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Publisher's Note

The end of the Cold War in Europe has brought about new changes in Northeast Asia. As we enter the 1990s, the unification environment has significantly changed. In the international arena, we frequently observe that the ideological conflicts among the "adversary" states are being replaced with a new trend of global partnership and cooperation. On the other hand, domestically, people are more confident largely due to improved Korean national strength and a newly earned status on the international scene.

Thus there is a strong demand for exploring and implementing our own unification policies to meet the challenges of a tumultuous international environment.

Recognizing as opportunities these historic occasions and the changing world situation, the Korean government established the Research Institute for National Unification (RINU) on 9 April 1991.

During the past year and a half, we have worked hard to better organize our national efforts for peaceful unification and explore appropriate policy options that will contribute to the government unification policy. Because we fully recognize the importance of basic studies that would ultimately help us in the course of national unification, we have wasted no time to concentrate on our basic studies.

I hope that the publication of the Journal can provide a forum where many people concerned here and abroad can exchange views on contemporary issues affecting Korea. On behalf of the Institute, I would like to welcome your continued support, relentless criticism, and friendly advice. I also hope that many of our readers will find the Journal interesting and helpful in their understanding of issues related to the Korean unification.

Finally, I would like to express my sincere thanks to the authors who contributed their articles to this inaugural issue and to the members of the editorial staff, who have done such a fine job in the publication of The Korean Journal of National Unification.

> Byoung Yong Lee President, RINU

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South Korea's Policy Options in a Changing World

SungJoo Han

In this last decade of the twentieth century, the world is changing at a pace faster and to a degree greater than ever. For nearly 40 years since the end of World War II, nations of various sizes and orientations have conducted their respective foreign relations within the parameters set by a host of factors including the Cold War, U.S.-Soviet bipolarity, and the hegemonial leadership of the United States in military and economic fields. However, the Gorbachevian revolution in the Soviet Union which started in the mid-1980s brought about the collapse of the socialist world. The resulting end of the Cold War, combined with the relative decline of the United States as an economic superpower, has brought about a fundamental change in world structure and international relations. Our rapidly changing world environment presents each nation with the need to reassess basic assumptions and priorities concerning foreign and security policies.

In particular, countries such as the United States and Japan, which have close relations with South Korea and whose policy changes would have a direct bearing on its security assessment, are in the process of reevaluating the basic assumptions, objectives and principles of their external policies. The United States is facing the criticism from within that it no longer has the need

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In particular, countries such as the United States and Japan, which have close relations with South Korea and whose policy changes would have a direct bearing on its security assessment, are in the process of reevaluating the basic assumptions, objectives and principles of their external policies. The United States is facing the criticism from within that it no longer has the need or ability to pursue blindly its internationalist and interventionist policies of the post–World War II era. Hence, much effort is being made to formulate new policies that will be appropriate for a post–Cold War world. In the meantime, Japan is also reevaluating the basic premises of its post-war policy that have led it to conduct a highly U.S.-dependent, passive and low-posture diplomacy. Thus, Japan is now trying to take best advantage of its status as an economic superpower in the post–Cold War era in which the importance of economic power is growing relative to military power.

The transformation of the international order presents South Korea with serious challenge as well as opportunity in the conduct of foreign relations. It is a challenge because, even as the world as a whole is moving towards reconciliation, cooperation and openness, South Korea is still locked with North Korea in mutual suspicion and tension. South Korea faces the dilemma of accommodation and vigilance; North Korea has to choose between continued isolation at the cost of falling hopelessly behind financially, and opening up to the outside world at the risk of losing control internally.

Furthermore, the end of the Cold War could prompt the United States to disengage prematurely from the region and the Korean peninsula, thereby creating a power vacuum that other major powers including China, Japan and Russia might try to fill. Internally, democratization has meant a growing voice and assertiveness on the part of private sectors and groups in foreign affairs, thereby presenting considerable constraints in the government's ability to conduct foreign relations, particularly in trade and other areas involving economic issues.

At the same time, changes in the international environment are providing South Korea with the opportunity to expand and diversify its foreign relations. In particular, they have enabled South Korea to carry out successfully what it has pursued as the "Northern Policy," a diplomatic effort to establish and expand relations with the socialist countries. While the collapse of the socialist bloc was necessary for successful implementation of the Northern Policy, it also had the ironic effect of making such an effort less urgent for South Korea. In any case, its success in establishing diplomatic relations with the countries of the former socialist bloc, including the former Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, is both a result and part of the reason for the changing international order.

Until the 1980s, based on the existing international structure and order, South Korea had been pursuing the following policy objectives since the establishment of an independent government in 1948, roughly listed in the following order of priority.¹

1. Recognition by various countries and international organizations. This was an important objective in view of the refusal of the Communist bloc and many non-aligned countries to recognize South Korea. United Nations membership was also sought as a part of the recognition campaign.

2. Competition with North Korea. Accompanying the "recognition war" between North and South Korea was the competition for support by various countries and in international organizations. Even after President Roh Tae Woo's 7 July 1988, declaration South Korea held a negative view of North Korean official relations with its allies until there came an improvement in the South-North Korean relationship.

3. *Maximizing security*. Having experienced the North Korean invasion of 1950 and facing a continuous military threat, security became the most important objective, especially after 1953. The primary object nation of security diplomacy was the United States, upon which South Korea has depended for its security. The South Korean objective was to retain a U.S. presence in Korea and to muster maximum support for South Korean force improvement and modernization.

¹ A more detailed exposition of this subject is given in my article, "Tasks and Options of Korean Diplomacy in an Age of Transition," *Sasang Quarterly* (Summer 1992), pp. 236–63.

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4. Achieving economic solvency, development and growth. In the economic field as well, the United States was the nation of South Korea's primary policy concern. Initially during the 1950s and 60s it was aid, then in the 70s and 80s it was market and other forms of economic cooperation such as investment. Beginning in the second half of the 1980s it was market protection. These became the main issues in South Korean economic diplomacy. Democratization at home has placed many constraints on the government's ability to pursue rational policy objectives effectively.

5. Enhancing international status. The ROK had to deal more with immediate and urgent tasks in the security, economic and political areas than to pay much attention to moral or ideological issues. Furthermore, handicapped by its divided nation status, South Korea found it difficult to assume an active role in multilateral activities or settings. Only after hosting the Olympics in 1988 and being admitted to the United Nations in 1991 could it begin to pay attention to issues of universal nature and relevance.

6. Fostering international conditions to promote unification. As a divided nation, unification had to be an important policy objective. However, the immediate task of having to deal with the North Korean threats of internal subversion as well as military attack made it inevitable to place a priority on peace and coexistence over unification. Only after the two Koreas' admission to the United Nations and progress in major-power cross recognition of North and South Korea could the ROK engage in earnest in a bona fide "unification diplomacy."

The several policy objectives described above were established on the basis of the international and regional environment that prevailed until the 1980s, but now those objectives will have to be reassessed and new priorities set. The following sets of external factors will affect South Korean policy formulation in the years to come: 1) basic structure and characteristics of international relations that are emerging in the post–Cold War era, 2) interests perceived and objectives set by the United States for the changing international environment, 3) regional power relations and configuration in East Asia, and 4) an evolving Korean situation situation, particularly as a function of changing North-South Korean relations.

Changes in International Relations

Since the late 1980s the world has been experiencing a revolutionary change. The official declaration in June 1990 of the end of the Cold War at a U.S.-USSR summit meeting was in itself an epoch-making event. What has since evolved, with German unification as well as the failed coup d'etat in Moscow and disintegration of the Soviet Union, have made the pace and depth of the change no less breathtaking than before the declaration.

1. The end of bipolarity. While the world economy was becoming pluralized with the relative decline of the American economy, the United States and the Soviet Union remained martially the most powerful countries, effectively maintaining a military bipolarity. The collapse of the Soviet Union put an end to that, raising the debate over unipolarity, multi-polarity or whatever form of power configuration that will replace it.

2. Trend toward accommodation and reconciliation among states. Accompanying the reconciliation and cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia is the general trend toward accommodation among and between countries that have previously been in conflict. Starting with the Sino-Soviet rapprochement in 1985, various pairs of countries have reconciled or have strengthened their relationships with each other. Nonetheless, local conflicts such as the 1990–91 Gulf War or conflict among different national groups such as in Eastern Europe cannot be ruled out.

3. Rise of regionalism. Growing interdependence among the various states, particularly within the same region, has spurred a movement toward regionalization of world economy. Europe

has all but completed its economic integrative process while the three North American countries, the United States, Canada and Mexico, have organized the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA). Asia is debating whether to further institutionalize economic cooperation and integration among the Asian states, led by Japan. In security, multilateralism is receiving increasingly greater attention as an arrangement that could replace the bipolar system.

4. Changing balance between military and economic capabilities. Increasingly, economic capabilities are gaining greater importance and relevance in international affairs. Poor economic performance was the major cause of the collapse of the Communist bloc Relative to military power, economic strength is becoming in contemporary and future international relations an increasingly more effective means of exercising influence over other states.

5. Democratization and movement toward market economy. The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union was accompanied by their democratization. They also discovered the merit of market economy. In other parts of the world there is a trend for authoritarian regimes to give way to democratic governments and socialist states adopt market principles and market economy.

6. A Changing concept of "security." Increasingly, the term is used to mean something far more comprehensive than defending one country militarily from outside attack. It involves not only the military aspect of a nation's safety, but all other relevant areas such as economy, environment, resources, or way of life that could be threatened by either external or internal circumstances.

A key question being asked in connection with the changes described above is how the relative power positions of the major countries will be altered and what kind of international system, if any, will replace the bipolar world that does not exist anymore. One view, which may be characterized as that of "pluralism school" and which is widely shared in Japan, holds that the days of superpowers are gone and several countries or regions with various power bases will construct a complex network of influence relationships characterized by collective decision making, mutual checks and balances and cooperative efforts to deal with conflicts and crises.²

At the other end of the spectrum is the argument that with the eclipse of Soviet power and in the absence of any other power to match either the former Soviet Union or the present United States, the latter has emerged as the preeminent military power, thus forming in effect a world of "unipolarity."³ According to this view, the United States remains the only superpower capable of projecting its military power and exercising its influence over any part of the world. Although the United States needed military cooperation and financial contribution from other countries in the successful 1990–91 Gulf War, the American role as policeman of the world has become even more essential than before, and its ability to impose U.S. values and pursue policies has increased.

Both arguments introduced above may exaggerate the actual situation, at least for the time being. It is true that the United States will remain the most powerful military power in the world. That power, however, will be most effective in neutralizing the power of an adversary or imposing its will on small countries in its own neighborhood such as Grenada and Panama. Although the United States led the multinational force that defeated Iraq in the Gulf War, it required an extraordinary set of circumstances—circumstances that produced resolutions in the United Nations and the U.S. Congress and enabled the United States to wage the war. But those circumstances are highly un-

² Hisashi Owada, "The Japanese Role in the Regional Security of East Asia," in Eric Grove, ed., Global Security-North American, European and Japanese Interdependence in the 1990's (London, 1990), pp. 12-14.

³ See, for example, Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," Foreign Affairs (January 1991), pp. 23–33.

likely to be duplicated in any future conflict. Indeed, the present era can be seen more as one of transition from what might be called bipolarity to "pluralism" rather than to unipolarity.

Another basic question to be asked in connection with future international relations is: how fundamental is the change taking place now? Will history somehow repeat itself, or is the very nature of international relations undergoing the type of fundamental change that will make unlikely a repetition of history with its wars, imperialism and conquests? Those who believe this change is rather fundamental observe that with the end of the Cold War the days of old "geopolitics," in which nations play the power game of dominating and being dominated, are over.

Hence, according to this view, military power is becoming less important and less relevant relative to other elements such as economic and technological capabilities. Big powers cannot dominate small powers as they both become increasingly more interdependent. There are no "hegemons," only more or less co-equal partners. Peace is sought through collective security rather than alliances. Multilateralism rather than unilateralism or bilateralism will be the order of the day. One can be assured that a repeat of the power politics that was prevalent at the turn of the previous century, during the two world wars or in the post-war period, is unlikely. In the words of Joseph Nye, "power is becoming less fungible, less coercive, and less tangible."⁴

On the other hand, there are many who believe that it is much too early to dismiss the old geopolitics.⁵ Particularly in Asia, although one can witness the emergence of a new kind of relations among nations, the transformation lags much behind that in Europe both in speed and depth. The reasons are many. In comparison with Asia, the countries of Europe, particularly

⁴ Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Bound to Lead: The Challenging Nature of American Power (New York, 1990), p. 188.

⁵ See, for example, Samuel P. Huntington, "America's Changing Strategic Interest," Survival (January/February, 1991), pp. 3–17.

Western Europe, which for the most part are geographically contiguous and culturally compatible among themselves, have had the experience for several decades of cooperation and integrative efforts; internally their politics are more democratic and their civil society has deeper roots; their economies are more evenly developed and their economic systems more homogeneous; they have several nations with comparable strengths that can balance off one another. Even then, Europe has not completely rid itself of geopolitics, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe. Considering these contrasts, it is only natural that Asia has a long way to go before it can eulogize the passing of the old power politics.

U.S. Response

Korean security interests and policy will be affected most directly by the future directions U.S. policy takes. The end of the Cold War and the American success in the Gulf War have made the United States the preeminent power in the world. However, those events in turn have triggered a serious internal debate concerning its future security role in the world.⁶

The military sanction of Iraq was possible only because many critical factors—oil, the survival of Israel, a power struggle among the Gulf countries, Sadam Hussein's audacity, and the availability of time (several months before the invasion) and launching space (Saudi Arabia)—converged to enable an international (UN) and national (U.S. Congress) consensus to form. A similar action is unlikely to be able to be taken elsewhere later.

Since the end of the Second World War, in the course of the competition and Cold War with the Soviet Union, the United States overcame its long-held isolationist instincts and pursued

⁶ See the debate in the Summer 1992 issue of Foreign Affairs. Norman J. Ornstein, "Foreign Policy and the 1992 Election," pp. 1–16; James A. Leach, "A Republican Looks at Foreign Policy," pp. 17–31; and Lee H. Hamilton, "A Democrat Looks at Foreign Policy," pp. 32–51.

an internationalist foreign policy for which a basic consensus had been formed. Now with the end of the Cold War, America's relative economic decline, and pluralization of the world, divergent views on U.S. foreign policy contend among themselves concerning the way in which the United States should proceed in the years ahead. At the risk of oversimplification, two of those views may be considered isolationist in nature, and three of them basically internationalist.

One form of isolationism in existence since long before the end of the Cold War is expressed by progressive critics who have opposed U.S. arms buildup, military interventionism, and what they consider to be economic imperialism abroad. They opposed the U.S. involvement in Vietnam, support of the rightist regimes in the Third World countries, and the arms race with the Soviet Union which has only enriched the military-industrial complex at home. They have been particularly critical of the military establishment's exaggeration of the Soviet threat.⁷ For them, the collapse of socialism and the Soviet Union not only vindicates their previous assertions but also strengthens the argument that the United States has no need for military alliances and presence abroad.

Another, more recent, expression of isolationism comes from the opposite end of the spectrum. Having their ideological roots in the pre–World War II America, these conservatively oriented critics accept that what they considered to be the greatest threat to the United States and humanity, that of the Soviet bloc, has now dissipated. But they disagree with the progressives saying that the Soviet Union collapsed only because the U.S. took a strong stand, militarily as well as in economics, against socialism and the Soviet power. Now that the United States has "won" that contest, it can safely mind its own business and interest as "a normal country in a normal time."⁸

⁷ For example, Richard Barnet, Global Reach (New York, 1974).

⁸ Jean J. Kirkpatrick, "A Normal Country in a Normal Time," National Interest

Despite these isolationist trends, it is not likely that the United States would abandon overnight the internationalist-interventionist policies it has maintained for over 45 years since the end of World War II. Those who, despite the end of the Cold War and economic obstacles, argue that the United States must maintain internationalist policies and role do so on the following three grounds.

One school argues that, since hegemonic leadership is inevitable in any international system, some other country or power will try to fill the gap should the United States vacate that role by following its isolationist instinct. Hence, Samuel Huntington, who sees the post–Cold War world as a "uni-multipolar system" contends that the United States should check the militarization of Japan, maintain military balance in Europe and Asia, and protect U.S. interests in the Third World lest some other power try to assert its own hegemonic leadership in either the economic or military field.⁹ Unlike the Cold War warriors, however, even those who believe the United States should not cede its leadership role take a lukewarm attitude toward alliance relationships the United States has with "Third World" countries such as South Korea.¹⁰

Another school advocates an American leadership role on moral or idealistic grounds. Consistent with the pre-War idealism that was an important part of U.S. foreign policy considerations, those in this school argue that the United States has a golden opportunity to work effectively towards some of the ideals for which the nation and its people stand. They lament that the United States is not taking full advantage of its preeminent position in this "unipolar" world to pursue the "new world order," which should include such ideals as the inviolability of

⁽Fall 1990), pp. 40-44.

⁹ Samuel P. Hungtington, "America's Changing Strategic Interest," Survival (January/February, 1991), pp. 3-17.

¹⁰ Ibid.

sovereignty, rule by law, peaceful settlement of disputes, and protection of human rights.¹¹

A third "internationalist" school argues that the primary role of the United States in the future world should be to maintain stability in key regions such as Europe and Asia, and to give reassurance of security to key countries such as Germany and Japan.¹² In fact, the United States has emerged as the protector of the world order in the wake of the end of the World War. In their view, a continued presence of the United States in Asia will help reassure those countries concerned about both intraregional and global sources of conflict.¹³ For this, they argue, the United States should recognize that it has lost the absolute superiority it once enjoyed in economic and political areas but continues to assume its military role with the support of and in cooperation with other countries.¹⁴

It should be noted that, from among the "five" schools of thought introduced above concerning the future policy directions, it is unlikely that the United States will adopt one policy exclusive of all the others. What seems certain is that, regardless of the relative weight each of these views will carry in the formulation of future U.S. policies, the United States will reduce its military presence globally and particularly in Asia, and it will have a direct bearing on policy toward Korea.

¹¹ Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment, Foreign Affairs (New York, 1991), pp,. 23-33; also, "Bush: Such Timidity, and Such a Bully Pulpit," The Washington Post, 23 September 1991.

¹² William Pfaff, "Redefining World Power," Foreign Affairs: America and the World (1990/91), pp. 34-48.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Several government reports such as "National Security Strategy of the United States," The White House, August, 1991, and "National Military Strategy of the United States," Washington, G.P.O. (for the Joint Chiefs of Staff), 1992, reflect views of this school. For reports on the defense planning guidelines of the Department of Defense, 1994–99, see The New York Times, 18 February and 24 May 1994.

Regional Politics

Asia lags behind Europe in regional integration and in the degree and depth to which former socialist states have been revolutionized. In Asia, for geographic as well as psychological reasons, the discontinuity between the former Soviet Union and Russia after its disintegration (and for that matter previously between Czarist Russia and the Soviet Union) is felt much less than it is in Europe. Nevertheless, changes do take place in the region in a way that is more relevant to South Korean choices than to global changes.¹⁵

To begin, the end of the Cold War, the subsequent disintegration of the Soviet Union, and emergence of a cooperative relationship between Russia and United States have all removed from the United States one of the most important incentives to maintain a strong military presence in Korea—that of countering the Soviet threat and expansionism. In light of the new international and regional situation of the 1990s, the level of U.S. troop presence in the future as well as the overall American role in Korea has become an object of reappraisal. As a result of these pressures the United States conducted an official review of its policy and position in Asia including Korea. Thus, a Department of Defense strategy statement, "A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Looking Toward the 21st Century," called for a transformation in the role of U.S. troops from one of leadership to one of support.¹⁶

The changes in the Soviet Union/Russia led to an official recognition of South Korea and the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1990, straining its relations with North Korea. The security implication for South Korea of this development is significant and far-reaching. For economic as well as political

¹⁵ See The New York Times, 18 February and 24 May 1994.

¹⁶ U.S. Department of Defense, A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Looking Toward the 21st Century (Washington, D.C., 1990).

reasons, Russia is limiting its supply of strategic goods including oil to North Korea. Although it has refused to abrogate its 1961 alliance (Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation) with North Korea and tries to maintain ties with Pyongyang, Moscow has been putting pressure on North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons program, which is posing a threat to regional stability and hampering North-South Korean dialogue.

Most important, the Soviet/Russian rapprochement with South Korea triggered a cross-recognition cycle between the two Koreas and the major powers, arousing strong incentive in Japan, China and the United States to follow suit. Contrary to the widely-held expectation that Japan would be the second major power to establish diplomatic relations with both Koreas, China moved first to normalize its relations with South Korea while the Japanese normalization effort with North Korea stalled due to Pyongyang's refusal to allow mutual inspection of nuclear facilities between North and South Korea.

Although the diplomatic normalization of August 24, 1992, between China and South Korea was achieved for reasons and logic of its own, there was an important element relating to Japan that lurks behind their move apart from economic and other bilateral interests. It is the perception in both China and South Korea that Japan is preparing to expand its political role and influence in Asia, requiring a countervailing move on the part of its neighbors who are weary of the implications of Japan's passage of the PKO bill, importation of quantities of plutonium, and apparent resurgence of "nationalism."

From the point of view of many Asians and Americans, Japan is gradually replacing the Soviet Union as a reason for the continuing U.S. military presence in the region, especially in Japan and Korea. It is not so much that Japan is seen as a present threat as it is the concern that, in case of a U.S. withdrawal, Japan either from a sense of insecurity or from plain opportunism might try to fill the vacuum. More immediately, it will take the form of larger Japanese military budget allocation and the creation of legal and institutional openings for overseas involvement. Presumably, a continued U.S. military presence will provide the needed reassurance for Japan's security as well as serving as a constraint on its arms buildup. South Koreans are now beginning to recognize the value of security ties with the United States not only to meet the North Korean threat but also as an irreplaceable balance to the other three major powers including Japan.

Multilateral security arrangements in the region (however "region" be defined) constitute another proposed response to an expected reduction of U.S. presence as well as to an anticipated increase in the role and influence of other powers, particularly Japan and China. It is too late, however, to think about an arrangement such as NATO and premature to attempt an Asian equivalent of CSCE. The ASEAN PMC formula proposed by ASEAN and supported by Japan is worthy of pursuit and support, but it will have only a limited relevance to Northeast Asia. In fact, the "geopolitical" elements still have too strong a presence in the area surrounding the Korean peninsula for a collective security system to be effective and sufficient. Furthermore, Seoul is still burdened with the complex predicament of the Korean division, with the accompanying and still existing threat from Pyongyang.

South Korean Policy Options

Given the radical changes in international relations taking place on both global and regional levels, South Korea needs to make a comprehensive and long-term assessment of the situation and make choices in several issue areas:

1) Relationship with the United States. Since its independence, South Korea has depended exclusively upon the U.S. for its security. In recent years, South Korea has made an effort to move away from this exclusive dependence, mainly in the non-military areas, in the name of "Northern Policy." But now, diplomatic normalization with the Soviet Union/Russia and with China seems to have accelerated the diversification process. South Korea will have to devise a way to balance the need to retain a U.S. military presence in Korea on the one hand and the pressures to reduce or withdraw it on the other.

2. Weight of military security. Ever since the Korean War, South Korea has been preoccupied with the immediate threat of North Korea. Thus security has been given the highest priority in attention as well as budget allocation. With the changing environment, the security situation is becoming more complex in terms of the source and type of threat. It requires paying attention to the broader regional context and to non-conventional security issues such as nuclear safety, environment, sea lines of communication, resources, and economic security.

3. Attention to universal and ethical issues. For reasons understandable, South Korea has been preoccupied with short-term and highly secular interests, mainly in areas of the economy and security. Due to urgent and immediate problems of its own, it could not pay attention to more universal issues of global peace, morality, values and ideals. Very often, however, "moral" issues have practical implications. With its membership in the United Nations and universal diplomatic relations, South Korea is now in a position to pay closer attention to and involve itself in global issues and areas of ethics.

4. "Non-zero sum game" with North Korea. As a divided nation, South Korea has for the most part been competing with North Korea, in effect playing a "zero sum game." This was inevitable in the face of the North Korean threat of external attack and internal subversion. In economics and internationally, however, North Korea is no longer in a position to be South Korea's serious rival. The July 7, 1988, declaration was meant to enunciate South Korean willingness to accept North Korea as a partner, not a competitor, in the international arena. This intention, however, has not been able to be tested substantially largely because North Korea never gave South Korea the opportunity to implement its announced intentions. Now that it has diplomatic relations with all four of the major powers including China, perhaps South Korea can start playing a "non-zero sum game" in earnest. South Korea can now seriously pursue its "unification diplomacy" and should make plans with the interest of a unified Korea, and with the divided South Korea, in mind.

5. *Multilateralism*. Finally, South Korea can play a more active role in and for multilateral arrangements, both regional and global. Already, Seoul played a key role in the organization and development of the Asia-Pacific Economic Council (APEC). It should pay more attention to and involve itself in non-economic organzations and arrangements, too. For the moment, South Korea is a member of neither a subregional organization such as the ASEAN nor a global grouping such as OECD, which is another reason why South Korea must become involved with new as well as old multilateral organizations and arrangements, both economic and non-economic.

In summary, the external circumstances require and internal developments enable South Korea to make choices in foreign relations that emphasize multilateralism, far-sightedness, and purposefulness.

빈 면

China's New Round of Economic Reforms and Sino-South Korean Relations

Euichul Choi

This article has two purposes: to offer a better understanding of recent reform efforts in China; and to analyze how this policy shift could affect Sino-South Korean relations. The first part of the paper deals with why Deng Xiaoping launched the campaign, "deepening the reforms." Next is an examination of how China's policy shift and changing conditions on and around the Korean peninsula in the Post–Cold War era will work for the development of political relations between the two countries.

The Rush Towards Economic Reforms

Deng Xiaoping made a month-long trip to Guangdong and Shanghai in early 1992. It was certainly not a pleasure trip to celebrate "spring festival," but a high-stakes political journey. The trip was called the Guangdong Inspection, in which Deng visited the Special Economic Zone (SEZ) of Shengzhen, Zhuhai and other municipalities. Since then, there have been renewed efforts for deepening the reforms in China's modernization.

His southern trip involved the direction and goal towards which China should move in the near future. Though many uncertainties remain, Deng anticipates economic prosperity. In the political arena, however, approaches for economic development still differ among leaders. Thus, this years meeting of the Fourteenth Party Congress will be crucial for the continuity of Deng's concept of a socialism with Chinese characteristics.

During his trip, Deng called for "fast-paced reforms" and "thought liberation," and "making quicker steps."¹ However, the event was not reported immediately in any of the major newspapers, (only in regional ones). In fact, the Party propaganda machines in the Center, dominated by the conservatives, strongly resisted delivering Deng's messages. Then, the publication of an article by Fang Sheng (professor of economics at the People's University) set a new stage for the ongoing battle between reformers and conservatives. Fang's article, entitled "Opening Up and the Use of Capitalism" gave theoretical support to Deng Xiaoping by advocating that "the so-called capitalist measures and ways...do not belong to class and can be used either by capitalism or socialism."² It was followed by nationwide media coverage on Deng's instructions for "greater courage in reforms" by April 1992. The tone of the propaganda gradually changed.

In the meantime, the Politburo meeting of March 9–10 put an end to the ideological debate on the so-called question of "names" and the "left." In fact, the question of whether to "name" a reform of an economic policy line "socialist" or "capitalist" was not new. However, the main criteria for China's socialist construction are to develop productive forces under socialism, to enhance the overall national strength of the socialist state, and to improve the living standards of the people.³ In short, what Deng Xiaoping advocated was that conventional distinc-

 [&]quot;Urges 'Reforms,' 'Thought Liberation,'" South China Morning Post, 19 March 1992, reprinted in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, China: Daily Report (hereafter FBIS-CHI), 19 March 1992. p. 28.

² People's Daily, 23 February 1992.

³ FBIS-CHI, 19 March 1992. p. 28.

tion between socialist method or capitalist means does not count much in the case of national economic development.

In his Work Report at the National People's Congress session in March 1992, Li Peng avoided the question of names and his statement gave a reassuring signal to many delegates that the current hard-line policies would not be changed. Deng Xiaoping noticed active resistance from "leftist" (conservative) leaders and felt seriously threatened politically.

Based on his personal experience, Deng Xiaoping knows what leftist policies can do. Deng has experienced political defeat by leftist leaders: in 1933, by Wang Ming; in 1969, by Lin Biao; in 1976, by the Gang of Four. After the Tiannanmen Incident Deng Xiaoping's popularity was weakened and side-lined, at least by the propaganda organs influenced by the leftist. Deng Xiaoping had to wage an important battle against his adversaries. Deng Xiaoping made a strong statement that "as 'Right' deviation can ruin socialism, so too, can 'Left' deviation. China needs to be vigilant against Right deviation, but primarily, it should guard against Left deviation."4 Deng also made strong warnings to those against market-oriented reforms. "Whoever is opposed to reform must leave office," Deng was quoted as saying.⁵ Li Peng's omission of the anti-leftist stance in his government Work Report⁶ showed that the problem remains and the fight may last for a long time. The sentence in which Deng urged guarding against the "left" was added to the final version of the report that was approved by the delegates.

In fact, the content of Deng Xiaoping's reforms is not new and has long been a subject of discussion among Chinese leaders. The unstable elements of the consensus raised questions over the rate of economic reform, the degree of decentralization, and the

⁴ Zhong Shiyou, "Fresh Impetus from Deng's Message," in *Beijing Review*, 13–19 April 1992, p. 5.

⁵ FBIS-CHI, 19 March 1992, p. 28.

^{6 &}quot;Li Peng NPC Work Report," in FBIS-CHI, 20 March 1992, pp. 1-3.

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adoption of Western methods. Throughout the decade these issues have periodically generated political debates. Then, the question came up, why did Deng Xiaoping launch a new offensive?

Defend the Socialism with Chinese Characteristics

Changes in the world situation and its impact on China provides Deng Xiaoping with an opportunity to attack hard-line policies advocated by the conservatives.

The collapse of the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the subsequent dismantling of the Soviet Union conveyed a clear message to China that the Cold War era had ended but that a new political struggle had intensified. These revolutionary events occurring abroad could create a dangerous phenomenon such as loss of confidence in a regimes' mandate from heaven, particularly a collective crisis of faith in communism as an ideology and a system for national development. In fact, communism's manifest inability to match the West in material terms or to provide anything approaching social equality contributed to the final collapse of Communist regimes.

Deng Xiaoping noticed widespread skepticism of socialism in the Chinese leadership. The negative effects of reforms such as runaway inflation and rampant corruption, coupled with the changing world order strained the leadership consensus. The Party leadership seemed to lose its identity and sense of mission. The cadres appeared to be suffering from inertia and "defeatism." Even worse, reforms of the last decade split the Party leadership between reformers and conservatives. On the mass level, people suffered a twofold relative deprivation. Due to the opening up policy, they have more information on what true development has brought to other states, and they have seen the rise of an increasingly affluent and corrupt communist political class. Thus, Deng Xiaoping seemed to recognize the urgent task as being ideological unity and leadership consensus. The wrong ideas and attitudes must be corrected, and socialism with Chinese characteristics should be developed through Deng's reform line. Deng firmly believed the economic outcomes of the past decade would enable China to survive in spite of the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The fall of these countries stemmed from their inability to manage the economy. Thus, economic construction has become a vital source of legitimacy for communist rule in China.

Since China is still far from the development targets that have been set, no time can be lost in the development of their economy. The ultimate goal is to convince those who do not believe in socialism. In Deng's opinion, the vital way to achieve this is to reach a certain level of economic prosperity, thereby guarding against the capitalist scheme of "peaceful evolution" of China.

Also, the preparation of the Fourteenth Party Congress weighs heavily with Deng Xiaoping. Deng is attempting to eliminate the major barrier of his reform policies: line struggle within the Party leadership. In order to cope with the resistance of the conservatives and to consolidate the reformers' power position, all kinds of support have been actively sought. It is important to note that the army has now put itself completely behind Deng Xiaoping and large numbers of army officers have made "study tours" of the SEZs. Veteran leaders such as Bo Yibo and Peng Zhen have already given support to Deng's approach. However, the "rush forward" is not enthusiastically received by all, particularly conservative elders such as Chen Yun.

Deng decided to push reform policies further, even though there remains power struggle inside the party and the political power structure has not yet been changed. Thus Deng plans to designate a new generation of reform-minded people to lead China at the coming Fourteenth Party Congress.

The Shift from Austerity to Liberal Economic Policy

The economic policies of conservatives during the past three years gave Deng and reformers ample justification to launch a new campaign to revive the open door and reform programs. In the aftermath of the Tiananmen Incident of 1989, Deng's popularity and political influence inside and outside the Party have greatly declined and correspondingly the conservatives have gained power. The conservative leadership had stressed stability almost at all costs by stressing ideology and re-centralizing control of the economy.

The conservative policies in effect since 1988 have two main components: macroeconomic austerity and government control. In November 1989, the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee passed a resolution on economic rectification known as the "39 points,"⁷ which called for a significant retreat from economic reform. The austerity program was carried out with remarkable rigor. Investment was curtailed and government spending was reduced. Worker wages were held at low levels. The conservative leadership instituted a system of economic planning, intensified government price controls, and reversed development strategy. In fact, the sectoral industrial policy was explicitly put forward as a substitute for the regionally based coastal development strategy promoted by Zhao Zhiyang. Due to these austerity policies, the conservative leadership was able to obtain the following objectives. First, they stopped inflation. Second, they expanded supplies of agricultural products. Third, they engineered a large export surplus by enforcing strict controls on imports. Finally, they upgraded energy supplies by giving priority to energy investment.⁸ However, planners overshot their objectives and engineered an economic recession more seri-

^{7 &}quot;CPC Decision on Improving Economy," FBIS-CHI, 18 January 1990, pp. 24-37.

⁸ Barry Naughton, "The Economy Emerges from a Rough Patch," *Current History* (September 1991), pp. 262–263.

ous than they had expected. The economic downturn spread throughout the country, becoming particularly intense in the market-oriented private and rural sectors.

But by the beginning of 1990 the situation had changed. The political situation in China and in other communist countries forced the government to shift its austerity policies. Chinese leaders began to worry about large-scale unemployment and underemployment that might lead to unrest among urban workers. The necessity for social stability became a policy priority and the pendulum gradually swung in favor of a tentative reendorsement of further reforms by the end of 1990. In December 1990 the Communist Party approved an outline for the Eighth Five Year Plan (1991–1995), which reversed almost all the proposals outlined in the 39 points.

The effects of expansionary policies slowly trickled down to the market place and the economy gradually began to pick up. Thus, China gradually resumed economic growth.

The important lesson for the planners in this period was that markets responded quickly. In effect, the planners' initiatives became obsolete before they could be carried out. The planners discovered their economic programs had little effect. Widespread popular discontent persisted because the regime was unable to cope with many of their economic and political problems. Deng Xiaoping and the reformers are now capitalizing on this situation, hoping to redefine policy priorities as well as the national agenda.

Prospects for Economic Reforms

By the beginning of 1991, China was emerging from the 1989– 90 recession and resuming moderately rapid growth. The gradual economic recovery increased the maneuvering room for the reformers. However, potentially serious challenges still face the economy. The resumed economic growth policy for social stability has given made a heavy financial burden on the state as well as substantial regression in the reform process. If market forces had been allowed to operate in the state sector, China could have benefitted from the closing of the least efficient producers; this would have released resources to more efficient competitors. By blocking that process, China's leaders ensured a continuing drain on the economy by supporting inefficient state enterprises. Moreover, the Tiananmen Incident and human rights abuses hit hard against the open-door policy that represents a vital step in breaking the economic impasse. China faced a difficult situation in which new international credit was denied and foreign investment was drastically reduced.

China's leadership began to acknowledge that it needs to take a more flexible stance and adjust its human rights policies conducive to Western standards in order to induce Western economic cooperation.

The prospects for economic growth are fairly good in the years ahead. The combination of comfortable levels of foreign reserves and healthy economic growth will encourage China's reform leaders to take further steps toward economic reform. In fact, Deng Xiaoping and the reform leaders advocated opening up the country even more than they have already. They also maintained that the policy of reform and opening was to be expanded not only in the industrial sector but also in commerce, foreign trade, finance and insurance.⁹ If China does not open up and reform further, capital and technology from foreign countries, especially from the Asia-Pacific region, will pour into Eastern Europe, the Russian Federation and elsewhere.

Even though reform leaders look more favorably on further economic reforms, it remains to be seen how much economic reform will be expanded and whether China's leadership will be prepared to take the risks associated with the reforms. We can expect the conservatives in the leadership to make their moves

^{9 &}quot;Let Us Be Bold and Rush Forward!," in *China News Analysis*, No. 158, 15 April 1992, p. 9.

between now and the convocation of the Fourteenth Party Congress in the fall. However, the power position of the conservatives has been weakened and Deng's hand has been strengthened by the recent deaths of two conservative gerontocrats–Li Xiannian, Chairman of the Chinese Peoples' Political Consultative Conference, and Deng Yingchao, widow of premier Zhou Enlai. Chen Yun and Wang Zhen were reportedly too ill to be politically active. Thus, in the months ahead a consensus to increase the pace of economic reform is likely to emerge from the top leadership debates, but reform will be paced moderately and cautiously. Though a new consensus will not resolve all doubts about the reforms, it will reduce the differences among China's leaders and permit major changes to continue in such areas as the economic system, and permit further advancement towards a "socialist" market system.

China's Policy toward the Korean Peninsula

China has largely overcome the penalties and ostracism it incurred in the wake of the 1989 Tiananmen Incident. In the past two years, China expanded much effort to end these sanctions and succeeded in restoring normal relations with the outside world. The Gulf crisis and China's acquiescence in the UN's sanctions against Iraq contributed to China's emergence from isolation. Now most governments of the G7 and the EC have resumed high-level contacts with China. Domestically, China's leadership is beginning to return to a reformist agenda. Deng Xiaoping is likely to head a leadership consensus for his reforms. Then, China will change to domestic and foreign policies designed to promote trade and to induce foreign investment and technology.

Given the potential for economic cooperation between South Korea and China, this prospect for change raises the question of how China may change its policy toward the Korean peninsula, especially its relationship with South Korea. China's policy toward the Korean peninsula has been largely a function of its overall foreign policy considerations. First, the survival of the Communist system of China becomes the imperative task. The collapse of the Communist regimes in Europe put an end to the Cold War era, but the political struggle has intensified. The breakup of the former Soviet Union eliminated China's major source of threat. At the same time, however, the breakdown of the Cold War order has left a power vacuum and political uncertainties in the world. China considers the world to be dominated by the West and "peaceful evolution" as a greater threat than war.

Though changes in the world situation offer new opportunities, they have put the China on the defensive. In order to cope with this challenge, China has been active in international affairs at which it has voiced its idea of a new international order based on the five principles of peaceful coexistence.¹⁰ Also to prevent the dominance of the West, China, is trying to build a united front with Communist regimes and with other countries, particularly with neighboring countries.

Second, the United States has become the main threat to China. The U.S. is likely to utilize rapid changes in world politics and to press China for further opening and reform. Sino-American relations have been strained because of arms transfer, human rights and trade conflict issues. China has made selective concessions to the U.S. requests, while the U.S. has not driven China into a corner because of China's importance in the international arena. China sees that so long as China and the U.S. have no direct strategic conflicts, military conflict with the U.S. is unlikely in the near future.

Third, the principal sources of capital and technology needed to modernize China are Japan, the U.S. and Western Europe.

^{10 &}quot;China in a Changing World: The Last Beacon of Marxism?" in China News Analysis, No. 145, 1 January 1992, pp. 1–9. Also, see Li Peng's speech at the Summit Meeting of the UN Security Council on 31 January 1992, reprinted in Beijing Review, 13–25 February 1992, p. 19.

Particularly important is a good and healthy relationship with Japan. At the same time, a militarily strong Japan is not in China's interests. Furthermore, China's current need to diversify economic cooperation and advantages of geography have strengthened apple to its neighbors. Active economic and political cooperation with Asian neighbors looms large for China's reforms.¹¹

Fourth, China needs a long period of peace and order to modernize its economy. For this purpose, China needs to maintain a peaceful external environment.¹² Recently China normalized its diplomatic relations with former adversaries such as India and Vietnam.

These policy calculations require China to pursue an independent and peaceful foreign policy, which in turn requires it to make policy changes toward the Korean Peninsula: In regard of China's policy toward Korean peninsula, security, development and independent actions would be the major policy objectives.

Security concerns have dominated China's relationship with Korea. The Korean peninsula has been regarded as being of "vital" importance to China's security, and China has tried to prevent any hostile power from taking control of it. During the Cold War era, China began to compete with the Soviet Union to keep North Korea on her side. Within its limited capacity, China has given substantial economic and military assistance to Pyongyang. Particularly, China gave political and ideological support to North Korea on the Korean question. These Chinese efforts have been successful in stimulating North Korea to maintain at least an independent posture in Sino-Soviet rivalry.

However, China's Korea policy has shifted subtly since China addressed its efforts on modernization for national development. While the commitment to North Korea remains firm,

¹¹ Excerpt from Qian Qichen's speech titled "China's Foreign Policy," reprinted in *Beijing Review*, 30 March–April, 1992, p. 9.

¹² Ibid., p. 9.

China does not seem to have supported North Korea in every matter. China tried to encourage North Korean leadership to adopt an open door policy and economic reform. Otherwise, the growing gap in national powers between North Korea and South Korea would act adversely to Chinese interests. China began to test its maneuverability on the Korean question in the 1980s. It also began to develop unofficial ties with South Korea under the principle of separation of politics from economics.

While China has moderated its military and economic support to North Korea, it encouraged North Korea to hold dialogue with South Korea and supported measures to lower tension on the peninsula. Considering North Korea's objection, however, China has made it clear that its contacts with South Korea would be limited to non-political areas. Chinese leaders also repeatedly stress that they will consult with North Korea on the Korean question.

All these facts indicate that China wants stability on the Korean peninsula and that the Korean problem should be settled other than militarily. Given the strategic importance of North Korea within the context of its own security and Sino-Soviet rivalry, China cannot press hard on North Korea. China, how-ever, did encourage North Korea to engage in inter-Korean contact, which China regards as the most effective way to reduce tension on the Korean peninsula.

In the Post-Cold War era, China still attaches great importance to North Korea because of ideological affinity and intimate personal relationships in the leadership between China and North Korea. To China, North Korea is one of the communist regimes that can build a united front to prevent Western dominance.

However, China has given clear signals that North Korea must change. China encouraged North Korea to join the United Nations and to adopt economic reforms. The vitality of Sino– North Korean relations has weakened due to the changing security environment on and around the Korean peninsula. In fact, Jiang Zemin, Chinese Communist Party General Secretary, is allegedly reported to have said about the relationship that "there are strong bonds, but we are not allies." In this context, China's stance toward North Korea has adjusted to meet national interests and the changing world situation.¹³ China's support of North Korea became selective and China applied pressure to move toward the common ground in the ongoing negotiations with the South. As for the nuclear issue, China encouraged North Korea to ratify the IAEA safeguards, and North Korea concurred. Furthermore, during South Korean Foreign Minister Lee Sang-Ohk's recent visit to China in April 1992 China agreed to maintain close contact and consult with South Korea over regional security matters, including North Korea's nuclear program. Through such security cooperation with South Korea, China has not only tried to tame North Korea's hostile behavior but has also increased its influence in both Koreas.

China does feel that unification of Korea will take a long time. The political antagonism, military confrontation and mutual distrust have existed for such a long time, and contradictions and disputes cannot be easily reconciled between South and North Korea. China seems to regard the German model for unification as in appropriate. China may feel uneasy that the emergence of a unified Korea with nuclear power potential would be a strong regional power in capability and independence of action. Thus, unification of Korea would not be compatible for Chinaese interests for the time being. For China, the key issues on the peninsula are reconciliation and mutual arms reductions. China has actually done something by trying to develop an environment conducive to maintaining peace and stability on the peninsula. China also wants Japan and the U.S. to make comparable improvements with North Korea.

As China moves to revive its economic reforms in the 1990s, investment and trade become the most important issues. China

¹³ Tian Jungching, "Striving for Reconciliation and speeding up Economic Exchanges," in World Outlook (Guo Ji Zan Wang), No. 7, 8 April 1992, p. 7.

recognizes the advantages of economic ties with South Korea as a valuable trading partner and a source of capital and technology, whereas South Korea can expand its trade and investment opportunities in China. Moreover, South Korea expects China to play a constructive role in moving towards relaxation and stability on the Korean peninsula.

Having the common goals of achieving economic prosperity and maintaining stability in this region, China and South Korea have deepened the basis of diplomatic normalization by expanding economic and cultural ties during the last decade.

Unlike the former Soviet Union's cross-recognition of the two Koreas, China has taken cautious steps with regard to South Korea, moving one step at a time and attempting to coordinate its move with its own domestic and external situation. Until now, China has been viewing any urgency in establishing full diplomatic relations with South Korea as a burden.

However, drastic changes in the world situation and on the Korean peninsula provide China with an opportunity to take independent action on cross-recognition of the two Koreas. In fact, the Chinese leadership repeatedly maintains that China decides its positions and policies on international issues independently.¹⁴

China has had two options in dealing with South Korea. First is the cross-recognition of the two Koreas by the four big powers. China has maintained that the improvement of inter-Korean relationships is prerequisite in normalizing its relationship with South Korea. Even though the North Korean attitude toward the nuclear issue provokes tension in the region, North Korea needs to acquiesce to mutual inspections due to its economic difficulties and due to a need to improve its relationship with Japan and the United States. All these developments would ultimately lead to cross-recognition of the two Koreas by the four big powers. Then, China would accelerate its normalization effort with South

¹⁴ Qian Qichen's speech, p. 9.

Korea on the condition that Japan and the United States would follow the Chinese path in normalizing their relations with North Korea.

The second option is China's sole recognition of South Korea. China's objectives such as regional security and economic construction would be important factors in facilitating its normalization efforts.

China and South Korea announced their agreement to establish diplomatic relations on August 24, 1992. It was China who finally took the bold initiative and independent action on the delicate Korean question. The major reasons for this Chinese diplomatic move seem to be as follows:

- (1) The situation on the Korean peninsula has improved significantly. Following their simultaneous participation in the United Nations, both South and North Korea have signed the protocol on Mutual Non-aggression, Exchanges, and Cooperation and the "Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula." Thus, the conditions China had laid down are basically being met.
- (2) In order to maintain peace and stability in Northeast Asia, China put pressure on North Korea to take more positive steps to solve the nuclear issue. If the North Korean nuclear issue can be solved satisfactorily, North Korea's relationships with Japan and the United States will improve. In fact, China wanted a normalized relationship between North Korea and Japan before normalizing relations with South Korea by solving the nuclear issue. When China faced North Korea's resistance on the nuclear issue, China seemed to change its stance on recognition of South Korea. After the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Sino-North Korean relations have changed qualitatively. China may have thought that North Korea would no longer play the "Russian card" against China, even if it were to move towards sole recognition of South Korea. Thus,

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China's move is a kind of "shock treatment" to urge North Korea to change its domestic and foreign policy directions. Unless North Korea changes, it will become a burden on China economically and diplomatically.

- (3) The expected increase in investment from and trade with Korea would contribute to the success of China's economic reform programs. China also longs for South Korea's Official Development Assistance (ODA) along with more import of capital and technology.
- (4) The Sino-South Korean normalization of diplomatic relations is a symbolic event that demonstrates the reformers' victory against the conservatives in foreign as well as domestic affairs.
- (5) It should also be noted that China gained a reliable partner to counterbalance Japan's increasing international and regional roles in politico-economic as well as military areas.

On the part of South Korea, the normalization with China finalizes "northern diplomacy," which aims to open diplomatic relationships with those countries who were North Korea's strong allies, particularly the former Soviet Union and China. Originally, Northern Policy was aimed at changing North Korea's self-imposed isolationist policy by enlisting the help of China and the Soviet Union. Since the collapse of the former Soviet Union, China, in fact, has become the only country that has the ear of North Korea's Kim Il Sung and it has played an important role in persuading him to seek detente with Seoul and pursue an open-door policy. South Korea has been able to expect China to play a constructive role in reconciliation and cooperation between South and North Korea. Now, the major external barriers for the advancement of inter-Korean relations are removed through Sino-South Korean diplomatic normalization.

Conclusion

China's reforms and opening up will likely be endorsed in the coming Party Congress this fall, and China will take further steps toward vigorous economic growth by promoting more of the reform-minded younger generation to leadership positions. Although the new consensus among top leadership will not resolve all doubts of reform agenda, it is expected to permit further advancement toward a socialist market system. The pace of reforms, however, will be moderate.

The changes in national developmental strategy through further reforms will influence China's foreign policy directions. As China takes modernization as top priority, it seeks to maintain world peace and to create a peaceful international environment, particularly in surrounding countries. China's action to establish a diplomatic relationship with South Korea strives to achieve stability on the Korean peninsula as well as in Northeast Asia. China seems to be prescribing shock treatment to cure North Korea's rigidity on the nuclear issue and to change its policy direction. However, China would anticipate that China's recognition of South Korea would ultimately lead to cross-recognition of the two Koreas by the four big powers.

On the part of South Korea, the major objectives of Northern Policy have been achieved. South Korea improves its security environment and expands its economic opportunities in China.

As for the future development of Sino-South Korean relationships, some suggestions can be illustrated.

South Korea should prepare some strategic thinking in dealing with China. South Korea's economic cooperation and assistance to China should be implemented in such a way that ensures South Korea's security. If China's modernization efforts could bring about either a rapid success or a failure, it is possible that China's foreign policy posture might be changed to threaten regional stability. Thus, South Korea's economic cooperation with China must be conducted in a steady and gradual manner. Moreover, the economic cooperation with China needs to be implemented to generate spillover effects to North Korea and to foster an opportunity to develop new regional economic cooperation.

In regard to security matters on the peninsula, South Korea needs to engage in serious discussions with China about Sino-North Korean military relationships. The targets of emphasis are weapons of mass destruction and delivery vehicles. South Korea should remind China that Chinaese arms and technology transfers to North Korea directly threaten the stability of the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia. Though China proclaimed its willingness to abide by the guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), China has not yet decided to become a full member of the arms control regime. In addition, South Korea seeks joint efforts with China to build multilateral confidenceand security-building measures (CSBMs) such as the so-called two-plus-four approach (a six-power consortium) to ensure security on the Korean peninsula. This effort could be carried out at the initial stage informally on an ad hoc basis.

South Korea is in fact expected to be in a more favorable position in the process of North-South talks due to the establishment of formal diplomatic relationships with China. However, South Korea should guard against an aggressive North Korean stance, which could stem from its fear of isolation, and make painstaking efforts with China to lead North Korea to reconciliation and cooperation. Also, South Korea should exercise adroit diplomatic maneuvers and utilize economic leverage to guard against a Chinese double-faced policy toward the two Koreas.

Building Peace on the Korean Peninsula: In Search of a Multi-Dimensional Approach

Jeong Woo Kil

Debate on settling peace on the Korean peninsula has a relatively long history, but until recently there has been no serious discussion supported by a feasibility study. A resurgence of ideas about some framework or institution to build peace and stability in Northeast Asia has been made possible by an emerging consensus among major powers in the region that they are entering a historical moment to form the foundation for peace and security based on tension reduction efforts in the area. Such consensus has been forming in the midst of the breakdown of the Cold War power structure that has defined the security environment in this region over the past four decades. The passively defined concept of peace in power politics dominating international relations has shifted into one with rather positive implications in the era of geoeconomics, made possible with the flow of trade, finance and technology and growing interdependence among regional economies.

With the frequent use of the concept of "global partnership," the old "enemy" is being replaced by the new term "adversary." In the formation of a new world order we can observe that there is still a complicated development process to this newly emerging order in the international arena. Especially on the Korean peninsula, where the two Koreas militarily confront each other and antagonism remains high, the complexity of this new order is vividly exposed.

Since the late 1980s the Korean government has conducted a so-called Northern Policy or "Omni-directional Diplomacy" to normalize official relations with previous socialist regimes. This policy started with a strong political motivation to exert diplomatic pressure on the North Korean regime, and it was a fullfledged initiative for easing tensions on the peninsula by exploiting the changing international environment in the post-Cold War era.

Korea's remarkable Northern Policy is a milestone, but there has been little serious debate over any concrete or concerted approaches to building an actual peace mechanism in the region. Of course, at the United Nations General Assembly address in October 1988 we heard President Roh Tae Woo's proposal for a consultative conference for peace between the United States, the PRC, the Soviet Union, and Japan as well as South and North Korea in order to lay a solid foundation for lasting peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia.¹

The ROK government, however, has not since then shown any positive reaction to several other proposals of a kind by the Soviet Union, Canada, and Australia for a multilateral security forum. Neither former Soviet President Gorbachev's All-Asian Security and Cooperation Conference proposal and All-Asian Process concept in September 1988 and May 1989 respectively, nor Foreign Minister Shevardnaze's All-Asian Forum proposal in September 1990, nor Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans' proposal for a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Asia (CSCA) in July 1990, nor Canadian Foreign Minister Joe Clark's idea of a new security dialogue among North Pacific

¹ Roh Tae Woo, Korea: A Nation Transformed, Selected Speeches (New York: Pergamon Press, 1990), p. 9.

Countries in July 1990 — the Korean government took a positive stance to none of these proposals for regional security.

Such passive response from Korea might be coming from a lack of clear understanding or in-depth analysis of positions and strategies of the several nations concerned in the regional security forum idea; Korea itself, however, proposed its own idea of multilateral arrangements. It can be understood that the Korean government has been indecisive in placing priority between the two tasks of establishing peace in Northeast Asia (and on the Korean peninsula in particular) on the one hand, and of attaining national unification on the other. Neither has it had a clear vision or strategy in linking these two significant issues.

Policymakers, in fact, seemed very much concerned that their efforts to create a peace mechanism on the peninsula by inviting the participation of major countries in the region and seeking their security guarantee would perpetuate the division of the peninsula. (In some sense it is true that the argument in favor of the status quo of a divided Korea might coincide with the interests of each of the countries surrounding the peninsula.) Within the extension of this line of argument, creating a peace mechanism in the region can be understood as an obstacle to the unification of Korea. Such anxiety can be justified considering historical experience in the late 19th century when the Korean peninsula was victimized in the midst of a struggle among major powers. The Korean government's apprehension towards a possible resurgence of a similar situation has led it to sustain the position that progress in inter-Korean relations should precede any serious debate on a multilateral approach to security arrangements.

This paper is an effort to examine the state of debate on a multilateral security forum in the region by exploring the positions of the countries involved. The paper also points out some considerations that should be taken into account in initiating a Korean version of a multilateral forum within the context of executing a so-called "multi-dimensional" foreign policy by the Korean government.

Multilateralism in Regional Security Arrangements

Last December U.S. Secretary of State James Baker mentioned the idea of a regional security forum consisting of four major countries, the U.S., PRC, Russia, Japan and South and North Korea, the so-called "two-plus-four formula."² It seems the proposal was initiated by focusing on tension reduction on the Korean peninsula through suggesting options for a breakthrough in resolving the issue of DPRK nuclear weapons development, which is a major obstacle in the inter-Korean dialogue. In a press interview in July 1992 Japanese Prime Minister Miyazawa also expressed his interest in some format of multilateral dialogue for regional security. He also mentioned that he would create a consulting body under his leadership to deal with the issue. This is the first statement ever made by an incumbent Japanese prime minister concerning a regional mechanism.

A Korean newspaper picked up the news with reference to the discussion currently undertaken within the Korean government policy circle, which is seriously considering a multilateral security forum similar to that of the U.S. proposal, as well as to a resurgence of President Roh's 1988 proposal.

Why is the Korean government reexamining the idea? Several considerations inducing such government action can be mentioned. First of all, recent developments on the Korean peninsula may exert a significant impact. Among these developments are the "Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation" on 13 December 1991; a South Korean Presidential statement on 18 December 1991, that no nuclear weapons exist "anywhere in the Republic of Korea"; and

² James A. Baker, III, "America in Asia: Emerging Architecture for a Pacific Community," Foreign Affairs (Winter 1991/1992), p. 13.

the six-point denuclearization agreement initialled by the Koreas on December 31, 1991, as well as the coming into force of the above two agreements on February 19, 1992. These occasions symbolically reflect the ongoing interplay among global and regional trends, inter-Korean relations, and North and South Korean domestic politics, which define a new positive setting of the power game on the peninsula.

Secondly, the admission to the United Nations by the two Koreas had significant impact in launching serious discussion of the multilateral forum. For South Korea, entering the United Nations means that the international community has given it official recognition and approval for its due place in world politics and economy. It means a successful fruition of what has been pursued in the name of "Northern Policy," an energetic effort to win diplomatic recognition by the former socialist countries who previously refused to deal with Seoul for fear of offending Pyongyang. By entering the United Nations together, North and South Korea have in effect gained a ready and useful channel of dialogue and consultations. Contrary to the apprehension some hold that North Korea might bring the inter-Korea quarrel into the world forum, it will be to Pyongyang's own interest to maintain a relationship of coexistence with South Korea. The United Nations offers Pyongyang a much needed opportunity to contact on a regular basis all other countries of the world including the western powers, and relieves the North from prolonged international isolation.³

Thirdly, in addition to the confidence built from the success of Northern Policy, leadership at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and diplomatic skill in inducing the PRC, Taiwan and Hong Kong to gain membership simultaneously could pro-

³ Sung-Joo Han, "Korea and the Changing International Relations in East Asia," paper presented at the second roundtable conference of the Korean Institute of International Studies and the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 9–16 October 1991, Seoul, Korea, pp. 11–16.

vide the Korean government with pride and privilege in actively playing in the world scene.

Fourthly, recent success with the expanding role of the CSCE, a security consultative body in the European theater, demonstrated positive aspects of a multilateral arrangement in dealing with regional security and other issues, even though reservation remains in applying the exact idea to the Asian region.

In addition to these positive considerations, some other elements might have been taken into account rather passively. First of all, the United States government is rethinking the idea of multilateralism in securing peace in the region, as explored in Secretary Baker's article. The idea assumes the gradual withdrawal of the U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific region and increasing burden-sharing with its host nations such as Japan and South Korea. This proposal when it is materialized as planned will be calling upon a South Korean decision sooner or later.

Secondly, the Korean government has taken seriously the increasing role of Japan in the region, which was symbolically manifested by the passage of the Peace Keeping Operations (PKO) bill at the Japanese Diet and the decision to send troops to Cambodia under the UN flag. This Japanese posture readily signals to Koreans that Japan is beginning an effort to boost its prestige and increase influence commensurate with its economic power in the international community . Among Japan's neighboring countries, South Korea is airing its sensitivity to Japan's recent path, and there is an increasing call for some measures to counter-balance Japan's expanding role. A multilateral mechanism is being discussed within the Korean government policy circle as one option to fit this purpose.

Thirdly, considering that the North's nuclear weapons program is a serious obstacle to hinder the progress of inter-Korean relations, a multilateral effort could be one possible breakthrough. The North's nuclear program and its missile shipment to the Middle East are drawing international attention and raising concerns among neighboring countries including Pyongyang's traditional allies, Russia and the PRC. A concerted pressure through a multilateral arrangement could also be an appropriate way to accomplish shared objectives.

Fourthly, the PRC's recent efforts to strengthen its defense capability are stirring the anxiety of regional states, who are demanding some sort of regime that can put China's expansionist intent within its control. The PRC is seeking to exploit the potential power vacuum created by the demise of the former Soviet military power in Northeast Asia and by the U.S. withdrawal of its forces from the Subic Bay naval and Clark airforce bases in the Philippines.

Finally, in regard to the ASEAN countries' recent gesture in formulating a security forum that could extend from their current major interest in economic issues, the Korean government would not want to be ruled out as a legitimate party in such a gathering. Moreover, there is every reason for Korea to try to preempt the ASEAN proposal by exploring its own idea of a multilateral security arrangement assuming within the scheme a major U.S. role.

The ROK government, willingly or unwillingly, is entering the moment to promote the idea of settling peace on the peninsula.

When South Korea considers a multilateral forum for discussing means to ease tensions, it would quite naturally project the North as a potential threat or adversary. But logically the North should not in the settlement of the peace mechanism be ruled out as a potential party with whom to cooperate. Therefore, the most significant factors to be considered in the process of materializing a regional security arrangement are the current state of inter-Korean relations and their prospects.

Current State of the Inter-Korean Relations

Since the first prime ministerial dialogue held in September 1990, seven rounds of meetings were held, and at the sixth high-level talks in February 1992 a historic document was put into force on Reconciliation, Non-aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation with Joint Declaration of Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

It should be clear that the North signed this agreement to guard against the sea-changes sweeping in the world and to survive in its own way without breaking from its old line of argument on unification.⁴ This is why the South is committed to pursuing a consistent policy of achieving genuine denuclearization, bilateral deterrence and confidence-building measures with the North while maintaining some U.S. troops as well as the mutual defense treaty with the U.S. for security on the peninsula. This includes emphasizing economic interdependence with Japan and other major powers in the region until it accomplishes a peaceful unification.⁵ Under the current circumstances, the North seems to be more interested in using the basic agreement with the South as a shield against external challenges and as a means of securing international recognition and economic cooperation from the South. The South on the other hand is more interested in creating political and military confidence and in realizing with the North mutual communications and visits between separated families.

As they witness the signing of the agreement, some protagonists argue that an era of reconciliation and cooperation between the two Koreas has already opened, so long as significant steps follow the agreements. However, there still remains skepticism that such agreement in formalities can be meaningful only when followed by substantive achievement in a more serious area of

⁴ Jeong Woo Kil, "Inter-Korean Relations in Changing Northeast Asian Context," paper presented at the international conference on "Korea and the Newly Emerging Global Order," sponsored by the Korean Institute of International Studies, 18–20 June 1992, Seoul, pp. 17–18.

⁵ Byung-joon Ahn, "Korea's Security Interests and Role in the Pacific Rim," Pacific Rim Security Cooperation (Seoul: Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, 1992), pp. 53–66.

security including the nuclear issue that is currently drawing urgent attention from the international community.

The North's attitude and actions on the nuclear issue can be regarded as a litmus test for determining whether or not it is serious about implementing the agreements and undertaking serious tension reduction talks with the South. Considering the failure of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission meetings to draw up details of regulations for bilateral inspections, the South Korean authorities reaffirmed their strong position: that there would be no substantial progress in inter-Korean relations especially in the area of economic cooperation until the proper settlement of the nuclear issue. The policy linkage of the South between economic cooperation and the nuclear issue is still valid.

After the visit to Korea in July by North Korean Deputy Prime Minister for International Trade, Kim Dal-Hyun, debate on the validity and effectiveness of such linkage strategy came to surface. The business community, eager to do business with the North, together with a group of liberals in the government are arguing that this policy can be implemented with a flexibility that could provide, even at limited scale, some leverage for North Korean reform-minded techno-bureaucrats supporting economic exchanges and cooperation with the South in their policy struggle against the hardliners in the Politburo and the military. On the other hand conservatives in the South, when pointing out the dual-track policy of the North, are emphasizing that a strict application of the linkage policy will be the most effective pressure to prod the North into following the path South Korea and other western countries are assuming to ease tensions on the peninsula. They are underscoring the implementation of mutual inspection of nuclear facilities, and unless it happens no substantial progress in inter-Korean relations can be expected. This voice is supported by the United States, which has continuously expressed concern over the North's ongoing nuclear weapons development and developing missile technology and their sale to the outside world. Secretary Baker's

proposal last December seems to be formulated within this line of serious apprehensions over Pyongyang's intention.

Considering North Korea's motive to develop nuclear weapons and based as well upon the report of the IAEA inspection of the North's nuclear site, neighboring countries in Northeast Asia have begun to share an urgent need to build a mechanism in which appropriate ways to solve this matter can be discussed.⁶ There has come a consensus that without successful resolution of the nuclear issue, no meaningful discussion on arms control or disarmament in the region can be possible. What are the positions of the four major countries, the U.S., Japan, the PRC and Russia to see multilateral security arrangements in Northeast Asia focus upon the Korean peninsula?

Major Powers' Assessment of a Multilateral Forum

Multilateralism has no roots in the Asia-Pacific region. There are few positive historical precedents for regional security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific. Unlike the Atlantic world, the Pacific area has never been neatly tied in alliance knots. Rather than replicating the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, for instance, the post–World War II Asia-Pacific region has been left largely to looser bilateral ties, often dominated by a single major ally. The cultural, linguistic, ethnic diversities, and certain longstanding animosities in Asia were too great to allow for any Pacific analogue to NATO.⁷

The underlying premise of the U.S. assessment of any kind of security arrangement is that the United States's has vital economic and security interests in the Asia-Pacific theater. The question is how best to protect these interests. On this basis, the U.S.

⁶ For an analysis of the DPRK's motive to go nuclear, to see Andrew Mack, "North Korea and the Bomb," *Foreign Policy* (June 1991), pp. 93–102.

⁷ For a detailed discussion of the pitfalls of multilateralism in the region, see Patrick M. Cronin, "Multilateral Security Approaches Toward Asia," *Strategic Review* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Strategic Institute, Spring 1992), pp. 66–68.

properly assesses the utility of existing security relationships, or force deployment patterns.

Currently five security alliances provide the framework for the American military interaction with its Asia-Pacific neighbors. Although these alliances were initially targeted, and justified in terms of containing Soviet or communist expansion, the actual threat environment defies simple description. In reality, few outside Japan and China ever saw the former Soviet Union as the primary threat. Many see threats emanating from non-communist sources, with a resurgent Japan being primary among potential alternate threats. In addition to a bilateral security alliance, the United States helped to bolster existing multilateral institutions, such as the United Nations peacekeeping operations and the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty regime on an international level, and such as APEC and ASEAN on a regional level.

Considering any regional coalition for security cooperation, the U.S. cannot guarantee that the American leadership of Desert Storm-type collective efforts will be automatic. If fewer and fewer Asians come to share America's vision of a new world order, the Americans could be increasingly excluded from the region. Thus, the United States may find sooner or later that a new multilateral forum for dialogue in Northeast Asia together with a limited regime for confidence- and security-building measures might be one of the best ways to cement the United States firmly in the region. Not only would the U.S. incur no rigid alliance commitments, but it would also reassure Asian countries that the United States is in the Pacific to stay. And although the U.S. may not fully share the fears of Japan's neighbors, the American commitment to a multilateral mechanism in the region can play a role to assuage the fears of the countries in Northeast Asia rather than exacerbate a resurgent, remilitarized Japan.

As China is currently and will be in the years or decades to come concentrating its efforts on national reconstruction, it needs an external environment of lasting peace, and in particular such an environment on its periphery. Security and stability on the Korean peninsula naturally has a close bearing on China's security and security environment. Consequently the Chinese government has on several occasions expressed its appreciation of and has highly appraised the positive developments on the Korean peninsula—particularly the significant progress in South-North relations over the past years.

China's interest in, or concern for, security on the peninsula lies, for the short and near term, in further relaxation of tension and improvement of relations between the four major countries and the two parts of Korea. However, China's role in the Asia-Pacific balance-of-power equation needs to be more clearly defined. It should come as no surprise that China looks out for China first. It distrusts both the Russians and the Japanese but desires normalized, if not cordial, relations with both nations. It seeks closer cooperation with the United States, but on its own terms and not as a "card" to be played against Moscow or any other power.

China's effort to exert influence in the international community and its emphasis on a multilateral approach toward conflict resolution and tension reduction are usually discussed within the context that the United Nations forum be defined as the most likely vehicle. China's veto power as a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council enhances its international power and prestige. The PRC may turn out to be the country in the region who shows the most serious interest in a new formula of multilateral security arrangement. The Chinese government has not explicitly stated an objection to the dispatch of Japanese troops to the U.N. peacekeeping operations based on the passage of the PKO bill; only the government news agency expressed any concern over the issue. And the normalization of relations between the Soviet Union and China in May 1989 ended a thirty-year conflict and struggle.

There seems to be no concrete incentive for the PRC to propose voluntarily a multilateral forum in Northeast Asia in general. If other countries were to offer any type of mechanism to talk about regional issues, however, especially the Korean question, the PRC will not be able to ignore its proper role. In its course of national reconstruction and facing inevitable leadership change, China does not want its neighboring ally North Korea to take any action to destabilize the security environment. Chinese leaders have stated in clear-cut terms that China does not want to see development of nuclear weapons by either side in Korea. This approach is in keeping with the Chinese government's recent entry into the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Therefore, a multilateral forum to be initiated to solve the nuclear problem on the Korean peninsula and to discuss conventional disarmament would be acceptable to the PRC, unless DPRK participation were ruled out.

The former Soviet Union had been relatively active in initiating some type of multilateral scheme for discussing regional security issues, but without any substantive followups. Such ideas were based on Soviet recognition of the contribution of the CSCE in securing peace and stability in Europe and its effort to implement a similar idea in the Asia-Pacific region. Since former President Gorbachev's All-Asian Security and Cooperation Conference proposal in September 1988 in his Krasnoyarsk address, through his speech before the Japanese Diet in April 1991, the Russian proposal evolved to reflect more and more a sense of reality and feasibility. In one set of proposals Moscow has been focusing on arms control and disarmament in the Asia-Pacific region without directly mentioning the Korean question as major agenda.

Russia, as a successor to the Soviet Union, technically has remained a military ally of the DPRK. Any open military conflict between Pyongyang and Western countries including the United States would have put Moscow in a rather awkward position, not dissimilar to what the Soviet Union found itself during the Gulf crisis. It has become quite expedient to review the existing pattern of military commitments made earlier to the ROK and the DPRK by the United States and the Soviet Union (now Russia) respectively. While the U.S. government announced its plans, then, to withdraw some of its troops from the territory of South Korea and to shift the role of American troops on the Korean peninsula from a leading to a supporting role, Russia decided to disengage itself from any active military support of Pyongyang and to refrain from entering into any new arms sales contracts with the DPRK.⁸

But since it would be highly detrimental to the peace and security in the region if Pyongyang were to feel itself abandoned in the face of a real or perceived military threat from the South, Russia assumes its treaty with the DPRK might serve as a counterbalancing role that would reassure Pyongyang. The new Russian government seems to have decided that its basic treaty with the ROK will provide a good opportunity for Russia to be actively involved in the process of ensuring regional security on the Korean peninsula. This line of logic makes sense in that Russia may enhance an advantageous position inherited from the Soviet Union on the peninsula. In other words, the strategy of Russia in its relations with the two Koreas on the issue of regional security should be placed on a solid basis of upholding normal political relations with each of them. Such a constructive approach to regional matters will serve Russia's best interests to pursue the all-important goal reflected in its foreign policy in this part of Asia Pacific: to avoid any military conflict here and to preserve a maximum possible stability on the Korean peninsula.

Japan argues that the U.S.-Japan security arrangement contributes greatly to the peace and stability throughout the region. It is important that the U.S.-Japan security arrangements add credibility, particularly in the eyes of Asian countries, to Japan's policy that it not become a big military power. Japan's policy of maintaining an exclusively defensive force posture in terms of

⁸ Gennady Chufrin, "Russian Interests in Korean Security in the Post-Cold War World," paper presented at the Workshop on Security and the Korean Peninsula in the 1990s, 25-27 March 1992, Canberra, Australia, p. 12.

weapon systems and scope of operations is in fact reassuring to countries in this region. The key requisite for permitting Japan to pursue this policy is its alliance with the United States.

Japan, even after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, perceives a potential threat from Russia based on its uncertainty of the future and the continuing modernization of the weapon systems in the Far East Russian forces. In regard to a multilateral security arrangement, Japan has been keeping a passive posture by pointing out the differences in the geopolitical conditions and strategic environment between the European theater and the Asia-Pacific region. Japan has also argued that it is more important to ensure regional stability by utilizing the existing cooperation mechanisms, centering on economic cooperation. However, some scholars argue the exception to this line of thinking is the Korean peninsula, where a large number of ground forces confront each other and arms control concepts including the CSBM can be applied.⁹

On the other hand, the current concern of many Asian countries on Japan's expanding role, including military activities and supported by its economic capability, can be an inducing factor for the Japanese government to consider seriously initiating some format of multilateral security arrangement. Foreign Minister Nakayama proposed at the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference in July 1991 that the conference be used as a forum for political dialogue in order to attain mutual reassurance among the friendly countries in the region. And a recent statement of Prime Minister Miyazawa on the multilateral mechanism for discussion of regional issues can be understood as a big shift in Japanese strategic thinking in this regard.

The four major powers each have their own assessment of a potential multilateral security forum, and they seem to be more

⁹ Satoshi Morimoto, "Japan's Interests in Security on the Korean Peninsula in a Post-Cold War World," paper presented at the Workshop on Security and the Korean Peninsula in the 1990s, 25-27 March 1992, Canberra, Australia, p. 4.

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prepared than ever before to engage in the initial stage of discussion. Considering this changing environment that calls upon serious attention to such a forum of multilateral arrangement, the Korean government should reexamine its foreign policy objectives as a whole, including a peace settlement and national unification.

Conclusion: Some Considerations for Korea's Multilateral Initiative

Korea is entering the moment to rearrange its foreign policy goals in a new international environment. In this process of adjustment the Korean government, among other things, should reposition its stance concerning the idea of a multilateral security arrangement for establishing peace on the peninsula.

The Korean government has promoted peaceful settlement of current inter-Korean relations on its way toward national unification. In the official unification formula, the government also set the stage for peaceful coexistence with the North, that is, that peace and unification are not matters of choice, and that these two concepts are neither contradictory nor consequential. When Seoul seriously assesses costs and benefits connected with initiating or participating in a multilateral security arrangement, it should reaffirm its position by accepting that the government of North Korea is a valid interlocutor in the pursuit of security on the peninsula.

The development of this viewpoint with South Korea's achievement in Northern Policy, which had the consequence of isolating North Korea, has in light of the events in Europe since 1989 been complicated. The costly and still problematic example of German unification, and the disorder in such former socialist systems as Romania, have had a sobering effect in Seoul. If Pyongyang is not really to be treated as an equal partner in the **process** of security construction, it follows that the alternative for Seoul would be to seek the collapse of a regime regarded as illegitimate. This, in turn, if and when successful, would make Seoul suddenly and irrevocably responsible for the welfare and order of an additional 21 million subjects, and for the development of the Northern half of the peninsula which at present is far behind the standard of the South in every respect. In agreeing to negotiate with North Korea, it would seem that South Korea has not chosen this road. Accordingly, it can be understood that the South's objective is now to find a mutually acceptable resolution of the problem of security.¹⁰

Following this line of argument, approaches to building peace and stability either by way of creating a multilateral mechanism to discuss security issues on the peninsula or by inter-Korean dialogue seem to be in conflict. However, the time will come when Seoul should reexamine its policy in the pursuit of peace, stability and unification. Without clear manifestation of its official position in this regard, Korea will face difficulties in leading or actively participating in any format of multilateral forum to be under serious discussion by neighboring countries.

In conclusion, some suggestions or caveats can be raised in the course of South Korea's endeavor in search of a peace mechanism. First of all, in setting foreign policy goals concerning multilateral mechanism, traditional security relations with the United States should be well cared for, and even further strengthened. Any format of regional security arrangement will not be meaningful in reality if the American active and positive role were to be ruled out.

Secondly, linkage between economic and security issues should be taken seriously and multifaceted approaches should be launched. Trade and arms control issues, of course, cannot be effectively or properly discussed at the same forum, but strategic thinking is required regarding the spillover effect from one area

¹⁰ James Cotton, "A Regional Response to the Korean Problems: Limitations of the Confidence-Building Model," paper presented at the international conference on "The New Asian-Pacific Era and Korea," hosted by the Korean Association of International Studies, 20-21 August 1992, Seoul, Korea, p. 4.

to the other. For instance, trade and economic matters could be dealt with at the current forum of the APEC and non-conventional threats like drugs, the environment, and refugee problems can be discussed through existing international organizations under the United Nations, and regional security and stability can be promoted by a newly initiated multilateral mechanism based on the current bilateral U.S.-ROK and the U.S.-Japan security ties and gradually extended to neighboring countries.

With regard to a new multilateral security arrangement in the region, the Korean government can justifiably play an active role by emphasizing the urgency of a solution to the Korean question and the potent factor of instability in the regional peace exposed by the North's nuclear program. The combination of South-North bilateral dialogue, a subregional forum such as a trilateral dialogue for policy consultation, and a regional multilateral arrangement in the economic and security arena could be an optimal mechanism to ease tensions and build a cooperative forum in Northeast Asia and on the Korean peninsula in particular.

Reunification and Korean Foreign Policy

Donald S. Macdonald

From the time that Korea fell under foreign domination at the beginning of the twentieth century, its people's demand was for independence. When liberation from Japan came in 1945, and Korea was divided into two occupation zones, the demand became not only independence, but unification. Unhappily, nominal independence came at the price of division between two contending ideologies and two military blocs. An attempt at unification by force resulted in war, which ravaged the peninsula and reinforced the division.

Since the armistice of 1953, the destiny of Korea has been pursued by two contending states. Both of them have developed political, economic, and military power that would have been unimaginable when Korea was first opened to the outside world in the late nineteenth century. Both have professed devotion to the cause of reunification; but they have sought international prestige and support in fierce competition with each other, each denying the other state's legitimacy.

It now seems probable, with the end of the Cold War and the reversal of the two Korean states' relative economic strengths, that Korea will be unified in the twenty-first century. Perhaps, as South Korean President Roh Tae Woo has suggested, it may come earlier. However, although outside forces were largely responsible for the division of Korea, internal forces must be largely responsible for putting Korea back together again—because both Koreas want it that way, and because other countries have little reason or opportunity to further it (and in some instances might have reasons to oppose it). In terms of foreign policy, the question for Korea is how to tap external forces to reinforce the movement toward reunification, or, at minimum, how to keep them from disrupting that movement.

An additional problem for the future is how to maintain Korea's national independence, which collapsed in 1905 before the military and economic might of a resurgent, modernizing Japan and was regained only by the action of the superpowers after Japan's defeat. The problems of reunification and independence are related, because national unity is necessary for both, and because one of the most important arguments for reunification is that it would strengthen Korea's position toward the outside world.

The purpose of this paper is to examine how Korea's international relations relate to both unification and independence.

Π

The goal of Korean international relations, like those of any country, is to optimize the country's national interests. These interests include the assurance of national independence and security, and the maintenance and increase of the material and psychological well-being of the nation and its citizens. In the case of Korea, the achievement of reunification constitutes another major national interest, but it clearly takes second place to security and well-being. In fact, it is an interest only insofar as it furthers security and well-being.

The potential benefits of reunification are both psychological and material. Psychologically, the unification issue—in addition to its linkage with the emotional problems of divided families and of ethnic and territorial unity—is related to the larger issues of nationalism and patriotism. These are significant elements of national strength, as will be discussed below. Materially, reunification would increase Korea's capacity for effective international relations because (a) the country would speak with one voice instead of two discordant voices; (b) the single reunified nation would have double the size and 150 percent of the population of South Korea (or three times the population of North Korea); (c) the natural resource base, while still modest, and the larger domestic market would strengthen a unified Korea's economy and somewhat lessen its dependence upon foreign markets and materials; (d) the reunified country would have clearly defined and defensible borders; (e) the burden of supporting enormous military forces would be lessened.

At the same time, reunification would clearly entail both material and social costs, as the German experience demonstrates. Estimates of cost run as high as 500 billion U.S. dollars. The strain of re-assembling two Korean societies, organized on entirely different principles for nearly fifty years, would be very great. It should also be recognized that some of the expected benefits can be realized without unification, through reduction of tensions such as family reunions, inter-Korean trade, and reduction of military expenditures. Nevertheless, the benefits of reunification, in both domestic and international terms, appear to outweigh the costs—particularly if these costs can be reduced or stretched out by a gradual approach.

III

Both Korean states have important strengths to back up their international relations: diligent, well-educated work forces; highly-organized and disciplined political, military, and economic institutions; and proven records of economic development, making effective use of foreign assistance (although the development record of the North Korean command economy has faded since the 1970s, while South Korea's record, based upon exports and interdependence with the market-oriented international economy, has burgeoned since the mid-1960s). Moreover, the historical record shows that Korea, despite the military might of both states that is a heritage of the Korean war, has never been an aggressor nation. This fact, together with Korea's moderate size and the identification of both Korean states with the developing world, give Korea advantages over the great powers in exploiting present and future opportunities for international trade and investment in the Third World.

On the other hand, Korea—even reunited—has serious weaknesses in its position toward the outside world. It is surrounded by three larger and stronger powers, among whom it is always a potential bone of contention. It has a history of domestic disunity that makes it vulnerable to outside forces; the present division of the country is only the most recent demonstration of Korea's propensity for factional rivalry and strife at the expense of national unity.¹ Koreans have been accustomed to regard their country as small and weak, and to seek the help of powerful outside forces to accomplish what they believe they cannot do by themselves. Korean dependence on outside sources of supply, a consequence of the peninsula's dense population and paucity of natural resources, makes it vulnerable to external economic pressure, as demonstrated by current North Korean energy shortages and the chronic, massive South Korean trade deficit with Japan. The Korean people, despite a century of exposure to foreign penetration, are still inclined to be inward-looking and suspi-

¹ Korea has been a unitary state for a thousand years; nevertheless its traditional eight provinces, five of them subdivided in 1895, have been a territorial expression of regional differences in culture, dialect, and outlook that in recent years have come to play a major role in South Korean politics—and may have an implicit role in North Korean politics as well. One aspect of German reunification that has never been referred to in the Korean case is its federal nature. Five of the states of prewar Germany were reconstituted in East Germany, and these states were admitted to the Federal Republic. Given the move in South Korea toward autonomy for provinces, cities, and counties, one possible unification formula might involve a quasifederal state in which the North Korean provinces (now nine in number, to match the number in the South) and province-level special cities would be able to preserve their socialist regimes, and in which the various provinces would have latitude to express different collective personalities.

cious of strange people and customs. Korean energies and resources have been dissipated in the military and diplomatic confrontation between the two states.

The consequence of all this, despite the growing influence of both Koreas on the international scene since 1948 and their recent establishment as United Nations member states, is a self-reinforcing derogation of Korean national stature: the Koreans feel defiantly inferior, notwithstanding all the progress they have made, and the world confirms their assessment.²

IV

The historical record demonstrates the impact of some of these Korean weaknesses.

In regard to the Korean propensity to look to foreign friends for support, the problem, in Lord Acton's oft-quoted phrase, is that in the modern world, nations have no friends—only interests. Perhaps this was not always so. Korea's historical relationship with China was based upon an extension of Confucian familial ties, under which China provided benevolent protection of Korea but (until imperialist rivalries led China to assert hegemony from 1884 to 1894) did not meddle in domestic Korean affairs.³ But when imperial China was defeated by upstart Japan in 1895, Korea willy-nilly became part of the harsher international order of nominally equal sovereign nations that had evolved in the West.

² A former tutor of Kim Il Sung, Il Peter Alexandrovich, is quoted as saying recently to South Koreans, "Americans, British, Russians, Chinese, Japanese they treat us like a second rate, colonial people." Daniel Sneider, "Kim Il Sung's Soviet-Korean Tutor Belies Dictator's Wartime Record." Christian Science Monitor, 2 July 1992, p. 6.

³ For a discussion of Korea's place in the Confucian international order, see M. Frederick Nelson, *Korea and the Old Order in Eastern Asia* (Baton Rouge: University of Louisiana Press, 1964).

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The initial Korean response to the new environment, rather than to prepare for defense, was to cast about for alternative elder brothers. Pro-Chinese, pro-Russian, and pro-Japanese factions contended at court, while successive Japanese, American, and Russian military advisers trained handfuls of ill-equipped soldiers. As late as 1904, Confucian scholars at the Korean court memorialized the throne against abandoning the traditional Confucian orientation. When Japan defeated imperial Russia, no choice remained, and Korea fell under Japanese rule.⁴

The development of the nation-state in Europe and America was accompanied by the emergence of popular patriotism. People came to feel an emotional affinity for the political systems of their states, as distinguished from ethnic, community, or family ties, or loyalty to the person of the ruler. Both elites and masses were thus motivated to go to war if necessary to defend their systems and their national boundaries. Oppressed European minorities in the nineteenth century developed a sense of nationalism centered in shared ethnic identity, and demanded states of their own. It was this process that inspired Woodrow Wilson's doctrine of self-determination of nations.

In Korea before the Japanese occupation, notwithstanding a strong and proud sense of ethnic identity, the people had a very weak sense of affinity toward their political system. Far more than in Europe, their loyalties were personal, not institutional, and a century or more of dynastic decline had undermined support for the royal house. Family, factional, and regional loyalties had precedence. In these circumstances, to mobilize the nation for effective defense against outside forces would have been extremely difficult, even if it had been tried. The Koreans watched helplessly as Chinese, Russian, and Japanese forces vied for hegemony over them.

⁴ For a review of Korea's troubles during the imperialist era, 1876 to 1905, see C.I. Eugene Kim and Hangyo Kim, *Korea and the Politics of Imperialism, 1876–1910* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967).

Resentment at the forty-year Japanese occupation of Korea led to the development of modern nationalism among the population. This nationalism fueled the unarmed countrywide uprising in 1919 to demand independence from Japan; the formation of the Provisional Government in exile in China; and a number of nationalist movements within Korea (all suppressed, sooner or later, by the Japanese Government-General). However, nationalist leaders were unable to combine their energies effectively in the struggle for independence.

In considerable measure, this inability was due to the power and efficiency of Japan, which denied the Koreans any hope for achieving independence in the absence of outside intervention. The hope of such intervention, based on Woodrow Wilson's advocacy of self-determination, encouraged the March First Movement; but, as the Koreans soon discovered to their sorrow, Wilson's doctrine was intended for the nations within the defeated states of World War I, not in the victorious ones such as Japan. In part, however, the weakness of the independence movement was also due to the ideological divisions and personal rivalries among the Koreans—evidence that family, group, and community continued to take precedence over the nation as a whole.⁵ The same weakness had been manifested in the sixteenth century, when factional rivalries impeded Korean defense against Japanese invasion.

Poverty and misgovernment in Choson Dynasty Korea, reported by foreign observers from the late nineteenth century on, created a negative impression of the country. The United States government—informed by the social Darwinism prevalent at the time—all but welcomed the Japanese takeover in 1905, and was the first to withdraw its diplomatic mission. Other governments followed suit. Korea dropped below the diplomatic horizon for the next generation.

⁵ See Chong-Sik Lee, *The Politics of Korean Nationalism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963).

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When World War II came, Syngman Rhee and other exiled nationalists saw the likelihood of Japan's defeat and Korea's reemergence, and argued strongly for international recognition. However, squabbling, unrealism and chicanery among exiled nationalist leaders had alienated both the United States and the Soviet Union, and led the United States to refuse to recognize any existing Korean leader or group as representing the Korean people. The ideas of trusteeship and military occupation were nurtured by the American conviction that the Koreans were not fit to govern themselves. It was for this reason that Japan, a defeated enemy but a respected state, was permitted its own administration, while "liberated" Korea was placed under the military government of two adversarial world powers.

It is frequently overlooked that the division of Korea was due not only to the U.S.-Soviet agreement to establish two separate occupation zones, but also to weakness and division of the Koreans. Their weakness, given the years of Japanese occupation, was inevitable. Their division, however, was a continuation of the factional rivalries and ambitions for power that had for so long characterized Korean politics-intensified by the ideological split between Left and Right, communists and anti-communists. Perhaps this, too, was inevitable; exiled nationalist movements everywhere appear to have the same problems. But it is significant that the Korean communists and their sympathizers readily followed the Soviet directive to reverse their position and support trusteeship in the midst of the anti-trusteeship demonstrations of late December 1945, while Syngman Rhee a short time later, reflecting conservative American anti-communist views, demanded a separate Korean state in the south.⁶ Both

⁶ On Soviet relations with Korea in 1945, see Eric Van Ree, Socialism in One Zone: Stalin's Policy in Korea 1945–1947 (Oxford, England: Berg Publishers Limited, 1989), pp. 143–144. On Syngman Rhee's support for a separate regime, see Donald S. Macdonald, U.S.-Korea Relations from Liberation to Self-Reliance; the Twenty-Year Record (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), p. 115, and Robert Oliver, Syngman Rhee: The Man Behind the Myth (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1954). It should be noted that U.S. policy officials were divided on the subject

positions made effective discussion of a unified transitional Korean regime virtually impossible.

Once the division of Korea was established, each Korean state looked to a protective "elder brother" in the old Confucian tradition. Syngman Rhee's entire foreign policy was built upon his relation with the United States, from which he constantly sought ever-larger grants of military and economic aid.⁷ He aspired to reunify Korea under his control by force with American support, but could not persuade the United States to go along with him. American counsel to broaden Korean relations with the world went largely unheeded until the end of his administration in 1960.

Similarly, North Korea in its early stages looked to the Soviet Union as its elder brother and protector; and the Soviet Union, unlike the United States, supplied it with the weapons and training needed for forcible reunification of the country. But when United Nations intervention pushed North Korea out of the South, the Soviet Union deserted it-as the United States had deserted the South before the war. It was the newly-victorious Chinese communists who came to its aid, preventing the reunification of the country under United Nations auspices as had been briefly planned and expected. As the Sino-Soviet confrontation heated up, Kim Il Sung was able to play the two countries off against each other and thus to achieve a considerable measure of independence for the North. The South had no alternative other than the United States (Japanese support being unthinkable for either Korea) and thus continued in a state of theoretical independence but practical dependence.

of Korea's future, with the Department of State until 1947 supporting negotiation with the Soviet Union for a unified Korea; and that Syngman Rhee, although he counted almost exclusively on the United States for his support, was no American puppet.

⁷ Donald S. Macdonald, U.S.-Korea Relations from Liberation to Self Reliance (Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 1992), p. 112.

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Since the mid-1960s, South Korea has moved a long way toward becoming master in its own house. This movement has been based largely on its amazing economic growth, which has brought it to the verge of full industrialization and has made it a significant actor in the world economy. Its economic progress, contrasted with North Korea's stagnation of recent years, has enabled South Korea to support its own enormous military establishment (which had been dependent upon American aid for many years) and even to pay some of the costs of the American forces stationed in Korea. Economic progress has also earned for South Korea a considerable measure of respect among the world's nations, which until a decade or so ago tended to dismiss the Republic as an American puppet (a view assiduously cultivated by North Korea). With new self-confidence and with an enhanced international reputation, South Korea has cast off its shell and reached out to the world.

However, South Korea—even with its large, well-equipped, and battle-tested armed forces—remains psychologically dependent on the United States because of the continuing threat from North Korea.⁸ Whether or not the remaining U.S. infantry division and air division in Korea are militarily essential for defense, their presence is still desired by seven out of ten South Koreans (according to a recent poll) because of the insurance these forces provide against North Korean attack. This dependence is likely to continue so long as the confrontation between North and South continues at present levels.

⁸ The author has elsewhere pointed out that even the anti-Americanism of radical students and intellectuals in South Korea is a sort of backward expression of dependence: for this group, all Korea's misfortunes can be heaped upon the head of the Americans, who thus become a scapegoat to relieve the Koreans of their own responsibility. Donald S. Macdonald, "American Imperialism: Myth or Reality." Korea and World Affairs 10, No. 3 (Fall 1986). For a recent survey of student opinion on relations with the United States, see Research Memorandum, Office of Research, United States Information Agency, 25 February 1992, "Korean University Students' Views on Korean Society, the U.S."

In a curious, reverse way, North Korea also remains dependent upon the United States, because the presence of American forces on Korean soil provides such a convenient means of rationalizing the mobilization of the population as a defense against the imperialist menace.

V

Independence, in the modern world, is more a state of mind than an objective reality. Every people wants to consider itself independent, as the breakup of the Soviet empire and the fractionation of Yugoslavia so eloquently demonstrate. In actuality, however, interdependence among nations is virtually a universal condition today, and the most advanced nations, in general, are the most interdependent. Even North Korea, with all its emphasis on self-reliance, is suffering because of the termination of concessional trade with the Soviet Union and China. South Korea has built its whole program of economic growth upon export to foreign markets; and, lacking domestic sources for most of its essential raw materials, it must import in order to export, as well as to meet the growing demands of its own population. Thus its fortunes are closely linked to those of the world economy.

Nevertheless, the sovereign independence of nation-states remains an important component of the modern international order, and seems likely to continue so for the foreseeable future. Every state must have the means to protect its people from foreign threats to their security and prosperity, whether the threat be military, economic, or psychological. Any elementary textbook on international relations will list the resources that a nation needs to protect itself-diplomatic skill, military and economic strength, scientific and technical competence, and so on. Among these resources, surely the most important is the unity of the people and their support for their country's political, economic, and social system and leaders. A perception of national independence, and the willingness to defend it, are key psychological elements in this support. Patriotism and independence are inseparably linked, as are patriotism and the perceived legitimacy that the political system enjoys.

The history of Korea, briefly summarized above, suggests that the nation's past problems have been due in large part precisely to the absence of patriotism. During the long period of Confucian relationship to China, patriotism was an extraneous idea. The traumatic encounter with imperialist rivalries and Japanese conquest, while it engendered a fierce nationalist feeling akin to xenophobia, did not produce either national unity or patriotism. The governments of South Korea from 1961 to 1987 were not regarded by the population as legitimate. The great majority of South Koreans look upon the North Korean government as illegitimate, as they are taught by their government to do, and North Koreans are taught to regard South Korea the same way. Moreover, despite the protestations of their leaders, some Koreans—especially among students and intellectuals—seem still to doubt their independence.

True independence will not come to Korea—North, South, or both together—in the eyes of the Korean people until their perceived dependence upon the presence of American forces is eliminated. The only way to eliminate it is by reducing the intensity of North—South confrontation to a level at which the people truly believe that they can provide for their own defense. Such reduction of tension, of course, is also an essential step toward reunification.

Eliminating dependence on American forces (which does not necessarily mean their total withdrawal) is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for the achievement of a perception of independence either by the people or by their leaders. The fortyseven-year preoccupation of each half of Korea with the threat from the other half has not only engendered military dependence on outside powers, but has also prevented Koreans from developing any valid concept of self-defense against the larger world outside the peninsula. Koreans still tend to regard their country as yakso ("small and weak"), when in fact South Korea alone ranks twentieth in gross national product among the world's nations and is twelfth largest in international trade—and, if reunited, would have the twelfth to fourteenth largest national product.⁹

It is true that even a united Korea with any imaginable military and economic base could not defeat any of the three huge nations that surround it either militarily or economically, let alone a combination of them. On the other hand, Korea could certainly develop the capability for inflicting unacceptable damage on any would-be attacker. Moreover, its three neighbors, as well as the United States, have a vested interest in the stability of northeast Asia. So long as these nations were persuaded that no one of them could co-opt Korea as a target of expansion or a base for attack, and so long as they were all convinced that a military or economic attack on Korea would have dire consequences, such an attack would be very unlikely. It is through such principles that the independence of Switzerland, a nation far smaller than Korea, has been assured.

VI

Korea's long-term future as an independent nation, therefore, rests on its capacity for credible self-defense, both military and economic; and upon the perception of its neighbors that no one of them could turn Korea into a base for military or economic aggression. Its security can also be enhanced by development of a broad range of relations of mutual economic and political benefit with as many as possible of the world's nations.

Credible self-defense requires a strong base of military and economic strength and popular support for the regime. This support depends upon the perceived legitimacy of the regime

⁹ Nicholas Eberstadt and Judith Banister, "Korean Reunification in the German Mirror," Asian Outlook (Taipei) 27, No. 1 (November-December 1991), p. 47.

and upon the strength of the people's patriotic attachment to the institution of the state, as well as the people's belief that the nation has the strength, capacity, and will to preserve itself. The continued division of the country weakens all these factors. It follows that if the two Korean states genuinely desire to assure their future security and prosperity, they must not only enhance their people's perception of Korean strength, but must also pay more than lip-service to the cause of reunification. As one scholar notes:

If...the reunification process is not seriously pursued by the divided parties themselves, while the role of third parties is becoming more prominent, the principle of self-determined unification by Koreans is likely to become impaired.¹⁰

Whether reunification is being "seriously pursued by the divided parties themselves" has been, at least until recently, a matter for some doubt. Both Koreas have put forward formulae for unification, but until very recently they seemed designed more for domestic and foreign propaganda effect than for meaningful negotiation—reminiscent of the grandiose formulae for general and complete disarmament put forward by the Soviet Union and the United States in the early days of the Cold War. The most recent unification proposals of the two sides do indicate some degree of convergence; but the diplomatic contacts between the two sides, from their beginning in 1971 to the current series of talks at the prime minister level, have not even begun to address the specifics of the unification process.¹¹

To begin with, it is clear that no foreign country is particularly eager for Korean reunification, nor likely to work for it, although various states may for diplomatic reasons associate themselves

¹⁰ Tae Dong Chung, "Korea's Nordpolitik: Achievements and Prospects." Asian Perspectives 15, No. 2 (Fall-Winter 1991), p. 173.

¹¹ For an analysis of unification proposals, see B.C. Koh, "A Comparative Study of Unification Plans: The Korean National Community versus the Koryo Confederation." Korea Observer 21 (Winter 1990), pp. 437-455.

with the unification formulae of one or the other Korean state.¹² On the other hand, the major powers will work for the reduction of tensions in Korea, because of their interest in the stability of northeast Asia. Since the reduction of tensions is an essential precondition for reunification, then the policies of both Koreas, as a part of the drive for reunification, should be aimed at encouraging participation of the major powers in the tension reduction process. Given the international quality of the Korean war and the Armistice Agreement, such participation is both necessary and appropriate. Among possible forms of participation would be the substitution of an international force along the Demilitarized Zone for the presence of U.S. forces as a deterrent to hostilities, and international observation or verification of force reductions or other arms control arrangements.

A multilateral guarantee for the independence of a unified Korea would be another useful way in which foreign countries could support unification. Although the real power of such a guarantee would be marginal, it would help to reassure a nervous Korean public at a time of transition. Such a guarantee would be particularly relevant if Korea were to opt for neutrality or nonalignment, as some authorities have proposed.¹³

Additionally, reunification must be perceived as a process, and not a single apocalyptic event.

If the approach toward the unification of the two Koreas can be defined as one that goes through the reduction of tensions, a peace settlement, and an accumulation of contacts between the South and North, then South Korea's improving relations with the Soviet Union and China can be viewed as the creation of

¹² See Donald S. Macdonald, "The Role of the Major Powers in The Reunification of Korea." Washington Quarterly 15, No. 1 (Summer 1992), pp. 135–154, esp. p. 147.

¹³ See In Kwan Hwang, The United States and Neutral Reunited Korea: Search for a New Basis of American Strategy (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1990), and Lhee Ho-jeh, "The Prospect of Neutralized Reunification of Korea," in Korea: The Year 2000, Han Sung-joo and Robert J. Myers, eds., Ethics and Foreign Policy Series, Vol. 5 (Lanham, MD: University Press of America and Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs), pp. 105–118.

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favorable conditions, which should lead toward a peaceful settlement, based on the recognition of reality.¹⁴

VIII

North Korean foreign policy contains a strong positive element of self-reliance, but this element has been combined with a kind of exceptionalism—the assertion that North Korea is somehow better than and different from the other nations of the world—and with a radical anti-imperialism that may appeal to like-minded leaders in such states as Cuba, but is most unattractive to the states most likely to provide meaningful trade and assistance. Until recently, it has rejected all forms of foreign participation in the reduction of tensions, and has demanded withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea as a precondition for discussing reunification. Moreover, North Korea has discouraged international cooperation through its unconventional diplomatic behavior.

North Korea employs a variety of covert and overt tactics, including massive propaganda efforts depicting the South Korean government as an illegitimate puppet of U.S. occupation, to weaken international and domestic support for South Korean President Roh Tae Woo and the U.S. military presence in the peninsula....Since the late 1960s, North Korea has deployed specially trained agents and military personnel to conduct terrorism against South Korea.¹⁵

North Korea in recent years has shipped large quantities of sophisticated weapons to states like Syria and Iran, including SCUD missiles, in defiance of the international accord on such shipments.

¹⁴ Chung, "Korea's Nordpolitik," p. 153.

¹⁵ U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, North Korea: The Foundations for Military Strength (Washington, D.C.), October 1991, p. 50.

Whether from real fear of aggression by the South and the United States, or from its own aggressive intentions against the South, or as a means of mobilizing its own population, North Korea has been engaged since the early 1960s in a massive military buildup, and more recently has also endeavored to strengthen itself through the covert development of nuclear weapons. Notwithstanding its adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1985, until this year it evaded signature of the required agreement on inspection of nuclear facilities.

North Korea has shown some signs of opening toward the world since 1980, including the passage of a joint venture law in 1984; endorsement of three-way talks among the North and South and the United States (refused by both South Korea and the United States); since 1990, an effort to normalize relations with Japan (somewhat surprising in view of North Korea's official anti-Japanism); and, in 1991, membership in the United Nations together with south Korea, after years of maintaining that only united Korea should be admitted. The effort at normalization with Japan has made little progress because of Japan's concern with nuclear proliferation; but if North Korea abandons its weapons program and accepts inspection, normalization may proceed, with its concomitant economic benefits. North Korea seems to have shifted its position on the U.S. force presence, no longer requiring complete withdrawal as a condition for proceeding with unification or tension reduction negotiations.

However, North Korea has rejected the idea of an international conference on reducing tensions, such as originally suggested by Henry Kissinger in the 1960s and most recently proposed by South Korean President Roh Tae Woo. As for North Korea's principal allies, although Mikhail Gorbachev, as President of the Soviet Union, was speaking in terms of an East Asian security arrangement, which might have included the two Koreas, China has sided with North Korea against an international conference, supporting North Korea's position that the Korean question is one for the Koreans themselves to solve without outside interference.

Moreover, North Korea's unification formula remains unrealistic in foreign eyes because it calls for sweeping institutional measures at the top, before the necessary trust and confidence are established between the two sides. The North seems to have no interest in obvious confidence-building measures, of which many have been proposed by the South, such as reestablishment of communications and trade and family visits. Invitations for North Korean representatives to observe South Korean and American military maneuvers have all been refused or ignored.

The changes in North Korea's foreign policies are probably due primarily to the collapse of the communist bloc and its concomitant adverse political and economic consequences, as well as to North Korean economic difficulties since the mid-1970s. Whether they reflect any real shift in North Korea's attitude toward the world remains to be established; and their relevance for the reunification process is marginal at best. Nevertheless, they offer hope that the North may be more amenable to cooperation with the regional powers in the future-especially if the North's rigid ideological position softens in response to the worldwide trend toward pragmatism noted by Robert Scalapino, in which "performance, not faith, has become the hallmark of legitimacy."¹⁶

South Korea, on the other hand, has gained immensely in the breadth and sophistication of its international relations. It is recognized by over 125 nations, and has diplomatic missions in many of them; it is a member of the United Nations and all its specialized agencies, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the Asian Development Bank; it has played an active role in negotiations of the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Its two-way foreign trade in

¹⁶ Robert A. Scalapino, "Pacific-Asian Political Trends in the 1990s." The Korean Journal of International Studies 22, No. 3 (Autumn 1991), p. 368.

1991 totalled \$72 billion, putting it among the top twelve trading countries of the world, and this trade is becoming increasingly diversified, diminishing the country's dependence on American and Japanese markets. The massive flow of foreign aid during the post–Korean war period, primarily from the United States, ended in the mid-1970s; and in recent years South Korea has undertaken a modest foreign aid program of its own.

South Korean President Roh Tae Woo's statement of 7 July 1988 and his speech to the United Nations in October 1988, according to one authority, "marked a watershed in North-South relations." These and subsequent policy statements have been eloquent expressions of South Korea's openness to the world.¹⁷

Korea's most impressive foreign-policy accomplishment has been its Northern Policy, first put forward in 1983 but made a centerpiece of South Korean policy since 1987, during the administration of President Roh Tae Woo.¹⁸ Under this policy, the Republic has established full diplomatic relations with virtually all former communist countries despite the shrill protests of the North at "betrayal" by its former comrades, and has pledged a \$3 billion program of trade and investment to the former Soviet Union. The Northern Policy, explicitly undertaken in large part to further the reunification process, has been accompanied by repeated overtures to North Korea for negotiation, and the formulation of a new reunification formula which, by starting with small confidence-building steps, appears realistic and workable in contrast to that of the North.

Nevertheless, South Korea also has impediments to the unification process. The long Cold War North-South confrontation engendered deep suspicions and fears of North-inspired espio-

¹⁷ Roh Tae Woo, Korea: A Nation Transformed; Selected Speeches (London: Pergamon Press, 1990), esp. pp. 3–10, 59–61, 76–83; Ohn Chang-il, "Military Talks in Korea," in The Korean Peninsula; Prospects for Arms Reduction under Global Detente, William J. Taylor, Jr., Cha Young-Koo, and John Q. Blodgett, eds. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), p. 177–178.

¹⁸ Chung, "Korea's Nordpolitik," p. 152.

nage, subversion, and incitement to rebellion, leading to highly restrictive legislation such as the National Security Law, and repression and condemnation of any utterance or action not deemed supportive of the South's political regime. The fears and suspicions were not unfounded; North Korean propaganda overtly supported rebellion in the South, and covertly attempted to stimulate and encourage it. In the light of South Korea's greatly increased strength, prosperity and freedom, and its new self-confidence, the old Cold War restrictions appear somewhat anachronistic. Yet a significant segment of south Korean elite opinion continues to support them.

Two emissaries of radical student and intellectual movements in the South, who defied the law in going to North Korea in the cause of unification and were feted there, were jailed upon their return and have remained in prison ever since, while the North Korean agent who assisted in the destruction of a South Korean airliner and its passengers in 1987 has been amnestied and released. South Korea continues to hold several hundred political prisoners, according to human rights organizations such as Asia Watch and Amnesty International;¹⁹ North Korean propaganda has severely attacked the restrictive laws and the holding of prisoners; the North, of course, is a far worse violator itself.²⁰

A weakness in the foreign policies of both Korean states is their continuing competition in international relations. Twenty years ago this year, on July 4, 1972, the two Koreas managed to agree on a joint declaration stating three principles for the achievement

¹⁹ According to the National Council of Churches of Korea Human Rights Committee Report, "1140 prisoners of conscience were officially arrested and prosecuted in 1991.... At present there are 1103 prisoners of conscience in South Korea (495 students, 334 workers, 85 opposition persons, 20 publishers, 40 soldiers and policemen, 7 farmers, 5 teachers, 96 long-term prisoners and 20 others." *Korea Update* (The Korea Church Coalition for Peace Justice and Reunification), Issue No. 105, January, 1992, p. 7.

²⁰ See Human Rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea)(Minneapolis, Minn., and Washington, D.C.: Minnesota Lawyers International Human Rights Committee and Asia Watch, 1988).

of unification: "through independent efforts" without foreign interference, peacefully, and through "great national unity."²¹ Yet up to now there has been no evidence of great national unity in the two states' foreign policies, not to speak of their attitude toward each other. Even without formal political unity, it should be possible for the two Korean states to work out a modus vivendi in which they complement and support each other in their foreign policies, laying aside the zero-sum competition of past years to work for the good of Korea as a whole.

IX

In conclusion: the reunification of Korea is a useful and perhaps necessary step to assure the independence and prosperity of the Korean people for the long term. Yet ideological differences and power rivalries continue to obstruct real progress, even after the end of the Cold War that caused the division of Korea in the first place. There is little or nothing that foreign countries can do about these differences and rivalries. However, foreign countries do have a contribution to make in the reduction of tensions and in the assurance of future Korean independence. Since reduction of tensions is an essential step in the unification process—which must be viewed as a process and not as a single event—there is an international dimension in the process. The foreign policy of both Koreas should aim at recognizing and capitalizing upon this dimension.

The principal ways in which foreign powers can assist in Korea's reunification and long-term independence include technical advice on arms control arrangements and confidencebuilding measures, drawn particularly from the European experience; the creation of a regional atmosphere that promotes a Korean sense of security and willingness to embark upon the

²¹ South-North Joint Communique, July 4, 1972; text cited in Handbook on Korean-U.S. Relations (New York: The Asia Society, 1985), pp. 375–376.

reunification process; participation in certain tension-reduction steps such as international inspections and international peacekeeping forces, as may be requested by the Koreans; and eventually, the provision of capital and technology for the rehabilitation of the North Korean economy, the cost of which, in the short run, will be beyond the resources of the Koreans themselves.

For successful conduct of its international relations, Korea—either divided or united—needs the unified support of its people, which in turn requires legitimacy of the political regime and a heightened sense of patriotism—of love of country, as distinguished from ethnic pride and identity, and of willingness to accord a higher priority to national interests, even at the expense of family, factional, and local interests, than has traditionally been the case. It is of the utmost importance that Koreans not be vulnerable to outside blandishments, or to feelings of subservience to foreign powers, such as caused Korea's international problems in the past. Since the division of Korea has itself been a cause, as well as a result, of disunity and the questioning of legitimacy, it follows that national unity and loyalty will be greatly reinforced by reunification.

For the sake of the security and prosperity of the Korean nation, as well as for the cause of unification, it is time for both Korean states to apply the principle of great national unity to their international relations-even before the unification process gets underway. The result would be to increase the prestige and influence of Korea on the world scene, even while it remains divided, and to hasten the day when the nation will be reunified.

The Process of South-North Dialogue and Perspectives for Unification of Korea

Tae Hwan Ok

In September 1945, a month after the end of World War II, the United States government decided to land its forces in Korea to accept the surrender of Japanese forces south of the 38th parallel, while agreeing to let the Soviet Union perform the same function on the rest of the peninsula.¹ That decision together with the launch of the Cold War forced Korea to suffer its separation. The American troops withdrew and by the end of June 1949, one year after the birth of the South Korean government, only a token of U.S. military advisers remained.²

Secretary of State Dean Acheson's declaration of 5 January 1950 that South Korea would not be included in the new U.S. defense line, on top of the heavy existing military imbalance between South and North Korea, encouraged Kim II Sung to attempt to communize the South by force. The North, supported by the Soviets, invaded on Sunday morning, 25 June 1950.³ Even

¹ Suk Bok Lee, *The Impact of U.S. Forces in Korea* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1987), p. 4.

² Ibid., pp. 20-24.

³ Joo Hong Nam, *America's Commitment to South Korea*, (London: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 31; Lee, *Impact*, p. 37. Acheson's declaration was made in accordance with the recommendation of Joint Chiefs of Staff that Korea was of little strategic value to the U.S.

though the American leaders still believed that Korea was militarily valueless, the Truman administration in its Cold War strategy quickly decided to defend South Korea.⁴

The war ended in a stalemate, and only deepened the division and distrust between the two Koreas. Negotiations for national unification were not initiated until 1971, when Pyongyang accepted the South Korean government's proposal for South-North Red Cross meetings. Further progress came when delegates of both governments signed the "South-North Joint Communique of 4 July 1972," in which Seoul and Pyongyang agreed to avoid aggression and hostilities, reduce tension, and ensure peace. One year later, however, the North unilaterally repealed the agreement with the accusation that the South was attempting to perpetuate the division of Korea.

In the late 1980s, however, the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe, Chinese and Russian reform movements and openness, together with its own economic difficulties, have all forced North Korea to agree again to hold high-level talks with the South. The seventh round of high level talks has been completed in Seoul. In the sixth round held in Pyongyang in February 1992, the prime ministers of both South and North Korea signed the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation (the Basic Agreement) and agreed to establish three subcommittees—political, military, and exchanges and cooperation.⁵

At the seventh talks, both parties signed an accord on the opening of liaison offices at the border village of Panmunjom as well as formation of four joint commissions to implement the Basic Agreement, setting the timetable for draft protocols, exchange visits by elderly dispersed family members and a group of cultural performers. Because of numerous difficulties, how-

⁴ Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, *Thinking in Times* (New York: The Free Press, 1986), p. 35.

⁵ Joong-ang Ilbo, 19 February 1992.

ever, such as the nuclear issue (which could yet block future dialogue) it is hard to know whether these proposals will be implemented.

This is a study of the process of inter-Korean negotiations and perspectives for the national unification of Korea. The goal is to understand better the background and the process of inter-Korean dialogue and predict prospects for South-North relations and national unification.

The Process of South-North Dialogue

The Cold War strategy of the superpowers forced Korea first to suffer separation and then to have them keep confronting each other in the role of the subordinate agency of a greater power. The Koreans, therefore, were prevented from developing their own dialogue on unification.

But in the beginning of the 1970s changes in the domestic as well as the regional environment compelled the two Koreas to alter their basic strategies of confrontation.

First, by normalizing relations with China President Nixon hoped to end the Vietnam War. He also wanted to use China as a means to induce the Russians to detente. Chinese leaders, who always feared a Russian surprise attack, welcomed Nixon's proposal as good will. The Russians were also interested in reducing their economic burden by slowing down the arms race with the United States. These big powers' conciliatory moods pressed both Koreas to start a dialogue for reducing tension.

Second, for quite a time after the Korean War, the North's planned economy seemed more effective than that of the South; at the beginning of the 1960s, the North Korean economy was far ahead and its GNP was double. By the end of that decade, however, the Northern planned economy, tightly controlled by the central government, turned out to be a cause of inefficiency and economic limitation. Moreover, the Pyongyang leadership overemphasized the defense industry, and all these elements caused them economic difficulties. They changed the goal of the first seven-year economic plan and even extended it by three years, but were unable to achieve even such a revised goal.⁶

In contrast, South Korea's free market economy was successful and its GNP began to exceed that of the North in the beginning of the 1970s. The South also started to modernize its weapon systems to catch up militarily with the North. Under these circumstances, the North Korean leaders wanted to use dialogue as a means to delay the modernization of the South Korean Army and maintain military superiority over the South. They also expected that a dialogue would reduce their economic burden by slowing down the arms race with the South. At the same time, through dialogue, Pyongyang wanted to form a legal "United Front"⁷ in the South. They intended ultimately to overthrow the legitimate ROK. government through a communist revolution in South Korea.

Third, in accordance with the Nixon Doctrine, the United States decided to remove the seventh Division (about 20,000 troops) from Korea.⁸ The leaders in Seoul, concerned about South Korea's military vulnerability to the North, tried to find a way to protect their territory against a possible surprise attack and expedited defense industry development. At the same time, they seriously considered dialogue as a means to buy time to achieve self-defense capability.

Therefore, on 12 August 1971, Seoul proposed to Pyongyang a Red Cross Conference to resolve the issue of ten million dis-

⁶ White Paper on Unification, 1990, (Seoul: Jung Moon Sa, 1990), pp. 93-94.

⁷ South-North Dialogue in Korea, (Seoul: International Cultural Society of Korea, 1973), No. 3, December 1973, p. 18. The design was to isolate the legitimate government from the people and lure the people to speak and rise against their own government.

⁸ New York Times, 10 March 1977 and 17 May 1978. At that time, Defense Minister Melvin R. Laird recommended that President Nixon withdraw an additional two-thirds of the Second Division by 1974, but Nixon forestalled Laird's plan because he feared that the South Korean government would pull back its 50,000 troops that were fighting in the Vietnam War as an ally of the U.S.

persed family members separated for over twenty years.⁹ They suggested facilitating mutual visits and meetings among dispersed families and relatives in the South and the North. The goal was to eliminate distrust and misunderstanding and to reduce tension. Two days later, the North Korean government accepted the Southern proposal and for the first time since the end of the Korean War the two Koreas began developing their own dialogue on humanitarian affairs.

In 1972 the they not only continued the Red Cross conference but also devised high-level talks. On 2 May 1972 President Park Chung Hee sent Lee Hu Rak, Director of the Korean Central Agency (KCIA), secretly to Pyongyang to hold a series of meetings with Kim II Sung and other North Korean leaders. At the end of May, North Korean Vice Premier Park Sung Chul reciprocated by visiting Seoul. These secret high-level talks were successful, and on 4 July 1972 Seoul and Pyongyang simultaneously announced the South-North Joint Communique. The two sides agreed:

- 1. To stop slandering and defaming each other; stop undertaking military provocations, large or small, against one another; and prevent inadvertent military incidents.
- 2. To implement various exchanges in many fields.
- 3. To cooperate positively with each other for an early success of the South-North Red Cross conference
- 4. To install and operate a direct telephone line between Seoul and Pyongyang as a means to prevent inadvertent military accidents and solve problems arising in the relations between the South and North promptly and efficiently.
- 5. To create and operate the South-North Coordinating Committee (SNCC) with Director Lee Hu Rak of the Seoul side and Director Kim Young Joo from Pyongyang as co-chairmen, with the purpose of enforcing agreed items, solving

⁹ Dong-A Ilbo, 12 August 1971.

problems arising in the relation between the two sides and solving the question of unification in accordance with the agreed principles.¹⁰

The Koreans applauded the communique and hoped it would open a new era of peace and stability through the preclusion of war and improvement of South-North relations. They hoped it could ultimately open the road to a peaceful unification of the country.

It did not take long, however, for the North Koreans to break the agreement: the dialogues turned out to be a source of trouble for Kim II Sung.

First, the dialogue channels held in Seoul and Pyongyang, although limited in scale, gave participants including delegates and reporters a first hand look at the society of the other side.¹¹ Such openness made leaders in Pyongyang uneasy because North Korean participants who visited Seoul could easily notice that South Korea was much more prosperous and that North Korean propaganda about destitute Southern society was a fabrication.¹² Second, The July 4 Joint Communique required the North to stop slandering and defaming the South, but the North Korean leaders quickly understood that they could not survive

¹⁰ Dialogue, No. 1, July 1973, p. 9 and No. 3, December 1973, p. 7.

¹¹ Ibid., No. 1, July 1973, p. 11. The twenty-five members of the South-North Coordinating Committee delegation and fifty-nine members of the Red Cross delegation as well as reporters from both sides began commuting between Seoul and Pyongyang for conferences.

¹² Ibid., No. 3, December 1973, p. 17 and No. 5, July 1974, p. 47. South Korea has long been pictured in the eyes of the North Koreans as a society suffering from prevailing poverty, unemployment and starvation. Meanwhile, North Koreans believe they have been living in a paradise on earth and their social system is one of the most advanced systems. When delegates of the North saw the streams of cars in Seoul, they thought the South Korean government was assembling all the cars it had across the country in order to impress them. Domestic goods, diverse in kinds and abundant in quantity, displayed in department stores in downtown Seoul really gave them a shock. At first, they simply refused to believe the reality.

without hostile propaganda and media agitation against the South. $^{\rm 13}$

Third, at the beginning of the dialogue, the North Korean leadership wanted to form a "united front" for the revolution in the South. However, they soon realized the dialogue would not serve their purpose of creating a favorable climate for the "peoples democratic revolution" in South Korea.¹⁴

Fourth, in 1973 two major socialist powers, China and the Soviet Union, were engaged in a worsening conflict. They could not agree on their interests in the Korean peninsula, so Kim Il Sung had no need to worry about any outside pressure to continue the talks.¹⁵

At the beginning of 1973, taking all these points into consideration, the North began to distort the basic spirit of the July 4 South-North Joint Communique. They even tried to use it for propaganda and intensified their efforts to deadlock the talks.

In this atmosphere two big events gave Kim Il Sung an excuse to suspend the dialogue. On 23 June 1973 President Park Chung Hee proclaimed a new foreign policy for peace and unification in which he expressed a willingness to enter the UN together with the North so long as it would not hinder Korean unification.¹⁶ On 8 August, however, opposition party leader Kim Dae Jung was kidnapped in Japan. News media abroad covered wild speculation linking the KCIA with the case. The North judged the situation to be the best opportunity to avoid blame for their one-sided decision to stop the dialogue.

After having held three rounds of the South-North Coordinating Committee Meeting and seven rounds of the South-North

16 Ibid., No. 3, December 1973, p. 37.

¹³ Ibid., No. 3, December 1973, p. 13. There was a total of 10, 282 cases of hostile broadcasts made through North Korea's radio and TV networks during the period from 11 November 1972 to 30 November 1973.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 18.

¹⁵ Ibid., No. 2, September 1973, pp. 81-82.

Red Cross Conference turn-by-turn in Seoul and Pyongyang, on 28 August 1973 the North unilaterally announced a suspension of the dialogue through a statement made in the name of Kim Young Joo, the co-chairman of the South-North Coordinating Committee on the Pyongyang side. The statement insisted that, in order to resume the talks, co-chairman Lee Hu Rak (who was to have masterminded the abduction of Kim Dae Jung) be replaced. It further urged the South to give up a "two Korea policy" supposedly expressed in the declaration of June 23.¹⁷

At the same time, the North resumed military provocations against the South, further deteriorating their relations. In October 1973, North Korea claimed the territorial rights over the waters surrounding five offshore islands in the Yellow Sea held by the South since the end of the Korean War. They dispatched naval vessels to the area and attempted to search South Korean civilian vessels on the high seas. Then in February 1974 North Korean combatants attacked two civilian boats of the South engaged in fishing near Baekyongdo Island in the Yellow Sea.¹⁸

Meanwhile, in order to consummate the people's democratic revolution through internal political confusion in the South, Pyongyang boldly attempted to remove President Park from office. In August 1974 Moon Se-Kwang, an ethnic Korean living in Japan, was trained and ordered by the North to assassinate President Park Chung Hee. The assassination plot failed, but it cost the life of the First Lady of South Korea on 15 August 1974 at the 29th National Liberation anniversary ceremony in the National Theater in Seoul.¹⁹

¹⁷ Ibid., No. 2, September 1973, p. 11.

¹⁸ Dong-A Ilbo, 15 February 1974.

¹⁹ Ibid., 15 and 16 August 1974; *Dialogue*, No. 6, October 1974, pp. 13–16. In November 1972, only four months after the announcement of the Joint Communique of July 4, the North instructed Moon to assassinate Park. Moon was ordered to attend the Memorial Ceremony on 1 March 1974 and to attack the President. However, Moon could not acquire the necessary weapon and the assassination plot was postponed.

On 15 November 1974 the United Nation Command (UNC) announced they had discovered underground tunnels in the DMZ that were designed to wage a major surprise attack on the front line fortifications of the South.²⁰ The August 1976 brutal murder of two American army officers by North Korean guards at the DMZ²¹ made things worse and tension in the area became fierce. The overall situation went back to the days before the South-North Joint Communique of 4 July 1972. With the exception of intermittent working level meetings in Panmunjom the dialogue had been discontinued for a long time .

To break the deadlock, President Park, in his 1979 New Year press conference, proposed to the North that the authorities of South and North Korea should conduct talks unconditionally "at any time, at any place, and at any level" to discuss resumption of the stalled South-North dialogue.²²

The North refused any sincere answer. Instead they merely attempted to capitalize upon the momentum for dialogue as propaganda: they called for a meeting of a "whole nation conference" in the name of the Democratic Front.²³ The North Korean leaders, however, could not totally ignore Park's proposal amid the rising demand for a resumption of the dialogue. Early in 1979, three rounds of abnormal contacts were held between the

²⁰ Chosun Ilbo, 16 November 1974.

²¹ Joong-ang Ilbo, 18 August 1976; Chicago Tribune, 20 August 1976.

²² Dong-A Ilbo, 19 January 1979.

²³ Dialogue, No. 20, July 1979, pp. 52–60. The Democratic Front for Unification of the Fatherland (Democratic Front) was merely a front organization of the North Korean Workers' (communist) Party. Its function was to extend, under the guidance of the Party, a blind support to the revolutionary and unification policies of the North as well as to organize and mobilize the whole population on the pretext of a "United front." The North Korean idea was that the two sides hold negotiations between the representatives of all political parties and social organizations, as well as individuals, to discuss the delicate political issue of national unification. North Korea thus rejected the South's proposal for a dialogue between the responsible authorities of the two sides.

members of SNCC of Seoul and the delegates of the North Korean Democratic Front at Panmunjom, with no progress.

To provide momentum to resume the deadlocked dialogue as well as to reduce tension on the peninsula, President Park and U.S. President Jimmy Carter announced in a joint communique on 1 July 1979 in Seoul that they wanted to hold a "meeting of senior official representatives of the South and the North and the United States" at the earliest possible date.²⁴

On 10 July, in a statement broadcast by Radio Pyongyang, the North rejected the "three-authorities meeting" proposal. Insisting that the question of national unification was an internal affair, they proposed a meeting between North Korea and the United States and suggested that the two sides discuss removing the American forces from South Korea and replacing the Military Armistice Agreement with a peace agreement.²⁵

Upon report of a negative response by the North to the proposed three-authorities meeting, the editorials of major newspapers of the South criticized the Northern attitude: the *Dong-A Ilbo* commented that "this negative response of North Korea constitutes nothing more than a repetition of its basic strategy, that is, to communize the whole Korean peninsula through the vietnamization of Korea."²⁶ The editor of *Joong-Ang Ilbo* said, "North Korea's negative response to the proposal stands illogical and unrealistic, and only shows that it is interested in neither dialogue nor in alleviation of tension."²⁷ Seoul Shinmun, "The issue of U.S. military withdrawal or that of a so-called peace agreement which Pyongyang gave as a reason for its refusal of

- 26 Dong-A Ilbo, 11 July 1979.
- 27 Joong-ang Ilbo, 11 July 1979.

²⁴ Chosun Ilbo, 2 July 1979.

²⁵ *Dialogue*, No. 22, October 1979. The North said in the statement that if and when problems relating to South Korea occurred in the course of such a meeting, the authorities of South Korea would be allowed to take part as an observer if the United States also requested it.

the proposal has nothing to do with the proposed meeting. It was thus an opposition raised only for opposition's sake."²⁸

At the beginning of 1980, after President Park was assassinated, the North in its efforts to create an environment favorable for the peoples democratic revolution in the South offered to resume dialogue. In a letter of 11 January 1980 to Prime Minister Shin Hyon Hwak, North Korean Premier Lee Jong-Ok used for the first time Shin's official title, "Prime Minister of the Republic of Korea," and said, "Should our dialogue resume, we are willing to hold North-South authorities' meetings along with the broad political conference we had already proposed and, further, to promote even a high-level authorities' meeting."²⁹

The proposal was accepted by Seoul and each side undertook working-level contacts to discuss procedural matters necessary for a meeting between the two prime ministers. In addition, by the middle of the 1980s a series of inter-Korean dialogues such as Red Cross Talks, Economic Meetings, preliminary contacts for a Parliamentarians Conference, and Sports Meetings had been held,³⁰ which precipitated an exchange of visits. In September 1985 hundreds of members of dispersed families were able to reunite joyfully with their relatives for the first time since the end of the Korean War.³¹

On 20 January, however, North Korea unilaterally suspended the ongoing inter-Korean Red Cross, economic and preliminary parliamentarians contacts on the pretext of the U.S.-ROK Team

²⁸ Seoul Shinmun, 11 July 1979.

²⁹ Dialogue, No. 23, July 1980. pp. 11–13. On the same day, the North sent several similar letters to eleven other South Korean leaders including Lee Hui-Sung, Army chief of Staff; Kim Jong-Pil, President of the Democratic Republican Party; Kim Young-Sam, President of the New Democratic Party; Kim Dae-Jung, co-chairman of the National Alliance for Democracy and National Unification.

³⁰ White Paper, 1990, p. 110.

³¹ *Dialogue*, No. 39, November 1985. Of the 100 hometown visitors of the South and North, 35 visitors of the South met 41 of their missing relatives, and 30 North Korean visitors met 51 of their relatives. Meanwhile, the visiting art troupe presented two performances at Seoul and Pyongyang respectively.

Spirit joint military exercise, which had been being conducted annually.³²

The Unification Policies of South and North Korea

Since 1960 North Korea has been advancing a unification plan for a Korean confederation. By the end of the 1950s, Kim II Sung had domestically consolidated political power in the Workers (communist) Party with the completion of purging his opponents from the party. Financially, the North had achieved very rapid growth by increasing the per capita GNP more than 20% annually. Kim II Sung was full of confidence in the socialist system. He believed that the Northern system was better and that they could absorb the South through economics.³³

Meanwhile, the 19 April Student Uprising of 1960 weakened political and social stability in the South, and by proposing his confederation Kim II Sung wanted to weaken the South's anticommunist capability. Ultimately he hoped to absorb South Korea politically through a people's democratic revolution in the South.³⁴

Internationally, Soviet Premier Khrushchev's detente with the United States in tandem with East German General Secretary Ulbricht's proposal of confederation to West Germany on 31 December 1956 pressed the North to adopt a peaceful coexistence policy toward South Korea. Kim Il Sung also needed to change his personal image as the aggressor during the Korean War into one of the world's peace-loving leaders.

On 14 August 1960, therefore, a day before the fifteenth anniversary of Korea's liberation from Japan, Kim II Sung proposed

³² *White Paper*, 1990, pp. 119–23. In January 1985, the North also called off the Red Cross Conference on the pretext of Team Spirit 85.

³³ Seong Ho Jhe, Analysis of North Korea's Unification Formula of Federation (Seoul: Research Institute for National Unification, 1991), pp. 5–6.

³⁴ Dialogue, No. 24, November 1980, pp. 67-69.

to South Korea a confederation for Korea for the first time since the end of the Korean War:

The peaceful reunification of our country must be achieved independently by holding general elections throughout North and South Korea on a democratic basis without any foreign interference....If the South Korean authorities still cannot agree to a free North-South general election for fear of the whole of South Korea being communized...a Confederation of North and South Korea could be instituted. We propose to establish the Confederation by way of setting up a supreme national committee composed of the representatives of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Government of the Republic of Korea...while retaining, for the time being, the present political systems in North and South Korea and maintaining the independent activities of the two governments.³⁵

In case South Korea were not ready to accept the confederation, he suggested, they could set up an "economic commission" composed of the business leaders of the two sides to exchange goods between them. The North also urged the South to reduce the armies of each side to 100,000 or less and hold a mutual conference represented by "governments, political parties, social organizations, and individual persons."³⁶

South Korea, with its inferiority in political consolidation, economic development, and military capability, rejected the North's proposal from the fear that Kim Il Sung's true intention was merely to create a favorable environment in the South for a people's democratic revolution.

On 23 July 1973, in an address welcoming Czechoslovakian General Secretary Gustav Husak, Kim Il Sung proposed a "Confederal Republic of Koryo," as an interim stage for national

³⁵ Dae Hwa Chung, "The North Korean Policy of Confederation: Its Theoretical and Substantive Implications and Relevance for Reunification of Korea, Studies on National Unification," Research Center for National Unification, Pusan National University, No. 6, 1984, p. 168.

³⁶ Ibid., pp. 168-69.

unification. At this time, Kim focused on the removal of U.S. troops from South Korea by emphasizing five major points for peace and unification: "To cease the reinforcement of armies and the arms race, make all foreign troops withdraw, reduce armed forces and armaments, stop the introduction of weapons from abroad and conclude a peace agreement."³⁷

On 10 October 1980, at the Sixth Worker's Party Convention address, Kim proposed the "Confederal Democratic Republic of Koryo" as a "unified state." However, the proposal included nothing new except addition of the word "democratic" to the old title and declaring the confederal system as a final stage for national unification. In addition, the North demanded five prerequisites including the replacement of the legitimate government of the Republic of Korea with a pro-communist regime, abolishment of the South's anti-communist policy including the repeal of all anti-communist-related laws, conclusion of a peace agreement between the U.S. and North Korea (over Seoul's head), and withdrawal of the U.S. forces from Korea. At the same time the North proposed its so-called "10-point policy guideline" for a unified Korea. However, the new plan showed nothing different from the old. Both plans lacked any practicability and were only designed as propaganda to mislead public opinion at home and abroad.³⁸

In the meantime, the South Korean government brushed aside the Northern proposal because they believed that Kim was trying to engineer a people's democratic revolution through the Koryo confederation system. Instead, the South had been continuously advocating its own unification plan of forming a unified

³⁷ Choson Chungang Yongam (Pyongyang: Chosun Jungang Tongshinsa, 1974), p. 56.; Dialogue, No. 24, November 1980, p. 68. Ten hours earlier on the same day President Park declared the seven-points foreign policy for peace and unification including the proposal of urging the North to enter the UN as a separate entity following the German case. The North criticized the proposal as a two-Korea policy.

³⁸ Dialogue, No. 24, November 1980, pp. 68-69; The Federation, pp. 13-15.

government of Korea through a general election based on population under the supervision of the UN.³⁹

On 22 January 1982, however, Seoul proposed to Pyongyang a more systematic, realistic unification formula than that previous. The new plan proposed organizing a "Consultative Conference for National Reunification" with delegates from both sides representing the views of the residents in their respective areas in order to draft a unified constitution. If the proposed unified constitution were adopted, the two sides could form a unified government through general elections held under the provisions of the constitution.⁴⁰

After the successful hosting of the 1988 Seoul Olympics, on 11 September 1989, the South Korean government proposed a revised unification policy, the "Korean National Community Unification Formula." It called for South and North to merge under the principles of independence, peace and democracy. A "Korean Commonwealth" would be formed as an interim stage for building a unified democratic republic. The organization would have a Council of Presidents as the highest decision-making organ, consisting of chief executives from the two sides. A Council of Ministers composed of about ten cabinet-level officials from each side was also suggested, to be co-chaired by the two prime ministers, and was earmarked to establish five standing committees-in the humanitarian, political-diplomatic, economic, military, and social and cultural areas. These committees were to discuss and adjust all pending issues between the two Koreas such as the reunion of dispersed families, the alleviation of political confrontation, developing national culture, forming an economic sphere for common prosperity, promoting exchanges, trade and cooperation, building confidence in the military and arms control areas, etc.⁴¹

³⁹ White Paper, 1990, p. 27.

⁴⁰ Dialogue, No. 28, March 1982, pp. 7-20.

⁴¹ Ibid., No. 48, December 1989, pp. 20-33.

At the same time, a "Council of Representatives" was to be created under the program, composed of around 100 legislators with equal numbers representing the two parts of the peninsula. Its function was to draft the constitution of a unified Korea and develop methods and procedures to bring about national unification. The Council was also designed to have an advisory function for the Council of Ministers.

This Southern proposal suggested that a unified Korea be a single nation and a unified government be formed through a general election in accordance with the new constitution. The unified legislature would have to be a bicameral parliamentary system, composed of an upper house based on regional representation and a lower house based on population.⁴²

The principles for unification are similar but there are several basic differences between the South and North on unification policy. First, South Korea makes no prerequisites. North Korea demands one-sided pre-conditions including the removal of the legitimate but anti-communist government in the South and the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea.

Second, the South emphasizes democratic procedures leading to unification, while the North's method is undemocratic, insisting that specific persons and organizations not in favor of their policies be excluded.

Third, Seoul puts great importance on exchanges and cooperation prior to political and military affairs in order to create a favorable environment for unification. Pyongyang, however, shows a keen interest only in political and military affairs rather than in exchanges and cooperation.

Fourth, the South regards the Korean Commonwealth as an interim state, with its ultimate goal the realization of a unified state. The North regards the Koryo Confederation system as a final stage of unification; the Northern concept is to bring about an incomplete unification under which two regional governments would continue to exist on the peninsula.

Fifth, South Korean unification policy is designed to seek a method of establishing a unified democratic Republic guaranteeing liberty, freedom and the pursuit of happiness, as well as participation and equal opportunity for all Koreans. Meanwhile, North Korea's unification policy is aimed at the communization of the entire peninsula through a liberation of the South.

The Changing Domestic and International Environment in the Mid-1980s and Its Influence on South-North Dialogue

As soon as Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in March 1985 he was determined to reform the domestic system through perestroika and glasnost. Gorbachev's new thinking had its effect on foreign policy, especially on the traditional Soviet concept of achieving national security at the expense of other countries. The Soviet Union improved its relations with the U.S. as well as with the Western European countries by signing the INF treaty, removing Soviet forces from Afghanistan, and announcing a unilateral 10% reduction of troops in Eastern Europe.⁴³

Gorbachev's new foreign policy encouraged most socialist countries in Eastern Europe to restore democracy and, one by one, adopt a market economy. The Soviet Union did not interfere in the changes and transitions in the region. In the throes of the democratic revolutions in Eastern Europe, East Germany collapsed by itself. Germany could unify thanks to Gorbachev's new foreign policy of non-interference.⁴⁴

Gorbachev's new policy also applied to Northeast Asia. In his speeches at Vladivostok in July 1986 and at Krasnoyarsk in September 1988, Gorbachev pledged that the Soviet Union

⁴³ David Holloway, "Gorbachev's New Thinking," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 68, No. 1, 1988–89, pp. 78–79.

⁴⁴ Andrei G. Bochkarev, "Perestroika in Soviet Foreign Policy," The Korean Journal of International Studies, Vol. 22, No. 2, (Summer 1991), pp. 282–88.

would reduce its military commitment in the Pacific and enhance multilateral cooperation, especially economic cooperation, with all the countries in Northeast Asia. During the period of perestroika, the Soviet Union normalized its relations with the People's Republic of China. These new relations put an end to Kim Il Sung's strategy of playing off the two Communist rivals to advantage, which he had been doing for more than 30 years in the confrontation between the two.⁴⁵

In the meantime, after President Carter's unilateral decision to remove U.S. troops from Korea, the South Korean government began cautiously to change its traditional security reliance on the U.S. and started trying to reach an accommodation with Socialist countries. In the beginning of the 1980s Seoul moved toward a more independent diplomacy. Relations with the Communist nations actively improved, including widening trade relations. South Korea's Northern Policy was quite successful, and it received positive support from the socialist world. As a result, most of the Eastern European countries as well as China and the Soviet Union responded to South Korea's invitation to the Seoul Olympics of 1988, despite Pyongyang's boycott.⁴⁶ As a result, North Korea faced isolation from even the socialist countries.

In addition, since the beginning of the 1970s, the North Korean economy began gradually to be crippled due to its inefficient centrally controlled planned economic system. Overemphasis on the development of heavy industry including the defense industry deepened the imbalance of industry structure. Underdeveloped technological standards caused defects in basic industries, and due to insufficient skilled labor and raw materials, not to mention the lack of any incentive system, the North Korean

⁴⁵ Ibid., pp. 287-88.

⁴⁶ *Dialogue*, No. 46, December 1988, pp. 42–48. In September 1990, South Korea normalized its relation with the Soviet Union. South Korea also normalized its relation with the People's Republic of China on August 1992.

economy went from bad to worse and faced bankruptcy by the end of the 1980s.⁴⁷

In an effort to solve its economic difficulties, North Korea had no alternative but to rely on economic aid from the U.S. and Japan. North Korea held a series of official government meetings to set up diplomatic relations with the them.⁴⁸ At the same time, North Korean leaders understood that having a South-North dialogue would be necessary for them to improve relations with the two wealthy countries.

Under these circumstances, President Roh Tae Woo announced on 7 July 1988 a special declaration that brought a significant change in the relations between the South and North. Roh proclaimed in his statement that South Korea would not only cooperate with the North in its participation in the international community but would also support the Northern efforts to improve relations with the U.S. and Japan.⁴⁹

As follow-up to the July 7 declaration, on 7 October 1988 South Korea proposed an open-door economic policy toward North Korea to achieve common prosperity.⁵⁰ Two months later the South again proposed a South-North high level meeting to discuss all pending issues related to unification. It required another two months to hold the first preliminary meeting at

50 Ibid., No. 46, December 1988, p. 63.

⁴⁷ Assessment of the Current State of North Korea and Prospects for Change, (Seoul: Research Institute for National Unification, 1991), pp. 208–16. North Korea recorded -3.7% GNP growth in 1990.

⁴⁸ Moon Young Huh, "North Korean Relations with Japan and th United States: Issues and Prospects," *The Korean Journal of Unification Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1992, pp. 97–101. U.S and North Korean diplomats have met in Peking 20 times to improve their relations while normalization talks between North Korea and Japan have been held seven times so far. In both cases, the most critical issue has been nuclear inspection.

⁴⁹ *Dialogue*, No. 45, November 1988, pp. 7–15. The new policy replaced the traditional policy of confrontation aimed at isolating the North from the rest of the world.

Panmunjom.⁵¹ One-and-a-half years after the first preliminary meeting began, the prime ministers of the South and the North met in September 1990 in Seoul for the first time since the end of the Korean War to discuss various pending South-North issues.⁵²

On 13 December 1991, at the fifth round of High-Level Talks held in Seoul, delegates of both sides agreed to make an accord on "Reconciliation, Non-aggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation."⁵³ On 20 January 1992 they also agreed to make an accord on Denuclearization.⁵⁴ In the sixth round of South-North High-Level Talks held in Pyongyang in February 1992, the prime ministers of both sides signed the basic accord and the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.⁵⁵

In May 1992, at the seventh round of High-Level Talks held in Seoul, the delegates of both sides agreed to open liaison offices at Panmunjom and form joint commissions to implement the basic accord. At the same time, the two sides agreed to allow about 100 dispersed family members from each side to visit each other's capital cities, Seoul and Pyongyang, on 15 August 1992. They also agreed to make a single set of protocols in order to implement the basic accord. But the two sides failed to draw up regulations on their mutual inspection of nuclear weapon sites. The South wanted an "on-the-spot inspection of all suspected facilities" in the North while the North claimed that the ongoing IAEA inspection was more than enough to verify the facts.⁵⁶ Since the South is clearly linking the nuclear question to the

56 Korea Herald, 11 May 1992.

⁵¹ Ibid., No. 47, May 1989, pp. 7, 32.

⁵² Ibid., No. 51, February 1991, pp. 7-32.

⁵³ Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North (Seoul: Board of Unification, 1992), pp. 9–18.

⁵⁴ Ibid., pp. 21-3.

⁵⁵ Joong-ang Ilbo, 19 February 1992. The inter-Korean Basic Agreement and the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization of the Korean peninsula entered into force on 19 February 1992.

implementation of the inter-Korean basic accord on cooperation, it will be difficult for this dialogue to be productive if the North fails to alter its nuclear policy.

Conclusion

Inter-Korean dialogue, which started in the beginning of the 1970s thanks to the changing domestic and international environment, have been held off and on. It was suspended at times due to Kim Il Sung's various maneuvers. From the beginning, Kim wanted to use the dialogues as a means to communize the whole peninsula by liberating the South.

In their process, however, Kim realized that instead of helping create a favorable environment for a people's democratic revolution in the South as he had hoped, the dialogues produced only negative results for the North. Inevitably the talks exposed their society to the South Koreans. At the same time, exchanges and visits exposed North Korean visitors to the revelation that the South was enjoying much higher economic prosperity.

In the long run, the dialogue would make the North Koreans aware of reality and request their leader to open society to a higher standard of living, even to political freedom. Such a change would obviously be the cause of the collapse of Kim's dynasty. Therefore, Pyongyang began to be reluctant to continue the dialogue, at times unilaterally postponing or suspending it.

However, North Korea's economic difficulties combined with the changing international environment of the late 1980s no longer allowed him to remain in his cage of isolation. Thus, Pyongyang again agreed to continue the inter-Korean dialogue, signed the basic accord on "Reconciliation, Non Aggression, Exchanges and Cooperation," and allowed IAEA inspection of its nuclear facilities.

Due to the ineffectiveness of traditional IAEA inspections, Seoul is continuously asking Pyongyang to accept a mutual inspection of alleged nuclear weapons sites by both sides. The South clearly links the nuclear question to the implementation of the basic accord on exchange and cooperation. Therefore, in order to improve inter-Korean relations and achieve national unification, North Korea must change its fundamental strategy of communizing the South, and it needs to acquiesce to Seoul's proposal of mutual nuclear facilities inspection. Otherwise, it will be difficult for this dialogue to be productive.

Inter-Korean dialogue is in fact related to North Korea's relations with the United States and Japan as well as China and Russia. The big powers have put pressure on North Korea to open up, and its domestic economic difficulties will ultimately force the North to adopt rational and practical measures in the future. If Pyongyang relinquishes the development of nuclear weapons and forsakes its basic strategy toward the South, then South-North economic exchanges and cooperation will proceed rapidly. Such exchanges, along with direct or indirect trade, will definitely establish mutual trust and lay the foundation for peaceful coexistence. From there, both sides can gradually move toward unification step by step on the basis of the spirit of the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation.

Verifying a Denuclearized Korean Peninsula: Current Negotiating Agenda^{*}

Seong W. Cheon

The nuclear problem on the Korean peninsula caused by North Korea's suspicious nuclear activities has emerged as a critical issue in inter-Korean dialogue and has become a major international concern. Although North Korea signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty(NPT) in December 1985, it had been for six years delaying to sign and ratify a fullscope safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency(IAEA). As the collapse of the Soviet Union and East European Communist regimes creadted an unfavorable external environment and international pressures to accept the IAEA inspection intensified, Pyongyang signed the IAEA safeguards agreement on 30 January 1992 and ratified it on 9 April 1992. Thus, an international inspection of North Korea nuclear facilities became possible. However the international consensus is that, as evidenced in Iraq, the IAEA safeguards inspection mechanism is not sufficient to deter a nation determined to develop nuclear weapons. Therefore, great attention has been paid both domestically and internationally to the ongoing South-North negotiation for establishing a bilateral inspection system. In this paper, the history of and the ongoing negotiation on the nuclear issue between

^{*} This is the updated version of the paper presented at the Ninth Annual Ottawa Verification Symposium, Montebello, Quebec, Canada, March 11–14, 1992.

the two Koreas are examined with particular emphasis on verification of a nuclear-free Korean peninsula.

The North's NWFZ vs. The South's Denuclearization

1. Proposals on the Nuclear Problem: Before the Beginning of High-Level Talks

Historically, the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea (DPRK) has strongly denounced the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula while advocating the idea of a nuclear weapons free zone (NWFZ) in the region. The first official record that revealed North Korea's anti-nuclear sentiment seems to be the letter of 7 November 1956 from the Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK to the members of the South Korean National Assembly and the general public, which accused the South of violating the Military Armistice Agreement and trying to introduce nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula.¹ During the 1960s and 1970s, the North intermittently raised the nuclear weapons issue, and Pyongyang's anti-nuclear campaign intensified with concrete proposals offered in the 1980s.

At the Sixth Congress of the DPRK Workers' Party held in December 1980, when some implementation measures were enumerated for the North's unification formula—the so-called Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo (DCRK)—North Korean President Kim II Sung proposed the establishment of a nuclearweapons-free and peace zone on the Korean peninsula.² In June 1986, Pyongyang issued a statement proposing a tripartite meeting among South and North Korea and the U.S. to discuss establishing a nuclear-weapons-free and peace zone on the Korean peninsula. In the arms reduction proposal issued on 23 July 1987, Pyongyang called for tripartite talks at the foreign minister level

¹ Rodong Shinmun, 8 November 1956.

² Rodong Shinmun, 11 October 1980.

to discuss a four-year process of the South-North mutual force reduction down to the level of 100,000 troops, together with the parallel withdrawal of U.S. forces and nuclear weapons from the peninsula. The updated and more comprehensive proposal made on 7 November 1988 suggesting a three-year timetable, spelled out detailed measures that would take place at each stage of the process. According to the proposal, the U.S. would pull back its forces and nuclear weapons to south of 35° 30' north latitude (a line running between Pusan and Chinhae) by the end of 1989 and a complete withdrawal of U.S. ground forces and nuclear weapons from the Korean peninsula would be carried out by the end of 1990. The proposal also suggested trilateral talks where among other issues verification could be discussed.

In the 1990s, North Korean proposals have taken a more refined and concrete shape. In the "Disarmament Proposal for Peace on the Korean Peninsula" made on 31 May 1990 Pyongyang presented a ten-point proposal for confidence building and arms reduction. Concerning the nuclear problem, the North proposed the following measure:

The North and the South should convert the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone.

- A. Joint efforts should be made to withdraw all the nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea immediately.
- B. Nuclear weapons should not be produced or purchased.
- C. Foreign planes and warships loaded with nuclear weapons should be banned from entering or passing through Korea.

On 30 July 1991 the North Korean Foreign Ministry proposed that the two Koreas jointly declare a NWFZ by the end of 1992, which would be guaranteed by neighboring nuclear weapon states by the end of 1993. The proposal has drawn attention in the sense that there was no request for trilateral talks and the withdrawal of U.S. forces was implicitly mentioned as a follow-up measure rather than a precondition for the pursuit of a NWFZ.

Seoul barely responded to Pyongyang's nuclear initiatives. As far as the nuclear issue is concerned, it is quite true that South Korea until recently has shown a lukewarm attitude. Quite contrary to North Korean anti-nuclear proposals, in the mid-1970s, then President Park Chung-Hee even hinted at the possibility that South Korea would develop nuclear weapons in case the United States withdrew its forces. No proposals concerning nuclear issues were since advanced by the South Korean government until 1 August 1991 when a statement was made by the Foreign Ministry saying that the two Korean authorities could discuss military matters including the issue of nuclear nonproliferation in order to reduce tension and build confidence between the two Koreas.³ There seemed to be many factors behind the South's indecisive position. Among several reasons, the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons beyond the control of South Korean authorities on the Korean peninsula was probably the most important.

2. The South-North High-Level Talks: From Round One to Round Four

During the first three rounds of South-North High-Level Talks which began in September 1990 no nuclear-related proposals were tabled by either side. It was at the Fourth inter-Korean Prime Ministers' Talks held in Pyongyang (22-25 October 1991) that the nuclear issue surfaced as a point of contention. At the meeting, the North proposed a draft of "declaration on establishing a nuclear weapons free zone (NWFZ) on the Korean peninsula" and linked its acceptance of the IAEA safeguards inspection to the withdrawal of U.S. forces and nuclear weapons

³ During this period, the only South Korean proposal for establishing a NWFZ on the Korean peninsula was made by the president of the Unification Party, an opposition party, on 16 January 1976.

from South Korea. The nine-point proposal (1) forbids the testing, manufacturing, introduction, possession, and use of nuclear weapons and (2) prohibits the transit, landing, and visiting of nuclear capable aircraft and ships. The proposal also (3) prevents any agreement guaranteeing a nuclear umbrella and allows no deployment or storage of nuclear weapons on either side's territory and (4) bans military exercises involving nuclear weapons. The proposal further (5) demands simultaneous inspections of North Korea's nuclear facilities by the IAEA and South Korea's military bases by the North.

On the other hand, South Korean Prime Minister Chung Won-Shik urged Pyongyang, without any condition, to first stop developing nuclear weapons and accept international safeguards inspection. South Korea's position on the nuclear issue, even though not explicitly declared at that time, was understood to be that even if U.S. nuclear forces were withdrawn, Seoul would need U.S. nuclear protection and therefore would allow U.S. ships and aircraft to pass through or visit South Korean territory including sea and airspace. Therefore, the North's proposal particularly points (2) and (3)—was directly contrary to the South's position.

In accordance with President Bush's unilateral announcement on eliminating tactical nuclear weapons (27 September 1991) and the reciprocal step taken by President Gorbachev of the former Soviet Union (5 October 1991), South Korean President Roh Tae-Woo made a "declaration on denuclearizing and building peace on the Korean Peninsula" on 8 November 1991 and launched a diplomatic campaign to deter Pyongyang from developing nuclear weapons. The declaration, the first official nuclear policy made by the South Korean government, is as follows:

(1) The Republic of Korea will use nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes, and will not manufacture, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons.

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- (2) The Republic of Korea will continue to submit to comprehensive international inspection of all nuclearrelated facilities and materials on its territory in compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty and with the nuclear safeguards agreement it has concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency under the treaty, and will not possess nuclear fuel reprocessing and enrichment facilities.
- (3) The Republic of Korea aspires for a world of peace free of nuclear weapons as well as all weapons of mass destruction, and we will actively participate in international efforts toward the total elimination of chemical and biological weapons and observe all international agreements thereon.

3. The South-North High-Level Talks: Round Five

At the Fifth inter-Korean High-Level Talks held in Seoul (10-13 December 1991) North Korea tabled its previous nuclear weapons free zone (NWFZ) proposal with no change and South Korea put forward a draft of "declaration on denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula" which was an extended version of President Roh's November declaration on denuclearization. At this meeting, the two sides reached a historic "Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation." The 25-point Agreement, as the name suggests, consists of three main parts and provides a framework for improvement of relations between the two countries. The main provisions of the Agreement are:

- (1) South-North Reconciliation
- Both countries agree to respect each other's political and social systems, not to interfere in each other's internal affairs, not to slander or vilify each other, and pledge not to attempt in any manner to sabotage or subvert the other.

- Both sides agree to work toward a peace treaty to replace the present Military Armistice Agreement that ended the Korean War on 27 July 1953.
- A South-North Liaison Office will be established at Panmunjom on the border within three months of the effective date of the agreement.
- (2) South-North Nonaggression
- Both sides agree not to use armed forces against each other and to resolve disputes through dialogue and negotiations.
- A hotline will be established between the two sides' military authorities to prevent accidental armed clashes and avoid escalation should any occur.
- In order to guarantee nonaggression, the two sides agree to form a South-North Joint Military Commission (JMC) within three months of the effective date of the agreement. To develop military confidence and realize arms reduction, the JMC is supposed to negotiate and implement the following measures: (1) the mutual notification and control of major military movements and exercises, (2) the peaceful use of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), (3) exchanges of military information and personnel, (4) phased arms reduction including the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and surprise attack capabilities, and (5) verification.

(3) South-North Exchanges and Cooperation

- Both sides agree to economic cooperation, including joint development of resources, and joint industrial and commercial ventures.
- Each side will carry out exchanges and cooperation in the various fields of science, technology, education, literature, newspapers, radio and television, and will promote the reunion of divided families and guarantee inter-Korean travel.

 Both sides will reconnect railroads and roads that have been cut off, and postal and telecommunications links will be set up.

Acting on the belief that the two Koreas themselves should inspect each other's nuclear-related installations and materials in order to build confidence in the military area, South Korean Prime Minister Chung proposed the South-North mutual inspection. He also called for simultaneous pilot inspections of one military and one civilian site designated by each other by 31 January 1992 on the condition that the two sides agree first to scrap nuclear reprocessing facilities. South Korea offered to submit Kunsan airbase and one civilian nuclear facility for inspection by the North and proposed Sunchon airbase and the Yongbyon nuclear complex for inspection by the South.

Pyongyang was obviously not prepared to respond Seoul's offer and put off further discussion on the nuclear problem until the later talks. The two sides merely agreed to hold an ad hoc meeting on the nuclear issue in the immediate future.

Joint Declaration on Denuclearization

1. After the Fifth Round of High-Level Talks and Denuclearization Declaration

On 18 December 1991 President Roh declared a nuclear-free South Korea, saying that "there do not exist any nuclear weapons whatsoever, anywhere in the Republic of Korea," which implied that U.S. nuclear weapons had been completely removed from the peninsula. President Roh's announcement was part of Southern efforts to induce the North to abandon its nuclear development program. The international community, particularly the United States, was concerned that the nuclear issue had not been resolved at the Fifth High-Level Talks even though the two Koreas reached a historic agreement. Responding to these concerns, South Korea has pushed Pyongyang to sign and ratify the IAEA Safeguards Agreement and accept international inspection as early as possible. Seoul even hinted that the annual "Team Spirit" Korea-U.S. joint military exercise might be cancelled depending on the North Korean attitude on the nuclear problem.⁴

The first ad hoc meeting on the nuclear issue was held on 26 December 1991. At the meeting North Korea withdrew its previous position insisting on a nuclear weapons free zone and proposed a draft "joint declaration on *denuclearizing* (emphasis added) the Korean Peninsula," which adopted many points of the South's proposal. For instance, the North Korean proposal forbids the possession of nuclear fuel reprocessing and enrichment facilities. It referred to neither the prohibition of a treaty guaranteeing a nuclear umbrella nor the transit, landing, and visiting of nuclear-capable aircraft and ships.

There has been much speculation as to why North Korea changed its position and virtually copied that of the South. North Korean leaders were well aware of the urgent necessity for normalizing diplomatic ties with Japan and improving relations with the U.S. so as to overcome their economic difficulties and diplomatic isolation. Since the U.S. and Japan have maintained their positions that Pyongyang should settle the nuclear problem and accept international inspection first, the North presumably had to take some positive steps.

After intense negotiations, the two sides finally came to an agreement on the "Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula" at the third ad hoc meeting on 31 December 1991. The six-point declaration contains eight principles of denuclearization and South-North mutual inspection:

(1) The South and the North forbid testing, manufacturing, production, receipt, possession, storage, deployment, and use of nuclear weapons.

⁴ The Hankook Ilbo, 17 December 1991.

- (2) The South and the North confirm uses of nuclear energy for only peaceful purposes.
- (3) The South and the North ban the operation of nuclear reprocessing and enrichment facilities.
- (4) In order to verify denuclearization, the South and the North carry out inspections of objects that will be chosen by the other side and agreed upon between the two sides.
- (5) The South and the North establish a South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission (JNCC).
- (6) The declaration enters into effect after being ratified respectively.

The eight principles of denuclearization can be categorized into two major parts. The first part, the ban on testing, manufacturing and production of nuclear weapons, should focus on the control of manufacturing nuclear materials and developing sensitive nuclear technologies. Thus, verification can be undertaken by locating and monitoring civilian nuclear installations such as nuclear reactors and nuclear fuel enrichment and reprocessing facilities. The second part, the ban on receipt, possession, storage, deployment, and use of nuclear weapons should concentrate on the detection of the existence of nuclear weapons. Therefore, compliance with these principles can be verified by examining whether North Korea is deploying at its military bases nuclear weapons that could have been made by the North itself or clandestinely introduced from the outside.

2. North Korea's Signing of the Safeguards Agreement

At the nuclear ad hoc meetings, North Korea promised to sign the IAEA Safeguards Agreement in the near future, and on 7 January 1992 at a news conference North Korean Ambassador to Vienna made it clear that North Korea would sign the Safeguards Agreement by the end of January. On the same day, the South Korean Ministry of National Defense announced that the U.S. and South Korean governments had called off the 1992 annual "Team Spirit" military exercise.

North Korea finally signed a fullscope Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency on 30 January 1992. The long-awaited signing was welcomed by South Korea and elsewhere. Unfortunately, however, Pyongyang showed no indication of early ratification of the Agreement. For example, North Korea's Ambassador to the UN Pak Gil-Yon said at a press conference on 3 February 1992 that the North would ratify the Safeguards Agreement within six months. South Korea demanded the North's ratification before the beginning of the Sixth Prime Ministers' Talks, that is, before 19 February 1992.

Meanwhile, the spokesman for the Southern delegation to the High-Level Talks made it clear that whether or not North Korea fulfills its obligation with respect to the nuclear problem would have definite influence on the overall South-North relations including a summit meeting between South Korean President Roh Tae Woo and his North Korean counterpart.⁵ Furthermore, he listed three specific issues upon which to focus at the Sixth High-Level Talks: North Korea's ratification of the Safeguards Agreement and agreement to form a Joint Nuclear Control Commission at earlier dates; and the prompt implementation of the South-proposed pilot inspection.

3. The South-North High-Level Talks: Round Six

At the Sixth High-Level Talks, the two Koreas formally brought into effect the "Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation," the "Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula," and the "Agreement on the Formation of Subcommittees of the South-North High-Level Talks."

⁵ The Chosun Ilbo, 14 February 1992.

In spite of these developments, however, the nuclear controversy could not be settled. A separate meeting was held on the nuclear problem, but the gap between the two sides' positions was too wide to be bridged at the meeting. Arguing that the nuclear issue is a litmus test of the North's determination to implement the inter-Korean agreements, the South pressed its counterpart to reach an agreement on the formation and administration of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission. Seoul also reiterated in its proposal its request for early implementation of the pilot and mutual inspection. On the other hand, Pyongyang manifested its refusal of Seoul's inspection scheme and maintained that inspection of the Yongbyon nuclear complex should be traded for nuclear inspection of all U.S. military bases in South Korea. In addition, North Korea tabled another issue. North Korean Prime Minister Yon Hyong-muk, in his keynote speech, warned of a recent Japanese nuclear build-up and proposed that the South and the North take some joint action. The two sides failed to reach a consensus but did agree to continue discussion of the issue at the truce village of Panmunjum on 27 February 1992. Regarding ratification of the IAEA Safeguards Agreement, North Korean roving Ambassador Choe U-Jin, who is also a delegate to the Prime Ministers' Talks, hinted that the IAEA Safeguards Agreement would be ratified at the Supreme People's Assembly to be held in early April 1992.

In his luncheon meeting with South Korean delegates, North Korean President Kim II Sung issued a statement in response to President Roh's announcement that the South would faithfully abide by the agreements reached, while urging the North to do the same. In his statement, President Kim denied that North Korea is seeking to manufacture nuclear weapons and renewed a call for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea. The following is an excerpt from Kim II Sung's statement:

There no longer exists the need for foreign troops to remain on the Korean peninsula. There can also be no excuses for the presence of foreign bases. I think the time has come now for us to make a decision on that matter. The nuclear problem on the Korean peninsula should also be resolved. There is no way for us now to be sure whether nuclear weapons still exist in the South or not. This situation does not eliminate our grave concerns about the nuclear weapons that have threatened us for 30 years. As for our position on the nuclear issue, as already manifested, we possess no nuclear weapons, and we neither plan nor feel the need to produce them. We cannot afford a nuclear confrontation with the surrounding big powers. We can never imagine that we would develop nuclear weapons that could annihilate our brethren.

On 27 February 1992 South and North Korea held a workinglevel meeting to discuss the formation and administration of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission. The South proposed that the two sides carry out the first mutual nuclear inspection under the Joint Declaration in late April or early May after working out regulations by mid-April 1992. Seoul also demanded that the pilot inspection be implemented at an earlier date. The North rejected both points and said that mutual inspections should be made after the two Koreas adopt a separate agreement on the implementation of the first three articles of the Declaration on the Denuclearization. Furthermore, Pyongyang demanded joint efforts to cope with nuclear threats from outside and an international guarantee on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The two sides have held 8 meetings at the JNCC but no visible results have been obtained.

Verifying A Denuclearized Korean Peninsula

1. North Korea's Resistance to Openness

Before discussing the verification issue, it is important to pay close attention to the fact that North Korea is basically opposed to the concept of openness. Considering the North's signing and advocating the fulfillment of the "Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation," some may argue that North Korea's secretive attitude will not be a significant impediment to the ongoing inter-Korean dialogue. Unfortunately, however, this argument turns out to be too optimistic. There is a good example of how strongly Pyongyang feels against the idea of opening its system to the outside. In the nonaggression part of the Agreement, both sides decided to organize a Joint Military Commission (JMC) to discuss and implement five measures including mutual notification and control of major military movements and exercises. But not a single provision mentions the "exchanges of observers." Without even observing military exercises and movements at an initial stage of the arms control process, it is doubtful how notification and control can be successfully verified.

Of course, South Korea originally insisted on mutually observing each other's major military exercises and movements. But North Korea objected strongly. North Koreans, having maintained a closed totalitarian system for more than 40 years, may be just overly sensitive to opening their system. They may not want to reveal their poorly fed and equipped soldiers, either. One argument worth our consideration is that for North Korean soldiers, it is unthinkable to show their exercises to officers of the U.S. imperialists' puppet regime (South Korea).⁶

Such resistance to openness has undoubtedly led North Korea to take a passive attitude toward verification. Pyongyang has not mentioned verification except to say, at the First Prime Ministers' Talks, that "The North and the South verify the implementation of agreed arms reduction measures through mutual on-site inspection of the other side." On the other hand, Seoul has demanded a permanent monitoring system to verify the implementation of measures guaranteeing nonaggression since the first round of High-Level Talks. Verification was, in principle, accepted at the Fifth High-Level Talks as one measure to guarantee nonaggression. But South Korea had to abandon its previous

⁶ Private communication with a North Korean defector.

demand of establishing permanent monitoring posts due to North Korean opposition. It is expected that North Korean resistance to openness will make it more difficult to negotiate the details concerning verification in the future.

2. South vs. North Korean Positions on Nuclear Inspection

Table 1. South and North Korean Positions on Inspection

North Korea	South Korea
civilian nuclear facilities	civilian nuclear facilities
military bases	military bases
	Southern (symmetric) proposal Northern (asymmetric) proposal

As shown in Table 1, South and North Korea show sharp discrepancies on how to determine the objects for inspection. As a condition for accepting the IAEA safeguards inspection, North Korea has been demanding simultaneous inspection of South Korea's military bases to see for themselves whether American nuclear weapons are removed. Since the South has already been adhering to the fullscope IAEA Safeguards Agreement for more than 16 years and the North has not, Pyongyang's position of asymmetric inspection is simply absurd to Seoul. South Korea, in turn, argues that it should be able to inspect North Korean military bases as shown in the pilot inspection proposal by South Korean Prime Minister Chung at the Fifth High-Level Talks. The South's argument for symmetric inspection is believed to be based on the fact that an inspection object should be chosen depending on whether the object has already been open to the outside world. Therefore, the South stresses that civilian facilities already opened (or in case of the North, will be so in the near future) cannot be traded for military bases.

At the Fifth High-Level Talks, South Korean Prime Minister Chung proposed a South-North mutual inspection separate from the IAEA inspection of all nuclear-related materials, places, and civilian and military facilities of both sides. As a starting measure, he proposed a simultaneous pilot inspection by 31 January 1992 of the North Korean Yongbyon nuclear complex and Sunchon airbase and the South Korean Kunsan airbase and one civilian facility designated by the North.

The motivation behind the South's pilot inspection proposal is Seoul's obvious belief that the negotiation for mutual inspections is filled with difficulties. In order for mutual inspections to be carried out, the two sides need first to form a Joint Nuclear Control Commission (JNCC). Then, they have to negotiate at the JNCC details concerning how to determine the objects of verification, and methods and means for verification. Seoul, which not only expects much controversy during the negotiation but also realizes the urgent necessity for inspecting the Yongbyon nuclear installations, had to propose implementation of the pilot inspection in advance. So far, there is no indication that Pyongyang has taken this matter seriously nor demonstrated its interest in Seoul's offer.

3. Nuclear Inspection Between the South and the North: Some Suggestions

In this section, some suggestions will be offered with policy measures that can be taken for pursuing mutual and pilot inspections between the two Koreas in civilian nuclear facilities and military bases, respectively.

(1) Inspection of Civilian Nuclear Facilities

Iraq's evasion of IAEA safeguards inspections and development of nuclear weapons in secrecy demonstrate that inspections between the two Koreas will have to be carried out more comprehensively and in such a way that the South-North inspection complements the current IAEA inspection system and, moreover, overcomes its limitations. Several measures can be considered.

First, considering that the IAEA inspectors have limited access only to the facilities where nuclear materials are reported to be present, in the case of South-North inspections, inspectors' access must be extended to such installations as control room, annex buildings, and others which the inspecting team wants to visit.

Second, since North Korea is reported to have significant amounts of natural uranium depots and run a uranium refinery, uranium mines and mills should also be included for inspection.⁷

Third, in order to build confidence between the South and the North, mutual nuclear inspections should allow enough time for inspection with a minimum notification period.

Fourth, in order to locate undeclared nuclear facilities and materials, effective intelligence collection methods should be available. Since the South and the North have virtually no technically advanced means of collecting intelligence, both sides may need to agree on an Open Skies agreement which is undoubtedly a significant confidence-building measure.

Finally, when a reprocessing installation operates, the IAEA inspectors are normally at the facility full time. Considering that North Korea has already built a nuclear fuel reprocessing facility at the Yongbyon complex, continuous inspection should also be required in the South-North mutual inspection until the North completely dismantles the facility.

(2) Inspection of Military Bases

In the case of inspecting military bases, the two sides will face many more difficulties. First, as mentioned above, the positions of the South and the North on how to include military facilities

⁷ According to one report, North Korea discovered 4 million tons of uranium deposits and is operating one uranium mill. See Leonard Spector and Jacqueline Smith, Nuclear Ambitions: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons 1989–1990, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), pp. 121, 139.

for nuclear inspection are different: the South's symmetric inspection vs. the North's asymmetric inspection. Second, nothing has been discussed on the details of inspection. The two sides have to agree upon which military bases are to be inspected; what they are going to see at each site and how intrusively; and what the details of the inspection procedures are.

Since military bases are going to be dealt with at the Joint Military Commission as well, they can possibly be grouped into two categories depending on whether the military unit at a base is equipped with weapons that could load nuclear warheads. Such units consist of missile, air force, and artillery units. Thus, the Joint Nuclear Control Commission is to be provided the authority to monitor these units. The JNCC can inspect them to see whether they have deployed nuclear weapons. If an agreement on some operational or structural conventional arms control measures is reached in the JMC, the JNCC can verify the implementation of these measures as well.

In view of the deep-seated mistrust and suspicion prevailing between the two Koreas, implementing the second part of the "Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation" will be much more difficult than the other two. A hotline between the two military authorities may be established and some exchanges of high-level military officials can be realized in the near future. This observation is based on the assessment that these measures will not demand serious openness of the North and have only minor influence on its society, if any. However, other steps requiring more openness on the part of Pyongyang will face more difficulties.

Keeping these circumstances in mind, mutual visits to military bases and units may be relatively more easily accomplished at an initial stage than direct inspections and searches. The latter steps may quickly raise a harsh debate and contribute to increasing tension between the two sides. All details such as determining the objects of visits, visiting procedures and periods can be decided by the inviting side. When confidence is gradually built up and suspicions are diminished through such informal visits, more formal inspections can be carried out. If it is difficult to agree on all the data of each other's military forces, several more important units and bases can be selected and inspected first rather than wrangling over the database.

Conclusion

This paper has reviewed the nuclear problem on the Korean Peninsula and suggested some measures to be taken for overcoming the limitations of the present civilian inspection system and for facilitating verification of military bases related with nuclear weapons. Although South and North Korea signed the "Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula," implementation of the Declaration is facing difficulties.

One important issue that could possibly complicate the ongoing negotiation in this regard is that the U.S. may want to participate directly in the South-North inspection. The U.S. wish to play a role in the inspection was expressed more clearly by Undersecretary of State Arnold Kanter in his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee. Mr. Kanter gave an affirmative answer in the hearing to Senator Alan Cranston's question about whether the U.S. was willing to form a joint inspection team with South Korea.⁸

In case the U.S. bases in South Korea are open for inspection by North Korea, the U.S. may have legal rights to demand its own participation. However, the U.S. participation is so politically sensitive that its feasibility and possible consequences should be thoroughly examined. The following problems can be expected.

First of all, North Korea may not allow the U.S. to search any part of its territory. President Kim Il Sung, in his New Year Address, put a particular emphasis on the principle of independence. He

⁸ The Han-Kyoreh Shinmun, 13 February 1992.

argued that "It was due to the coercion of the foreign forces that our country (was) divided, and our struggle for national reunification is aimed at putting an end to the foreign domination and achieving national identity."⁹ Given the North Korean attitude reflected in Kim's address, it is difficult to imagine that Pyongyang will welcome American inspectors.

Second, the North may use the U.S. demand of its participation in the South-North inspection as a bargaining chip to obtain more concessions from both the U.S. and South Korea, which will make the ongoing negotiation less favorable to Seoul.

Third, if the U.S. is allowed to participate, the North may take advantage of the matter and launch a propaganda campaign to criticize Seoul's dependence on the U.S. imperialists, which will inflict political damage on the South Korean government.

Finally, the U.S. participation will lead to acceptance of the idea of trilateral talks which for many years North Korea has been pursuing but the U.S. rejecting.

In addition to these negative consequences that may arise, the South Korean general public and even some key policy makers have reservations on direct U.S. involvement in inter-Korean nuclear inspections. Given these considerations, it would be advisable for the U.S. to provide assistance to South Korea in carrying out effective on-site inspections by giving all the necessary intelligence and technologies rather than insisting on direct participation.

⁹ The Pyongyang Times, 1 January 1992.

Defense Spending vs. Economic Growth: A New Controversy in the Era of Inter-Korean Reconciliation and Cooperation

Kyudok Hong

Over the last year and a half, the guns-and-butter issue in South Korea has suddenly appeared as one of the most urgent items on its security agenda. This is rather suprising, given that people in the South have tended to view defense spending as inviolate in light of the real and perceived threat of North Korea. Today, the debate on how much defense spending is enough has come into vogue not only among the general public but also among policymakers. This heightened interest in military spending would appear to be the result of two factors.

The first major event that has contributed to the debate on defense spending is the end of the Cold War arising from the political disintegration of the Soviet Union. The winds of change in the East and West confrontations finally blew to the Korean peninsula and the two Koreas formally brought into effect the "Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation" (hereafter abbreviated as "Basic Agreement") and the "Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula," at the Sixth South-North High Level Talks held in Pyongyang from February 18–21, 1992. These signs of change in South-North relations make some reductionists question the wisdom of maintaining large military expenditures and suggest conversion of the funds into welfare and social infrastructures for eradicating economic difficulties currently faced by South Korea.

Second, the liberalization of the South Korean political system ultimately makes it possible to break with the notion that security issues lie beyond the scope of public accountability. Due to the democratization process initiated in 1987 and the changed dynamics in the domestic political structure, distributional pressures for social welfare have become much more visible and powerful influences on decision making in such crucial areas as defense spending.

Nevertheless, the immediate result of the ongoing debate will more likely be a slower increase rather than a significant reduction.

This study attempts (1) to examine the validity of the argument that reductions in arms spending would improve economic performance, (2) to explain what determines South Korea's large military expenditures and why it is difficult to reduce them, and finally (3) to seek ways to institutionalize arms control and arms reductions on the Korean peninsula.

Finally, this study suggests that aiding North Korea's defense conversion will be a plausible means of giving Pyongyang an incentive to give up its military buildup, and therefore contribute to arms control and arms reduction on the Korean peninsula.

Ongoing Debate on the Level of Defense Budget

The sudden demands for a cutback in South Korea's enormous defense budget is in part a product of its domestic economic difficulties. Recent reports that the Korean economy is losing its competitive edge in sharing export markets have fueled calls for smaller defense spending. Reductionists argue that the changing global situation resulting from the disintegration of the former Soviet bloc has reduced the chance that Pyongyang will mount a surprise attack on the South.

Within the South Korean government, however, few officials are inclined to accept the theory that North Korea's hostility will lessen significantly due to the climate of international detente. They agree that chances of another war breaking out on the Korean peninsula have been reduced considerably, but point to North Korea's continued use of a quarter of its GNP on military spending as reason for caution. Further, North Korea's developing nuclear weapons program and its missile system capable of delivering nuclear warheads, can be regarded as a major threat not only to South Korea but also to the surrounding nations, including Japan. Despite its unilateral reduction of 100,000 troops in 1987,¹ the North still maintains 995,000 men under arms compared to South Korea's armed forces total of 650,000.²

The debate over military spending began in September 1991 when the Minister of National Defense, Lee Jong-Koo, asked for a 25% increase in the defense budget for the fiscal year 1992. In seeking Won 9.6 trillion (US\$13.2 billion), against the FY 1991 level of Won 7.7 trillion, Lee emphasized the need for South Korea to acquire state-of-the-art weaponry, including a new fleet of F-16 fighters and P3 Orion reconnaissance planes.³

Procurement of such expensive high-tech weapons would inevitably increase the defense budget. According to a recent article the aquisition of F-16s will cost the government US\$5.3 billion and the P3 Orions will cost US\$800 million.⁴

¹ Yong Kwan Chung, "Pukhan Kukbang Chongch'aek ui Kujo wa Yoksa e daehan Yongu," (A Study on the Structure and History of North Korean Defense Policy) *Pukhan Yongu* (North Korean Studies), Vol. 2, No. 3 (Fall 1991), p. 201.

² The Ministry of National Defense, ROK *Defense White Paper 1991–1992*, p. 108. However, other sources indicate that its numbers are over 1.2 million. See Nicholas Eberstadt and Judith Banister, "Military Buildup in the DPRK: Some New Indications from the North Korean Data," *Asian Survey* Vol. XXXI, No, 11 (November 1991), pp. 1110-1112.

³ Jae Hoon Shim, "Soldiering on," Far Eastern Economic Review, 26 September 1991, p. 27.

The MND finally did get Won 8.41 trillion for FY 1992 and is now asking for Won 9.84 trillion for FY 1993, a 17% increase.⁵ Over the last five years the defense-budget to government-budget ratio has been 30% for 1988, 31.3% for 1989, 29.3% for 1990, 27.6% for 1991, and 25.3% for 1992. Meanwhile, the defense budget to GNP ratio was 4.37% for 1988, 4.26% for 1989, 3.94% for 1990, 3.77% for 1991, and 3.71% for 1992. The MND announced in its Mid-Term Defense Plan on 17 May 1992 that it is planning to maintain an average defense budget ratio of 24.4% of the government budget and 3.69% of GNP, an annual increase of 12.4% for the next five years (1993–1997).⁶

Since the collapse of South Vietnam in 1975 military expenditure in South Korea has seldom dropped below 30% of the national budget. Under an agreement with the U.S., total defense spending has ranged between 6% of GNP in the early 1980s to 3.77% this year.

Opposition parties are always asking for a cutback, but their demands have never really attracted public support. Moreover, in practice, the defense budget has never been challenged seriously in the National Assembly simply because the Defense Committee is dominated by ruling party members. However, a challenge to the way the government deals with defense spending came unexpectedly from the business community. The Federation of Korean Industries (FKI), a conservative organization of top conglomerates, has recently surprised the government by asking for an outright reduction in the defense budget. An FKI statement in August 1991 said the government must allocate resources better by providing more money for industrial infrastructure projects. In May 1992, however, the FKI did not directly mention any necessity to reduce military spending. But it did call for a troop reduction and asked for a conversion of manpower to

6 Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ The Chosun Ilbo, 18 May 1992.

the industrial sector, where a lack of labor has posed a serious problem.⁷

In addition to the business community, various citizen's groups increasingly pressuring the government with vocal demands for cutbacks. Prominent among these groups has been the Citizen's Coalition for Economic Justice, a dissident-oriented organization, which has argued that the defense budget should not only be gradually reduced but thrown open to thorough discussion in the media.⁸

Lee Jong-Koo, the former Minister of National Defense, has agreed to publicize many of his spending programs and said he will accept a public debate on the issue. Since then, members of the academic community, including Professor Choi Kwang of the Hankook University of Foreign Studies, Dr. Lee Kye-Shik of the Korea Development Institute, and Dr. Hyun In-Taek of the Institute of Social Sciences, have called for a reallocation of the defense budget.⁹

But while demanding cuts in the overall size of military expenditure, critics have different ideas of where the savings should come from or how much they are aiming for. Presidential candidate Park Chan-Jong, for example, has called for reducing the number of armed forces to 300,000 against the current level of 650,000, and has said that if elected President he will reduce the defense budget to one-third the current level during his tenure.¹⁰ He is also calling for building a professionalized armed forces

⁷ The Han-Kyoreh Shinmun, 13 May 1992.

⁸ Shim, "Soldering On" p. 27.

⁹ Kwang Choi, "Kunbi Naeyok Palkija," (Let's open details of defence expenditure to the public) Sisa Journal, 12 September 1991, pp. 50-51; The Segye Times, 8 January 1992; Chang Hwan Mo, "Sahoe Kanjop Jabon, Pang Wi Bi Jool Yeo Choong Dang Eul," (Funding Social Infrastructure, by reducing defense expenditures) The Han-Kyoreh Shinmun, 11 September 1991.

¹⁰ Interview with Jee Man-Won, Sisa Journal, 5 September 1992.

equipped with high-tech weapons and a highly educated officer corps.¹¹ Ruling party presidential candidate Kim Young-Sam recently proclaimed he will increase funding for education up to 5% of GNP if he is elected.¹² He didn't mention, however, whether these funds would be reallocated from the defense budget.¹³ As a matter of fact, most presidential candidates are avoiding the sensitive issue of fund reallocation while acknowledging the need for a long-term reduction of the military budget and the number of armed forces personnel.

However, there are some who still oppose a serious cutback of the defense budget. According to them, even though South Korea has spent more on defense since 1979 has not reached military parity with North Korea. As a very recent armed incursion by North Korean commandos clearly illustrates, the threat of North Korean armed aggression against the South still exists, despite the relaxation of Cold War tensions and Pyongyang's severe economic hardships. For those who oppose defense cuts, Japan's military buildup, and Chinese efforts to modernize its armed forces are further reasons for caution. In their eyes, Japan is trying to expand its military role into the international community and China will soon have a considerable military influence on regional affairs.

On the other hand, instead of outright cuts, some suggest more efficient managment of the defense budget to minimize waste. Jee Man-Won, a retired army colonel, saw the problems in the allocation and operation of the ROK defense budget and called for an improved accounting system that would better handle the problem.¹⁴ Lee Sun-Ho, a former marine colonel, shared Jee's

¹¹ He mentioned that he will have the entire officer corps hold M.A. degrees and thus be more oriented to modern science and technology. He also promised to spend more on their welfare. Ibid.

¹² The Dong-A Ilbo, 18 July 1992.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Man-Won Jee, Hanguk Kun Odiro Kayahana? (ROK Armed Forces: Where to go

criticism and lamented that, "the Korean armed forces looks like a very sick dinosaur....The most serious problem for the ROK armed forces is that the military tries to solve the issues with its own limited perspectives."¹⁵ Jee believes that a future troop reduction is inevitable. However, he warns that such a reduction should involve long-term planning well ahead of actual reduction in outlays and that it needs very careful preparation. According to him, it will take 4 to 5 years for a restructuring of armed forces' manpower, while investing in more high-technology defense equipment. In this case, however, reducing numbers does not necessarily lower the defense budget.¹⁶ Ironically, it would mean even higher spending as it would require a vast amount of advance investment to convert the present labor-intensive armed forces into a technology based one.¹⁷

Opposition critics and dissidents believe Seoul's spending of about US\$10 billion on defense each year—nerely twice the North's expenditure—should be scaled back to make room for more spending in such areas as social welfare, housing and the environment.¹⁸ But the official position of the MND is that the country must keep defense outlays to a level of 4.5% of GNP for another three to four years in order to reach military parity with the North.¹⁹ The ministry notes that amid its serious economic

19 Interview with The Korea Herald, cited in Sisa Journal, 12 September 1991, p. 51.

from here?) (Seoul, Kim Young Sa, 1991).

¹⁵ The Kyung Hyang Shinmun, 29 February 1992. Sun Ho Lee, Hanguk Kun Mosi Munje Inga? (ROK Armed Forces: What are the problems?) (Seoul: Pul Moo Won, 1991).

¹⁶ According to Shim Jae Hoon, reducing numbers is unlikely to save enough money to satisfy the critics as the pay levels of South Korean soldiers are well below those in the private sector. According to defense experts, the total cost of maintaining an average South Korean soldier in battle-fit condition is US\$13,810 a year, significantly lower than the US\$16,620 for a soldier in Taiwan. Shim, "Soldiering On" p. 27.

¹⁷ Interview with Jee Man-Won, Sisa Journal, 5 September 1992, p. 52.

¹⁸ According to the *Defense White Paper 1991–1992*, the North's defense budget for 1990 was US\$5.44 billion.

problems, Pyongyang has recently introduced and deployed on the front lines Scud-B missiles, and hovercraft to transport its special warfare forces; it produces biological and chemical weapons and; above all, it is pushing for the production of nuclear weapons.

On the FKI request for troop cuts, an MND official said on 11 June 1992 that "South Korea will not reduce military manpower in the immediate future despite progress in inter-Korean relations." He continued, that "Any manpower reduction must be compensated by equipment modernization and increase in skilled experts, and this would only increase the defense budget."²⁰ Major General Kim Jong-Bae, Director of the MND's Strategic Planning Directorate, acknowledged, however, that "a reduction in manpower may be a necessary trend considering the progress in inter-Korea relations." He also believes that "the current military budget is not unreasonably large compared to other countries,"²¹ and he noted that Japan, China and North Korea are strengthening their military, which "makes it difficult for us to cut our defense budget or reduce military manpower unilaterally." The comment came after the FKI and other organizations called for a cut in the military budget, claiming a reduction of 100,000 military personnel would save 107 billion Won (US\$135.9 million) annually. Kim also opposed the idea of troop cuts, arguing that it would worsen the already serious shortages of career soldiers compared to other countries such as Japan and the United States. On the FKI's request for force modernization, Kim said, "A larger share of the military budget will be distributed to the air force and the navy for the coming five years." Therefore, according to him, the new budget will give 60 % to the navy and air force and 40% to the army in 1993. "About 3 trillion Won will be spent on improving defense capability and any

²⁰ The Korea Herald, 12 June 1992.

further budgetary cutbacks will severely affect procurement plans."²²

According to a poll by *The Segye Times* and Hankook Public Opinion Institute on 5–6 September 1991, 37.4% of 801 respondents over 20 years old believed that either the defense budget should be cut drastically or reduced gradually, while 27.5% said that it would be acceptable to maintain the current level of defense expenditures. On the other hand, 18.8% said that it would be desirable to increase the defense budget while 16.2% said they didn't know. On the question of allocation of the defense budget, 53.2% said that investment needs to be made to improve the soldier's living quarters and welfare. Only 15.3% called for procurement of modern weapons while 17% of the respondents said funds need to be invested to develop the defense industry.²³

The Puzzle of Guns and Butter: Trade-Off or Myth?

Historically, most analyses of the economic impact of defense expenditures on Third World development have concentrated on possible growth effects (either positive or negative) stemming from increased defense burdens.²⁴ In spite of the numerous studies done to determine the relationship between military expenditure and economic growth, the controversy remains unresolved.

²² Ibid.

²³ The Segye Times, 9 September 1992.

²⁴ Jacques Fontanel in his review essay examines three recent studies on this issue. They are Saadet Degger, *The Economic Effects* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986); Nicole Ball, *Security and Economy in the Third World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988); Robert E. Rooney, *Third World Military Expenditure and Arms Production* (London: Macmillan, 1988). See Jacques Fontanel, "The Economic Effects of Military Expenditure in Third World Countries," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 27, No. 4 (November 1990), pp. 461–466.; Nicole Ball, "Military Expenditure in Third World Countries: A Rejoinder to Fontanel," *Journal of Peace Research* Vol. 28, No.4 (November 1991), pp. 431–432, and Jacques Fontanel, "Reply to Nicole Ball," *Journal of Peace Research* Vol. 28, No. 4 (November 1991), pp. 461–466.

From the controversial findings of these studies emerged two schools. The first, led by Emile Benoit²⁵ contends that defense expenditure has a positive relationship on economic growth in developing countries. The second school argues a negative relationship between defense expenditure and economic growth. This section will briefly introduce the previous research on this puzzle and examine whether there is a trade-off between defense spending and economic growth in South Korea.

The classic study of the economic effects of military spending was made in 1973 by Emile Benoit for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. He surprised the academic world by claiming that he had discovered a positive correlation between the defense burden (military expenditure as a percentage of civilian GDP) carried by 44 developing countries between 1950 and 1965 and their rates of economic growth. His major finding was that "countries with a heavy defense burden generally had the most rapid rate of growth, and that those with the lowest defense burdens tended to show the lowest growth rates."²⁶ His finding takes on importance because it is contrary to conventional wisdom and also suggests to policymakers in the Third World that military spending encourages economic growth not only by direct interaction but also by indirect interaction through foreign aid and investment.

Benoit contended that countries with high defense burdens have the following advantages: (1) the attraction of foreign capital which engenders industrialization and economic growth; (2) the creation of new jobs and defense manpower training which create and strengthen attitudes and skills useful in civilian occupations; (3) the building of the basic infrastructure a devel-

²⁵ Emile Benoit pioneered this study to find any relationship between defense expenditure and economic growth in developing countries. Emile Benoit "Growth and Defense in Developing Countries," Economic Development and Cultural Change, (January 1978). For further details see also Defense and Economic Growth in Developing Countries (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1973).

oping country needs to promote development; (4) a Keynesiantype effect in stimulating the use of unemployed or underemployed resources by raising aggregate demand where anti-inflation policies would otherwise have kept it below the level conducive to maximum real growth; and (5) contribution of defense programs to the essential security required for economic progress, programs which under conditions of national danger may even have energizing and motivational benefits.

There are some fundamental weaknesses, however, in Benoit's study. As many critics assert, the suggestion of a positive correlation between military expenditures and economic development in some developing countries does not establish a causal relationship between the two. Further, as Deger and Smith correctly point out, the real growth rate of civilian GDP is an inadequate indicator to measure the level of development in developing countries.²⁷ Among the 44 countries of his sample only a few had negative GNP growth, while most of them experienced an increase in their military spending along with an increase of GDP during the tested period.

The United Nations commissioned two studies to determine the link between defense spending and economic growth. An MIT study of 69 countries between 1952 and 1970 came up with a negative correlation between defense burden and economic growth, contradicting Benoit's hypothesis.²⁸ The MIT study contends that high defense expenditure has adverse effects on domestic investment (i.e., domestic capital formulation will be jeopardized), the diversion of resources for agriculture to the manufacturing sector, and the decrease of the purchasing power of the people due to a heavy tax burden. The next UN-commissioned study also contradicted Benoit's. It used data for 50 coun-

²⁷ Saadet Deger and Ron Smith, "Military Expenditure and Growth in Less Developed Countries," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* Vol. 27 (June 1983), pp. 335–353.

²⁸ The MIT study was commissioned by the UN Expert Group on Disarmament and Development in 1980 at the request of the UN Special Session on Disarmament in 1978.

tries covering the period 1965–73 and concluded that "no systematic relation is obvious between military expenditure and economic growth."²⁹

Using a slightly different methodology, Lim tried a replication study based on Benoit's analysis on fifty four developing countries for a later time period (1965–73) and found that high military burdens are not related to economic growth.³⁰ On the other hand, Faini and associates employed regression estimates for 69 countries over some or all of the 1952–70 period and found that an increase of 10 percent in the defense burden led to a reduction of annual growth of 0.13%.³¹

While Benoit, Lim, and Faini concentrated on the direct impact of defense expenditures, there are some who have focused on their indirect ramifications. Using equation systems that posit, in addition to the direct spin-off effects, related effects through reduced private investment or domestic savings, Deger and Sen and Deger and Smith show that for the 1965–73 period in 50 countries, although military spending has a small positive effect on growth, the net effect of military spending on growth is negative owing to associated decreases in investment or savings.³²

Then, does the South Korean case confirm Benoit's assertion that a high military burden leads to economic growth? There is no doubt that South Korea has displayed a comparatively heavy defense burden and rapid economic growth. This rapid eco-

²⁹ Nicole Ball, "Defense and Development: A Critique of the Benoit Study," Economic Development and Cultural Change 31 (April 1983), p. 500.

³⁰ David Lim, "Another Look at Growth and Defense in less Developed Countries," Economic Development and Cultural Change (1983), pp. 377–384.

³¹ R. Faini et al. "Defense Spending, Economic Structure and Growth: Evidence among Countries over Time," *Economic Development and Cultural Change* (1984), pp. 487–498.

³² S. Deger and S. Sen, "Military Expenditure, Spin-off, and Economic Development, "Journal of Development Economics (1983) pp. 67–83, and Saadet Deger and Ron Smith.

nomic development makes South Korea a rather exceptional case in regard to the generally supposed negative impact of defense burden on economic performance.

Despite the conventional wisdom that military expenditure is undertaken at the expense of social welfare expenditure, there are conflicting views among scholars on whether there has been a trade-off in South Korea.³³ Steve Chan and others have discovered no clear evidence of such trade-offs in their studies on Taiwan and Korea.³⁴ Mok Jin Whyu argues more emphatically that there has been no significant trade-off between defense and social spending categories.³⁵

Walter and David Galenson, however, provide a different picture by suggesting that they found evidence of substitution effects between defense spending and the performance of the Korean economy.³⁶ In assessing the economic burden of defense spending, they concluded that South Korean defense spending

³³ Little research has been done to analyze the guns and butter issues in South Korea. Hyun's study is a pioneering work in the field. See In-Taek Hyun, "Between Compliance and Autonomy: American pressure for Defense Burden-Sharing and Patterns of Defence Spending in Japan and South Korea," (Unpublished PhD Dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles, 1990).

³⁴ Chan and Davis argue that Taiwan and South Korea have been largely successful in dampening the negative economic consequences of a comparatively heavy defense burden. Steve Chan, "Defense Burden and Economic Growth: Unraveling the Taiwanese Enigma," *American Political Science Review* Vol. 82, No.3 (September 1988), 913–920. Steve Chan and David R. Davis, "Defense Allocation, Inflation, and Unemployment in South Korea and Taiwan: A Granger Analysis," *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, Vol. III, No. 2 (Winter 1991), pp. 239–257. Eui-Gak Hwang, "Kukbangbi ui Kukmin Kyongjejok Yonghyang," (Influence of Defense Expenditures on National Economy) Kukbang Ronjip 15 (Fall 1991), pp. 20–36.

³⁵ Jin Whyu Mok "Defense Enigma: The South Korean Trade-Off over Guns and Butter," in Proceedings of the World Conference of Korean Political Studies, (Seoul: Korean Political Science Association, 1989) cited in Hyun, "Between Compliance and Atonomy," p. 54.

³⁶ Walter Galenson and David W. Galenson, " Japan and Korea," in David B. H. Dennon, ed. Constraints on Strategy (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1986) pp. 181–88. cited in Hyun, Ibid.

diverts significant resources from private consumption and saving.³⁷

According to Galenson, increases in defense spending are financed in one or more of several different ways—increasing tax revenues, increasing bond revenues, or a trade-off between defense spending and other items. In the case of South Korea, according to Hyun, South Korean taxpayers financed some 14% of total defense spending with the defense surtax they paid in 1975, and in the late 1980s, they financed almost half of total defense spending. As a result, the overall tax burden has deepened. Hyun concluded that "this overburdened defense tax has distorted the structure of private consumption and savings and has had a negative impact on the economy in general."³⁸

In South Korea, where about 30% of the total budget goes to defense, a substantial trade-off between guns and butter should be expected. Although South Korea has largely been successful in dampening the negative economic consequences of its heavy defense burden, that does not necessarily mean that Korea would not be better off were its defense expenditures reduced to the level spent by, for example, Japan.

Determinants of Defense Spending in South Korea

The controversy over whether there is a trade-off between military spending and economic growth remains unsolved. However, the most important question to be posed here is why South Korea has been unable to reduce its defense budget unilaterally and, therefore, cannot utilize the funds for other areas such as social welfare, building the social infrastructure, and education. In this section, the major determinants of South Korea's military expenditures will be analyzed.

³⁷ According to them, the static cost of defense has been equivalent to as much as 11% of total private consumption in South Korea. Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid., pp. 210-11.

There are several determinants of defense expenditure in South Korea. First, North Korea has rapidly increased its military assets in the last few years. Particularly, Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program is expected to reach the production stage within a year or two. Also, South Korea is within reach of North Korea's improved SCUD-B missiles and other delivery systems that can be armed with nuclear warheads. This is the major reason why Seoul does not want to reduce its level of defense spending unilaterally.

It is clear that the arms race between Seoul and Pyongyang arises mainly from mistrust and threat perception. South Korean people can never forget the bitter experience and horror of the three-year Korean War provoked by the communist regime of North Korea. The fratricidal war not only caused massive destruction of the land and heavy human casualties but also created mutual antagonism between the North and South. This Cold War mentality provides the government with a rationale for arguing that national security concerns take precedence over individual freedom and social welfare, and in the absence of reliable data on North Korean defense expenditures the South Korean government gives considerable leeway to its own defense increases.³⁹

A second factor is competition among agencies within the government. In this case the dominant player in South Korean politics has been the military. The military establishment has its own corporate interests in keeping the defense budget growing and the numbers of troops high. In keeping with the inter-agency competition of Allison's bureaucratic politics model, we can see that the EPB's calculation is not always harmonious with the MND's vision for the future.⁴⁰ In this sense, overall levels of

³⁹ Estimates are varied among major institutions such as IISS, RAND, SIPRI, ACDA, NSPA and KIDA. See Choon-Sam Park, "Puk Han Kun Sa Bi Kyu Mo Pan Dan," (Estimates of North Korean Military Expenditures) Kukbang Ronjip 15 (Fall 1991), pp. 88–99.

⁴⁰ Choi Gak-kyu, Deputy Prime Minister and the Minister of the Economic Planning Board (EPB) said on 19 May 1992 that he is going to reexamine the

defense spending in South Korea are worked out among government agencies in light of conflicting domestic needs and the overall requirements of government fiscal policy. Again, the military establishment is likely to try to influence the future military budget in its favor.

Third, it is said that there is little concern about a militaryindustrial complex in South Korea because the government fully controls the arms industry by financing and controlling them. Yet clearly the South Korean arms industry has its own corporate interest in keeping the arms industry busy. With tightened government spending the level of aid to defense companies has steadily dropped. However, if South Korean arms industries try to revitalize arms production and exports by cooperating with foreign defense industries such as Russian⁴¹ or other Asian defense industries,⁴² their joint ventures with foreign arms industries will definitely influence the level of the defense budget for the coming years.⁴³ Nevertheless, because of the small size of the domestic market, the success of the defense industry's move into more high-tech products depends on their export potential. To

level of defense budget for FY 1993 and will discuss the matter with the MND officials. But he cautioned by saying, "It won't be easy to make a drastic cutback because there are factors for increasing defense expenditures...," *The Han-Kyoreh Shinmun*, 19 May 1992. It is said that EPB will allow the defense budget increase less than 9% against the MND's original demand for 18.1%. *The Chosun Ilbo*, 24 August 1992.

⁴¹ The South Korean government has offered to provide tax benefits for domestic industries which invest in the conversion of the Russian defense industry. *The Segye Times*, 13 July 1992, p. 1.

⁴² The MND official announced on 13 July 1992 that it will cooperate in producing arms with five Asian states including the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, Mongolia and Malaysia. *The Han-Kyoreh Shinmun*, 14 July 1992, p. 2.

⁴³ In addition, there is the aggressive policy of the Western arms industries who look for their partners in East Asia because of their shrinking domestic market after the end of the Cold War. Seoul happens to be the ideal place where there is a convergence of interests between the Western arms industries searching for a sales market and domestic arms industries that aim to acquire high-tech technology. See also Flora Lewis, "Pay the Cost of a Proper Arms Cure," *International Herald Tribune*, 24 April 1992, p. 8.

break into the worldwide arms market, the South Korean arms industry has no choice but to rely more on government aid.

Fourth, there is the bilateral security relationship with the United States. This has been one important factor for determining the level of defense spending in South Korea, and it will probably be so in the future unless South Korea no longer needs American security protection.⁴⁴ Since the United States attempts to tame free riders by pressuring them to assume a greater share of the defense burden, South Korean defense expenditure will continuously be influenced by this factor.

Fifth, the pace and scope of both Japan and China's military buildup is also likely to be a factor in increasing the ROK defense budget. Unlike its Western allies, Japan still considers the former Soviet Union a potential threat. The Japanese Defense Agency's five-year plan, announced last year, established a Yen 22.75 trillion (U.S. \$170 billion) program, with an average 3% annual increase in defense spending. Purchases will include 10 destroyers, five submarines, 42 F-15 fighters, four airborne early warning aircraft and numerous patrol aircraft, helicopters and missile systems.⁴⁵

On 18 July 1992 Miyasita Sohei, the Minister of State and Director General of the Defense Agency, announced that there was no need to reduce the Japanese defense budget despite the end of the Cold War, saying "because no other Asian countries have begun to reduce their defense budgets and the Japanese Self-Defense Force is solely established for its own defense, there is no need for Japan to consider a cutback for now."⁴⁶

⁴⁴ In fact, the amount of Korean burdensharing for year 1993 has released by the MND on 22 July, 1992. South Korea will pay US\$220 million, but the exact amount will be finalized at the SCM in October 1992. (22% increase of the amount paid to the U.S. in 1992) *The Chosun Ilbo*, 23 July 1992, p. 2.

⁴⁵ The Defense Agency of Japan, *Defense of Japan 1991*, (Tokyo: The Japan Times, 1991), p. 90.

⁴⁶ The Joong-ang Daily News, 18 July 1992.

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China, despite its troop cuts, also increased its defense budget for improving power projection capability, especially in the South China Sea. B.A. Hamzah cautioned by saying "We are witnessing a *Pax Sinica* in the making."⁴⁷ In addition, China is said to persist in exporting missiles to the Middle East.⁴⁸ Nevertheless, according to Professor Hwang Byung-Moo, the danger of a Chinese buildup is still overshadowed by Japan's defense buildup.⁴⁹

Last but not least the democratic transition during the Roh Tae Woo government created a new social and political atmosphere in South Korea in which people have begun to demand equality, welfare and justice by exerting political pressure on the ruling regime through various channels. Their demands for more assertive policy initiatives on arms reduction and arms control will ultimately influence the level of military spending. As long as threats such as North Korea's nuclear and missile development exist, people may reluctantly accept the idea of spending more money on national defense. Yet, if Pyongyang does clearly show evidence of giving up its military buildup, military officials will be hard pressed to persuade people to keep up the level of defense spending. Even now, there are some analyses indicating that South Korea has achieved a defense capability sufficient to deter a North Korean attack. The Japanese Defense Agency and the Rand Corporation are among those who concur with this view.⁵⁰ Improving relations between Seoul and Pyongyang have

⁴⁷ Russia began delivery of a squadron of 24 SU-27 advanced fighters to Beijing early this year, with two more squadrons of SU-27s on order. Contracts have been signed for two squadrons of advanced SU-31 fighter interceptors and for a number of T-72 tanks. *The Hankook Ilbo*, 21 June 1992, p. 4.; Jim Hoagland, "Russian Arms to China: Japan Steps In," *International Herald Tribune*, 14 July 1992, p. 4.; B.A. Hamzah, "China's Strategy," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 13 August 1992, pp. 19–20.

⁴⁸ International Herald Tribune, 4-5 April 1992, p. 4.

⁴⁹ Byung-Moo Hwang, *Sin Chungguk Kunsa Ron* (A New Study on the Chinese Defense) (Seoul: Pub Moon Sa, 1991).

⁵⁰ The Defense Agency of Japan, Defense of Japan 1989 (Tokyo: The Japan Times,

already cut the demand for arms in South Korea. Moreover, if discussions on arms control and force-reduction measures on the Korean peninsula result in any agreements, the rationale for arms procurements will no longer exist and, by extension, neither will the need for an arms industry.

So far, the process of democratization has further expanded the already enhanced role of these societal forces. Demands for more "butter" will definitely affect the magnitude and level of spending for "guns" in South Korea.

Conclusion: North Korea's Defense Burden and Prospects for Curing the Illness of Overarming

North Korea has not given up its military buildup and therefore cannot utilize its scarce financial resources and technology in a more productive manner. Having suffered from the Korean War, North Korean political leaders have been obsessed with military security. Kim Il Sung adopted and vigorously implemented the doctrine of four military lines in the 1960s: (1) arming the entire people; (2) fortifying the entire national territory; (3) elitizing all military personnel; and (4) modernizing the whole military sector.⁵¹ Since then, North Korea has allocated to the defense sector almost 30% of government expenditure and 20–25% of gross national product for the past three decades. The direction of economic development strategy has been realigned to promote military self-help through defense industrialization, favoring the heavy industrial sector over the light, consumerindustrial sectors. Preparing for contingencies, North Korea has also devoted itself to accumulating immense wartime materials at the expense of ordinary citizens' consumption needs.⁵²

¹⁹⁸⁹⁾ and Charles Wolf et al., The Changing Balance: South and North Korean Capabilities for Long-Term Military Competition R-3305/1-NA, December 1985).

⁵¹ Kwan Yong Chung, "Pukhan Kukbang" p. 190.

⁵² Chung-in Moon, "The Political Economy of Security on the Korean Peninsula in the Regional Context." Paper presented at workshop on "Security and the

North Korea's obsession with building a military power has not ceased even after having experienced economic exhaustion. The steady erosion of North Korea's previously strong ties with the Soviet Union, and to a lesser extent with China, has forced Pyongyang to expand its domestic arms production in order to maintain its forces ranged against South Korea.

In addition, the country's arms industry⁵³ is assuming growing economic importance because weapons exports-in particular, missile sales to the Middle East—are one of the few channels through which North Korea can earn foreign exchange. North Korea's immediate economic problems therefore pose an acute short-term dilemma. The desire to cut back drastically on the military establishment is contradicted by the need for hard currency. In other words, their arms export policy is likely to continue unless they can find an alternative to satisfy the demands for hard currency. Although shortages of almost all basic commodities and energy plague the rest of the country, the military and the arms industry appear to enjoy ready access to scarce resources.⁵⁴

According to Kim Suh-Myung and Tao Bingwei, North Korean defense economy is under the direct control of the military.⁵⁵

Korean Peninsula in the 1990s," held by the Australian National University from 25–27 March 1992, p. 8.

⁵³ North Korea has 134 arms factories, many built underground. One quarter of these produce ammunition, more than 10% make artillery and small arms, while the rest are involved in the manufacture of tanks, vehicles, missles, war ships, aircraft and communications equipment. Tai Ming Cheung, "Economic Weapons," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 23 May 1992.

⁵⁴ While many of the country's industrial plants are affected by severe energy shortages, it is estimated that the North maintains more than 1 million tons of oil stockpiled in case of war. Ibid.

⁵⁵ Both Kim Suh-Myung, Chairman of Eastern Economic and Technology Development, China and Tao Bingwei, Senior Research Fellow of China Institute of International Studies visited RINU to present lectures in 1991 and said that the North Korean economy is divided into three parts. In addition to the defense industries mentioned above, profitable businesses such as gold mines are managed by the party while industries for production of civilian goods and light

There is also speculation that Pyongyang is trying to support its ever-growing military spending by selling whatever and wherever it can. Further, more than 100 civilian factories could quickly switch to military production in an emergency, and much of the rest of the economy is skewed towards supporting the arms industry, with the heavy industrial sector receiving special priority from the government.⁵⁶

But a more serious problem for the Pyongyang regime is that much of the revenue generated from arms sales is probably plugged back into the country's arms purchases. Pyongyang still spends several hundred million dollars on foreign arms a year, which is about 70% of total imports.⁵⁷

The arms race on the Korean peninsula has seriously drained the North Korean economy, and this is the key factor forcing Pyongyang to begin talks with Seoul on the reduction of military tensions. In addition, with reduced external assistance, the North Koreans are quickly falling behind in technological advancements as the South Koreans continue to acquire the latest arms from the U.S. and other Western countries.

What Pyongyang must keep in mind is that to prevent deeper poverty it will have to shift funds from the military to economic development. The idea must be developed in both the South and the North that the reduction of military expenditure, as well as the generation of greater resources for sustainable development, will directly favor the construction of more secure, more fair and more peaceful societies.

How can Pyongyang be made to reduce its heavy military burden? "Hard cash is uniting what ideology put asunder,"

industries are under control of the government.

⁵⁶ Cheung, "Economic Weapons."

⁵⁷ Seong Pyo Hong, "Nam-Puk Han Mugi Chegye wa Pi Haek Chidae Ronjaeng," (South-North Weapon System and Debate on a Nuclear-Free Zone) Jun Kyo Hak Shinmun, 26 June 1991.

according to Jim Hoagland.⁵⁸ What Pyongyang currently needs most is foreign capital. Germany and Japan have recently adopted a tougher and more direct approach in giving aid to the Third World. They are now explicitly tying their development aid to cuts in recipient military spending.⁵⁹ In other words, rewards for cuts might be a better idea than bullying the recipient.⁶⁰ Pyongyang's problems will not be mended without reducing its exaggerated defense expenditures. In any event, Germany and Japan cannot take on the military spending and development trade-off alone. It might help if the Bush administration also lent its weight.

The United States should take the lead in creating a series of positive economic incentives for restraint in the buying and selling of armaments. Currently, the U.S. warns Pyongyang that its missile exports to Syria must cease at once. But the "stick" is more useful when it goes along with the "carrot." In this sense, William D. Hartung's advice is worth heading: the U.S. needs to establish an international economic conversion fund that would be used to aid those countries like Czechoslovakia and the Ukraine, that have expressed interest in getting out of the arms export business.⁶¹

Officials of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank have also appealed for reductions in military expenditures, and former World Bank president Robert McNamara has suggested making a country's level of military spending an explicit condition for receiving assistance from these multilateral

⁵⁸ Hoagland, "Russian Arms to China."

⁵⁹ Some suggest that wealthy states could offer significant financial rewards to induce other poor countries to join them in a meaningful regime of arms control. See David A. Koplow and Philip G. Schrag, "Linking Disarmament and Development," SAIS REVIEW Vol. 11, No. 2 (Summer-Fall, 1991), pp. 95–112.

⁶⁰ Leslie H. Gelb, "More Guns, And Almost No Butter," *International Herald Tribune*, 9–10 May 1992, p. 8; Hoagland, "Russian Arms to China."

⁶¹ William D. Hartung, "Curbing the Arms Trade: From Rhetoric to Restraint," World Policy Journal Vol. IX, No. 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 219-247.

lending agencies.⁶² It is still premature, and I am far from prepared myself, to offer a concrete agenda for the suggested "guns" for "butter" challenge on the Korean peninsula.⁶³ Yet, I would like to suggest that aid for defense conversion to the production of consumer goods rather than negotiating a futile arms reduction will give Pyongyang a better incentive to bring down its military spending. If a conversion fund is raised among countries in a regional or global context, this fund could assist North Korea in shifting its arms production to production for consumers.

If a "guns for butter" deal works in the North Korean case it will not only be helpful for reducing the cost of unification but will also contribute to regional stability in Northeast Asia. In the absence of such a positive step toward diverting heavy military expenditures, it is difficult to see how tensions in Korea can really be reduced.

⁶² Ibid., p. 242.

⁶³ Information and analyses on the national experiences of conversion issues are published by the International Institute for Peace Vienna. See March 1992 issue of *Peace and the Sciences*; See also Stephen Kirby, "The Political Economy of Conversiya," *Pyonghwa Yongu* (Peace Studies) Vol. 1 (1991), pp. 51–76.

빈 면

Juche Idea: Base of Regime Legitimation of North Korea in the Age of Decaying Socialism

Sung Chull Kim

There have been many studies on how the Juche¹ idea of Kim Il Sung in North Korea has played a role in the political and social mobilization of the masses. While employing such concepts as practical ideology and transfer culture,² those studies demonstrated that the ruling elites made use of the Juche idea to justify coercive mobilization policies. Basically they emphasized its rhetorical function. However, we have to note that even a coercive regime has a value that rationalizes the regime structure and to a certain extent induces legitimacy. Without this value the regime will confront the discontent of the masses on day-to-day political affairs, and thus hardly manage to persist. Such value is called 'legitimating value'³ and that of North Korea is the Juche idea.

¹ The notion literally means self-reliance or independence.

² These notions were first used by Franz Schurman. But Chalmers Johnson further developed them to explain changes in socialist regimes. See Schurman, *Ideology* and Organization in Communist China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968); and Johnson, "Comparing Communist Nations," in Chalmers Johnson, ed., *Change in Communist Systems* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970).

³ For the concept of legitimating value and other components of the regime, see David Easton, *Systems Analysis of Political Life* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979; originally published in 1965), Chapter 12.

This research will focus on the Juche idea's function of the legitimation of the existing North Korean regime, especially in the age of decaying socialism of the Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union. In detail, it will examine not only what are the properties of the Juche idea but also what aspects of the regime the idea rationalizes. In addition, with special reference to the Juche idea, this research will delve into the question of whether there is any feasibility in a regime change that must confront the rapidly changing international environment and account for the hereditary political succession from Kim II Sung to his son Kim Jong-II.

Development of Juche Idea

In the midst of turbulent intra-party factional strife after the Korean War, the origin of the notion of Juche was Kim Il Sung's motivation to consolidate his power. Kim used this notion shortly after the most prominent leader of the domestic faction, Park Heon-yeong, was executed in 1955. Insofar as Kim used it to eliminate his opponents, particularly the Soviet faction and the Yenan faction, it was not a systematic theory or idea. The notion focused on the denunciation of Kim's opponents by charging that they were dogmatists and formalists.⁴

In retrospect, the notion of Juche was timely used by Kim, inasmuch as its use coincided with the diversifying trend in international communism. Hegemony of the Soviet Union in the international communist movement actually ended with the death of Stalin in March, 1953. In 1955 the Soviet Union effected a limited rapprochement with Yugoslavia, which had been expelled from the Cominform by Stalin. Furthermore, as soon as Nikita Khrushchev's secret speech at the 20th Congress of the

⁴ See Kim Il Sung, "On Eliminating Dogmatism and Formalism and Establishing Juche in Ideological Work" (Speech for the party propaganda cadres on 28 December 1955), in Kim Il Sung Jeojakjip (Selected Works of Kim Il Sung) (Pyongyang: Korean Workers' Party Press, 1980), Vol. 9.

Communist Party of the Soviet Union in February 1956 embarked on a program of de-Stalinism, international communism turned into polycentrism. National communism emerged in the East European countries, while an ideological conflict between the Soviet Union and China started. At first glance these changes seemed to threaten the status of Kim, who had faithfully followed the Stalinist model. But it is notable that Kim made use of the changes to attack his opponents such as Park Chang-ok and Choi Chang-ik at the so-called August Factional Incident in 1956, by accusing them of anti-party elements influenced by international revisionist thought.⁵

During the period of the Sino-Soviet conflict in the 1960s, Kim Il Sung developed the Juche idea. While keeping a balance between Moscow and Beijing, Kim intended to pursue independence and set off competition between them in providing aid to North Korea.⁶ Kim's intention was well documented in an editorial of the Korean Worker's Party (KWP) organ, *Rodong Shinmun*, on 12 August 1966.

We cannot accept that a certain party should lead other brother parties [in the international communist movement]. A particular party cannot become a 'center of world revolution' or a 'leading party'. Each party is responsible for leading its own nation's revolution and the national buildup. No other party is responsible for this task. If a 'center of world revolution' or a 'leading party' is allowed in international communism, it is recognizing the privileged status of a certain party. In this case, a certain party may give orders and other parties will obey them. Individual communist and worker's parties then will not be able to lead revolutions in their own countries independently.⁷

⁵ Yong-won Han, Bukhan Yeongu (Studies of North Korea) (Seoul: Bakyeongsa, 1989), pp. 130-131.

⁶ Ho-min Yang, "Juche Idea: North Korean Ideological Setting," in Chong-shik Chung and Gahb-chol Kim, eds., North Korean Communism: A Comparative Analysis (Seoul: Research Center for Peace and Unification, 1980), p. 137.

^{7 &}quot;Let Us Defend Independence", in Jun-Yop Kim, Chang-sun Kim, and Il-seon

Prior to such expression to oppose the privilege of a leading party and to maintain independence in leading the revolution, the four guiding principles—independence in ideaology, politics, economy, and defense—were proposed during the end of 1950s and early 1960s. Notably, by the time independence was emphasized, the Juche idea became a systemic legitimating value whereby the ruling elites centered around Kim II Sung could rationalize all the policies and authority structures as well.

A scrutiny of official documents of North Korea shows that the status of the Juche idea escalated and finally superseded Marxism-Leninism during the 1970s. Marxism-Leninism had been considered the principle of the party until the end of the 1960s. According to the report for the revision of the party constitution that the Third Party Congress adopted in April 1956, the new constitution was the embodiment of the organizational principle of Marxism-Leninism and the realization of Korean particularity.⁸ However, the Juche idea has been the guiding principle of the party since the early 1970s. The new constitution (article 4) of North Korea adopted in December 1972 reads : "The Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea takes the Juche idea as the guiding principle of the republic, the ideaology that creatively applie Marxism-Leninism to our own situation." The ascending status of the Juche idea, in comparison to Marxism-Leninism, was confirmed at the Sixth Party Congress in October 1980 when the revised party constitution described that the KWP was guided only by the Juche idea and the revolutionary idea of Kim Il Sung.⁹ To sum up, the notion of Juche, which was first publicized in the midst of factional strife during the 1950s, developed into a guid-

Lee, eds., *Bukhan Yeongu Jaryojip* (Source Book of North Korea Studies) (Seoul: Asiatic Research Center, Korea University, 1981), Vol. 1, p. 66.

⁸ National Unification Board, *Joseon Nodongdang Jaryojip* (Source Book of the KWP National Congresses) (Seoul: NUB, 1980), Vol. 1, p. 524.

⁹ Ibid., 1988, Vol. 4, p. 133.

ing principle of the party in particular and a legitimating value of the regime in general during the 1970s.¹⁰

Properties of Juche Idea

It has been maintained by North Korean authorities that the Juche idea was a 'creative adoption' of Marxism-Leninism for the independent development of the Korean revolution.¹¹ The notion of creative adoption originated in Kim Il Sung's speech in 1951, which stressed the particularity of the Korean nation.¹² However, there has been neither clear explication of the notion of creative adoption nor an open interpretation of the relationship between the Juche idea and Marxism-Leninism. Furthermore, the status of the Juche idea has been stated in a contradictory way: on the one hand, the idea is the unitary idea of the KWP, and on the other, it is not incompatible with Marxism-Leninism.¹³ Since there is no clarification of the notion, it might seem to be political rhetoric. Nevertheless, we have to analyze the structure of the idea in order to examine how the existing regime and the ongoing process of the hereditary succession of power have been justified.

¹⁰ For more details on the changes of the idea's content, see The Research Institute for *National Unification*, *Bukhanchejeeui Silsanggwa Byeonhwajeonmang* (Reality and Prospect of North Korean System) (Seoul: RINU, 1991), pp. 92–112.

¹¹ For instance, Kim Jong-II said that: "The Great Leader Comrade Kim II Sung creatively adopted Marxism-Leninism to the Korean situation, created the Juche idea in the process of seeking the revolutionary path, and paved the way for the independent development of our revolution." Kim Jong-II, "Let Us Move Forward with Marxism-Leninism and Juche Idea," in Kim Jong-II Jeojakseon (Selected Works of Kim Jong-II) (Seoul: The Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University, 1991), p. 166.

¹² Gahb-chol Kim and Seongjun Koh, Juche Sasanggwa Bukhan Sahoejueui (Juche Idea and Socialism in North Korea) (Seoul: Munusa, 1988), p. 66.

¹³ Il-chul Shin, "Development of Juche Idea by Kim Jon-II: With Special Reference to Socio-Political Organism," in Jin Young Suh, ed., Hyeondae Junggukgwa Bukhan 40 Nyeon (Modern China and Forty Years of North Korea) (Seoul: Asiatic Research Institute, Korea University, 1990), Vol. 3, pp. 250–252.

Man-Centrality Idea

One of the basic principles of the Juche idea is that man is the master of everything and determines everything. Kim Jong-Il's article "On Juche Idea" — which was presented at the Conference of Juche Idea Commemorating the Seventieth Birthday of Kim Il Sung in 1982—developed the idea of 'man-centrality' and 'human determinism' which had not been clearly articulated by previous sources. According to Kim, man understands the world and transforms it to being subordinate to himself. This is so because man has three attributes that other creatures do not have: independence, creativity and consciousness. First, with independence, man is free from the constraints of nature and society and is able to change them to obey him. Second, owing to creativity man can improve his own fate by replacing old ones with new ones. Finally, with consciousness man controls his goal-oriented activities.¹⁴

Here we can contrast man-centrality in the Juche idea with historical materialism in Marxism. Even though Marx recognized that a class consciousness as a human factor finally contributes to the change in the mode of production, he considered it to be a product of contradiction between the forces of production and the relations of production. Through a close examination of German Ideology which dealt with consciousness, we can find the following three propositions:

- 1. Consciousness is "determined" by actual life process.
- 2. Consciousness forms its corresponding ideologies.
- 3. New ideologies come into conflict with the existing relations of production when the relations of production come into conflict with the forces of production.¹⁵

¹⁴ Kim Jong-Il, "On Juche Idea," in Kim Jong-Il Jeojakseon, pp. 71-72.

¹⁵ Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *German Ideology* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1976), pp. 42–51.

For Marx, consciousness is a representation of the contradiction in economy. Consciousness forms its corresponding ideologies which criticize the existing mode of production or lead revolutionary activities. However, even though consciousness finally develops into revolutionary activities, it is not created by human intelligence but is finally determined by circumstances.

In contrast, according to the man-centrality notion of the Juche idea, man decides his own fate because of the attributes of independence, creativity and consciousness. This notion not only justifies the party's attempt to inculcate masses of the people and remold them into communist men, but also extols the masses armed with the Juche idea as a driving force for historical development.

Continuous Revolution in Socialism

Not only is the Juche idea different from Marxism in the explanation of the driving force in history, but also the former is distinguished from the latter in the interpretation of socialism. Both Marxism and the Juche idea discriminate between socialism and communism; however, the Juche idea differs from Marxism in the explanation of how socialism will be transcended by communism. By illuminating the difference, we need to examine how the Juche idea justifies continuous revolution.

According to Marxism, socialism is a transitional phase in which the political power of the state maintains control against counter- revolutionaries and establishes new property relations. In this phase efficient workers are compensated with higher rewards for the achievement of abundant economy.¹⁶ When the state succeeds in achieving these goals it becomes unnecessary and "dies out" or "withers away."¹⁷ While presenting the famil-

¹⁶ Melvin Rader, *Marx's Interpretation of History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 128–129.

¹⁷ Friedrich Engels, "Socialism: Utopian and Scientific," in Robert C. Tucker, ed., Marx-Engels Reader (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1972), 2nd ed., p. 713.

iar slogan "from each according to his abilities, to each according to his work," Lenin emphasized the high economic productivity in socialist construction through wielding powers by the party elites, i.e., through the dictatorship of the proletariat.¹⁸

Kim Il Sung has also stressed the material base as a condition for the achievement of communism. However, his Juche idea can be distinguished from Marxism-Leninism in that the former has divided socialism into two periods: the building of the socialist institution and the development of socialism. As shown in Figure 1, Kim Il Sung has proposed the 'transitional period' of building the socialist institution between socialist revolution (i.e., the abolishment of the capitalist mode of production) and socialist development.¹⁹ In the transitional period the exploitative class relationship ends and socialist institutions are established, and yet a gap between classes-the peasants and the workers in particular-would remain. For this reason, according to the Juche idea, the dictatorship of the proletariat should be continued during the period of socialist development for the abolishment of the gap.²⁰ In other words, even after the establishment of a new relation of production, political power should be exercised by the state for the development of socialism.

¹⁸ Alfred G. Meyer, Leninism (New York: Praeger, 1963), p. 203.

¹⁹ Kim Il Sung, "Transitional Period from Capitalism to Socialism and Problem of Proletariat Dictatorship" (A talk presented before the party cadres of ideological work on 25 May 1967), in Uri Hyeokmyeongeseoeui Juchee Daehayeo (On Juche in Our Revolution) (Pyongyang: KWP Press, 1970), p. 483.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 487.




Figure 1. The Juche Idea's Configuration of Socialism

Here the Juche idea rationalizes the slogan of uninterrupted revolution through generations during the period of socialist development and legitimates the Three Great Revolutions in idea, technology, and culture.

By the establishment of a socialist institution, sources of exploitation and poverty would be eliminated finally, but a gap between social members in their material and cultural conditions would remain. The reason for the gap is that remnants of idea, technology, and culture of the old society are backward. Socialism is a transitional phase which is differentiated from communism because of the former's backwardness in idea, technology, and culture as well as a gap between classes.... In order to overcome transitional characteristics of socialism and to build a communist society, we have to continue the revolution for liquidating the backwardness in idea, technology, and culture.²¹

According to the Juche idea the revolution in idea aims at the indoctrination of the masses so as to provoke revolutionary fanaticism. The revolution in technology intends to increase productivity for the civilized living standard of the people. Kim said that this revolution should be achieved through independent, modernized and scientific management of the national economy. The revolution in culture attempts to improve the intellectual and cultural standard. These three revolutions have been closely

²¹ Kim Jong-II, "Let Us Move Forward with Marxism-Leninism and Juche Idea," p. 170.

related to the rise of Kim Jong-II as the designated successor to his father Kim II Sung, as we shall see later.

Functions of Juche Idea

What are the major functions of the Juche idea in the age of declining socialist regimes? How do the properties discussed above contribute to the regime legitimation? There might be many answers to these questions. Not only did the idea contribute to consolidating the power base of Kim II Sung and Kim Jong-II by legitimizing of the purge of their opponents, but it also promoted a sense of nationalism while emphasizing independence in international affairs. More importantly, it now plays an important role to legitimate the structure of the existing regime under the name of the 'socio-political organism,' lays the foundation for hereditary succession, and rationalizes the particularity of the socialist regime by calling it 'socialism of our own style' in a new age.

Legitimation of Regime Structure: 'Socio-Political Organism'

Each political system has a legitimating value whereby the regime structure, i.e., the structure of authority relations between the ruling elites and the masses, is rationalized. As Chalmers Johnson has aptly pointed out, the legitimating value in the socialist regime is usually initiated and rationalized by the ruling elites.²² Accordingly, it is not an appeal to a set of existing predispositions but a guiding principle of the ruling elites to direct a new change. This type of value in North Korea is the Juche idea. While the Juche idea provokes revolutionary sentiment by emphasizing the human factor, it maintains the importance of a

²² Johnson, "Comparing Communist Nations," p. 10. The authoritarian regime also is based on legitimation from the top. In an analysis of Asian authoritarian regimes, Jyotirindra Das Gupta has called such a way of legitimation 'top-down legitimation.' See "A Season of Caesars: Emergency Regimes and Development Politics in Asia," Asian Survey, Vol. 18, No. 4 (April 1978), p. 321.

particular form of structure in authority relations between the leader, the party and the people. This regime structure, which is based on the notion of collectivity, is called the 'socio-political organism.'

What should be examined here is the logic of how the sociopolitical organism of the Juche idea defines authority relations in North Korea. To draw a preliminary conclusion, in the Juche idea the authority relations between the leader, the party, and the people are delineated as follows: (1) the masses of the people as subjects of the revolution should be subordinate to the leader and the party; (2) the leader is the 'brain' of the organism; and (3) the party is the nexus of the organism.

The socio-political organism is a type of collectivism according to which individuals should serve the society to which they belong. Individuals cannot survive without the persistence of the collective. Such collectivist ideas have frequently been expressed in terms of "one exists for totality and totality exists for one". For the same reason, the party's view on labor is also based on collectivism.

The view or attitude on labor for the interest of the collective is based on the collectivism which posits that the socio- political life is more important than the individual life.... Only when a society or group is strong, wealthy and prosperous can a high level of independence and the creative life of an individual be continuously guaranteed.²³

The interests of the collective has priority over individual interests. Accordingly, revolutionary loyalty and comradeship are emphasized, and are measured by faithfulness to the leader, Kim II Sung.²⁴ In this respect the Juche idea criticizes pluralism

²³ KWP, Jucheeui Nodonggwan (Juche's View on Labor) (Pyongyang: KWP Press, 1991), p. 26.

²⁴ KWP, Suryeonge Deahan Chungsilseonggwa Sahoe Jeongchijeok Saengmyeongche (Faithfulness to the Leader and Socio-Political Organism), (Pyongyang: KWP Press, 1990), p. 50.

as a mode of politics. By advocating competition for survival, pluralism breaks the unity and cohesion of the masses and produces social disorder and chaos.²⁵

Then what is the role of the party between the masses and the leader? The party inspires the loyalty of the masses to the leader Kim Il Sung. For this purpose the party binds and mobilizes them through 'mass line', such as the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Method, the Spirit of Chongsanri, the Chongsanri Method and the Daean Management System.²⁶ The mass line is implemented through various forms of transmission belts, that is, auxiliary organizations of the party. The auxiliary organizations not only train the masses through group activity but also indoctrinate them to instill loyalty and revolutionary sentiment; accordingly, they are called the 'party's trustworthy supporters', or the 'party's periphery organizations'.²⁷

The party is a mechanism of the binding socio-political organism by inspiring the loyalty of the masses to Kim Il Sung. Therefore the Juche idea emphasizes a mythical authority of the party

²⁵ Kim Jong-II, "Historical Lesson in Building Socialism and the General Line of Our Party" (A talk to the senior officials of the Central Committee of the KWP on 3 January 1992), in FBIS-EAS-92- 024 (5 February 1992), p. 14.

²⁶ Kim Jong-Il, "Korean Worker's Party is the Revolutionary Party that Succeeds the Honorable Tradition of Down-With-Imperialism," in *Kim Jong-Il Jeojakseon*, pp. 139–140.

²⁷ There are two ways through which the auxiliary organizations are controlled by the party: One is the horizontal and the other is the vertical. On the one hand, the party committee at every level guides and supervises party committees which belong to the organizations. In other words, the party committee of the organization is required to implement decisions of the party committee at the corresponding level. On the other hand, the dual membership of the Central Committee members of the party contributes to the party's control over the organizations. Since most of the officials of the national organizations are CC members, they control lower levels of organizations through their own hierarchical structures such as congresses and standing committees. See Chong-Wook Chung, "Mass Organizations and Campaigns in North Korea," in Robert A. Scalapino and JunYop Kim, eds., North Korea Today: Strategic and Domestic Issues (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1983), p. 89.

by portraying it as the successor to the tradition of the anti-Japanese revolution.²⁸ Furthermore, the idea demonstrates that the party's leadership is same as Kim's leadership on the ground that he is the supreme leader of the party.²⁹

In order to play a role in the binding socio-political organism, the party stresses an ideological education of cadres and organizational discipline. On the one hand, the party inculcates the Juche idea upon all party cadres and prevents other forms of political expression and opinion. According to Kim Jong-II, without the Juche idea as the unitary ideology of the party, the party will fail to guarantee its unity and will provide reactionaries with opportunities to revive.³⁰

On the other hand, the party adopts the organizational principle of democratic centralism, first proposed by Lenin. The notion of 'democratic' is intended to induce the voluntary participation of the cadres in party works, whereas that of 'centralism' requires strict discipline. What should be noted is that the notion of democratic is a rhetorical one and is always subordinate to that of centralism:

By following the principle of democratic centralism in party works, the party is able to establish a strict discipline under which all the cadres act in perfect order under the guidance of the leader and implement the party's direction and decision unconditionally.³¹

²⁸ KWP Constitution, cited in Source Book of KWP National Congresses, 1980, Vol. 2, p. 525.

²⁹ Kim Jong-Il, "Korean Worker's Party is the Revolutionary Party that Succeeds the Honorable Tradition of Down-With-Imperialism," pp. 135–136.

³⁰ Kim Jong-II, Joseon Nodongdangeun Uri Yinmineui Modeun Seungrieui Jojikjaimyeo Hyangdojaida (Korean Worker's Party Is the Organizer and the Guide for the Victory of Our People) (Pyongyang: KWP Press, 1990), p. 19.

³¹ Sang-geol Lee, Jucheeui Sasang, Riron, Bangbeopeui Simhwa Baljeon (Deepening and Development of Juche's Idea, Theory, and Method) (Pyongyang: Social Science Press, 1984), Vol. 4, pp. 167–168.

It is important to note that the notion of democratic is not compatible with that of 'centralism' in the Juche idea, inasmuch as the latter supersedes the former. In sum, the particular form of regime structure in North Korea, embodied in the socio-political organism, requires the loyalty of the masses to the leader Kim II Sung and the party, whereas it stresses the party's role as an intervening mechanism to bind and indoctrinate the masses so as to legitimate the regime as a whole.

Legitimation of Hereditary Succession

The rise of Kim Jong-II as the designated successor to his father Kim II Sung has often been explained in terms of his rising status in the party apparatus. At the unpublicized 7th plenum of the Fifth Central Committee of the KWP in 1973, the junior Kim was appointed as secretary in charge of organization, propaganda and agitation.³² But it was not until 1980 that Kim's acquisition of power was publicized.³³ At the Sixth Congress of the KWP in 1980 Kim Jong-II was appointed to the overlapping membership of the three crucial organizations: the Standing Committee of the Politburo, the Secretariat, and the Military Committee. Among Central Committee members no one other than Kim II Sung and Kim Jong-II took overlapping memberships in the three organizations.

This, then, raises the following question: How has the rapid emergence of Kim Jong-II in the party and the preparation of

³² Dong-bok Lee, "Hereditary Succession in North Korea," paper delivered at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, 30 August-3 September 1979, Washington, D.C., p. 23, cited in Byung Chul Koh, "Political Succession in North Korea," Korea and World Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Fall 1984), p. 564.

³³ However, it is said that the political succession issue was first discussed at a secret meeting held immediately after the 6th plenum of the Fifth Central Committee on 22 December 1972. At this meeting, the two old cadres, Choi Yong-geon and Kim Il, proposed Kim Jong-Il's succession to his father Kim Il Sung. Institute for North Korea Studies, ed., General Survey of North Korea (Seoul: INKS, 1983), p. 168.

political succession been legitimized? There have been two ways: propaganda of the junior Kim's contribution to the development of the Juche idea and the logic of uninterrupted revolution through ongoing generations. The mass media praised him for having systemized the Juche idea "in conformity with the demands of the times and evolving revolution".³⁴ In turn, the Juche idea, which stresses the uninterrupted revolution even after the establishment of socialist institutions, has legitimized this hereditary political succession. According to party theorist Hwang Jang-yop, inheritance of the leadership was successfully achieved so that the continuous revolution through generations is guaranteed in North Korea.

Whether a wise leadership is available is a basic question determining the ultimate destiny of a revolution....The experience of history shows that when the inheritance of the revolution is not guaranteed, the party may degenerate, and revolutionary cause pioneered by the leader may face a serious ordeal. This important question of the role of the leader and the inheritance of the leadership in carrying out the cause of the working class, was brilliantly solved for the first time in history only by the Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung, who fully understood the longstanding yearning of the people to be led by an outstanding leader in unprecedentedly difficult circumstances.³⁵

This concept of continuous revolution in the Juche idea developed to the Three Great Revolutions in idea, technology, and culture in 1973. Programs of these revolutions were enacted by work teams composed of not only party cadres but young college students. The work teams were under the direction of the desig-

³⁴ Korean Central Broadcasting Network, "The Great Accomplishment of Our Party Which Is Deepening and Evolving the Immortal Juche Idea" (An unattributed talk aired on 5 February 1992), cited in FBIS-EAS-92-028 (11 February 1992), p. 12.

³⁵ Hwang Chang-yop, "On Inheriting the Leadership," Summary of World Broadcasts: Far East-6554-C1-2, 1980, cited in James Cotton, "The Ideology of the Succession in North Korea," Asian Perspective, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Spring-Summer 1987), p. 15.

nated successor, Kim Jong-II. Accordingly, the launch of the Three Great Revolutions resulted in the expansion of Kim's power by driving out the established forces opposing him from posts in factories, workshops and cooperative farms and by replacing them with youths supporting him.

Since the revolution in idea has been the most important task among the three revolutions, the rise of Kim Jong-Il guaranteed dissemination of the Juche idea and its ascending status. In turn, the junior Kim praised the idea of his father as "an idea which provided solutions to problems arising in a new age different from the era that gave rise to Marxism-Leninism."³⁶

As heir apparent, the junior Kim's commitment to the spread of the leader's idea is quite similar to that of Lin Biao during the early stage of the Cultural Revolution in China. Just as Lin turned the military into a politicized instrument to spread Maoism, so Kim Jong-II fully mobilizes the work teams to impose the Juche idea. One difference is that even though Lin was a designated successor to Mao, his power was limited because he remained only as a defense minister under the premiership of Zhou Enlai in the state.³⁷ In short, Kim has no competitor, while Lin was checked by Zhou.

Legitimation of Regime Particularity: 'Socialism of Our Own Style'

Since the socialist regime is characterized by the absence of an evolving consensus among the people, it attempts to remold the people by imposing a legitimating value. The regime in North Korea has done so through the Juche idea. However, with recent

³⁶ Kim Jong-Il, On Correctly Understanding the Originality of Kimilsungism (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1984), p. 3.

³⁷ Lin planned to re-create the post of head of state at the Second Plenum of the Ninth Central Committee convened on 23 August 1970, in order to place him over the Zhou's post. However, Mao rejected Lin's plan even before the plenum, because he remembered the painful experience of Liu Shaoqi's abuse of the post and felt danger of power concentration around Lin. John Gardner, *Chinese Politics and the Succession to Mao* (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1982), p. 44.

changes in the environment, particularly the collapse of socialist regimes in the Soviet Union and East European countries, the ruling elites faced the questions of how to interpret these changes and how to prevent ideological restlessness.

To probe these questions, Kim Jong-II newly proposed 'socialism of our own style' in 1991,³⁸ and further developed the slogan in a talk to the senior cadres of the Central Committee of the KWP on January 3, 1992.³⁹ According to Kim, socialist regimes in other countries collapsed for the following reasons.

- 1. They did not put the main emphasis on strengthening the main motive force of construction of socialism, while seeking the economic factor only.
- 2. They failed to differentiate socialism from capitalism by adopting liberalism as a mode of political interaction.
- 3. They did not strengthen the regime's solidarity based on 'independence' and 'self-determination.'

According to Kim, first, by adhering to the building economy those regimes failed to carry out a continuous revolution in general and ideological and cultural revolution in particular. In this respect, Kim has attributed the success of building socialism to the remolding of the masses into the main defender of socialism.

The socialist economic system cannot be maintained or managed to conform with its nature, apart from the socialist government, and socialist government can neither keep its existence nor play its function in keeping with its nature, if it is separated from the people with the socialist idea. In light of this, it is clear that the popular masses who are equipped with the socialist idea are

³⁸ Kim Jong-II, "Socialism of Our Own Style Centered Around the Masses of People Will Be Certainly Victorious" (A talk presented before the Central Committee members on 5 May 1991), in *Kim Jong-II Jeojakseon*, pp. 541–570.

³⁹ Kim Jong-II, "Historical Lesson in Building Socialism and the General Line of Our Party." This was publicized in Rodong Shinmun, the organ of the KWP, on 4 February 1992.

always the decisive factor in the development of the socialist society and its destiny. 40

Second, Kim has maintained that the penetration of liberal ideas broke the unity and cohesion of the society and finally demolished the societal foundation. He has contrasted collectivism in socialism with liberalism in capitalism and has given a priority to the former. Finally, just like his father, Kim has not admitted the difference between the center and the periphery in the international communist movement, while saying that "there can be no higher or lower parties or leading or led parties."⁴¹ According to Kim, by keeping self-determinism and banning the penetration of so-called 'reform' or 'restructure,' the socialist regime of our own style can be maintained.

Accordingly, for Kim Jong-II the North Korean regime confronting the changes in environments is able to persist not by the adaptation to these changes but through illuminating the particularity of the North Korean regime under the name of 'socialism of our own style.' Thus Kim has stressed the Three Great Revolutions, the revolution in idea in particular, for the success of socialist development. However, it should be noted that socialism of our own style is nothing but more political rhetoric, which intends to reinforce the ideological education of the people and eliminate the reference for regime comparison in a new age of declining socialism.

Juche Idea and the Possibility of Regime Change

Then, how much can the Juche idea contribute to the persistence of the existing regime of North Korea in the future? Can we expect the possibility of a regime change in light of a rapidly changing environment? In answering these questions we must take into account the condition for a regime change in view of the

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 13.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 15.

experience of Eastern Europe. On one hand, a regime cannot be changed unless there is popular discontent with the existing regime. Such discontent is articulated in an 'alternative value' that is able to replace the existing legitimating value. A power struggle within the palace, like a coup d'etat that proposes no alternative value, cannot bring about a regime change. An elite shift through such a power struggle alters the authority relations without any significant change in the structure of the regime. Likewise, intermittent riots derived from discontent with living conditions cannot develop into a regime change. This is so because the riots give the ruling elites an opportunity for harsh repression. Furthermore, repetitive riots lead the ruling elites to become immune, desensitized, and even prepared for them.⁴²

On the other hand, an 'identity vacuum'⁴³ of the ruling elites is also necessary for a regime change. Since the socialist regime is based on top-down legitimacy, it will experience a regime breakdown when the ruling elite no longer feels confident to legitimize the existing regime. Provided that the elites feel a strong identity with the regime and try every possible means, including the use of military force, the regime still will not change. Therefore, a regime change in socialist countries occurs when the two junctures come about: emergence of an alternative value and spread of identity vacuum among the ruling elites. That is, only when the legitimating value is seriously challenged and the elite loses the will to rule, will a regime be changed.

Based on this postulate regarding the condition of a regime change, we can predict the future of the socialist regime in North

⁴² James W. Button, Black Violence: Political Impact of the 1960s Riots (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), p. 175.

⁴³ For the discussion of this concept, see Giuseppe Di Palma, "Legitimation from the Top to Civil Society; Politico-Cultural Change in Eastern Europe," World Politics, Vol. 44, No. 1 (October 1991), pp. 49–80. Di Palma has maintained that the regime change occurred when the ruling elites lost their will to rule. Since the socialist regimes in the Eastern European countries were imported products, the self-legitimation or legitimation from the top eroded when the ruling elites felt the loss of global partnership by the collapse of neighboring regimes.

Korea, with special reference to the Juche idea. To draw a conclusion at first, possibility of a regime change in the short run is extremely remote. There is little evidence that an alternative value will emerge and replace the Juche idea nor that the ruling elite feels any identity vacuum. Rather, the elites reinforce ideological education that stresses the particularity of North Korean socialism under the name of 'socialism of our own style' and the structure of regime in terms of 'socio-political organism.'

In detail, there are three reasons for the low possibility of a regime change, provided that North Korea maintains its closed system. First, to a certain extent the Juche idea does successfully legitimize the regime. Despite that Juche thought originated from Kim Il Sung's motivation to consolidate his power, later it developed to a systemic legitimating value. Suppose the authority structure centered around Kim Jong-Il after the death of his father is replaced by another elite group, such as the military. This case does not guarantee a regime change if the elite group cannot present an alternative value to replace the Juche idea.

Second, the Juche idea, which is embodied in 'socialism of our own style' as the most sophisticated notion in recent years, prohibits the masses and the party cadres from comparing their regime with the collapsed socialist regimes as well as with the capitalist regimes. Furthermore, based on the notions of sociopolitical organism and socialism of our own style, the ruling elite not only reinforces the ideological education of the people, but also isolates them from the outside world. This is so because, as shown in the classical theory of sociology, the elimination of the reference for a comparison prevents the formation of a sense of relative deprivation among the masses and prohibits the party cadres from feeling any loss of identity.

Finally, a scrutiny of the history of North Korea shows an absence of experience with democracy and capitalism, an experience which could contribute to the emergence of an alternative value and an organized opposition. Some Eastern European countries such as Czechoslovakia and East Germany underwent an industrial revolution and experienced the establishment of democratic institutions before the Second World War. The absence of such experience in North Korea makes it difficult for an alternative value to rise and denounce seriously the Juche idea, even when the regime faces a perilous economic situation.

Nevertheless, we cannot exclude the possibility of a regime breakdown in the long run. After the death of Kim Il Sung, the junior Kim and his associates will for various reasons be forced to instigate a reform policy conducive to the introduction of new values and the increase in income disparity, which will produce a sense of relative deprivation among the people. In North Korea, where the channel for interest articulation is not institutionalized, widespread relative deprivation will bring about a spontaneous explosion with violence.⁴⁴ This explosion may lead to chaos rather than an immediate regime change such as the establishment of a democratic regime. This is so not only because the Juche idea will no longer be able to work as a dominant value, but because an alternative value will not be developed fully enough to replace the old one. In the case of some Eastern European countries such as the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, composed of multi-nations, the resulting chaos brought about a separation into independent states. In North Korea, however, which has no ethnic division, it is highly feasible that the chaos will persist for a time before the establishment of a new regime.

Conclusion

This research examined how the legitimating value in North Korea, the Juche idea, rationalizes the existing socialist regime in the rapidly changing political environment, and then it predicted the future of the regime with special reference to the idea. The Juche idea that has two distinctive properties, i.e., man-centrality

⁴⁴ For the discussion of spontaneous uprising, see Thomas H. Green, *Comparative Revolutionary Movements: Search for Theory and Justice* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1990), 3rd edition, pp. 88–92.

and continuous revolution through generations, contributes to the legitimation of the regime in the following respects. First, the regime structure embodied in 'socio-political organism' defines the particular authority relations between Kim II Sung, the party and the masses of people. This particular form of regime structure is based on the concept of collectivity, the best interest of which can be represented by the leader Kim Il Sung only. Second, the Juche idea, which stresses the uninterrupted revolution through generations for the socialist development, justifies a hereditary political succession from Kim Il Sung to Kim Jong-Il. The Three Great Revolutions has allowed the junior Kim to extend his power base. More importantly, the work teams of the revolutions have contributed to the dissemination of the logic that inheritance of the leadership can guarantee the continuous revolution through the generations. Finally, the Juche idea illuminates the particularity of the existing regime of North Korea. Under the name of 'socialism of our own style,' the idea prohibits the masses from comparing their regime with other socialist regimes. Furthermore, the Juche idea rationalizes the ideological education by illustrating that a man armed with a revolutionary spirit is the main force to fortify the existing regime and to confront capitalism.

Based on the analysis of the Juche idea's role of regime legitimation, we can expect that a regime change will not occur in the near future. Many observers of North Korea focus on the analysis of an expected consequence of Kim Jong-II's political succession after the death of Kim II Sung. Some foresee longevity of the junior Kim's power, and others predict an immediate breakdown of his power base due to the absence of charismatic leadership. However, what should be noted is that a regime change occurs only when the two junctures finally come about: emergency of an alternative value and a feeling of identity vacuum among the elite. That is, a regime change happens only when the existing structure of authority relations is seriously denounced by an alternative value and the elites lose the will to rule. In North Korea, owing not only to the absence of democratic experience but also to the notion of socialism of our own style that prevents the people from comparing the regime with others, the feasibility of a regime change is very low in the short run—even after the death of Kim Il Sung.

빈 면

The Basis of Power Succession of Kim Jong-Il and Policy Directions

Hyun-Joon Chon

As the second-ranking figure in the power structure of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Kim Jong-II is the leader with whom we must deal to solve the problems of the Korean peninsula after Kim II Sung. Kim II Sung has confirmed that, except for a part of foreign affairs, Kim Jong-II now holds all power. However, despite his being such an important person, there is still little we know for certain about Kim Jong-II—only a variety of speculations. Due to lack of academic interest, therefore, not only are there few specialized works on this subject, but even the works that have been published are generally descriptive rather than analytical.

This article does not, of course, overcome the scholarship difficulties arising from existing studies. Materials published by people in North Korea contain mostly propaganda and have little value as factual evidence, and secondary literature produced by North Korean specialists in South Korea are generally ideologically oriented accounts. Therefore such materials cannot be taken at face value. It is not easy to come up with an objective, non-ideological analysis in a study of North Korean figures based on scholarly data. In particular, research on Kim Jong-II has more shortcomings than research on Kim II Sung, because there is hardly anyone who has directly met or shared experiences with Kim Jong-II. Nevertheless, I have attempted to study objectively what is possible in relation to the necessary research on Kim Jong-II.

Our interest in Kim Jong-Il concentrates on the exercise of actual power, whether he can easily receive legal power, to what extent he can maintain power after succession, and what policy directions he will take.

In this article, in order to analyze to what extent Kim Jong-II's power base is firm, we will examine whether or not he controls the coercive power structure and security apparatus, and whether or not he has a hold on the persuasive aspect of power (popular support). Accordingly, as the basis for a concluding analysis I will look at future prospects for power maintenance, and attempt to forecast Kim Jong-II's policy direction while he does remain in power.

Control of the Means of Coercion

1. Comprehensiveness of Support Base

In order to receive power succession in an autocratic system like that of North Korea, the successor must have complete advance backing, and in the area of unofficial backing Kim Jong-II's nomination is perfect. The evidence of this is that supreme leader Kim Il Sung has confirmed Kim Jong-II as his handpicked successor and secured him in the corresponding duties. Furthermore, in the North Korean political system characterized by the "three-inone" rule of the Party, the government and the military, anyone who wishes to attain supreme power must have authority over these three ruling bodies. That is, through some method he must be guaranteed the support base of the ruling elite. Kim Jong-II has in fact been drawing the support of the basic political elite since 1960,¹ and as a result he has guaranteed the support of the

¹ Takashi Sakai, "Kim Jong-II's Power Base", in Han S. Park, North Korea's Conditions and Prospects (Seoul: Tonghwa Yonguso, 1991, p. 16).

first-and-a-half- to second-generation of the revolution. They can be divided as follows. First, Kim II Sung's partisan comrades; second, graduates of Mangyondae Revolutionary Academy and Kim II Sung University; third, party members in their 50s and 60s trained through the Party secretariat, study abroad or overseas travel; fourth, graduates of the "Three Great Revolutions" school; fifth, 14-to-30-year-old young people organized in Partyaffiliated groups; sixth, military and military-associated Party organizations; seventh, Kim Jong-II's relatives, etc.²

As the above shows, Kim Jong-II's power base is quite "inclusive." That is, horizontally it includes all groups maintaining the essential elements of power in the Party, the government, and the military, and vertically it includes each group from the center to the base. Furthermore, not only does Kim Jong-II's power base include horizontally people affiliated with groups ranging from scholars, scientists and technicians, Party bureaucrats, soldiers, etc., but it also covers vertically all age groups including the elderly (60s-70s), the middle-aged (50s), and youth (30s-40s).

The elderly elite, the generation of the military leaders including Kim Il Sung, follow and support Kim Il Sung's every line. They are the first and 1.5 generations: O Jin-u, Pak Song-ch'ol, Choe Kwang, So Ch'ol, Kim Chol-man, Paek Hak-lim, Yi Tu-ik, etc.

The academic-centered support base, who tend to be of the second generation, are active in various areas such as politics, foreign affairs, economics and the military. Most of them were appointed during the time of Kim Jong-II's strengthening of power. They include Kang Song-san, Kim Kang-hwan, Kim Kukt'ae, Kim Pyong-ryul, Kim Hwan, Paek Pom-su, So Yun-suk, Oh Kuk-ryol, Oh Yong-bang, Yon Hyong-muk, Yi Kil-song, Yi Ponggil, Yi Pong-won, Yim Hyong-gu, Chon Pyong-ho, Choe Munsok, Choe Sang-uk, Choe Yong-hae, Han Sang-gyu, Hyon

² Hung-yeol Doh, "Formation and Circulation of Elites", in Hyon-uk Ko, et al. North Korea's Structure and Change (Seoul: Kyongnam University Institute of Far Eastern Affairs, 1990), p. 239.

Chun-kuk, Hong Si-hak, Yun Ki-bok, Kim Yong-nam, Choe Yong-rim, Kang Hui-won, Hong Song-nam, Kim Pok-sin, Kim Yun-hyok, Kim Dal-hyon, Kim Ch'ang-ju, Chang Ch'ol, Kang Sok-ju, Han Si-hae, etc.

Relatives include Chang Song-taek, Pak Song-ch'ol, Yang Hyong-sop, Hwang Chang-yop, Kim Chung-rim, Kim Ch'angju, Kim Pong-ju, Kim Tong-kyu, Yi Yong-mu, Kang Hyon-su, Kang Hui-won, etc. They are summarized below (see table).

Summary of Kim Jong-Il's Surrounding Elite

(In the Party)

Name (Age & Rank)	Status	Education	Relation to the Kims
Gye Eung-Tae 74: 8	Secretary Politburo	Party School of USSR	
Jeon Byeong-Ho 68: 9	Secretary Politburo	Kim Il Sung U. Moscow U.	
Kim Yong-Sun 57: 25	Secretary Head of Int'l Dept.	Kim Il Sung U. Moscow U.	Brother-In-Law Kim Il Sung(?)
Hwang Jang-Yeop 66: 28	Secretary	Kim Il Sung U.	Kim Il Sung's Nephew
Yun Gi-Bok 66: 34	Secretary	Moscow U.	
Kim Guk-Tae 68: 38	Head of Cadre Dept.	Mangyeongdae School Kim Il Sung U. Moscow U.	Kim Chaek's Eldest Son
Lee Chan-Seon Deceased	1st Deputy Head of Organization Dept.	Moscow U.	
Jnag Seong-Taek 47: CC Cand.	Head of Work Teams of Three Great Rev.	Kim Il Sung U.	Kim Jong-Il's Brother-In-Law
Han Si-Hae 58	Deputy Head of Int'l Dept.	Kim Il Sung U.	

(In the Government)

Name (Age & Rank)	Status	Education	Relation to the Kims
Yeon Hyeong-Muk 65: 6	Politburo Prime Min.	Mangyeongdae School Kim Il Sung U. Ural Engineering U.	
Kim Yeong-Nam 61: 7	Politburo Deputy PM Foreign Min.	Kim Il Sung U. Moscow U.	Supported by Kim Yeong-Ju
Yang Hyeong-Seop 67: 43	Head of Supreme People's Conference	Moscow U.	Kim Il Sung's Cousin
Kim Dal-Hyeon 52: 34	Deputy PM Trade Min.	Kim Il Sung U.	Son-In-Law of Kim Il Sung's Cousin Once Removed
Kang Seok-Ju 53: CC Cand.	1st Deputy Foreign Min		

(In the Military)

O Jin-U 75: 3	Defense Min. Politburo		
Choi Gwang 75: 10	Chief of Staff	Drop-Out of High School	Guardian of Kim Jong-Il
Kim Cheol-Man 74: 18	Military Committee Member	х.	
O Guek-Yeol 63: 37	Former Chief of Staff	Mangyeongdae School	Son of O Jung-Heup
Kim Du-Nam 65: 61	Unidentified	Mangyeongdae School Soviet Mil. Academy	
Kim Gang-Hwan 61: 63	Head of Party Mil. Dept.	Mangyeongdae School Soviet Mil. Academy	

2. Control of the Party Secretariat and the Security Apparatus

In North Korea, where the Party dominates the State,³ control over the Party is essential in guaranteeing the maintenance of authority. In effect, control of the Party means complete control of the secretariat: Article 26 of the "Korean Worker's Party Regulations" states that "The secretariat decides all internal Party matters, necessary Party procedures, and Party issues, and leads the execution of all such decisions." In actuality, the Party secretariat has nearly complete authority. Furthermore, paramount leader Kim II Sung is directly in charge of the secretariat and second-in-command Kim Jong-II as "Proxy Authority" actually runs politics. After the October 1980 Party Congress when Kim Jong-II became Party Secretary, he was able to manipulate the Party apparatus as he liked.

Centered on the Party secretariat, Kim Jong-Il also controls the "Organizing and Leading Departments" which are the basis of authority over the instruments of violence (*Gewalt* Apparatus), such as the National Ministry, the Security Ministry, the Korean People's Army, etc. In controlling the elites, Kim Jong-Il in actuality has secured the position of highest authority. In an interview with *The Washington Times* on 12 April 1991, Kim Il Sung confirmed that "Kim Jong-Il is in actual control of various areas including the Party, government, and the military." Party secretariat secretaries Kye Ung-tae (Public Security), Chon Pyong-ho (Economy), Han Song-ryong (Agriculture), Yun Ki-bok (South Korea policy), Kim Yong-sun (International), Hwang Chang-yop (Ideology) all comprise Kim Jong-Il's close circle of technocrats.

³ The North Korean socialist constitution introduced in December 1972 states in Article 4 "The Democratic People's Republic of Korea...takes the chuch'e thought of the Korean Worker's Party as its leading guide in its activities." In North Korea all state activites are conducted according to the directives of the Worker's Party. However, Professor Dae-Sook Suh and others assert that the 1972 Constitution shifts emphasis from the Party to the state. Dae-Sook Suh, *Kim Il Sung: The North Korean Leader* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), pp. 269–276.

However, the most important thing is that Kim Jong-II is in charge of 27 "Expert Posts" and 12 "City and Province Party Chairmanships." This is where the specialist posts fundamental to system maintenance are concentrated. Among the 27 specialist posts the "Organizational Guiding Division" is actually the highest organ. Kim Jong-II is directly in charge of this division, divided into 13 sections with 25 vice-chairmen. This division controls the Party organization through the "Three-Line (Party organization, Administration, Security)–Three-Day Report System", and its concrete task is to manage the leadership of Party life and the affairs of cadres, including their private lives.⁴

The all-powerful Organizational Guidance Division began under the talented leadership of Yi Ch'ang-son, and the vicechairmanships can be represented as follows. The first Vice-Chairman of Section 1, Yi Ch'an-son (65 years old, appointed November 1984, deceased); Vice-Chairman of Section 2, Yi Hwason (56 years old, appointed April 1986); Vice-Chairman of Section 3, Kim Kwang-woo (appointed November 1989); etc. Yi Ch'ang-son, the first vice-chairman, simultaneously held the post of Central Party First Secretary, and controlled the Party lives of all the people in the Party Center. Section 2 commands the thought and lives of people in charge of foreign relations, including the foreign ministry, international economic and industrial ministry, and trade. Section 7 is in charge of the Internal Security Ministry, Section 10 manages Public Welfare, Judicial Law, and Administration, Section 13 manages the entire Korean People's Army. As Section 13 maintains "Party Leadership" over the army, it is in charge of day-to-day military affairs and directly controls the Military Party Committee (Committee Chairman O Jin-U) and the Military Political Bureau. As Chairman of the National Defense Committee and Supreme Commander of the

⁴ For details of the report system see Ku-won Shin, "Kim Jong-II's Strong Points and Weak Points, and the People's Resistance", Wolgan Joongang (July 1991), pp. 439-443.

Korean People's Army, and with O Jin-U in charge of the People's Armed Forces, "Marshall" Kim Jong II is secure in his control of the military. Paek Hak-rim is in charge of the Internal Security Ministry but with Chang Ki-t'aek, the younger brother of Kim Jong-II's brother-in-law Chang Song-t'aek, chairman of the Political Bureau of the Internal Security Ministry, Kim Jong-II has complete control of the security apparatus governing the instruments of violence. The vice-chairmanship of the Ministry of National Security, which Kim Jong-II effectively controls, is currently vacant, but with Kim Jong-II's brother-in-law Chang Songt'aek having been nominated to fill the position, Kim Jong-II has thorough control of this organ as well.

Furthermore, through these security apparatuses, with surveillance and control over the elite as well as ordinary people and dividing the people into the "Core Classes," the "Wavering Classes," and the "Enemy Classes," Kim Jong-II can make a completely "monolithic" society without political deviations. The international human-rights organization Asiawatch estimates that about 150,000 political criminals and their families are imprisoned in "Special Zones," showing the extent of this control over the people.

Securing the Means of Persuasion

1. "Miranda" Government

Power cannot be maintained by enforcement measures only. Rather, it can be said that power is sustained because of voluntary compliance from the masses. Charles E. Merriam refers to the "Miranda" and "Credenda" as means to induce such voluntary subordination from the masses.⁵ Miranda is a way to homogenize the mass by appealing to their human feelings and thus includes activities such as setting up various memorial

⁵ Charles E. Merriam, *Political Powers* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1950), pp. 101–132.

days; building symbolic and commemorative structures, encouraging certain types of music while banning certain songs; beatifying the anecdotes and history; holding mass demonstrations, etc. On the other hand, "Credenda" affects human reason and therefore is a way to induce respect and obedience from the people by legitimizing power. In other words, when the masses believe that power is legitimate, they respect their government and even sacrifice themselves for the just cause of their leadership.

It is believed that Kim Jong-II has successfully utilized such methods as "Miranda" in order to take advantage of the shamanistic tradition of the masses. Through repeated education people fully believe the beatified history of Kim's family and their patriotic roles during the Japanese colonial period and the Korean War. People are also struck with awe before the gigantic commemorative structures. They feel pride as well as fear and they know they will be punished if they are critical of the leadership. They worship Kim II Sung and Kim Jong-II and obey them as if they were gods. In this sense, North Korea is a pseudo-religious state.⁶

2. "Credenda" Government

In this form of government, most important is to secure the legitimacy of the regime. Max Weber once said that there are three types of rule: 1) traditional rule 2) rational rule 3) charismatic rule.⁷ People tend to follow the customs and traditions of their ancestors without reason. Likewise, people tend to obey authority as illustrated in such rules as a paternalistic rule and a

⁶ Onjook Lee, Pukhan Sahoe Yongu (A Study on the North Korean Society) (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1989), p. 31. Sang Woo Rhee defines the North Korean system as a divine political system. Sang Woo Rhee, "Kim II Sung che je ui tuk jil," (Charateristics of Kim II Sung System) Puk Han 40 Nyun (North Korea 40 Years) (Seoul: Eul Yoo Mun Hwa Sa, 1989), p. 25.

⁷ Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), pp. 152–153.

monarchic rule. Rational rule mean rule of law. People regard the law as a minimum of the morality and therefore tend to believe anything if it is stipulated by the law. People also tend to believe in a charismatic leader. Yet, such charismatic leaders are created for manipulating public obedience.

In order to legitimize traditional rule, the North Korean leadership brought in "a theory of successor,"⁸ and made sure that their people took it for granted and regard it as rational that the No. 2 man will naturally succeed the No. 1 man. For Kim Jong-II, however, one thing that needs to be done is to build his own charisma, which his father cannot bequeath him. Kim II Sung built up his charisma from his own accomplishments. He maintains an image as the national father. His proclaimed victory in the Korean War, effective reconstruction after the Korean War, and his capability to maintain self-reliance earned him a charismatic leadership. Therefore, Kim II Sung rules not merely as a President or Party Secretary General, but by his own personal authority as a "Suryong" like a divine King. It is most important for Kim Jong-II to receive his father's spiritual authority. This is the core of the sucession problem.

In order to stimulate this process, Kim Jong-II spent much effort to create his image as a philosopher. His father Kim II Sung and other Communist leaders such as Lenin, Stalin and Mao Zedong all succeeded in portraying their images as philosophers. He therefore wrote many articles and contributed to supplement his ideas to the Juche thought that is the central value system of the people in North Korea.

Kim also made efforts to boost his image as an economic manager. Like his father, he spent most of his time on fact-finding tours and giving on-site instructions to workers and laborers. This was one way to avoid the criticism that the economy was

^{8 &}quot;Juche Sasang Ui Sahoe Ryuksa Wonri" (Socio-Historical Principle of Juche Thought) in *Juche Sasang Chong Seo 2* (Pyongyang: Sahoe Kwahak Chulpansa, 1985), pp. 209–222.

worse-off since he began controlling the nation's political power in the 1970s.

Kim Jong-Il's Quality and Popular Support

1. Quality as a Leader

How much actual political ability does Kim Jong-II have? At present there are two general opinions about Kim Jong-II's temperament, one positive, one negative. We will begin with the negative opinion.

First, there is the criticism of Kim Jong-II's ability, which holds that while Kim Jong-II has no ability of his own he has been designated successor by supreme leader Kim II Sung. Moreover, his temperament is seen as inadequate for leadership, being a person given to debauchery and luxurious living, thus representing the worst aspects of "Oriental Despotism." Due to a stuttering problem he avoids public speaking and does not meet foreign delegations. Out of an inferiority complex about his height he wears elevated shoes, lacking any artistic knowledge he approves of the artistic works presented by his secretaries almost without amendment, and he lacks the critical governmental experience of his father.

Second, there is the issue of his style of rule. As a movie buff he wastes foreign exchange on a film collection, and is criticized for passing the time watching movies like a capitalist lumpen. His life is decadent and disordered, he conducts his business in an impromptu manner, he enjoys wild extravagance and he likes to call people up irregularly at three or four a.m.⁹, inconveniencing all his subordinates.¹⁰

⁹ Yong-hwan Ko, "The Truth about North Korea's Ruling Kim Jong-II, Kim Jong-II Group," p. 385.

¹⁰ This point is illustrated in *The Leader Kim Jong-Il* 2 as follows. "He left at 4 am and directly go to the office at the Party's Central Committee. From there, he is planning for a new day. He is working all the way through the night." Jin Tak et al. *The Leader Kim Jong-Il* 2 (Tokyo: Tongbangsa, 1984), pp. 165-166.

There is also the issue of the political decision-making process and the distribution of power. This criticism arises from Kim Jong-II's preference for "political style", a type of behind-thescenes position which tends toward impromptu decisions more than high-level discussion, and displays of authority rather than high-level decisions. The main people with whom Kim Jong-II associates include O Jin-U (Armed Forces Minister), Yi Ch'an-son (Chairman of the First Section of the Organizational Guidance Division, died 1992), Hyon Chun-kuk (Editor-in-Chief of the *Rodong Shinmun*), Kim Yong-sun (Party Secretary), Kim Yongnam (Foreign Minister), Kang Sok-ju (Vice-Chairman of the First Section of the Foreign Ministry), Kwon Hui-kyong (Vice-Chairman for Foreign Intelligence), and Kim Ch'ung-il (Vice-Chairman of the Propaganda Bureau).

Others who exercise influence in this secretive political decision-making process include Kim Jong-II's photographer, cook, barber, tailor, shoemaker, and so on, who have access to the Organizational Guidance Vice-Chairman and thus have more real power than Central Party Economic Secretary Pak Nam-ki.¹¹ Of course this reveals the degree of authority wielded in the secretive policy-making processes of a dictatorship.¹²

Third, there is the issue of Kim Jong-Il's personality. Because he lost his mother early in life and was raised by a stepmother, his personality is quite twisted. His cruelty is such that he allegedly killed his younger brother by dropping him into a well, and one can assume that the obsequiousness shown to him from an early age by all around him has caused him to be arrogant and overbearing.

However, opposed to this is a positive evaluation of Kim Jong-II. First, as to his drinking habit, Kim II Sung in his excellent

¹¹ Yong-hwan Ko, "The Truth about North Korea's Ruling Kim Jong-Il, Kim Jong-Il Group", p. 388.

¹² Un-hui Choe and Shin Sang-ok, The Fatherland: That Heaven, That Distance (Calfornia: Pacific Arts Cooperative, 1988), p. 116.

health sometimes imbibes alcohol. Many world politicians enjoy drinking—there are even womanizers such as John Kennedy.

Second, as to the problem of movies, the first area in which Kim Jong-II worked after graduating from Kim II Sung University was the Propaganda Ministry. Because it is important to maintain power over the ideological system, and because mobilizing the people through movies serves both a cultural purpose and more quickly and expediently serves the state's goals, raising the emotions of the masses and mobilizing them in a single direction, naturally he would have a strong interest in this area.¹³

According to a February 1988 Pyongyang news broadcast, Kim Jong-II has made as many as 3,000 films. In fact in the early 1970s he made such important films and operas as *Sea of Blood*, *Tell the Story, The Flower Girl, True Daughter of the Party, Song of Mt. Kumgang*, etc., and wrote the scripts to the operas himself. *The Theory of Film Art*, written in 1973 by Kim Jong-II, lays out the Juche theory of art and serves as the guide to all literary and artistic activity, and his Theory of the Seed is the basic theory of artistic creativity.

Third, there is a different assessment of Kim Jong-Il's arrogant behavior. Kim Jong-Il is said to be exceptionally polite toward the first-generation revolutionaries and considerate toward the sons and daughters of the revolution. In particular, Kim Jong-Il protects the lives of the old revolutionaries. On New year's day he gathers dye and other presents and gives a New Year's greeting to them. According to former North Korean diplomat Ko Yonghwan, when People's Armed Forces Vice-Chairman O Jin-U was involved in a traffic accident Kim Jong-Il saved his life, and this incident is revealing of Kim Jong-Il's attitude toward the revolutionary generation.¹⁴

¹³ Yong-ku Yoo, "Kim Jong-II's Governmental Style," Wolgan Joongang (March 1992), p. 372.

¹⁴ Yong-hwan Ko "The Truth about North Korea's Ruling Kim Jong-Il, Kim Jong-Il group," p. 387.

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The Leader Kim Jong-Il Vol. 1 & 2 reveals that Kim Jong-Il always defers to the old partisans at state functions, he sends them on holidays to resort areas, and he gives them food, films, and books on life-prolonging medicines for their 60th birthday celebrations.¹⁵

On the basis of such evidence it is possible to infer that Kim Jong-Il has an open-minded personality and that he values substance rather than formality and shows his feelings frankly.¹⁶

2. Popular Support

How much popular support does Kim Jong-Il have? Of course under the present circumstances this is very difficult to evaluate accurately, but on the basis of intelligence analysis there are two kinds of assessments.

First, the negative assessment claims that the economic stagnation from 1974 onward was caused by the wasteful and uneconomical industries set up by Kim Jong-II and that the people are beginning to doubt Kim Jong-II's administrative abilities.¹⁷ Due to his unpopularity Kim Jong-II firmly avoids speaking to the masses and devotes himself to organizational issues.

Second, the positive assessment holds that Kim Jong-II manages difficult tasks with timeliness and appropriateness with his bold and magnanimous character. Especially he makes his contribution as a morale booster by giving people a sense of pride through his capacity to guide them at work. He has an artistic talent.¹⁸

¹⁵ The Leader Kim Jong-Il 2, pp. 151–162 lists in detail Kim Jong-Il's acts of consideration.

¹⁶ Choe and Shin, pp. 93–113.

¹⁷ See the testimony of Nam Myong-ch'on, a North Korean student in Leningrad who defected to the South on April 2, 1990. North Korea, Its Shocking Reality (Seoul: Choson Ilbosa, 1991). p. 165.

¹⁸ The Leader Kim Jong-Il 1, p. 284; Kwang-dong Cho, "The Northern Compatriots Lives, Hearts, and Dreams," *The Han-Kyoreh Shinmun*, 5 June 1991.

It appears that most North Korean people hold the second view. This is because they understand that leaders such as Kim II Sung or Kim Jong-II "naturally" possess extraordinary abilities from birth, and it is forbidden to challenge or deny the authority of Kim II Sung or Kim Jong-II.¹⁹ They believe that they could not live without their belief in Kim II Sung and Kim Jong-II.²⁰ Because of this the people tend to believe these mythical attributes and take them at face value.

The North Korean people do not think of Kim Jong-II as Kim Il Sung's son, but as the "Comrade" who is always close by, listening to and solving their problems. This belief about Kim Jong-II has become the mysterious religion of North Korea.

In fact, the North Korean people do not want to see their myth broken. Perhaps they are fearful that their future might be destroyed. In that sense, the myth will not be broken so long as people want to keep it with them.

In the end, Kim Jong-Il without Kim Il Sung will soon be the myth of the North Korean people. First, the ordinary people do not have accurate information about Kim Jong-Il. Second, as mentioned above, through "Miranda" rule Kim Jong-Il does not actually appear before the people and thus presents a mysterious image.

Power succession and policy direction

1. The Timing of Succession

Kim Jong-Il's power succession culminated with his designation as Supreme Commander of the Military on 12 December 1991, leader of the Party, the Government, and the Army on 31 March

¹⁹ Hyon-hui Kim, The Hankook Ilbo, 11 August 1991.

²⁰ While visiting New York, Han Si-hae, Vice-Chairman of North Korea's "Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland," said in an interview with An Tong-il that Christianity and Juche thought resemble each other in their emphasis on equality, love, firm determination and solidarity. *Sahoe P'yongron* (July 1991), p. 281.

1992, and the declaration of his title as Marshall on 20 April 1992. Since his official selection as successor in the 1980s Kim Jong-II's position has continued to solidify, and according to Choch'ongryon, the organization of pro-Pyongyang Koreans in Japan, he has even been called the "Great Leader."²¹ That is, through Kim Il Sung's very gradual and careful transfer of legal position to Kim Jong-Il, according to the logic of "selecting a successor while the Leader is alive," by 1995, designated the "Year of Unification", Kim Il Sung will have transferred all power to Kim Jong-Il and will retire as "International Leader," governing from behind the scenes.²²

However, the current situation is rapidly changing. While from North Korea's position the timing may seem quite natural, from an outsider's perspective North Korea's pace seems difficult and frustrating. Therefore researchers are continuously trying to understand the reason for the delay in transferring power to Kim Jong-II. Why doesn't Kim Jong-II, who wields such actual power, have the title of Supreme Leader? The delay of power succession can be analyzed as follows.

First, there is the problem of Kim Jong-II's personal ability. Because Kim II Sung is well aware of Kim Jong-II's shortcomings, he may be delaying the power transfer out of "parental feelings" and the feelings of the old guard.

Second, Kim Il Sung may dread transferring power to anyone before he dies, having a great attachment to his position attained through bitter struggle.

Third, environmental factors for the delay in succession may include the necessity of Sino-North Korean partnership with the surviving first-generation Chinese revolutionaries, the collapse

²¹ According to the congratulation message of Han Tok-su, chairman of the Choch'ongryon Central Information Meeting for the congratulatory committee for Kim Il Sung's 80th birthday and the 60th anniversay of the establishment of the Korean People's Army, 8 May 1992. *Joongang Broadcasting Agency*, 10 May 1992.

²² Chae-ch'on Kim, "The Theory and Practice of Succession," p. 48.

of the Soviet Union and Eastern European socialist states and the threat of American world hegemony, North Korea's own economic stagnation, the crisis mentality of the first-generation revolutionaries over Kim II Sung stepping down, etc.

Of course, all three of the above reasons in combination may contribute to the delay in succession, but the author sees the second reaon as most important.

2. Speculation on the Maintenance of Power

Nevertheless there remains the question of how long Kim Jong-Il will maintain power once he takes over the regime. There are several opinions on this among scholars.

First, there is the theory that succession is impossible.²³ This theory predicts that because Kim Jong-II's support, from the common people to the elite, is won only through coercion, succession itself is impossible and power will be transferred to Kim P'yong-II, who takes much more after Kim II Sung, or to Kim's more capable son-in-law Chang Song-t'aek.

Second, there is the "collapse theory" that power seized will collapse in one to two years.²⁴ The method of collapse will be a military coup, or a palace coup by reformist bureaucrats or alienated relatives such as Kim Yong-ju or Kim Song-ae.²⁵

Third, there is the possibility of at least medium-term power maintenance.²⁶ The reasons for this are first, Kim Jong-II has solidified his power base for over 20 years, so that even if he does lack sufficient personal charisma he can maintain organizational power. Furthermore, compared to Kim II Sung, who has reso-

²³ Tong-min Sung, "Kim Jong-II," Chayu Kongnon (July 1990), p. 161.

²⁴ Sang Woo Rhee, Seminar at the Research Institute for National Unification on 25 May 1991.

²⁵ Jung-min Kim (former high-level official in the North Korean Ministry of Internal Security), Seminar at the Research Institute for National Unification on 9 May 1991.

²⁶ Takashi Sakai, "Kim Jong-II's Power Base," pp. 56-57.

lutely avoided internal reform for the sake of establishing political legitimacy, Kim Jong-Il could be a conspicuous improvement.

Fourth, there is the view that, whether or not in the short or medium-term North Korea pursues a reformist or an isolationist path, the basic contradictions of the socialist system will lead to ruin not just for Kim Jong-Il's regime, but for North Korea itself.²⁷

Analyses based on Kim Jong-Il's abilities or personality may each have valid grounds, but based on the above analysis of the solidity of Kim Jong-Il's power base in the areas of persuasion and coercion, we expect him to maintain power for more than five years.

3. Policy Directions in Various Areas

In overall policy direction, Kim Jong-Il's free and active personality and his political pragmatic attitude²⁸ would lend themselves to the direction of reform and opening, there being no other away to strengthen the system than to pursue a reformist path. Here are policy direction predictions in various areas:

First, in the political area the importance of the ideological attitude of "Korean-style socialism centered on the popular masses" together with the three-in-one system, leader-party-masses, and social-political unity will continue to be stressed.

Second, in the economic sphere there will be a selective opening.²⁹ Examples include an emphasis on consumer goods, the

²⁷ Professor Byung-chul Koh devides power succession scenarios into four types, short-term failure, short-term success, medium-term success, and long-term success, and suggests that the most likely possibilities are short-term success and medium-term success. By short-term he means one year, medium term, four to five years, and long-term, six to ten years. See Byung-Chul Koh, "North Korea's Power Succession: Problems and Prospects," Research Institute for National Unification, North Korean System Change: Current Situation and Prospects (Seoul: Research Institute for National Unification, 1991), pp. 349–352; Song-ho Kim, "The North's Successor Kim Jong-II" Tongil Hanguk (February 1990), p. 38.

²⁸ For the concrete content of Kim Jong-II's speeches see Choe Un-hui and Shin Sang-ok, *The Fatherland: that Heaven, that Distance*, pp. 231–232.

²⁹ Jae-Jean Suh, "Policy Directions after Kim Il Sung", paper presented at the seminar commemorating the first anniversary of the Research Institute for National Unification, 10 April 1991, pp. 18-26.

creation of Special Economic Zones, expansion of exports, introducing the essential elements of "market socialism," allowing more private garden plots, introduction of privately-owned taxis, opening of golf courses, karaoke bars, lotteries, and so on. Of course although such openings could become a Trojan Horse, they are essential measures in the present situation.

Third, in the military sphere, North Korea will continue to push for arms reduction and peace agreements, while on the other hand because of the threat of the surrounding great powers it will also concentrate on producing up-to-date weapons. Of course, this is also because Kim Jong-II's ultimate base of support is the military.

Fourth, in the area of foreign policy North Korea will try to break out of its isolation and attempt to strengthen relations with the U.S. and Japan, and like the Chinese and Soviet experience will attempt to maximize its national economic benefit from the U.S. and Japan. Also, though in its relations with South Korea it will try to maintain a friend-foe situation, South-North relations will still continue to progress.

Conclusion

Because Kim Jong-II's "before-the-fact" legitimacy is weak, he must "after the fact" skillfully match carrot-and-stick tactics to succeed in preserving political power. Because Kim Jong-II did not actually experience the anti-Japanese armed struggle that is the basis of political legitimacy in the North Korean regime, the next best thing is to use expressions from this armed struggle such as "combat," "revolution," "struggle," etc., to convince the people of his ability to succeed his father and carve out the image of the "son who struggles with shovel and hoe" like the "father who struggles with gun and sword".

Kim Jong-Il clearly lacks the charisma of Kim Il Sung. But to compensate for this he has built up his power base for the last 20 to 30 years. He has efficiently demonstrated administrative experience and political leadership and now possesses a stable base of power, ranging from the support of the power elite to a "religious support" of the people. Therefore, after Kim Il Sung's death Kim Jong-Il's regime will not easily be toppled.

Furthermore, the time of succession will come whether due to Kim Il Sung's actual death or his physical incapacity to carry out his duties. At a minimum Kim Jong-Il will likely remain in power for at least five years and policy will move in the direction of reform and opening, both because Kim Jong-Il himself feels the need for opening, and because of changes in the objective environment.