



Korean Unification and the Positions and Roles of the Four Neighboring Powers

Edited by Bae, Jung-Ho





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인 쇄 2011년 12월
발 행 2011년 12월

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편 집 인 국제관계연구센터
등 록 제2-02361호 (97.4.23)
주 소 (142-728) 서울시 강북구 한천로 1307(수유동) 통일연구원
전 화 (대표) 900-4300 (직통) 901-2527 (팩시밀리) 901-2543
홈페이지 <http://www.kinu.or.kr>

기획·디자인 (주)현대아트컴 (02-2278-4482)
인 쇄 처 (주)현대아트컴

ISBN 978-89-8479-623-2 93340

가 격 ₩ 8,000

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·매장: 734-6818 ·사무실: 394-0337

Foreword

As the debate about unification has recently been enlivened in Korean society, the flame of hope for unification is being re-kindled. However, there are still many who focus solely on the enormous costs involved, while others remain passive toward the unification issue. Particularly members of the younger generation feel satisfied with ‘co-existence under an unstable peace’ as a divided peninsula.

However, as indicated in a special report by the Russian Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) which assessed that “North Korea is already in the process of collapse,” the unification issue is no longer something we can avoid.

Therefore, armed with this consciousness of the problems of our era, this project assesses the significance of the recent rekindling of interest in unification and considers a new vision of unification and its potential value, dealing intensively with the positions and roles of the four neighboring powers regarding unification as well as ideas for strategic cooperation among South Korea and its powerful neighbors.

The publication of this project owes much to the diligent efforts of KINU research associates such as Hyo Min Lee, Uichan Ko and Jisuk Park who reviewed and edited the various papers. Also, the English version of this publication benefited greatly from the accurate translations done by research associates Meredith Rose Shaw and Hyo Min Lee.

It is the editor’s hope that this research project can help both Korean and foreign experts, academics, and readers to better understand the value of Korean unification and the various positions and roles that can be played by the US, Japan, China and Russia.

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»» Chapter **1**

A Vision of Korean Unification and Its Value : Building Great Power Korea



Korea Institute for
National Unification

A Vision of Korean Unification and Its Value : Building Great Power Korea

Jung-Ho Bae

(Director, Center for International Relations Studies, KINU)

The Korean Peninsula is positioned at the intersection of the continental and Pacific powers, surrounded by the four powerful nations of the U.S., Japan, China and Russia. Because of Korea's geopolitical position, various centrifugal and centripetal forces act upon it. Furthermore, the conflict between the two Koreas is a global issue which intersects with various great power interests.

If centrifugal forces impact the peninsula much more strongly than centripetal forces, the two Koreas may be sucked toward an unhappy fate in the whirlpool of global political struggles regardless of their own desires. Thus, Koreans must work hard to ensure that the centripetal forces are stronger.

To this end, South Korea and the Korean people must pursue unification from the viewpoint of building a "Great Power Korea(GK)" in the 21st century. The achievement of "GK" can be made infinitely more probable through a process of unification led by the South.

Based on an awareness of these issues, this paper will contemplate the significance of the recent rekindling of public will toward unification, considering new visions of unification and new assessments of its value.

Igniting the Flame of Korean Unification

In the 1950s, 60s, and 70s South Korea was preoccupied with the pursuit of rapid

industrialization amid the Cold War structure, and “overcoming division to achieve unification” was considered a primary value of the nation.

However, after the IMF financial crisis, many Koreans came to see unification as something to fear and avoid, due to wrong-headed thinking about the costs involved. Rather than promoting unification, such people support a policy of stable management of division for the sake of their short-term peace of mind.

The core group behind the Sunshine Policy focused on slogans such as “our nation by itself” and “national independence,” and funneled some \$7 billion in financial and material aid into the North, while overlooking North Korea’s strategies for regime preservation, nuclear development, South Korea policy, and national cooperation. Awash in nationalist sentiment, they even provided several dozen kilograms of fiber-optic cable to the North, a move that could potentially have tremendous impact on South Korea’s national security.

However, contrary to their expectations, inter-Korean relations suffered continual setbacks from events such as missile test launching and nuclear tests. Thus the current inter-Korean relationship is lacking in trust and susceptible to uncertainty and instability when sudden events cause relations to stagnate, cool down, or grow worse.

With the inauguration of the Lee Myung Bak administration, South Korea’s policy toward the North changed to reflect the understanding that inter-Korean relations should not be a “product of ideology” but a “product of practicality” and the desire for sincere inter-Korean dialogue oriented toward unification.

As South Korean society became more actively engaged in discussion about unification, the flame of unification was rekindled.

However, a sizeable portion of the population is still solely concerned about the costs of unification, and others are mainly passive about unification issues. Particularly some in the younger generation, aware of “the huge costs of Germany’s unification,” favor “peaceful if unstable co-existence as a divided peninsula” instead of unification.

Yet various factors such as the political uncertainty of North Korea’s power transition, along with its bleak economic outlook, the rise of China, the changing strategic

environment in Northeast Asia, China's national interests and its "unilateral protection" of North Korea, have combined to make it impossible to ignore the unification issue any longer. The South Korean people should rekindle the flame of hope for national unification.

If Korean Unification is Delayed

If China continues to stick to its policy of maintaining the status quo on the Korean Peninsula, it could become a major obstructing force against unification in the future as its national power grows. In that case, unification will become more difficult with the passage of time, and the costs of unification may also increase.

If the South Korean people remain fearful of the various "labor pains" accompanying unification, and seek to avoid or remain passive toward it, they will never overcome the limitations on national growth and may face the following problems.

First, as China grows economically it is consuming vast resources, and thus it has been focusing investment on developing North Korea's mineral resources. If unification is delayed and the Kim Jong Eun regime continues to operate the military-first political system avoiding reform and opening, North Korea's mineral resources may be exhausted by China. If unification is achieved at some later date after the mineral resources, which could have been used to supply funds for unification and provide a foundation for the peninsula's development, have been exhausted, North Korea will be rendered an "empty vessel."

Second, if North Korea does not change its system and policies and allows its economic problems to continue, the North Korean people will spend more time suffering in despair under abject conditions. Excluding a few places like Pyongyang and Kaesong, out in the provinces young students are finding it hard to acquire even an elementary education. With a rising illiteracy rate the quality of North Korea's labor force will decline. Furthermore, North Korean citizens will become intellectually and emotionally impoverished. The North Korean labor force is supposed to help make up for the unification costs and

become a driving impetus for peninsular development; its decline in both quality and quantity would be a tremendous loss for the economy and the Korean people.

Third, if division continues, South Korea may suffer not only due to the development limitations caused by division but also because of the effects of its low birth rate and aging society on the labor force, making it difficult to maintain its current economic strength. Continued military conscription of the nations youth also exacerbates these labor problems.

Thus if Korean unification is delayed and Korea is unable to overcome the limitations caused by division, then instead of becoming a “Great Power Korea(GK)” in the 21st century Korea may be relegated to the status of “Sandwich Korea(SK),” smothered by great powers like the U.S., China, and Japan. Therefore, it is best to achieve unification as soon as possible. I advocate a policy of “unification as soon as possible, and gradual integration.”

Developing and Leaping to Great Power Korea Status

As has been pointed out, the Korean peninsula lies at the intersection of the continental and Pacific powers, and four great powers exist in the region - the U.S., Japan, China and Russia.

Because of Korea’s geo-political position and regional strategic environment, two forces are at work on the peninsula - centrifugal and centripetal forces. Thus there is a limit to how much they can pursue survival and prosperity while maintaining national pride in South Korea’s regional status as a middle power or strong small country.

International political relations expert and master of realist theory John J. Mearsheimer, on a visit to South Korean in October 2011, gave a media interview in which he stated that South Korea had been placed in the worst possible geopolitical position by China’s rise.¹⁾

1) *Joongang Ilbo*, October 10, 2011.

South Korea's position is difficult because economically it is sandwiched between China and Japan, and politically it is sandwiched between China and the US.

Therefore, as George Friedman emphasized in his book *The Next Decade*,²⁾ the next ten years will be an “era of revolutionary change” in which the fate of the Korean people and the peninsula may depend on their will and degree of preparation.

In other words, depending on how they prepare strategically for the changes expected in the next ten years, South Korea may develop and leap to the high status of “GK,” or it may become an “SK” sandwiched between the great powers the US, China and Japan.

Advancing to GK status is the mission of this era for the Korean people. Achieving national unification is an essential task in order to construct a GK. If the two Koreas are unified, according to an analysis by Goldman Sachs, the capital and technology of the South combined with the natural resources and work force of the North should enable Korea to leap to G7 status within 30~40 years.

The Goldman Sachs report “A United Korea? Reassessing North Korea Risks”³⁾ draws attention to North Korea's natural resources and competitive labor force, stating that if these elements could be combined with South Korea's advanced technology and capital resources it would create a powerful synergistic effect, and in 30~40 years the GDP of unified Korea could reach a level equivalent to that of G7 nations like Japan, Germany and France.

South Korea imports 97% of its mineral resources and 2,300 tons of rare-earth elements, but buried under North Korea's soil are an estimated 700 billion won in latent mineral resources.

In fact many of South Korea's key mineral imports, including iron, gold and copper, are found in massive amounts in North Korea, along with some 20 million tons of rare

2) George Friedman, *The Next Decade: Where We've Been...and Where We're Going* (New York: Knopf/Doubleday Publishing Group, 2011).

3) Goohoon Kwon, “A United Korea? Reassessing North Korea Risks,” *Goldman Sachs Global Economics Paper*, No. 188, September 21, 2009.

earth elements. In particular, North Korea has the world's largest deposits of magnesite, and is in the world's top 10 in tungsten, molybdenum, graphite, barium sulphate, gold, mica, and fluorite.

North Korea's mineral resources are an enormous boon for the Korean people. These resources could be a valuable asset in building an economic community and raising funds in the process of unification. Furthermore, it could form the economic foundation for Korea's development and its leap to GK status.

Also, after unification, the processes of system change and industrialization in North Korea will create new jobs, expanding the unified economy. Post-unification North Koreans will receive new education which will help them to restore their intellectual and emotional potential and develop job skills, while South Koreans will gain access to the new North Korean market, helping to provide employment opportunities not only for youth but also for unemployed older Koreans. The older generation's experience with industrialization in South Korea will contribute greatly to North Korea's successful system transition and industrialization.

Therefore, Koreans should pursue unification and use their historical consciousness of the turning points of division and unification, along with the spirit of the times, to leap to the status of a strong and advanced GK in the 21st century.

In sum, the value of unification in nationalist and historical terms is that it will not only free the Korean people from the pain of national division and increase their collective self-esteem, but also that it will lay the foundation for Korea's leap to a new GK era.

A Decisive Catalyst for Peace and Prosperity in Northeast Asia

Because of Korea's geopolitical position it is affected by both centrifugal and centripetal forces, and it is at the intersection of the interests of several great powers. Therefore the problem of the divided peninsula is an international issue which affects not only the two Koreas but also the great powers involved in the region.

If the centrifugal forces affect the peninsula much more strongly than the centripetal

forces, it means that Northeast Asia enters into a state of conflict and confrontation amid the maelstrom of great power politics. If the centripetal forces have a stronger effect, then the uncertainty and instability of the strategic environment will be reduced to the extent that the situation surrounding the peninsula has been stabilized.

In this context, we should recognize that South-led unification can make a very positive contribution to the stability of the Northeast Asian strategic environment. In other words, the value of Korean unification for the Northeast Asian region is that it can act as a decisive catalyst in building a community for peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia.

Resolving the North Korean Nuclear Issue and Constructing a Peace Community in Northeast Asia

While North Korea claims to have peaceful objectives for its nuclear programs, such as nuclear energy development, it has expanded these programs in pursuit of becoming a nuclear power. Therefore, all of the countries involved in the region, including the U.S., Japan, China and Russia, have sought to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue through various bilateral dialogues as well as the Six-Party Talks.

However, many security analysts in the U.S., Japan, China, and Russia believe that North Korea is unlikely to willingly surrender its nuclear weapons since it considers them a key part of its regime survival strategy, and therefore they argue that the Six-Party Talks are of limited use or mere show. These analysts are skeptical of finding a fundamental solution to the North Korean nuclear problem through dialogue and negotiations.

In this way, the North Korean nuclear issue is exacerbating instability in the Northeast Asian strategic environment, and if the North makes enough progress on miniaturization to mount a nuclear warhead on a missile, it could weaken the US deterrent capability and deal a mortal blow to the regional security environment. Then, to overcome the limits of extended nuclear deterrence the US could re-deploy tactical nuclear weapons in Japan and South Korea, increasing its emphasis on nuclear arms. This

could put China in an even more compromising security position.

Thus we can point to South-led unification as a clear solution to the fundamental problems of North Korea's nuclear programs and building a nuclear-free Korean peninsula. South-led unification will decisively resolve the North Korean nuclear problem and contribute to building a North Korean peace community by keeping the Korean peninsula peaceful and nuclear-free.

A Decisive Turning Point in Constructing the Northeast Asian Economic and Cultural Communities

The Korean peninsula is in a very favorable position to serve as both the geographic and economic hub of East Asia. Positioned on a global main trunk route connecting continental Asia with the Pacific, Seoul's central position offers an optimal contact point superior to other major regional cities such as Tokyo, Beijing, Shanghai and Vladivostok. In other words, with its latent potential as a "crossroads of East Asia" and a "strategic gateway," the Korean peninsula carries greater economic and geographic value than even Singapore or Hong Kong.

In this way, if Korea is unified it can serve as a central hub for the Northeast Asian region. The Korean peninsula can contribute greatly to East Asian development by acting as a nucleus of distribution, information networks, business and finance, a place where people, materials and culture are gathered and transferred.

Therefore, in its policies toward North Korea and unification South Korea is emphasizing international cooperation and coordination. I have advocated a "development strategy linking Korea and Northeast Asia" as a win-win strategy for expanding the "common denominators" among the mutual interests of South Korea and the neighboring powers.⁴⁾

4) Jung-Ho Bae, *Development Plans for 21st Century Korea and North Korea Policy* (in Korean) (Seoul: KINU, 2002).

If, to usher in the era of management on the peninsula, the rail lines connecting South and North Korea are re-opened, this would enable diversification of the transport network along with shipping and aviation in Northeast Asia by connecting the Trans-Siberia, Trans-China, and Trans-Mongolia Railroads, reducing transport costs and revitalizing economic, human, and cultural exchanges among Korea, Northeast Asia, and the European continent.

If South-led unification brings liberal democracy, market economy, rule of law, and respect for human rights to the North, this can spur on economic cooperation throughout the region by revitalizing such projects as Siberian development, the gas pipeline connecting Korea with Russia, and cross-border development of the Tumen River valley. This economic cooperation can further expand and enliven human and cultural exchanges.

In sum, South-led unification will enliven economic cooperation and exchange, along with exchanges of people and culture throughout the region, and thus become a decisive turning point in the construction of a Northeast Asian cultural community.

Preparing for Unification

In preparing for unification, along with preparing plans and resources for the integration and unification processes, the most important thing will be fostering a strong public will for unification and construction of GK.

The Tenacious Spirit of the Korean People

Korean unification can contribute greatly to Koreans' ethnic history through creation of the advanced "GK" nation, and to the Northeast Asian region through the creation of peace and prosperity, and thus we must no longer fear its accomplishment.

In a period of global transition, the Korean people stand at a crossroads between crisis and opportunity, and we must do our utmost to achieve "rapid unification and grad-

ual integration.” Thus, the South Korean people must respond to North Korea’s provocations, policy toward the South, and encouragement of South-South conflict by increasing our national deterrent ability; furthermore we must pursue the grand strategy of building a GK nation alongside the policy of “rapid unification and gradual integration.”

The most important key to achieving this is for the Korean people to possess a strong will and mental readiness to pursue unification and establish a GK nation. A strong will is essential in order to overcome the various hardships and obstacles accompanying the great task of unification.

The importance of possessing a strong will can be described in concrete terms as follows: First, the tasks of unification and construction of an advanced GK nation must be supported by strong public will in order to sail past the maelstrom of South-South conflict spurred by the North’s policies.

Current South Korean society is gripped by ideological conflict over how to resolve the North Korea problem, and the North attempts to use this conflict and strategically aggravate it. In advance of local government elections in June of 2010, North Korea fomented South-South conflict by promoting a psychological battle over the question, “Will it be war or peace?” in order to aid the victory of political groups favorable to them. In the 2012 presidential election North Korea may again make provocations in order to strategically manufacture a sense of crisis and thus help forces favorable to them to gain power. The emergence of a progressive left-wing government friendly to the DPRK regime would be extremely valuable in helping the North to obtain economic aid.

The South Korean people must be aware of the DPRK’s strategic intent and avoid being used by them, and for this purpose it is essential that they possess a strong will toward unification and GK.

Second, it can enable us to prepare funds for unification. Such funds are aimed not for immediate use but for burden-sharing with the next generation and historical preparation for the future. The South Korean people must have a strong will to achieve uni-

fication and build an advanced GK nation in order smoothly establish instruments such as a unification tax.

Third, it can enable us to establish greater cooperation with neighboring countries. If the Korean people lack a strong will and enthusiasm for unification and GK, then national cohesion and motivation for Korea's 21st century development may be weakened. In that case centrifugal forces will prevail over centripetal ones, and Korea may be pulled along by the competing interests of the strong neighboring powers. The strong will and enthusiasm of the Korean people for the goals of unification and GK will be extremely valuable in securing the understanding and support of the neighboring powers.

Fourth, it can contribute a strong impetus to pursue grand strategies to minimize unification costs and confusion in the immediate post-unification period and promote the GK vision. If the Korean people's will and enthusiasm for these tasks is weak, unification could be seen not as a "policy issue" but rather as a "political issue" and could be abused for the purpose of expanding South-South conflict. Without the strong support and enthusiasm of the South Korean people, it will be difficult to even muster the national power needed to deal with the 21st century security environment and pursue development of GK.

In sum, the strong will of the Korean people for unification and GK can help to eliminate various conflicts related to North Korea and unification along the way to making a unified GK a reality.

The Costs of Division vs. the Costs of Unification

The sooner unification occurs the better, but a significant number of South Koreans consider only the mind-boggling figures put on the cost of unification and appear wary or hesitant about going through with it. But there is no equivalent consideration of the enormous price Koreans pay to maintain division.

When considering the costs of unification, we must first acknowledge the costs of

division. Because most Koreans have lived all their lives in a divided state and grown accustomed to it, they are not aware of the continual expense of “shoveling sand against the tide” to maintain division.

Division costs are non-productive in nature, make no contribution to developing the national economy, and would immediately disappear after unification.

Major sources of division costs include ▲the waste of public energy on South-South (ideological) conflict; ▲“obligatory” military service for the “entire” young male population due to the North Korean threat; ▲limitations in building a modern 21st century military force due to the need to focus all military strength on North Korea; ▲the unstable peace between South and North; ▲the limits on South Korean trade with the continent due to its status as a “artificial island.”

Furthermore, some analysts fear that if division continues in the long-term, South Korea may face severe shortage of young skilled labor due to its low birth rate and aging society and thus may find it difficult to maintain its current level of economic strength.⁵⁾

This problem can be framed in terms of the costs of division and the benefits of unification, e.g. unification will enable access to North Korea’s labor force and erase the labor shortage caused by obligatory military service. Thus, when calculating the costs of unification we must also consider the various costs of division and the benefits that can be gained through unification (See figure below).

[Figure I-1] Formula for Calculating the Net Costs of Unification

$$\text{Net Unification Costs} = \text{Total Unification Costs} - \text{Costs of Division} - \text{Benefits of Unification}$$

5) Kwon, “A United Korea? Reassessing North Korea Risks,” September 21, 2009.

Unification costs may vary widely according to the timing, process, and form of unification. Also, early unification costs will include not only the costs of crisis management but also the costs of developing the North. Since over time North Korean development costs will be taken over by investment, after unification the Korean people will be able to reap many benefits just like Germany did.

In order to minimize unification costs, disorder and other negative effects as much as possible, we must promote “unification as soon as possible” and “gradual integration.”

»» Chapter **2**

German Reunification and the European Union



Korea Institute for
National Unification

German Reunification and the European Union

Don-Jay Yeom

(Dean, Graduate School of Strategic Studies, Sungkyunkwan University)

Introduction

One of the most significant issues in unification of the Korean Peninsula involves “diplomacy towards unification,” which is a question of how to get the four countries surrounding the Peninsula to support the reunification of the two Koreas, rather than opposing it. Unlike the Germans, the Korean people do not need consent from their four neighboring countries in order to achieve unification. However, the interests and influences those nations have on the Korean Peninsula make their engagement one of the most crucial factors in reunifying Korea.

Before it took place in 1990, reunification of Germany had been generally considered much more difficult than that of Korea. Under the “Germany Treaty,” Germany had to acquire consent from the U.S., France, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom,⁶⁾ the victors of World War II, in order to reunify, while France, the Soviet Union, and the U.K. were considered unlikely to approve Germany’s reunification.

6) In 1952, West Germany signed a treaty with the three Western allies, which allowed West Germany to recover its sovereignty which had previously been restricted, but granted “the rights and responsibilities” over “issues with regards to Germany and Berlin in its entirety” to the four WW II victors and thereby made their approval a prerequisite to German reunification. Furthermore, West Germany did not have sovereignty over West Berlin, which had been under the administration of the armed forces of the U.S., France, and the U.K., which made consent from the four parties even more crucial.

Nevertheless, Germany managed to gain consent from the four victors of WW II and achieved reunification. Germany has maintained amicable relations with those four parties sincere unifying, playing an important role in promoting stability and prosperity in Europe. Therefore, examining the German experience can provide important insights for Korea as to how diplomacy towards unification should be conducted.

In this paper, I will identify the external factors that made German reunification possible, with a special focus on the role of the European Union, known as an important facilitator of reunification, and draw lessons for Korea's diplomatic policies towards unification of the Korean Peninsula.

The Background to German Reunification and the Stances and Positions of the Four Victors

The Background to German Reunification

Until the Berlin Wall fell on November 9, 1989, few had predicted that the communist regime of East Germany would collapse and, one year thereafter, Germany would be reunified. Though the stance of the U.S. was different, no European nation was eager to see a unified Germany.

Even after the fall of the Berlin Wall, when the East German communist regime was on the brink of collapse, it seemed impossible that Germany would acquire consent for reunification from the Soviet Union, France, and the U.K., which held the right to veto German reunification. A powerful Germany had always posed a threat to peace in Europe, and reunification of the nation would mean the end of the privileges the four victors enjoyed over Germany.

However, France, the U.K., and the Soviet Union, former opponents of reunification, eventually came to agree to it. Thus, I will first examine the processes of change in the engaged parties' positions and the background behind those changes.

The Stance of France

France had feared the possible unification of Germany more than any other country. Though the relationship between the two nations was closer than ever in the wake of World War II, thanks to the close personal connection between Konrad Adenauer, the first Chancellor of West Germany, and Charles de Gaulle, the first President of France, France maintained its unchanging opposition to German reunification.

After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, when German Chancellor Helmut Kohl announced that “The German people have the right to self-determination,” French President Francois Mitterrand called for a European Union summit conference, where he publicly denounced Kohl. The “Ten-Point Program for Overcoming the Division of Germany,” proposed by Chancellor Kohl on November 28, 1989, met with a furious response from Mitterrand, who claimed he “will never allow that.” In addition, on December 6, 1989, at the height of the pro-democracy revolution in East Germany, President Mitterrand met with Mikhail Gorbachev, then the head of state of the Soviet Union, and together the two leaders warned against “unilateral actions of Germany.” On December 21, President Mitterrand visited East Germany and promised support for its communist regime in an attempt to prevent its collapse.

France took this stance because it feared that a unified Germany might take over France’s predominant position in Europe, draw attention away from the case for strengthening the European Community(EC), and reduce its financial contribution to the European Community due to the cost of reunification. However, when free elections on the East German side in March 1991 brought down the communist regime and the Soviet Union switched its position towards allowing German reunification, France felt it would be difficult to stop the process. Therefore, it decided to approve the reunification of Germany in exchange for a commitment from Germany to pushing for an earlier European integration.

Paris concluded that if France joined forces with Germany to further European integration, it would be able to “control through unity” the power of the reunified

Germany, while completing European integration more quickly in the face of British opposition, and gaining the upper hand in the European region after the integration.

The Stance of the United Kingdom

Though it had been an active supporter of West Germany's foreign policies in most cases, the U.K. opposed German reunification even more vigorously than France. This is because reunification was expected to undermine London's influence in Europe and facilitate European integration, whereas the U.K. was eager to delay the integration as long as possible.

Therefore the U.K. began to strongly oppose the reunification of Germany after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Margaret Thatcher, then the prime minister of the U.K., met with Gorbachev in September 1989 and asserted that much consideration should be given to the interests of neighboring countries during the course of German reunification, and expressed discontent about the reckless progression of the discussion on reunification to U.S. President George H. W. Bush on November 17. After Kohl announced the Ten-Point Program, she sent an official message through diplomatic channels to West Germany, stating "The reunification of Germany is not an outstanding issue in the current state of affairs." At the EC summit on December 8, Thatcher proposed that France join forces with the U.K. in taking steps to delay the impending reunification of Germany, though the two countries failed to reach a practical agreement.

However, the U.K. shifted towards a stance of accepting German reunification in March 1990 when the Alliance for Germany, promoting a platform of immediate reunification, won the elections in East Germany and Thatcher's policy of opposing European integration ran into opposition even in the Conservative Party. The U.K. later somewhat compensated for its loss of face by joining the U.S. and France in urging the Soviet Union to agree to the reunification.

The Stance of the Soviet Union

Among the four victors of WW II, the Soviet Union was the most aggressive opponent of German reunification, maintaining that it could not approve of it without neutralization of Germany, because Russia had seen 20 million deaths during WW II and East Germany served as the first line of defense in the East-West confrontation.

In this context, while Gorbachev publicly called for reform in East Germany, the Soviet Union's stance in October 1989 was that it could never allow the collapse of the communist regime. As the protests in East Germany intensified, making the prospect of reunification seem increasingly imminent, the Soviet Union attempted to hinder further developments by proposing a peace conference to conclusively settle WW II, a conference of the four victors to discuss the German issue, and a Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Russia also demanded that the united Germany secede from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Still, when the Alliance for Germany won the East German elections and the U.S., France, and the U.K. pressured the Soviet Union to accept the unification, Moscow ultimately gave in, though not without first extracting promises from Germany to acknowledge the Oder-Neisse line, limit the number of German troops to under 370,000, renounce weapons of mass destruction, and provide massive financial support for Moscow.

The Stance of the United States

Until 1970, the U.S. also had not welcomed German reunification, which it regarded as a potential threat to stability of Europe. However, Washington changed its stance and was the first to support German reunification when a full-scale democracy movement began to take place in Eastern Europe. In an interview with the Washington Times in May 1989, U.S. President Bush stated that he welcomed the reunification of Germany, and on October 24 he remarked that the U.S. "cannot agree to some European coun-

tries' position on the issue of German reunification," providing the impetus for Chancellor Kohl to aggressively push towards reunification in the face of internal and external opposition.

In particular, the very next day after Chancellor Kohl announced the Ten-Point Program, the U.S. pledged its active support, on the condition that the united Germany would remain a member of the EC and NATO, and made efforts to persuade France and the U.K. to approve reunification. In close cooperation with West Germany, Washington took careful steps to overcome the Soviet Union's opposition. The U.S. resolutely rejected the proposals for a ministerial-level conference of the four victors, the CSCE summit, and a peace talk to finish WW II, which were all proposed by Moscow to delay the reunification. The U.S. also drastically simplified the process of attaining consent from the four WW II victors by proposing the so-called "Two Plus Four" talks.

Furthermore, the U.S. devoted much effort in various aspects to making it easier for Gorbachev to overcome domestic opposition to approve German reunification. In order to strengthen Gorbachev's political position in Moscow, Washington played a leading role in various measures, including inviting the Soviet foreign minister to NATO headquarters on December 19, 1989, announcing the "Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance" at a NATO summit on July 5, and deciding to offer economic support to the Soviet Union at a G7 summit on July 9.

West Germany's Foreign Policies and Strategies Aimed at Reunification

Since WW II, the most important objectives of West Germany's foreign strategy were restoration of its sovereignty, rebuilding of the economy, and peaceful management of the state of national division. And while the "reunification provision" as stated in the Basic Law of West Germany had never been excluded from the nation's official foreign policy goals, in effect it was not regarded as a realistic policy objective until the Berlin Wall collapsed in November 1989. Taking into account the Cold War and con-

tinued East-West competition, West Germany assumed that publicly clamoring for reunification would make the goal even harder to achieve.

The government of West Germany did not formulate a concrete road map for reunification, nor did it proclaim its ambition to reunite the two Germanies. However, that does not mean that it had given up on the idea. In its implementation of internal and external policies, West Germany made steady efforts to pave the way for reunification, forging favorable circumstances and removing obstacles wherever they could. One example was the effort to gain recognition of both Germanys as a single economic entity when the European Economic Community (EEC) was established in 1958, which allowed West Germany to achieve monetary and economic integration with East Germany without going through the approval process of the European Community.

Though not all of West Germany's policies were aimed at reunification, its major post-war policies - including offering exhaustive apologies and reparations for Nazi's war crimes, adhering to a pro-America and pro-West diplomatic line, strengthening ties to Western Europe countries, and improving relations with the Eastern Bloc - gave significant consideration to the reunification issue. West Germany was able to achieve the "miracle of the 20th century" by quickly seizing a narrow window of opportunity that opened after the fall of the Berlin Wall with a series of well-conceived countermeasures.

The following is an explanation of West Germany's diplomatic policies toward reunification, with a focus on major policy decisions that contributed to the nation's reunification.

Exhaustive Apologies and Reparations for the Past

As in West Germany's domestic politics, historical issues - particularly apologies and reparations for the crimes of the Nazi era - were given top priority in framing the nation's foreign policy, since without such measures it would have been impossible for

West Germany to gain trust of neighboring countries and maintain functional foreign relations.

West Germany exhaustively dealt with the history issue in three ways: recognizing the crimes both at home and abroad; punishment, apology, and reparation; and actions to ensure that the tragedy would not recur. After the end of World War II, West Germany acknowledged the crimes of the Nazis in their entirety and made full apologies. The West German government offered a sincere apology for the Nazis' crimes every year on Israel's national holiday. On a visit to Warsaw, former Chancellor Willy Brandt knelt at a monument to Jewish victims of German atrocities. In West Germany, more than 90,000 former Nazis and associates were brought to trial, and guilty verdicts were delivered in about 7,000 cases. The nation also paid more than 120 billion marks in reparations to Israel and neighboring European countries.

Extra emphasis was placed on reassurance measures. With France, West Germany established a foundation designed to facilitate exchanges between the youth of the two nations and jointly published a history textbook. It also preserved and displayed all facilities and evidence related to Nazi crimes, while rigorously educating the nation's students about that shameful history. Such efforts on the Western German government's part laid a foundation upon which Germany was able to earn the trust of neighboring countries and acquire their consent for national reunification.

Adherence to a Pro-America, Pro-West Diplomatic Line

At the end of World War II, the most important challenges facing West Germany were restoring sovereignty, rebuilding the economy, and establishing democracy. Therefore the first West German Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, maintained a pro-America, pro-West line in foreign policy, rejecting the Soviet Union's offer to allow German reunification on the condition that West Germany would become neutral. That policy line remained unchanged until reunification, despite several regime changes in West Germany.

In this context, in the face of a furious opposition from nationalists who argued that pro-West policies and reunification were incompatible, West Germany joined NATO in May 1955 and followed NATO's so-called "Double-Track Decision,"⁷⁾ agreeing to the deployment of Pershing- II missiles and cruise missiles to Germany on November 21, 1983, and winning the firm trust of the U.S. and its Western allies.

Strengthening Ties to Western Europe and Facilitating European Integration

West Germany attached as much importance to European integration as it did to its own reunification with East Germany.⁸⁾ In fact, more emphasis was placed on European integration than on German reunification, since West Germany believed German reunification was impossible outside of the framework of an integrated Europe. In particular, Adenauer understood well that supporting European integration would benefit Germany in various ways, for example, by restoring his country's sovereignty, alleviating the surrounding countries' fear of a stronger Germany, securing an equal footing in international negotiations, rebuilding the economy, and enhancing Germany's status in foreign affairs.

Therefore, West Germany enthusiastically agreed to the 1950 proposal by French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman to establish the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and later played a leading role in developing the ECSC into the EEC and eventually into the EU. During this process, while contributing about 30% of the EU budget, West Germany conceded the leading position in European integration to France, declaring support for "a Europeanized Germany rather than a Germanized

7) This refers to the decision made by NATO on December 12, 1979, in response to the Soviet Union's deployment of mid-range missiles in Europe, that the West would continue negotiations with Moscow but would also deploy Pershing- II missiles to Europe in case the negotiations fell apart.

8) The Basic Law, adopted at the establishment of West Germany, states "... Inspired by the determination to promote world peace as an equal partner in a united Europe ... the Germans ... have achieved the unity and freedom of Germany in free self-determination," in its preamble.

Europe.” Such measures contributed significantly to earning the support of European countries, including France, for German reunification.

In addition, the West German government promised an immediate conclusion of the Maastricht Treaty and monetary integration, thereby winning France’s consent for reunification. Unified Germany actively contributed to European integration, improving its status on the international stage with the consent and blessing of the neighboring countries.

Improving Relations with the Eastern Bloc

Since its establishment as a nation, West Germany had adhered to a thoroughly pro-West foreign policy line until January 1967, when it established diplomatic ties with Romania, abandoning the Hallstein Doctrine and paving the way for improvement in the nation’s relations with East Germany and the other Eastern Bloc countries. Through the New Ostpolitik, or Eastern Policy, after West German Chancellor Brandt took office in October 1969, he signed non-aggression and cooperation treaties, called “Eastern Treaties,” with the Soviet Union, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, significantly improving relations with East Germany as well as the Soviet Union and the communist nations of Eastern Europe.

In addition, West Germany positively responded to the Soviet proposal for a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and signed the final protocol in July 1975, laying the framework for better Germany-Soviet Union relations. After Gorbachev came into power in 1985, West Germany actively supported his reforms in the Soviet Union and offered financial support, which greatly helped to improve relations between the two nations.

However, it should be noted that West Germany’s Eastern policies were grounded in the nation’s firm, close connection to the U.S. and the Western allies. The strong trust of the West enabled West Germany to reach out to the Soviet Union, and support from its strong Western allies allowed the country to negotiate on an equal footing with the

Soviet Union.

The Kohl Administration's Astute Diplomacy towards Reunification

West Germany's policies early in the post-war era - making a thorough reparation for the past, taking a pro-America, pro-West policy line, strengthening ties to Europe, and improving relations with the Eastern Bloc - laid the foundation for reunification, but it was the astute diplomatic maneuvering by the Kohl administration of West Germany after the fall of the Berlin Wall that directly led to German reunification. At home, the administration made efforts to calm the agitated German public in order to prevent the Wall's collapse from being connected to a rise in German nationalism. Abroad, Kohl reassured the Soviet Union that the German government would not try to provoke nationalistic sentiment in either West or East Germany, while working through Washington to extract Moscow's promise to refrain from any military intervention. This careful approach by West Germany helped to clear the anxiety of the neighboring countries and also enabled a peaceful progression towards reunification.

Second, with its "Ten-Points Program," the Kohl government showed its commitment to use the fall of the Wall as an opportunity to achieve reunification, while reassuring the neighboring countries that reunification would not take place outside of the framework of European integration.

Third, the West German government successfully obtained full support for reunification from the U.S. by readily accepting its demand that the unified Germany remain a member of NATO, despite opposition and threats from the Soviet Union. Furthermore, Kohl consulted with Washington beforehand on West Germany's every move in the course of reunification process, which enabled effective cooperation between the two countries in persuading Moscow. Kohl gained France's support by promising to promote swift European integration.

Fourth, the Kohl administration accepted the Soviet Union's demands boldly and promptly, helping Moscow to make a quick decision. West Germany agreed to ac-

knowledge the Oder-Neisse line, which meant renouncing 27% of what was German territory prior to division, to place a limit of 370,000 on the total number of troops of unified Germany, to renounce weapons of mass destruction, to cover the cost of withdrawing Russian troops out of East Germany, and to offer massive economic support to the Soviet Union, even though such decisions entailed substantial political risks.

German Reunification and the Development of the EU

German Reunification and European Integration

European countries feared and opposed German reunification more than any others. Yet today Europe is the biggest beneficiary of German reunification, since the process facilitated European integration and unified Germany has played a leading role in advancing unity and prosperity in Europe.

When France proposed the establishment of the ECSC, which later developed into EU, its main intention was to keep the military expansion of Germany in check. The EC, which integrated Europe on an economic level, developed into the EU, a political union, because it was necessary to keep unified Germany in check within the framework of European Union.

In this regard, although France played the leading role in integrating Europe, Germany was the more important background factor in the establishment of the European Union.

Stances of Major European Nations with Regard to the Expansion and Advancement of the EU

«France»

France was the most interested of all European nations in the expansion and advancement of the EU, in which it saw many potential benefits. In addition to preventing

unified Germany from pursuing regional hegemony, Paris could strengthen its influence in Europe by assuming a leading role in the EU. In cooperation with Germany, France could stabilize Europe and offset the influence of the U.K. through the EU.

«The United Kingdom»

Until the EU was formed, the main intention of the U.K. had been to delay European integration as much as possible while also taking part in the process, since European integration would increase the influence of France and Germany, while avoiding participation would only isolate the U.K.

On the other hand, London has actively supported expansion of the EU to include Eastern Europe, as it assumes that an increase in the number of member countries would reduce France's influence and delay expansion of the functions and roles pertaining to the EU.

«Germany»

Germany's stance was to actively take part in endeavors to develop the EU in coordination with France, since doing so would alleviate the neighboring country's fear of unified Germany pursuing hegemony, while the advancement of European integration would increase Germany's influence.

In essence, Germany had been traditionally regarded as a destabilizing rather than stabilizing factor in Europe, and unified Germany was too large a nation to be considered on the same level with other European countries. Therefore, Germany's neighbors were concerned that the country might return to its former expansionist policies, claim broader autonomy and greater influence following the restoration of its full sovereignty, wield increased economic competitiveness due to its expanded territory and population, or seek more sway in international politics after the end of the Cold War by taking advantage of its economic potential.

Keen to allay these concerns, Germany for the most part accepted proposals aimed at decreasing the share of influence a single country might exert on the decision-mak-

ing process of the EU, including proposals to establish majority rule in ministerial meetings and strengthen the authority of the Council of the European Union. In addition, Germany after unification did not call for increased German representation in the Cabinet and legislature and judiciary institutions of the EU, since it gave top priority to reassuring fellow member countries about unification.

However, like the U.K., Germany actively favored accepting more countries from the Eastern European region into the EU, reasoning that political and/or economic instability in Eastern Europe could result in a drastic increase of refugee influx into the country. In this context, Germany offered financial aid to support pro-democratic, pro-market economy reforms among the countries in the region, while backing their attempts to join the EU. Germany also took into account that it was in the best position to benefit from economic and political reforms in Eastern Europe.

Development of the European Union after German reunification

After German reunification, European integration was further expanded and advanced. The number of EU member countries grew from 15 at the time of reunification to 27, forming the single largest integrated market with a total population of 500 million. From a regional perspective, the EU expanded eastward to include Eastern Europe and became a massive institution covering the entire continent of Europe.

The areas and extent of integration also expanded. Under the Maastricht Treaty, signed February 7, 1992, the European Union was officially established on November 1, 1993. Monetary integration followed, making the euro the common currency of the EU member states.

In addition, the EU has adhered to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) since it was adopted in 1993. Under the Treaty of Lisbon, which took effect in December 2009, the EU introduced the post of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, implementing more active peace and security policies. In addition, combat forces were formed under the direct command of the EU

in 2007. Today the EU is evolving from a simple economic organization to a framework for cooperation in politics and security affairs.

The Background to the Success of European Integration

From the beginning, the ECSC, from which the EU evolved, was primarily aimed at holding Germany in check. The formation of EU itself was spurred by German reunification. However, there were a number of other factors that made integration possible.

First, the European countries shared a common value system based on Christianity, as well as democratic political systems and market-based economies, which served as the fundamental basis for integration. Second, integration was urgently needed in the region. The European countries felt that it was necessary to collectively respond to the newly formed trade blocs such as NAFTA and ASEAN, and the end of the Cold War made it easier to settle conflicts between countries in the region. Third, Europe's circumstances were favorable to integration; there were relatively few sources of conflict, such as territorial disputes, between countries, and the arms race and nationalism were waning. Fourth, Europe's long history of intra-regional interaction, including its experiences of conflict and cooperation, fostered a desire for integration in the region. Fifth, the region had a number of trusted leaders, such as Winston Churchill, Charles de Gaulle, Adenauer, Mitterrand, and Kohl, who did not shrink from serious efforts towards integration and thereby made the process easier.

The Advancement of the EU and the Role of Unified Germany

«Facilitating European Integration»

German reunification was the major driving force behind European integration. Once it realized that the reunification of Germany was inevitable, France accelerated the process of European integration in order to keep Germany in check within the

framework of an integrated Europe. On the other hand, Germany also promised to immediately join the cause, with the intention of acquiring consent for reunification from the four victors of WW II, helping to spur integration.

Unified Germany has also been the biggest contributor to the advancement of the EU. Taking into account the neighboring countries' concerns about Germany gaining power, it has yielded the leading role in integrating Europe to France, assuming the role of a dedicated supporter of European integration. The establishment of the euro area would have been impossible without Germany's decision to renounce its own currency, the Deutsch Mark. Germany has made a significant financial contribution to the European Union as well, covering 21.11% of its total budget. In addition, Germany is the largest contributor to the European Financial Stability Facility, accounting for 27.13% of its funds, followed by France(20.38%) and Italy(17.91%). Therefore, Germany's tremendous economic power has served as an impetus for the advancement of the EU.

«Contributing to Peace and Prosperity in Europe»

German reunification and the subsequent process of European integration have proven that France and Germany, long-time antagonistic rivals, can resolve their conflicts of interest, recover mutual trust, and form a partnership. The active support of Germany bolstered the EU's support for vulnerable European economies, such as Greece, as well as the countries of Eastern Europe, and thereby reduced the factors threatening European security, such as refugee influxes and regional conflicts or civil wars, contributing to peace and prosperity in Europe.

In particular, Germany played a leading role in the accession of Eastern European countries into the union as well as financial support projects for those countries. The expansion of the EU to the eastern part of the continent enabled all member states of the union to pursue the Common Foreign and Security Policy within the EU framework. In terms of economy, it also substantially contributed to collective prosperity in Europe by opening Eastern European markets for Western European countries,

enabling Western European capital investment and technical assistance to flow to Eastern Europe, and broadening the overall consumer market.

«Hastening the End of the Cold War»

German reunification significantly contributed to ending the Cold War by facilitating the democratization of Eastern Europe and reform in the Soviet Union. With the end of the Cold War, the Eastern Bloc countries emerged as new democratic states, which also went a long way towards promoting democracy, peace, and international cooperation across the world. Unified Germany's political and financial support in particular vastly encouraged Russia's reform.

«Facilitating the Integration of Eastern and Western Europe»

German reunification and the democratization of Eastern Europe served as precursors to the geopolitical and economic integration of Europe. In addition, the accession of formerly Eastern Bloc countries into the EU promoted peace and security in the entire region.

The EU, with Germany as its largest budgetary contributor, also established a number of initiatives in Eastern European countries such as the PHARE program (Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their Economies), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (ERBD), and the European Investment Bank, thereby facilitating East-West integration in practical terms.

«Promoting Global Peace and Prosperity»

German reunification and European integration sent a signal to the world that humankind can actually overcome its long history of conflict and distrust to achieve peace and collective prosperity. The Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU also vastly contributes to spreading democracy and furthering universal values for the entire human race. For example, European support for the democratic revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya would have been impossible without the shared policy framework.

In the future, Germany will continue to contribute in many aspects to the advancement of the EU and the promotion of world peace. It will also act as a mediator between the two sides of the Atlantic and a catalyst for further integration between Eastern and Western Europe. As Germany has become the third largest economy in the world and has enjoyed an elevated status in the international community since reunification, it is expected to play an active role in addressing transnational problems.

Lessons and Implications of German Reunification

The Background to Gaining Consent for Reunification from the Four WWII Victors

As stated above, the strategies and policies of the West German government played an important role in gaining consent for reunification from the four victors of World War II. However, there were a number of other factors that had substantial influence on the decision. The following is a comprehensive examination of those factors.

«The Irrepressible Enthusiasm of the East German Public for Reunification»

Reunification of Germany was made possible by the earnest desire of the East Germans for it after they brought down their communist regime through the popular protest movement. This enthusiasm for unification, rooted in the people's yearning for freedom and their admiration of the affluent West German society, expanded uncontrollably after the Berlin Wall collapsed. The Rome Treaty, which took effect in 1958 and led to the establishment of the EEC, recognized East and West Germany as a single economy, so consent from the EU was not needed to proceed with the economic and monetary integration of the two Germanys. Therefore it was difficult for any country to stop or delay German reunification.

The Soviet Union needed to provide massive financial aid to East Germany and quell protests by force in order to prevent reunification. But Moscow was unable to

take either option due to its ailing economy and concern about damaging its thawing relations with Washington. France and the U.K. had hoped that the East Germans and the Soviet Union would oppose to reunification, only to be disappointed. Since the CSCE agreement had guaranteed the people's right of self-determination, there was no justification for opposing the cause once the Eastern Germans freely voted for reunification. Therefore, France and the U.K. had to take the second best policy option, which was to allow reunification while promoting European integration.

«Consideration of Future Relations with the German People»

Once the leaders of France, the U.K., and the Soviet Union realized it was impossible to suppress the East Germans' enthusiasm for reunification, they gave some thought to their future relations with the German people. If German reunification was inevitable and unified Germany was likely to emerge as the most powerful country in Europe, the last thing they wanted to do was antagonize the German people.

Therefore, the three countries gave their consent to reunification while taking steps to prevent any potential negative consequences and seeking other forms of compensation. France decided to facilitate European integration, while the Soviet Union opted to seek economic support from West Germany. However, Margaret Thatcher of the U.K. opposed German reunification and European integration without careful consideration, and consequently suffered substantial political damage which ultimately compelled her to retire from the political scene.

«Erasing Concerns about Germany's Hegemonic Intentions and Establishing Trust»

The reason these European countries opposed German reunification was due to their concern that a united Germany might pursue hegemony over Europe. However, West Germany was able to alleviate such concerns and gain trust by making thorough reparations for Nazi crimes and expressing its commitment and contributing to European integration and various EU initiatives.

West Germany's actions during the period of German division also rendered it trust-

worthy in the eyes of the U.S. and its Western allies. The West German government implemented its Eastern policies under close consultation with its Western allies and followed NATO's Double-Track Decision by agreeing to deploy Pershing-II missiles and cruise missiles in Germany despite the risk of nuclear war.

In addition, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, West Germany promptly announced policies which earned it even more trust from its peers. West Germany convinced France of its commitment to promote European integration without delay, reassured the U.S. that unified Germany would remain a member state of NATO and the EC, and promised the Soviet Union that it would acknowledge the Oder-Neisse line, limit the number of unified German troops to 370,000 or fewer, renounce weapons of mass destruction, and provide massive financial support, thereby removing doubts and strengthening partnerships with those countries.

«Favorable Responses from the American and French Public»

During the period of division, the West German government made continuous efforts to improve the public perception of Germany in major countries. First of all, West Germany offered sincere apologies and thorough reparations for Nazi crimes to the Jewish people, who had a strong influence on world opinion, and managed to change their view of Germany. As for the U.S., West Germany entirely respected and followed Washington's opinions, while taking well-planned public relations initiatives to overcome the Nazi image ingrained in the American public's memory. With France, West Germany established a youth exchange program and jointly published a history textbook, as well as yielding the leading role in the EU to France, thereby building trust.

As a result, a survey in 1990 showed that 88% of the American public was in favor of the Bush administration's support for German reunification. In France, a poll conducted in November 1989 found that 68% of the respondents approved of reunification. By contrast, only 45% of the British public said yes. This implies that public opinion influenced government policy towards Germany in each engaged country.

«Commitment to Hastening European Integration»

Since the end of World War II, the Western allies had attempted to keep Germany in check through a “control through integration” policy. Therefore, West Germany was able to earn those countries’ trust by actively participating in and contributing to the ECSC and the EC. After the Berlin Wall collapsed, West Germany alleviated its neighbors’ concerns about possible German hegemony by promising to help France to further advance European integration.

Differences between the Situations of Germany and Korea Concerning Reunification

«Obtaining Consent for Reunification from Neighboring Countries»

As mentioned in the introduction, Germany had to acquire consent from the four WW II victors in order to proceed towards reunification. By contrast, there is no such external restriction in the case of Korea. Once an agreement is reached between South and North Korea, the two Koreas can push towards reunification regardless of the opinions of their neighboring nations.

«The Relatively Limited Power and Influence of Korea»

Compared to West Germany, Korea’s national power and influence over international affairs are limited. West Germany’s strong economy and political and military potential made its neighbors more uneasy about German reunification, but those factors turned into advantages after the fall of the Berlin Wall.

The four countries surrounding the Korean Peninsula are all among the world’s most powerful nations. A unified Korea would still lag far behind its neighbors in terms of land mass, population, economy, and political and military influence. That is both an advantage and a disadvantage for Korea in pursuing reunification; it means that unified Korea would pose no threat to the surrounding powers, but at the same time the country has very limited influence on relations among its powerful neighbors. Korea’s decision

as to which side it supports would have little impact on regional power relations, making it difficult for Korea to play the role of a “regional balancer.” Therefore, Korea would face far more daunting challenges in dealing with foreign affairs issues than Germany did on its way to reunification.

«The Difference between U.S.-Soviet Union Relations and U.S.-China Relations»

The relationship between the U.S. and the Soviet Union at the time was a key contributing factor to German reunification. However, U.S.-China relations are likely to be an obstacle to reunification of the Korean Peninsula. In the case of Germany, relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union were thawing at that time, providing an impetus for German reunification. On the other hand, at a time when the hegemonic competition between the U.S. and China - the superpowers backing South and North Korea respectively - is intensified, U.S.-China relations are expected to act as a barrier to Korean unification.

«The Difference between Soviet-East German relations and Sino-North Korean relations»

Changes in China will not necessarily result in changes in the North Korean regime, as North Korea is less dependent on China than East Germany was on the Soviet Union. In the past, when the Soviet Union relinquished its role as the sponsor of East Germany, that immediately resulted in the collapse of the East German communist regime. However, the North Korean regime is unlikely to collapse or change its attitude, due to the fact that China has rather limited influence on North Korea and is actively backing its regime.

«Factors Detrimental to Regional Integration and Cooperation in Northeast Asia»

With regards to regional integration, conditions in Northeast Asia differ substantially from those of Europe. First, unlike European nations, countries in the region do not see integration as an urgent necessity. Second, although Northeast Asian coun-

tries share a common Confucian culture and value system, this falls short of becoming a catalyst for integration. Third, the region has both liberal democratic states and communist ones, making it difficult to integrate them all into a single system as Europe did. Fourth, there is no trusted leader who is willing to actively promote regional integration. Fifth, as the world's most powerful states, the U.S., China, Japan, and Russia have many different interests on a global scale which make it difficult for them to focus on regional issues.

Furthermore, the Northeast Asian region has numerous issues that discourage mutual cooperation between countries. First, the region involves the various interests of the U.S., China, Japan, and Russia - all powerful players with global influence - which means regional issues are closely connected to global issues and conflicts of interest are difficult to resolve. Second, rising China has emerged as a new destabilizing factor in the region. Still feeling the humiliation it suffered after the Opium War, China seeks to rise as a superpower, building up its armaments and undermining regional stability in the process. In addition, Chinese leaders have provoked concern among China's neighbors by excessively focusing on Sino-centrism while disregarding the universal values of humanity. Third, there are numerous unresolved issues between China, Japan, and South Korea, including disputes over territory and history, reparations for past war crimes including the comfort women issue, the abduction of foreigners by North Korea, etc. However, it will be difficult to achieve a reasonable settlement of such issues, because the three key parties involved lack experience finding solutions through negotiation and public sentiment in each country is intense. Fourth, despite increasing intraregional economic cooperation, the countries of the region have been locked in a fierce "trade war," adding to the potential for regional conflict.

Therefore, a regional integrative organization like the EU would be difficult to achieve in Northeast Asia, and it is hard to expect that such an integration movement would serve as a catalyst for unification of the Korean Peninsula.

The Four Neighboring Countries' Influences on Korean Unification

While Germany had to acquire consent for reunification from the four victors of WW II, no such consent is needed for Korean unification. From that point of view, the potential foreign influences on Korean unification seem rather limited compared to those that acted on German reunification. However, given that Korea's national power and diplomatic capacity to influence international relations are relatively limited, and the conditions surrounding Germany had become more favorable around the time of its reunification, it makes sense to assume that the four neighboring countries would have no less significant influence on unification of the Korean Peninsula than the four victors of WW II had on German reunification. The following is an examination of the neighboring nations' potential influences on the situation on the Korean Peninsula and its unification.

«Positive Influences»

First, the South Korea-U.S. alliance and the China-North Korea alliance are key factors in preventing North Korea's provocations and maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. The South Korea-U.S. alliance serves as a safeguard that keeps the North from invading the South in pursuit of unification under communism. Though not perfect, the China-North Korea alliance also plays an actual role in preventing North Korean provocations and making the North less aggressive.

Second, the South Korea-U.S. Alliance and the China-North Korea Alliance contribute to preventing extreme confrontations and impulsive reactions between the two Koreas. With the inter-Korean border is heavily militarized on both sides, an accidental clash combined with reckless reactions from either side might escalate into a massive armed conflict. The two alliances help reduce the likelihood of an unintended military clash on the Peninsula by giving a sense of stability to both the South and the North.

Third, Chinese aid to North Korea contributes by reducing the likelihood of an unexpected political disruption in North Korea resulting from economic hardship and im-

proving the quality of life of the North Korean people.

Fourth, China also contributes by easing the aggressiveness of the North Korean regime and persuading it to take more flexible policies both at home and abroad.

Fifth, reforms in China and improvement of South Korea-China relations have increased the influx of information from the outside world to North Korea, while also helping both the South and the North to comprehend the state of affairs on the other side of the border.

«Negative Influences»

First, the China-North Korea alliance and China's political and economic support for North Korea delay the collapse of the illegitimate North Korean regime and make unification difficult.

Second, China's neglect of universal values, such as human rights, provides the North Korean regime with justification for oppressing its people and delays changes in the North. China could vastly improve the human rights situation in North Korea simply by paying attention to it.

Third, the rivalries among the four countries surrounding Korea have had a detrimental effect on peninsular stability and the conditions for unification. The China's protest of the South Korea-U.S. joint military exercises, which were held in the West Sea in the wake of the sinking of the South Korean naval vessel Cheonan, might have given North Korea the "wrong signal."

Fourth, when the hegemonic competition between the U.S. and China intensifies, unification of the Korean Peninsula becomes more difficult.

Fifth, Chinese policies on North Korean defectors prevent the North Korean people from fleeing the regime on a massive scale and further damage human rights conditions in North Korea.

Lessons from German Reunification and European Integration for Unification of the Korean Peninsula

First, unification of Korea is only achievable when the North Korean people can determine their government and leadership by their own free will. The single most important factor in German reunification was the East German people's demand for unification. Germany's neighbors could not take actions against the people's will, either. The same will happen in the case of unification of Korea.

Second, in order to facilitate unification, top priority should be given to increasing the national power of South Korea. It was the strong economy of West Germany and the immense potential of unified Germany that enabled the country to achieve reunification in spite of opposition from France, Britain, and the Soviet Union. Particularly noteworthy is the fact that those three victors of WW II could not maintain their opposition to German unification in the end because they realized it would be unwise to alienate the German people. Also, it is not so essential to reassure Korea's neighbors that unified Korea will not pose a threat to them as it grows more powerful, since none of those neighbors actually feel threatened, because the national power of unified Korea would still be relatively limited compared to that of its powerful neighboring countries.

Third, Korea needs an unwavering support to achieve unification. The active support of the U.S. was the key factor in making German reunification possible. West Germany was able to win the support of the U.S. because it had earned Washington's trust by maintaining pro-American, pro-West policies since its establishment.

Fourth, Korea should make steady efforts to improve external conditions for unification early on. West Germany's success in unification diplomacy also owed much to such efforts: the country had offered thorough reparations for Germany's past crimes, maintained friendly relations with France, and improved its relations with the Eastern Bloc.

Fifth, rather than acting as the "facilitator of reunification," the "Two Plus Four"

talks served as no more than a “formal ratifier” of the process. Most of the major issues discussed at those meetings were eventually settled via interactions between the two Germanies. Therefore, Korea would be well advised to realize that major issues are not likely to be resolved through a multilateral framework and to approach forums like the Six-Party Talks in a flexible manner.

Sixth, regional integration initiatives in Northeast Asia will not be very helpful in achieving unification of the Korean Peninsula. It is true that France approved German reunification because it could keep Germany in check through the EU. With that exception, however, European integration did not contribute in a meaningful way to German unification. Moreover, initiatives for regional integration in Northeast Asia are less likely to succeed and even less likely to actually facilitate the unification of Korea. However, Korea could convince foreign parties of the benefits of its unification by using the example of unified Germany’s contribution to the integration and collective prosperity of Europe.

Recommended Strategies and Policies for Diplomacy towards Unification

«Promoting Friendship and Partnerships with Neighboring Countries»

Unlike Germany, Korea can achieve reunification without first gaining the consent of its neighbors, once an agreement is reached between the South and the North. However, foreign interventions or interruptions should be avoided in order to ensure that the process proceeds smoothly, and this would be much easier with support from neighboring countries. Korea also needs its neighbors’ cooperation in managing the costs of reunification and attracting foreign investment to rebuild the economy of unified Korea. That is why South Korea should make efforts to enhance relations with its regional partners in advance.

To that end, Korea should take advantage of the existing forums, such as regular summit conferences, international agencies in various areas, and the Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat established in September 2011, while also making active ef-

forts to establish bilateral free trade agreements with the neighboring countries. To address the intense nationalist sentiment among the public in China, Japan, and Korea, it would be recommendable to plan youth and student exchange initiatives as well.

«Diplomacy towards Unification Based on the Korea-U.S. Alliance»

The most serious potential challenge in Korea's relations with its surrounding countries is the collision between its alliance with the U.S. and its partnership with China. While it is important to respond in a flexible way on a case-by-case basis, Korea's main approach should be grounded in the Korea-U.S. relationship, judging from Germany's experience.

Korea-U.S. relations have fewer potential issues that could give rise to conflict of interests. Moreover, if Korea loses the trust of its key ally, it will hardly be trusted by any other country.

«Raising Awareness about the Potential Benefits of Korean Unification to Different Parties»

Unification of the Korean Peninsula can deliver substantial benefits to international society and the Northeast Asian region, particularly the countries surrounding Korea. Korean unification will go a long way toward promoting world peace, as it means eliminating the risk of another Korean war and abolishing the worst dictatorship in the world. The Northeast Asian region will also be freed of its most serious source of conflict. By unifying the Korean Peninsula, intra-regional transportation can be immensely improved, giving rise to a new single market boasting a population of 700 million and a total GDP of 6 trillion dollars in the area within a 1,200 kilometer radius of Korea. The region will emerge as the central hub of the Asia-Pacific area. Various international economic cooperation initiatives could be established as well. For example, Gangwon Province and northwest Japan could join forces to form an East Sea economic cooperation agency. North Korea and northeastern China could be integrated into a new economic network. There would also be promising possibilities for connecting

Korea and Russia's Primorsky Krai region.

China will be the biggest beneficiary among the four major surrounding countries. The greatest risk factor in Northeastern Asia will be eliminated with unification of Korea. In the long term, the U.S. influence in the region will decrease. In addition, China will no longer bear the stigma of sponsoring the worst autocracy in the world and will enjoy elevated status as a responsible member of international society. As to the economy, China could also benefit from a boom in the northeast due to exchanges with North Korea, as well as gaining access to a new market of 27 million people with high purchasing power.

As the leader of international society, the U.S. will also benefit much from the unification of Korea and the consequent elimination of a key destabilizing force in Northeastern Asia, elimination of the threat of WMD proliferation in the region, and propagation of democracy. The U.S. will be exalted by the entire world as a "supporter of reunification of the Korean people" and "promoter of world peace." The U.S. could also enjoy increased exports and enhanced investment opportunities due to the economic development of North Korea.

Japan will no longer be criticized as the original culprit behind the division of Korea. It will also find new opportunities to export and invest thanks to the economic development of North Korea and the establishment of a new logistics network connecting Japan to the continent. Its initiative for an East Asia Economic Community will be given a fresh impetus. Moreover, Japan will be able to conclusively determine the fate of those citizens who were abducted by North Korea.

Russia is likely to be a major beneficiary, as it has nothing to lose but much to gain from Korean unification. Russia will be able to strengthen its partnership with Korea to develop its Primorsky Krai and Siberia regions. As traffic increases, its Trans-Siberian Railway will become more profitable. In addition, improved transportation and economic development in North Korea will open up new markets for Russian goods and commodities. Strengthened Korea-Russia relations will also elevate Russia's status in the Northeast Asian region.

《Preparations against Potential Long-term Challenges》

There are several potential daunting challenges which Korea would be lucky to avoid prior to achieving unification. First, the U.S. might entirely or partially retreat from its interventionist policies, which would weaken the mutual defense commitment and reduce the U.S. military presence in Korea. When faced with an economic downturn, the U.S. might feel compelled to make policy shifts like the Nixon Doctrine of 1969.

Second, a conflict between the U.S. and China might one day force Korea to choose between its alliance with the U.S. and its partnership with China. A serious conflict of interests between the U.S., South Korea's closest ally, and China, its next-door neighbor and largest economic and "strategic" partner, is increasingly likely to happen in the future.

Third, the U.S. Armed Forces might be withdrawn from Korea after reunification. Some speculate that China would welcome a continued U.S. military presence in unified Korea, but such speculation hardly seems credible. The U.S. might also voluntarily decide to pull its troops out of Korea.

Fourth, South Korea should be prepared for accidental clashes with China. Increased exchanges between Korea and China heighten the risk of conflict. The substantial differences between the two countries' customs and legal systems might exacerbate the situation. Unintended clashes involving Chinese fishing boats operating in the West Sea might develop into armed conflicts, or a rather trivial quarrel between internet users from the two countries could inflame public sentiment in both countries, fomenting serious emotional conflict between Korea and China.

» Chapter **3**

The United States and Korean Unification



Korea Institute for
National Unification

The United States and Korean Unification

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Although the United States, as a long-time security ally and an important trading partner of the Republic of Korea (ROK), will surely be involved in the reunification of Korea, little has been done to prepare for reunification. The reasons are easy to find. People put off doing things that are difficult, especially when the difficulty involves figuring out how to go about the task, and they put off doing things when there is no deadline.

It is widely agreed that unification is inevitable, but when it will come is an open question. The North Korean regime, which has been the major impediment to unification, is unable to provide for the economic needs of its people and has lost their respect. Yet because it has devoted the bulk of its resources to staying in power, and because the North Korean people lack any vision of a political alternative, the regime continues to stumble along, as it has for decades. Something will have to happen to replace it or persuade it to relinquish power, but what that something will be, and when it will come, is difficult to say.

Once the regime no longer poses an obstacle to unification, the hard work will begin. In the meantime, almost nobody is eager for unification: not the North Korean regime, not the South Korean government or most of its people, and not North Korea's neighbors. For their part, the Americans hardly even think about it. Only the North

* The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of any organization with which they are affiliated.

Korean people are eager for unification, because they believe it will make their lives easier.

As for how to achieve unification, the most that can be said is that it will be extremely challenging in terms of economic and social costs, and it may require the astute practice of foreign policy to gain the support of important members of the international community. It is widely agreed that the final goal will be for South Korea to absorb the North, probably over a period of many years. It is also clear that the task will be so expensive that, at least in the short term, South Korea will need financial assistance to handle it.

Unification will change the political landscape of East Asia. South Korea will become a new nation with 25 million more people. China will be forced to make changes in its foreign policy. Russia, with a much shorter Korean border, will be less affected. Japan will feel the impact both in its economy and in its foreign policy.

American presidents and other top government officials have frequently voiced their support for Korean unification, but in a perfunctory way. How deeply the United States will be involved in unification is difficult to say. Certainly the U.S. military will want to act quickly to secure North Korean nuclear materials and other WMD resources, but beyond that, American involvement in unification will depend on a variety of factors, including the current international situation.

What Unification Will Look Like

When and how unification is achieved will influence what impact it has on the region and what role the United States and other countries will play. Perhaps the most important variables will be (1) what model is used to guide the unification process; (2) what scenario of conditions actually brings about unification; (3) when unification comes; and (4) what post-unification expectations the North Korean people hold.

Unification Models

The two Koreas have been thinking about how to achieve peaceful unification at least since the 1970s. A detailed discussion of this topic is better left to those who have made a special study of unification, but a brief overview of the respective unification models of the two Koreas may provide a clue as to how unification will finally take place.

The first meaningful government-level contact between the two Koreas occurred in July 1972. Before that meeting, unification seemed more likely to result from another Korean War than from peaceful negotiations (although since then the North Korean regime has frequently warned that war remains a distinct possibility). In the North-South Joint Communiqué of July 4, 1972, representatives of the two Koreas agreed to three unification principles, which favored the preferences of North Korea. First, that unification be achieved without the interference of foreign powers, meaning that the United States would have to leave South Korea. Second, that unification be achieved by peaceful means. And third, that unification be achieved by some unspecified unification of the Korean people while leaving the different (and opposing) political and economic systems of the two Koreas intact for the time being. Ever since this declaration, the North Korean have reminded their South Korean brethren that they agreed to these three principles.

North Korea has expanded on these three principles in its various unification proposals, culminating in the 1993 announcement of Kim Il-sung's Ten-point Program of Great Unity of the Whole Nation for Reunification of the Country. These ten points include the non-interference principle, the peaceful unification principle, and the co-existence principle, and they call for all Koreans to patriotically share the national (i.e., South Korea's) wealth. There is even a principle proposing that "Those who have contributed to the great national reunification should be highly esteemed"-which might be broadly interpreted as an insurance policy for the North Korean leaders in case their country collapses.

The “Basic Agreement” of 1991 began by reaffirming the principles of the 1972 Joint Communique, with the first points of the chapter on South-North reconciliation again pledged to keep the two Koreas politically separate: “South and North Korea shall recognize and respect the system of each other.” The South-North Joint Declaration announced at the June 15, 2000 summit meeting said nothing interesting about the process of unification beyond repeating that the issue must be resolved by the two Koreas “on their own initiative” and claiming that the respective unification plans of the two Koreas had unspecified “common elements.” The statement released at the conclusion of the second Korean summit, on October 4, 2007, reiterated the principles of earlier statements, including the primacy of the “on their own initiative” principle, and renewed the pledge of the two Koreas not to interfere in each other’s internal affairs.

At first glance, and also after careful consideration, it is not obvious how the agreed-upon unification process would achieve unification in the foreseeable future, although it would put a veneer of unification on the Korean people. The short-hand description of this unification process is “one nation, two states, two systems, two governments.” If the two states and governments respected each other and if the two systems were compatible, then the description of unified Korea as “one nation” might have some substance. But the two governments and systems are completely different, and both governments claim jurisdiction over the territory of the other, so the unification formula amounts to very little.

The North Korean formula does not speculate about when or how the two Koreas might finally unify their systems. The South Korean formula (e.g., under President Kim Dae-jung) does envision a time in the distant future when meaningful unification would be achieved under democracy and a market economy. As the years pass, the South Korean people become ever more cautious about taking on the enormous task of unification, and their reluctance to swallow North Korea whole predisposes them to embrace a stage-wise process in which political unification under the South Korean government system is first achieved, and only later economic and social unification.

Midway in his term, President Lee Myung-bak proposed that unification take place in three stages.⁹⁾ The first stage would see the near-term formation of a “peace community,” meaning that the two Koreas would not harm each other (and also would become a nuclear-free zone). The second stage would involve the formation of an “economic community” in which inter-Korean exchanges would be expanded and North Korea’s economy improved. Only in the third stage, after the North Korean economy had been strengthened, would the two Koreas unify their systems to create a “genuine community.”

Ever since West Germany absorbed East Germany, the German unification model has served as the principal guide for Korean unification planning, despite differences in conditions and circumstances. President Lee Myung-bak’s unification minister visited Germany in 2011 and talked about unification, and when the president himself made the visit, he said, “South Korea has a lot to learn from Germany’s experience.”¹⁰⁾ Although hardly controversial, this judgment enrages the North Korea regime, which has stated in *Nodong Sinmun*, “‘Reunification under a free democratic system’ is, needless to say, aimed at harming our idea and system and extending their rotten fascist ruling system to the North. It is, in fact, as good as a declaration of war on us.”¹¹⁾

President Lee has proposed that a unification tax be levied on South Koreans to prepare a fund to help pay for unification. This proposal has been resisted by many South Koreans, who are not eager to help North Koreans pull themselves out of the hole they have dug for themselves. The proposed tax is also opposed by the North Korean regime because collecting a tax to rebuild North Korea implies that South Korea will some day

9) “ROK President Lee Proposes Three-Step Reunification with DPRK,” *Yonhap News Agency* (in English), August 15, 2010, <<http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr>>, fb 08.15f.10.

10) “Lee Says S. Korea Should Be Financially Prepared for Unification with N. Korea,” *Yonhap News Agency* (in English), May 10, 2011, <<http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr>>, fb 05.10x.11.

11) Sim Chol-yong, “Stern, Hard Blow at Traitorous Maneuver,” *Nodong Sinmun* (electronic edition), June 5, 2011, <<http://dprkmedia.com>>, fb 06.09a.11

be in charge of unifying the two Koreas under its own government.¹²⁾ The North Koreans badly need financial assistance from South Korea but their government would prefer that the assistance take the form of private donations, trade, and investment so as not to confer any legitimacy on the South Korean government.

In sum, both Koreas envision unification as occurring in stages. However, North Korea is only interested in reaching the first stage, in which the two Koreas unify symbolically, and presumably on the strength of that symbolic unity South Korea would be expected to extend economic aid to North Korea, whereas the South Koreans talk about an eventual unification of governments and systems under democracy and the market economy. Thus there is general agreement on what a planned unification would take place gradually and there is also agreement that unification should not be accomplished by force. But these models do not take into account the possibility that some event might trigger an opportunity for the two Koreas to unite in a precipitous fashion. Even talking about such a “contingency” angers the North Korean authorities, and for that reason such talk was taboo during the engagement presidencies of Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun, only to emerge cautiously in recent years.

Unification Scenarios

The end state of the unification process is usually considered to be complete unification under democracy and a market economy: in short, an absorption of North Korea into South Korea. Over the years there has been no shortage of speculation about what scenarios might bring about unification. The shortest list comprises two scenarios: hard landing and soft landing. Longer lists usually include the following scenarios: (1)

12) For example, KCNA reporting on a press statement by The DPRK Foreign Ministry’s Disarmament and Peace Institute (in English), “After inventing ‘unification tax’ which no successive [sic] regimes had ever thought of, the authorities are crying out for raising funds necessary for ‘unification through absorption’.” September 5, 2011, <<http://www.kcna.co.jp>>, fb 09.05e.11

North Korea loses a war; (2) the North Korean people revolt or their government loses control of the people (most likely after the death of Kim Jong-il; (3) the Kim regime (under Kim Jong-il or a successor regime) opts for a negotiated stage-wise unification to save itself for the time being.

What is a more important determinant of the course of unification is what the situation on the ground is. In the aftermath of a war, not only will the North Korean infrastructure be badly damaged but many people will be injured and killed and remnants of the Korean People's Army may continue to fight. In the aftermath of a collapse of social order or revolutionary uprising, the infrastructure will be largely intact but North Korean society may experience widespread chaos. On the other hand, in a negotiated or stage-wise unification, life will continue more or less normally but the people and infrastructure of North Korea will need South Korean support.

Considering conditions in the northern half of the peninsula in more detail, it is necessary to ask such questions as the following. Will the North Korean police and military cooperate with the South Koreans to keep social order? Will many North Koreans want to move around within the country or cross the border into China or South Korea? Will local governments continue to function? Will North Korea's national and local leaders remain in place and will they have any legitimacy? Will sufficient food and adequate housing, medical care and jobs be available for the people? What will be the condition of the physical infrastructure such as roads and railways? By the time of unification, how well developed will the people's economy be? And what role will other countries, especially China, play at the time of unification?

Unification Timing

There has been no end of speculation about when unification will be realized. South Korean government officials, experts, North Korean defectors, and the general public have offered their opinions. Since 2009, the (South) Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU) has set in motion its own "Unification Clock," which was turned

back by several minutes in 2010, with the dial for collapse/absorption moving ahead of the dial for agreed unification (which was considered less likely).¹³⁾ As a basis for predicting when unification will come, all these estimates have limited usefulness. North Korean society has been crumbling for many years, yet there is no indication that a social collapse or an agreement on unification is on the horizon. Likewise, North Korea has been threatening war almost since it became a separate state, but war has never broken out.

What is important about these predictions is how they affect the preparations that are made for unification. For example, those who believe that unification will come sooner are more likely to make concrete preparations. Those who predict that unification is in the distant future are less likely to take any steps to prepare for it. To take a specific historical example, in 1994, immediately after the death of Kim Il-sung, expectations of a North Korean collapse were running high, and it has been argued that one reason the U.S. government agreed to the provision of aid (and two light-water reactors) to North Korea is that government officials expected that the regime would collapse before the reactors could be built. Whether the economic aid and political recognition that the United States accorded materially undermined the possibility of a North Korean collapse cannot be known.

The whole issue of predicting the future is fraught with problems. Research on how people see the future has shown that, as one might expect, people base their views of the future on current conditions and, with minor adjustments, simply expect that those conditions will continue on into the future. That is, people simply ignore the concept of time. When pushed, they may be honest enough to admit that their vision of the near future is much more detailed than is their vision of the distant future. It is always the case, however, that the future is seen with a kind of tunnel vision whereby people describe one aspect of the future (e.g., the economy) without being able to consider all of the other aspects that might change or remain the same.

13) Park Young-Ho and Kim Hyeong Ki, *2010 Unification Clock: When Will We See a Unified Korea?* (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2010).

If people have such great difficulty looking into the future, is there any better way to predict what the future will be like? A useful alternative is to look at present or past situations that parallel Korean unification. This approach brings with it its own problems because no two circumstances are identical, but the problems involved in drawing analogies may be less than those of trying to look into the distant future. The first comparable situation that comes to mind is Germany, which explains why German reunification is so often studied to provide insights about what Korean unification may look like. Another source of comparison is Vietnamese unification. The German case may provide a useful model of absorption under democracy whereas the Vietnam model may be more useful for predicting what will happen if the two Koreas undergo a gradual step-wise unification in which the North holds on to some aspects of its political and economic policies over a period of time.

All of that said, the South Korean public as well as its North Korean experts generally do not expect unification to occur in the near future. To take just three examples, a random sample of Koreans contacted in August 2010 made the following predictions about unification timing: 8 percent predicted unification within 5 years, 27 percent within 10 years, 23 percent within 20 years, and 28 percent in more than 20 years.¹⁴⁾ A survey conducted in August 2011 recorded the following predictions: 58 percent predicted unification within 20 years, 19 percent between 20 and 30 years, 16 percent in more than 30 years, and 7 percent believed unification would be impossible.¹⁵⁾ And 20 Korean economic experts made the following predictions in 2010: none expected unification within the next 5 years but 95 percent predicted that it would occur within 30 years.¹⁶⁾

14) According to a report presented by Prof. Lee Kark Bum at a 2010 symposium hosted by the Hansun Foundation. Reported by *The Daily NK* (in English), September 17, 2010, <<http://www.dailynk.com>>, fb 09.17f.10

15) *KBS Television*, August 15, 2011, <<http://www.kbs.co.kr/tv>>, fb 08.17f.11.

16) Reported by *Yonhap News Agency* (in English), September 14, 2010, <<http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr>>, fb 09.14c.10.

Post-Unification Expectations

A crucial factor that will influence how unification proceeds, especially in an absorption situation, is what the North Korean people expect at the time of unification. Will they be satisfied to stay where they are in return for a standard of living that is slightly better than they had before unification but still decidedly below what South Koreans enjoy, or will they want to live like South Koreans, and if so, will they expect the South Koreans to provide such a living?

It is safe to assume that at unification, North Korean information control will cease to exist, thereby enabling all North Koreans to get a clear and full view of how South Koreans live. This is the kind of knowledge that the East Germans had for many years before unification. Today, North Koreans are already gaining some information, and if present trends continue and unification is put off for a decade or more, by the time of unification the North Koreans may already be fully aware of how South Koreans live.

As the German case showed, it is difficult for people to put up with an inferior lifestyle when they see fellow citizens living much better. The economic logic of Korean unification has always assumed that South Korea will provide technology and management skills while North Korea will provide natural resources and cheap labor. Will North Koreans be content to provide cheap labor? It is almost a certainty that North Koreans who, before unification, held skilled and professional jobs will expect to earn the salary of skilled and professional people in South Korea. If they cannot earn that in the North, many of them are likely to move to the South, even though the cost of living will be higher.

As for their entitlement to a higher standard of living, while they might accept the argument that they have lost fifty years of progress by remaining loyal, or at least obedient, to the Kim dynastic regime, they are more likely to fasten on the belief spread by the North Korean media that their economic failure is due largely to the stifling effects of the capitalist powers, especially South Korea, the United States and Japan. If this is the case, they will not only expect to receive equal pay for equal work, but they will al-

so expect reparations. In 2003, North Korea claimed that the South Koreans were owed \$43 trillion for damages wrought on them by the Americans since 1945.¹⁷⁾ And in 2010, KCNA claimed that the United States owed \$65 trillion for damages inflicted on the North Korean people.¹⁸⁾

East Asia after Korean Unification

Korean unification will change the map of Northeast Asia, although exactly what the changes will be depends on the timing and nature of unification. If the unification process takes many years, there will be time for Korea and the international community to make accommodations to the new order. If unification takes place suddenly and results in North Korea's absorption into South Korea, that is another matter. For the sake of simplicity, let us assume that unification does in fact take place suddenly and results in one Korea based on the South Korean model.

Political and Military Environment

After unification, East Asia loses a dictatorship and gains a democracy, leaving China as only dictatorship in Northeast Asia. Korea will now be the size of France, facing Japan, a country with which it has a history of uneasy relations. Korea will be no match for the economic, political, and military power of China, but relations between the two countries may be problematic given that one is a democracy and the other is not. Moreover, as China grows stronger it may adopt a kind of Monroe Doctrine whereby it feels it has the right and duty to keep non-Asian powers from exercising too great

17) "Tremendous Damage Caused by U.S. Imperialists to S. Korea Estimated," *KCNA*(in English), November 29, 2003, <<http://www.kcna.co.jp>>, fb 11.29e.03.

18) Sam Kim, "N. Korea Demands Massive Compensation from U.S. for 60 Years of Enmity," *Yonhap News Agency* (in English), June 24, 2010, <<http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr>>, fb 06.24i.10.

an influence in the region. Without a regional organization to smooth over disputes, East Asia could become a difficult political neighborhood to live in.

Politically, the new Korea will not look like the old one. One-third of the population will be North Korean, and if they are allowed to vote in national elections, they may make their influence felt by changing the nature of politics and the economy. From the very beginning, it may be necessary to offer some kind of accommodation to former North Korean politicians, bureaucrats, and soldiers in order to gain their cooperation. South Korea already has a significant segment of voters with socialist inclinations, so the unified Korea may move to the political left toward a social democracy.

It is the hope and expectation of most of the world's people that after unification Korea will divest itself of the nuclear weapons it has inherited from North Korea, but perhaps that will not be the case. Korea will face a nuclear China and a Japan that could quickly acquire nuclear weapons. Many Koreans, especially those from the North, will remain suspicious of the intentions of the Japanese, and even in the northern half of the peninsula the Chinese are not very popular. Korea may opt to depend upon U.S. extended nuclear deterrence for its security, but even today some South Koreans are skeptical of the U.S. commitment in that regard, and without a threatening North Korea, there will be one less rationale for the United States to extend deterrence to Korea.

A minority of South Koreans have often spoken of making unified Korea a politically neutral country-Asia's version of Switzerland. This seems to be the official position of the North Korean government as well. Positioned between China and the West, which have different political systems and a very different Cold War history, it is understandable that Korea would wish to avoid getting caught up in future conflict and instead concentrate on economic development. But whether it is possible for a country in Korea's geopolitical position to be neutral is another question. True neutrality would mean decisively downgrading security relations with the United States and presumably establishing a measure of security relations with China and possibly Russia. This would constitute a major political change in the region. Yet, South Korea has already moved closer to China than to the United States in its trading relations, so a political realign-

ment is not unthinkable.

If such a realignment takes place, it will have a major impact on Japan, which will want to remain allied with the United States. Japan will even be inclined to strengthen its alliance with the United States, putting Japan at political odds with the rest of Northeast Asia, except perhaps Taiwan.

Economic Changes

After unification, East Asia will lose a dysfunctional socialist command economy and gain a more powerful market economy, although given the high costs of rebuilding the northern half of the country, the Korean economy may be in for some difficult years. How much unification will cost depends upon its timing, conditions in North Korea, economic goals of the unification process, and whether unification proceeds peacefully by stages or is imposed in haste. For years economists have been making predictions about the cost of unification but there is little consensus, which is hardly surprising. Consider, for example, just one expenditure: the cost of upgrading North Korea's rail network. In calculating cost, should one set as the goal a rail network similar to South Korea's? Or would travel on existing lines at a speed of 40 miles per hour be a sufficient goal for the northern half of the peninsula? The difference in cost probably amounts to several billion dollars.

The entire rehabilitation process, over, say, a 30 year period, could well amount to 5 trillion dollars if unification began today, although some experts predict less than one trillion dollars.¹⁹⁾ The longer unification is put off and North Korea continues its downward economic spiral, the more expensive it will be. Every day North Korea's factories, farmlands, and economic infrastructure deteriorate. There is little rebuilding. However bad the situation may be when unification finally arrives, the initial cost will be much

19) In 2010, South Korea's unification minister mentioned the \$5 trillion sum. "Hyun In-taek: It Would Be Hard for Two Koreas to Coexist if Peace Not Achieved," *Interfax* interview, September 17, 2010, <<http://www.interfax.com/interview.asp?id=189751Hyun.doc>>.

less than the total cost, and once North Korea's mining and manufacturing infrastructure is repaired much of the cost of unification can be paid for with increased revenue from those sectors. In addition to tapping North Korea's mineral wealth and hydropower, a unified Korea will be able to put in place trade routes between China and Russia on the continent, and Japan and the international market. Thus, in the long-term it seems likely that Korea will come out ahead financially, but the short-term costs will be formidable and the new Korean economy will be unable to cover all of them.

U.S. National Interest and Position on Korean Unification

The Sara Lee Corporation, an American consumer goods conglomerate best known for its frozen foods, for many years used the advertising slogan "Everybody doesn't like something, but nobody doesn't like Sara Lee." The same can be said of the official American attitude toward Korean unification: It must be supported, whether or not reunification would be entirely in U.S. national interests (not to say that it would not be).

To take just a few examples, President Eisenhower in 1953 said to ROK President Syngman Rhee, "The United States will not renounce its efforts by all peaceful means to effect the unification of Korea."²⁰ President Carter, not a great fan of the ROK government of its time, told President Park Chung-hee in 1979, "We must take advantage of changes in the international order ... ultimately, to bring permanent peace and reunification to the Korean peninsula." In 1985, President Reagan told President Chun Doo-hwan, "We must ultimately achieve peaceful reunification of the divided land through democratic means." President George H. W. Bush told the ROK National Assembly in 1992, "The American people share your goal of peaceful reunification on terms acceptable to the Korean People." A year later, President Clinton repeated those

20) Unless otherwise indicated, quotations are taken from Peter M. Lewis, "U.S. Foreign Policy toward the Korean Peninsula: An Anti-Unification Policy or Just Too Many Uncertainties to Account For?" *International Journal of Korean Unification Studies*, Vol. 16, No. 2 (2007), pp.79~108.

words to the Assembly: “We support Korea’s peaceful reunification on terms acceptable to the Korean people,” and added, “And when the reunification comes, we will stand beside you in making the transition on terms that you have outlined.” President George W. Bush, known to be critical of the ROK’s sunshine policy approach to reunification, said on his visit to the Demilitarized Zone in 2002, “I see a peninsula that is one day united in commerce and cooperation instead of divided by barbed wire and fear. ... And when the day comes, all the people of Korea will find in America a strong and willing friend.”²¹⁾ And in 2009 the President Obama’s White House issued a ‘Joint Vision’ paper which speaks of the United States’ “aim to build” a “peaceful reunification on the principles of free democracy and a market economy.”²²⁾ At the diplomatic level then, the United States supports Korean unification.

U.S. national interest is realistic; it is also political, meaning that elected government officials must keep in mind the opinions of the electorate. And politics, as the former Congressional leader Tip O’Neill famously said, is local: for the electorate, the most important issues are those that immediately affect them. Put in a more elegant fashion, Lord Palmerston, in a speech to the British Parliament in 1848 said: “We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.”

What are those American interests? The White House periodically issues a National Security Strategy, the latest of which was released in May 2010.²³⁾ In order of presentation, the interests listed were security (e.g., homeland defense, counter-terrorism, and counter- proliferation), economic prosperity, promoting American values (e.g., de-

21) Thomas M. Defrank, “Prez Peeks at N. Korea,” *New York Daily News*, February 20, 2002, <http://articles.nydailynews.com/2002-02-20/news/18198068_1_wire-and-fear-north-korea-sunshine-policy-GWBush...doc>.

22) The White House, *Joint Vision for the Alliance of the United States of America and the Republic of Korea*, June 16, 2009, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Joint-vision-for-the-alliance-of-the-United-States-of-America-and-the-Republic-of-KoreaJoint-Vision.doc>.

23) The White House, *National Security Strategy*, May 2010.

mocracy and human rights), and maintaining a stable international order (e.g., maintaining strong alliances, strengthening international institutions).

Less frequently, the United States has issued reports on its national security interests in Asia. The last government report, which was issued in 1998, lists the following: maintain U.S. engagement in the region, including deployment of American troops in Asia; strengthen alliances with Japan, Korea, Australia, Thailand, and the Philippines; engage with China; increase cooperation with Southeast Asia and with Russia; support multinational dialogue; promote democracy; counter proliferation; and fight terrorism, drug trafficking, and other transnational crimes. The report particularly mentions the goal of “dampening the sources of instability” in Asia.²⁴⁾

The U.S. government has not found the opportunity to issue a more recent Asia-Pacific security report, but five American think tanks undertook the task in 2009 with the intention of advising the Obama administration. Their list of interests is virtually identical to the 1998 report, with the following minor adjustments: Engaging China is replaced by “articulating a realistic and pragmatic China policy,” countering radical Islam is added, as is strengthening American soft (e.g., economic) power and promoting open and free trade.²⁵⁾

So what would these interests suggest about the U.S. attitude toward a unified Korea, if it emerged today? National interests are not firm policy guidelines because trade-offs are a fact of political life. It is often the case that in pursuing one interest a country must slight another; for example, strengthening the domestic economy may involve erecting trade barriers that go against the goal of free trade, or fighting terrorists may require befriending foreign dictatorships. So it is difficult to predict what roles the United States might play in Korean unification simply by looking at a list of U.S.

24) U.S. Department of Defense, *The United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region*, November 1998.

25) Ralph A. Cossa et al., *The United States and the Asia-Pacific Region: Security Strategy for the Obama Administration*. Sponsored by IDA, Pacific Forum CSIS, INSS, CNA, and the Center for a New American Security, February 2009.

interests.

U.S. national interest is oriented first of all toward threats, especially security (military) threats. North Korea has been high on the U.S. security threat agenda, perhaps coming in second only to Iraq and Afghanistan. Once North Korea is absorbed into South Korea or agrees to a peaceful unification process, Korea will no longer be a major security issue, unless it is involved in a new regional security crisis. U.S. national security concerns will probably shift to China (which arguably is already a bigger security threat), so a unified Korea's relations with China will be of major American concern.

Unification will undoubtedly solve an important security problem for the United States. Yet there are many in South Korea who believe that the United States wants to keep the two Koreas separated, presumably so that the United States can continue to station troops in South Korea and exert political influence over it. This is certainly the official view of the North Korean government. North Koreans have been taught that the cause and major impediment to unification is the United States, which is accused of partitioning the peninsula after the Japanese surrender in 1945 (the Soviet Union's role is not mentioned), preventing Kim Il-sung from reuniting the country by force during the "Great Fatherland Liberation War," and ruling the southern half of the country through a South Korean puppet government since then. After unification, these people will have an important say in Korean policy making.

While it is true that the peninsula was divided by agreement between the Americans and the Soviets, who were acting out of necessity and did not expect that the division would last so long, in fact for the last several decades, and especially since the end of the Cold War era, the two Koreas are kept separate by the wishes and in the interests of the Kim regime, which recognizes that without a separate Korea to rule over it will be finished. And since the late 1990s, a growing number of South Koreans, concerned about the costs of unification, have been content to keep the peninsula divided as well. It is probably true that if the Kim regime should fall, or if should agree to unification, North Korea would fall into the lap of South Korea regardless of what the United States

might think about it.

Even though there may in fact be some advantages to the United States of maintaining the status quo on the Korean peninsula, considering the nuclear threat of North Korea and its terrible human rights record it is wrong to believe that the United States wants North Korea to remain as it is, and if North Korea changes its character and becomes a non-nuclear open democratic society, there would be no reason to expect that it would remain separate from South Korea in the long term. It is more accurate to say that, whereas the United States is eager for unification in order to rid the world of North Korea, unification per se has received almost no attention.²⁶⁾ Korea is half a world away and its domestic issues are of little interest to most Americans.

The above-mentioned lists of security interests also suggest that, once North Korea's WMD arsenal has been secured, America's primary interest in Korea may be in maintaining the U.S.-Korea security alliance and keeping some troops stationed in Korea as a rapid-response and stabilizing force. In the absence of a North Korean threat, the UN command in Korea would have no purpose, although American troops might stay in accordance with the ROK-U.S. security treaty. By the same token, the Japanese might consider that without a North Korean threat there is less need for 100,000 American troops to be stationed in Japan. The most obvious rationale for stationing U.S. troops in either Korea or Japan would be to counter Chinese force; this argument would probably appeal to the Japanese but not so much to the Koreans.

U.S. Roles in Korean Unification

What roles the United States would play in the unification process in pursuit of its national interests depend in part on how unification takes place, as discussed in a 2002 report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).²⁷⁾ In a scenario of

26) This is the point of the Peter M. Lewis article cited above.

27) This is the reasonable argument of a 2002 report by the Center for Strategic and International

planned unification—for example if the North Korean regime agrees to give up at least some of its power—the United States might offer to act as an “honest broker” to push forward dialogue and negotiations between the two Koreas. It is not at all clear that Koreans would welcome such an offer. North Koreans have always insisted that unification be accomplished without any foreign interference, so they might well object to the U.S. playing any such facilitating role. Many South Koreans would probably agree. South Korean nationalism has always been strong, and with the addition of 25 million North Koreans who are even more nationalistic than their southern brethren, the Korean people may have little tolerance for foreign involvement in their unification or in hosting foreign troops on their soil.

A role that almost surely would be appreciated would be for the United States to help unified Korea obtain loans (e.g., from international financial institutions) and even provide direct aid. On the other hand, whether a unified Korea would want the United States to continue extending deterrence against military threats is hard to determine, and much would depend upon the regional situation at the time—especially the Korea-China relationship. Keeping an alliance with the United States would help offset any political or military pressure that China might put on a unified Korea, but it would also destroy any hope that Korea would become a neutral power.

In a North Korean collapse scenario, the United States might initially secure North Korean weapons of mass destruction and provide support for South Korean peace-keeping operations. American aid could also be offered, and the United States might be able to use its influence to keep the Chinese from coming into the northern half of the peninsula to secure their border or protect their economic interests in the country. After the collapse situation had stabilized, the United States could take up the same roles it would play in a planned unification scenario.

In a war or conflict scenario, the United States might play a major role in fighting North Korean forces and then occupying North Korea, after which it would take up the

Studies titled *A Blueprint for U.S. Policy toward a Unified Korea*.

roles of the collapse and planned unification scenarios.

In the long term, it would be in the interest of the United States, Japan, and maybe Korea to play a balancing and stabilizing political role in Northeast Asia, especially to counter Chinese power. The United States would want to assure the Japanese that they had nothing to fear from a new Northeast Asian configuration, and the United States would also want to keep trade lanes open to protect its East Asian trade. In short, the United States would like to see a unified Korea become another Japan.

These would be taxing roles for the United States to play, but less difficult if preparations had already been made. Only recently has the South Korean government begun making concrete plans for the range of unification alternatives that may occur, but in the United States there is little evidence that any unification preparations have been made by beyond some consideration of how to intervene quickly to secure North Korea's WMD resources.²⁸⁾

The CSIS report mentioned above included a list of recommendations for U.S. policy toward a unified Korea. Here are a few of those recommendations, adapted to our concerns:

- Discuss with South Korea the value and scope of the U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty and make plans to adjust its terms so that a stabilizing and peace-keeping U.S. force can remain in a unified Korea.
- Periodically reassure the South Koreans that the United States can be trusted to continue providing extended deterrence against threats to their security, thereby preventing a unified Korea from feeling that it must engage in a regional arms race, especially one involving nuclear weapons.
- Prepare to play a logistical role during any difficult transitional period leading to unification.

28) Edward A. Olson has made this argument in a 2005 article titled, "U.S. Planning towards Korean Unification: A New Approach," *International Journal of Korean Unification Studies*, Vol. 14, No. 1 (2005), pp. 97~112.

- Make a commitment to provide material support for a reconstruction effort in the northern half of the unified country.
- Prepare to secure at an early date the weapons of mass destruction that are currently held (and hidden) by the North Korean government.
- Promote multilateral dialogue in the region to pave the way for a unified Korea to take its place peacefully in a new regional order.
- Promote public understanding and support in the United States and in South Korea for a good working relationship between the two countries, now and in the future.
- Promote reconciliation between the Koreans and Japanese, who will undoubtedly have at least an economic role to play in the unification process.

It is worth repeating the cautions we offered in our opening paragraph. While these recommendations constitute prudent and even necessary measures to prepare for a Korean unification that is inevitable, it must be recognized that it is difficult for people and governments to expend time and effort on tasks that have no deadline and are difficult to manage. This is not a problem unique to unification. On an even larger scale, it is a challenge encountered by those who argue for more attention to global environmental concerns. But for Americans, whose participation in world affairs is so broad that their attention is constantly spread among many international problems, it bears reminding that some day the situation on the Korean peninsula will become one of the top priorities of the U.S. government, and on that day the success of America's participation in Korean unification will depend largely on how much planning and preparation has already gone into the task.

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»» Chapter 4

Japan's Role and Position on Korean Unification



Korea Institute for
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Japan's Role and Position on Korean Unification

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Korean Unification and the Strategic Environment in East Asia from Japan's Point of View

I define Korean unification as a *de facto* agreement between the two Koreas, contingent on the imminent collapse of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea(DPRK) and the readiness and resolve of the Republic of Korea(ROK) to shoulder the task of unification. Also I assume that the DPRK's external commitments will be nullified and the ROK's external commitments will continue intact and extend to the former DPRK territories. This is an extreme scenario of Korean unification. The major reason to use this definition is that an extreme scenario can reveal many unlikely effects and consequences that would not be generated under more ordinary scenarios. The adoption of this definition does not bias my description and analysis of what follows.

I examine those influences that Korean unification may have on the strategic environment of each country: the United States, China, the Russian Federation and Japan, in that order.

The United States

- (1) Korean unification will move the ROK's border right up adjacent to China.

- Presumably the ROK and the U.S. will keep their bilateral alliance intact after unification is realized. Hence the U.S. military forces in Korea will face China's military forces. American soldiers and Chinese soldiers will stand face to face for the first time since the withdrawal of Chinese troops from North Korea shortly after the armistice agreement between the United Nations forces and the North Korean forces.
- (2) Korean unification will mean the elimination of one of the two nuclear-capable rogue states, Iran and North Korea. The United States will be interested in whether North Korean nuclear capabilities and facilities are inherited by South Korea or destroyed by the U.S. Marine Corps stationed at the Futenma Marine Corps Air Field. Will the United States allow South Korea to inherit North Korea's nuclear capabilities and facilities? Will a unified ROK declare a non-nuclear position? My guess is that even if the nuclear weapons and facilities are destroyed by the U.S. Marine Corps, unified Korea might take a somewhat ambiguous strategy. Depending on the way in which U.S. acceptance might be secured, for instance, as in the India-U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement, a unified Korea might try to go nuclear.
 - (3) Korean unification will mean a direct encounter between Korea's vibrant capitalism and China's no-less-vibrant capitalism. What mixture of conflict and cooperation will emerge between the two brands of capitalism is unknown. Korean unification will have an effect on China's perception of its strategic environment similar to the Japanese colonization of Korea in 1911. After 1911, Japan built industrial infrastructure and heavy industries along a beltway linking Chonjin, Pyongyang and Shinuiju, paving the way for Japan to further colonize Manchuria and parts of coastal northern China thereafter. Now the Rason and Hwangkumpyong special economic zones are being planned between North Korea and China.
 - (4) Korean unification will invigorate the activities of Human Rights Watch and other non-governmental organizations beyond the Yalu (Amnok) River into China

and especially in the Yanbian region where approximately two million ethnic Koreans reside. China would hardly welcome the addition of two more problematic minorities – ethnic Koreans in Northeast China and ethnic Mongolians in Inner Mongolia – to Tibetans in Tibet and Qinghai and Uighurs in Xinjiang-Uighur.

China

- (1) Ethnic Korean minorities in Northeast China might be agitated by Korean unification. China might face problems from its ethnic Korean minorities as Turkey does with its ethnic Armenian minorities. During World War I and thereafter, a newly independent, republican Turkey massacred many Armenians and others to leave Turkey along with Armenians residing in communities annexed by Turkey .
- (2) South Korean capitalism will permeate China deeply, potentially causing trouble. Being resource-hungry, both Korea and China will intensify their competition in resource-rich areas including Central Asia, where competition is already very fierce.
- (3) China's hungry search for energy resources in the Bohai Bay and the East China Sea may collide with Korea's no less hungry search on these maritime fronts. It must be noted that China's sea-patrolling ships have never fought against heavily armed South Korean Maritime Safety Agency ships in the East China Sea.
- (4) China's nightmare would be a united, nuclear-armed Korea sitting so close to Beijing and other important industrial, naval and military facilities.
- (5) China is apprehensive about the possibility of a reunified Korea metamorphosing into a "pawn" in the U.S.-led strategy of China-encircling "conengagement" (strategic containment or constraint and economic engagement) like India.

Russia

- (1) The loss of a former Russian satellite-client state that has more recently become one of the world's most troublesome countries will probably be something Russia can face calmly. In fact, Russia may start envisaging unified Korea as a market similar to India. That is, Russia may consider Korea as a good customer for Russian resources and weapons (two things it has in abundance).
- (2) The inheritance of nuclear weapons status by unified Korea may not be welcome to Russia. At the same time, technological and scientific cooperation between the two countries may be enhanced in competition against the United States and in their efforts to restrain China.
- (3) Russia may welcome unified Korea as another customer of Russia's natural gas resources along with Japan and China, which might prompt Russia to consider building gas-supplying pipelines connecting Ulan-Ude, Vladivostok, Rason, Seoul and Busan.
- (4) Russia may not welcome the prospect of the Sea of Japan (the East Sea) being more deeply controlled by the U.S. Navy. In addition to Sasebo and Yokosuka, Chongjin and Rajin may become key naval ports for the U.S. Navy in Northeast Asia. Both ports are too close to Vladivostok and Nakhodka for Russia's comfort.

Japan

- (1) A unified Korea as a nuclear-weapons state may not be welcome to Japan. The relationship between nuclear-capable Korea and non-nuclear Japan might not remain stable for long. The asymmetry might prompt Japan to go nuclear. Since the United States would not welcome Japan as a nuclear-weapons state, there may be no need to worry on this point. But such asymmetry would be neither healthy nor stable.

- (2) A unified Korea would pose a challenge to Japan in terms of market evolution. South Korea, resource-hungry and not relying on its tiny domestic market demand, has been innovative and aggressive in foreign markets while catching up with and replacing Japan in many manufacturing areas. Absorbing North Korea as a market would not change this South Korean strategy much. Rather, their innovative and aggressive strategies would be accelerated. The northern market would remain tiny and would not expand Korea's domestic demand as much as the unified population size, estimated at about 70~80 million, might suggest. Furthermore the gap between northerners and southerners may cause further trouble for the Korean government, already struggling with a large rich-poor gap in the South. Unified Korea's intensified scientific and technological surge might pose a threat to Japan.
- (3) The aggravation of the income-gap after unification might intensify Koreans' anti-Japanese instinct, as some will prefer to chant about the past rather than jointly envisioning the future with Japan. As Korea's capitalist economy is becoming far more globalized, a surge of nationalism following unification might lead to trouble with neighbors like Japan and China.
- (4) Assuming that the Korea-U.S. alliance commitments are kept intact, some Japanese may be apprehensive that unified Korea could replace Japan as the key U.S. ally in East Asia. Whereas peace-loving and inward-looking Japanese may be happy about being liberated from the status of the key U.S. ally in East Asia, other Japanese would prefer to keep that status, since Korea does not enjoy strategic depth like Israel.

Japan's Interest in and Perception of Korean Unification

While the earlier section dealt with the influences that Korean unification may have on the strategic environment, this section will provide an empirical, descriptive summary of Japan's interest in and perception of Korean unification.

Japanese are generally positive about Korea and Japanese-Korean relations these days. In a 2010 survey conducted by the Cabinet Office of the Japanese Government, 61.8% of respondents answered that they feel positively (*shitashimi*) about Korea. Also, 59.9% responded positively when asked about Japanese-Korean relations. In another survey conducted by the *Yomiuri Shimbun* in 2010, in response to the question, “In which area should Japan and Korea deepen cooperation?” respondents selected from a set of choices as follows: the economy (26%), security (21%), tourism (9%), culture (12%), sports (5%), the environment (14%), and local government interaction (8%). In the same survey, respondents in both Japan and Korea were asked to choose two out of six priorities for handling North Korea. Respondents answered as follows:

	Japan	Korea
① Termination of nuclear development	47%	58%
② Termination of missile development and experiment	22%	29%
③ Resolution of the abducted Japanese citizens issue	61%	4%
④ Normalization of diplomatic relationship with North Korea (Korean unification)	9%	23%
⑤ Economic cooperation with North Korea	5%	32%
⑥ Promotion of Six Party Talks	35%	37%
⑦ Others	0%	0%
⑧ None	1%	2%
⑨ No answer	2%	3%

Japanese interest in Korean unification among the public is not particularly high. Given that the Japanese tend to have a predominantly inward-looking orientation, Korean unification does not interest them very much. Korean unification itself is not an easy subject to ponder. Occasional attention is given to Korean things such as Korean film stars, Korean songs, Korean food, very competitive university entrance exams, Samsung, etc. Abducted Japanese citizens, nuclear development, and the Six-Party Talks are three political issues which interest many Japanese. But Korean unification is

not such a target of interest. Even to those few Japanese citizens who have some interest, it just seems like an event which might take place sometime in the nebulous future.

Korean unification is perceived as a remote possibility. For 20 years or more, it has intermittently been said that North Korea's collapse is imminent. Even when torrential floods killed thousands of people or starvation was said to claim millions of lives, there were no reports of large-scale demonstrations, collective protests, palace coup d'états or assassination attempts. Some old Japanese may remember that during the colonial period there were very few collective actions in colonized Korea. Perhaps military oppression makes protests unlikely. The DPRK lives on as a state, and slogans such as "military-first politics" and "the strong and prosperous great state" keep being pumped out. Why? People wonder about this in Japan as well. Perhaps military oppression and the elites' clever but brutal survival strategy, combined with the basic status quo orientation of all the neighboring countries (China, Russia, Japan, the U.S., and probably both the DPRK and the ROK as well) might explain the longevity of the DPRK. Only once the DPRK and the ROK have maintained peaceful co-existence, peaceful interactions and harmonious relations for many years can we come to believe in the possibility of peaceful unification. Conditions are not ripe for peaceful unification at present. The only scenario which has most recently been highlighted as a possibility for opening the DPRK is the Libyan model.

An agreement between Libya and the West was concluded in 2003 to denuclearize Libya and in return to open Libya for free trade and investment of a sort. In 2011 a rebellion broke out, and when Libyan government forces began killing rebels and civilians alike, NATO forces intervened militarily to protect the people by denying the government forces use of Libyan air space. NATO's humanitarian intervention helped the rebel forces to take over the capital and oust the Libyan government. The DPRK denounced NATO's intervention and declared that it would never denuclearize itself, whatever incentives the West might offer it.

Japan's Role and the Japan-Korea Strategic Cooperation for Korean Unification

Japan's Preferences

Despite all the afore-mentioned obstacles, there are things Japan and Korea can do together to make Korean unification more peaceful and less costly.

«Nuclear-Free Declaration»

The DPRK has tenaciously upheld its philosophy of self-reliance (*juche*). They abhor any degree of national humiliation. To be proud of their country without being militarily jeopardized and economically marginalized, they feel they must possess nuclear weapons and generate electric power from nuclear power stations. Hence the slogans “military-first” and “strong and prosperous nation.” The DPRK has been successful in generating nuclear power and developing nuclear weapons despite the Six Party Talks, where the initial deal was for the other five parties to provide nuclear power plants to the DPRK and for the DPRK to abandon the endeavor of producing nuclear weapons in return. The DPRK has been able to dupe the United States and the ROK in the process by its astute, adroit and agile diplomacy. Japan's demand in the process of Korean unification would be the denuclearization of the former DPRK and a joint declaration against nuclear weapons by unified Korea and Japan.

«Free Trade Agreements Extended to All Areas»

Japan's second priority would be a free trade agreement or some variation between unified Korea and Japan. A free trade agreement between the ROK and Japan has been at times close to conclusion, especially when Roh Moo-Hyun was president. Irrespective of whether or not a free trade agreement between the ROK and Japan is concluded prior to Korean unification, Japan's preference is to jointly enhance com-

petitiveness and resilience through a free trade agreement between unified Korea and Japan, which would signify the birth of an enormous domestic market with a combined population of 200 million at a very high per capita income level. Right now Japan's manufacturing sector is having difficulties exporting products abroad. But with Japan directly investing in South Korea, jointly producing manufactured goods with a high technology and skill level and exporting them to Korea's FTA partners the European Union and the United States, both South Korea and Japan can be satisfied. With a free trade agreement between unified Korea and Japan, the mutual benefits would be much greater.

«Historical Issues»

The ROK and Japan have issued joint communiqués and declarations a number of times in the past, either officially or semi-officially, related to historical issues. Three points have been pledged by both parties: reflecting on the past history of war and colonialism, building up cooperation between the two nations, and envisioning a cooperative and prosperous future. After Korean unification, unified Korea and Japan should continue moving in that direction.

«Investigations into Abductions»

At the time of Korean unification, unified Korea and Japan should declare jointly that the abduction of citizens, whether of Japan or of the ROK, should not have taken place and that thorough investigation and reporting by both unified Korea and Japan is necessary in order to uphold the principles of human rights.

What Role Can Japan Play in Korean Unification?

«Diplomatic support»

Japan should be the first to congratulate Korea on its unification. Just as the ROK's rescue teams were the first to reach Japan when the earthquake, tsunami and nuclear

disaster unfolded beginning on March 11, 2011, upon the event of Korean unification Japan should extend full diplomatic support to unified Korea.

«Setting Up a Unification Fund»

A unification fund should be set up for funding the myriad tasks of unification. Given the enormous gap between the DPRK and the ROK in terms of infrastructure, industrial base, technological level, household economy, and governance structure, unifying the two will require untold financial resources, professional manpower resources, and good ideas. In order to amplify the positive benefits of Korean unification and mitigate the problematic aspects, a unification fund must be set up in a globalized manner. The Six Parties, including Japan, should make an initial large provision to this fund.

«Migration Control»

We cannot predict the form and process of Korean unification. But if it comes through the collapse of the DPRK regime, we can expect a mass exodus of residents of the former DPRK which will need to be controlled. For that to happen effectively, all the five parties must cooperate.

How Can Japan Strategically Cooperate with Korea for Korean unification?

«Vis-à-vis China, Korea and Japan Should Tone Down the Significance of the U.S.-Allied Territory Adjoining China.»

The advent of a unified Korea next door to China's capital and its northeast territory will constitute a direct military threat to China. It would be a replay of a scenario China has experienced twice before – with the 1911 Japanese colonization of Korea and the 1951 landing of U.S. armed forces at Inchon and their advance toward the Amnok River, both of which posed direct threats to China. What is important for Japan and Korea, which need peaceful relations with China in all areas, is to convince China that unification will not be a replay of 1911 or 1951. A tremendous amount of effort and in-

genuity will be necessary to convince China. Since China has stiffened its posture against what may be called a unified “congagement” strategy by the U.S., the ROK, and Japan, it is absolutely necessary for those three allies to clarify that they have no intention of threatening China.

«Vis-à-vis the U.S., Japan and Korea Should Jointly Declare a Nuclear Weapons-Free Position while Remaining Fully Allied with the United States.»

While the U.S. will solidify its strategic position up to the Amnok river through Korean unification, Korea might well be tempted to inherit the former DPRK’s nuclear weapons and facilities. When the DPRK bombarded what the ROK claims as its own territorial land and sea, some voices in the ROK argued that it should develop nuclear weapons in order to retaliate. After Korean unification, Korea’s nuclear programs would be targeted against China. Also the idea of constructing a missile launch site on Jeju Island after Korean unification may be interpreted as having an anti-Chinese purpose. Both Korea and Japan should remain within the confines of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. If either Korea or Japan were to break out of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the “Nuclear Five” powers, especially the U.S., would no longer regard that country as a solid ally and the entire strategic environment would dramatically change. The likely consequence would be a militarily strong Korea or Japan bereft of a solid alliance with the United States.

«Vis-à-vis Russia, Korea and Japan»

Vis-à-vis Russia, the current issue the DPRK faces is the planned installation of a natural gas pipeline via Ulan-Ude and Vladivostok. This would prevent China from accessing to the Sea of Japan directly. For that, Rason port must be opened to the adjoining Jilin Province. An agreement has been reached between the DPRK and China to the effect that Rason in North Hamgyong Province and Hwangkumyong in South Pyongan Province are to be made into special economic zones. This issue may come up again once Korean unification is achieved. The soft “congagement” strategy must be

handled adeptly.

Conclusion

In discussing Japan's position and role in Korean unification, I have first defined Korean unification as the result of the collapse of the DPRK and the readiness and resolve of the ROK to absorb the former DPRK. Needless to say, this definition is not the only definition, nor is it a particularly likely scenario. Yet this scenario helps us to think about the otherwise unthinkable. Another somewhat extreme scenario would be the gradual step-by-step development of a confederation of the former DPRK and the ROK in the event that the former almost collapses but the latter does not resolve to shoulder the responsibilities of nation-building. A variant of this scenario would be the continuation of the two sovereign states with the DPRK metamorphosing, perhaps inadvertently, into a formally failed state. Both the ROK and the PRC would help a failed DPRK, by investing heavily until portions of the failed DPRK are semi-colonized by the two countries. It is important to note that Japan seeks to play a respectable role in all of this.

»» Chapter **5**

Managing the Path toward Eventual Korean Unification: The Chinese Way



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Managing the Path toward Eventual Korean Unification: The Chinese Way

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The central theme of this paper is the Chinese response to the precarious security situation on the Korean Peninsula. After a year of hard pressure and persuasion by China on North Korea, along with efforts by the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the United States to gradually resume engagement with Pyongyang, the worst of the North/South armed confrontation resulting from Pyongyang's adventurism in 2010 appears to have eased in recent months.²⁹⁾ This is a great relief to Beijing, which in 2011 was able to partially shift its policy focus on immediate crisis management of Korean affairs to one oriented toward shaping long-term stability on the Peninsula. However, China's overall perception of the security challenge on the Peninsula is still very grave. Given the unpredictable consequences of Kim Jong-il's succession arrangement and the tightened US military pressure on the North, some form of brinkmanship may be routinely attempted by either side in seeking a favourable position in the negotiations. China constantly faces the risk of being caught in the crossfire, as it was in 2010. More importantly, the Korean Peninsula crisis of 2010 may have convinced Beijing to think more strategically about sensible responses to the issue of Korean reunification. This takes into consideration such factors as the sudden departure of Kim Jong-il, failed implementation of the power transfer to Kim Jong-un, worsening internal conditions in

29) This was concretely reflected by the resumption, for instance, of South Korean medical aid to the North in November 2011 and U.S.-DPRK contacts in Germany in October 2011. *Channel News Asia*, November 8, 2011.

the North, a heightened offensive by Washington and Seoul to entrap the North in a constant state of agitation, and the increasingly close connection between inter-Korean conflict and mounting tensions in the regional security environment, e.g., the Sino-U.S. rivalry due to the shifting balance of power.

There is no doubt that Beijing's Korean Peninsula strategy will continue to hinge on crisis aversion. Yet Beijing has realized that the status quo is becoming harder and harder to maintain due to the factors mentioned above. The atrophy of Pyongyang's state organization has evolved into political decay. Its primary foes' patience with the current state of co-existence has run increasingly thin, and they may be tempted to seize any opportunity to speed the process of unification through absorption. Washington has focused on coordinating aspects of its hedging strategy against Beijing, which may force the latter to accelerate arms build-up as a counter-action.³⁰⁾ Beijing may choose to play the DPRK card more vigorously against perceived U.S. efforts to establish a miniature anti-China NATO in Asia. The series of troubling international developments in 2010 seemed to put China in a diplomatic plight. If the tension in the Korean Peninsula cannot be handled sensibly, China could face an enormous backlash against its status as a power in the region. For instance, it became the odd man out in Northeast Asia in 2010 by taking a "neutral" stance regarding North Korea's provocations. The strategic dilemma for Beijing is that it has no better options.³¹⁾

The Worsening Security Environment in Northeast Asia

In theory, China prefers to keep an equal distance in its approach to the two Koreas,³²⁾

30) Colonel Dai Xu was influential in promoting the notion that America is constructing a C-shaped arch containing China. See his book, *C-shape arch against China* (Shanghai: Wenhuchubanshe, 2010).

31) You Ji, "Dealing with the 'North Korea Dilemma': China's Strategic Choices," *RSIS Working Paper*, No. 229 (Nanyang Technological University, 2011).

32) See Gong Keyu, "Tension on the Korean Peninsula and Chinese Policy," *International Journal of Korean Unification Studies*, Vol. 18, No. 1 (2009), p. 114.

although privately it knows where the future of peace lies for the Peninsula. However, China's efforts to support the Pyongyang regime's survival may put it in direct confrontation with the U.S. and the ROK due to their hostile policies toward the DPRK.³³⁾ This persistent opposition over the DPRK has facilitated an emerging trend of strategic realignment in the region into a bipolar structure: U.S. promotion of collective hedging against China and China's diplomatic, economic and military counter-hedging.³⁴⁾ Certainly this trend is not Beijing's choice, but bipolar realignment may be forced upon it, as shown by the Korean Peninsula confrontation of 2010. Ultimately this realignment is defined militarily by an upward spiral of action-reaction cycles.

Most analysts identify China as the primary driver behind the changing security order in Asia. Yet America's ostensible assertiveness in Asian politics in 2010 under the slogan "returning to Asia," i.e., showing hard power through repeated war drills in very sensitive areas and enhanced forward deployment in Asia, proved that it outweighs China in the struggle to shape the regional order. In fact, America is more instrumental than China in constructing a new Asia-Pacific security architecture. This is concretely embodied in its coalition-building efforts aimed at establishing a geostrategic chain constraining China.³⁵⁾ Washington wisely utilized the series of Asian security crises in 2010 to successfully lay the foundation for a future coordinated response to China's rise. North Korea is the source of regional instability, and China's support of its regime's survival is helping to drive this bipolar realignment.

Conceptually, bipolar realignment is built on two conditions. The first is the ex-

33) At the 2011 Shangri-la Dialogue in Singapore in May, Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberger elaborated on this hostile policy by saying that it was not aimed at regime change *per se* but may lead there eventually.

34) See Henry Kissinger, *On China* (New York: Penguin Press, 2011). In his answer to the question of how he saw emerging global multipolarity, Professor Stephen Walt of Harvard University said he believed that global multipolarity was inevitable but that he would rather view it through the lens of rising Sino-U.S. bipolarity. He elaborated on this in his lecture, "America and Asian Alliance," delivered at RSIS (Nanyang Technological University, January 14, 2011).

35) *Global Times*, October 29, 2011.

istence of two leading states in strife, rooted in mutual mistrust and ideological and strategic differences that cannot be easily channelled through an accommodating security-building process. With the U.S. involvement in Korean conflicts and China's efforts to protect its "core national interest" of domestic stability by maintaining the status quo on the Peninsula, there will be an inevitable and lasting clash of strategic interests. Although this clash of interests is manageable, after a power shift it may become more expensive for the hegemon to define the terms of its management. Secondly, the making of a bipolar order parallels a hierarchical rebalancing as a result of power transition. However, this paper argues that if a bipolar order were to arise on a global scale in the distant future (which is still not apparent by most current indicators), it would emerge most rapidly in Asia, and probably first take root on the Korean Peninsula. Yet this would be an atypical kind of bipolar order compared with those of the past. It would have the following features.

First, Asian bipolarity would only emerge as a result of a long evolutionary process of bipolar realignment. would evolve within a unipolar world and thus bear the unique features of U.S. domination of regional affairs. Furthermore, bipolarity would emerge exclusively in the security realm. Secondly, bipolar realignment will not develop in a linear fashion but as the result of gradual changes in the balance of power, starting in the economic realm. In fact there has never been a true balance of power in Asia. Yet American superiority is being diminished by China's rise, setting the course for a rebalancing. In this process the two major powers will mobilize support from within the region, resulting in realignment.³⁶⁾ Thirdly, due to the Asian trend of interdependence, the process of coalition building may not necessarily lead to the emergence of two clear-cut confrontational camps. Therefore, while there may be signs of bipolar realignment, it may or may not eventually evolve into an opposing bipolar regional order of the type seen in the Cold War. Finally, there is clear difference between a bipolar order and bipolar realignment. The former indicates that the relationship between the two key

36) Elizabeth Economy, "Reality in U.S.-China Relations," *CFR Expert Brief*, January 14, 2011.

powers is confrontational across the board, but in the latter the relationship is confrontational only on specific issues. Because of the complicated interdependent relations involving all stake-holders, the existing hegemon will always fall short in soliciting expected support from its allies on all issues against its chief rival. In turn, the latter will pursue a divide-and-rule response to counter offensives by the hegemon. It must be prepared to provide support to U.S. allies on selective issues of mutual concern in economic and security. And the allies of the dominant power may maintain substantial relations with the rising power and bandwagon on it for practical benefits.³⁷⁾ Yet the underlying idea behind the word “bipolarity,” whether for order or merely for realignment, is that key regional players have treaty obligations, historical legacies, ideological preferences, realistic external threats (e.g. territorial disputes), and domestic political needs. The dichotomous interests and shared security stakes align in a kind of “camp leaning,” especially when the dominant power issues an ultimatum such as “you are either with us or against us,” or when the rising power prematurely takes a revisionist stance against the existing order. This may squeeze the other states and limit their room for choice, forcing them to pick sides. A realist perspective would see this as a natural outcome.³⁸⁾

This strategic realignment is tightly linked to the construction of a new Asian-Pacific security architecture, and both elements are embedded in the U.S.-led alliance networks. Since the U.S. finds it more and more burdensome to pressure Beijing alone, Joseph Nye’s concept of “constraining China’s rise through regional countries” has become the new formula for U.S. Asian policy, serving as a guiding strategic principle in building a collective mechanism to hedge against China’s rise.³⁹⁾ To Beijing

37) David Kang, “Getting Asia Wrong: the Need for New Analytical Frameworks,” *International Security*, Vol. 27, No. 4 (2003), p. 70.

38) Aaron L. Friedberg, “The Future of U.S.-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?” *International Security*, Vol. 30, No. 2, Fall 2005, pp. 7~45.

39) Joseph Nye, “The Future of American Power: Dominance and Decline in Perspective,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 89, No. 6 (2010), pp. 2~13.

analysts, U.S. return to Asia involved forcing nations to pick sides in regional disputes, nicely echoing Nye's idea of using regional countries to constrain China.

Initially, coalition-building may take the form of coordination on specific issues. The DPRK's adventurism in 2010 gave a boost to this endeavor, as Beijing was forced to offset the allied pressure on Pyongyang. This needlessly aggravated Sino-U.S. relations, with consequences far more profound than the immediate action-reaction tussle of the players involved. To Beijing this simply confirmed its new threat perception that the U.S. and its allies were engaged in a strategy of "encirclement" to limit China's freedom of action.⁴⁰⁾ China's anxiety derives from the fact that, strategically speaking, Washington has many means through which it could undermine China's rise, should it be deemed necessary.⁴¹⁾ Encouraging Taiwan's *de jure* independence is one way, but coalition-building is a lot more cost-effective.⁴²⁾

This process starts with an effort to broaden the U.S.-led bilateral alliances into multilateral ones. This has been pursued for some time but at a slow pace. Now the pace has accelerated, as seen by the quiet upgrade of the trilateral security talks between Washington, Tokyo and Canberra, from basically annual 2+2 ministerial talks to more specific and institutionalized three-way defense cooperation, such as intelligence sharing, deployment of military facilities, regular exchanges of top brass and more frequent joint war exercises.⁴³⁾ The trilateral meeting of the foreign ministers of America, Japan and South Korea in Washington in December 2010 consolidated trilateral security co-

40) "America Encircles China from Two Fronts through Manufacturing Hostility toward China over the SCS Dispute," *Global Times*, July 27, 2010.

41) Talk given by Condoleezza Rice during her visit to East Asia in March 2005, reported by the *AP*, March 21, 2005

42) Emma Chanlett-Avery and Bruce Vaughn, "Emerging Trends in the Security Architecture in Asia: Bilateral and Multilateral Ties Among the United States, Japan, Australia, and India," *CRS Report for Congress*, RL34312, January 7, 2008.

43) The U.S. military presence in Asia is being enlarged through increased military facilities, joint exercises and formal personnel exchanges. A permanent U.S. base in Darwin in northern Australia will serve to check China's rising military power. *The Australian*, November 11, 2011.

operation in the aftermath of the Cheonan incident. The Yeongpyeong shelling provided a fresh catalyst for the three states to erect a new defense framework against common threats. This framework includes regular trilateral security talks and joint war drills.⁴⁴⁾ The D.C. meeting was only a small step towards connecting two separate U.S.-centered bilateral alliances in Northeast Asia, but some embryonic form of military coordination is already being pursued by the U.S.⁴⁵⁾ With U.S. encouragement the ROK and Japan staged their 9th joint military exercises on November 11~12, 2011, the largest so far. Although the official target of this collective defense gesture is North Korea, not China, Beijing senses that the DPRK is only an immediate concern and is being used as a cover for an ultimate joint defensive alliance against China itself.⁴⁶⁾ It is too soon to expect a trilateral security bloc to materialize in Northeast Asia, since Tokyo is cautious about becoming militarily involved in such a constructive effort due to its constitutional limitations, and Seoul is still constrained by painful memories of Japanese colonialism.⁴⁷⁾ Yet if the situation on the Korean Peninsula deteriorates, or if anxiety over China's rise prevails, the emerging trilateral framework could become more structured.⁴⁸⁾

44) *The Washington Post* revealed that U.S. State Department officials have stated that the U.S. is seeking a new definition of the U.S.-ROK-Japan relationship for the sake of better coordination against China. *The Washington Post*, December 6, 2010.

45) The U.S. Pacific Command played a crucial role in bringing the ROK and Japan together for three-way naval drills as a way to improve military cooperation.

46) "U.S.-ROK War Games Challenge Chinese Psychological Bottom Line," *China Review*, December 1, 2010.

47) Yoshito Sengoku expressed caution about joining the U.S.-ROK naval exercises and ROK defense officials were critical of remarks by Naoto Kan about dispatching the Japanese air force to South Korea to withdraw Japanese nationals in case of a crisis. This happened when the U.S. pushed for more formal defense ties between the three countries. *The Chosun Ilbo*, December 13, 2010.

48) The defense ministers of Japan and South Korea met in Seoul on January 10, 2011 to discuss signing a bilateral military cooperation agreement to allow more combat logistical support and intelligence sharing. This was unprecedented. *The Chosun Ilbo*, January 11, 2011.

China's Perception of the Looming Peninsula Crisis

Generally speaking, Beijing is rather pessimistic in its assessment of security stability on the Korean Peninsula. China seeks the status quo on the Peninsula for the sake of its own domestic priority of social stability,⁴⁹⁾ but Beijing has found this increasingly difficult to maintain. The catalysts for change come from both sides of the 38th Parallel. The DPRK has been in a sub-crisis state for a long time. Now the prospect of Kim Jong-il's departure may trigger an irreversible upheaval, particularly if it occurs within a short period of time. The succession in Pyongyang may incite a fierce power struggle among the North Korean elites as a result of Kim Jong-il's divide-and-rule approach. Each cycle of succession in this dictatorial regime entails a process of power redistribution that is zero-sum by nature. Can the DPRK's political system, which is already greatly weakened by internal and external crises, absorb such a tremendous impact?⁵⁰⁾

As for South Korea, its chosen policy toward the North can decisively influence the latter's policy orientation toward hawkishness or conciliation. In a way, the termination of the Sunshine Policy partially caused Kim Jong-il's adventurism in 2010. From time to time, external factors have played a more important role in shaping the North's foreign policy. In Beijing's perception, the U.S. and the ROK are strategically on the offensive. U.S.-ROK pressure-based actions, such as their constant war drills, trap the North in a provocative stance and induce it to make strategic mistakes. If the purpose of this is to back North Korea into a corner in order to induce regime change, then it may be considered a rational choice, but it also raises the risk of further armed confrontation or even a suicidal attack by Pyongyang. The long-term security prospects for the

49) Liu Jixian, "New Development of PLA Political Work: Study Hu Jintao's Military Thought," *Zhongguojundui zhengzhigongzuo*, No. 10 (2008), p. 2.

50) See You Ji, "Hedging Crisis and Opportunities of North Korea's Hereditary Succession: a Chinese Perspective," *International Journal of Korean Unification Studies*, Vol. 21, No. 1 (2011).

Peninsula are bleak.

On the other hand, with the chapter of confrontation of 2010 turned over, Beijing's general evaluation of the Peninsular situation has become less gloomy in terms of near-term crisis management. This is based on the following basic calculus.

Factors Conducive to Stability

First, one major scenario of upheaval anticipated by Beijing is the failed succession of Kim Jong-un and the resulting civil war inside the DPRK, which would spill over into the South. Logically this means that Beijing must help the DPRK regime to survive by propping up Kim Jong-un's government. On the other hand, despite its passive support of the hereditary succession, Beijing is well aware that it has no particular influence over the succession plan. However, Beijing is certain that by the time this plan is put into action, a whole package of protection has already been put in place to allow the successor to sail through the power politics of Pyongyang.⁵¹⁾ If fate gives Kim Jong-il five years to tutor his son, the heir may be able to consolidate his rule against the odds. The Confucian subtext of *Juche* philosophy may accord a level of automatic legitimacy to the successor, and the general public may accept their new leader out of ignorance. During the period of power transition and consolidation, it will be wiser and more sensible for the younger leader to not rock the boat.

Secondly, Pyongyang's adventurism in 2010 was mainly an eruption of accumulated frustration over Lee Myung-bak's hostile policies and did not represent a basic change of its defensive-retaliatory posture against the South. From a position of extreme weakness, the North simply lacks the capability to sustain confrontation over an extended period of time. Its assertiveness reflected the Sun Tze stratagem of "taking an offensive

51) In 2001 Kim Jong-Il suffered a serious car accident, but he recovered well. Since then he has contemplated the succession issue. Information by Lu Guangye, former PLA attaché to Pyongyang, in Sydney in July 14, 2003.

move for the purpose of defense.”⁵²⁾ The Kim family knows the limits of brinkmanship and always backs down before being cornered. Therefore it is not likely that Pyongyang will repeat provocations like those of 2010 in the foreseeable future, unless seriously provoked by the South. This will help Beijing’s efforts to restore stability on the Peninsula, which is in everybody’s best interests.

Thirdly, despite the real prospect of war on the Peninsula in 2010, Beijing still firmly believes that no party involved in that conflict is seriously considering a major showdown. That is why Beijing is ultimately confident that peace can be maintained in Northeast Asia to the end of this decade, in line with its vision for a period of strategic opportunity. The North’s top priority is still regime survival, not war against the South, although it may engage in some adventurous acts. The ROK and the U.S. are not well prepared for a major offensive. More importantly, the global economic situation and the more urgent nuclear challenge from Iran act to dissuade America from translating its “hostile intent” into a regime-changing war. Although Washington occasionally explores military solutions *vis-à-vis* Pyongyang, it is still highly reluctant to use force, which would be opposed not only by China but also by its allies. Thus provocations from both sides may raise the level of tensions but will not escalate into a real war. All parties in the region still cling to the status quo for fear of the enormous uncertainties that an abrupt change on the Peninsula would bring. This means that although a major change is looming in the North which may lead to eventual unification, any immediate change is perceived to be too expensive to be pursued at the moment. A subtle balance has been struck, with every country hedging and making plans but unprepared to take action.

The Possibility for Miscalculation

In the short run Beijing sees reining in Pyongyang as the key to maintaining stabil-

52) Talks between Zhang Zujian and Zhang Zhaozhong, *Associated Korean Press* (December 28, 2010).

ity in Northeast Asia. What emboldened Kim Jong-il in 2010 was his gamble that none of his neighbors had the stomach for war. In the lead-up to his departure, the Kim family may become reckless in challenging the South, although the strategic calculus mentioned above will remain in effect.⁵³⁾ This raises the old question of how much influence Beijing has on the DPRK. Clearly Kim Jong-Il strongly resisted Beijing's interference when planning acts of adventurism in the past. However, given China's substantial economic aid to the DPRK – 70% of all international food aid and up to 80% of its energy needs⁵⁴⁾ - its influence is logically considerable.⁵⁵⁾ Yet using economic aid to change North Korea's behavior is a one-off and irreversible weapon, as it is linked to the DPRK's survival. If China were to suspend aid and thereby sets off a serious crisis in the North, it would replace the U.S. as Pyongyang's number-one enemy. In a way, punishing Pyongyang by cutting off aid would signify a fundamental change in China's status quo policy, meaning that Beijing has finally decided to abandon the Kim family. At present China would prefer to reserve this punitive tool rather than putting it into practical use.

Beijing criticized the North's acts of tactical military harassment in 2010 for poisoning the security situation on the Peninsula and harming the atmosphere for the denuclearizing process.⁵⁶⁾ Hu Jintao clearly conveyed to Kim Jong-il Lee Myung-bak's "enough is enough" message. Hu sternly warned Kim that no matter how much U.S.-ROK pressure may be applied, the ball was in Pyongyang's court. If it gave the other side a ready excuse for confrontation, it should not expect any more support from

53) Zhang Liangui, *Phoenix TV*, 2011. See also "North Korea may have further provocations for power succession," *Yonhap News*, February 10, 2011.

54) Ether Pan, "The China-North Korea Relationship," *Council on Foreign Relations Brief Paper*, July 11, 2006.

55) Y. W. Kihl and H. N. Kim, *North Korea: the Politics of Survival* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2006), p. 197.

56) Qu Xing (ed.), *The Blue Book: World Situation and Chinese Foreign Relations in 2010*, (Shishichubanshe, 2011), pp. 83~96.

China.⁵⁷⁾ The softening of the North's reaction to the ROK since December 2010 maybe proof that these words were effective. Kim Jong-il assured the Chinese that he did not have any intention of repeating "super-harsh reactions" continuously.⁵⁸⁾

In the short run, the real risk of war lies in how the South reacts to Pyongyang's provocations, even in their technical form. The ROK's domestic politics leave little room for the president to take a soft stance when innocent lives are lost. Here the line between a sensible response and an excessive one is dangerously thin. In the long run, Beijing believes the danger of further confrontation also lies in the confusing U.S.-ROK signals of war avoidance on the one hand but heightened military pressure on the other. This helps to stimulate Pyongyang to make provocations which fall just short of real acts of war. Beijing's biggest worry is that with the North growing weaker day by day, Washington and Seoul may come to see the military option as a realistic and feasible way of resolving the North problem. Their own provocations appear to have become more constant, as seen by the increased frequency of war drills. Under the circumstances there is little Beijing can do to restrain this brinkmanship.

In seeking to ensure that the crises of 2010 are not repeated in the future, Beijing has reshaped its DPRK policy according to the principle that North Korea's actions directly violate China's strategic interests, for instance by causing unnecessary Sino-U.S. tension. Its assessment of the DPRK's internal situation has forced it to make abrupt changes to its policy direction *vis-à-vis* Pyongyang, which is preoccupied in the near-term with managing the current crisis.⁵⁹⁾ Beijing needs to adopt new long-term approaches to the DPRK challenge. Beijing has already depicted North Korea as a normal neighbor. What it needs to do in the future is to operationalize this concept via concrete policies that reflect Pyongyang's merits and challenges rather than "historical ties."

57) Liu Ming's comments on China's position on another Korean War.

58) Interviews of Chinese and ROK security experts in Beijing and Seoul in October 2011.

59) Professor Jin Canrong's speech on "Grand Academic Forum," *Phoenix TV*, December 13, 2010.

China's North Korea policy is increasingly in flux.⁶⁰⁾ In this regard Beijing's support for Kim Jong-un is not unconditional. In the meantime Beijing will continue to maintain its "neutrality" against overt ROK-U.S. pressure on the North to prevent an early collapse of the regime before it is prepared. In fact, with Beijing's backing, the life of the DPRK regime may be extended until one day Beijing finds it too expensive to do so. At that point its support for unification will become practical and substantial.

Korean Unification and the China Factor

China's long-stated position on Korean unification is nothing but positive support, since this matches both sides' rhetorical commitment to unification. Its expedient backing of Kim Jong-un does not change Beijing's basic perception of the North as a major source of regional instability. Seoul's hasty approach to regime change in the North is another source of conflict. Unification would eventually remove both sources of tension and thus deserves Beijing's support. Yet beneath the surface there are unannounced preconditions for that support. First of all, reunified Korea should be friendly toward China, free of U.S. military presence, and keeping a proper amount of distance from Japan. More importantly, unification must be achieved peacefully and by the initiative of the two Koreas, with minimal outside interference. Otherwise, the serious consequences of a war for unification would hugely damage China's vital interests and create major problems, such as dealing with the flood of refugees. External intervention would likely lead to deployment of U.S. soldiers along the Yalu River which, amidst the ongoing Taiwan challenge, could result in an enhanced tripartite alliance between unified Korea, the U.S. and Japan, presenting China with an aggregate security threat.⁶¹⁾ Today Beijing has a realistic evaluation of its influence over the direction of

60) Ambassador Yang Wenchang characterized Sino-DPRK relations as one between two normal neighbors, the first open expression from Chinese official circles. *The Chosun Ilbo*, June 8, 2007.

61) For instance, Shen Dingli linked Chinese support to North Korea to the issue of Taiwan in the

Korean unification, which is very limited. Therefore, it would rather slow down the process than attempt to help guide it along an uncertain course. This sums up China's status quo policy toward the Peninsula. If the course of unification is gradual, China's influence on the end result will grow over time. In the meantime, it is working to create a favourable eventual position for itself *vis-à-vis* unified Korea.

Cooperation with Seoul – The Only Way for China to Attain its Strategic Goal

Given the enormous imbalance of power between the two Koreas and the DPRK's fragility, unification can only be imagined on Seoul's terms. If this process is peaceful, it will mostly likely happen through a South Korean absorption of the North according to the German model. And if Beijing is to achieve its goal of securing a favorable position in Northeast Asia following Korean unification, it has no other alternative but to maintain cooperative relations with South Korea. This is not a subjective choice but a strategic necessity. Seoul is also aware that without Beijing's support its long term efforts at unification will not play out in the way it desires, because Beijing has a key bearing on the form and timing of the DPRK's collapse.⁶²⁾ Most importantly, China is in the best position to help unification due to its enormous economic power.⁶³⁾ In fact, Chinese security analysts question the ROK's ability to realize German-style unification due to South Korea's relative economic weakness compared to the former West Germany. Also, China perceives that Japan is apparently unwilling to get involved and

context of continued U.S. presence in unified Korea. Shen Dingli, "North Korea's Strategic Significance to China," *China Security*, Autumn 2006, pp. 19~34.

- 62) Successive ROK presidents have expressed the view that China's vital interests should be considered in Seoul's process of seeking Korean unification.
- 63) One estimate by RAND held that South Korea would have to inject US\$700 billion to stabilize North Korea's economy; Seoul does not have that kind of money. On the consequences of the failure of North Korea's economic reforms, see Stephen Haggard and Marcus Noland, *Famine in North Korea: Markets, Aid, and Reform* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007); Marcus Noland, *Korea after Kim Jong Il* (Institute for International Economics, 2004), p. 64.

America may be unable to support unification in economic terms.⁶⁴⁾

China's influence and cooperation will be most clearly reflected by its promotion of the economic development of unified Korea. Today ROK exports to China stand at about \$52 billion, larger than its exports to the U.S. and Japan combined. In 2010 China's contribution to South Korea's growth exceeded 50%.⁶⁵⁾ Clearly Beijing has a long-term strategic vision for promoting the realignment of regional politics through its economic leverage. This could translate into Sino-Korean economic cooperation to quicken the pace of post-unification recovery.

The post-Kim Jong-il North Korea may facilitate this process of absorption. The method of unification depends on the very unpredictable interaction between the two Koreas and the major power politics of the region. Clearly Washington and Tokyo do not hope to see a unified Korea fall into China's sphere of influence, and while Beijing has no intention of creating such a sphere of influence, it will nevertheless try to prevent a tripartite post-unification alliance of Washington, Seoul and Tokyo from emerging. As this seesaw battle plays out, the weakening of Pyongyang may create the necessary conditions for absorption, but Beijing's Korean specialists have cautioned that the path may be long and arduous. If the process is begun before China grows powerful enough to protect its vital interests it may take longer, even though after the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong events more Chinese have come to embrace the idea of the North as a liability, breaking from the "buffer mentality" of the past.⁶⁶⁾ Fundamental

64) Comments by Chinese experts on the Russian IMEMO Report on Korean Unification through Southern absorption. "Focusing on Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan," *Shenzhen TV*, November 5, 2011.

65) This appeared in a KIET report dated November 22, 2010. The report states that the ROK's GDP for the first half of 2009 was 504 trillion won - 20 trillion larger than the same period in 2008. The breakdown of this 20 trillion reveals that 52% of the increase was achieved through increased exports to China. South Korea's dependence on China for growth is also expressed by the fact that its overall export growth in the first six months was 3.5% but its export growth to China was 17.2%. *The Chosun Ilbo*, November 23, 2010.

66) On the Chinese debate on buffers and liabilities, see You Ji, "Understanding China's North Korea Policy," *China Brief*, Vol. 4, Issue. 5 (The Jamestown Foundation, 2004).

change in Pyongyang will have to be prompted internally, but external factors may influence the pace of change. Beijing will try to assume the role of pace-setter. Under these circumstances, strategic tolerance will be necessary.

Preconditions for Sino-ROK cooperation on unification

As the pace setter for change in Pyongyang, Beijing will adopt a strategy of gradualism in its support for Seoul-led unification, built upon several preconditions as mentioned earlier. First, Sino-ROK cooperation has to proceed from restoration of a long-held tacit agreement between Beijing, Washington and Seoul that “using military force to resolve the North Korean challenge is not an option.”⁶⁷⁾ For instance, Washington and Seoul seem to have reached a consensus that denuclearizing North Korea is possible only through regime change. Lee Myung-bak’s 2010 “Liberation Day Address” promoted a unification model moving beyond “crisis management,” meaning that comprehensive preparations should be made for the sudden collapse of the DPRK. For this he proposed consideration of a unification tax to financially prepare for absorption of the North by collecting a sum of US\$ 2.14 trillion in three decades.⁶⁸⁾ This offense-based policy is at odds with Beijing’s definition of maintaining the status quo on the Peninsula: the DPRK remains nuclear free and the U.S. and the ROK refrain from stifling the North through military means. Beijing’s analysts consider this approach to be as risky as the North’s adventurism, and it may weaken China’s willingness to cooperate on unification.⁶⁹⁾ In their opinion the most cost-effective means of unification is

67) This quote is from former ambassador William Perry’s speech at the workshop Military Alliance in the Post-Cold War Era in Tokyo, December 2~6, 1998. Since 2008 the basic thinking in Washington has changed. Scott Snyder used moderate language to describe this new Western consensus in Scott Snyder and See-Won Byun, “The Obama Administration and Preparation for North Korea Instability,” *International Journal of Korean Unification Studies*, Vol. 18, No. 2 (2009), p. 11.

68) “Lee Lays Out 3-Stage Master Plan for Reunification,” *The Chosun Ilbo*, August 16, 2010.

69) “China firmly opposes U.S.-ROK naval drills in the Yellow Sea,” *To Kung Pao*, July 2, 2010.

to wait for the natural demise of the Kim dynasty, which appears highly possible. In short, Beijing strategists say, why not give time a chance to bring about unification at the minimum cost? Strategic patience is the key for Seoul to achieve its final goal.

Secondly, the ROK brought the U.S. Navy into the Yellow Sea, which exerted a profound military and domestic impact on Chinese strategic thinking.⁷⁰⁾ In a way, this has been interpreted as part of a U.S.-led plan to construct an Asian chain of alliances constraining China. As a result, Beijing sees protecting Pyongyang as a necessary counter-action despite the structural nature of the clash of vital interests between the two countries.⁷¹⁾ This will affect the pace of unification.

On the whole, Beijing seeks a roadmap for Korean unification that accommodates the interests of all parties involved except for North Korea: a soft landing and peaceful evolution through necessary and appropriate external pressure on Pyongyang, restraint from regime-changing war, meaningful progress on denuclearization prior to unification, and economic preparedness. Many Chinese are confident that Sino-ROK cooperation on unification is possible as the two countries share the same model of unification through absorption, and there is no clash of strategic interests, except for the dichotomy of tactical approaches toward North Korea; also, the two share strong economic ties of interdependence. In contrast, Korean-Japanese mistrust is rooted in historical discord and reinforced by territorial disputes. Anti-Americanism is deeply seated in the minds of Koreans. These factors will be relevant to Sino-ROK relations after unification, when North Korea's role as a thorn in the side of the bilateral relationship will disappear altogether.

70) General Ma Xiaotian said in the Shangri-la Dialogue in May 2011 that U.S.-ROK naval exercises occurred at the wrong time and in the wrong place. See also "U.S.-ROK Naval Drills Challenged China's Psychological Bottom-line," *China Review*, September 1, 2011.

71) Zhang Liangui, "Pyongyang's Wooing Beijing is just a Tactical Adjustment," *Rennwuzhoukan (Celebrities)*, December 2010.

Conclusion

Korean unification has been under discussion for a long time. The deepening crisis in North Korea has warmed up this discussion in recent months, as the North's political succession poses a regime-threatening challenge to its leadership. Its vulnerability lies in the single fact that the whole nation's fate hinges on one person who is in poor health.⁷²⁾ China, along with every other party involved, is preparing strategies to hedge against any sudden change in Pyongyang. These include propping up the DPRK in order to allow more time to create favorable conditions for managing the uncertainties of unification, seeking cooperation with South Korea to effect a peaceful transition of the DPRK, and balancing the U.S. to prevent a war for regime change from breaking out. All this is necessary to buy time and build capacity to cope with post-unification regional power politics.

The unification process would significantly impact China's DPRK policy, which has been centered on the principle of crisis aversion. Beijing realizes the high cost of this policy: heavy economic aid to an increasingly unpredictable neighbor. This status quo-based policy not only symbolizes Beijing's lingering "buffer zone" mentality but also its difficulty in finding any feasible substitute. Therefore, Beijing is not in a position to visibly alter its DPRK policy any time soon.⁷³⁾ Consequently, except in terms of crisis management, Beijing no longer has a clearly defined long-term DPRK policy. If anything, its policy can be described as *ad hoc*, issue-oriented, short-term, and driven by domestic politics. Yet China may have set a different policy bottom line *vis-à-vis* the North in the wake of the adventurous acts of 2010, which dragged China into con-

72) At the DPRK's 60th anniversary celebration on September 9, Kim Yong-nam, chairman of the Supreme People's Assembly, said "We will rely completely on the great leader Kim Jong-Il for our fate..." *The Chosun Ilbo*, September 13, 2008.

73) On the debate between the two schools of "buffer zone" and "liability," see You Ji, "Understand China's North Korea Policy," *China Brief*, Vol. 4, Issue 5 (The Jamestown Foundation, March 8, 2004).

frontation against its will with the international community and especially with America.

Until the massive uncertainties associated with unification can be cleared in a significant way, China needs to preserve the DPRK while gradually facilitating the emergence of a unified Korea with a friendly policy toward China based on cooperation rather than balance of power. But the ultimate means to achieve this is to develop strategic and cooperative relations with Seoul. To do so, Beijing must support the ROK in maintaining peace and stability on the Peninsula, eventually leading to unification.

The key to a smooth unification process lies in the method of North/South absorption. Many Chinese believe that strategic patience is necessary in order to obtain the most cost-effective and optimal results. Recent world history provides a precedent of peaceful regime change and unification in the early 1990s. If Koreans and their allies are sensible and farsighted, history may repeat itself. Why not give time a chance?

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»» Chapter 6

Russia's Role and Position on Korean Unification



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Russia's Role and Position on Korean Unification

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Korean Unification and Strategic Environment in Northeast Asia and East Asia.

Unification is a long-standing national objective of Korean people. In 1972, 1991, 2000, and 2007 the leaders of North Korea and South Korea reaffirmed the principles of their position on the unification process. The central principle is that reunification should be achieved independently by the two Koreas, on their own initiative, without outside interference or reliance upon outside forces, through the joint efforts of the Korean people who are the masters of the country.

But in reality no durable progress has been achieved in inter-Korea relations. North and South Korea officially stand for unification and advocate creating a Confederation of Korea as a first stage. But each side believes that ultimately unification will mean the assimilation of one part of Korea by the other on its terms and conditions.

Up until the late 1980s, Pyongyang thought the solution would be simply a matter of choosing the right time to capture the South. Following the dissolution of the USSR, South Korea began to seriously prepare for the collapse and subsequent absorption of the North.

Both are examples of a “zero-sum game.” Without mutual respect and recognition of the partner’s interests it is impossible to move forward with a process of unification.

At the beginning of the 21st century the prospect for peaceful co-existence of North

and South emerged. Two summits were held, dialogue expanded, trade increased and joint projects were initiated, including an industrial complex in Kaesong and a tourism project in Kumgangsan financed by South Korea.

But when the Lee Myung-Bak administration put forward the idea of a “big deal” (first denuclearization of North Korea, then normalization of relations and economic aid), it was perceived in Pyongyang as a veiled plan to absorb the North.

In 2010 the escalation of tensions caused by the sinking of the Cheonan and the artillery shelling of a South Korean island critically damaged any prospect of talks on future unification. Given the lack of a mechanism for dialogue and peace-building in Korea, new military incidents may occur between the two states in the future.

In the following pages we will discuss several scenarios of how the situation on the Korean Peninsula may evolve. One scenario is that a deep economic crisis and chaos in North Korea may ultimately lead to the downfall of the regime. This in turn may lead to the absorption of that country by South Korea.

Sudden unification via absorption might be dangerous and could have many negative consequences. North Korean “patriots” and proponents of *juche* nationalism, who will have nothing to lose, will most likely resist absorption using all available military means, not excluding guerrilla war throughout the Korean Peninsula. There is no doubt that such resistance plans are in place in North Korea. This could create long-term instability in Korea and even lead to a full-blown civil war.

Some studies estimate that the costs of Korean unification could exceed \$600 billion over 10 years. But this estimate might be too low. In the 20 years since German unification, an estimated 1.3 trillion euros (1.9 trillion dollars) have been transferred from the former West Germany to rebuild the former East Germany.

Taking into account the experience of German unification, it is obvious that the same process will be much more costly on the Korean Peninsula. The economic potential of the South is not sufficient to cope with the social-economic problems of the North while preserving the standard of living that South Koreans have made such tremendous efforts to achieve. In contrast to German Unification there is no inter-Korean

communication or travel, and as a result of the civil war personal distrust between citizens of the two Koreas is much higher than what Germans experienced during the “Cold War” years. It will be difficult to bridge such major cultural and social differences.

But on the other hand, the collapse of the North Korean regime, which has been predicted many times, may not take place in the foreseeable future. The North Korean government has been able to maintain social and political stability despite the chronic economic crisis and lack of resources.

In the mid-1990s, despite universal predictions of imminent collapse, the DPRK managed to survive. Even the land-slide of the Asian financial crisis (1997-1998) did not undermine the foundation of its centrally planned economy. The country endured the period of the “Arduous March” (“Silent Famine”) which cost many North Korean lives.

The reality is that for the foreseeable future power in North Korea will remain in the hands of the Kim clan and its inner circle. This power is supported by the highly stratified structure of the ruling class, bound together by thousands of family and social ties. There is no real opposition or alternative power base. Any possible dissident activity is cruelly suppressed, and conditions for the formation of organized dissent are absent.

Under such circumstances it is almost impossible to envision a sudden collapse of the existing regime in North Korea.

China, a country which can potentially wield strong influence on North Korean government policy, definitely does not wish to see the thousands of U.S. troops stationed in South Korea move right up to its border. This may happen if the North Korea regime suddenly collapses. That is why China’s policy toward the Korean Peninsula clearly emphasizes stability, as was confirmed once again during the May 2011 visit to China by North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il.

As President Hu Jintao said at his meeting with the North Korean leader (according to the state-run China Central Television), “All sides should remain calm and restrained, show flexibility, eliminate obstacles, improve relations and make positive ef-

forts to realize peace, stability and development on the peninsula. We call on all relevant parties to continue to uphold the standard of a nuclear-free, peaceful and stable Korean Peninsula.”

After their meeting both sides called for restraint on the Korean Peninsula and expressed their desire to re-start the Six-Party Talks on the North Korean nuclear issue, but they did not offer any new proposals that might persuade the U.S., Japan and the Republic of Korea to resume those talks.

That was Kim Jong-Il’s third visit to China in just over a year. At a meeting between Prime Minister Wen Jiabao of China and South Korean President Lee Myung-bak in Japan on May 28, 2011, the Chinese leader explained that Chairman Kim was in China to study “economic development.”

As shown on CCTV, Chairman Kim visited a farm, a car plant, and an electronics factory and was briefed about research into e-books and LCD technology. He met with Chinese President Hu Jintao and attended a banquet together with most of the Chinese Communist Party’s nine-member Politburo Standing Committee.

China’s state-run Xinhua news agency reported that Chairman Kim had remarked that China’s “reform and opening policy has been proven correct.” He also said that North Korea “is currently focusing its efforts on economic development, and we really need a stable environment for this.”

But after Kim Jong Il’s previous visits to China, he never followed up with Chinese-style reforms, and this time the official Korean Central News Agency reported that during his visit Kim declared his intention to “witness for himself the dynamic progress in the rapidly changing land of China” but did not mention his domestic economic plans.

Chairman Kim was only quoted as saying that “The Korean people rejoice, as over their own success, that everything is going well in their neighbor China.”

Despite isolation and international sanctions the North Korean leadership has no plans to change anything in its internal and foreign policies. The model of an economy based on self-sufficiency and self-reliance has allowed them to build up substantial re-

serves that can increase the chance of survival in a crisis situation. During food crises, North Korea usually makes some concessions but does not yield on its core principles - it only bends them in order to receive international food aid.

The only strategy that has any hope of inducing change is to create the conditions for a gradual evolutionary transformation of North Korea, starting with economic reforms similar to the initial reforms taken by China. It is no accident that North Korea's leaders, including Kim Jong-Il, have shown great interest in the economic development of the Chinese territories closest to North Korea and are seeking to understand why the population just across the border it is able to enjoy a decent quality of life under nearly identical climatic and agricultural conditions.

Theoretically the Chinese economic model might be applicable to North Korea, but the leaders of North Korea fear that reform could be the first step toward the introduction of a market mechanism, which would ultimately lead to the collapse of the existing regime.

On the other hand, there is a growing understanding even among the ruling class of North Korea that economic changes are inevitable. Our strategy should be to encourage North Korea's leaders to adopt this economic policy.

As a first step toward the unification process, relations between North and South must be improved. One of the most crucial steps to achieving this is to reach an agreement on denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

Russia from the very beginning was opposed to North Korea's nuclear weapons program. At the end of the 20th century, Moscow was unhappy about being excluded from the Four-Party Talks (between the two Koreas, China, and the United States) and the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), despite the fact that the idea of multinational talks on Pyongyang's nuclear program was initially put forward by Russia in 1994 (only in 2003 did Russia join the dialogue system), and the fact that Soviet specialists had discovered and technically analyzed the place in North Korea where the nuclear electric plant was constructed.

It is important to facilitate inter-Korean dialogue. Koreans should search for appro-

priate responses to the historical challenge they are facing. The role of foreign powers is not to intervene in inter-Korean relations, but to exert their influence in order to prevent clashes and to help both Koreas proceed toward reunification, indicating readiness for reasonable, mutual concessions.

The six-party negotiations were unable to prevent two nuclear tests by North Korea. Today North Korea openly positions it self as a nuclear power.

At present, the prospects for restarting the negotiations are unclear. At the same time it is necessary to have a channel for discussing concerns related to the nuclear and missile programs of North Korea. The “old” six-party configuration has played its role. But now the time has come to think about a different format of negotiations with another agenda. Denuclearization is possible in principle, but only in the long-term and only after North Korea receives what its leadership wants most of all. For Pyongyang the nuclear program is a crucial means to obtain three major “concessions” from outside powers, principally the United States.

The first is full recognition by the White House of the existing regime in North Korea, including the establishment of diplomatic relations.

The second is a guarantee from the United States that there will be no efforts from Washington or its allies Seoul and Tokyo to undermine the Pyongyang political system and there will be no external threat to North Korea.

The third is provision of large-scale economic and technical assistance.

When former U.S. President Jimmy Carter visited Pyongyang in April 2011, he was told that North Korea would not give up its nuclear program without some kind of security guarantee from the U.S. The North has repeatedly stated that it wants an assurance that U.S. will not attack it, along with a peace treaty formally concluding the Korean War.

This seems to be a reasonable time to put forward an initiative for a multilateral diplomatic conference on Korea (as the post-war agreements stipulated) with participation by the same six countries plus England and France (as permanent members of the UN Security Council) as well as the Secretary General of the UN and the head of the

International Atomic Energy Agency. It would be possible to hold this conference under the auspices of the UN, which formally was a participant in the military conflict in Korea.

The core agenda of this conference should be comprehensive, encompassing not only the problem of denuclearization but also discussions of a new peacekeeping regime on the Korean Peninsula, of a concept for creating a multilateral mechanism for guaranteeing security in Northeast Asia.

Russia rescued the six-party negotiations in 2005 when they were stalled by the dispute over the freezing of North Korea's accounts at Banco Delta Asia in Macao at the request of the United States. Russia put forward a solution to that problem. In the spring of 2011, thanks to Russia's intermediary efforts, North Korea agreed to return unconditionally to the Six-Party Talks, which it had left at the end of 2008.

Russia expressed deep concern and condemned the artillery shelling by North Korea of the South Korean island of Yeongpyeong in 2010 which resulted in human casualties. Russia supported UN Security Council Resolution 1874 in May 2009 to sanction North Korea after its second nuclear test.

It is important to remember that the Working Group on a Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism, which was established within the framework of the Six-Party Talks, has agreed upon the major content of the Guiding Principles of Peace and Security in Northeast Asia as a first step toward a multilateral regional security system. The agenda of the conference should include the afore-mentioned three major concerns of North Korea.

Reduction of tensions on the Korean Peninsula will be a decisive factor in establishing security and stability in the region and should be regarded as a critical step in creating an atmosphere conducive to unification. There is real, growing concern over the possibility of an arms race breaking out in the region. This makes an agreement on confidence-building measures very important. Such measures can promote a better environment for negotiations. What makes confidence-building measures important is that, although they do not arrest military activities, they regulate them and make them more

predictable. Confidence-building measures can help to remove suspicions and concerns and, in the end, enhance military stability.

Among such measures, the most useful ones might be:

- Mutual notification about maneuvers and military exercises;
- Invitation of foreign military observers to maneuvers and military exercises;
- Agreements on avoiding incidents at sea;
- Bilateral or multilateral discussion of respective military doctrines;
- Information exchange on the military force deployment of each country.

What might the situation look like after the unification of Korea? It will mainly depend on what scenario of unification takes place. Even under the most optimistic scenario - a unification process developing peacefully and gradually over a rather long period of time - unified Korea will inevitably be oriented toward internal problems and will direct most of its resources to resolving them.

There is no need to explain the reason for this. On the one hand, the dramatic modernization of the North's economy and social structure will open a lot of possibilities for South Korean companies to invest in the North and benefit from its inexpensive labor force and natural resources. But on the other hand, such a drive to the North will require enormous financial resources which will need to be taken from the South's economic and social development programs, creating a situation that may provoke strong dissatisfaction from the South Korean population. At the same time, it may require siphoning away investment from developing the economic potential of the South in order to avoid yielding to international competition.

Under such circumstances, during the process of "unification accommodation" unified Korea is unlikely may play a major role in world economic affairs and most probably will need to borrow large sums of money from international financial organizations and private funds.

Unified Korea will require not only money but, even more important, peaceful conditions. A peaceful surrounding environment will be a decisive factor in successful

resolution of its internal problems. That is why, for unified Korea, peace, stability, and trust in the Northeast Asian region will be of great interest. At the same time unified Korea will have a chance to become a key player in the process of creating a new regional order.

At the beginning the unification process will most likely be supported by almost all of the regional powers as well as a majority of world states and by the United Nations as an organization. But in the long run the possibility cannot be excluded that some countries in the region may consider the rise of a powerful unified Korea as a rival, at least in economic terms. This may lead to attempts to contain the development of the new Korea. That is why it will be important for the leaders of unified Korea to promote a constructive, positive vision of a new Korean state with a benevolent role in global and regional politics.

Russia's National Interest, Perceptions, and Position on Korean Unification

Russia can play an important role in ensuring security and stability on the Korean Peninsula. This could be considered a natural function of Russia, since objectively speaking Russia is one of the major centers of power of Northeast Asia.

The geopolitical role of Russia may become even more evident during and after the reunification of Korea. Russia, as a friend of Korea, will integrate into the world community in a new, more qualitative way. Russia sees a unified Korea as a potential strategic partner.

For Russia the most desired outcome is a national reconciliation and peaceful coexistence of two Korean states on the path to eventual unification of Korea over a long period of time. The emergence of a unified Korea that seeks to maintain friendly, neighborly and cooperative relations with Russia does not contradict Russia's core interests. But at the same time we should admit that the prospects for a unified Korea in the foreseeable future are quite low.

What are the principles of Russian policy toward the unification of the two Korean

states? These are very clearly established.

First, Russia supports the process of reconciliation between the two Korean states.

Second, Russia supports exclusively peaceful, diplomatic means of resolving the problems of the Korean Peninsula.

Third, Russia supports the peaceful unification of Korea on the condition that the unified Korean state maintains a friendly attitude toward Russia and other neighboring states.

Fourth, Russia supports a guarantee of the non-nuclear status of the Korean Peninsula, observance of the non-proliferation regime and exclusion of weapons of mass destruction from the region.

Fifth, Russia offers its support and assistance of broader economic interaction among the three parties of Russia, North Korea, and South Korea.

It would be preferable if the unified Korean state remained neutral, peaceful, non-nuclear and without a foreign military presence on its territory.

The prospect of North-South unification was never raised by Soviet leaders and was never was discussed even theoretically by Soviet scholars. It is interesting to note that the possible unification of East and West Germany was analyzed, though not openly, by Soviet scholars, who prepared recommendations on this issue for the Soviet leadership. But in case of Korea the very idea of unification of the two countries after their devastating and cruel civil war was regarded as absolutely unrealistic.

The leaders of the USSR always supported the ruling regime of Kim Il Sung in Pyongyang, even when Moscow was unhappy with North Korea's pro-Chinese policies or was dissatisfied with the DPRK's failure to fulfill its commercial obligations with the Soviet side. Moscow also did not agree to all of Pyongyang's requests for military-technical assistance, sending a signal to the North Korean leadership that the USSR was not in favor of any plans to repeat the war on the Korean Peninsula.

The Soviet Union, as we know, recognized West Germany and established full diplomatic relations with Bonn in 1955 but did not show any intention of doing the same with Seoul. Only at the end of the Gorbachev era did Moscow decide to start a process

of normalization with South Korea, and official relations with Seoul were established only in 1990.

After the break-up of the USSR, new Russian democratic leaders started to regard North Korea as a country which did not share any common values with Moscow and was an undesirable partner. Political and military contacts stopped almost completely. Russia officially informed Pyongyang that under the new conditions Moscow did not have any intention of fulfilling its obligation to defend the DPRK that had been established in the bilateral Treaty of 1961 (the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the USSR and the DPRK).

Geographically, Russia shares an 18-kilometer border with the Korean Peninsula along the Tumen River. Historically, Russia has been involved in affairs on the peninsula for almost 150 years, from the mid-19th century onward. Today Russia seeks to maintain normal relations with both South and North Korea.

Russia has the advantage of many decades of close relations with the North Korean elite, and although its influence is now limited, still Russia has the potential to help promote the positive evolution of the system and elite in North Korea.

In Russia-North Korea relations, pragmatism prevails. Russia delivers oil, food and other commodities to Pyongyang only in accordance with its obligations according to the Six-Party Talks and UN sanctions.

The Russian auto plant Kamaz has opened an assembly line specializing in the production of medium-size trucks of the model “Taebaeksan-96.” In 2007 only 50 trucks were assembled at the plant.

Russia is interested in opening a trans-Korean railway connecting Rajin and the rest of northern Korea to the Trans-Siberian railroad. This will enable South Korean and Japanese cargo to be sent across Russian territory to the Central Asian and European markets.

Eighty percent of overall bilateral economic trade between Russia and North Korea consists of barter between regions. The most active Russian regions trading with the DPRK are Eastern Siberia and the Far East. The Russian Maritime Province (Primorsky

Kray) exports to North Korea \$4 million in refined oil per year. Instead of money the local government is compensated with North Korean labor.

North Korean laborers in Siberia and the Far East were common during the era of Soviet-DPRK relations, and this practice continues today. Every year 3-5 thousand North Koreans come to Russia to work as woodcutters and builders; some have also managed to find work in agricultural and marine industries. Through deployment of these laborers, the DPRK has partially repaid the outstanding debt it still owes Russia from Soviet era loans. During the Soviet era, the DPRK incurred a debt of approximately \$8 billion, which Pyongyang still owes to Moscow but cannot repay.

Having embraced modern market economy principles, Russia is not interested in providing Soviet-type assistance to North Korea. The Russian private sector has demonstrated a lack of interest in doing business in North Korea. Thus Russia-North Korea economic links are very limited and weak. Bilateral trade remains stagnant around the level of \$50 million (in 2009).

In 2000 President Vladimir Putin visited North Korea. In 2001 and 2002 the leader of North Korea twice traveled to Russia. But these visits produced very few practical results.

Without political dialogue and economic exchanges with North Korea, Russia may lose its potential to positively influence policy in Pyongyang, and this will have a negative effect on the general situation on the Korean Peninsula and relations between North and South.

Russia's strategy is to maintain good neighborly relations with both North and South Korea. But taking into consideration many factors, it is clearly impossible to maintain an equal level of relations with Seoul and Pyongyang. Moscow does not see any restriction to developing its strategic partnership with Seoul. As for Russian-North Korean relations, there are limits caused by fundamental differences in the political, economic and social structures of the two countries.

Russia sees South Korea as a dynamic and promising state within the very important East Asia region, a member of the G20, and host of the 2010 G20 Summit. At

the end of 20th century, South Korea joined the ranks of the developed countries with its new industrial economic model, successfully expanding foreign trade. Twenty years after the normalization of relations, South Korea has become Russia's third-largest economic partner in the Asia-Pacific region. The scale of cooperation continues to expand, with particular attention being paid to joint investment projects (the accumulated value of South Korean investment in the Russian economy in 2009 totaled \$1.5 billion). For Russia, the top priorities are stability, development, and promotion of its economic interests in the region with the aim of developing the Far East.

In November 1992, during President Boris Yeltsin's visit to Seoul, the Treaty on Basic Relations between South Korea and Russia was signed, stating that both countries shared a "friendly and cooperative relationship." When President Kim Young-Sam visited Moscow in 1994, the two leaders described their countries' relationship as a "constructive and mutually complementary partnership." During President Roh Tae-Woo's visit to Moscow in September 2004 both sides agreed to upgrade bilateral relations to a "comprehensive partnership based on mutual trust."

As a result of the summit meeting between President Dmitry Medvedev and President Lee Myung-Bak in Moscow on September 29, 2008, Russia-South Korea relations were upgraded from a "comprehensive partnership based on mutual trust" to a "strategic and cooperative partnership." The meaning of this agreement is that both countries decided to develop a full-scale cooperative relationship and to diversify their bilateral relationship to have a broader regional and global scope. Bilateral cooperation from now on will cover a wider range of issues including political, diplomatic, military, security, economic and cultural affairs.

During President Lee Myung-Bak's Moscow visit 26 documents were signed, covering cooperation in industrial and technological fields such as energy, IT, nanotechnology, the space industry, nuclear energy, finance, and ocean development. Both sides agreed to develop sustainable exchange and cooperation in the area of national defense, including technological cooperation and meetings between military officials. It was also agreed to continue summit meetings to exchange opinions and views on major

international events and situations on the Korean Peninsula, in Northeast Asia and around the world and to expand cooperation and interaction between governments and at the public and private sector level.

Moscow and Seoul reached an agreement to hold a strategic dialogue at the first vice ministerial level on foreign affairs and national security. The first such dialogue took place in May 2007 in Moscow. This will promote further cooperation in foreign affairs and national security and allow the two countries to address the changing situation on the Korean Peninsula and throughout the world.

Economic cooperation between two countries is developing rapidly and successfully. Russia is providing the Republic of Korea with additional opportunities to widen the scope of cooperation in the Eurasian region through participation in Russia's Far East and Siberia development plans. The "Action Plan" for economic and trade cooperation, concluded in November 2005, was the driving force behind the dramatic increase in bilateral trade volume and investment.

As a result of the September 2008 summit meeting between President Dmitry Medvedev and President Lee Myung-Bak it was agreed to improve trade structure, to increase the export volume of Russian machinery, technical equipment and high-tech products, and to strive for a higher standard of economic and trade cooperation. Understanding the need for dialogue at the private sector level to enhance economic cooperation, it was agreed that the "Korean-Russian Business Dialogue" and other regional level talks would be expanded and participation of small and medium-sized enterprises in economic and trade cooperation would be promoted.

It is clear that there is unlimited potential for economic cooperation between two countries, and both sides should explore this more efficiently.

While there are bright prospects for the Russian-South Korean strategic and cooperative partnership, some possible obstacles should also be mentioned. The Republic of Korea is a close political and military ally of the U.S. If Russian and American policies were to move in conflicting directions, especially over matters such as security in the Asia-Pacific region, this would inevitably effect Russian-South Korean relations.

The state of Russian-North Korean relations also may influence Moscow's policy toward Seoul, though it is difficult to imagine that this influence will have a dramatic effect on practical Russian-Korean cooperation. This will most likely only affect tactics for resolving the problems of the Korean Peninsula, namely the North Korean nuclear problem.

There are also problems related to historical relations between Russia/the Soviet Union and South Korea which have left many Koreans with negative feelings toward Russia, though the new Russia had nothing to do with them. Both sides need to take systematic steps to deepen mutual understanding and trust between politicians, journalists, and intellectuals as well as the common people.

Russia's Role and Russian-South Korean Strategic Cooperation for Korean Unification

Russia is interested in peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula because it is closely connected to the security and development of the Russian Far East and Siberia.

In this sense strategic cooperation with the Republic of Korea is very important. In the security field Russia has built up a degree of trust with the Republic of Korea, which provides the additional possibility of Russia taking an increased political and diplomatic role and becoming more effective and consistent in dealing with the situation on the Korean Peninsula.

On the other hand, "the strategic and cooperative partnership" with Russia opens additional opportunities for the Republic of Korea to grow more confident in dealing with North Korea and in a broader sense strengthens its position in regional and global politics.

In the field of economic development and modernization Russia is interested in a partnership with the Republic of Korea, which is regarded as the most suitable partner for promoting major projects like the "2013 Far East and Zabaikalye Development Program." Russia is also looking for new markets for its energy and natural resources

and trying to diversify its supply routes. For the Republic of Korea, which needs a secure supply of energy and natural resources to maintain sustainable economic growth, the importance of the relationship with Russia is obvious.

Expansion of Russia's economic cooperation with both Korean states could provide a positive impulse for strengthening cooperation in Northeast Asia and other regions. In the dialogue between North and South Korea Russia may become a key player by helping to resolve existing political and military contradictions and conflicts on the Korean Peninsula.

At his summit meeting with President Medvedev, President Lee Myung-Bak presented his idea for "Three Great New Silk Roads." The first is a "Steel Silk Road" - connecting the Trans-Siberia railroad with a Trans-Korean railroad. The second is an "Energy Silk Road" - constructing an oil and gas pipeline across North Korea. The third is a "Green Silk Road" -cooperation in agriculture and forestry in the Far East.

The Russian side supports these project ideas. Russia is already doing its best to contribute concretely to the railway connection project, understanding that this project will not only help to improve the situation on the Korean Peninsula but may have a positive impact on the international transportation and logistics markets.

Russia is also in favor of the second project, trying to persuade North Korea to agree to construct oil and gas pipelines across its territory. At the same time, Russia's Gasprom Company and the Korea Gas Corporation signed a memorandum of understanding concerning the export of Russian natural gas to the Republic of Korea via North Korea. If this project is realized, the Republic of Korea will receive from Russia 20% of its total consumption of natural gas for 30 years. This project will help diversify the Republic of Korea's sources of natural gas and also decrease import prices.

The "Three Great New Silk Roads" projects can only be achieved through cooperation between the two Koreas and Russia. If such cooperation is achieved it will greatly help to change overall situation on the Korean Peninsula for the better and create pre-conditions for a unification process.

There are a number of major projects that could be brought to life, for example the

linking of the Trans-Siberian railroad to Korea's railroad infrastructure. Part of this project is a plan to build a line from Khasan in Russian territory to Rajin port in North Korea in order to transport containers from South Korea. There are also plans for building power lines across the territory of North Korea to South Korea as well as constructing a natural gas supply infrastructure throughout the Korean Peninsula.

Russia supports dialogue and cooperation between South and North Korea and has emphasized this as a crucial factor affecting peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.

Russia and the Republic of Korea maintain close cooperation at the ARF and APEC forums, and both have expressed their positions in favor of strengthening the non-proliferation treaties on nuclear and bio-chemical weapons. Both countries share the view that Russian-Korean bilateral and multilateral cooperation must be reinforced in order to effectively deal with global security issues such as international terrorism, cross-border organized crime, climate change, food security, energy security, piracy and cyber crimes.

A very promising area is cooperation in industry, science and technology. Both sides are promoting exchanges of experts for joint studies and symposia, establishment of joint study groups and institutions, and exchange of technical information, documents and research results. Both countries are actively cooperating in such fields as nanotechnology, nuclear energy, space development. There has already been an important achievement in space development - the successful flight of Korea's first manned space project. There are also other projects, such as construction of an exclusive industrial complex for Korean companies in the region near Moscow and an exclusive harbor for Korean ships near Vladivostok.

The current system of exchange between North Korea and Russia is that the former exports labor and agriculture goods and the latter exports electricity, oil and raw materials.

The concept of three-party cooperation means the combination of Russian energy and resources, North Korean territory and labor, and South Korean capital and

technology. The objective of this policy to revive and modernize the North Korean economy in order to create income sources and promote inter-Korean cooperation and economic ties between both Koreas and Russia, leading to the creation of an economically integrated system on the Korean Peninsula.

Cooperation between Russia, North and South Korea in oil, gas and railway construction and utilization of these and other projects could provide a good start for reconciliation between Seoul and Pyongyang.

»» Chapter 7

Korea's Diplomatic Strategy for Unifying the Korean Peninsula



Korea Institute for
National Unification

Korea's Diplomatic Strategy for Unifying the Korean Peninsula

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Preface

In 2010, Korea's nominal GDP ranked the 13th in the world, and on 5 December 2011, it has become the 9th country in the world in terms of total trade volume, reaching \$1 trillion. Korea ranked the 23rd in the 2010 world competitiveness evaluation conducted by the Swiss International institute for Management Development(IMD). Korea's competitiveness ranked the 7th among the G20 member states, 9th among countries with more than 20 million population, and 8th among the Asian-Pacific countries.⁷⁴⁾ As such, Korea has grown from the ruins of war and division to a mid-sized country with considerable national strength in just 60 years. Korea is the only one which has achieved both economic development and democratization among countries that have newly become independent after World War II.

Korea had received foreign aids and now it is an aid-giving country. Furthermore, in the globalization and information age, Korea is an active player in the international community under the banner "Global Korea," expanding its soft power represented by K-pop and Korean wave and hosting international events such as the G20 summit talks.

However, the structure of division on the Korean peninsula poses an obstacle to achieving Korea's state vision, which is to become an advanced first-class country. In par-

74) "Records and Evaluation of the 2010 Exports and Imports," Korea's Ministry of Knowledge Economy; Data on 2010 world competitiveness rankings, IMD.

ticular, the North Korean nuclear issue is the core obstacle to the development of North-South relations and the fatigue from not being able to resolve the nuclear issue for a long time is growing. As long as the possibility of violent conflict is not dispelled in North-South relations, the state of division inevitably poses an obstacle to Korea's state development strategy.

In the 21st century, we should achieve a state vision of leaping forward to an advanced country that contributes to the international community on the state- and national-level, as well as the level of peace and common prosperity beyond the Korean peninsula. To this end, the Korean peninsula should not remain in the state of confrontation, being caught between the continental and ocean powers. We should proactively solve the unification issue with a determination to not only solve the Korean peninsula issues through national reconciliation and peaceful unification but also to contribute to the peace and common prosperity of Northeast Asia and, beyond that, to mankind's common development. Unification will be a key turning point for Korea to leap forward and become a country that can play a major role in the world's political, economic, and security order.

However, unification means a change to the state of the Korean peninsula and will have major effects on the interests of the four surrounding countries. Therefore, Korea should obtain active support and cooperation from the four surrounding countries and the international community by establishing a clear vision of a unified Korea. In particular, considering the international aspect of the unification of the Korean peninsula, coordinating the interests of the surrounding countries is essential to smoothly achieving unification. To be more specific, advance consultation is required for various issues, including stabilizing peace on the Korean peninsula; humanitarian, political, and military intervention; refugee issues; and disposal of weapons of mass destruction.

With these issues in mind, this paper presents Korea's vision of unification and the future of unification, analyzes the four surrounding countries' positions on the unification of the Korean peninsula, and presents the direction and strategy for unification diplomacy with a view to obtaining the support and cooperation of the four surrounding

countries.

Korea's Vision of Unification and the Future of Unification

Korea's Vision of Unification in the 21st Century: To Achieve "Advanced First-Class Country"

Looking ahead at the changing domestic and international environment for achieving the vision of unification, first, North Korea's changes will be inevitable and will eventually take place despite its rigid system. South Korea's internal and external position will be consistently enhanced depending on our efforts, and the environment for unification on the international level is expected to flow positively, though variably.

Korea's long-term state vision is to become "a first-class country in the world through efforts to become an advanced country." As a new independent country after World War II, Korea has become a very exemplary case of successfully achieving industrialization and democratization. As a result, Korea has become a member state of the OECD, and the 24th member state of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee(DAC) in 2009, establishing itself as an aid-giving country. Korea is the only country that has transformed from an aid-recipient to an aid-giving country. Now Korea has to become one of the first-class countries that lead the international community by becoming a truly advanced country through advancement based on the success of industrialization and democratization.

The Lee Myung-bak administration has defined its vision of foreign relations and security as "a mature world-class country" and the core strategic task as "North-South relations of co-existence and co-prosperity." Korea has aspired for sustained economic growth and balanced welfare in the process of achieving an advanced first-class country. To this end, it should further branch out to the world as a trade country and enhance its soft power to support its status as a trade country. Developing itself to be a "mature world-class country" requires a strong foundation of smart power that in-


tegrates hard power and soft power. In the mean time, Korea should improve North-South relations and create and stabilize a lasting peace structure to overcome the structure of division and achieve a unified country.

In the 21st century, Korea's state goal is "to become an advanced country and achieve unification," and achieving an advanced first-class country specifically means to become advanced and achieve unification. In formality, unification means "establishing a sovereign state with one political system and regime;" in substance, it should include not only unification in formality but also the level of integration represented by "the degree of institutionalizing value, process, and standards." Integration is a task that should be continuously pursued before and after unification.

The Future of Unification

I would like to present "the G8 advanced first-class country" as the goal of the future of unified Korea. To be specific, I present the vision of the unified Korea as a bridge country connecting the continent and the ocean and an Asian Hub bridging world's peace and prosperity. The subset of the vision of the future includes "a prosperous Korea, a nature-friendly Korea, a peaceful Korea, and a wonderful Korea." Integrating this with the Lee Myung-bak administration's "community unification initiative," the vision can be presented as follows: First, to become a country that contributes to world peace by achieving national strength on the level of a "permanent member state of the UN Security Council" through the realization of a "peace community" on the Korean peninsula. Second, to become an economically advanced country on the G8 level by achieving an "economic community" of North and South Korea. Third, to achieve a country whose cultural and welfare level corresponds to top-ranking OECD member states by forming a "national community." ([Figure VI-1])

[Figure VI-1] G8-Level Central Country of the World



«Advanced Democratic Country: “A Prosperous Korea”»

An advanced, democratic society means an advanced first-class country that embodies mature democracy and develops friendly market economy. It is a welfare country where freedom as a community is enjoyed, human dignity is embodied to the maximum, and the quality of life is improved for all the people of the North and the South, while its economy is advanced to the G8 level.

«Model Country of Peace and Prosperity: “A Peaceful Korea”»

The Republic of Korea is the only country that simultaneously achieved economic

growth and democratization after World War II. Therefore, if a unified Korea is realized, it will emerge as a model country that has simultaneously achieved democracy, peace, and prosperity. By realizing the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and eliminating military threat from North Korea, it can be a world model of non-proliferation as a denuclearized and peaceful country. The elimination of military threat from the Korean peninsula could be followed by arms reduction and enable Korea to play the role of propelling international peace. Korea can play the role of peace accelerator and peace creator for lasting peace in the Northeast Asian region, and it will contribute to the peace and development of Northeast Asia by playing the role of catalyst for regional cooperation and development with a goal of common prosperity in the region. Furthermore, Korea can enhance its national stance as an active participant in creating international peace order and step forward as a country that contributes to world peace on the level of a member state of the UN Security Council.

«Green Growth Country: “A Nature-Friendly Korea”»

The effect of integration of North and South Korean economy will enable Korea to secure potential for future growth amid sustained development. The integration of the North and South Korean economy will be a momentum that increases opportunities for employment and investment. After unification, the Korean peninsula could be the center of the pan-Yellow Sea and the pan-East Sea economic blocs and develop as the center of the Northeast Asian market with a population of 640 million and GDP at \$7 trillion, and could emerge as a distribution hub of Northeast Asia and the world by connecting the Korean peninsula's transportation networks with the trans-continental TCR, TMR, and TSR and further with the Pacific routes. Moreover, Korea could realize the future of green growth by achieving green Korean peninsula through environment-friendly balanced development and developing environment-friendly industries. Thus, a unified Korea could be a future development model of the world's green growth.

«Creative Cultural Country: “Wonderful Korea”»

A unified Korea will bring about the opportunity to boost state building. Through this, Korea will be able to boost social and cultural dynamic and enhance the people’s pride and confidence. The unified country will establish a new national identity and expand open international exchanges as the center of new culture. In addition, its general national strength will grow further, combining the hard power (economic, technological, and defense powers) and soft power (culture, value system, information networks, and systems). Korea will also lead creative culture and soft power on the level of top-ranking OECD member states.

[Table VI-1] Estimated GDP of Leading Countries in the World: 2010~2050

	U.S.	China	Japan	Russia	Korea	Canada	France	Germany	Italy	U.K
2010	14,537	4,696	4,602	1,378	1,127	1,395	2,366	3,086	1,927	2,568
2020	17,981	12,676	5,222	2,562	2,153	1,708	2,815	3,522	2,238	3,129
2030	22,821	25,652	5,812	4,269	3,509	2,071	3,306	3,764	2,407	3,627
2040	29,827	45,019	6,040	6,316	5,028	2,581	3,892	4,391	2,576	4,383
2050	38,520	70,605	6,675	8,564	7,167	3,164	4,592	5,028	2,969	5,178

Source: Goldman Sachs. “BRICs and Beyond,” November 2007, p. 149. The GDP of Unified Korea is based on the calculation of Goldman Sachs’ estimate of GDP.

Four Surrounding Countries’ Stance on the Unification of the Korean Peninsula

The United States

Although the United States respects the “principle of parties concerned” in the issue of unifying the Korean peninsula, basically, its stance is that unification should be achieved in the direction of prevailing South Korea’s value of liberal democracy and market economy in the entire Korean peninsula. That is, unification should be achieved

based on the common values shared by South Korea and the United States. The United States has agreed to develop “strategic alliance of the 21st century” with South Korea and this U.S. strategy is in the hope for South Korea to go beyond the Korean peninsula and become a key partner in the security strategy for Northeast Asia and the world. The United States expects close cooperation based on the Korea-U.S. alliance in the unification process of the Korean peninsula, as well as continued Korea-U.S. alliance even after unification in a direction conducive to the U.S. interest in the Korean peninsula and the Northeast Asian region.

The United States’ official position is that U.S. forces could remain or withdraw from Korea, depending on Korea’s position. Thus withdrawal of U.S. forces is possible depending on the decision of the government of the unified Korea after unification. The U.S. position is to maintain U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) as long as North Korea’s military threat exists on the Korean peninsula. However, the United States has made decisions on the size of USFK in accordance with its own security strategies, and USFK’s continued presence or withdrawal and its size have always been and will be a subject of close consultation between South Korea and the United States.

Although the United States supports gradual and peaceful unification of the Korean peninsula as the best way, it seems to maintain a position that unification caused by an emergency situation in North Korea cannot be ruled out. Concerning an emergency situation in North Korea, the United States’ top priority is to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, in particular, nuclear weapons, outside the Korean peninsula or to terrorist groups, and the United States stresses Korea-U.S. cooperation in this area. In addition, the United States stresses the need to prepare for the possibility of drastic changes in North Korea’s system due to the instability and uncertainty of the North Korean system.

Meanwhile, the United States is concerned about the possibility of unified Korea having a pro-China tendency. However, the U.S. stance is to coordinate and prepare for the changed relationship due to the changed international political and economic stance of unified Korea as well as changed relationships among the neighboring countries.

China

What China has officially stressed in its stance toward unification of the Korean peninsula is “independent” and “peaceful” unification by North and South Korea, and through a gradual process. Independent unification, in China’s term, means that China does not want infringement on its interest due to influence by the United States and the international community. China believes that unification of the Korean peninsula could pose a threat to China’s national interest. China judges that in case of armed conflict in the process of unifying the Korean peninsula, instability would rise on the Korean peninsula and have a negative effect on China. Thus to China, peaceful unification means that any form of instability is not desirable in the process of unification. China also believes that gradual unification is favorable to China because unification would take place when China’s national strength is more solid.

Meanwhile, China is concerned about unification by South Korea’s absorption of North Korea in a situation where Korea-U.S. alliance is maintained, and China in effect rejects this form of unification. China is worried that influx of a large number of refugees to China due to an emergency situation in North Korea would make China’s domestic situation unstable. In addition, China is concerned about the possibility of the ethnic Koreans’ pro-Korean tendency after unification. China believes this could trigger other ethnic minorities’ separation and independence movements. China considers it a threat to China if USFK continues its presence after unification. China is also worried about unified Korea being friendlier to Japan than to China.

If more pragmatic leadership that fulfills more international responsibility emerges in China in the future and many changes take place in North Korea-China relations, China could more positively accept unification led by South Korea than it would now. However, if the gap of national strength between the United States and China is further reduced and China intensifies its diplomacy for hegemony, China would strengthen its efforts to offset the United States’ influence on the Korean peninsula. China would consider it a favorable opportunity to expand its influence if the United States’ relative

power is weakened. If the unification of the Korean peninsula has a negative effect on expanding China's influence, it is likely that China will in effect create obstacles to unification, contrary to its official position.

Japan

Japan's traditional interest in the unification of the Korean peninsula has been that unification should not hinder Japan's peace, safety, and prosperity but should create an opportunity for enhancing Japan's political influence. This is a natural conclusion considering that the core of Japan's policy toward the Korean peninsula has been to counter any anti-Japanese administration on the Korean peninsula because Japan considers it a security threat to Japan. The most important consideration in Japan's perception of and policy on the Korean peninsula is to minimize instability on the Korean peninsula, and Japan's main interest is relaxation of tension rather than the unification of Korean peninsula itself. Thus successive Japanese administrations' Korean peninsula policies have not been on the premise of unification.

Japan's basic stance on the Korean peninsula's unification method is "a peaceful way on the principle of parties concerned," but it has some room for flexibility. Officially, the Japanese government has supported the South Korean government's stance on unifying the Korean peninsula and South Korea's unification policies, and has in effect supported South Korea's initiative regarding the principle of parties concerned to unification. However, rather than regional instability that could be caused by the process of unification or after the unification, maintaining the status quo is more important to Japan's national interest. Therefore, we have to be aware of the possibility of change in Japan's basic stance on the unification method of the Korean peninsula. In particular, Japan considers it a practical possibility that an emergency situation on the Korean peninsula could take place due to an emergency situation in North Korea, which did not receive any attention in the Cold War period.

Japan prefers gradual process of the unification of the Korean peninsula and its

stance is that the process should be done through a multilateral consultation framework. Japan has stressed that (1) unified Korea should guarantee arms reduction and denuclearization; (2) a multilateral consultation body is necessary for this guarantee; (3) the unified Korea should not be a virtual threat factor in the Northeast Asian region. In particular, Japan stresses the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and thus would prefer unification with the nuclear issue resolved.

Russia

Russia's stance is that it would support Korean peninsula's unification if the process is peaceful and if the unified Korea does not form an anti-Russian alliance. In the event of unification, Russia is expected to make active intervention for the emergence of a friendly unified Korea, and in this case, Russia will demand the withdrawal of USFK. Meanwhile, Russia's perception is that the United States, China, and Japan oppose the unification of the Korean peninsula because a unified Korea means the emergence of another key player in addition to China and Japan. Thus Russia believes that only Russia is friendly toward the unification of the Korean peninsula.

Russia's view is that peaceful unification of the Korean peninsula is difficult to expect in the current situation and it favors the state of division over unification through South Korea's absorption of North Korea with the support of the United States. Russia regards the emergence of a unified Korea with the pro-U.S. and anti-Chinese tendency as the formation of a "NATO in the East." In particular, Russia regards the Russian areas bordering the Korean peninsula as its sphere of influence and its position is to contain the emergence of a pro-U.S. and anti-Chinese unified Korea.

With regard to the timing of unification, Russia at this point regards the unification of the Korean peninsula as something of distant future. However, it projects that there is the possibility of unification in the process of transforming the international order from the uni-polar to a multi-polar system. With regard to the unification method, some Russians view the scenario of South Korea's absorption of North Korea as the most

likely one, but others have different views.

Basic Diplomatic Direction and Strategy for Unification

Basic Direction

First, South Korea should declare that North and South Korea are the parties concerned to unification and the two should lead the unification of the Korean peninsula in accordance with “the principle of solution by the nation.” The theory of North and South Korea being the parties concerned is explained as follows: (1) In political and legal terms, North and South Korea are the parties concerned. (2) Historically, the division of North and South Korea was because of the theory of power in international politics, contrary to the principle of solution by the nation. (3) In terms of international politics, the four surrounding countries are supporting the principle of North and South Korea being the parties concerned to the unification of the Korean peninsula. (4) In cultural and historical terms, the Korean peninsula has maintained one history for a long time and the North and South Korean people share the same national characters and traditional culture and value.

Second, unifying Korea should be carried out and achieved in “the frame of peace and cooperation in Northeast Asia.” Pursuing the unification of the Korean peninsula is not only beneficial to the interest of the Korean peninsula but also to the national interests of the four surrounding countries, not hindering their national interests. In addition, the unification contributes to solid peace and stability of Northeast Asia and to sustainable and environment-friendly common economic prosperity. Korea should pursue “the unification of the Korean peninsula amid peace and prosperity of Northeast Asia,” not “putting the unification of the Korean peninsula before peace and prosperity of Northeast Asia.” Korea should consider an international treaty if necessary.

Third, considering the emergence of a firm G2 era in Northeast Asia, diplomacy for unification should assume the strategy of embracing China using the axis of Korea-U.S.

alliance, not choosing one between the United States and China. In the mean time, Korea should develop strategic cooperative partnership with Japan and Russia.

Fourth, Korea should demonstrate an active role in building multilateral security and economic cooperation system in Northeast Asia, thereby create favorable conditions for unification. Korea should pursue complex networking diplomacy that encompasses multi-layer relationships between North Korea and the four surrounding countries and between the United States and China.

Fifth, Korea should establish a “message sending system” for building a specific image of a unified Korea and to promote empathy. To this end, Korea should produce a “nation brand” that graphically expresses the image of a unified Korea, including its vision, class, and role in the international community. I propose “Asian Hub: Bridging World’s Peace and Prosperity” as Korea’s vision for pursuing a unified Korea, and “Korea: Leading the Future” as its slogan.

Strategy

First, Korea should adopt a soft power strategy utilizing the nation’s image. Korea is “a model of economic development and democratization” and the emergence of a unified Korea should be a model of achieving peace, following economic development and democratization. Korea’s modern pop culture represented by the Korean wave, including K-pop and Korean dramas, is gaining world’s attention. Korea can utilize this soft power to promote the image that the new international order in Northeast Asia to be established by unifying the Korean peninsula contributes to peace and economic prosperity beyond the region and expands to Asia and the world.

Second, Korea should carry out a network building strategy that systematically builds a policy cooperation network. In carrying out diplomacy for unification, it is important to build trust and cooperation at peace time. Thus Korea should maintain close cooperative relations with the four surrounding countries - the United States, China, Japan, and Russia - with their leadership and policymaking authorities on bilateral

level. Korea should maintain “strategic dialogue” channels that are formed and operated between governments and civilian sectors and support them to operate policy networks in an integrated and systematic manner.

Third, Korea should actively participate in global governance. Time and space is becoming more compact globally through IT and internationalization. Thus Korea should actively participate in global governance, such as the United Nations and its subsidiary organizations and other international organizations. Through such participation, Korea should make the world accurately understand the future of the Korean peninsula and the vision of unification that Korea is pursuing, and should try to define the North Korean issues within the international norms by mobilizing all global and regional regulatory systems.

Fourth, Korea should assume the strategy of expanding its bridge role between powers and smaller and weaker countries. Korea should play the bridge role between the G20 nations and non-G20 nations through a strategy of building soft power and networks utilizing its position of a mid-sized country. Korea can play the bridge role that coordinates the conflict of interests among various countries, not only between the United States and China and between China and Japan but also between Asia and Europe, and advanced countries and newly developing countries. Korea can play a leading role in forming norms based on the commonality and public interest of the international community, and should exert more efforts to form new platforms of international governance such as the “Seoul Consensus.”

Fifth, Korea should adopt the strategy of expanding public diplomacy. The nuclear issue, human right issues and other North Korean issues have become major topics for discussion to not only international policy forums but also experts groups and NGOs. It is necessary to make the existing public diplomacy activities more systematic and intensive. Korea should not only expand and intensify public diplomacy toward the international community but also toward domestic civilian sectors and thereby increase civilian-government cooperation.

Sixth, Korea should strengthen the foundation for smooth promotion of diplomacy

for unification. Diplomacy for unification should be carried out under general strategy and guidelines on the situation of North Korea and unification issues, and cooperation among relevant government agencies is very important. Korea should establish a center that plans and coordinates civilian-government cooperation in diplomacy for unification, tentatively named “Unification Diplomacy Center.”

Ways to Generate Cooperation From the Four Surrounding Countries of the Korean Peninsula

Only when the four surrounding countries, which have sensitive interest in the unification of the Korean peninsula, acknowledge that the unification of the Korean peninsula is conducive to each country’s interest and contribute to increasing peace and common prosperity of the Northeast Asian region, can they actively support unification and extend a helping hand. The unification of the Korean peninsula is an important task that encompasses the national interest of Korea and the four surrounding countries. Korea should make the international community recognize it as a fact that the unification of the Korean peninsula is a model of world peace and development.

The United States

A unified Korea will greatly contribute to prevailing the United States’ national interest and its traditional values to Asian regions and the world. Korea is a model of simultaneously achieving economic development and democratization and, on top of this, a model of contribution to international peace and common prosperity. A unified Korea could contribute to international peace by actively participating in preventing new security threats along with the United States. Korea’s active participation in the U.S.-led nuclear summit(such as hosting the second nuclear summit) will bring about positive effects to maintaining the United States’ leadership over international order.

Above all, a fundamental solution is necessary to the North Korean nuclear issue, which is one of the greatest obstacles to maintaining the international nonproliferation regime. In this regard, the unified Korea will be a worldwide model of nonproliferation and active realization of peace as a denuclearized peaceful country. Moreover, the unified Korea will play the peace mediator role for conflicts that could arise in the dynamics among the powers in the Northeast Asian region. Amid continued Korea-U.S. strategic alliance, the unified Korea will share the role with the United States. In addition, the unified Korea will be able to prevent China from becoming a hegemonic country and thereby prevent the emergence of a “vertical Sino-centric” international order, and contribute to the emergence of a horizontal peace order that is mutual beneficial and equal.

A unified Korea will be a bridge country linking the continent and ocean and Korea-U.S. alliance will continue to play the role of the pillar of peace and stability in the Northeast Asia region even after unification, just like the continuation of the NATO alliance. Korea-U.S. alliance will be operated amid cooperation with a Northeast Asian multilateral security cooperation system that is expected to be formed in the process of unification. Unified Korea’s continued alliance with the United States will be a fortress of strategic cooperation through the United States’ continued bilateral alliance with other Asia-Pacific countries such as Japan and Australia. A unified Korea will be the catalyst of economic prosperity that leads the economic prosperity of the Northeast Asian region through the Korea-U.S. FTA, the Korea-China-Japan FTA, and developed Korea-Russia economic partnership.

China

Pursuing the unification of Korea should be carried out along with developing trust relationships between Korea and China in political and security terms, and this will be the foundation of strategic friendly relations with China. The emergence of a unified Korea will contribute to peace and economic prosperity of Northeast Asia and pos-

itively contribute to China's national interest. Unified Korea will peacefully cooperate and coexist with China and contribute to expanding peace and security of Northeast Asia. The emergence of a unified Korea will positively contribute to China's economic interest, such as consummating China's long term strategy on modernization. That is, the emergence of a unified Korea will contribute to creating a stable and peaceful environment intended by China, present an opportunity to accelerate the economic development in Northeastern China, and provide a positive turning point in China's construction of the Northeast Asian community.

Furthermore, the unified Korea will respect the existing borders with North Korean regions as well as China's minority policy based on the principle of non-intervention. Korea-U.S. alliance after unification will be adjusted in accordance with the post-unification era. Korea-U.S. relations will be developed to more balanced relations, and Korea-China military cooperation will be possible, and military trust and cooperation between Korea and China will increase. Moreover, the emergence of a unified Korea eliminates the source of security crisis on the Korean peninsula and thus will be an important opportunity for parallel development of Korea-U.S. alliance and Korea-China strategic cooperative relationship.

Japan

Unified Korea will be the foundation for further advancement of Korea-Japan relationship based on the "strategic cooperative" relations that are expected to follow as relationships between the two countries develop further. A unified Korea will play the role of neutralizing China's "vertical Northeast Asian order" by cooperating with Japan. The process of realizing unified Korea will propel continuous development of the Northeast Asian community centered on Korea, Japan, and China. Thus the emergence of a unified Korea is the path to realizing the Northeast Asian community also favored by Japan.

Unified Korea will play the role of partner for denuclearization and creating peace

in the Northeast Asian region. The unified Korea will be the most friendly neighboring country to Japan in the aspect of foreign relations and security. Cooperation with Japan is inevitable in the process of denuclearizing the Korean peninsula, and this will be a stage to unfold Japan's initiative to make Northeast Asia a nuclear-free zone. Furthermore, comprehensive security cooperation between the unified Korea and Japan will play the role of neutralizing China's "vertical Northeast Asian order."

If the unified Korea presents an opportunity for co-existence and co-prosperity throughout Northeast Asia, the unified Korea would be a genuine helper to Japan's "Northeast Revitalization New Deal policy" in the economic aspect. Unified Korea and Japan will be positioned as equal leaders and competitors in good faith in the advanced technology industries of the Northeast Asian region. In addition, the emergence of a unified Korea will present an opportunity to propel the realization of the Northeast Asian community planned by Japan.

With regard to history issues, the emergence of a unified Korea will be an opportunity to resolve conflict elements with Japan and make a new start. In particular, the emergence will present a clue to fundamentally resolving the issue of North Korea's abduction of Japanese, which is one of the issues of the Japanese people's acute concern.

In social and cultural aspects, the unification of Korea will be an opportunity to develop the existing pop culture represented by the Korean wave to a new pop culture combining the traditional culture of North and South Korea. As countries of strong traditional and pop culture, social and cultural exchanges between the unified Korea and Japan in various forms could generate the effect of actively sending the message of Northeast Asian culture to the entire world.

Russia

The unification of Korea will bring about considerable benefits to Russia, such as maintaining the stability of the Korean peninsula, removal of North Korea's weapons of mass destruction, central country of the Eurasian connections, entry of the Russian

Far East into the Asia-Pacific economic bloc, and full-steam development of the East Siberian areas and the Russian Far East. The process and emergence of a unified Korea will play the role of stepping stone for new development in the areas that traditionally border between Russia and the Korean peninsula, while respecting Russia's interest in these areas. The emergence of a unified Korea will be an opportunity for the Russian Far East's economic leaping forward. Full-scale development of Siberian oil fields and underground resources, as well as transportation networks including the Eurasian railways and gas pipe lines will contribute to Russia's national development.

Creating a friendly external environment is essential to Russia's successful achievement of its national goal of modernization and other goals and the stability of the Korean peninsula, which has a 17km border with the Russian Far East, is also very important. The unification of the Korean peninsula will enable the Russian government to more focus on achieving its national goals because it will transform a potential conflict region in the Russian border areas to a stable region. In addition, with the unification of the Korean peninsula, the TSR-TKR connection will naturally be realized and Russia will be able to emerge as the central country that connects major Eurasian cities - Busan, Seoul, Wonsan, Khabarovsk, Siberia, Moscow, Prague, Frankfurt, and Paris. Through this connection, human and material movements between Europe and Northeast Asia are expected to increase on a large scale. The Russian government has long felt the need to develop East Siberia and the Far East areas, but has not been able to develop full-scale because of lack of capital, technology, manpower, and investment. Thus the unification of the Korean peninsula will open the possibility of developing this region on a full scale.

Conclusion

The unification of Korea means the end to the divided countries system that emerged after World War II, and this will be the end of the post-war system and the symbol of a new international peace order. The new international order of Northeast

Asia that will follow the unification of the Korean peninsula will contribute to peace and economic prosperity beyond regional scope to Asia and world. In particular, the emergence of the Northeast Asian community will be possible and Korea's central role in the security and economic development of the Asia-Pacific region is expected. Moreover, the unified Korea will play a catalyst role for peace and prosperity worldwide.

To the Korean nation, the unification of the Korean peninsula has a symbolic meaning of achieving "national integration" that has not been possible due to the division. In addition, this will be a decisive opportunity for Korea to achieve its state vision of the 21st century, which is to become an advanced first-class country. Unification will be a stepping stone for leaping toward a proactive and creative country befitting the globalization era by integrating North and South Korea's national strength that has been wasted in the draining competition during the long division. However, more importantly, the emergence of an integrated country that has achieved democratic peace on the Korean peninsula will open a path that contributes to peace and common prosperity in Northeast Asia and the world.

Diplomacy for unification is an effort to set the stage for the unified Korea to contribute to mankind's development in the future. Despite the attention given to the geopolitical location of the Korean peninsula, we have not been properly aware of the importance of diplomacy for unification in the process of carrying out Korea's unification policy. Though belatedly, now we are aware of the need for diplomacy for unification because the Korean peninsula issues have become more internationalized and the globalization and information age has progressed rapidly. Although the main purpose of diplomacy for unification is to assist the realization of unification, more fundamentally, it is an effort to find a way to co-exist and develop by informing the neighboring countries and the international community and making them understand our national development strategy.

Contributors

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Dr. Bae received B.A. in Political Science from Yonsei University and an M.A. and a Ph.D. in Political Science from University of Tokyo. His research interests include Japanese domestic politics and foreign policy, South Korean policy toward North Korea and unification policy, International politics of Northeast Asia. He is the author of a number of monographs and books in Korean on those subjects, including *South Korea's Strategy for Regime Transformation in North Korea and Cooperation among Northeast Asian Four Countries* (Seoul: KINU, 2009); *Domestic and Foreign Policy of the Abe Cabinet* (Seoul: KINU, 2007); *Japan's Security Strategy within its National Strategy* (Seoul: Nanam, 2006); *Korea's Vision for 21st Century and Strategy toward North Korea* (Seoul: KINU, 2002). He is editor-in-chief and a co-author of *The U.S.-ROK Alliance in the 21st Century* (KINU-CNAS Joint Research Project, 2009) and *Nuclear Security 2012* (KINU-USKI Joint Research Project, 2010).

Yeom, Don-Jay | Dean, Graduate School of Strategic Studies, Sungkyunkwan University

Dr. Yeom served as a secretary to the president for National Policy in the Roh Tae-woo administration, playing a pivotal role in the drafting of the administration's Northern policies and in negotiations with communist countries to establish diplomatic ties. In June 1990, Dr. Yeom successfully arranged a summit talk between Korea and the Soviet Union through behind-the-scenes negotiations. Shortly before German reunification, he was appointed minister of the Korean Embassy in Germany, where he witnessed the process of German unification. Under the Roh Moo-hyun administration, Dr. Yeom served as the First Deputy Director (for foreign affairs) of the National Intelligence Service (NIS). Dr. Yeom now conducts research and gives lectures on the topics of national intelligence, national security, and German reunification. He authored *The Process of German*

Reunification and its Implications (2010), and his latest scholarly article is entitled “Prospects for Security Conditions in Korea and Challenges in National Intelligence.” Dr. Yeom graduated from Yonsei University with a B.A. degree in Political Science and Diplomacy, and received his M.A. and Ph.D. degrees from the Graduate School of Public Administration at Seoul National University.

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Dr. Hassig is an independent scholar specializing in North Korean affairs, and an adjunct professor of psychology at the University of Maryland University College, where he teaches courses in social psychology, organizational behavior, and political psychology. He was educated at Albion College (B.A. in psychology), UCLA (M.A. and Ph.D. in social psychology), and the University of San Francisco (M.B.A. in marketing). He has taught psychology at Albion College, George Mason University, and the University of Maryland University College in the United States and abroad. He has also taught marketing at the University of Southern California and California State University at Los Angeles, and English at the University of San Francisco. He is the co-author of *North Korea through the Looking Glass* (2000) and *The Hidden People of North Korea* (2009). His recent articles on North Korea include “Kim Jong-un Inherits the Bomb,” *International Journal of Korean Unification Studies* (2011), and “North Korea in 2009: The Song Remains the Same,” *Asian Survey*, January/February 2010.

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Dr. Oh is a Research Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) and a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution. She was formerly a member of the political science department of the RAND Corporation and has taught courses at a number of universities. She is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, the Korea Working Group of the United States Institute of Peace, the Board of Directors of the United States Committee of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific, and she is the co-founder and former co-director of The Korea Club of Washington, D.C. She received her B.A. at Sogang University and M.A. at Seoul National University. She sub-

sequently earned an M.A. and Ph.D. in Asian Studies at the University of California, Berkeley. She is the co-author of *North Korea through the Looking Glass* (2000) and *The Hidden People of North Korea* (2009). Her recent articles include “The United States between Japan and Korea” (2010), and “Military Confrontation on the Korean Peninsula” (IDA 2011).

Takashi Inoguchi | President, University of Niigata Prefecture
Professor Emeritus, The University of Tokyo

Dr. Inoguchi received Ph.D. in Political Science from Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is also former Assistant Secretary General of the United Nations assigned to The United Nations University Headquarters. He has published some 85 books and numerous articles both in English and in Japanese in the broad range of subjects, yet focusing on Japan and international affairs. Among them are *American Democracy Promotion* (2000), *Political Cultures in Asia and Europe* (2006), *Globalization, Public Opinion, and the State* (2009), and *Reinventing the Alliance* (2003). He is a member of the Science Council of Japan and Founding Editor, *The Japanese Journal of Political Science* (Cambridge University Press) and *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* (Oxford University Press).

You Ji | Associate Professor, The University of New South Wales

Dr You Ji is Reader at School of Social Science, the University of New South Wales. He graduated from the Peking University and worked in the Chinese government for a number of years before studying in Australia. He is author of three books, including the *Armed Forces of China*, and numerous articles. The latest include: “Hedging Opportunities and Crises against Pyongyang’s Hereditary Succession: A Chinese Perspective” (2011), “The Evolution of Beijing’s Military Strategy toward Taiwan” (2011), “China’s Response to the Deadly Triangle: Arms Race, Territorial Disputes and Energy Security” (2010), “Friends in Needs or Comrades in Arms: Sino-Russo Military

Cooperation” (2010). You Ji is on the editorial board of the *China Journal*, *Provincial China*, *East Asia Policy*, *Asian and Middle East Studies* and *Journal of Contemporary China*.

Alexander Panov | Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary

Dr. Panov graduated from the Moscow State Institute of International Relations(MGIMO) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR in 1968. Speaks English and Japanese. Dr. Panov has published more than 50 publications in the field of international relations, a number of monographs including “The Diplomatic Service of Japan”, “Post-War Reforms in Japan. 1945~1952”, “From Mistrust to Trust”(in Japanese), “It is Clear after the Storm”(in Japanese), “Russia and Japan: Formation and Development of Relations in the late 20th-the early 21st Century” and many more.

Park, Young-Ho | Senior Research Fellow, KINU

Dr. Park received a Ph.D. in political science from the University of Cincinnati. He has served as director for international relations studies, unification policy studies, North Korean human rights studies, and planning and coordination at KINU. He is a policy advisor to the Ministry of Unification of the ROK. He was president of the Korean Association of Area Studies and a vice president of the Korean Political Science Association. He has written widely on inter-Korean relations, Korean unification issues, North Korean human rights, North Korea, and U.S. foreign and security policy toward the Korean Peninsula. His most recent publications are *Unification Clock: Predicting Korean Unification* (KINU, 2010) and “The Helsinki Process in Comparative Perspective: Implications for the Korean Peninsula,” *Comparative Democratic Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 1 (2009).

최근 발간자료 안내

연구총서

2009-01	북한 비핵화를 위한 한·미 전략적 협력에 관한 연구	전성훈	7,500원
2009-02	세계경제위기와 미·중관계 변화 연구: 북한 핵문제에 미치는 영향	황병덕, 신상진	9,000원
2009-03	북한의 국력 평가 연구	전현준 외	10,000원
2009-04	북한경제의 시장화 실태에 관한 연구	임강택	9,000원
2009-05	21세기 한국의 동아시아국가들과 전략적 협력 강화방안	여인곤 외	10,000원
2009-06	북한체제 전환을 위한 전략적 과제와 한국의 동북아 4국 협력전략	배정호 외	10,000원
2009-07	북한 '변화'의 재평가와 대북정책 방향	박형중 외	10,000원
2009-08	북한 개방 유도 전략: 목표, 기본방향 및 단계별 과제	최진욱 외	10,000원
2009-09	북한주민 인권의식 고취를 위한 전략적 인권외교의 방향	홍우택 외	6,500원
2009-10	통일대비 북한토지제도 개편방향 연구	허문영 외	9,000원
2009-11	북한인권 침해구조 및 개선전략	이금순, 김수암	7,500원
2009-12	통일대계 탐색연구	조 민 외	8,000원
2009-13	Modernization and Opening-Up of North Korean Economy: Roles and Efforts of Neighboring Countries	김규륜 외	7,500원
2009-15	Peace-Keeping on the Korean Peninsula: The Role of Commissions	Gabriel Jonsson	20,000원
2010-01	북한 핵 보유 고수 전략의 도전과 대응	박형중 외	9,500원
2010-02	탈사회주의 경제이행 국가의 권력구조 유형과 개혁 경로: 포스트-김정일 체제에 대한 시사점	최진욱, 김진하	8,000원
2010-03	북한 개방화와 인권개선 방안연구	김국신, 김연수, 서보혁	7,000원
2010-04	북한의 체제위기와 사회갈등	조한범, 양문수, 조대엽	7,500원
2010-05	오바마 행정부 출범 이후 동북아전략 환경의 변화와 한국의 동북아 4국 통일외교전략	배정호 외	12,500원
2010-06	북한주민 인권의식 실태연구	이금순, 전현준	8,500원
2010-07	라진·선봉지역 물류분야 남북 협력방안 연구	김영윤, 추원서, 임을출	8,000원
2010-08	민족공동체 통일방안의 새로운 접근과 추진방안: 3대 공동체 통일구상 중심	박종철 외	11,500원
2010-09	통일한국의 정치체제	허문영	6,000원
2010-10	북한 핵에 대한 억지방향 연구	홍우택	5,000원
2010-11	북한의 포스트 김정일체제 전망	정영태 외	11,000원
2010-12	북한주민의 의식과 정체성: 자아의 독립, 국가의 그늘, 욕망의 부상	조정아 외	17,000원
2010-13	북·중 경제관계와 남북경협에 대한 대북 파급효과 비교분석	최수영	7,500원
2010-14	East Asian Community Building: Issue Areas and Perspectives of Regional Countries	김규륜 외	10,000원
2010-15(I)	신아시아 외교와 새로운 평화의 모색(I)	김규륜 외	13,000원
2010-15(II)	신아시아 외교와 새로운 평화의 모색(II)	김규륜 외	13,000원
2011-01	제2차 핵안보정상회의와 북한 핵문제	전성훈	14,500원
2011-02	북한군의 기강 해이에 관한 연구	이교덕 외	11,000원
2011-03	통일 진입과정에서의 북한 재건 방향	최진욱, 김진하	5,500원
2011-04	북한의 부문별 조직실태 및 조직문화 변화 종합연구	정영태	16,000원
2011-05	북한형사재판제도 연구: 특징과 실태	이규창, 정광진	8,000원
2011-06	북한주민의 삶의 질: 실태와 인식	김수암 외	12,000원
2011-07	한반도 평화와 북한 비핵화: 협력적 위협감축(CTR)의 적용방안	박종철 외	10,000원
2011-08	대북한 핵협상 전략구상방향	홍우택 외	6,000원
2011-09	중국의 부상에 대한 북한의 인식과 대응	허문영, 마민호	12,000원
2011-10	북한 핵의 국제정치와 한국의 대북 핵전략	배정호 외	11,000원
2011-11	평화통일을 위한 통일외교 전략	박영호 외	13,500원

2011-12(I) 중국의 G2 부상과 한반도 평화통일 추진전략 제1부	황병덕 외	15,500원
2011-12(II) 중국의 G2 부상과 한반도 평화통일 추진전략 제2부	황병덕 외	13,500원
2011-12(III) 중국의 G2 부상과 한반도 평화통일 추진전략 제3부	황병덕 외	18,000원

학술회의총서

2009-01 북핵 문제 해결 방향과 북한 체제의 변화 전망		6,500원
2009-02 북핵 일괄타결(Grand Bargain)방안 추진방향		5,500원
2010-01 이명박 정부 2년 대북정책 성과 및 향후 추진방향		8,000원
2010-02 독일 통일 20년과 한반도 통일비전		6,000원
2010-03 분단관리에서 통일대비로		5,500원
2010-04 독일 통일 20년과 한국의 통일대비		7,000원
2011-01 한반도 통일비전과 국제협력		4,000원
2011-02 제1차 샹이오 인권포럼-북한인권 실상과 개입방안		8,500원

협동연구총서

2009-15-01 북한개발지원의 포괄적 추진방안(총괄보고서)	임강택 외	8,500원
2009-15-02 북한개발지원의 이론과 포괄적 전략	박형중 외	10,000원
2009-15-03 북한개발지원의 쟁점과 해결방안	김정수 외	10,000원
2009-15-04 북한개발지원을 위한 국제협력 방안	장형수 외	10,000원
2009-15-05 북한개발지원체제의 구축방안	이종무 외	9,000원
2009-15-06 지방자치단체의 북한개발지원 전략과 접근방법	양현모 외	10,000원
2009-16-01 복잡계 이론을 통한 북한의 정상국가화 방안 연구(총괄보고서)	김국신 외	6,000원
2009-16-02 북한체제의 행위자와 상호작용	이교덕 외	8,000원
2009-16-03 북한 계획경제의 변화와 시장화	이 석 외	9,000원
2009-16-04 탈냉전 이후 국제관계와 북한의 변화	민병원 외	8,000원
2009-17-01 비핵·개방·3000 구상: 추진전략과 실행계획(총괄보고서)	여인곤 외	7,500원
2009-17-02 이명박 정부의 대북정책 및 추진환경과 전략	박종철 외	8,000원
2009-17-03 비핵·개방·3000 구상: 한반도 비핵화 실천방안	조 민 외	9,000원
2009-17-04 비핵·개방·3000 구상: 북한의 개방화 추진방안	함택영 외	7,500원
2009-17-05 비핵·개방·3000 구상: 남북경제공동체 형성방안	조명철 외	7,000원
2009-17-06 비핵·개방·3000 구상: 행복공동체 형성방안	이금순 외	7,500원
2010-14-01 북한정보체계 실태조사(총괄보고서)	황병덕 외	12,000원
2010-14-02 북한정보체계 실태조사(上)	황병덕 외	14,000원
2010-14-03 북한정보체계 실태조사(下)	황병덕 외	13,000원
2010-15-01 이명박 정부 외교안보통일정책의 세부 실천방안 (총괄보고서)	여인곤 외	9,000원
2010-15-02 이명박 정부 외교안보통일정책의 추진환경 및 전략과 실천방안	박영호 외	9,500원
2010-15-03 이명박 정부 대북통일정책의 세부실천방안	허문영 외	7,000원
2010-15-04 이명박 정부 외교정책의 세부실천방안(1): 협력 네트워크 외교 분야	남궁영 외	7,500원
2010-15-05 이명박 정부 외교정책의 세부 실천방안(2): 포괄적 실리외교 분야	전재성 외	9,500원
2010-15-06 이명박 정부 안보정책의 세부 실천방안	이수훈 외	7,500원
2010-16-01 북한의 정상국가화 지원방안 연구(총괄보고서)	이교덕 외	7,000원
2010-16-02 북한의 정치부문 정상국가화 지원방안	전현준 외	7,500원
2010-16-03 북한 시장 진화에 관한 복잡계 시뮬레이션	조정아 외	14,000원
2010-16-04 북한의 정상국가화를 위한 국제사회의 지원방안	민병원 외	7,500원
2011-14-01 북한정보관리체계 개선방안(총괄보고서)	황병덕 외	14,500원

2011-14-02	북한정보관리체계 개선방안(上)	황병덕 외	13,000원
2011-14-03	북한정보관리체계 개선방안(中)	황병덕 외	12,000원
2011-14-04	북한정보관리체계 개선방안(下)	황병덕 외	13,500원
2011-15-01	북한 경제발전을 위한 국제협력 프로그램 연구: 국제사회의 경험 분석(총괄보고서)	임강택, 이상연	11,000원
2011-15-02	부패의 개념과 실태 및 반부패 개혁	박형중 외	10,000원
2011-15-03	체제전환국의 시장 - 민주제도 건설 지원	박영호, 캐스린버티니, 린리	13000원
2011-15-04	국제사회의 개발지원전략과 협력체계 연구	장형수, 김석진, 김정수	9,500원
2011-15-05	수원국의 역량발전을 위한 개발협력 전략과 사례	이중무, 김태균, 송정호	9,500원
2011-15-06	인프라 개발을 위한 국제협력 사례와 시사점	이상준, 남경민, 임을출	9,000원

논총

통일정책연구, 제18권 1호 (2009)	10,000원
<i>International Journal of Korean Unification Studies</i> , Vol. 18, No. 1 (2009)	20,000원
통일정책연구, 제18권 2호 (2009)	10,000원
<i>International Journal of Korean Unification Studies</i> , Vol. 18, No. 2 (2009)	20,000원
통일정책연구, 제19권 1호 (2010)	10,000원
<i>International Journal of Korean Unification Studies</i> , Vol. 19, No. 1 (2010)	20,000원
통일정책연구, 제19권 2호 (2010)	10,000원
<i>International Journal of Korean Unification Studies</i> , Vol. 19, No. 2 (2010)	20,000원
통일정책연구, 제20권 1호 (2011)	10,000원
<i>International Journal of Korean Unification Studies</i> , Vol. 20, No. 1 (2011)	20,000원

북한인권백서

북한인권백서 2009	이금순 외	10,000원
<i>White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea 2009</i>	이금순 외	20,000원
북한인권백서 2010	박영호 외	20,000원
<i>White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea 2010</i>	박영호 외	20,000원
북한인권백서 2011	김국신 외	17,500원
<i>White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea 2011</i>	김국신 외	17,500원

기타

2009	Lee Myung-bak Government's North Korea Policy	Suh, Jae-Jean	5,500원
2009	김정일 현지도 동향 1994-2008		15,000원
2009	The U.S.-ROK Alliance in the 21st Century	Bae, Jung-Ho, Abraham Denmark	10,000원
2009	북한의 주요현안과 한·미 전략적 공조	배정호	10,000원
2009	오바마 행정부의 출범에 따른 미·중관계의 변화와 한반도	배정호	10,000원
2010	김정일 현지도 동향 1994~2009		15,000원
2010	2010 독일통일백서		13,000원
2010	21세기 러시아의 국가전략과 한·러 전략적 동반자관계		10,500원
2010	Russian National Strategy and R.O.K.-Russian Strategic Partnership in the 21st Century		13,500원
2010	NPT 체제와 핵안보		13,000원
2010	Nuclear Security 2012: Challenges of Proliferation and Implication for the Korean Peninsula		15,000원

2010	통일 환경 평가(통일대계 연구 2010-01)	박종철 외	18,000원
2010	통일비전 개발(통일대계 연구 2010-02)	조민 외	12,000원
2010	독일의 평화통일과 통일독일 20년 발전상(통일대계 연구 2010-03)	황병덕 외	16,000원
2010	사회주의 체제전환 이후 발전상과 한반도통일-중국, 베트남 및 중동부 유럽 국가들의 사회주의 체제전환 중심(통일대계 연구 2010-04)	황병덕 외	15,000원
2010	전환기의 북한과 통일담론(통일대계 연구 2010-05)	배정호 편저	11,000원
2010	한반도 통일과 주변 4국(통일대계 연구 2010-06)	최진욱 편저	11,000원
2010	Korean Unification and the Neighboring Powers(통일대계 연구 2010-07)	최진욱 편저	13,000원
2011	남북 친화력 확대 방안(통일대계연구 2011-02)	조민 외	6,000원
2011	통일대비를 위한 국내과제(통일대계연구 2011-03)	박종철 외	13,000원
2011	통일외교 과제와 전략(통일대계연구 2011-04)	최진욱 외	13,000원
2011	US-China Relations and Korean Unification(Grand Plan for Korean Unification 2011-05)	최진욱 편저	12,000원
2011	2011년 통일에측시계구축	박영호, 김형기	7,500원
2011	한반도 통일과 동북아 4국의 입장과 역할	배정호 외	6,500원
2011	Korean Unification and the Positions and Roles of the Four Neighboring Powers	배정호 편	8,500원
2011	중국의 부상에 따른 동북아 전략환경의 변화와 한반도	배정호 편	12,000원
2011	2011 Unification Clock: When We See a Unified Korea?	Park Young-Ho, Kim Hyeong Ki	4,000원

연례정세보고서

2009	통일환경 및 남북한 관계 전망: 2009~2010	7,000원
2010	통일환경 및 남북한 관계 전망: 2010~2011	7,000원

통일정세분석

비매품

2008-12	한·러 정상회담 결과분석		여인곤
2009-01	2009년 북한 신년 공동사설 분석	최진욱, 전현준, 정영태, 조정아, 최수영, 박영호, 박형중	
2009-02	하반기('08년 7월~12월) 북한의 정세 분석	최진욱, 임순희, 전현준, 정영태, 조정아, 최수영	
2009-03	북한의 대남 비방 공세의 의도와 전망	최진욱, 전현준, 정영태	
2009-04	북한의 제12기 최고인민회의 대의원 선거 결과 분석	전현준	
2009-05	2008년 북·중무역의 주요 특징	임강택, 박형중	
2009-06	북한 최고인민회의 제12기 제1차 회의 결과 분석	최수영, 정영태	
2009-07	한·미 정상회담 결과분석	김국신	
2010-01	2010년 북한 신년 공동사설 분석	임강택 외	
2010-02	북한 최고인민회의 제12기 제2차 회의 결과 분석	최수영	
2010-03	김정일 방중과 중국의 전략외교	배정호, 박영호, 전병곤	
2010-04	2010상반기 북한정세 분석 보고서	정영태, 이교덕, 최수영, 임순희, 조정아	
2010-05	독일통일 20주년 조망: 독일통일이 한반도 통일에 주는 시사점	황병덕	
2010-06	야로슬라블 한·러 정상회담 결과 분석	여인곤	
2010-07	북한 3대 세습 후계구도 분석 및 정책변화 전망	김진하	
2011-01	2011년 북한 신년 공동사설 분석	최진욱 외	
2011-02	미·중 정상회담의 의미와 한국의 전략적 고려사항	배정호 외	
2011-03	2011년 미·중 정상회담 평가: 동북아 및 한반도에의 함의	황병덕 외	
2011-04	2009년 헌법 개정 이후 북한 노동법제 동향	이규창	
2011-05	최근 북한주민의 의식변화와 정책적 시사점	임순희	
2011-06	최고인민회의 제12기 제4차 회의 결과 분석	임강택, 최진욱	
2011-07	중동 민주화 혁명과 한반도 전략적 함의	배정호, 박영호, 박재적, 이기헌	

2011-08	북한의 여성권·아동권 관련 법 제정 동향	임순희, 김수암, 이규창
2011-09	상반기 북한경제 분석 보고서	최진욱, 임강택, 임순희, 정영태, 김진하, 한기범

KINU 정책연구시리즈		비매품
2009-01	신평화구상 실현을 위한 전략과 과제	김규륜 외
2009-02(I)	접경지역의 평화지대 조성을 통한 남북교류 활성화 방안(I): 접경지역 평화적 이용을 위한 이론적 검토와 사례연구	손기웅 외
2009-02(II)	접경지역의 평화지대 조성을 통한 남북교류 활성화 방안(II): 접경지역 평화적 이용을 위한 기존제안 검토	손기웅 외
2009-03	대북정책의 대국민 확산방안	조한범 외
2009-04	통일 예측 시계 구축	박영호, 김지희
2009-05	북핵일지 1955-2009	조민, 김진하
2009-06	미국 대북방송 연구: 운용실태 및 전략을 중심으로	이원웅
2010-01	한반도 녹색성장을 위한 남북한 산림협력 법제 개선방안 예비연구	이규창
2010-02	2010년 통일에측시계	박영호 외
2010-03	북한 경제개발계획 수립방안 연구: 베트남 사례를 중심으로	임강택 외
2010-04(III)	접경지역의 평화지대 조성을 통한 남북교류 활성화 방안(III): 정책제안	손기웅 외
2010-04(IV)	접경지역의 평화지대 조성을 통한 남북교류 활성화 방안(IV): 2010년 「코리아 접경 포럼」 자료집	손기웅 외
2011-01	재스민혁명의 분석과 북한에 대한 시사점	박종철 외

북한인권: 국제사회 동향과 북한의 대응		비매품
2009	북한인권: 국제사회 동향과 북한의 대응, 제4권 1호	박영호, 이금순, 김수암, 홍우택
2009	북한인권: 국제사회 동향과 북한의 대응, 제4권 2호	박영호, 이금순, 김수암, 홍우택
2010	북한인권: 국제사회 동향과 북한의 대응, 제5권 1호	김국신, 김영운, 전현준, 이금순, 이규창
2010	북한인권: 국제사회 동향과 북한의 대응, 제5권 2호	김국신, 전현준, 이금순, 이규창
2011	북한인권: 국제사회 동향과 북한의 대응, 제6권 1호	김수암, 전현준, 이규창

Studies Series		비매품
2009-01	The Evaluation of Regime Stability in North Korea: Scenario Workshop Choi Jin-Wook, Kim Kook-Shin, Park Hyeong-Jung, Cheon Hyun-Joon Cho Jeong-Ah, Cha Moon-Seok, Hyun Sung-Il	
2009-02	Developing Inter-Korean Economic Relations for the 'Advancement of the Korean Peninsula Lim Kang-Teag, Kim Kyu-Ryoon, Jang Hyung-Soo, Cho Han-Bum, Choi Tae-Uk	
2009-03	The Everyday Lives of North Koreans Cho Jeong-Ah, Suh Jae-Jean, Lim Soon-Hee, Kim Bo-Geun, Park Young-Ja	
2009-04	North Korea's Regime Maintenance Policy Since the Kim Jong-il Regime and Prospects for Change Chon Hyun-Joon, Jeung Young-Tae, Choi Soo-Young, Lee Ki-Dong	
2010-01	Strategy for Encouraging North Korean Opening: Basic Direction and Sequential Tasks Choi Jinwook, Lee Kyo-Duk, Cho Jeong-Ah, Lee Jin-Yeong, Cha Moon-Seok	
2010-02	Unification Clock: Predicting Korean Unification Park Young Ho	

2011-01 A New Approach to the National Community Unification Formula
Park Jong Chul, Hong Woo Taek, Lee Kyu Chang, Kim Philo, Chun Chae Sung,
Cho Seong Ryoul, Hong Ihk Pyo, Hwang Sun Hye

기타

비매품

2010 2010 Unification Clock: When We Meet a Unified Korea Park Young Ho
2010 In Search of New Peace on the Korean Peninsula Kim Kyu-Ryoon

통일연구원 定期會員 가입 안내

통일연구원은 민족공동체 실현을 위한 국민 역량을 축적하고 통일환경 변화에 적극적 주도적으로 대응할 수 있도록 통일문제에 관한 제반 사항을 전문적, 체계적으로 연구하고 있습니다. 본원의 연구성과에 관심이 있는 분들에게 보다 많은 정보와 자료를 제공하고자 연간 회원제를 운영하고 있습니다.

연간 회원에게는 간행물을 우편으로 우송해 드리며 각종 학술회의에 참석할 수 있는 혜택을 드립니다.

1. 회원구분

- 가) 학생회원: 대학 및 대학원생
- 나) 일반회원: 학계나 사회기관소속 연구종사자
- 다) 기관회원: 학술 및 연구단체 또는 도서관

2. 가입방법

- 가) 「회원 가입신청서」 작성
- 나) 신한은행 140-002-389681(예금주: 통일연구원)으로 계좌입금
- 다) 연회비: 학생회원 7만원, 일반회원 10만원, 기관회원 20만원

3. 회원특전

- 가) 연구원이 주최하는 국제 및 국내학술회의 등 각종 연구행사에 초청
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