2.00	2.00	2.00
International Officer	3.00	2.50	3.00	3.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	1.00	1.00
Total	3.09	3.23	3.30	3.19	3.00	2.85	3.04	2.73	2.71	2.77

Classification of Social Strata	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Core Class	2.75	2.97	3.17	3.10	2.88	2.63	2.36	2.38	2.58	2.75
Worker Class	3.20	3.35	3.38	3.21	2.98	2.86	2.70	2.75	2.67	2.73
Unstable Class	3.15	3.23	3.26	3.18	3.00	2.83	3.50	2.57	2.52	2.63
Hostile Class	3.32	3.43	3.39	3.31	3.29	3.30	3.22	3.00	3.20	2.75
Total	3.13	3.26	3.31	3.19	3.01	2.86	2.97	2.66	2.64	2.70

The research results show that the problem of housing and necessities is not serious as seen in <Table II-20>. The average score is 2.77, and it is lower than the dissatisfaction with the ideology and other political problems. This is very important and it implies that future changes to the North Korean system can be stirred by political rather economic issues. The following are the result of analysis on daily necessities and accommodation

circumstances by social and economic background variables.

First, females scored 2.80 and males 2.72. Females suffered more with the problem of accessing daily necessities because they are in charge of housework. Both males and females answered that the problem of daily necessities has improved since 1999. Despite this, their responses show the situation has gotten worse since 2005, and this highlights likely future tendencies.

Second, Kangwondo is in the worst position with a score of 4.00 in the research by region. This is the case because the central government has little regard for Kangwondo. Kangwondo has experienced great hardship since 2004. However, since 1999, the issue of daily necessities in all the regions has improved.

Third, farmers are in the worst position with a score of 3.17. Farmers seem to be neglected in terms of the supply of daily necessities in the same manner as with food. Rural communities are isolated, so transportation in rural communities is sporadic. However farmers answered that the problems with daily necessities has improved since 2000.

Fourth, the core class and the hostile class both scored 2.75. This result is difficult to understand, but it can be said to be because the core class has felt 'relative' deprivation, and the hostile class has felt 'absolute' deprivation. Both classes responded that necessities and housing have improved since 1999. It was only the core class that answered that it has become worse since 2005 because they were not skilled at engaging in private business compared with other classes, so they were able to secure little in the way of secondary incomes.

(3) The rise and fall of GNI

The North Korean economy has showed a continuous contraction since the 1970s, and it recorded a low rate of economic growth of 2%-4% in the 1980s. This is the result of accumulated structural defects within the North Korean economy, and North Korea has been faced with a general insufficiency of technical human resources, technology, investment resources, industrial raw materials, energy, and necessities of life due to this and other factors. Meanwhile, in terms of the accumulated structural defects, the big changes in the former Soviet Union and the East European socialist block accelerated the decrease of their supportive exports (industrial raw materials and machine equipment). As North Korea's export markets shrank, the North Korean economy has recorded continual minus growth since 1990.

After 1991, the former Soviet Union demanded hard currency settlements in trade, and China also reduced supportive trade and demanded hard currency settlements in trade. As a result, the import of essential products such as crude oil, coke, and crops for the North Korean economy decreased rapidly, and the decrement of the North Korean GNI increased. As the aggravation of the overseas economic environment and the structural defects of the economic system had a synergistic effect, the will of North Korean people to work also decreased. In particular, as natural disasters like cold-weather damage, insect damage, flood damage, etc. reduced crop production, the North Korean economy has been confronted with serious crisis after crisis since 1993.

In addition, North Korea experienced a series of natural disasters for three years from 1995 to 1997, so the worst economic environment happened simultaneously as hundreds of thousands of deaths by starvation were occurring as well. The North Korean authorities started 'the Arduous March' and 'the Forced March for

Socialism.’ In addition, the North Korean authorities requested economic support from the international community and started to improve their international relations. They have wrapped these actions around the national strategy of ‘the great powerful nation’building since 1998, but their final aim was to solve their economic difficulties including the issue of food shortages.

The Inter-Korean Summit Meeting in 2000 marked a watershed in the recovery of the North Korean economy. The North Korean economy has been converted to the gradual recovery phase while South Korea has continued its economic support to North Korea. Moreover, as private business was partially permitted, though it was taken as the last resort to solve economic difficulties, North Korean people started to recover from the worst of their economic problems.

The purpose of the 7.1 measures enforced in July 2002 was to actualize and formalize wages and private business which had already spread among people. Therefore people did not accept it as a watershed. It simply became an opportunity for people to engage in unofficial economic activity relatively autonomously, so people worked hard and improved their economic circumstances. Whatever the reason, the North Korean economy improved in growth to positive figures from 1999, nominal GNI increased, and international trade is also continuously growing as seen in <Table II-21>.

Table II-21. Economic Indicators of North Korea

	unit	'96	'97	'98	'99	'00	'01	'02	'03	'04
Nominal GNI	hundred million dollar	214	177	126	158	168	157	170	184	208
Economic Growth Rate	%	-3.6	-6.3	-1.1	6.2	1.3	3.7	1.2	1.8	2.2
The Total Amount of Foreign Trade	hundred million dollar	19.8	21.8	14.4	14.8	19.7	22.7	22.6	23.9	28.6
Budget Scale	hundred million dollar	N.A	91	91	92	96	98	N.A	N.A	25.1

The future problem is whether North Korean economic growth can continue or not if South Korea and China reduce their support and economic cooperation with North Korea after the UN resolution imposes sanctions on North Korea. The North Korean economy will be naturally stagnant and it will take a long time to recover from its presently depressed economic condition.

C. International Economic Relationships

The problems caused by the nuclear tests starting in the early 1990s accelerated the fall of the North Korean economy which was essentially caused by the collapse of socialist countries. North Korea tried to cooperate with the international community by joining the UN, but this effort came to nothing because of the nuclear problem. The Najin-Sunbong Free Trade Zone which started in 1991 was not revitalized and the efforts to improve relations with South Korea based on the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement declared in 1992 were stopped.

Although North Korea and the U.S. signed the Geneva Agreement in 1994, the improvement of the relationship with the U.S. did not proceed favorably. In 1995, many people starved to death through natural disasters. Kim Jong Il requested the help of the international community for the first time, but the international community provided North Korea with only humanitarian support not full-scale economic support. As a result, North Korea could not help but avoid continuous minus growth, and the people started to engage in their own business. The central government could not guarantee people's livelihoods, so individuals were forced to take care of themselves.

The authority of Kim Jong Il and the central government has declined, so Kim Jong Il began to improve relations with the western world including the EU, putting forth the idea of 'the great

powerful nation' as the national aim in 1998 to recover his authority. The improvement of the relationship with the EU proceeded well, and relations with the U.S. were limited to diplomatic relations in 2000.

However, with the coming of the Bush government in 2001, all the previous efforts of North Korea fell through. The Bush government redefined North Korea as an integral part of an 'axis of evil' and pushed forward a strategy aimed at the collapse of the Kim Jong Il regime. Since October 2002, North Korea and the U.S. have been confronted by the worst situation due to the HEU program. The six-way talks held to solve the second nuclear crisis in August 2003, and the historic September 19 joint statement was adopted in September 2005. However, North Korean and U.S. relations became worse when the scandal of North Korean currency counterfeiting arose. The U.S. forced all the banks in the world to suspend transactions with North Korea, freezing North Korean BDA accounts on September 15, 2005.

At this point in time, North Korea proceeded with a missile test on July 5, and the UN Security Council including China and Russia also proceeded with economic sanctions against North Korea. Opposing it, North Korea proceeded with another nuclear test on October 9, and the UN Security Council decided upon economic sanctions against North Korea unanimously. South Korea, China and Japan were both active and passive in the economic sanctions against North Korea. The U.S., in particular, declared its goal to be to replace the Kim Jong Il regime through the stoppage of economic transactions with North Korea. If this were to be realized, the key point is how long will the Kim Jong Il regime be able to survive.

North Korea has already been branded with an evil reputation such as a terrorist country, a terrorist-supporting country, a terrible human rights violator, a defaulter country, etc since the 1970s. On

account of these issues, North Korea is facing various sanctions such as those of the Wassenaar Agreement and the sanction by the EAR, so it is prohibited to transport strategic materials to North Korea. Therefore, North Korea's official position is that it remains unconcerned with the economic sanctions of the UN Security Council, but objectively if sanctions isolate the North completely, it would not be able to sustain itself for more than 1 year. China is providing support with several essential goods and food including 500 million tons of crude oil yearly. North Korea's dependence rate on China is increasing rapidly from 20.4% in 2000 to 39.0% in 2004 as seen in <Table II-22>.

Table II-22. North Korea's Dependence on South Korea-China-Japan

(Unit: hundred million dollar)

	1990	1995	2000	2002	2003	2004
Total Trade Amount	41.7	20.5	19.7	22.6	23.9	28.6
Between North Korea and China (dependence rate)	4.82 (11.5%)	5.50 (23.5%)	4.88 (20.4%)	7.38 (25.4%)	10.23 (32.8%)	13.85 (39.0%)
Between North Korea and Japan (dependence rate)	4.76 11.4%	5.95 (25.4%)	4.64 (19.4%)	3.68 (12.7%)	2.65 (8.5%)	2.52 (7.1%)
Between North Korea and South Korea (dependence rate)	0.13 (0.3%)	2.87 (2.2%)	4.25 (17.8%)	6.42 (22.1%)	7.24 (23.1%)	6.97 (19.6%)

Additionally, North Korea's dependence rate on South Korea is increasing every day. South Korea surpassed Japan in North Korea's dependence rate in 2002, and it became the second most important country in terms of rate of transactions after China. Due to the increased transactions which are related with the development of the Gaesung Industrial zone and the expansion of the Geumkangsan sightseeing business, the importance of these relations are increasing. In particular, commercial transactions among economic cooperative businesses are rapidly increasing from 6.8% in 2002 to 39.1% in 2005 and then to 41.4% in Jan.-Aug. 2006 as seen in <Table II-23>.

Table II-23. The Change of South and North Korean Economic Cooperation by Commercial Transaction

(unit: million dollar)

	Commercial Transaction				Non-commercial Transaction	Total
	General Trade	Trade on Commission	Economic Cooperation	Subtotal (Percentage)	Non-commercial Transaction	Total
1995	230.4	45.9	0.0	276.3 (96.2%)	11.0	287.3
2000	110.5	129.2	33.6	273.3 (64.3%)	151.8	425.1
2002	171.8	171.2	25.0	367.9 (57.3%)	273.8	641.7
2004	171.8	176.0	89.2	436.5 (62.6%)	260.5	697.0
2005	209.8	209.7	270.0	689.5 (65.3%)	366.2	1,055.8
'06.1-8	189.4	156.5	244.7	590.7 (76.2%)	184.9	775.5

Data: Korea International Trade Association, Statistics of North and South Trade.

4. Assessment of Government Control

A. Social Regulation

(1) The Regulation of People by the Public Security Office

Table II-24. Regulation of People by Public Security Office

Gender	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Male	2.21	2.25	2.29	2.34	2.21	2.28	2.35	2.44	2.42	2.31
Female	1.94	2.14	2.23	2.30	2.25	2.26	2.28	2.39	2.25	2.28
Total	2.00	2.16	2.25	2.31	2.23	2.26	2.30	2.41	2.33	2.29
Place of Residence	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Pyongyang	1.67	1.67	2.00	3.00	3.00	4.00	3.00	2.00	1.00	1.00
Haamkyungdo	2.00	2.17	2.28	2.34	2.27	2.30	2.31	2.43	2.38	2.34
Pyongahndo	1.83	1.75	1.75	1.93	1.86	1.85	2.09	2.30	2.20	2.00
Hwanghaedo	2.67	2.83	3.25	3.25	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00
Yangjakangdo	1.70	2.10	2.00	1.86	2.17	2.17	2.33	2.67	2.33	2.33
Kangwondo	2.33	2.56	2.75	3.00	3.25	3.67	3.50	3.50	4.00	4.00
Total	2.00	2.16	2.26	2.33	2.25	2.28	2.31	2.43	2.35	2.30
Job	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Worker	2.00	2.18	2.29	2.38	2.24	2.29	2.33	2.48	2.42	2.34
Farmer	2.15	2.38	2.45	2.73	2.60	2.71	2.86	3.00	2.80	2.80
Intelligent People	1.87	2.00	2.20	2.08	2.09	2.30	2.20	2.13	2.00	2.00
Student	1.96	2.11	2.24	2.29	2.54	2.64	2.60	2.67	2.71	2.71
Officer	2.14	2.14	2.29	3.00	2.67	2.40	2.20	2.20	2.20	2.25
Soldier (private Rank)	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.67	1.50	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00
International Officer	2.33	2.33	2.67	2.67	2.00	3.00	3.00	4.00	4.00	3.00
Total	2.00	2.17	2.28	2.38	2.29	2.35	2.38	2.49	2.42	2.36

Classification of Social Strata	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Core Class	1.91	2.17	2.21	2.10	1.88	1.88	1.77	1.77	1.77	1.77
Worker Class	1.97	2.12	2.24	2.28	2.25	2.36	2.33	2.45	2.43	2.52
Unstable Class	2.07	2.12	2.20	2.37	2.28	2.29	2.18	2.30	2.20	2.13
Hostile Class	1.90	2.05	2.06	2.07	2.14	2.10	2.67	3.00	3.00	2.50
Total	1.98	2.12	2.21	2.26	2.19	2.24	2.24	2.34	2.30	2.25

The degree of social regulation is 2.30 as seen in <Table II -24>, and it shows that social regulation has been effective. The following is the research analysis on the regulation of people by the public security office by social and economic background variables. First, males scored 2.31 and females 2.28 in the research by sex. Males consider the social regulation more relaxed than females. The reason seems to be that males have witnessed a slackening in regulation cases more at work. Particularly social regulation has been better since 2000.

Second, regulation is relatively relaxed in Haamkyungdo with a score of 2.34 compared with Kangwondo's 4.00 in the research by region. This is related with the loose regulation of Haamkyungdo considering the refugees from Haamkyungdo are the most numerous. It contains some regional differences, but social regulation has been strengthened with the period between 2003 and 2004 as the turning point. As a result, the number of refugees is gradually decreasing.

Third, overseas workers responded to loose regulation with a score of 3.00 while both the intelligentsia and soldiers answered that regulation was positive with a score of 2.00. This is because

overseas workers have their own autonomy but soldiers and the intelligentsia are under tight regulation. With the exception of students, all the other groups have felt a strengthening of regulation since 2002.

Fourth, in the research by class, worker class recognized the loosest regulation with a score of 2.52. This seems to be because the security office does not seriously supervise or regulate the working class. Of particular note is that the core class responded that social regulation is performed effectively and well with a score of 1.77. It can be deduced from this that at least the core class considers the survival of their system possible.

(2) The Regulation of Illegal Behavior by the Public Security Office

Table II-25. Illegal Behavior Regulation of Public Security Office

Gender	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Male	2.50	2.54	2.69	2.58	2.50	2.49	2.49	2.57	2.49	2.48
Female	2.16	2.32	2.38	2.45	2.46	2.44	2.41	2.52	2.46	2.51
Total	2.23	2.37	2.45	2.48	2.47	2.45	2.44	2.54	2.47	2.50
Place of Residence	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Pyongyang	1.50	1.50	2.00							
Haamkyungdo	2.23	2.35	2.45	2.53	2.53	2.52	2.48	2.55	2.49	2.54
Pyongahndo	2.11	2.13	2.13	2.07	2.07	2.08	2.27	2.40	2.30	2.11
Hwanghaedo	2.33	2.50	2.60	2.75	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.50	3.00
Yangjakangdo	2.00	2.20	2.33	2.00	2.17	2.33	2.33	2.75	2.67	2.67
Kangwondo	3.00	3.25	3.29	3.00	3.33	3.50	3.00	3.00		
Total	2.23	2.36	2.45	2.48	2.49	2.48	2.46	2.54	2.48	2.50

Job	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Worker	2.23	2.36	2.42	2.49	2.40	2.41	2.46	2.57	2.48	2.50
Farmer	2.27	2.38	2.45	2.82	2.80	3.00	2.86	2.80	2.80	2.80
Intelligent People	1.93	2.07	2.07	1.82	2.00	2.00	1.89	1.86	1.71	1.71
Student	2.32	2.56	2.71	2.76	3.08	3.09	3.00	3.25	3.43	3.43
Officer	2.43	2.43	2.71	2.83	2.83	2.80	2.80	2.80	2.80	2.75
Soldier (private Rank)	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	2.00	1.50	1.50	2.00	2.00	2.00
International Officer	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00
Total	2.23	2.36	2.44	2.50	2.50	2.49	2.49	2.59	2.53	2.54
Classification of Social Strata	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Core Class	2.00	2.21	2.34	2.35	2.35	2.41	2.29	2.29	2.29	2.36
Worker Class	2.24	2.40	2.49	2.53	2.54	2.50	2.48	2.51	2.47	2.50
Unstable Class	2.30	2.35	2.47	2.47	2.45	2.43	2.32	2.52	2.50	2.45
Hostile Class	2.26	2.39	2.31	2.46	2.43	2.40	2.56	2.86	2.67	2.40
Total	2.22	2.36	2.45	2.48	2.48	2.46	2.41	2.51	2.46	2.45

The regulation of illegal behavior has a score of 2.50 as seen in <Table II-25>, so illegal behavior is generally well controlled. The following is the research analysis on the regulation of illegal behavior by the public security office based on social and economic background variables.

First, males scored 2.48 and females 2.51, so males think the illegal behavior is regulated well. This is the opposite result of the regulation of people by the public security office. Males seem to recognize that illegal behavior is regulated well in the workplace. They also responded that illegal behavior has been regulated better

since 2004.

Second, in Hawanghaedo, illegal behavior is not regulated well showing 3.00 in the research by region. This is because Hawanghaedo is a rural area with frequent food smuggling cases but the regulation does not match the illegal behavior most commonly in evidence there. In particular, the regulation of the illegal behavior was not consistent, so some regions have tighter regulations and some regions have looser regulations.

Third, students' scores were 3.43 and overseas workers' were 3.00 in the research by occupation. They believed that regulation is relatively loose compared with other occupational groups. This is because they have relative autonomy due to their occupation. Especially in the case of overseas workers, who deal with foreign currency, they have a higher tendency to get involved with illegality, but they are not regulated to an appropriate degree. Generally, since 2000, regulation has been strengthened because individual trade was legalized but on the other hand, the regulation became tighter.

Fourth, the working class response to the idea that illegal behavior is least regulated produced a score of 2.50. This class has a high level of dissatisfaction because the working class that is loyal to government is not treated appropriately. Therefore they have high levels of discontent towards the improper enforcement policies and practices of the security apparatus. If North Korean leaders cannot take effective actions to solve their discontent in the future, North Korea might experience a major revolution.

(3) Movement

Table II-26. Travel Frequency

Gender	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Male	2.40	2.31	2.39	2.37	2.46	2.50	2.50	2.51	2.51	2.53
Female	2.18	2.36	2.44	2.41	2.51	2.49	2.50	2.44	2.44	2.43
Total	2.23	2.35	2.42	2.40	2.49	2.50	2.50	2.47	2.48	2.47
Place of Residence	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Pyongyang	1.33	1.33	2.00	2.50	2.50	3.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00
Haamkyungdo	2.19	2.33	2.41	2.35	2.46	2.47	2.48	2.47	2.44	2.45
Pyongahndo	2.29	2.40	2.33	2.46	2.46	2.58	2.60	2.56	2.67	2.67
Hwanghaedo	2.57	2.33	3.00	2.75	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.00
Yangjakangdo	2.00	2.20	2.11	2.14	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.33	2.33
Kangwondo	2.78	2.78	2.87	3.25	3.25	3.33	3.00	3.00	4.00	4.00
Total	2.21	2.34	2.41	2.39	2.45	2.47	2.47	2.47	2.48	2.49
Job	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Worker	2.23	2.36	2.40	2.36	2.43	2.49	2.49	2.46	2.46	2.45
Farmer	2.11	2.27	2.40	2.42	2.40	2.43	2.83	3.20	3.20	3.20
Intelligent People	1.75	1.88	1.93	2.08	2.09	2.27	2.70	2.88	2.88	2.88
Student	2.31	2.38	2.58	2.59	2.85	2.73	2.40	2.50	2.71	2.71
Officer	2.14	2.14	2.29	2.71	2.71	2.60	2.80	2.80	2.60	2.60
Soldier (private Rank)	2.75	2.75	2.75	2.75	2.00	1.00	1.00	1.50	1.50	1.50
International Officer	3.00	2.50	2.50	2.50	4.00	4.00	4.00	3.00	3.00	3.00
Total	2.21	2.32	2.39	2.40	2.46	2.48	2.53	2.55	2.56	2.56

Classification of Social Strata	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Core Class	1.94	2.21	2.52	2.26	2.29	2.33	2.57	2.42	2.50	2.54
Worker Class	2.23	2.36	2.37	2.21	2.28	2.29	2.28	2.28	2.22	2.10
Unstable Class	2.25	2.30	2.31	2.60	2.72	2.74	2.72	2.81	2.87	2.95
Hostile Class	2.58	2.65	2.60	2.45	2.55	2.44	2.38	2.50	2.80	2.80
Total	2.22	2.34	2.40	2.36	2.44	2.45	2.47	2.48	2.50	2.49

The limitations placed upon movement are strictly maintained, and scored 2.50 as seen in <Table II -26>. The following is the research analysis on travel frequency by social and economic background variables.

First, males scored 2.53 and females 2.43, so males traveled more often. It seems that males go to work and have more trips for food. Of particular note is that males answered that they travel more and more, but females answered there are more limits in traveling. This means that males travel more whatever their purpose is. Considering that refugees speak of the increase of travel for food and trade with one voice, males are doing trade as much as females.

Second, Pyongyang and Kangwondo showed high scores of 4.00. These regions seem to have more freedom of movement compared with other regions. In particular, the movement to Yangkangdo and Jakangdo has increased but the travel to Haamkyungdo and Hwanghaedo has decreased. This is proof that the North Korean authorities are controlling the movement elastically in accordance with the different characters of the regions.

Third, farmers are relatively free to travel with scores of 3.20 in the research by occupation. Soldiers have more limits on traveling. Farmers' responses were that they travel frequently,

meaning that a farmers' living is as hard as laborers. Generally, the purpose of travel is the purchase of food and business, and the purpose of trips by farmers is for business too.

Fourth, the unstable class has the most frequent travel with scores of 2.95 in the research by class. The unstable class gets relatively less benefit from the government, so they may travel to do their business. The important thing to note is that the travel of the unstable class, which has a high possibility of deviation from acceptable norms can potentially quicken the relaxation of the society, but the North Korean authorities did not regulate consistently throughout the country. This is related to the capitalistic elements spreading in North Korea these days.

(4) The Increase and Decrease of Refugees from North Korea

Table II-27. Entrance Status of Refugees (May 2006)

classification	Until '89	'90	'91	'92	'93	'94	'95	'96	'97	'98	'99
Number of Refugees	607	9	9	8	8	52	41	56	86	71	148

classification	'00	'01	'02	'03	'04	'05	'06.5	Total	Death? Immigration, etc.	Residing at home
Number of Refugees	312	583	1,139	1,281	1,894	1,383	716	8,403	299	8,104

The numbers of refugees have been gradually increasing from the 1990s as seen in <Table II-27>. Around 200,000 refugees are

known to be scattered in China, Russia, Vietnam, and Thailand. North Korea makes an effort to strengthen border defenses to prevent escape from North Korea, but it cannot regulate the borders effectively due to economic difficulties. Although there are some political refugees, the cause of escaping North Korea is mainly the poor economy. According to refugees' testimony, the more deepening of economic difficulties, the more refugees there are from North Korea. The increase of refugees produces a seriously destabilizing influence on the stability of the North Korean system. Refugees have increased because of deepening economic difficulties and looser regulations of attempts to escape. This stirs the people in North Korea and weakens the will of people to find local solutions to their problem by themselves. Therefore the changes in refugee numbers can be a barometer of the sustainability of the North Korean system. However the number of refugees in South Korea is restricted by the ability of the South Korean government to accommodate them, so it does not equate with the real refugees' number and the number of refugees coming to South Korea.

B. Political Opposition

(1) Expression of Dissatisfaction

Table II-28. Expression of Dissatisfaction in Daily Life

Gender	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Male	2.49	2.45	2.53	2.50	2.62	2.63	2.71	2.72	2.74	2.74
Female	1.95	2.18	2.24	2.21	2.25	2.27	2.39	2.46	2.51	2.44
Total	2.07	2.24	2.31	2.29	2.36	2.39	2.51	2.57	2.61	2.56

Place of Residence	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Pyongyang	2.00	2.00	1.50	1.50	2.00	2.00	3.00	3.00	4.00	4.00
Haamkyungdo	2.05	2.23	2.31	2.33	2.40	2.45	2.57	2.57	2.62	2.57
Pyongahndo	2.28	2.38	2.56	2.43	2.43	2.54	2.73	2.80	2.70	2.67
Hwanghaedo	2.86	3.17	3.25	3.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00
Yangjakangdo	2.11	2.33	2.33	2.14	2.33	2.33	2.50	2.75	3.33	3.33
Kangwondo	1.78	1.89	2.00	1.50	1.75	1.67	1.00	2.50	2.50	2.50
Total	2.08	2.25	2.33	2.31	2.37	2.42	2.55	2.59	2.65	2.62

Job	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Worker	2.17	2.33	2.40	2.43	2.41	2.51	2.69	2.73	2.78	2.70
Farmer	2.37	2.58	2.50	2.67	2.90	2.88	2.83	2.60	2.60	2.60
Intelligent People	1.81	1.94	2.13	2.25	2.36	2.36	2.70	2.50	2.88	2.88
Student	1.68	1.86	2.08	1.73	1.92	2.00	1.90	1.81	2.07	2.07
Officer	2.00	2.00	2.17	2.17	2.40	2.25	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00
Soldier (private Rank)	1.50	1.75	1.75	1.75	2.33	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.50
International Officer	3.00	2.50	3.00	3.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	3.00	4.00
Total	2.10	2.25	2.34	2.34	2.41	2.48	2.60	2.59	2.68	2.63

Classification of Social Strata	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Core Class	1.82	2.06	2.29	2.20	2.25	2.27	2.38	2.46	2.54	2.42
Worker Class	2.05	2.25	2.24	2.25	2.41	2.54	2.70	2.62	2.65	2.65
Unstable Class	2.19	2.32	2.32	2.27	2.29	2.27	2.29	2.56	2.74	2.72
Hostile Class	2.43	2.37	2.63	3.00	2.92	3.00	3.33	3.14	3.50	3.50
Total	2.09	2.25	2.30	2.32	2.41	2.46	2.59	2.62	2.72	2.68

People in North Korea are permitted to express their dissatisfaction to just a limited degree with score of 2.62 as seen in <Table II-28>. In this case, we have to be careful that people under a socialist system do not receive as much stress as people under a capitalist system due to the characteristics which socialist societies tend to produce. As mentioned before, if they pretend to be following the rules, they do not face big problems in life. The following is the research analysis on the expression of dissatisfaction in daily life by social and economic background variables.

First, males scored 2.74 and females 2.44, so males express dissatisfaction more. This seems related to the male-oriented culture of North Korea. The deep-rooted patriarchal culture has existed in North Korea until now, so males' status is much higher than females' status. Therefore, females should endure more even if they feel discontent. This is related to the way in which females are somewhat disinterested in politics. However the level of expression of discontent is getting higher.

Second, Pyongyang is 4.00 and Yangkangdo and Jakangdo are 3.33 in the research by region, so they showed somewhat higher results. People from Pyongyang have more opportunities to express their discontent as a typical city of North Korea. Additionally, the food supply goes smoothly in Pyongyang, so the discontent of people from Pyongyang may not be that serious.

Third, overseas workers have an outstandingly high average of 4.00. This is because they can discuss freely anything except political issues due to their occupational traits. However other occupational groups cannot express their opinion as easily in reality. In particular, farmers' opportunities to express their opinions are decreasing. This can be said to be the case because South Korea has supported the North with fertilizer since 2002, so the farmers' food supply problem has been improved.

Fourth, the hostile class has an extraordinarily high result of 3.50 compared with other classes. This means that the hostile class has become freer to express their discontent. When the food problem was severe in the early 1990s, the hostile class suffered terrible sacrifices, and such an experience may enable them to express actively their discontent with the food distribution system.

(2) The Possibility of the Existence of Critical Power

Table II-29. The Existence Possibility of Critical Power

Gender	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Male	2.27	2.28	2.33	2.42	2.51	2.57	2.64	2.62	2.59	2.68
Female	1.85	1.99	2.12	2.30	2.35	2.35	2.39	2.59	2.57	2.52
Total	1.95	2.05	2.18	2.34	2.40	2.42	2.48	2.60	2.58	2.59
Place of Residence	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Pyongyang	1.67	2.00	2.50	3.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00
Haamkyungdo	1.89	2.00	2.16	2.31	2.37	2.34	2.44	2.54	2.52	2.50
Pyongahndo	2.13	2.07	2.00	2.25	2.33	2.55	2.50	2.44	2.44	2.50
Hwanghaedo	2.43	2.80	3.00	3.00	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.50	4.00
Yangjakangdo	2.44	2.56	2.67	2.57	2.50	2.80	2.80	2.75	3.00	3.00
Kangwondo	2.33	2.33	2.25	2.75	2.75	2.67	2.50	4.00	4.00	4.00
Total	1.95	2.06	2.19	2.35	2.40	2.41	2.48	2.59	2.58	2.60

Job	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Worker	1.94	2.07	2.26	2.38	2.42	2.43	2.52	2.62	2.59	2.62
Farmer	2.00	2.09	1.94	2.27	2.44	2.57	2.50	2.40	2.60	2.60
Intelligent People	1.75	1.81	1.87	1.83	2.00	2.18	2.20	2.38	2.50	2.50
Student	1.74	1.81	1.92	2.07	2.17	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00
Officer	2.67	2.83	2.83	3.00	3.00	2.75	3.00	2.75	2.75	2.67
Soldier (private Rank)	2.25	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.67	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.50
International Officer	2.67	2.00	2.00	2.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00
Total	1.94	2.05	2.18	2.31	2.39	2.39	2.46	2.54	2.55	2.56
Classification of Social Strata	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Core Class	1.67	1.77	2.04	2.00	2.20	2.40	2.42	2.91	2.91	3.00
Worker Class	1.95	2.08	2.17	2.37	2.47	2.51	2.58	2.58	2.63	2.53
Unstable Class	1.90	2.02	2.17	2.32	2.26	2.34	2.45	2.56	2.43	2.45
Hostile Class	2.41	2.45	2.50	2.85	2.85	2.70	2.78	2.86	3.00	3.50
Total	1.95	2.05	2.18	2.35	2.42	2.46	2.54	2.64	2.64	2.65

The possibility of the existence of critical power did not show a high score with 2.60 as seen in <Table II-29>. The following is the research analysis on the possibility of the existence of critical power by social and economic background variables.

First, males scored 2.68 and females 2.52, so males have a higher result. In other words, males seem to consider more that the critical power against the system exists. This is because males hear more

rumors at the workplace.

Second, Pyongyang, Hwanghaedo, and Kangwondo showed 4.00 in the research by region. This may be because of the cases of witnessing fly sheets or listening indirectly to the rumors of the corruption in the 6th Corps in 1995. Of particular note is that the critical power against the system decreased temporarily after 2002 in some regions like Pyongyang, Yangkangdo, and Jakangdo.

Third, overseas workers' scores are the highest with 3.00 in the research by occupation. They can access foreign information directly, so they seem to take a critical position against the system more often. Among the refugees who held a high position in North Korea, many of them are diplomats or studied abroad. In 2003, immediately after the 7.1 measures of 2002, the critical power of farmers and soldiers decreased.

Fourth, the hostile class' score is high with 3.50 in the research by class. This is a thread which connects to the notion that if there exists critical powers of judgment against the system among refugees, we can predict that there would also be similar critical thinking among the hostile class or those otherwise dissatisfied. The hostile class recognizes the existence of critical power more clearly through mutual information exchanges.

(3) Acts Critical to the North Korean System

Table II-30. Existence of Criticizing Act against the Upper Class in North Korean

Gender	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Male	2.34	2.28	2.39	2.35	2.42	2.44	2.53	2.58	2.63	2.65
Female	1.73	1.81	1.95	2.06	2.08	2.19	2.32	2.48	2.49	2.55
Total	1.85	1.90	2.05	2.13	2.18	2.26	2.39	2.52	2.55	2.59

Place of Residence	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Pyongyang	1.00	1.00	1.50	2.00	2.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00
Haamkyungdo	1.85	1.90	2.06	2.17	2.19	2.27	2.41	2.49	2.49	2.57
Pyongahndo	1.88	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.20	2.44	2.67	2.50
Hwanghaedo	2.29	2.33	2.50	2.25	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	
Yangjakangdo	1.78	1.78	1.89	2.00	2.17	2.17	2.17	2.25	2.00	2.00
Kangwondo	1.87	2.00	1.71	1.33	1.67	1.50	1.00	4.00	4.00	4.00
Total	1.85	1.90	2.04	2.13	2.15	2.23	2.36	2.48	2.51	2.57

Job	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Worker	1.86	1.90	2.12	2.25	2.19	2.34	2.43	2.57	2.52	2.68
Farmer	1.77	1.84	1.89	2.18	2.22	2.29	2.33	2.50	2.50	2.50
Intelligent People	1.75	1.88	1.93	1.75	2.00	2.09	2.30	2.62	2.75	2.75
Student	1.66	1.66	1.73	1.75	2.00	2.00	2.00	1.83	1.60	1.60
Officer	2.33	2.33	2.50	2.60	2.60	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.50	2.00
Soldier (private Rank)	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.67	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50
International Officer	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00
Total	1.82	1.87	2.03	2.12	2.16	2.25	2.34	2.47	2.46	2.52

Classification of Social Strata	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Core Class	1.43	1.52	1.73	1.29	1.43	1.43	1.64	1.70	2.00	2.10
Worker Class	1.89	1.95	2.13	2.24	2.33	2.45	2.50	2.68	2.71	2.72
Unstable Class	1.91	1.98	2.10	2.31	2.28	2.39	2.41	2.57	2.50	2.55
Hostile Class	2.20	2.17	2.06	2.33	2.25	2.10	2.44	2.71	2.67	2.75
Total	1.86	1.91	2.06	2.14	2.19	2.26	2.37	2.53	2.54	2.57

The acts critical to the North Korean system seems not serious as seen in <Table II-30>. It is merely the frequency which is increasing gradually. The following is the research analysis on the existence of acts critical to the North Korean system by social and economic background variables.

First, males scored 2.65 and females 2.55, so males admit the existence of fly sheets more. Males witness these cases more than females while traveling to other areas and working in the workplace.

Second, Kangwondo showed the highest score of 4.00 in the research by region because people in Kangwondo have witnessed flysheets in person. Kangwondo is the border area which has a great many scattered propaganda bills from South Korea. The appearance of 'anti-Kim Jong Il fly sheets' seems to be one result of the influence of these sheets. Third, overseas workers scored the highest with 3.00 in the research by occupation. This can be said to be the case since they have more chances to contact quality information rather than witness it in person. The next are workers with 2.68. They have opportunities to see fly sheets at the workplace or factory. Also they are working under the conditions dictated by poor distribution, so they have high levels of dissatisfaction.

Fourth, the hostile class is the highest with 2.75 in the research by class. The hostile class has met both sets of experiences, witnessing it personally and listening to rumors. There would be relatively many cases of critical acts in their places of residence, so there may also be many rumors. Many refugees said that they listened to such rumors for these reasons.

C. The Formation of a Counterculture

(1) Juvenile Culture

Table II-31. Existence of Capitalism Culture

Gender	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Male	2.63	2.69	2.77	2.84	3.08	3.17	3.29	3.35	3.36	3.27
Female	1.98	2.16	2.32	2.58	2.76	2.97	3.23	3.29	3.39	3.37
Total	2.12	2.27	2.43	2.65	2.86	3.03	3.25	3.31	3.38	3.32
Place of Residence	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Pyongyang	1.67	2.00	2.50	3.00	3.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00
Haamkyungdo	2.09	2.25	2.40	2.60	2.81	2.99	3.14	3.19	3.27	3.22
Pyongahndo	2.06	2.13	2.19	2.71	2.79	2.85	3.45	3.50	3.50	3.44
Hwanghaedo	2.14	2.17	2.25	2.25	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.00
Yangjakangdo	2.89	2.89	2.89	3.14	3.33	3.50	3.67	3.80	3.75	3.75
Kangwondo	1.43	1.71	1.83	1.50	2.00	3.00				
Total	2.09	2.24	2.39	2.62	2.83	3.02	3.22	3.27	3.34	3.28
Job	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Worker	2.06	2.21	2.38	2.60	2.78	2.96	3.18	3.27	3.32	3.23
Farmer	2.00	2.15	2.29	2.54	2.36	2.89	3.13	3.14	3.20	3.20
Intelligent People	1.88	2.00	2.31	2.38	2.83	2.92	2.91	2.87	3.25	3.25
Student	1.97	2.13	2.19	2.44	2.92	3.10	3.11	3.14	3.00	3.00
Officer	2.67	2.83	3.00	3.20	3.40	3.25	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50
Soldier (private Rank)	1.75	1.75	1.75	2.00	2.67	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50
International Officer	3.00	3.00	3.50	3.50	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00
Total	2.05	2.19	2.35	2.57	2.81	2.99	3.16	3.24	3.30	3.25

Classification of Social Strata	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Core Class	1.56	1.82	2.07	2.42	2.63	3.00	3.08	3.33	3.58	3.58
Worker Class	2.08	2.25	2.41	2.59	2.82	2.98	3.18	3.23	3.34	3.34
Unstable Class	2.41	2.53	2.68	2.80	3.09	3.22	3.47	3.48	3.48	3.33
Hostile Class	2.43	2.45	2.50	2.85	2.93	3.00	3.33	3.43	3.33	3.25
Total	2.12	2.28	2.44	2.65	2.88	3.05	3.27	3.34	3.42	3.38

The existence of a capitalist culture is responded to with a score of 3.31 as seen in <Table II-31>. This means that there is a considerable ‘anti-Juche culture’ within North Korea. The following is the research analysis on the existence of a capitalist culture by social and economic background variables.

First, males scored 3.27 and females 3.37 in the research by sex. Females feel and see the evidence of the ‘counterculture’ of juveniles more. Females meet teenagers more and they have more information on the issue. Of particular note are the results which suggest that the capitalist culture which increased gradually from 1996 has decreased since 2005. This is proof of sharpening regulation.

Second, Pyongyang has the highest score with 4.00 in the research by region. People in Pyongyang accepted foreign cultures for the first time and also they have many opportunities to come into contact with it. In fact, North Korean agents operating against South Korea are known to watch almost all the historical dramas of South Korea without skipping any episodes. Another characteristic is that Yangkangdo and Jakangdo are somewhat high with scores of 3.75. These regions have active border trade with China, so South Korean cultural properties can flow easily to these places.

Third, overseas workers have the highest scores with 4.00. Overseas workers who frequently travel to China due to their work

can come in contact with South Korean culture naturally and pass it on to their children.

Fourth, the core class scored 3.58, and this indicates that the upper class in North Korea comes into contact with capitalist culture more. The core class within North Korea gets access to capitalist culture through several ways and they circulate it. Even Kim Jong Il, the chairman, is known to enjoy South Korean songs and dramas. However the regulation on the possession of capitalist cultural items has become stricter since 2005, so the influence of capitalist culture is going down.

(2) Religious Activity

Table II-32. Existence of Religious Activity

Gender	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Male	1.42	1.45	1.52	1.47	1.51	1.59	1.55	1.62	1.68	1.85
Female	1.27	1.29	1.31	1.48	1.52	1.61	1.60	1.58	1.58	1.60
Total	1.30	1.32	1.36	1.47	1.52	1.60	1.58	1.60	1.62	1.70
Place of Residence	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Pyongyang	1.67	1.67	2.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00
Haamkyungdo	1.30	1.33	1.38	1.48	1.52	1.62	1.62	1.61	1.64	1.72
Pyongahndo	1.22	1.13	1.13	1.29	1.29	1.31	1.27	1.40	1.30	1.33
Hwanghaedo	1.57	1.67	1.75	1.75	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Yangjakangdo	1.38	1.38	1.38	1.33	1.33	1.33	1.33	1.50	1.33	1.33
Kangwondo	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00				
Total	1.30	1.32	1.36	1.47	1.48	1.57	1.57	1.58	1.59	1.67

Job	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Worker	1.32	1.34	1.36	1.45	1.41	1.49	1.44	1.46	1.47	1.58
Farmer	1.15	1.15	1.35	1.67	1.80	2.13	2.14	2.60	2.50	2.50
Intelligent People	1.31	1.31	1.27	1.42	1.55	1.55	1.60	1.63	1.63	1.63
Student	1.24	1.25	1.24	1.50	1.73	1.67	1.75	1.67	1.60	1.60
Officer	1.83	1.83	1.83	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.25
Soldier (privateRank)	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
International Officer	1.00	1.00	1.67	1.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	4.00	4.00
Total	1.29	1.31	1.35	1.47	1.50	1.58	1.55	1.58	1.60	1.70

Classification of Social Strata	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Core Class	1.18	1.22	1.33	1.50	1.53	1.53	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.75
Worker Class	1.24	1.28	1.29	1.37	1.41	1.55	1.58	1.70	1.75	1.73
Unstable Class	1.46	1.43	1.46	1.63	1.59	1.65	1.62	1.52	1.55	1.64
Hostile Class	1.43	1.50	1.47	1.62	1.69	1.73	1.67	1.57	1.50	1.75
Total	1.31	1.33	1.36	1.49	1.51	1.59	1.59	1.61	1.63	1.71

The existence of religious activity showed a score of 1.71 as seen in <Table II-32>, so there is almost no religious activity. The following is the research on the existence of religious activity analysis by social and economic background variables.

First, males scored 1.85 and females 1.60 in the research by sex, so males admit the existence of religious activity more. This can be said to be the case because males have more opportunities to come to contact with social information.

Second, Pyongyang scored much higher than others with 3.00 in the research by region. This is just for propaganda purposes, but there exist several churches in Pyongyang; Jangchung church, Bongsu church, and the Chilgol church.

Third, overseas workers scored the highest with 4.00 in the research by occupation. Overseas workers have more chances to get access to information on religious activity than other groups, so they can acquire more information on religious activity than is officially recognized by the North Korean authorities.

Fourth, the core class and the hostile class recorded 1.75. This is because the core class could recognize the existence of religion by exchanges of information and the hostile class could recognize the existence of religion through rumors. Some of the hostile class might have witnessed secret religious activity in person.

Table II -33. Existence of Shamanistic Custom

Gender	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Male	2.87	2.82	2.92	2.97	3.03	3.03	3.06	3.06	3.03	2.96
Female	2.60	2.68	2.80	2.84	2.88	3.01	3.05	3.06	3.05	3.08
Total	2.66	2.71	2.83	2.88	2.93	3.02	3.05	3.06	3.04	3.03
Place of Residence	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Pyongyang	2.33	2.33	3.50	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00
Haamkyungdo	2.60	2.67	2.80	2.83	2.90	2.96	3.02	3.06	3.04	3.04
Pyongahndo	2.65	2.60	2.60	2.85	2.77	3.00	2.90	3.00	3.00	3.13
Hwanghaedo	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.25	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50	4.00
Yangjakangdo	3.22	3.22	3.22	3.14	3.17	3.33	3.33	3.00	2.67	2.67
Kangwondo	2.14	2.43	2.33	3.00	3.50	4.00				
Total	2.62	2.68	2.80	2.87	2.92	3.01	3.05	3.07	3.05	3.06

Job	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Worker	2.60	2.65	2.75	2.72	2.76	2.91	2.89	2.91	2.90	2.85
Farmer	2.34	2.46	2.57	2.69	2.73	2.67	3.00	3.17	3.17	3.40
Intelligent People	2.71	2.82	2.94	3.08	3.08	3.25	3.45	3.38	3.38	3.50
Student	2.60	2.63	2.82	3.25	3.58	3.60	3.56	3.71	3.67	3.67
Officer	3.50	3.50	3.67	3.60	3.60	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.25
Soldier (private Rank)	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.33	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00
International Officer	3.67	3.50	3.50	3.50	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00
Total	2.60	2.65	2.78	2.84	2.91	3.02	3.05	3.07	3.07	3.06
Classification of Social Strata	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Core Class	2.58	2.70	3.00	2.95	3.06	3.06	3.23	3.50	3.50	3.45
Worker Class	2.50	2.59	2.65	2.67	2.80	2.92	2.95	3.03	3.03	3.11
Unstable Class	2.86	2.84	2.83	2.95	2.94	3.00	3.03	2.96	2.96	2.77
Hostile Class	2.96	2.95	3.11	3.38	3.31	3.36	3.33	3.14	3.00	3.00
Total	2.65	2.71	2.80	2.87	2.93	3.01	3.05	3.09	3.08	3.05

Meanwhile the score for belief in shamanistic customs is 3.05 as seen in <Table II-33> showing that this occurs actively. It is prevalent due to both the gloomy reality of the present and the uncertainty of the future. This reveals the people's attitudes, and the fact that it is evidence of dependence upon shamanistic performers not their leaders or generals, means that we should pay attention to its political direction. The following is research into shamanistic customs and on beliefs relating to the existence of shamanistic customs based on social economic background variables.

First, males scored 2.96 and females 3.08 in the research by sex, so females admitted the existence of shamanistic customs more. It can be argued from this that females have more experiences of shamanistic customs due to their curiosity regarding their future. The more unstable the society is, the more people who exhibit tendencies towards dependency. However, this phenomenon has decreased since 2004 because the North Korean authorities have regulated it strictly.

Second, Pyongyang, Hwanghaedo, and Kangwondo are 4.00 in the research by region, so this shows that shamanistic customs are more prevalent in these areas. In particular, shamanistic custom have grown rapidly in Pyongyang since 1999. This is because Pyongyang people have higher levels of curiosity in terms of the future than other regions, and they have more opportunities to raise their social position. On the contrary, Hwanghaedo and Kangwondo people hope that a bright future will rise out of the gloomy reality, and this is arguably the reason for such a result.

Third, overseas workers'scale scored 4.00 in the research by occupation. This is because overseas workers have positions beneficial for acquiring information on the existence of shamanistic customs and they have personal experiences of them through their desire to raise their social position.

Fourth, the core class scored the highest with 3.45. They have relatively higher opportunities to raise their position in the future, so they have a higher possibility of trying to confirm these expectations through consultations with shamans. Additionally, they have a higher possibility of hearing information about 'good fortunetellers' from their colleagues.

(3) Typical Group Consciousness

Table II-34. Existence of Cronyism such as Regionalism and Classmates

Gender	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Male	2.29	2.25	2.29	2.30	2.42	2.35	2.43	2.45	2.50	2.61
Female	2.16	2.21	2.25	2.23	2.29	2.32	2.46	2.40	2.41	2.44
Total	2.19	2.22	2.26	2.25	2.33	2.33	2.45	2.42	2.45	2.51
Place of Residence	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Pyongyang	2.00	1.67	1.50	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	4.00	4.00
Haamkyungdo	2.20	2.25	2.29	2.25	2.35	2.33	2.44	2.44	2.45	2.51
Pyongahndo	2.06	2.00	2.07	2.17	2.25	2.27	2.44	2.38	2.50	2.57
Hwanghaedo	2.17	1.80	1.67	1.67	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Yangjakangdo	2.38	2.38	2.50	2.33	2.20	2.20	2.40	2.50	2.33	2.33
Kangwondo	2.29	2.29	2.67	3.00	3.00	3.00				
Total	2.19	2.22	2.28	2.25	2.32	2.30	2.41	2.41	2.43	2.51
Job	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Worker	2.18	2.26	2.33	2.25	2.25	2.32	2.42	2.43	2.47	2.59
Farmer	1.96	1.82	1.81	1.50	1.33	1.25	1.25	1.33	1.33	1.33
Intelligent People	1.88	1.88	1.87	2.08	2.36	2.27	2.30	2.00	2.25	2.25
Student	2.31	2.27	2.33	2.53	2.75	2.80	2.78	2.88	2.83	2.83
Officer	2.50	2.33	2.17	2.60	2.60	2.25	2.25	2.25	2.25	2.25
Soldier (private Rank)	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.67	1.00	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50
International Officer	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	4.00					
Total	2.14	2.17	2.22	2.22	2.29	2.29	2.35	2.35	2.38	2.45

Classification of Social Strata	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Core Class	2.28	2.31	2.27	2.24	2.43	2.64	2.75	2.75	2.75	2.75
Worker Class	2.00	2.02	2.08	2.05	2.12	2.13	2.15	2.15	2.23	2.12
Unstable Class	2.40	2.42	2.46	2.40	2.50	2.45	2.67	2.61	2.63	2.69
Hostile Class	2.20	2.32	2.29	2.69	2.86	2.64	2.89	2.86	2.83	3.25
Total	2.15	2.18	2.22	2.24	2.35	2.35	2.46	2.44	2.48	2.48

The existence of cronyism produced a score of 2.49 as seen in <Table II -34>. This means that social activity by cronyism is increasing in North Korea, but it is not at a serious level. The following is the research analysis on the existence of cronyism such as use of regionalism and classmates by social and economic background variables.

First, males scored 2.61 and females 2.44 in the research by sex. This shows that males follow cronyism. Males consider job acquisition, movement, and raising one's social position important and they stop at nothing to meet these ends. Cronyism in particular, is something which is deployed as a means of solve economic problems has increased after the period of economic difficulties.

Second, Pyongyang is recorded as having the most frequent social use of cronyism with a score of 4.00 in the research by region. North Korean top universities are grouped together in Pyongyang, and high-ranking officials live in Pyongyang, so there are many opportunities to solve problems through cronyism.

Third, overseas workers scored the highest with 4.00 in the research by occupation. The occupation group of overseas worker became popular among North Korean people and the upper elites after the beginning of the economic difficulties. Competition to get these positions has become serious and cronyism has been

prevalent. In fact, there are many sons of the upper class among overseas workers.

Fourth, the hostile class scored the highest with 3.25. The hostile class has many limitations placed upon them in terms of their social activities due to their social position. However, they could engage in social activities to some degree when they use bribery, after the beginning of economic difficulties. In this case, relationships are very important, and therefore, they gave high scores on the issue and importance of social activities through cronyism.

5. The Assessment on Foreign Relation Area

A. The Influx of Foreign Information

(1) The Knowledge of Change in South Korea

Table II-35. Knowledge on South Korean Circumstance

Gender	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Male	2.17	2.17	2.36	2.49	2.89	3.00	3.09	3.15	3.22	3.26
Female	1.61	1.69	1.84	2.19	2.40	2.58	2.89	3.06	3.26	3.33
Total	1.72	1.78	1.95	2.27	2.54	2.71	2.96	3.09	3.24	3.30
Place of Residence	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Pyongyang	1.67	1.67	2.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	4.00	4.00	4.00
Haamkyungdo	1.72	1.78	1.96	2.25	2.50	2.66	2.94	3.05	3.21	3.31
Pyongahndo	1.78	1.81	1.94	2.29	2.86	2.92	3.18	3.20	3.40	3.33
Hwanghaedo	2.43	2.33	2.75	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50	4.00
Yangjakangdo	1.63	1.63	1.88	1.67	2.00	2.17	2.50	3.25	3.00	3.00
Kangwondo	1.75	1.75	1.71	2.00	2.33	2.50	2.00	2.00		
Total	1.74	1.79	1.96	2.26	2.53	2.68	2.94	3.09	3.24	3.32

Job	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Worker	1.66	1.71	1.87	2.18	2.40	2.58	2.83	2.95	3.10	3.18
Farmer	1.86	2.00	2.02	2.31	2.55	2.75	2.86	3.17	3.40	3.60
Intelligent People	1.88	1.88	2.07	2.25	2.55	2.55	3.00	3.25	3.50	3.50
Student	1.63	1.67	1.83	2.50	2.82	3.00	3.38	3.33	3.40	3.40
Officer	2.17	2.17	2.17	2.40	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.25	3.50
Soldier (private Rank)	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.33	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00
International Officer	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.50	3.50	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00
Total	1.72	1.77	1.91	2.24	2.51	2.67	2.92	3.03	3.19	s3.29
Classification of Social Strata	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Core Class	1.56	1.66	1.93	2.39	2.80	2.93	3.42	3.58	3.67	3.73
Worker Class	1.68	1.74	1.92	2.20	2.52	2.68	2.89	3.00	3.14	3.20
Unstable Class	1.74	1.77	1.98	2.20	2.49	2.68	2.84	2.88	3.14	3.33
Hostile Class	2.18	2.29	2.33	2.77	2.93	3.00	3.33	3.43	3.50	3.25
Total	1.73	1.79	1.98	2.28	2.59	2.75	2.98	3.08	3.25	3.33

The knowledge of change in South Korea is rather high with a score of 3.31 as seen in <Table II-35>. Typically, South Korea was perceived and depicted as an ‘American Puppet’ or as "The street full of beggars," but since the economic difficulties in the early 1990s, South Korea’s support to North Korea has increased and information on South Korea has flowed into North Korea from China. As a result, North Korean people’s perception of South Korea is changing. The following is the research analysis on the knowledge of prevailing circumstances in South Korea according to social and economic background variables.

First, males scored 3.26 and females 3.33 in the research by sex. Females have a slightly higher result. This is because not only males but also females started to get access to external information since 2004. Perhaps females, who are responsible for household matters, get access to more South Korean news through the evidence of South Korean food and fertilizer support to North Korea.

Second, Pyongyang and Hwanghaedo scored 4.00 in the research by region. This is possibly because Pyongyang is the place where South Korean culture circulates most frequently, and Hwanghaedo is the place which is often damaged by floods, so a lot of South Korean food was supplied to this area. Particularly since South Korean goods have even been supplied to Pyongyang since 2003, South Korean circumstances have become more widely known to North Koreans.

Third, overseas workers appeared to be the most familiar with South Korean circumstances with scores of 4.00. Overseas workers were already a group that was well acquainted with South Korean circumstances since the Inter-Korean Summit Meeting since 2000. One result of particular note is that farmers scored 3.60. This arguably means that South Korean news is carried to rural communities. This seems to happen because South Korean fertilizer aid is distributed into these rural communities.

Fourth, the core class is ranked 3.73. This indicates that the upper class of North Korea is comparatively rather familiar with South Korean circumstances. The upper class seems to know well about South Korea's developed image through videos and CDs of South Korea.

(2) Knowledge of Changes in China

<Table II -36> Knowledge on China's Change

Gender	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Male	2.70	2.72	3.00	2.97	3.22	3.23	3.32	3.42	3.50	3.50
Female	2.21	2.38	2.58	2.73	2.75	2.83	2.91	2.96	3.00	3.05
Total	2.31	2.45	2.67	2.79	2.89	2.95	3.05	3.14	3.20	3.22
Place of Residence	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Pyongyang	1.33	1.67	2.00	2.00	2.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00
Haamkyungdo	2.31	2.48	2.74	2.85	2.97	3.02	3.08	3.15	3.19	3.22
Pyongahndo	2.47	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.71	2.69	3.18	3.40	3.50	3.56
Hwanghaedo	2.86	2.83	3.50	3.50	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00
Yangjakangdo	2.44	2.38	2.38	2.33	2.33	2.67	2.67	2.75	3.00	3.00
Kangwondo	1.88	1.88	1.86	2.67	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00		
Total	2.31	2.46	2.68	2.80	2.91	2.97	3.06	3.15	3.21	3.24
Job	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Worker	2.34	2.45	2.71	2.80	2.85	2.93	3.06	3.15	3.21	3.18
Farmer	2.33	2.54	2.83	3.17	3.11	3.25	3.14	3.17	3.17	3.40
Intelligent People	2.25	2.31	2.47	2.42	2.82	3.00	3.00	3.13	3.13	3.13
Student	1.89	2.14	2.44	2.71	3.09	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.17	3.17
Officer	3.00	3.17	3.17	3.20	3.20	3.25	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50
Soldier (private Rank)	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.75	2.67	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00
International Officer	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00
Total	2.30	2.44	2.68	2.81	2.92	2.99	3.08	3.16	3.22	3.21

Classification of Social Strata	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Core Class	2.55	2.73	3.00	3.00	3.20	3.27	3.42	3.58	3.58	3.58
Worker Class	2.20	2.35	2.58	2.76	2.87	2.92	3.00	3.10	3.08	3.00
Unstable Class	2.28	2.39	2.69	2.80	2.88	3.03	3.19	3.28	3.39	3.43
Hostile Class	2.73	2.76	2.78	2.85	3.00	2.91	3.11	3.29	3.50	3.75
Total	2.32	2.46	2.69	2.82	2.93	3.00	3.12	3.24	3.28	3.28

The knowledge of changes in China scored 3.23 as seen in <Table II-36>. North Korean people seem to know a good deal about China's development. In fact, 90% of daily necessities used by North Koreans are made in China, so China's development is no longer a secret anymore. The following is the research analysis on the degree of knowledge about change in China according to social and economic background variables.

First, males scored 3.50 and females scored 3.05 on the analysis by sex. According to these results, males come into contact with Chinese related news more often. This is proof that males get access to more China news while at their workplace or doing business, and also males understand the achievement of China's reforms and opening while engaging in normal (and informal or illegal) transactions with China.

Second, Pyongahndo unexpectedly scored the highest with 3.56 in the research by region. Shineuju is in Pyongahndo, so it seems to acquire somewhat more information about China.

Third, overseas workers are ranked the highest with 4.00 in the research by occupation. This is because they experience closer proximity to China because the reality of trade is that China is the main counterpart for business.

Fourth, the hostile class is ranked at 3.75 in the research by class.

This comes as somewhat of a surprise. The hostile class seems to be involved greatly in business with China personally as a means of solving their economic problems.

(3) Knowledge of International News

Table II-37. Knowledge on Capitalist Countries

Gender	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Male	2.08	2.16	2.30	2.46	2.62	2.74	2.88	2.97	2.97	2.90
Female	1.72	1.81	1.96	2.28	2.58	2.64	2.72	2.79	2.90	2.93
Total	1.79	1.88	2.04	2.33	2.59	2.67	2.77	2.85	2.93	2.92
Place of Residence	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Pyongyang	1.67	1.67	2.00	2.00	2.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00
Haamkyungdo	1.76	1.85	2.05	2.33	2.60	2.64	2.74	2.83	2.90	2.90
Pyongahndo	1.86	1.81	1.94	2.07	2.43	2.69	3.00	2.90	2.90	2.78
Hwanghaedo	2.86	3.00	3.25	3.75	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50	4.00
Yangjakangdo	2.22	2.22	2.33	2.43	2.33	2.60	2.60	3.33	3.33	3.33
Kangwondo	1.43	1.43	1.33	2.00	2.50	3.00		2.00		
Total	1.80	1.88	2.05	2.34	2.58	2.66	2.78	2.86	2.93	2.92
Job	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Worker	1.74	1.80	2.02	2.28	2.50	2.54	2.67	2.79	2.82	2.73
Farmer	1.78	1.87	2.00	2.33	2.20	2.38	2.43	2.67	2.83	3.00
Intelligent People	1.94	2.00	2.00	2.25	2.55	2.64	2.80	2.75	3.00	3.00
Student	1.87	2.00	2.14	2.59	3.00	3.20	3.22	3.43	3.43	3.43
Officer	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.40	2.40	2.75	2.75	2.75	2.75	2.75
Soldier (private Rank)	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.75	3.00	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50
International Officer	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	3.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00
Total	1.81	1.89	2.06	2.34	2.55	2.64	2.75	2.86	2.92	2.89

Classification of Social Strata	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Core Class	1.94	2.03	2.07	2.47	2.93	3.00	3.27	3.45	3.64	3.64
Worker Class	1.70	1.76	1.96	2.32	2.40	2.48	2.53	2.67	2.68	2.61
Unstable Class	1.87	1.96	2.19	2.34	2.88	2.79	2.87	2.88	2.92	2.88
Hostile Class	2.07	2.10	2.22	2.38	2.57	2.80	3.25	3.17	3.17	3.00
Total	1.82	1.88	2.06	2.35	2.62	2.67	2.79	2.88	2.92	2.89

The level of knowledge of international news on the part of North Korean people is lower with 2.91 than that of South Korean news as seen in <Table II-37>. North Korean people know a great deal about China, but they do not know as much about the U.S. or Japan. This is the result of the government information interception and censorship policies. The following is the research analysis on the degree of knowledge of major capitalist countries according to social economic background variables.

First, males scored 2.90 and female scored 2.93. Females know more than males. This means potentially that males are under stricter regulation. Actually, the gap between males and females is slight, so there is little point in arguing about this. However, what is needed is more detailed research and analysis as to how much social regulation by Inminban (Resident's Association) has an influence on the level and means by which females access external news.

Second, Hwanghaedo scored the highest with 4.00. Yangkangdo and Jakangdo followed next. Although these regions are inland areas, they were able to get access to external information. This illustrates the fact that there are no blind spots in terms of foreign information throughout the whole of North Korea. After the period

of severe economic difficulties, as unrestricted travel was allowed, information on China, South Korea, and the western world flowed into North Korea. It attracted a great deal of attention and this fact, in turn, influenced the future policy decisions of the Kim Jong Il regime.

Third, overseas workers have the most access to information about the west, being on a scale of 4.00. One fact to note is that soldiers rank rather highly with 3.50. Although they may undertake special duties in the army which separate them from ordinary life, in practice, international information flows into the army. This shows that the army's attitude to the western world might change even under Sungun politics ('military-first' politics), therefore the question of potentially how it will change arises.

Fourth the core class is placed on a scale of 3.64 according to the research by class, and this indicates that the North Korean upper class has access to more international information. The upper class has many opportunities to acquire foreign currency, so they often buy goods at the foreign currency stores. It is common knowledge to them that Japan and Europe are rich societies.

B. Securing of Security Resources

The Korean Peninsula cannot produce important basic resources like crude oil or natural gas. In particular, there is no crude oil, so South and North Korea have to import all their oil from oil producing countries. Additionally, North Korea suffers from a shortage of foreign currency, so it cannot import crude oil in bulk and it suffers constant energy shortages. Due to energy shortages, electric power problems occur, industrial facilities like factories and railroads stop operating, and even household electricity suffers from shortages.

The shortage of security resources means that potentially (and

in actuality in the case of North Korea) the inability to fulfill the material needs of populations places incredible strains upon ordinary people. China supplies 500 thousand tons of crude oil to North Korea yearly, so North Korea will be faced with energy difficulties if the relations between the two countries suddenly grow worse. For the present, there is only a very low possibility of China stopping the crude oil supply to North Korea, but if China's economic sanctions against North Korea begin in earnest, depending on the resolution of the UN Security Council on October 15. The North Korean economy will grind to a sudden halt.

Additionally, there is a shortfall to the tune of a million tons of food every year, so North Koreans are only able to receive the minimum number of calories. As a result, the average height of North Koreans is shorter and the mortality in childbirth through complications is high. The firmness of the system is weakening due to people's often illegal movements. As the reliance on foreign countries for food is increasing, the level of political and diplomatic independence is weakening.

C. International Criticism on the Human Right Issue

North Korea was labeled as being part of 'the axis of evil' by the Bush Administration in 2001. George W. Bush views Kim Jong Il as a 'tyrant' and condemns the regime for killing people by starvation. Such views of North Korea accelerated the development of policies aimed at 'regime change' or 'system transformation.'

North Korea has been condemned as a 'terrorist country,' a 'terrorist supporting country', and 'bad country' since 1987. In particular, their terrorist activities against South Korea made North Korea notorious. North Korea is being punished with economic sanctions from western countries through the Wassenaar

Arrangement due to terrorism against South Korea.

North Korea is receiving the blame for presiding over a terrible human rights 'situation.' Every kind of freedom is the subject of control and dissidents are punished relentlessly. These illegal punishments, perfunctory trials, and death by starvation illustrate the fact that the system operates in a profoundly inhumane manner.

On a national basis there are about 20,000 political prisoners who are suffering poor conditions and are forced to work in around 20 concentration camps. They are punished without the benefit of having had proper trials. Even the freedom of common people is restricted and people are forced to obey their leader absolutely. Refugees who try to escape this system of coercion are increasing every year and it has become a big political issue between North Korea and South Korea or North Korea and China. Refer 「white paper on human rights in North Korea 2006」, Korean Institute for National Unification(KINU) for the detailed analysis of North Korean human rights

The UN Security Council created the North Korean Human Rights Act and accused North Korea of sanctioning human rights abuses in 2006. The U.S. also enacted a North Korean Human Rights Act to improve North Korean human rights in 2004. The U.S. started to accept North Korean refugees and created a link between human rights problems and economic sanctions against North Korea. Such a trend is spreading to the EU which has relatively good relations with North Korea. The EU is stimulating the improvement of North Korean human rights, and they would not support North Korea if their demands were not accepted. North Korea will find it impossible to avoid being isolated from the world due to its human rights problems. This international isolation is deepening by that UN Security Council's sanction resolution to North Korea approved after North Korea's nuclear test.

III. Assessment and Prospects for the Durability of the North Korean Socialist System

1. General Assessment

Table III-1. The Crisis Level of Each Item

Indicator	Item	Scale	Average Scale
Ideology	Q 1) The binding power in everyday life	3.05	3.47
	Q 2) Proposition of Collectivism	3.74	
	Q 3) Son's Inheritance of Father's Power	3.41	
	Q 3-1) Inheritance of Kim Jong Il	3.56	
	Q 4) The Quality of Kim Jong Il Leadership	3.43	
	Q 5) Comparison of South Korean system and North Korean system	3.64	
Elite	Q 6) Hope to the Future	3.63	2.77
	Q 7) Fair Compensation on Labor	3.63	
	Q 8) Assessment on the Principle of Independence	3.50	
	Q 9) The Reality of Independence Principles	3.11	
	Q 10) Pride on the Roles and Positions of Government Officials	2.77	
	Q 11) The Corruption Degree of Government Officials	3.61	
	Q 12) Existence of Group Conflicts Among Officials	2.84	

Indicator	Item	Scale	Average Scale
Elite	Q 13) Interests Conflict Between Offices	2.67	2.77
	Q 14) Existence of Cronyism	2.82	
	Q 15) Conveyance of Superior Authorities' Instruction	1.87	
	Q 16) Irregular Application of the Lower Branches	2.93	
Economy	Q 17) The Occupancy of Unofficial Area in North Korean Economy	3.59	3.24
	Q 18) Dietary Life	2.87	
	Q 19) Necessities and Habitation	2.77	
	The rise and fall of GNI	*3.50	
	International Trade	*3.50	
Regulation	Q 20) Control on People	2.29	2.72
	Q 21) Illegal Behavior Regulation of Public Security Office	2.50	
	Q 22) Travel Frequency	2.47	
	Q 23) Expression of Dissatisfaction	2.56	
	Q 24) Existence Possibility of Critical Power	2.59	
	Q 25) Existence of criticizing act against the upper class in North Korean	2.59	
	Q 26) Existence of Capitalism Culture	3.32	
	Q 27) Existence of religious activity	1.70	
	Q 27-1) Existence of shamanistic custom	3.03	
	Q 28) Existence of cronyism such as regionalism and classmates	2.51	
International Relationship	Q 29) Knowledge on South Korean Change	3.30	3.39
	Q 30) Knowledge on China's change	3.22	
	Q 31) Knowledge on capitalist countries	2.92	
	Import Amount of Crude Oil and Crops	*3.75	
	International Criticism on the Human Right Issue	*3.80	

* Among durability indicators of North Korea ① GNP, ② international economic relation of North Korea, ③ increase of refugees, ④ guaranteeing security resources, ⑤ international criticism on human rights problem, for these things, common data were applied and analyzed not the refugees' survey, and also the durability result was granted by writer's discretion.

The crisis level of North Korea by each standard is 3.47 for ideology, 2.77 for elite, 3.24 for economy, 2.72 for statistics, and 3.39 for international relations as seen in <Table III-1>. In North Korea ideological movement is the most serious, international relations are weakened, and the economy is in poor condition, but social regulations are still working and the elite is still acting as a strong force for integration in the society. In other words, the factors which could see the collapse of the Kim Jong II regime are ideological weakening, continuing economic difficulties, and the aggravation of international relations, while the regime's survival factors are the concentrating power of the elite and the regulation of enforcement and control mechanisms.

With these factors in mind, generally we can argue that the Kim Jong II regime is not going to collapse easily as long as the elite maintains its strength and unifying influences and social regulation continues, even despite the inflow of international influences and information its ideology faces serious challenges to its credibility.

Table III-2. The Factors of Kim Jong II Regime Sustainance

	Frequency	Percentage
Strengthening ideological education	120	22.4
Strengthening 'military-first' politics (Sungun politics)	85	15.9
Leadership of the Korean Workers' Party Officials	33	6.2
Strengthening Social Regulation	139	26.0
Blockade External Information	149	27.9
Etc.	9	1.6
Total	535	100

* Multiple responses are included.

As seen in <Table III-2>, the Kim Jong II regime is sustained by the current blockade of foreign information, ideological education, and social regulation and control. Therefore if such complete ideological and physical regulation were to drastically weaken or disappear entirely, the Kim Jong II regime would quite probably collapse. North Korea seems to sustain its regime through military regulation and control, the organization of the Korean Workers' Party, Inminban, the National Security Police, and the State Security Department, all this in spite of China's economic sanctions against North Korea with the UN topping the list.

Therefore if economic sanctions are unable to 'seal' North Korea completely from international society, it seems that North Korea is unlikely to collapse within one or two years. Moreover, a more important fact is that North Korea is not going to tolerate sanctions by neighboring countries which cut it off completely from the outside world without any retaliatory action on their part. They will overcome the situation by fair means or foul. Any attempt to hermetically seal the North Korean economy is going to bring terrible disaster to the Korea peninsula.

Table III-3. Sustenance Period of Kim Jong II Regime

	Frequency	Percentage
Less than 5 years	55	22.9
5 years ~ 10 years	115	47.9
10 years ~ 15 years	38	15.8
15 years ~ 20 years	19	7.9
20 years ~ 30 years	3	1.7
More than 30 years	9	3.8
Total	239	100

Refugees see that the Kim Jong Il regime is going to last for 5-10 years in the future as seen in <Table III-3> and is the same situation as at present. This result was from the fact that there no economic sanctions were applied by China and South Korea according to the UN Security Council' resolution to punish North Korea on October 15, so if this had been the case, the duration of the regime could be have been shorter. However, a foolproof blockade against North Korea has not yet been achieved, so the Kim Jong Il regime will exist for a maximum of 10 more years. North Korea could sustain itself longer if the North is able to find a breakthrough to the North Korean nuclear problem, and if neighboring countries were to support North Korea economically.



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