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한반도 통일을 향하여:
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세계정치학회 제17차 서울세계대회
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개 회 사

먼저 바쁘신 와중에도 이 자리를 빛내주신 권오기 부총리님과 내빈 여러분께 감사의 말씀을 드립니다. 오늘 민족통일연구원은 정치학자들의 올림픽이라 할 수 있는 세계정치학회 서울대회를 계기로 전 세계의 정치학자들과 함께 우리의 통일문제를 생각해 보는 자리를 마련했습니다.

한반도 분단의 원인은 냉전과 함께 주변국들간의 세력균형이라는 국제관계에서 비롯됐습니다. 따라서 국제관계에서 통일의 실마리를 풀어나가려는 노력은 당연한 수순이라고 생각합니다. 주변국들의 협조가 없다면 통일과정이 술한 난관에 봉착하게 될 것은 자명한 이치이며 통일의 성사여부조차도 불투명하게 될 것입니다. 이미 많은 전문가들이 한반도를 둘러싼 주변국들이 통일보다는 현재의 분단상태를 지속시키는 현상유지를 선호한다는 점을 누차 지적한 바 있습니다. 한반도의 통일로 동북아시아의 역학관계가 변화하는 것을 원치 않기 때문이라는 주장들을 하고 있습니다.

그렇다면 우리로서는 주변국들에게 통일된 한국이 결코 그들에게 경계의 대상이 되지 않는다는 점을 설득하고, 동북아시아의 평화와 안정에 보탬이 되는 방향으로 통일이 추진될 것임을 확신시키는 작업을 해나가야만 할 것입니다.

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비계획 수립에 직접 참가한 실무전문가로부터 한반도 통일에 대한 주변국의 정책방향을 들어보는 자리를 마련했습니다.

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감사합니다.

1997. 8. 19

민족통일연구원 원장

丁世鉉

축 사

학술회의 참석 인사와 내외 귀빈 여러분.

세계정치학회 제17차 세계대회를 맞이하여 민족통일연구원이 세계 정치학회와 함께 개최한 국제학술회의가 성황리에 열리게 되는데 대해 축하를 드립니다. 이번의 서울대회를 위해 한국을 방문하신 중에, 오늘 이 회의에 참석해 주신 해외의 손님 여러분에게 따뜻한 환영의 말씀을 드립니다. 한반도문제가 국제사회의 관심을 모으고 있는 이때, 「한반도 통일을 향하여」라는 주제 하에 세계적인 석학 여러분들과 견해를 나누게 된 것을 뜻깊게 여깁니다.

참석자 여러분.

바로 이 시각, 한반도 북녘 동해안의 금호지구에서는 경수로 부지 준비공사 착공식이 거행되고 있습니다. 한반도의 안정을 위한 우리와 국제사회의 협력이 이제 본 궤도에 오른 것입니다. 4년전, 핵문제로 인해 긴장으로 치닫던 당시를 돌이켜 보면, 이는 큰 변화라고 하지 않을 수 없습니다. 대북경수로지원은 남북관계사에 있어 깊은 의미를 지니게 될 것입니다. 한반도의 평화를 위한 노력도 새로운 단계에 접어들었습니다. 지난 8월 5일 뉴욕에서 남북한과 미·중 4자 모두가 참여하는 예비회담이 열린 것을 여러분도 잘 아실 것입니다. 4자회담이 제의된 지 만 14개월만에 한반도의 공고한 평화를 정착시키기 위한 긴 과정이 시작된 것입니다. 김영삼 대통령의 이번 광복절 경축사를 통해 제시된 바와 같이 이제 한반도에서는 무력적화노선의 포기 아래 상호 존중, 신뢰, 협력으로 진정한 평화가 뿌리내려야 할 것입니다.

이와 함께 우리는 그 동안 식량난을 겪고 있는 북한의 어려움을 덜어주기 위해 많은 노력을 기울여 왔습니다. 지금까지 한국의 대북 지원 총량은 액수로 2억 6천만달러를 넘는 세계 최대의 규모입니다. 우리는 앞으로도 같은 동포의 입장에서 이같은 지원노력을 꾸준히 기울여 나갈 것입니다. 우리는 나아가 북한의 식량난 해결에 실질적으로, 그리고 근원적으로 도움을 주고자 합니다. 이를 위해서는 무엇보다 대북 지원의 투명성 보장이 매우 중요한 과제가 될 것입니다. 아울러 북한 식량난을 구조적으로 해결하기 위해서는 남북한간의 다각적인 협력이 효과적일 것입니다.

북한 당국도 이제는 스스로를 도와야 할 것입니다. 그들이 우선 자원배분을 합리화한다면 북한주민들이 겪고 있는 식량난은 어느 정도 해소될 것입니다. 더욱 중요한 것은 북한당국이 어려움에서 근원적으로 벗어날 수 있도록 개혁과 개방의 길로 나와야 한다는 점입니다. “늦게 오는 자는 역사의 벌을 받는다”는 말이 있습니다. 북한의 지도자들은 시간이 결코 자신들의 편에 있지 않다는 점을 인식해야 할 것입니다.

참석자 여러분.

통일은 한국민의 오랜 숙원입니다. 그러나 저는 이것이 우리 자신만을 위한 것이라고 보지 않습니다. 한반도의 통일은 냉전의 진정한 종식이자, 21세기를 여는 세계사의 방향이라고 여러분들께 말씀드립니다. 태평양과 유라시아 대륙의 길목이 막혀있는 채로 세계공동체시대를 이야기하는 것은 이치에 맞지 않는 일일 것입니다. 우리는 한반도의 통일을 국제사회의 축복과 협력아래 이루어 나가고자 합니다. 통일국가를 이루어 온 인류의 평화와 번영에 더 크게 기여함으로써 세계의 협조에 보답하고자 합니다.

저는 오늘 이 자리가 한국인의 이러한 뜻과 의지를 확인하고 그 길을 안내하는 소중한 대화의 장이 되기를 기대합니다. 끝으로 이처럼 뜻깊은 모임을 마련하신 세계정치학회와 민족통일연구원, 그리고 자리를 빛내주신 모든 참석자 여러분께 감사를 드립니다.

1997. 8. 19.

부총리 겸 통일원 장관
權 五 琦

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I

Foreign Policy for Unification of Divided Nations: The Case of Germany

Ulrich Albrecht

(Professor, Free University of Berlin)

The remarkable fact about the process of German unification following the "change" (Wende) in the GDR, is that it happened at all, and at such pace. A majority of political actors was opposed to unification. Three of the four victorious powers who retained responsibility for "Germany as a whole," as recent publications demonstrate, went into the year 1990 with the firm will to resist unification. Along with these actors other powers, e.g. Poland, rejected unification.

The proof of these assertions is, in the exceptional case of German unification, simple. Key actors have published their memoirs or written about the event: Mikhail Gorbachev, Margaret Thatcher, Francois Mitterrand, James Baker, Hans-Dietrich Genscher. In some cases, their closest advisors have also submitted detailed (and often more pertinent) records: e.g. Anatoli Tsernaev, Jacques Attali, and Horst Teltschik, on the views and policies of the Soviet, French and West German leaders respectively. A third layer of specific evidence is provided by

academics who were involved in the negotiating processes, and whose writings will be drawn on extensively in this presentation. President Mitterrand of France is said to have stated in the Ministerial Council on 18th October 1989: "After all, we cannot declare war upon Germany in order to prevent her reunification."¹⁾ The British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher had seen the Soviet President shortly beforehand, and recalls:

"I explained to him that although NATO had traditionally made statements supporting Germany's aspiration to be reunited, in practice we were rather apprehensive... Mr. Gorbachev confirmed that the Soviet Union did not want German unification either."²⁾

Similarly, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze stated in Ottawa in February 1990 "that 90 percent of the Russian people would vote against the reunification of Germany if they could."³⁾

The opposing pole is formed by the German Federal Government, personified by Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher. The latter stated repeatedly in

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- 1) "On ne peut quand même pas faire la guerre à l'Allemagne pour empêcher sa réunification!" Quoted from Jacques Attali, *Verbatim*. Tome 3. *Chronique des années 1988-1991*, Paris (Fayard) 1995, p.322. - The actual authenticity of this *verbatim* protocol is somewhat in doubt, cf. Attali's introduction to his book and the following debate. This is, of course, a general problem of political memoirs. - Translations of non-English citations in the following by the present author.
 - 2) Margaret Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years*, London (Harper Collins) 1995, p. 792.
 - 3) Quoted from: Philip Zelikow/Condoleezza Rice, *Germany Unified and Europe Transformed. A Study in Statecraft*, Cambridge, Mass./London (Harvard UP) 1995, p. 192.

1990 that one should not let "the unification process turn sour." They were supported by an extremely motivated staff who conceded that German unification for them was a highly emotional "affair of the heart" (*Herzenssache*).⁴⁾ But all the commitment and diplomatic energy applied in Bonn will not suffice to explain why unification, against stubborn resistance on the part of important powers, became a speedy diplomatic success.

It was solely the American government which decided at an early stage to accept Kohl's concept of rapid unification and to support it massively. Robert D. Blackwill underlines the early commitment of the American President: "Bush repeatedly stated his strong support for German unity. He was the sole leading Western politician outside the FRG who even then expressed himself in this way."⁵⁾ Blackwill furthermore speaks about an "extraordinarily active American diplomacy" in the pursuit of German unification.⁶⁾

The reasons for this American commitment have been highlighted in great detail in the seminal study by Zelikow/Rice cited above and will be summarized briefly in the following. The purpose of this brief introduction is to demonstrate that in the

4) This aspect is analysed in the dissertation of Barbara Munske, *The Two Plus Four Negotiations from a German-German Perspective, An Analysis of Perception*, Munster/Hamburg (Lit) 1994.

5) Robert D. Blackwill, "Deutsche Vereinigung und amerikanische Diplomatie" (German Unification and American Diplomacy), in: *Außenpolitik. Zeitschrift für internationale Fragen*, no. III/1994, p. 213. To my knowledge, this article has only been published in German.

6) *Ibid.*, p. 211.

beginning of the German unification process there existed a powerful veto-coalition, formed by three out of the four victorious powers, against the German desire for rapid reunification. This constituted for Kohl and Genscher (and for President Bush) at the least a "no win"-situation. It remains remarkable that unification was achieved against this coalition in less than one year, and with the final consent of the three powers, initially opposed. The change of position of these three powers, France, Britain and the USSR, and the role of the US and the FRG in facilitating this change, is the subject of the following reflection. That the consent of all these powers to German unification was won within such a short space of time is all the more surprising in that the British Prime Minister had her own ideas on the future treatment of the "German question" and certainly showed the resolve to push them through. This little-known dimension calls for a special sub-chapter in this presentation.

There was ample reason for the initial "no" of the three dissident powers. "Help me to avoid German unification, otherwise I am going to be replaced by a military figure. If you fail to do so, you will be held responsible for war," pressed Gorbachev in early December 1989 towards Mitterrand in Kiev.⁷⁾ Mitterrand, for his part, was initially confident of Soviet resistance to German unification. One month before the fall of the Berlin Wall, on 2nd

7) "Aidez-moi à éviter la réunification allemande, sinon je serai remplacé par un militaire; si vous ne le faites pas, vous porterez la responsabilité de la guerre." Attali, loc. cit., p. 366.

October 1989, Mitterrand declared (on his way to the golf course): "Those speaking about German reunification do not understand anything. The Soviet Union will never accept this. This would be the death of the Warsaw Pact."⁸⁾

The British Prime Minister argued in a similar vein: "Initially, it also seemed likely that the Soviets would be strongly opposed to the re-emergence of a powerful Germany, particularly one reunited on the West's terms and accompanied by the discrediting of communism."⁹⁾ German unification was indeed accompanied by the downfall of the Soviet system, the loss of the role of superpower, and the decay of communism. - Thatcher also sketches repeatedly French reservations against unification, focussing upon Mitterrand ("Like so many Frenchmen of his generation, he is driven by a fear of the consequences of German domination").¹⁰⁾ For Britain and for European politics, Mrs. Thatcher anticipated a new variant of the German problem:

"I also saw at once that it had profound implications for the balance of power in Europe, where a unified Germany would be dominant. There was a new and different kind of 'German Question' which had to be addressed openly and formally: I did so."¹¹⁾

8) "Ceux qui parlent de réunification allemande ne comprennent rien. L'Union soviétique ne l'acceptera jamais. Ce serait la mort du Pacte de Varsovie." Ibid., p. 313.

9) Thatcher, loc. cit., p. 792.

10) Ibid., p. 552

11) Ibid., p. 769.

In sum: Gorbachev was afraid (as we know today, rightly so) of the end of the Soviet system and of the Warsaw Pact, Mitterrand was moved by the memory of historical experience, and Thatcher foresaw the existing equilibrium of power being replaced by teutonic dominance - what could possibly contribute more to marshalling opposition against the German desire for reunification?

In my view the defeat of this opposition was not due to the intrinsic merits of the alternative, German-American approach. The success of this policy - the push towards rapid unification - cannot be explained either in terms of its being an intellectually superior solution to the German problem, nor in the first instance as the consequence of a more democratic position oriented towards the right of self-determination of the German people. It is, above all, the outcome of fulminant power struggle in which the Bush/Kohl coalition asserted itself not only against two major Western allies but also against the Soviet protagonists who also had to swallow the unpalatable fact that they would be relieved of their booty of World War II. The veto coalition lost, not because there was no alternative concept (there was indeed one, as will be shown), but because it faced an uphill fight for a number of reasons, not the least one being a lack of countervailing political power.

In order to set the stage, we shall first deal with a question that might appear totally ridiculous: the dispute about the appropriate name to be given to the talks on German unification.

"2+4" or "4+2"?

A piece of semantics throws light on the highly divergent political positions at the beginning of the international negotiations on German reunification. In Germany these are called the "2+4 talks," as Hans-Dietrich Genscher explains in his memoirs:

"I stressed that the two German states, whose responsibility was state unification, would talk about the foreign policy aspects to the Four, and not vice versa. Any indication that the Four would negotiate about Germany ought to be avoided. This resulted in the sequence given in the title of the conference: Two plus Four, not Four plus Two."¹²⁾

There was, however, nothing obvious about this "result." Other parties involved fiercely opposed this designation. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher "preferred to call it the 'four-plus-two' - that is the Berlin Four Powers and the Two Germanies."¹³⁾ The Soviets were especially provoked in this semantic battle. Valentin Falin, the long-term head of the International Division in the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (the quasi Party-Foreign Minister of the

12) "Ich legte Wert darauf daß die beiden deutschen Staaten, deren Sache die staatliche Vereinigung war, über die außenpolitischen Aspekte mit den Vier sprachen und nicht umgekehrt. Jeder Anschein, die Vier würden über Deutschland verhandeln, mußte vermieden werden. Daraus ergab sich die im Titel der Konferenz genannte Reihenfolge: Zwei plus Vier, nicht Vier plus Zwei." Hans-Dietrich Genscher, *Erinnerungen* (Memoirs), Berlin (Siedler) 1995, p. 729.

13) Thatcher, loc. cit., p. 799.

USSR) recalls:

"The Soviet Foreign Minister got the 'strict' instruction to insist upon the '4+2' version. This was not only because the responsibility for 'Germany as a whole' rested with the four powers and because the FRG insisted until recent times upon the confirmation of this responsibility. Furthermore the respective positions of Britain and France had to be taken into account. But the most important and principal issue was: the '4+2' formula mirrored the correct priorities."¹⁴⁾

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, however, returns without confirmation of this formula from the first ministerial meeting on German reunification in May 1990. Falin reports:

"Anatoli Tsernaev [Gorbachev's principal personal advisor] prepared a press release in the name of the President, which was to define the meaning of the negotiations in general and of the '4+2' formula in particular. Just to be sure he rings Shevardnadze and reads out the text. The minister declares his consent but asks for one amendment. The formula '2+4' would be preferable."¹⁵⁾

Tsernaev turned in dismay to Falin, the responsible Party secretary: "It is outrageous! Mikhail Sergeevich has clearly pressed upon him that for us the '4+2' formula is the only acceptable one. In all his cables about the ministerial meeting and after his return he did not give the slightest hint that he

14) Valentin Falin, *Politische Erinnerungen* (Political Memoirs), Munich 1993, p. 491.

15) Ibid.

disobeyed this directive... Do you know what he responded to my question: 'How come?' 'Genscher had asked repeatedly for this, and Genscher is such an amiable fellow.'"¹⁶⁾

Falin imbues this semantic defeat with cardinal significance: "The '2+4' formula entered into force. In my view the Soviet Union was moved into a hopeless situation."¹⁷⁾

Robert D. Blackwill recalls that at first: "Moscow and Paris preferred Four plus Zero, and London was on a similar track."¹⁸⁾ This seemingly insignificant detail, the naming of the negotiations, indicates that the Germans were able from the very beginning of the process not only to participate on an equal footing with the victorious powers, but also to set their imprint on this designation, making it the "2+4" talks. The episode says something about power relations in international diplomatic engagements. The acceptance of the "German" name for the negotiations is also directly related with the agenda setting of the ensuing negotiations. Bonn learned in this exchange that German positions could be successfully asserted. If this was so, then the British, the French and the Soviets might also be prepared to give in on more substantive issues.

16) Ibid., p. 492.

17) Ibid.

18) Blackwill, loc. cit., p. 215.

The British Alternative Concept

It appears that the British Prime Minister was the sole other politician, besides the Bush/Kohl coalition, to offer a reasonable alternative concept for German unification and the embedding of the process into a European framework. This position tends to be underrated in the literature about reunification, and hence shall be delineated here in some detail. Because Whitehall is notoriously reluctant to concede access to contemporary records the *modus procedendi* in this section is a very simple one: I rely on the Thatcher memoirs for the key features of her concept, and for her evaluation of the barriers to its success. The political culture of the United Kingdom does not produce equivalents of Attali or Teltschik, close advisors publishing insider accounts.

Margaret Thatcher's point of departure is identical with the American one: "There was some fear that Germany - first under the spell of Mr. Gorbachev and later with the lure of reunification - might have moved away from the Western alliance towards neutralism."¹⁹⁾ She, like the Bush team, is afraid of an early Soviet move based on a realistic assessment of the diplomatic situation:

"Of course, the Soviets might have calculated that a reunited Germany would return a left-of-centre government which would achieve their long-term objective of neutralizing and denuclearizing

19) Thatcher, loc. cit., p. 783.

West Germany."²⁰⁾

In contrast to the Americans, Mrs. Thatcher retains an ambiguous perception of the Germans (she begins the "German" section in her memoirs by mentioning "a tendency to regard the 'German problem' as something too delicate for well-brought-up politicians to discuss")²¹⁾

"Germany has veered unpredictably between aggression and self-doubt... The true origin of German *angst* is the agony of self-knowledge... Germany is thus by its very nature a destabilizing rather than a stabilizing force in Europe."²²⁾

This perception is also well documented in the famed Chequers meeting of German specialists with the Prime Minister in spring 1990. - Margaret Thatcher's conclusion:

"Germany should not be a great power able to exert itself at others' expense."²³⁾

In the early stages of the process, Thatcher favoured the continued existence of two Germanies: "It seemed to me that a truly democratic East Germany would soon emerge and that the

20) Ibid., p. 792. Indeed the general expectation in Germany at the time was that the first democratic elections in the GDR in March 1990 would produce a landslide victory for the Social Democrats, and that this in turn might tip the scales in favour of a stable leftist government in a reunited Germany.

21) Thatcher, loc. cit., p. 790.

22) Thatcher, loc. cit., p. 791. The Prime Minister claims that President Mitterrand shared this view ("He observed that in history the Germans were a people in constant movement and flux," p. 796).

23) Ibid.

question of reunification was a separate one."²⁴⁾ She repeats this position in a message to President Bush before the 18 November 1989 EU summit, "that the priority should be to see genuine democracy established in East Germany and that German reunification was not something to be addressed at present."

According to Thatcher, the US administration at this point still shared the view that there should continue to be two Germanies in the foreseeable future ("The President later telephoned me to thank me for my message with which he agreed").²⁵⁾

Thatcher, in contrast to the Bush/Kohl approach, views the problem from a pan-European perspective, as called for in the Ottawa mandate for the 2+4 talks ("...including questions of the security of her neighbours"): "The wishes and interests of Germany's neighbours and other powers must be fully taken into account."²⁶⁾ The Prime Minister is especially afraid of a potential hegemonic role of a reunited Germany in Europe (it "is simply too big and powerful to be just another player within Europe").²⁷⁾ A federal Europe, the ties of the Atlantic Alliance, appear insufficient to Mrs. Thatcher, too tenuous to contain the new Germany. She mistrusts the ability of "a federal Europe which would 'bind in' the new Germany to a new structure within which its

24) Ibid., p. 792.

25) Ibid., p. 793.

26) Ibid., p. 792.

27) Ibid., p. 791.

preponderance would be checked."²⁸⁾ Her solution is the classical British response: the construction of a new balance of power. The core idea of this new design:

"Only the military and political engagement of the United States in Europe and close relations between the other strongest sovereign states in Europe - Britain and France - are sufficient to balance German power."²⁹⁾

This new formation - a power triangle between the US, Britain and France pitted against a reunited Germany - would have required far-reaching change in the present setup of a European Union. The EU would turn into "a looser, more open Community."³⁰⁾

In the field of security, Thatcher's concept would have meant the re-introduction of an old Gaullist idea, a NATO directorate of the three powers (this may have strengthened the Prime Minister's conviction that her idea would be attractive to the French; she also notes that President Mitterrand "is driven by a fear of the consequences of German domination").³¹⁾ A nice side-effect of the concept would be that Britain would be brought more to the fore of European politics, and that the Bush idea of Germany as the USA's main European "partner in leadership"

28) Ibid., p. 759. - The argument is repeated (p. 783) that according to "the French, but swallowed by the US State Department too - only a 'united Europe' could keep German power responsibly in check." See also pp. 795, 814, for the same argument.

29) Ibid., p. 791.

30) Ibid., p. 769.

31) Ibid., p. 552.

would be twisted into a revival of the older Anglo-American special relationship (she repeats the idea more than once: "A Britain with armed forces which had the skills, and a government which had the resolve, to fight alongside America, seemed to be the real European 'partner in leadership'").³²⁾

Margret Thatcher convincingly calculated also that the Soviets would be more willing to follow her approach than the American alternative. "Nothing was more likely to stir up old fears in the Soviet Union - fears which the hardliners would be anxious to exploit - than the prospect of a reunited, powerful Germany, possibly with renewed ambitions on its eastern flank."³³⁾ Gorbachev, who indeed had to cope with "hardliners" during the summer of 1990, was more likely to concede unification according to the Thatcher scheme than to swallow the American concept.

Reunification was to have been organised in the Thatcher concept in a step-by-step modus via the CSCE, which "would provide a basis for restricting any unwelcome attempts to change borders in eastern Europe as a whole: but it would not stand in the way of German reunification."³⁴⁾ "The CSCE framework... would not only help avoid Soviet isolation but would help balance German dominance in Europe."³⁵⁾ The Prime Minister intended to

32) Ibid., p. 769. - cf. also her statement (p. 783) that "the main results of this [the US] approach ... were to put the relationship with Germany - rather than the 'special relationship' with Britain - at the centre."

33) Ibid., p. 790.

34) Ibid., p. 796.

35) Ibid., p. 799.

come with an active policy of her own into the CSCE ("on which I was to develop my ideas the following year").³⁶⁾ "The fundamental argument for slowing German reunification was to create a breathing space in which a new architecture of Europe could be devised where a united Germany would not be a destabilizing influence/over-mighty subject/bull in a china shop."³⁷⁾ In sum, "this policy was to encourage democracy in East Germany while slowing down the country's reunification with West Germany. With the first half of that policy no one disagrees. Nor at the time did everyone disagree with the second, to which indeed frequent lip service was paid."³⁸⁾

The basic dividing line between the American and the British approach thus is whether one can trust the Germans. The optimistic answer is corresponds to the Bush policy, the sceptical one to the Thatcher concept. One should not be too quick to denounce the British approach as old-fashioned. It reflects the core of ideas of the Political Realism school, to a greater extent than the American position.

But Margaret Thatcher was not just playing with ideas. She has her plausible doubts about the real strength of the France-German axis, a taboo topic in German political analysis (Thatcher assumes that Chancellor Kohl "seemed willing to subordinate German interests to French guidance, since this

36) Ibid.

37) Ibid., p. 814.

38) Ibid., p. 813.

reassured Germany's neighbours").³⁹⁾ The German interest in rapid reunification certainly was dominated by a high emotional content, without giving much regard to questions of future European politics. And it might be concluded that the intra-European consequences of the Bush/Kohl concepts also have not been high on the American agenda.

As we know, the Thatcher alternative failed to receive support. In her memoirs, Margaret Thatcher is again very frank about her defeat:

"If there is one instance in which a foreign policy I pursued met with unambiguous failure, it was my policy on German unification... In the event, the desire for unity among Germans on both sides of the Elbe proved irresistible. So the policy failed."⁴⁰⁾

The concluding pages of the Thatcher book are full of arguments that in principle her policy on German reunification had not been wrong. Mrs. Thatcher even sees a future for her defeated concept ("It should not be beyond the capacity of a future British prime minister to rebuild an Anglo-French entente as a counter-balance to German influence").⁴¹⁾ - In her assessment of the reasons why her approach to German unification failed, Margaret Thatcher is remarkably weak. She is correct in her appraisal that "the real question now was how the

39) Ibid, p. 552.

40) Ibid, p. 813, p. 814.

41) Ibid, p. 815.

Americans would react."⁴²⁾ But she appears not to consider that her concept challenged the Bush/Kohl approach - nor what this challenge meant for her own chances of success.

Margaret Thatcher's reflections on why she did not succeed are understandably full of criticism towards her Western colleagues. "President Bush, as I afterwards learnt, failed to understand that I was discussing a long-term balance of power in Europe rather than proposing an alternative alliance to NATO."⁴³⁾ French politics failed because of "the refusal of France under President Mitterrand to follow his and French instincts and challenge German interests."⁴⁴⁾ In her memoirs, the Prime Minister refers repeatedly to statements by the French President that he was fully in line with her assessment, but in the end "he made the wrong decision for France,"⁴⁵⁾ and did not break the intimate relationship with the Germans.

The fact that the Soviet President did not support her approach appears to have been an especially disappointing experience for the Prime Minister. She does not raise the question whether British diplomacy failed to demonstrate sufficiently the attractions which ought to have made her concept more acceptable to the Russians than the Bush/Kohl approach. Nor does she say anything about the power game which was apparently being

42) Ibid., p. 795.

43) Ibid., p. 799.

44) Ibid., p. 791.

45) Ibid., p. 798.

played out. Instead, Mrs. Thatcher assumes that she was defeated by German financial potency: "The Soviets were prepared to sell reunification for a modest financial boost from Germany to their crumbling economy."⁴⁶⁾ This simplistic assessment is repeated in Thatcher's perception of the famed Gorbachev-Kohl meeting in July 1990, at which the Soviet President announced his government's unconditional consent to unification ("In July at a meeting in the Crimea the West German Chancellor agreed to provide what must have seemed to the Soviets a huge sum, though they could in fact have extracted much more").⁴⁷⁾ President Mitterrand again is of the same opinion, commenting about Russian concessions in February 1990: "What did Kohl give for this? How many billions of Deutschmark?"⁴⁸⁾

Conclusions: the Reasons for the End of the Veto-Group

The most decisive contribution to the squaring of the circle came from Washington. The team around President Bush took an early decision to accept Kohl's drive for rapid unification. This not because of a special relationship with the Germans. The American concept was to chase the Russians, to deny them the breathing

46) Ibid, p. 791.

47) Ibid, p. 798. - The Gorbachev/Kohl July 1990 summit took place in Moscow and the Caucasus, not the Crimea, as Mrs. Thatcher erroneously writes.

48) "Que lui a donné Kohl en échange? Combien de milliards de Deutsche Mark?" Attali, loc. cit., p. 416.

space which Margaret Thatcher envisioned. The Russians were not to have any pause for thought - otherwise they might arrive at the idea of dropping non-defendable positions (such as their principal *nyet* to reunification) at an early date in return for very substantial concessions: consent for unification in exchange for German neutralization. In the American view, this would have meant the end of NATO, and an enormous loss of position for the US in European affairs. America would then have found herself in a much more peripheral situation, unable to bring much influence to bear on the crucial questions of the post-communist era, the transformation of the former state socialist economies into market economies, and the restructuring of the European security regime after the demise of the Warsaw Pact. Neutralization of Germany also would have meant the loss of control over this country. In contrast continued leadership in a NATO that included Germany would assure the US a key role in masterminding the predictable changes, and in gearing them into line with US interests.

Blackwill summarizes this situation: "Moscow might indeed have refused to quit Four Power rights if NATO had insisted on full membership of a reunited Germany. They also might have refused to withdraw their 380,000 troops from East Germany, or they could have tabled the condition of simultaneous pull-out of Western forces. They might have inferred that Gorbachev's efforts for new Soviet thinking about European security might be frustrated if one insisted upon NATO membership of the unified

Germany."⁴⁹⁾ Yuli A. Kvitsinsky, Soviet deputy foreign minister, confirmed in a 1993 publication these American speculations: "I believe until this day that Germany would have left NATO or at least its military organization if the German people had been confronted decidedly enough with the choice - national unity or NATO."⁵⁰⁾ Kvitsinsky frankly admits the uphill struggle against time in Moscow: "Even in May 1990 there was no such plan [for reunification] ready in Moscow. Instead people conducted all sorts of debates."⁵¹⁾ Both authors appear to be correct: if the Soviet leadership in early summer 1990 had turned with an energetic appeal to the Germans: "national unity or NATO membership of a part of Germany," there can be little doubt that the overwhelming response would have been to choose the first option. For the average German the alliance meant much less than for Western political elites.

In the first half of the year 1990, the Soviet were not in a position to mark such bold moves. The American calculus worked. Zelikow/Rice find in conclusion:

"The United States did offer leadership, deciding early that it was committed to German unity and communicating that clearly and often to Kohl. This permitted the German Chancellor to follow his instincts, assured of the backing of German's most powerful

49) Blackwill, loc. cit., p. 212.

50) Yuli A. Kvitsinsky, *Vor dem Sturm. Erinnerungen eines Diplomaten* (Before the Storm. Memoirs of a Diplomat), Berlin (Siedler) 1993, p. 22.

51) Ibid, p. 11.

ally. Whenever Kohl wanted to push harder or faster, he turned to George Bush for support. He found that the American believed in the promise the West had made to Adenauer: the Federal Republic was an incubator for German democracy until the day the German people could be joined together in one state. In 1989 Bush told Kohl unambiguously that he was ready to deliver on that bargain. Timing was of the essence for Bush, too."⁵²⁾

Soviet Positions

The Soviets (like everyone else) assumed for long - too long - that they were holding the key to German reunification, and that they even had a direct veto position. Kvitsinsky describes this self-perception (he speaks about a "surrealist mess of ideas") in the leadership of the decaying Soviet Union:

"The fact that our troops were still stationed in the GDR was linked in an odd manner with the view we could principally dictate conditions for reunification, the withdrawal of the Federal Republic from NATO, and that we could carry through the creation of a confederation of the two states."⁵³⁾ Gorbachev himself initially assumed that he was holding the cards in the veto coalition with the British and the French. As Tsernaev reports, the President uttered in a small gathering at the end of January 1990: "Eventually I personally will fly solely because of

52) Zelikow/Rice, loc. cit., p. 367.

53) Kvitsinsky, loc. cit., p. 12.

this question for one day to the various capitals."⁵⁴⁾

Gorbachev and his team, however, soon had to recognize that progress in the relationship with the opposing superpower was linked to concessions in the German question. More arms reductions, substantial American aid in the difficult perestroika, could only be hoped for if the Soviet Union showed flexibility in the 2+4 talks. In adequate recognition of the true national priorities of the Soviet Union Gorbachev conceded unification - the question whether with the end of the Warsaw Pact and the loosening of ties among former communist countries there would be two German states in the future or just one had lost in priority. As Zelikow/Rice demonstrate, the key compromises about the 2+4 accord were forged at summit meetings between Bush and Gorbachev (and not primarily by Kohl and Genscher, as these understandably prefer to portray process for domestic consumption in Germany).

There is an additional feature which helps to understand the defeat of the original Soviet position. The debilitated Soviet state became more and more unable to keep pace with the professional Western way of conducting diplomacy. Soviet negotiators at the political directors' level in the 2+4 talks were occasionally to be found treading water, with no instructions from Moscow. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze showed up at the first three ministerial

54) Anatoli Tsernaev, *Die letzten Jahre einer Weltmacht. Der Kreml von innen* (The Last Years of a World Power. The Kremlin from Within), Stuttgart (DVA) 1993.

meetings each time offering a differing concept on how to proceed. The complicated coordination machinery between the Soviet Foreign Ministry as part of the formal government and the international secretariat of the Party Central Committee broke down. Valentin Falin, the last head of the latter, writes of his determination to apply the brakes to the unification process. Gorbachev "ends a long telephone conversation with me the night before his meeting with Helmut Kohl in the Caucasus in this way: 'I am afraid that the train has already left the station.'"⁵⁵⁾

British and French Positions

In the American perception, the British and the French tried to buy time, as Blackwill reports:

"If Great Britain and France had had a choice between the option of bringing about rapid German unification in the interest of German membership in the Atlantic Alliance, and the option of executing their Four Power rights in such a way that the two German states would be united only in a long-term evolutionary process, they certainly would have opted for the second, postponing possibility."⁵⁶⁾

Mitterrand especially viewed Gorbachev as a bulwark against

55) Falin, loc. cit., p. 492. - cf. in this context also Hannes Adomeit, "Gorbachev, German Unification and the Collapse of Empire," in: *Post-Soviet Affairs*, vol. 10, no. 3 (July-September 1994), pp. 197~230

56) Blackwill, loc. cit., p. 212.

rapid reunification. As late as the end of May 1990 - the 2+4 negotiations were in full swing - on a flight to Moscow Mitterrand reflects: "Gorbachev will press me to resist German reunification. I would love to do this, if I could believe that he will stand firmly. But why should I quarrel with Kohl if Gorbachev drops me three days later?"⁵⁷⁾ There had been repeated anger in Paris about Russian "unreliability." Mitterrand, according to Attali, reacted in a furious manner when he learned about first Russian concessions: "Whatever has got into Gorbachev? He reassures me that he will stand firm, and he gives up everything!"⁵⁸⁾

Margaret Thatcher clearly notes the failure of her two partners in the veto coalition. In conversation with the French President, the Prime Minister found: "The trouble was that in reality there was no force in Europe which could stop reunification happening. He agreed with my analysis of the problems but he said he was at a loss as to what we could do."⁵⁹⁾

The actual date of British and French resignation to the American concept, according to Blackwill, is to be found in the second half of April 1990 ("The President met Prime Minister Thatcher on the Bermudas on 13 April and President Mitterrand

57) "Gorbachev me demandera encore de résister à la réunification allemande. Je le ferais avec plaisir si je pensais qu'il tiendrait. Mais pourquoi me facher avec Kohl si Gorbachev me lâche trois jours après?" Attali, loc. cit., p. 495.

58) "Qu'est-ce qui prend à Gorbachev? Il me dit qu'il sera ferme, et il cède sur tout!" Ibid., p. 416.

59) Thatcher, loc. cit., p. 797.

at Key Largo on 19 April... After these intensive deliberations by the President the British and French governments finally abandoned their hesitant attitude and for the first time declared their readiness to end their Four Power rights with unification").⁶⁰ This is a simplification (as the Mitterrand reflections on his flight to Moscow in May 1990 indicate). Zelikow/Rice stress the power aspect in their assessment: "The British and the French emerge from this story as somewhat secondary players... At the end of the Cold War London and Paris reacted and followed; they did not lead."⁶¹ As it has been shown in this paper, this appraisal does not hold at least with regard to the "Iron Lady": she had a concept of her own, a true alternative, one which must have been more attractive for the Soviets (and the French) than the Bush/Kohl formula - and which was defeated in the event.

Finally, the veto coalition could not succeed, beyond reasons of power politics, because in a crucial situation the three powers possibly could not openly challenge a great principle of international politics: the recognition of the right of self-determination of peoples. The assertion of this right had contributed to the great sea change of 1989/90. Thus the rare coincidence of power interests with a fundamental political principle (and not primarily sheer statecraft) led to the unexpectedly rapid reunification of Germany.

60) Blackwill, loc. cit., p. 217.

61) Zelikow/Rice, loc. cit., p. 367.

Epilogue: The Meaning of Four Power Talks for the Solution of the Korean Question

There is a strong parallel to the pre-1990 German situation in defining the answer what the Korean question actually is. Obviously the Korean question is reunification of the country divided artificially at the peak of the Cold War. And as it became possible to reunite Germany after the end of the Cold War, there are now high hopes that another divided victim of this great East-West contest, Korea, can also be retransferred into a single state. There is a feeling that if Korea can be reunited, then the "ripe moment" to try is right now with the end of the Cold War, or never.

As in the German case, it is not up to solely the Koreans and their respective governments to build the road to reunification. Formally, the victorious allies of World War II, the US, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and France had the mandate to act "on Germany as a whole." These powers quitted this mandate with the so-called 2+4 agreement of September 1990. In the Korean case the US, Russia, China, and Japan have no formal say in matters of national unity. But the influence of these major outside powers in the region is so overwhelming that a basic development such as Korean reunification optimally would be facilitated by an accord, formal or informal, among these powers. Reunification of Korea will be the outcome of a power game among strong contestants, each of which having numerous

possibilities to alleviate or to undermine a reunification process. Thus even the format of German reunification talks, the 2+4 formula, may be repeated in the Korean case. Given the political downswing of Russian power, there may be 2+3 talks in the end, but this does not really alter the scenario.

The alternative format for talks has been set with the "Two plus Two" formula (the two Koreas plus the US and China), proposed again during the summit between Presidents Clinton and Kim in April 1996. "The new plan would involve the four nations in direct negotiations from the beginning and thus represents an alternative to the complicated 'Two Plus Four' procedure - direct negotiations between South and North Korea, followed by guarantees of the US and China, plus Japan and Russia, if necessary," wrote the *Korea Times* (19 April 1996).

Fundamentally, the quest for reunification of the two Koreas is based on the esteemed right of self-determination of people, and a skilful negotiation process may induce the parties concerned to concede again reunification of a country divided during the Cold War.

A well-intentioned Korean reunification strategy would both consider the formal commitment of the four to respect and to promote the right of self-determination of people as well as the non-declared goals of foreign policies of those powers. The skilful play with these positions might greatly help on the road to unification.

Stressing again the German parallel, it was possible to

overcome a strong veto-coalition (formed by the Soviet Union, Britain and France) of powers whose undeclared foreign policy interests contradicted German unification. Squaring the circle of non-declared four-power objections against unification will provide for the major foreign policy challenge of Korean politics in the effort to reunite the country. There are good chances to succeed on this way.

The principal idea in the larger "2+4" arrangement remains that the two Koreas, like the two Germanies, act on core talks about their realignment, and that outside powers, predominantly the US and China, act as guarantors of such a precarious procedure and its outcomes. A third layer of parties involved is formed by Japan and Russia.

The main problem over the years has been that North Korea blocks the road of direct talks with the ROK, and that the Pyongyang regime prefers direct negotiations with the US. This stalemate has triggered the search for an alternative. As a precondition for alternative ways the US and South Korea have stated that improvements of relations between the US and North Korea and between Japan and North Korea must be accomplished only in tandem with progress in relations between the two Koreas (what in turn underlines the significance of inclusion of Japan into the talks).

The sometimes sensational news about direct North-South Korean rapprochements have recently been embedded in international strategies involving principal foreign policy actors -

what makes these moves more convincing for outside observers. Apparently, the scenery about the future of Korea is on the move (even if this means the proverbial "moving the glazier"). The strife for an appropriate format of talks reminds a German observer of the state of affairs in January/February 1990 in this country, when diplomats struggled for the optimal formula for unification talks. As it is known today, the ensuing negotiations accomplished an accord about German unification much sooner than originally expected.

The open question, again reflecting much of the 1989/90 German situation, is whether the North Korean regime will survive in the process. The other parties involved wisely bypass this problem. The US and South Korea do not insist on a formal surrender of the North (albeit their position is that they do not accept the present model of social organization in North Korea). China is like Russia mid-way in a complicated transition process which does not suggest to lecture other countries about proper way of how to organize one's society.

The "Two Plus Two" concept was designed to meet the most pressing need in international affairs, as far as Korea is concerned: to replace the armistice, after the end of the Cold War and the demise of communism in most countries on the globe, by something else more durable and more stable. A high rate of diplomatic activism is to be expected around what will emerge as the final negotiation table.

□ 국문 요약

통일을 향한 외교정책: 독일의 교훈

독일통일에 가장 크게 공헌한 국가는 미국이다. 그러나 그것은 미국과 독일의 특별한 관계 때문이 아니다. 이는 유럽지역에서의 NATO를 둘러싼 미국의 영향력의 약화 및 러시아 세력의 확대를 우려해서이다. 영국과 프랑스는 가능하다면 독일의 통일의 지연시키고자 하였다. 그러나 이러한 주변국들의 반대는 결국 성공하지 못했다. 주변국들의 권력정치는 국제정치의 커다란 원칙인 민족자결의 원칙에 도전하지 못한 것이다. 결국 각국들의 이해관계와 정치적 기본원칙의 우연한 결합이 독일의 급속한 통일을 가져왔다고 볼 수 있다.

한반도 통일문제는 냉전에 의해 인위적으로 분단된 나라의 재통일 문제이다. 독일의 통일이 냉전후 가능했던 것과 마찬가지로 한반도 역시 현실점에서 통일될 가능성이 매우 높다. 지금 무르익은 이 시기에 통일하던지 아니면 영영 못하던지 둘 중의 하나이다.

독일의 경우와 마찬가지로 한반도 역시 한반도 단독으로는 통일을 이룰 수가 없다. 2차대전 전승국인 미국, 소련, 영국, 프랑스가 독일 문제를 다루었던 것처럼, 한국 역시 미국, 러시아, 중국, 일본이 직접적으로 개입은 못한다하더라도 이들 국가들의 영향력은 무시하지 못할 것이다. 그러므로 한반도 통일은 이들 국가의 공식적, 비공식적 합의에 의해 진행될 수 있을 것이며, 결국 주변국가들의 파워게임의 결과로 이루어질 것이다. 독일통일의 공식이었던 2+4 공식은 한국의 경우에도 되풀이될 수 있다.

기본적으로 한반도 통일의 요구는 민족자결원칙의 존중에 기초해

야 하며, 기술적인 타협과정을 통해 이해 당사자들을 통일에 이르도록 유도해야 한다. 즉 한국의 통일전략은 민족자결의 원칙뿐 아니라 주변각국의 숨겨진 외교정책의 목표를 고려해야 한다. 이들의 입장을 조정하는 것은 통일로 가는 길을 매우 용이하게 할 것이다. ◇

II

South Korean Foreign Policy for National Unification

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Introduction

After North Korea's invasion of the South in 1950, relations between the Republic of Korea (South Korea) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) were confined almost exclusively to a military standoff. During the Cold War period South Korea solidly aligned with the US, North Korea with the Soviet Union and China. The two Koreas competed for political legitimacy on the international stage. They were denied, however, even the opportunity to talk to each other's patron states.

As the Cold War pattern gave way to pragmatism in world politics in the mid-1980s South Korea opened relations with China and the Soviet Union, and in the early 1990s normalized relations with both. The South and the North held a series of high-level talks, and finally concluded their Basic Agreement, the first official document governing inter-Korean relationships. Soon after the two Koreas signed the agreement, the Soviet Union collapsed. With the

collapse of the Cold War system, the international environment has been changing continuously. South Koreans became optimistic that two Koreas could merge peacefully in the near future, following the example of German unification. In the mid-1990s, however, confrontation and mistrust have continued to characterize the relationship between the two Koreas.

The purpose of this article is to examine the South Korean foreign policy concerning unification. This article will first discuss the salient trends in the inter-Korean relations in the post-Cold War era, focusing on South Korean policy toward the North. Second, it will analyze South Korea's relations with the four major powers, the US, Japan, China and Russia. Special emphasis will be given to ROK-US relations in dealing with North Korea. Thirdly, the paper will explore the prospects for Korean unification. I shall speculate about possible scenarios of Korean unification, and explore the main issues that will be raised in the process of unification. Finally I shall essay a preliminary assessment of the efficacy of South Korean foreign policy concerning unification.

Inter-Korean Relations in the Post-Cold War Era

As world moved into an era of détente and peaceful coexistence in the mid-1980s, South Korea was making headway in opening diplomatic relations with the Eastern Bloc including the

Soviet Union through the so-called "northward diplomacy."¹⁾ At the same time, it began to search for a way to open a dialogue with North Korea. On July 7, 1988, the ROK government announced the Special Presidential Declaration for National Self-Esteem, Unification, and Prosperity. The July 7 Declaration recognized the North not as a hostile enemy but as a member of the national community with whom the South would pursue co-prosperity. Subsequently, the ROK government lifted its economic sanctions against North Korea and enacted the Guidelines for Intra-Korean Exchanges and Cooperation in 1989. With the introduction of these measures, economic exchange between North and South Korea began to expand slowly.

South-North High-level Talks

The Eastern European socialist bloc began to be dismantled beginning in the late 1980s. In 1990 East and West Germany united into one nation. Against such backdrop, South Korea normalized diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. Dramatic tension reduction between the East and the West at the global level provided an opportunity for the two Koreas to improve their relations. North and South Korea initiated high-level talks headed by their prime ministers in 1990. At the fifth round of high-level

1) Byung-joon Ahn, "South Korea's New Nordpolitik," *Korea and World Affairs*, vol 7. No. 4 (Winter 1988) pp. 693-705.

talks, on December 12, 1991, the two sides adopted a historic agreement. The Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North (commonly known as the Basic Agreement) called for comprehensive steps for inter-Korean reconciliation and cooperation.²⁾ The Basic Agreement is comparable to the Treaty on the Basis of Relations between the two Germanies signed in 1972. Then on December 31, 1991, the two Koreas signed the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, which stipulated that neither side would possess nuclear weapons and that a joint nuclear control commission would be established. At two other high-level talks that followed, both sides concluded an agreement to establish South-North liaison offices and pacts to set up a joint military commission and separate commissions to handle exchanges and cooperation.

Those two documents laid a foundation for peaceful unification by mutual consent. Unfortunately, however, high-level talks came to halt as the suspicion of the international community over North Korea's nuclear development mushroomed. On March 12, 1993, Pyongyang suddenly announced its refusal to allow a special inspection suggested by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),³⁾ and revealed its intention to withdraw from the

2) Ministry of National Unification, *Peace and Cooperation: White Paper on Korean Unification* (Seoul: Ministry of National Unification, ROK, 1996), pp. 200~207.

3) North Korea had signed the IAEA fullscope safeguards agreement on 30 January 1992, and ratified it on 9 April 1992.

NPT. After that, it refused to resume inter-Korean dialogue. Instead, it demanded exclusive negotiations with the US over the nuclear issue. For its part, the US decided to deal directly with North Korea for its own interests in nuclear non-proliferation.

North Korean Nuclear Issue

The United States led the negotiations with North Korea, and a series of Washington-Pyongyang bilateral talks have held since June 1993. On managing the North Korean nuclear issue, the US is committed to close consultations with South Korea. Since the advent of the North Korean nuclear crisis, however, the US and South Korea's strategic priorities have not necessarily been congruent. South Korea, whose the number-one security priority is to deter aggression and adventurism by North Korea, demanded that the US step up pressure on North Korea to accept nuclear inspections in order to roll the North's nuclear weapons program back to zero. But the US launched a strategy of inducement, offering a range of concessions if the North would cap whatever nuclear weapons program it had at the time.⁴⁾ In other words, the US placed top priority on stopping further nuclear weapon proliferation in the East Asian region.

4) William J. Taylor, Jr., "US National Security Strategy and North Korea," *US-Korean Relations at a Time of Change* (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 1994), pp. 32~35.

In dealing with the intransigent North, divergent opinions show up within South Korea as well as internationally. Those holding different views in South Korea can be broadly divided into two groups, progressive and conservatives, based on their policy orientations toward the North. Progressives argue that from a historical perspective it is inevitable that changes will come in the North. Therefore, Seoul should help North Korea to open and reform itself through generous economic aid.⁵⁾ Conservatives, however, distrust Pyongyang, maintaining that it will not change its hard-line policy toward the South no matter how much aid is given. Therefore, conservatives argue, the US and South Korea should increase pressure on the DPRK government to force it to give up its nuclear plan. The ROK government has assumed a centralist position and tried to take a balanced approach toward the North, but under the influence of the contending groups, has been vacillating back and forth. The ROK government's North Korea policy is still affected by these different opinions and it occasionally makes policy reversals.

The nuclear talks between the United States and North Korea finally came to an agreement on October 21, 1994, in the signing of the Agreed Framework (commonly known as the Geneva Agreement) and two secret protocols. With this, North Korea promised to abandon all its plutonium production capacities and to

5) Sung-Joo Han, *Korea in Changing World: Democracy, Diplomacy, and Future Developments*, Speeches and Commentaries by the former minister of Foreign Affairs (Seoul: Oreum, 1995), pp. 68~76.

fulfill nuclear safety measures completely, in exchange for the supply of light-water reactors (LWR) and supply of heavy fuel oil as well as an eventual normalization of relations with the United States. Chapter 2 of the Geneva Agreement specified that within three months after the signing of the agreement Washington and Pyongyang would ease trade and investment restrictions, establish liaison offices in each other's capitals, and, so long as the talks on issues of concern to each other proceed smoothly, enter into ambassador-level diplomatic relations.

After the signing of the Geneva Agreement, the US, Japan and South Korea established the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), an international organization to be responsible for the financing and supply of an LWR project in North Korea. The US and North Korea also held several rounds of LWR talks. During the LWR talks, Pyongyang arbitrarily declared the suspension of the talks and threatened to lift the freeze on its nuclear program if the US insist that the North accept the South Korean standard model. Finally, however, in June 1995, North Korea accepted the South Korean reactor model and South Korea's key role in the LWR project. Since South Korea would be the principal source of the LWR project's financing, there was no practical alternative. South Koreans hope that the LWR project⁶⁾ will help dramatically increase the inter-Korean

6) South Korean technicians entered Sinpo, the site of the LWR construction in the North, as KEDO members in 1997. Nowadays, they are breaking ground for the first-phase construction works. The construction of the No. 1 and No. 2 LWR will be completed around the year 2005.

exchange and cooperation over the ten years of construction.

Inter-Korean Relations in the Post-Kim Il Sung Era

The first inter-Korean summit in the history of divided Korea, between South Korean president Kim Young Sam and his North Korean counterpart Kim Il Sung, was scheduled to be held July 25-27, 1994, just before concluded the Geneva Agreement. But it was cancelled because Kim Il Sung suddenly died. Since then, North Korea has continued to reject proposals to resume government-level inter-Korean dialogue. Pyongyang criticized the ROK government for failing to express condolences over Kim Il Sung's death. Thereafter, the North has put top policy priority on the improvement of its relations with the US, and clings to a hard-line policy against Seoul.

Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation

Pyongyang permits South Korean investment toward the North, and maintains indirect South-North contacts in the form of multilateral talks through KEDO. The primary factor forcing North Korea to engage with the South is its deteriorating economic situation. Until 1990, the Soviet Union accounted for more than half of North Korea's trade, but since the Soviet collapse North Korean industry has declined steadily. Seven years of negative growth at an annual rate of over 5 percent have plunged the

faltering economy into complete disarray.⁷⁾ Nowadays, most industries are being operated at an average of about one-third of capacity, and economic planning seems to have ground to a halt. In this situation, Pyongyang has no other choice but to accept South Korean capital to ease its economic difficulties.

North Korea is growing weaker economically, both in absolute terms and vis-à-vis South Korea. In efforts to open North Korea, South Korea is trying to utilize its economic power to influence the North. The ROK government announced measures to revitalize inter-Korean economic cooperation on November 8, 1994. Thereafter, South Korea began to push for a business-first policy. It approved a visit by several businessmen to the North, and the first direct investment in the North by a South Korean firm, Daewoo Business Group, in May 1995. South Korean businessmen imported cheap North Korean minerals and steel products. Furthermore, they want to employ cheap North Korean labor in the form of joint ventures or production commissions.

Through the businessmen's efforts, intra-Korea trade has grown steadily from \$18 million in 1989 to \$287 million in 1995,⁸⁾ and South Korea has become the third largest trade partner of North Korea. Nonetheless, economic exchanges between the two Koreas will not pass beyond a certain limit of expansion. North

7) Yong-Ock Yoo, *The Unification Policy of Korean Peninsula* (Seoul: HAK MUN Publishing, Inc. 1996), pp. 72~77.

8) Ministry of National Unification, *Peace and Cooperation: White Paper on Korean Unification* (Seoul: Ministry of National Unification, 1996), p. 149.

Korea lacks the capacity to purchase in large quantities due to a shortage of foreign exchanges, nor can it afford to export sufficient quantities of goods to the South because of energy shortage in the industrial sector. A large-scale expansion of South-North economic exchanges can only be envisaged when the DPRK government opens its economy widely to foreign investment. The DPRK leaders, however, will stick to their policy of an opening controlled to the extent that it will not undermine the stability of the regime. Therefore, it still remains to be seen if the Seoul's business-first policy toward the North will bear fruit.

Food Aid to North Korea

The DPRK government announced that a severe rainstorm, which continued from the end of July to early August 1995, damaged 145 counties in the northwest region. A UN survey team reported that North Korea actually did suffer crop damage amounting to approximately 1.01 million to 1.47 million tons, 15 to 20 percent less than the expected harvest.⁹⁾ Upon hearing of the disaster in the North, the ROK government provided 150,000 tons of rice aid free of charge in the fall of 1995. Pyongyang did not receive the food relief as a brotherly gesture; Northern officials

9) It is not easy to have a clear picture of the North Korean food situation because the ROK and various international agencies present different sets of figures based on different estimation methods and assessment standards. Nonetheless, major agencies agree that the North has been short of 2 million tons of grain on average over the past seven years.

hampered the smooth delivery of the rice. They forced the crewmembers of a South Korean vessel to raise a North Korean flag and detained another vessel under charges of espionage. After suffering such humiliation, South Koreans were in no mood to beg North Korea to accept more rice aid from the South. The US, however, judging that a drastic collapse of the North Korean regime due to aggravated food shortages would affect its own national interests, asked South Korea to take the lead in aiding North Korea.

The United States contended that the food aid to North Korea was a matter of humanitarian consideration, requiring unconditional aid, while the ROK government found it difficult to render unconditional aid to the North. It thus set forth several preconditions: a change of attitudes toward the South; correct estimate of the North Korean food shortages; and assurance of transparency in the process of food distribution in North Korea. In addition, the ROK government insisted that North Korea formally request food aid through official government channels.

For Seoul, economic aid to North Korea is neither a matter of purely humanitarian consideration nor a matter to be decided upon simply for economic reasons. In fact, South Korea did continue to donate food to the North in order to create a new environment for the South-North government-level dialogue. In 1996, it donated \$3 million worth of additional foodstuffs to the World Food Program and other international organizations for the North Korean flood victims. The ROK government also expressed its willingness to

help North Koreans solve the food shortage at its roots. South Korea might assist in various ways to improve North Korea's agricultural productivity and to recover the farmlands lost in the floods by lending the necessary equipment. But the DPRK government has done everything possible to avoid government-level talks. In spite of the rice aid, the North has not abandoned its scheme to undermine the South. The submarine incursion in September 1996 is a good example of North Korea's efforts to commit possible war provocations.

The Four-Party Peace Talks

Ever since the conclusion of the Armistice Agreement in 1953, Pyongyang has sought to sign a peace treaty with Washington, while rejecting South Korea as a party concerned.¹⁰⁾ While negotiating the nuclear issues with the US, North Korea took a series of well-calculated measures to undermine the mechanisms of the Armistice Agreement, with the ultimate goal of achieving the withdrawal of 37,000 American servicemen stationed in South Korea. In April 1994, it declared its withdrawal from the Military Armistice Commission (MAC), setting up instead a Panmunjom Representative Office of the (North) Korean People's Army. After the death of Kim Il Sung, his son Kim Jong-il declared a state of

10) United Nations Command delegation and communist delegation on July 27, 1953, signed the Armistice Agreement. South Korea did not sign the armistice because Rhee Syung-man, the first president of the ROK, opposed a cease-fire at that time.

semi-war and repeatedly violated the Korean Armistice Agreement with armed demonstrations. In December 1994, North Korea forced out the Chinese delegation of the MAC. In February 1995, it drove out the last remaining Polish delegation of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission.

In February 1996, North Korea again announced that it would no longer follow the rules of the 1953 armistice. In its place Pyongyang proposed a tentative agreement with the US until a permanent peace agreement would be concluded. And the North suggested that a joint DPRK-US military body should be established to replace the MAC.¹¹⁾ On April 4, 1996, Pyongyang announced that it would not uphold its duties concerning the maintenance of the DMZ. On April 5 through 7, the North Korean military staged armed shows of force at Panmunjom.

North Korean moves against the truce agreement were followed by a Seoul-Washington joint proposal for four-party peace talks. At a summit meeting held on Cheju Island, Korea, on April 16, 1996, South Korean President Kim Young Sam and US President Bill Clinton agreed on three principles regarding their North Korea policies: the question of peace on the Korean peninsula and the question of Washington-Pyongyang bilateral talks should be dealt with separately; the question of peace on the Korean peninsula should be primarily led by the initiative of South Korea without any forestalling by the United States; and the

11) Selig S. Harrison, "Promoting a Soft Landing in Korea," *Foreign Policy*, No. 106 (Spring 1997) pp. 57~75.

United States will never have direct talks with North Korea as far as the question of peace on the Korean peninsula is concerned. Furthermore, the two heads of state put out a co-proposal that North and South Korea, the United States, and China hold four-party talks without any preconditions whatsoever with a view to setting up a peace structure on the Korean peninsula.

Initially, North Korea displayed little interest in the four-party talks. It was concerned that such talks would be used to step up US and South Korean pressure on the North for a bilateral North-South peace treaty excluding the United States. In fact, South Korea expects that North and South Korea should play the main role on the four-party talks while the US and China play supporting roles to guarantee the steps agreed by two Koreas. North Korea eventually did agree to attend a US-South Korean briefing to explain the concept of the proposal in New York in March 1997. One month later when delegates from North and South Korea and the US got together to discuss modalities of the four-party peace talks, South Korean delegates called for a virtual revival of the 1991 Basic Agreement.¹²⁾ South Korea also expressed willingness to discuss a wide range of economic cooperation as well as grain aid in exchange for the introduction of tension reducing and confidence-building steps on the Korean peninsula. At preliminary four-party peace talks opened on August 5, 1997, delegates from the two Koreas, China and the US

12) *Korea Times*, June 7, 1997.

tentatively agreed to convene the four-party talks within six weeks. However, the prospects for an early realization of the four-party talks are not bright because North Korea reiterated its demand for the withdrawal of American forces and the establishment of a peace treaty only with the US.

Management of International Relations

Given the geopolitical conditions surrounding the Korean peninsula, any fundamental change in inter-Korean relations would require the support of the international community. In particular, the US, Japan, China, and Russia have varying degrees of leverage over North Korea's foreign policy. South Korea thus makes diplomatic efforts towards the four major powers to share its assessment of North Korea's present and future and to ensure a coordinated approach to North Korea.

Relations with the US

The ROK-US security cooperation system is based on the ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty signed in 1953. Major pending military issues between the ROK and the US are negotiated through annual ROK-US Security Consultative Meetings, and detailed military measures are implemented through the ROK-US Combined Forces Command. The cooperative ROK-US relationship has served as the cornerstone in deterring North Korean

aggression. The ROK-US security alliance remains essential to prevent North Korean miscalculation and to keep pressure on North Korea to act in good faith. After the conclusion of the Geneva Agreement in 1994, however, North Korea has exerted all possible efforts to improve its relations with the US, and has tried to drive a wedge between Seoul and Washington. In dealing with North Korea, therefore, South Korea's foremost concern is to maintain good relations with the US.

The Clinton administration's North Korea policy developed in accordance with a program called A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, which was set forth as a new security strategy in the post-Cold War era.¹³⁾ The objective of the US policy toward the North is to contain North Korea within the sphere of American influence, and help the North to make a soft landing and join the international community through a gradual introduction of conciliatory policies. The ROK government is, in principle, in accord with the US engagement policy, but has raised questions about the pace of the diplomatic relations between the US and North Korea. It demands that progress in normalizing relations with North Korea be linked with the issues of South-North Korean dialogue.

The Geneva Agreement has been a general guideline for Washington to develop its relations with Pyongyang. In order to abide by the Geneva Agreement, the US Department of State

13) The White House, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (July 1994).

adopted its first-step measures of easing economic sanctions against North Korea in January 1995. Faced with the constraints set by the Republican-led Congress as well as diplomatic pressure from South Korea, however, the Clinton Administration could resort to a very limited scope of measures to ease economic sanctions against North Korea.¹⁴⁾

After the conclusion at the end of 1995 of KEDO-North Korean talks on the light-water reactors supply, the United States came out more strongly for improving its relations with North Korea. It asked South Korea to take equally positive attitudes in dealing with North Korea and to give aid to the North. Relief aid, however, has evoked a difference of opinion between the two countries.¹⁵⁾ Different positions were revealed at a tripartite senior consultative meeting between the US, Japan and South Korea held in Honolulu in January 1996. Immediately after that meeting, Seoul announced that for the time being there would be no additional large-scale rice aid to North Korea on a government basis. By contrast, however, Washington made it public that it would pursue its aid policy to North Korea in the form of an indirect aid through the World Food Program (WFP). Thereafter, the US

14) The first-step measures covered 4 categories: travel, news gathering, and communication; monetary transactions; permission of trade for a specific item; and atomic energy-related business. These measures can be administered by presidential decrees only without any modification of related laws and regulations, thus merely remaining as symbolic ones.

15) Kook-Shin Kim, "The Origins of the U.S. Aid Policy Toward North Korea and the Outlook for Its Future Development," *East Asian Review*, Vol. 8, No. 4, (Winter 1996) pp. 74~95.

pushed forward with its aid policy toward the North. And South Korea reluctantly began to provide food aid to the North through the WFP.

The US stand of continuing its efforts to normalize Washington-Pyongyang relations became manifest through the US-North Korea talks on the control of missile exports¹⁶⁾ and talks on the repatriation of US servicemen's remains. Seoul did not express openly its objection to these talks. But they feel uncomfortable with these US-North Korean military contacts. For South Koreans, US reassurances that the future of the Korean peninsula can only be settled with the active involvement of the two Koreas has seemed to be undermined by direct US contacts with the North on a widening range of issues. South Korea, as a matter of fact, wants to be the main player in any discussions on Korean affairs.

Washington continues to view its relations with North Korea as a subordinate aspect of its alliance with the South. However, it is more or less unavoidable to find different policy priorities between Seoul and Washington due to their respective national interests. At a summit meeting held on Cheju Island, on April 16, 1996, the United States made it clear that the question of the Korean peninsula would never come to any solution if South Korea were excluded from the peace talks. On the other hand,

16) The US expects that North Korea will be banned from exporting missiles to the Middle East countries, such as Iran and Syria. It is also making diplomatic efforts to bind the North within the Missile Technology Control Regime.

Washington has come to have a free hand in approaching Pyongyang through the Cheju joint declaration, which states that the question of peace on the Korean peninsula and the question of Washington-Pyongyang bilateral talks should be dealt with separately. Therefore, it is expected that the US would closely cooperate with South Korea in the four-party peace talks. But once an agreement is made on a feasible peace structure on the Korean peninsula among the four participants, the US can be expected to accelerate its efforts to normalize ties with North Korea. And Washington will lay greater weight on the increase of its influence over North Korea and the maintenance of the status quo on the peninsula than on improvement of inter-Korean relations.

Relations with Three Regional Powers

Three regional powers, Japan, China and Russia, generally support South Korea's effort for the peaceful management of national division.¹⁷⁾ North Korea began to engage in talks with Japan to discuss the normalization of relations in 1992. The talks were ruptured, however, in 1992 because of the North Korean nuclear controversy. During the North Korea nuclear crisis, Japan closely cooperated with the US and South Korea for the resolution of the nuclear issue. The crisis triggered by North Korea's

17) Tae-Hwan Kwak, ed., *The Four Powers and Korean Unification Strategies* (Seoul: Kyung Nam University Press, 1997)

suspected nuclear weapons programs has been instrumental in routinizing triangular policy consultations among the US, Japan and South Korea. Japan reaffirmed the three-way cooperative efforts in dealing with North Korea after the adoption of the Geneva Agreement. It will continue to work closely with South Korea.

China is North Korea's only ally in any effective sense, as well as its number-one trading partner. The North Korea-China friendship treaty, a virtual military pact concluded in 1961, still remains in effect. China, however, has progressively downgraded its relations with North Korea since it established diplomatic relations with South Korea in 1992. China has played a constructive role for the resolution of the North Korea nuclear issue. It exerted influence on Pyongyang to give up nuclear development plan. China has also played a role in keeping the UN Security Council from taking tough measures against North Korea. Currently, China is taking part in the four-party talks. Since China emphasizes the stability in the East Asian region for its sustained economic growth, South Korea expects that China will again play a constructive role as an intermediary between the South and the North in building a peace mechanism on the Korean peninsula.

Russia relations with North Korea gradually declined since 1990 when Moscow set up diplomatic relations with Seoul. Russia shared the view with South Korea that North Korea's nuclear development posed a threat to peace and stability in the Northeast

Asian region. Russia has agreed to make concerted efforts with the international community to solve the North Korean nuclear issue. Recently Moscow has nullified its security treaty with Pyongyang. Instead it is selling its most advanced military equipment and technology to South Korea. Russia demands that it too be involved in peace talks about the Korean peninsula. Due, however, to its own internal troubles it will probably be unable to play any big role in building the peace mechanism on the peninsula.

Prospects for the Korean Unification

Over the past seven years, the North appeared to have been showing signs of opening itself to the outside world. But Pyongyang leaders still hesitate to open up and reform because they have witnessed the fatal consequences of extensive reform in the Eastern European countries. North Korea watchers around the world say that the change may be brought about either in the form of a soft landing or a drastic collapse. For the limits of available information, however, no reasonable consensus on the fate of North Korea has emerged yet. It is such a tightly controlled and sealed society that it is difficult for outsiders to have any clear idea of which direction it might take in the future. Given Pyongyang's dismal failure, unification is expected to take place essentially on South Korean terms, even though the timing and manner remain uncertain. According to Young C. Kim, there

are three possible pathways to Korean unification: war, mutual consent, and unification by default.¹⁸⁾

Scenarios of Unification

Jang-yop Hwang, a former secretary of the Central Committee of the North Korean Worker's Party, said that North Korea is ready to wage an all-out war against South Korea whenever the time is ripe.¹⁹⁾ If the economic crisis in North Korea continues to worsen, as Hwang says, Pyongyang out of desperation might find a final resort in taking a gamble on war. In case of war, combined ROK-US forces would quickly defeat the North. War of any length, however, would wreak havoc on both parts of Korea.

In the scenario of unification by default, unification occurs when the economic crisis precipitates the disintegration of the North Korean regime. It is essentially a replay of the German experience, involving abrupt but peaceful unification. The costs of economic reconstruction in an absorption scenario would greatly exceed those experienced in Germany. East Germany had population and per capita income one-fourth as large as West

18) Young C. Kim, "Korea Reunification: Selected Scenarios," in Gerrit W. Gong ed., *Korean Peninsula Issues and US-Japan-South Korea Relations* (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1993), pp. 59-68.

19) Jang-yop Hwang is the most prominent North Korean defector since the end of the Korean War in 1953. *Korea Times*, July 11, 1997.

Germany's, while the North, with a population half that of the South, has a per capita income at most one-eighth as large. The cost of rehabilitating the North Korean economy would be enormous; estimates range anywhere from \$200 billion to \$2 trillion over a couple of decades.²⁰⁾ This bleak prospect provides the most persuasive argument against the desirability of a sudden unification through absorption. But the German case illustrates that such events are by nature abrupt, so the sudden absorption process could occur regardless of Seoul's desires.

The unification by mutual consent scenario implies a peaceful, mutually accommodating process of unification. With the passage of time, the hard-line stance of the DPRK leadership would soften somewhat. Then, North Korea would be inclined to shift its policy lines in favor of coexistence. Pragmatic interests would enable the two Korea to establish a cooperative system in handling arms control efforts. Gradually, thereafter, the leadership in the North and South could reach a peaceful unification agreement through negotiations as equal parties.

The ROK government is publicly declaring that it is pursuing a negotiated unification. The most desirable scenario from Seoul's perspective is to delay the process of unification until a later date when the industrial capabilities of North Korea have grown markedly. Then the North would gradually become integrated with the South. But there are many critics to the assumption of

20) Aidan Foster-Carter, *Korea's Coming Reunification*, (London: The Economist Intelligence Unit 1992) Special Report No. M212, pp. 96-99.

unification by mutual consent. Eberstadt argues that the North is more likely to implode rather than to attain a soft landing. For him, the cherished vision of a gradual and orderly drawing together of the two Korea is today nothing more than a fantasy.²¹⁾ Harrison also maintains that a negotiated end to the division of the Korean peninsula is unlikely given Korean culture and political tradition. Absent a significant incentive or threat, according to Harrison, there is almost no likelihood that North Korean leaders will pursue compromise with the ROK government.²²⁾

Considering the critics of the negotiated unification as well as the ROK government's efforts to avoid a war or huge financial burdens, we cannot expect that Korean unification will closely follow any one of the three scenarios mentioned above. It is more likely to take place through a mixed form of the three scenarios. For these reasons, forecasting the process and ultimate form of unification is a very difficult task.

International Issues for Unification

Historically, Korea has been viewed as a strategic asset by the four major powers surrounding Korean peninsula. The US, Japan, China and Russia all hope to have a stable Korea as a

21) Nicholas Eberstadt, "Hastening Korean Reunification," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 76, No. 2, (March/April, 1997) p. 79.

22) Selig S. Harrison, "Promoting a Soft Landing in Korea," *Foreign Policy*, No. 106, (Spring 1997) pp. 57~75.

buffer zone in politics of the balance of regional power. They have a striking convergence of interests in maintaining peace on the peninsula. All of them, however, assume that a rapid unification of Korea would run contrary to their national interests. They appear to have concerns that unified Korea not be hostile and allied with a power hostile to their countries. Therefore, South Korea should maintain good relationships with neighboring countries to secure their understanding and final approval of unification.

To transform the divided nation into a unified one, South Korea needs to muster as much support as it can. Therefore, South Korea would make diplomatic efforts to remove any doubts the surrounding states may have, presenting the idea of a unified Korea in a positive light.²³⁾ Eventually, after North and South Korea reach an agreement for unification, two Korean leaders would call an international conference for the final resolution of the unification process. The international meeting would presumably take the form of 2+4 formula, that is, two Korea plus the US, Japan, China and Russia. At the meetings, the issues related to the security policy of unified Korea would dominate the discussion, specifically such issues as nuclear policy, arms reduction and military alliances of the unified Korea.

The Geneva Agreement signed between the US and North Korea in 1994 is not a formal treaty but a road map. It does not

23) Presidential Commission on the 21st Century, *Korea in the 21st Century* (Seoul: Seoul Press, 1995), pp. 59~139.

solve the North Korean nuclear problem, but simply permits both sides to settle the matter later on. If the LWR project is implemented smoothly, North Korea is obliged to accept special IAEA inspections, probably by the year 2000. Until then, the outside world could not be sure whether Pyongyang possesses nuclear weapons or not. Jang-yop Hwang alleged, however, that it is a common understanding in North Korea that its military does hold nuclear weapons. Neighboring countries, particularly Japan, suspect that united Korea would emerge with nuclear weapons, but there is no such possibility that united Korea would decide to go nuclear. South Korea reiterates a nuclear-free Korean peninsula after unification. If the two Koreas maintain an uncertain attitude regarding these nuclear issues, however, they will not gain international support for peaceful unification.

North Korea has a huge army of more than one million soldiers, while South Korea has six hundred thousand men. Simple arithmetic shows that a unified Korea, absent any significant prior force reductions, would have 1.6 million men under arms. In adding up the number of ground forces' weaponry, combat vessels, and air force aircraft and other weapons of mass destruction in both Koreas, the figures are staggering. Therefore, North and South Korea would reduce the number of military forces and hardware on both sides to alleviate the anxieties of the neighboring countries. Further, unified Korea would release hundreds of thousands of military personnel for productive undertaking. But it would maintain a self-sufficient defense

capability.

The ROK and the US have maintained a close military relationship for the past half-century. The US lays out a security strategy that unambiguously identifies a continued forward military presence in Asia, particularly the stationing of US armed forces in Korea after unification.²⁴⁾ The ROK government accepts the strategic rationale for a continued US presence in unified Korea. The Japanese government also supports a post-unification US military presence because the removal of US forces from the Korean peninsula would increase pressure to reduce or withdraw US Japan-based forces as well.²⁵⁾ China, however, viewing North Korea as a useful buffer zone, would have the feeling that US bases in a unified Korea could be a threat to its security. If Washington and Beijing fail to establish harmonious diplomatic relations until the time of Korean unification, China would increase pressure on South Korea and the US to readjust the role of the American forces in Korea. In any case, the most fundamental issue would be how to redefine the Korea-US security alliance to make it serve the regional stability.

24) US Department of Defense, *United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region* (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, February 1995).

25) Ralph A. Cossa, "Security Goals and Military Strategy of the US and Japan and Their Impact on Korean Peninsula Security," *Korea and World Affairs*, Vol. 20, No. 4 (winter, 1996) pp. 590~607.

Conclusion

During the Cold War, the South and the North each claimed to be the sole legitimate government on the peninsula. In the post-Cold War era, however, South Korea has emerged as the clear victor over the North in virtually every area of competition, except that of the military. South Korea normalized its relations with China and Russia, while maintaining its friendly ties with the US and Japan. North Korea, on the other hand, has failed to make progress in improving its relations with the US and Japan, while its ties with China and Russia have weakened. This imbalance in the diplomatic achievements of the two Koreas cannot be viewed in isolation from the South's overwhelming economic superiority. Indeed, a stable democratic government with a sustained economic growth has strengthened South Korea's diplomatic capability.

South Korea's unification plans are based on the assumption that the road to unity will be peaceful and gradual. All surrounding powers also assume that a gradual drawing together of the two Koreas would be optimal for financial or geopolitical reasons. The possibility must be admitted, however, that an unexpected turn of events could precipitate an abrupt unification. South Korea must be prepared for such a contingency. In any case, either peaceful unification by mutual consent or sudden unification through absorption, South Korea may face a rough road ahead in achieving unification, if it fails to improve further its relations with the major powers. Therefore, South Korea

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should increase its diplomatic capability substantially to create, rather than simply respond to, a new environment that is conducive to achieve national unification.

□ 국문 요약

한국의 통일외교

1990년대 초반 전세계적으로 탈냉전 분위기가 확산될 때 한국은 소련 및 중국과 외교관계를 수립하였다. 한편 남북한은 평양과 서울을 오가며 고위급회담을 전개하여 1991년말 남북기본합의문을 채택하였다. 남북기본합의문을 체결한 후 소련의 붕괴로 인해 국제정세의 근본적인 변화가 초래되었다. 한국인들은 남북한이 동서독의 통일사례를 따라 곧 통일을 달성할 수 있을 것이라는 기대를 갖게 되었다. 그러나 동구 사회주의권의 붕괴에 따라 체제불안을 느낀 북한이 핵무기 개발에 박차를 가하게 됨으로써 남북관계는 오히려 더욱 경직되었다.

북한은 미국과 핵협상을 고집하였다. 이에 미국은 북한과 3차례 고위급회담을 개최하고 1994년 10월 제네바 합의를 체결하였다. 제네바 합의문에 따르면, 북한이 핵개발을 동결한 후 합의사항이 순조롭게 이행되면 미국은 북한과 국교를 정상화하게 되어 있다.

제네바 합의가 체결되기 직전 남북한은 정상회담 개최를 합의하였다. 그러나 김일성이 급사함으로써 무산되었다. 김일성 사후 북한체제를 실질적으로 통치하고 있는 김정일은 대미관계 개선을 대외정책의 최우선 목표로 설정하고 남한에 대해서는 강경책을 지속하고 있다. 그러나 북한은 남한과 경제교역을 지속하며 기업인들의 대북 투자를 허용하고 있다. 그리고 KEDO를 통해 간접적으로 남북한 접촉을 계속하고 있다. 북한이 대남 강경책을 유지하면서도 남북 경제협력력을 지속하는 이유는 북한 경제상황의 악화에 기인한다. 북한은 소

련 및 동구사회주의권 붕괴 이후 계속 악화되고 있는 경제적 위기를 극복하기 위해서 남한으로부터 경제원조를 받지 않을 수 없는 것이다.

1995년 북한이 수해를 입게 된 직후 남한은 북한에 150,000만톤의 곡물을 지원하였다. 그후 남한은 세계식량계획 등 국제기구를 통해 대북 지원을 계속하고 있으며 최근에는 남북적십자 회담을 통해 곡물을 지원하고 있다. 남한은 이같은 지원을 통해 남북관계가 경색국면에서 탈피하여 정부차원의 대화가 재개되기를 희망하고 있다. 그러나 북한은 식량지원에도 불구하고 대남 적대자세를 버리지 않고 있는 바, 잠수함 침투 사건 등 북한의 군사적 도발행위가 이를 입증하고 있다.

1996년 4월 한국과 미국은 제주도 정상회담에서 한반도 평화체제 구축을 논의하기 위한 남북한, 미국, 중국이 참석하는 4자회담을 제안하였다. 최근 8월 5일부터 개최된 4자회담을 위한 예비회담에 4개국 대표는 6주 이내에 본 회담을 개최할 것을 잠정적으로 합의하였다. 그러나 북한이 주한미군 철수 및 미국과 단독 평화협정 체결을 계속 고집하고 있기 때문에 올해 안에 본 회담이 개최될 수 있을지 확실하지 않으며 개최된다고 해도 실질적인 성과를 기대하기는 어려울 것이다.

한국의 지정학적 위치 때문에 남북관계 개선을 위해서는 주변 강대국들의 지원이 절실히 요구된다. 미국, 일본, 중국, 러시아는 정도의 차이는 있지만 모두 북한에 대해 외교적 영향력을 행사할 수 있는 바, 한국은 이들과 북한정세에 관한 인식을 공유하고 대북 정책에서 공동보조를 취할 수 있도록 외교적 노력을 기울여야 한다. 이들 주변 4국은 모두 동북아 질서의 안정을 원하고 있으며 한반도에서 평화가 유지되어야 한다는 데 동의하고 있다. 그러나 이들 모두 남북

한의 급격한 통일은 원하지 않고 있다. 이들은 통일이 한국이 자국의 안보에 위협이 되거나 또는 위협이 되는 세력과 결합할 수 있다는 점을 우려하고 있는 것이다. 따라서 한국은 바람직한 통일한국상을 설정하고 이들 주변국들에게 통일이 동북아 지역의 평화유지와 공동번영에 기여할 수 있다는 점을 홍보하여야 한다.

궁극적으로 남북한이 평화적 통일에 합의하면, 남북한은 주변4국과 공동회담을 개최하여 남북한 통일에 대한 국제적 승인을 얻어야 할 것이다. 이러한 2+4회담에서는 통일 한국의 안보정책 문제가 가장 큰 논란의 대상이 될 것이다. 특히 통일 한국의 핵정책, 군비통제 그리고 대외 군사동맹 등 국방정책이 중요한 의제가 될 것이다. 그 중에서도 한국과 미국간의 군사동맹관계, 즉 통일 한국에서 주한미군의 지속적인 주둔 여부 및 역할 규정 문제가 가장 큰 쟁점이 될 것이다.

한국의 통일정책은 남북한 통일이 평화적으로 점진적으로 달성되어야 한다는 것이다. 주변 4국도 지정학적 요인과 급속한 통일에 따른 부정적인 파급효과를 우려하여 남북한의 점진적 통일을 지지하고 있다. 그러나 독일의 사례가 보여주는 바와 같이 예기치 못한 사태의 발전에 의해 통일이 갑자기 다가올 수도 있는 것이다. 한국은 이와 같은 비상사태에 대한 대비책도 철저히 마련해야 할 것이다. 평화적 합의통일의 경우이던 급격한 흡수통일의 경우이던 통일을 달성하는 시점에 있어 주변 4강과의 관계가 원만하지 못하면 많은 고난을 겪게 될 것이다. 따라서 한국은 외교적 역량을 강화하여 주변환경을 통일에 도움이 되는 방향으로 조성해 나가야 한다. ◇

III

Korean Unification: Likely Major Regional Powers' Reactions¹⁾

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Prediction always is a risky business, but in the case of predicting how the major regional powers of Northeast Asia might react towards a unified Korean regime, the number of variables involved makes prediction especially tricky. The prudent scholar, faced with such a task, usually will seek to avoid it. Since I consider myself an analyst, and not necessarily a scholar, I will endeavor to predict these reactions; but I also intend to remain mindful of the tentative nature of this endeavor and I ask the reader to remain mindful of this, also.

Others, however, might choose to attribute a lack of prudence, rather than scholarliness, as the reason behind my willingness to attempt these predictions. Upon completion of this paper, I will leave it to the reader to judge which attribute (or perhaps both)

1) The analysis contained in this paper is derived from a two-year United States government-sponsored project in which the author and Dr. Tom Garwin analyzed the ramifications of Korean unification for United States regional defense strategy and force posture. The views expressed in this paper represent only those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States government or any of its agencies.

might best describe the nature of my attempt.

As noted above, a number of variables must be considered when trying to predict how the major regional powers of Northeast Asia might react towards a unified Korea. It is a categorization, prioritization, and an analysis of these variables, and the placing of them within the context of major regional powers' strategic objectives, which will form the framework for this analysis.

Perhaps the two most important variables in understanding how the major powers of Asia might react are the mode of Korean unification and the type of international system which obtains during and following unification. Overlaid upon these variables is the strategic calculus each regional power will make based upon the strategic objectives they are likely to pursue regardless of which variables obtain. I begin this analysis, therefore, with a description of likely forms of Korean unification, followed by possible different types of Asian international systems, and then by a short analysis of each powers' likely strategic calculus. Throughout the discussion, I will comment upon implications for the United States, but I also will conclude with a discussion on policy implications for the United States.

Modes of Korean Unification

Korea unification can occur under three broad types of scenarios. Each of these scenarios have a number of variants, but an understanding of these three "base" scenarios, along with a

couple of special variants, should be sufficient for an analysis which seeks to understand how major regional powers might react to the resulting unified Korean regime. These three scenarios are:

Slow Embrace - A drawn out unification process based on economic cooperation and increased contacts between the two existing Korean regimes. Such a scenario assumes a moderation of the Northern regime. Eventual political unification occurs essentially on the South's terms.

Confederation is an important variant of the slow embrace scenario, in which the integration process stalls. The northern and southern regimes then coexist within the context of a loose confederation. Both regimes maintain some freedom of action (possibly including some in international affairs) and the confederation itself provides an additional arena for competitive politics, with a significant nationalist component. However, one must assume the military confrontation on the peninsula has been eliminated or controlled by high-confidence arms control measures. (Otherwise this scenario is not sufficiently different from continued political division of the peninsula to be worthy of consideration as part of a study premised on *unification*.) The scenario assumes that *both* regimes undergo substantial change, with the North moderating and improving its attractiveness and the South undergoing a crisis of confidence and at least a partial reversal of its democratic transition.

Collapse of the North - An economic and political implosion

of the DPRK regime leads to rapid official unification of the peninsula under ROK control. While major uncertainties surround the process of integrating the North into the ROK economy, society, and polity, it seems clear that both the realities of the situation and ROK elite preferences will tend toward a slower initial integration process than that experienced in Germany. Complete integration is likely to take between ten and forty years, or more, depending on how it is defined. For some time during the extended period of integration, the focus of a Democratic ROK government will be on maintaining economic growth in the South while pacifying and developing the North.

In a particularly troubling variant, the DPRK society collapses along with the economy and polity, leading to humanitarian disaster, and, possibly, chaotic activity by armed remnants of the North Korean military. This variant creates fertile ground for international contention over the peninsula. Even without extensive conflict, it is likely that Coalition forces would be deployed north of the DMZ, possibly entangling the US in human rights issues as the ROK endeavors to sort through the remnants of the Communist North, and also potentially raising Chinese concerns about the enhanced US geo-strategic position on the Asian mainland.

Unification after War - The ROK/US Combined Forces Command (CFC) emerges victorious after a war on the peninsula. One variant has the DPRK invading the south out of desperation or miscalculation, but being repelled and chased back north of

Pyongyang. A coordinated attack would likely result in devastation of the Seoul area and perhaps elsewhere in the country, leading to a period of dependency for Korea post-unification.

A troubling variant (in political terms) has an ambiguous beginning in which ROK forces move north (perhaps having been invited in by a local reform faction) to protect North Koreans from political reprisal or from humanitarian disaster. This expedition might be followed by a local DPRK counter-offensive combined with bombardment of Seoul, posing a dilemma for coalition (US) forces, complicating the problem of securing regional support (Japan, China, Russia) for US participation in subduing the North, and perhaps leaving lasting scars between the US and major regional powers.

Several conclusions concerning Korean unification can be identified as a result of a closer analysis of these scenarios and a survey of analysts studying the Korean situation. First among these is that the *Slow Embrace* and *Collapse* scenarios are viewed by most experts as more likely to occur than either war or confederation.

In any of the unification scenarios, a large residual US force presence on the Korean peninsula would be unlikely due to (both US and Korean) domestic constraints and the likely Chinese reluctance or unwillingness to accept a large US force presence on the peninsula. Ideally, however, the United States might be able to keep enough combat power on the peninsula to support the defense of a reunified Korea. Only under the best of

circumstances would the United States be able to use forces stationed on the peninsula to project power regionally in order to discourage hostilities, foster US interests, and maintain US engagement in Asia.

Regardless of the scenario under which Korea reunifies, it is likely that the transition period (i.e., the time between which unification begins and a truly unified, stable regime emerges) will hold both challenges and opportunities that will differ from those once the unification process is completed. Additionally, the process of unification may have a dramatic effect on the regional security environment, perhaps influencing a shift away from one regional security environment to another. Unification, furthermore, will entail enormous development burdens for the Koreans, but probably ultimately will result in a Korea that is a strong middle power in Asia.

Alternative Regional Security Environments

Three generic regional security environments appear to be possible. This assessment is based upon the premise that leadership groups within each of the Northeast Asian countries generally perceive the conduct of international relations as a matter of *realpolitik*, or balance of power, terms. While concepts of interdependence have emerged within the region over the last couple of decades, they clearly still do not dominate regional thinking about diplomacy and security.²⁾

Given this, the three generic environments, with one important variant, are:

Non-Polar - A continuation of today's status quo in Asian security affairs. It is inaccurate to call this situation "uni-polar," because the US does not act as an engaged arbiter of regional disputes. In this system, perhaps because security concerns are satisfactorily managed, nations focus on economic goals more than on military power relations. The US continues to underwrite regional security because of its long-term interest in forestalling a nuclearized world and the emergence of peer military competitors, but strains emerge periodically as increasingly wealthy Asian countries appear to act as "free riders." Various possibilities would be tried in response to these strains, including the use of multilateral task forces for some sea control, humanitarian operations and peacekeeping.

Continental Chaos is a variant of the non-polar system in which China and Russia are both absorbed in internal struggles. Weakened continental government could bring Japan and a unified Korea into conflict as they attempt to secure economic and political interests on the Northeast Asian landmass, placing more delicate and perhaps more stressful different demands on US-Japan and US-Korea relations than other scenarios. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction via "brain drain" is

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- 2) The idea that a *realpolitik*-based analysis is most suitable for the Northeast Asian region because it reflects the approaches of the various countries' leadership groups resulted from a conversation with Dr. Kyongsoo Lho on July 22, 1997.

likely to be an even more serious threat in this scenario than in others. Finally, there is some possibility that Taiwan would be involved in struggles on the Chinese mainland, further complicating US regional policy.

Multi-Polar - Under this system, three or more major regional powers (possibly including the United States) pursue autonomous security strategies. In the most plausible variant of this system, China or Russia (or both nations) develop regional clout equal to or greater than that of the US (perhaps in part because of a US decline in power as well as a rise by these regional powers). Japan is assumed to take a more powerful and independent regional role, almost certainly with a heightened defense posture, and with added political and economic assertiveness. Weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons, seem likely to play a large role in this security scenario.

Bi-Polar - Such a system does not necessarily imply a hostile confrontation between the US and China. However, *contention between China and an opposing coalition dominates regional security affairs*. I do not assume that the US necessarily will always have to be the senior partner in the anti-Chinese coalition, though that seems likely.

A Non-Polar security environment is the most likely regional security environment over the near term, given that it is a continuation of the current Asian security context. Furthermore, the non-polar environment appears to be acceptable to all of the major regional powers and preferred by most, if not all of them.

This type of security environment is the one that probably is the most preferred by the United States.

In terms of maintaining a *Non-Polar* security environment, the successful management of two critical relationships seem essential: the US-Japan bilateral relationship and the US-China bilateral relationship. A fundamental change in either of these relationships could precipitate a shift to a different Asian security environment. Negative changes in the US-Japan relationship would be central to a shift to a *Multi-Polar* Asia; while negative changes in the US-China relationship could precipitate a shift to a *Bi-Polar* Asia. Therefore, within US strategic calculations, it is possible to address the *Bi-Polar* and *Multi-Polar* environments as undesirable departures from the preferred *Non-Polar* environment.

The Strategic Calculus of the Major Regional Powers

Chinese Strategic Calculus

The Chinese paramount strategic objective over the next 15-25 years is to facilitate its economic development by ensuring a stable regional environment.³⁾ The consensus behind this

3) References to this objective are numerous within Chinese publications and official statements. For a couple of examples, see Yan Xuetong, "China's Post-Cold War Security Strategy," *Contemporary International Relations*, No. 5, Vol. 5 (May 1995), pp. 4-5; and, General Qian Qichen, "Unswervingly Follow the Independent Foreign Policy of Peace," *Qishi (Seek Truth)*, No. 123 (June 16, 1995), pp. 2-6, in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service, China*, 95-129 (hereafter referred to as

objective among Chinese leadership groups is so strong and broad that it is unlikely to change based upon the emergence of new or different Chinese leaders. The objective, despite this strong consensus, still can not be considered as an absolute guide for all Chinese policies. There are issues, both internal and external to China, over which the Chinese government may be willing to forego, if only temporarily, this fundamental strategic objective. The two most prominent issues of this nature are the reunification of Taiwan with the mainland and the internal stability and control by the central government of the existing peripheries of China (most notably, Hong Kong, Tibet, Inner Mongolia, and Xinjiang).⁴⁾

Chinese economic development is designed to allow China to regain its historical regional, if not global, position of "wealth and power." The concept of "wealth and power" is a recurring theme in Chinese attempts over the past century to recover from its relative weakness, if not subjugation, *vis a vis* both the West and Japan. Included in this drive for regional and international prominence is the implicit desire eventually to dominate the East Asian political scene, hopefully through the weight of its economic and diplomatic influence and, failing that, through military

FBIS-CHI-95-129), June 16, 1995. This assessment also is shared by numerous western analysts. For a couple of examples, see Alfred D. Wilhelm, Jr., *China and Security in the Asian Pacific Region Through 2010*, CRM 95-226, March 1996 (Alexandria, Virginia: Center for Naval Analyses) and William J. Murphy, "Power Transition in Northeast Asia: U.S.-China Security Perceptions and the Challenges of . . .," *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies*, Vol. 13 (January 1994), pp. 60-73.

4) Yan Xuetong, "Orientation of China's Security Strategy," *Contemporary International Relations*, Vol. 6, No. 2 (February 1996), pp. 2-5.

preeminence. Such an objective, however, usually is implicit in Chinese writings about their view of the Asia-Pacific region of 2010 and beyond, concealed by a strong tendency to claim that the trend in international relations is towards a multi-polar world and Asia-Pacific region.⁵⁾

Chinese strategic calculations of today are dominated by the need to assure stability within the region based upon a hard *realpolitik* approach to international relations.⁶⁾ The corollaries to this need are requirements to manage relations with the region's other major powers in such a way as to assure that China is not in fundamental conflict with Japan, Russia, or the United States. Of these three nations, relations with the United States is deemed to be the most important, with Japanese and Russian relations following in order of their importance.⁷⁾ The rationale for this

5) See, among several others, Qian Qichen, pp.2-6; Yan Xuetong and Li Zhongcheng, "Looking Ahead at Early 21st Century International Relations," *Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (Contemporary International Relations)*, June 20, 1995, pp. 2-8 in *FBIS-CHI-95-162*, June 20, 1995; Shen Qurong, "Historical Lessons and Common Efforts for a Bright Future," *Contemporary International Relations*, Vol. 5, No. 11 (November 1995), pp. 1-8; Chen Peiyao, "The New Asia-Pacific Triangle of Dependence, Constraint, Cooperation, and Competition," *Guoji Zhanwang (World Outlook)*, No. 20 (October 23, 1995). pp. 3-4, as reported in *FBIS-CHI-95-241*, October 23, 1995; and, Song Bang, "Lessons From the 50 Postwar Years," *Contemporary International Relations*, Vol. 5, No. 12 (December 1995), pp. 6~14.

6) Samuel S. Kim, "Chinese and Russian Perspectives and Policies Toward the Korean Reunification Issue," *Korea and World Affairs*, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Winter 1994), p.704.

7) For reports on this Chinese perspective, based upon numerous interviews with Chinese analysts, see Banning Garrett and Bonnie Glaser, "Looking Across the Yalu: Chinese Assessments of North Korea," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 35, No. 6 (June 1995), pp. 528-545 and Banning Garrett and Bonnie

priority is based in large part, again, upon the Chinese economic development program, which is highly dependent upon US and Japanese trade with and foreign investment into China.

The current state of relations between China and each of these other nations, however, obscures this assessment of priorities; the reasons for this are twofold. First, the United States policy with respect to Taiwan and human rights in China strikes at the very issues (i.e., Taiwan and internal stability) which could cause China to deviate from its fundamental strategic objective of economic development. Chinese scholars also privately fear the role that Japan might take should a confrontation develop between the United States and China over Taiwan.⁸⁾ Russia, on the other hand, in recent years has carefully avoided policies that might exacerbate Chinese concerns about Taiwan or the Sino-Russian border regions.

Secondly, Chinese officials in recent months have become increasingly concerned about the long-term regional strategies of both the United States and Japan, fearing that a containment strategy directed against China may be developing both within and among the two countries.⁹⁾ Additionally, Chinese scholars

Glaser, "China and the Great Powers in the Asia-Pacific: Perspectives from Beijing," unpublished paper presented at the U.S. Army War College 7th Annual Strategy Conference, April 23-25, 1996, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.

8) Garrett and Glaser, "China and the Great Powers in the Asia-Pacific."

9) Examples of the Chinese articulation of this fear abound. For a couple of examples, see Chen Peiyao, pp. 3-4, Qian Qichen, pp. 2-6, and Garrett and Glaser, "China and the Great Powers in the Asia-Pacific."

have become concerned about the potential for Japan to expand its political and military influence over the next decade such as to become a very capable counter-weight to increasing Chinese regional influence.¹⁰⁾

The Chinese strategic calculus *vis a vis* Korea fits into this overall Chinese strategy. Of paramount importance to China when considering Korea is that the peninsula remain stable with a regime that is not hostile, and preferably friendly, towards China.¹¹⁾ Implicit in this calculation is Beijing's vital interest (which is shared by all three of the other regional powers) that the Korean peninsula remain non-nuclear, not only in terms of signifying friendly Sino-Korean relations, but also in terms of avoiding a proliferation sequence which results in Japanese nuclearization and potential destabilization of the region. The extent to which Korea can contribute to Chinese economic development via trade and foreign investment is an important, but not dominant, factor in Chinese strategic considerations about the peninsula.¹²⁾

*The Japanese Strategic Calculus*¹³⁾

Japan is essentially a status quo power, but one plagued by

10) Ibid.

11) See Garrett and Glaser, "Looking Across the Yalu," pp. 528-529 and Hu Weixing, "Beijing's Defense Strategy and the Korean Peninsula," *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies*, Vol. 14 (September 1995) pp. 50~51.

12) Ibid.

13) The analysis in this section is taken from an unpublished paper by Dr. Michael Green entitled "Korean Reunification Scenarios: The Japanese View," dated July 28, 1996.

insecurity over the future of US and Chinese intentions in East Asia and the long-term viability of the Japanese social and economic model. In general terms, all Japanese political parties and bureaucracies (except the Communists) remain wedded to some updated version of the "Yoshida Doctrine" - a focus on economic growth and a solid defense relationship with the United States, complimented by a gradual expansion of political activity in forums such as the G-7, the United Nations and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). This incrementalism has served Japan fairly well in the first few years of the post-Cold War era. Whether it will continue to serve Japan's interest into the next Century, however, is a point of increasing debate in Tokyo.

The traditional post-war model of Japanese economic and foreign policy worked because Japan had capitalism without cost and security without risk. With the collapse of the GNP growth bubble in 1991, Japan's economic managers came under greater pressure to choose either insulation for domestic firms *or* continued GNP growth. The bureaucracy has tried - but failed - to have it both ways by spending close to 10% of GDP on stimulus packages and subsidies since 1993. The only lesson has been that economic expansion will not come without painful restructuring. With the Gulf War Japanese strategists learned painful lessons as well - without demonstrated sweat and blood equity, Japan might someday lose the US security guarantee. There are difficult decisions ahead for Japan.

Some Japanese political leaders (notably Ichiro Ozawa) have

pointed to these difficult decisions and argued that Japan must abandon the contours of the Yoshida Doctrine, accept greater risk and with it higher returns in economic and foreign policy, and become a "normal nation." Elements of this thinking have infused policymaking, but for the most part, Japanese leaders in business, government and politics are unwilling to institute a revolution. The Japanese strategic calculus for North East Asia over the next 15-20 years therefore derives from a fundamental desire to avoid radical change in the region and difficult choices at home. However, should radical change occur (such as abandonment by the United States in a hostile environment), and the most difficult of choices confront Japan's political leadership, major debate and even revolution are not out of the question. As Japanese political observers say of their own system, Japan is like a plate of peas, stable and conservative until one of the legs of the table below is removed and the peas roll off the plate in directions no one can predict. Japan's goal is to keep those legs secure, but if this policy fails, popular opinion, the strategic calculus - and many of the decision-makers themselves - probably would change.

The Korean Strategic Calculus

An assessment of a unified Korea's strategic calculus is an exceedingly difficult undertaking, given that such a state does not exist today and the mode of reunification remains unknown. Long-term Korean security objectives after a reunification of

Korea, therefore, are likely to be different from its objectives *a priori*. Korean objectives are dominated today by the tense security situation on the peninsula and the struggle by competing regimes to prevail in controlling the mode and timing of unification.

However, a number of fundamental security objectives will apply both during and after unification. First, any Korean regime, in order to establish its legitimacy, must seek to protect Korea against possible aggression by other regional powers. Secondly, any Korean government will seek to minimize outside intervention in internal Korean affairs. This objective would apply nearly equally to both allies and enemies among the major powers. Third, any unified Korean government will pursue an objective of economic development. The priority given to this last objective could vary widely, however, depending upon the mode of unification. For instance, a reunification through war or sudden collapse of the North would cause such economic disruptions that economic development will become an absolute top priority, creating a strong incentive for a Korean regime to compromise on other objectives.

Pursuant to these objectives, a united Korea can be expected to seek political and, if needed, military alliances which maximize Korea's security interests at a minimum sacrifice to Korea's internal and external political autonomy. This strategy will be conditioned by the relative importance economic development objectives will take in establishing the legitimacy of the

post-unification Korean government.

In many ways, these objectives and strategies are not fundamentally different than those of today. What will be different, however, is the environment in which the Korean state will seek to pursue these objectives. This inevitably will lead to variants of, if not different, strategies designed to achieve these objectives.

Freed from the debilitating effects of the competition along the 38th parallel, a reunified Korea has the potential to become a strong "middle" power, capable of fielding substantial military forces but still unable to dominate the Asian region. Its ability to influence regional outcomes, however, could vary widely, depending upon a number of factors. Most prominent among these factors will be: the mode of reunification, the nature of the Asian political system, and the specific strategies that a united Korean regime adopts. Most obviously, untoward events during unification could long delay Korea realizing its full economic and military potential and lessen its regional role.

A number of potential security threats might emerge in the aftermath of reunification. These security threats, however, are mainly based upon the geographical position of Korea and, therefore, can be rather easily discerned. Territorial threats could emerge, either in the form of irredentism or aggression,¹⁴⁾ in

14) Disputes over the proper Sino-Korean border date back to the 17th century. Li dynasty Korea claimed the Sino-Korean border was as far north as the Hailan River, while Ching dynasty China argued that the Tumen River was the proper border. The issue was settled temporarily by the Treaty of Jiandao, between China and Japan in 1909. Despite

which Korea's antagonists could be China, Russia, or Japan. As importantly, in a number of scenarios refugee flows, particularly between Korea and China, could create political instability that threaten a new Korean regime. The fact that Korea probably cannot rise above the level of "middle" power, coupled with these multiple sources of possible security threats, suggests that the Korean strategic calculus probably will be based upon an approach which seeks to balance its relationships with the region's major powers so as to provide Korea leverage in pursuit of its fundamental strategic objectives.¹⁵⁾

This calculation (i.e., the necessity to balance its relations among the region's major powers) will be conditioned by the long history of relations between Korea and both China and Japan. On one hand, the size, proximity, and economic opportunities offered by both powers will create a need for Korea to maintain a minimal level of friendly relations with both; while on the other hand, these same factors, coupled with the historical distrust and animosity between them, is likely to cause a united Korean regime to limit the extent of its friendly relations with either.

This would imply a natural inclination for a Korean regime to

early opposition from Kim Il Sung, the PRC and the DPRK accepted the Tumen River as the border. For more details, see translated copy of "Territorial Issue Hidden Behind China-South Korea Cooperation," *Tokyo Foresight*, December, 1995. Translation appeared in the *Daily Report, FBIS-EAS-96-052, FBIS Publications*.

15) Theoretically, Korea could attempt to pursue a policy of "armed neutrality," but this option, when pursued by Korea in the past, has proven to be unsustainable.

seek a closer relationship with another major power, such as the United States or Russia, which because of natural conditions (such as geography or capabilities) poses less of a potential threat to Korea. This inclination, however, will be conditioned by the Korean perception as to whether this other major power can be relied upon to protect not only its own interests within the region, but Korea's also. Such perceptions can be difficult to sustain.¹⁶⁾

Another key aspect of the Korean post-unification strategic calculus will be the decision as to whether and how to "go nuclear." Two dynamics are likely to influence such a Korean decision: the military balance between Korea and its rivals (and, by implication, whether Japan develops nuclear weapons) and, the Korean perception of its allies' reliability. A unified Korea may "flirt" with acquiring nuclear weapons not as an end in itself but simply as a means to force its allies to remain committed to its

16) Many South Korean defense planners already consider that, given Korean reunification, it is inevitable that the United States will withdraw its troops from Korea. In the middle of 1995, the ROK Ministry of National Defense released a booklet entitled *ROK's Defense Toward the 21st Century*, which justified 110 trillion Won in defense spending over six years due to the eventual withdrawal of the US forces and the rearmament of both Japan and China. See the translated summary of *ROK's Defense Toward the 21st Century* printed in the *Choson Ilbo*, July 9, 1995. Translation appeared in the *Daily Report*, FBIS-EAS-95-131, FBIS Publications. Additionally, Korean government participants at a joint KIDA/CNA workshop, held from October 17-20, 1994, in Seoul, on future US-ROK naval cooperation, stated that they foresaw an inevitable withdrawal of the United States from the region, and that this withdrawal would lead to a power vacuum which would be filled by either China or Japan. See *Prospects for US-Korean Naval Relations in the 21st Century*, Center for Naval Analysis and the Korean Institute for Defense Analysis, February, 1995.

defense. Clearly, a Korean decision to "go nuclear" could have a profound effect on the regional security balance, especially when considering the possibility that such a decision might induce a similar Japanese decision.

Current Korean views of their country's future relations with the major powers in the region appear to be predicated upon an assumption of growth in both Chinese and Japanese influence within the region. Russia, while seen as a significant area for investment and a minor potential ally, is not seen as being able to recover its previous position in the region. The United States is seen as an important power within the region both now and into the future, but the growth of Chinese and Japanese influence is expected to result in a relative decline in American influence.

*The Russian Strategic Calculus*¹⁷⁾

Russian leaders of all political stripes, now and in the foreseeable future, are likely to understand the following as their overriding objectives in the Asian-Pacific region with respect to the Koreans:

- maintain stability: Without allies, Russia has neither the political, economic nor military resources that might be required to influence in a serious or sustained way the

17) The analysis in this section is taken from an unpublished paper by Enders Wimbush entitled "Korean Reunification Scenarios: The Russian View," dated July 28, 1996.

immediate future of Korea. For all of the reasons noted above, Russia's national interests are best served by a stable Korean environment, even if this includes the continued presence of US military facilities on Korean soil. Stability also offers Russia time to understand or intuit China's next strategic moves in Eurasia. If the current Chinese-Russian rapprochement sours, as it almost certainly will at some time, Russia may not be adverse to US forces remaining in Korea to balance Chinese intentions elsewhere in the absence of Russian military power.

- promote economic interaction: South Korea has become a major trading partner with and investor in Russia. No Russian government other than the most xenophobic nationalist one will wish to impede a fuller development of the Russia-Korea economic relationship, which assists Russian recovery.
- curtail North Korea's nuclear program: Nuclear conflict on the Korean peninsula will threaten Russia's main naval base at Vladivostok, and it could spill radiation over the Russian-Korean border.
- ensure a soft landing for the North Korean economy: Economic collapse in North Korea will result in refugee flows into Russia and, possibly, violence.
- remain a player: Russia may admit to no longer being a super-power, but Korea is not a super-power problem for Russia. Rather, it is a regional power problem, and Moscow

feels strongly that it must be involved in any settlement that includes other regional actors.

The United States Strategic Calculus

Several over-arching US strategic objectives can be identified without making reference to specific scenarios. These objectives are listed below without regard to prioritization.

- Deter strategic nuclear attacks against the US and allies.
- Discourage, deter, and, if necessary, defeat aggression directed toward the US, its interests, or allies.
- Forestall the emergence of a hostile regional hegemon or coalition.
- Downgrade the role of WMD in international affairs.
- Protect US access to vital resources and markets.
- Assert Freedom of Navigation and protect SLOCs.
- Combat terrorism and drug trafficking directed against the United States.
- Maintain a regional ability to conduct NEOs and otherwise protect US citizens.
- Encourage human rights and democratization.

The non-scenario specific strategic objectives listed above have important implications for US regional defense strategy. Primary among these is the need for the United States to demonstrate military capabilities and commitment as required so

that potential allies will feel free to align themselves with the United States and potential aggressors will be discouraged from challenging US interests.

The United States also must foster strong security cooperation with regional partners, taking steps to ensure adequate regional basing, access, and infrastructure to support unilateral or coalition military operations. *Interoperability with allied militaries* must be stressed, as must be responsibility-sharing. To the extent that multilateral cooperation in military operations can be encouraged, the United States should demonstrate a willingness to participate in and support selected humanitarian and/or peacekeeping operations to validate America's role as a positive regional force. More fundamentally, United States capabilities and actions should discourage the escalation of regional military tensions or competition. Finally, the United States should continue to stress civilian control of foreign militaries and the promotion of regional militaries' respect for human rights and democracy.

Policy Implications for the United States

The United States should seek to retain a Non-Polar Asian security environment. For reasons previously stated, such a security environment provides a more favorable context for the pursuit of US interests within the region.

The US also should seek to retain its two security partnerships (i.e., with Japan and Korea) in Northeast Asia

following Korean unification. The US-Japanese security relationship is likely to remain important to stability throughout Asia, and - given Japan's global economic power - perhaps globally. Its continuation must remain one of the, if not the, key US security objectives within the region.

A continued US-Korean security relationship is important for a couple of reasons. In many contexts, maintaining a close US-Korean security relationship could prove essential to the stability of the US-Japanese relationship (either as a means of ameliorating potential Japanese-Korean tensions or as a means of alleviating Japanese concerns about domination of the Korean peninsula by a hostile regional power). A continuing US-Korean security relationship also could prove important to preventing an unacceptable increase in Chinese regional power through the domination of the Korean peninsula.

Assuming unification, continuing non-polarity, and a twin pillar security stance in Asia, the United States should seek to remain actively engaged in Korea. Korea, however, is likely to be less inclined to serve as a base for the US unilateral use of force elsewhere in the region, especially regarding Taiwan. In any case, geography is comparatively not favorable for use of the peninsula in many potential Asian contingencies (except perhaps in the Russian Far East) this is especially true if the United States retains access to bases in Japan.

The most important aspect of the US-Korea security relationship is how it might affect the US-Japan or US-China

relationships. Furthermore, through a mishandling of its relationship with Japan, the United States also could provide an impetus for Korea to move closer to China. At the same time, a gross mishandling of the US relationship with China might result in both Japan and Korea distancing themselves from the United States.

The United States should remain actively engaged throughout the Korean unification process in order to facilitate its interests and objectives in Asia. Central to this should be an understating that Korea and Japan are essential components of the same overarching security framework. At a minimum, the United States must support a relationship with Korea that supports strong US-Japan security ties and does not exacerbate US-China tensions. The worst case scenario for the United States would be not only to "lose" Korea as a pillar, but also to "lose" Korea to China.

More broadly, the United States should work to ensure a unified Korean regime that is both friendly to the United States and its foreign policy goals and capable and interested in forming a strong security relationship with the United States. This is true in any projected future Asian security environment, but especially true in a *Bi-Polar* or *Multi-Polar* environment.

It is important to note that the actual mode of unification will affect the character of the resulting Korean regime, as well as security relations with its neighbors. Post-unification Korean political evolution will be critical to the US-Korea security

relationship, but the United States will be able influence this evolution only at the margins. Nevertheless, there appear to be actions that the United States can take which could contribute to a favorable outcome in any scenario.

The United States should visibly support, and work quietly to influence, a South Korea which seeks to set the pace and method of integrating the North. Once the unification process begins, it behooves the United States to take the lead in organizing and facilitating multilateral financial aid. A determination on the level of US forces which stay in a unified Korea should result from joint US-Korea discussions, and not from unilaterally-announced pre-set targets. The minimum US objective in this process (although not necessarily the preferred US objective) should be to achieve close military relations with a unified Korea and an access understanding based upon peninsular defense. In a broader sense, this process could set the stage for US-Korea-Japan cooperation on SLOCs and other regional problems with the ultimate goal of producing security interdependence and significant burden-sharing.

The United States should actively manage its bilateral relationships to mitigate tensions between Japan and Korea and to produce the perception that the US security link to each nation is a valuable asset to the other country. Further, the United States should encourage informal discussions and consultations on the appropriate size and role of post-unification forces on and around the Korean peninsula. This should not be pursued as a step toward formal multi-lateral negotiations; rather, it should be part

of a process of informing and consulting with other Northeast Asian nations to mitigate against surprises that could have unfortunate and potentially dangerous consequences.

The United States also should work to demonstrate a continuing and future commitment to the region, including strong military capabilities relevant to the region. This is true regardless of whatever changes US regional military force dispositions and composition might undergo.

Finally, the United States should support steps to resolve WMD issues on the peninsula as early as possible during the unification process. The ultimate goal should be a WMD-free Korean peninsula.

□ 국문 요약

한반도 통일에 대한 주변국의 예상반응

한반도 통일에 대한 주변국의 반응은, 주변국 각국의 전략적 목표, 한반도 통일의 유형, 통일과정에 따른 지역안보환경의 유형을 분석함으로써 예상해 볼 수 있다. 우선 통일의 유형과 지역안보환경에 기반 하여 시나리오를 구성한 후, 그것에 기반 하여 주요국가들이 추구할 전략적 목표를 예상해 본다.

첫째단계는 시나리오를 만드는 것이다. 통일의 유형은, 전쟁을 통해 남한이 북한을 무너뜨리는 경우, 북한이 붕괴하는 경우, 남한이 북한을 점진적으로 통합해 가는 경우로 분류해 볼 수 있다. 지역안보환경은 단극체제(현재와 같은 경우의 지속), 양극체제(미국과 중국의 경쟁), 다극체제(중국, 미국, 일본의 경쟁)로 나눌 수 있다. 이러한 두 가지 변수의 9가지의 조합(예를 들면 단극체제 하에서의 북한의 붕괴)은 주변국의 반응을 분석할 시나리오들의 토대를 구성한다.

둘째 단계는 시나리오와 관계없이 주요 주변국 및 통일한국의 예상되는 안보목표를 평가해보는 것이다. 중국, 일본, 러시아, 미국의 장기적인 안보목표에 대한 평가는 시나리오들과 결합되어질 것이다. 이러한 안보목표들을 살펴보는 것은 지역안보환경과 한반도 통일유형에 따라 각국이 어떻게 반응할 것인가를 보여줄 것이다.

마지막으로, 이러한 시나리오들을 분석함으로써 각 국가들이 어떻게 시나리오들을 만들어가려고 할 것인가에 대한 통찰을 얻을 수가 있다. 이 논문에서는, 한 예로서 미국이 자신의 안보목표에 가장 적합한 시나리오를 추구해 가는 것이 분석될 것이다.

미국은 동북아안보환경에서 무극체제를 유지하려고 노력할 것이다. 그러한 환경이 미국의 안보목표추구에 적합하다. 또한 미국은 한반도통일 이후에도 일본, 한국과 동반자관계를 계속 유지하려고 할 것이다. 일본의 경제력을 감안할 때, 미·일 안보관계는 아시아, 더 나아가 세계의 안정을 유지하는데 여전히 중요한 요소가 될 것이다. 한·미 관계 역시 다음의 몇 가지 이유로 중요하다. 긴밀한 한·미 안보관계의 유지는 미·일 관계의 안정에 필수적이다. 그것은 한·일간에 잠재해 있는 긴장을 완화하며, 적대국가가 한반도를 지배할 가능성에 대한 일본의 우려를 누그러뜨리는 수단이 될 수 있기 때문이다. 또한 한·미 안보관계는 한반도지배를 통해 중국의 세력이 지나치게 증대되는 것을 막는 데도 중요하다.

통일, 무극체제의 지속, 안보관계를 가정할 때 미국은 한국문제에 여전히 적극적으로 개입해야 한다. 그러나 한국은 미국의 군사기지로 되는 것을 꺼려한다. 또한 아시아에서의 한반도의 지리적 조건은 무력사용에 적합치 않다. 이는 특히 미국이 일본기지를 유지하고자 한다면 더욱 그러하다. 한·미 안보관계에서 가장 중요한 것은 그것이 미·일, 미·중 관계에 미치는 영향이다. 미·일 관계에서 생기는 문제는 한국으로 하여금 보다 중국에 접근할 동기를 제공할 수 있다. 또한 미·중 관계에서 생기는 문제는 일본과 한국으로 하여금 미국으로부터 멀어지도록 할 수 있다.

미국은 자국의 이익과 목표를 위해 한반도통일의 전 과정에 적극적으로 개입하려고 할 것이다. 미국은 미·일 안보유대를 강화하고 미·중 관계를 악화시키지 않는 한·미 관계를 발전시켜야 한다. 미국으로서 최악의 시나리오는 한국을 잃는 것이라기 보다는 한국을 중국에게 잃는 것이다. 미국은 통일한국이 미국과 미국의 외교정책목표에 우호적이 되도록 그리고 미국과 긴밀한 안보관계를 형성할 수

있고 또한 그렇게 되기를 바라도록 노력하여야 한다. 이는 특히 양국 또는 다극체제하에서 더욱 그러하다.

통일의 유형은 한국의 정치체제 및 주변국과의 안보관계를 특징 짓는 데에 영향을 미칠 것이다. 통일이후의 한국의 정치적 전개는 한·미 안보관계에 비판적일 것이며 미국은 이러한 상황을 크게 바꾸지는 못할 것이다. 그러나 미국은 한반도 통일시나리오에 바람직한 결과가 이루어지도록 공헌할 수가 있다. 미국은 남한이 북한을 통합하는 속도와 방법을 찾는 데에 도움을 줄 수 있으며 영향을 미칠 수 있다. 일단 통일과정이 시작되면 미국은 여러 국가들의 재정지원을 조직하고 촉진하는데 주도적이 되어야 한다. 통일한국에 주둔할 미군의 규모에 대한 결정은 한·미 공동의 합의에서 나와야지 일방적 선언에 의해서는 안된다. 이에 관련된 미국의 최소한의 목표는 통일한국과 긴밀한 군사관계를 유지하는 것이며 한반도의 방위에 기초한 이해의 접근이다. 이 과정은 안보적 상호의존과 의무의 분담이라고 하는 궁극적 목표와 관련된 지역문제 및 SLOC에 관한 한·미·일 협력을 가져다 줄 것이다.

이같은 맥락에서, 미국은 한·일 간의 긴장완화를 위해 또한 미국과의 안보유대는 소중한 자산이라고 하는 인식을 가져오기 위해 양자관계를 잘 유지해야 한다. 또한 미국은 통일이후 한반도 및 한반도 주변의 군사력의 적절한 규모와 역할에 대한 비공식적 토론과 협의를 촉진해야 한다. 그러나 이것이 공식적인 다자간 협상을 위한 한 단계로 추진되어서는 안된다. 이것은 동북아시아 국가간의 정보교류와 협의의 과정이 되어야 하며 이는 불행하고 위험한 결과를 가져올 수 있는 충격을 완화하기 위함이다.

미국은 지역방위를 위한 강력한 군사력을 포함하여 앞으로도 계속 될 자국의 공헌을 증명하도록 노력해야 한다. 이것은 미국의 지역군사

력의 배치와 구성이 어떻게 변화하던지 간에 계속 추구될 것이다. 마지막으로, 미국은 한반도 통일과정에서 가능한 한 빨리 한반도내의 대량살상무기문제를 해결하도록 조치를 취해야 한다. 궁극적 목표는 한반도내의 대량살상무기를 제거하는 것이 되어야 한다. ◇

IV

The Japan-ROK Security Relationship and Korean Unification

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Japan-South Korea Security Relations: Present and Future

Despite the historical animosity that exists between Japan and South Korea, bilateral security relations between the two countries have been improving rapidly since 1992. Five reasons account for this phenomenon. First, due to the end of the Cold War, Japanese domestic politics is now much less divided on the propriety of cooperation with South Korea. In the Cold War era, the Socialists were opposed to improving relations with South Korea, let alone security cooperation. However, now that ideological confrontation has largely disappeared, and simplistic dichotomy between the conservatives being pro-South Korean and the progressive being pro-North Korean no longer holds. Recently, even the Japanese Communists are trying to normalize their relations with South Korea.

Second, it is likely that the US security commitment to this region will diminish in the future. In order to augment the reduced US commitment, it is in the interests of both Japan and South Korea to promote bilateral security cooperation. Fortunately, the United States is encouraging the promotion of bilateral security relationships among its East Asian allies.

Third, the North Korean threat, particularly its suspected development of nuclear weapons and Nodong missiles, has induced Japan and South Korea jointly to cope with the problem. Faced with common problem of potential North Korean nuclear development, Japan and South Korea, together with the United States, started to consult frequently to figure out effective policies toward North Korea and sort out differences that might exist between them. This further facilitated improvement in the bilateral security relationship.

Fourth, as North Korea's domestic situation continues to deteriorate, the likelihood of early unification of the Korean peninsula is higher than before. In the unification process, the possibility cannot be ruled out that some political factions might use historical antagonism that the Korean people have toward Japan for parochial political purposes. Stable relations between Japan and South Korea would be one of the most important preconditions for peaceful unification. In addition, as South Korean security policy is becoming geared more for post-unification strategic environment, Japan is becoming more important factor in its strategic calculations.

Finally, Japan and South Korea now have an increased number of common interests in extra-peninsular affairs, namely the rise of China, nuclear waste dumped in the Sea of Japan, and security in the Asia-Pacific region.

Interestingly enough, it is the South Korea that is more enthusiastic about promoting the bilateral security relationship for several reasons. First, Japan is potentially more threatening to Korea than Korea is to Japan, largely because of the difference in size, economic power, and industrial and technological levels of development. In the early 1990s, partly due to improved North-South relations, symbolized by the Basic Agreement and the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in 1991, "Japan's remilitarization" was seriously discussed in South Korea and some people began to regard Japan as the primary threat to South Korea. The shift of attention from North Korea to Japan was reversed after 1992 when suspicions about North Korea's nuclear development deepened. However, it is always possible, especially if the military threat from the North disappears, that South Korea will again direct its attention to Japan. Increased contact with Japan serves both as information-gathering activities to gauge the possible rise of Japan as a military threat and as constructive measures to prevent such an eventuality.

Second, South Korea is currently trying to diversify the sources of weapons procurements. South Korea has relied almost solely on the United States as a supplier of its weapons systems.

In order to reduce the heavy reliance on the United States in the military-technological field, South Korea is seeking to purchase weapons from other countries as well. Japan is one of the potential suppliers of advanced military technologies. As a matter of fact, South Korean Defense Minister recently proposed a bilateral exchange program on technologies in ministerial talks with Japan, although the Japanese side declined this proposal mainly due to the restrictions on military technological transfers imposed by the Three Principles on Arms Export.

Third, the South Korean military, especially the Navy and the Air Force, is interested in acquiring knowledge and skills from the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) with regard to naval and air operations. As South Korea started to pay more attention to the Navy and the Air Force in its long-term defense plan in preparation for post-unification national defense, it has come to regard Japan as the most promising candidate from whom to acquire know-how about naval and air operations, education, and training. The ROKN is interested in operational skills particularly with regard to destroyer-class surface ships, diesel-powered submarines, and maritime reconnaissance aircraft, now that it started to procure 3,200-ton indigenous destroyers, 1,200-ton submarines, and P-3Cs. Japan has acquired and operated those systems for many years. *During the Cold War, the JMSDF developed one of the world's most effective anti-submarine capabilities, utilizing those very systems that the ROK has just begun to procure.* The ROKAF is also interested in promoting

cooperative relations with Japan. It is particularly interested in Japan's capability on early warning and information collection and technology for aircraft production. However, Japan has not responded positively to these South Korean interests; self-imposed restrictions on military activities prevent Japan from embarking on such close military cooperation.

Finally, South Korea is also interested in figuring out how Japan is coping with a dwindling defense budget. In 1994, Japan and South Korea agreed to exchange information and views on organizational restructuring and weapons procurement policy at the time of reduced defense expenditure.

The Current Status of Security Relationship between Japan and South Korea

Next, let us take a look at the current status of the Japan-ROK security relationship. The bilateral security relationship consists mainly of four pillars: exchange of personnel; regular meetings; arrangements for prevention of accidents; and mutual port calls.

First, with regard to the exchange of personnel, Japanese Defense Ministers visited South Korea in 1979, 1990, 1995, and 1997, and South Korean Defense Ministers visited Japan in 1994 and 1996. Japanese Chairmen of the Joint Staff Council visited Korea in 1990, 1995, and 1996. South Korean counterparts have visited Japan in 1990, 1994, and 1996. In addition, six of Japanese

chiefs of the three services and six of their Korean counterparts have paid visits to each other's countries.

There are 14 full-time Korean students in JSDF's staff colleges and the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS). On the other side, there are normally three Japanese students annually studying at Korean war colleges, and before long there will be two additional students studying at the Air War College and the Korean National Defense University (KNDU). There have been frequent exchange visits between NIDS and KNDU and the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA). Also, representatives from the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU) have frequently visited NIDS and other organizations within the Japan Defense Agency (JDA).

Second, since 1994 the two countries have held annual working-level defense talks attended by a Defense Counsellor and the Director of J-5 on the Japanese side and the Director of the Policy and Plans Office on the South Korean side. Intelligence officers from each services usually meet twice a year. Operations officers from the Ground Self-Defense Forces (JGSDF) and the ROK Army (ROKA) meet once a year; likewise for the Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) and the ROK Air Force (ROKAF). Naval operations officers are also scheduled to have regular meetings.

Third, in 1995 Japan and South Korea concluded an agreement on prevention of accidents in the air, augmented in 1997 by the opening of a hot line between the air defense post in

Fukuoka and the air defense control center in Osan. In the 1995 arrangement, Japan and South Korea agreed to notify each other when their aircraft fly into the other side's air defense identification zone (ADIZ) and to refrain from scrambling aircraft in response to incursions as long as the flight plan is filed in advance and the aircraft is following the planned route. In addition, it is likely that joint training for search and rescue (SAR) operations and prevention of accidents on the sea will be discussed in the working-level meeting in August 1997.

Fourth, since 1994, a training squadron of the Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) and the ROK Navy (ROKN) have made three mutual port calls. Mutual visits of C-130 transport aircraft are scheduled to start in 1998.

Finally, it should be pointed out that Japan and South Korea have participated together in RIMPAC, the annual multilateral joint military exercise in the Pacific, since 1990. Although it is not a bilateral activity and both sides have denied that the joint participation in the RIMPAC was the first step to a closer naval cooperation, it does offer an important starting point for such development in the future.

What has been accomplished by these interactions? Probably, the answer is "not much." Although overall level of mutual understanding has risen and there have been more people involved in the bilateral activities, not many tangible "results" have been produced by these activities. However, these interactions do constitute the first steps for closer cooperation in the future.

South Korea's Perception of Japan's Defense Policy

South Korea's interest in Japan's defense policy remains high even after the sense of threat from North Korea revived due to its nuclear development. However, increased bilateral interaction notwithstanding, consensus has not been reached in South Korea as to the nature of Japan's security policy and how South Korea should respond. Generally speaking, the South Korean government has come to see Japan's security policy as largely peaceful and conducive to the security of South Korea. On the other hand, the South Korean media and some scholars are more inclined to see Japan as a potential threat and thus less willing to promote the bilateral security relationship. This was one of the reasons the Japanese training squadron visited Pusan instead of Inchon, which is closer to Seoul and more visible to the South Korean public.

A look at ROK *Defense White Papers* reveals the changes over time in South Korean government views of Japanese defense policy. In the early 1990s, South Korea's view about Japanese defense policy was not favorable. *Defense White Paper 1990-1991* said that Japan was "becoming a military superpower as it expands its military strength to fill the void left by the shrinking U.S. role in the region." (p. 56). In 1991, the rhetoric was further heightened. *White Paper 1991-1992* now said that Japan was "gradually trying to change its territorial defense concept to a more aggressive forward defense by interpreting more broadly the concepts of command and control and territorial defense." (pp. 61-

62) Whatever the statement exactly meant, it became a diplomatic issue when the Japanese government protested.

However, from 1992 on, the *White Paper* demonstrated a sea change in South Korean policy vis-a-vis Japan. It started to emphasize the importance of "actively promoting substantial military exchange and cooperation" with Japan, "[t]aking into consideration Japan's expanding role in the region and its developing security cooperation relationship with the United States" (p. 23)¹⁾ South Korea, rather than opposing Japan's growing security role in the region, seemed to have decided to make use of it to its own advantage. After the 1992 *White Paper*, the South Korean government ceased to express the concerns that Japan might again become a military superpower. In August 1993, then Foreign Minister Han Sung-joo said that it was unlikely that Japan would become a military superpower.

It was reported that following the 1992 decision, the ROK Ministry of National Defense set up a project team for spelling out how it should manage the bilateral security relationship with Japan. As a result, when then Defense Minister Rhee Byoung Tae visited Japan, he proposed: 1) exchange visits of defense ministers and officials; 2) mutual port calls; 3) exchange of students; and 4) an agreement on prevention of air accidents.

In spite of the increased defense contacts, South Korea seems to remain concerned about possible nuclear development by Japan.

1) Translation based on the original Korean text.

Even after the 1992 decision, South Korea has repeatedly expressed its concern about the possibility in part due to upcoming review of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995. In October 1992, then Defense Minister Choi Sae Chang expressed his concern about nuclearization of Japan and called for upgrading the inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In November 1993, President Kim Young Sam said that although South Korea would not develop nuclear weapons even if North Korea went nuclear, Japan might.

In contrast to the improving official posture, South Korean media and academics, display much less sanguine views on Japanese defense policy. Although there are some who regard Japan's defense policy as peaceful and conducive to Korean security, the dominant view in the circle is that Japan has become a major military power (軍事大國) or at least trying to become one. By doing so, Japan is attempting to become a dominant power in East Asia (For these views, see bibliography).

However, their conclusions are not as important as the logic by which they reached such conclusions. By categorizing and analyzing their logic, some means to narrow the perception gap between the two countries may be achieved.

First, let us take a look at some arguments that are grossly misleading and/or based on inappropriate assumptions.

A) Inappropriate comparison

One analyst at the KNDU has claimed that Japan's defense budget was on a par with defense budget of all the countries in East Asian countries combined. However, whatever method he might have used in this calculation, it is quite clear that he excluded Russia and possibly China from the equation. It is obviously inappropriate not to take Russia into account, for Japan's defense posture was shaped mostly with an eye on Russia until recently.

Emphasizing the size of the Japanese military, another analyst wrote that Japan possessed three times as many destroyers and five times as many P-3Cs as the US Seventh Fleet in 1991. Here again, this comparison is off the mark because in practice the JMSDF constitutes an integral part of the US Seventh Fleet in the Pacific and, therefore, they are complementing each other with the JMSDF providing a shield (defensive power) and the Seventh Fleet a sword (offensive power). Finally, it should be reminded that use of nominal defense budget vastly overstates Japanese spending.

B) Underdefined use of terms

The term "militarization(軍事大國化)" widely used in South Korea in reference to Japan is often poorly defined and can mean different things to different people. In Japan, the term "militarization" refers to a major military buildup and a transformation of a country into a great power capable of

exercising military power independently to achieve its diplomatic goals. However, in Korea the term usually means much less. One analyst once referred the dispatch of the JSDF to Cambodia as an evidence that Japan was trying to become a major military and political power. Another commentator concluded that Japan was becoming a major military power by referring to the 1993 Miyazawa Doctrine.

The difference in the use of the term might have contributed to the perception gap between the two countries. Asked whether Japan might become a military superpower in the future, 56.4% of the Koreans answered affirmatively whereas only 18.5% of the Japanese respondents did so. Moreover, 25.9% of the Korean respondents said that Japan had already become a military superpower whereas only 3.4% of the Japanese agreed with this view.²⁾ The loosely defined use of terms has been hindering mutual understanding between the two countries. It is quite ironic that such a problem is arising from the common heritage of our languages.

C) Misinterpretation and exaggeration

There are some in Korea who interpret the rise of the conservative political factions in Japan as a symptom of rising of nationalism and statism. However, this analysis does not correctly reflect political reality in Japan. It was not as much the rise of

2) *Yomiuri Shimbun*, May 24, 1995.

the conservatives as the demise of the progressives that brought about the "relative" rise of the conservatives. One analyst concluded in 1992 that imperialistic nationalism was reviving in Japan at grass-roots by pointing out the fact that 68% of the Japanese citizens responded positively to the dispatch of the JSDF abroad on peacekeeping missions. Taking into account the fact that South Korea has also dispatched a large number of forces abroad on the peacekeeping missions and that the missions are supported by its citizens, it is hard to call Japanese actions "imperialistic" or "nationalistic."

D) Difference in political culture and system

Difference in political systems and political culture have also contributed to the misunderstanding between Japan and Korea. At the top of its political hierarchy, Korea has a powerful president who can exercise dominant influence over the executive, legislative and even judiciary powers. However, in Japan political decisions are made out of step-by-step process of consensus building. Even the prime ministers are not supposed to make major policy decision on their own. In addition, although South Korea has revised its constitution many times, Japan has never revised its constitution since its establishment. Japanese political institutions are better-established than those of South Korea and sometimes much more rigid.

These differences tend to make the Koreans overestimate the probability that Japan will suddenly make a major policy change.

For this reason, Japan's repeated reference to the most fundamental principles of Japanese defense policy, such as Article 9 of the Constitution and the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, has failed to convince the Korean of Japan's peaceful intentions. Only deeds, not words, will work to convince Koreans.

E) Deep-rooted anti-Japanese sentiment

Deep-rooted anti-Japanese sentiment still pervasive in Korea has prevented balanced and objective assessment of Japanese defense policy. Being regarded as "pro-Japanese" is politically dangerous in Korea. For this reason, most analysts refrain from criticizing even the most misconceived analysis of Japanese defense policy. In addition, as Professor Kim Yong So of Ewha Women's University has pointed out, using the "Japanese threat" for the purpose of mobilizing political support of the Korean citizens is sometimes imperative. In this case, anti-Japanese sentiment is used for domestic political goals with negative repercussions on Japan-ROK relations.

F) Immaturity of security studies

Both Japan and Korea lack well-established scholarship in security studies. In the case of Japan, study of national security or military affairs has been a "taboo" since the Second World War and, few resources have been invested in the field. No useful conceptual framework has been developed to understand the importance of security relationship with Korea. In the case of

Korea, study of military affairs has been largely monopolized by the government and information on security issues is hard to obtain. Moreover, preoccupied by North Korea, the South Koreans could not spend much time and effort in studying extra-peninsular military affairs or even the military history of foreign countries.

Failure to integrate security studies and regional studies is another source of the problem. Those who study about Japan tend not to be so familiar with security issues and those who are knowledgeable about security issues usually lack the knowledge about Japan. Japan also suffers from the same problem, to a slightly lesser extent.

Second, there are cases where Japan is a main source of the problem.

A) "Japan as a victim" theory

Many Japanese people, even some defense experts, often point to the fact that in human history Japan has been the only victim of atomic bombs in explaining and substantiating Japan's non-nuclear policy. They claim that the Japanese are the only people who rightly understand the grave consequences of nuclear explosion. However, this line of argument is not always seen as very logical. One Korean commentator has concluded that Japan would not stand still if a rival nation came to possess nuclear weapons because Japan was the only victim country of such weapons. Japan's repeated statement that it is the only living

victim of atom bombs can be seen as an argument for justifying Japanese possession of an independent nuclear deterrent. As long as the link between the fact that Japan was a victim and the fact that Japan is holding onto the non-nuclear policy is clearly spelled out, "Japan as a victim" story alone will not convince the Koreans of Japan's intention of not developing its own nuclear capability.

B) Unresponsiveness of Japan's defense policy

Japan's inability to quickly respond to changing international strategic environment poses a question about the credibility and rationality of its defense policy. Professor Lee Ki-Tak once expressed his concern about Japan's inability to take appropriate responsibility in dealing with post-Cold War strategic environment. He said that the Koreans became worried when Japan failed to clearly define its new policy direction when the United States was undertaking such changes in response to the end of the Cold War. Even well-intentioned inaction can become a source of misunderstanding.

C) Ideological bias imported from Japan

As a matter of fact, the argument that Japan is becoming a military superpower, in some cases, is an import from Japan. Some of the articles on Japanese defense policy written by Korean authors depend heavily on articles written by left-wing scholars in Japan.

Finally, there are fundamental issues where the disagreements between Japan and South Korea are most acute and real. There are no clear-cut answers and solutions to these issues.

A) Japan's potential military strength

The most widely discussed proposition in Korea is that Japan, with its cutting-edge technologies, scientific prowess and large industrial base, could build up massive military strength, including nuclear weapons, in a relatively short period of time. Although it might be politically difficult for Japan to do so, it is true that Japan has the potential to do so. Though Japan currently has no intention to do so, the underlying capability is still there.

B) Japan's rise as a major political power in Asia

One Korean analyst contended that Japan, rather than remaining an economically powerful but militarily weak country, was trying to become a great power by exercising its military power more actively. This analysis was made with regard to Japan's dispatch of the JSDF to Cambodia. It is without doubt, however, that he did not believe that the dispatch of the JSDF on peacekeeping mission *per se* posed a threat to the security of Korea. One need only recall the fact that South Korea is one of the countries most actively engaged in UN peacekeeping operations to undermine his argument. It is the fact that Japan is becoming more active in military activities in general that is worrying the Koreans.

As far as the last two issues are concerned, it is not misunderstanding but more fundamental structural factors that are causing problems. They are likely to remain as points of contention for the foreseeable future.

Unification of Korea and Its Implications

The Japanese government has time and again repeated its support for peaceful unification of the Korean peninsula. In addition, more than half of the Japanese population think that Korean unification will eventually come about.³⁾ Yet it seems that the Japanese still have ambivalent feelings toward the issue. The most important reason for this seems to be uncertainty as to what kind of country will appear in the aftermath of unification, which is more a legitimate concern than emotional or irrational opposition.

In order to find out what kind of concerns Japanese have about Korean unification as well as continuation of the division of Korea, likely consequences of five different scenarios, particularly with regard to the security of Japan, will be examined. Although there are several different ways of categorizing the unification scenarios in different time frames, here the strategic configuration of Korea and long-term implications of each scenario will be the main focus. The five scenarios are: divided Korea with

3) *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, June 15, 1997.

North-South confrontation; divided Korea in peaceful coexistence; unified neutral Korea; unified Korea aligned with the United States; and unified Korea aligned with China.

DIVIDED KOREA

A) Divided Korea with North-South Confrontation

<positive aspects>

- The existence of North Korea guarantees amicable relations between Japan and South Korea. Thanks to North-South confrontation and South Korea's need to defend against North Korea, potential friction between Japan and the ROK such as disputes over the Takeshima (Tokto) Island and fisheries can easily be contained.
- The North Korean threat offers a favorable political pretext for revitalizing the Japan-US security relationship, which would enhance deterrence against North Korean aggression and discourage China from using force in achieving its objectives.

<negative aspects>

- North Korea poses a threat to the security not just of South Korea but also of Japan. The threat would be much greater if it actually comes to possess weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), namely nuclear weapons and Nodong missiles.

- The North Korean political system does not seem to be sustainable in the long run and thus remain a source of instability.
- Conflict on the Korean peninsula would put Japan in a historical turning point. Japan would be forced to choose between continuing its "pacifist" policy and becoming a "normal country." If it fails to choose the latter, the Japan-US security relationship would likely experience a major crisis, which in turn might heighten uncertainty in the region.

B) Divided Korea in Peaceful Coexistence

<positive aspects>

- Since the power configuration on the peninsula would not be that different, major powers including Japan would not become worried about losing their vested interests in Korea. Particularly, China would be happy to see the northern buffer maintained.
- South Korea would be able to further develop its political and economic system without disturbances, with which Japan would feel comfortable.

<negative aspects>

- It is unlikely that the Korean people will accept the division forever. Therefore, this scenario contains inherent instability.

- The North and the South would still have a competitive relationship, especially as to political jockeying for legitimacy, which might eventually develop into political friction and, eventually, military confrontation. Plus, all the political factions in both the North and the South would have to put early unification high on their political agendas, making it more difficult to sustain the division in a stable manner.

UNIFIED KOREA

[Common features to all "unified" scenarios]

<positive aspects>

- Unification would resolve the frustration (*han*) of the Korean people. In the long run, it would become a basis for a more stable political environment. Appeals to chauvinistic nationalism might lose their political utility.

<negative aspects>

- A unified Korea would experience political, economic, social problems in the course of unification. These difficulties might endure for a long time. Political turmoil might result in an unstable relationship with other countries.⁴⁾

4) Here one should be reminded of the interesting proposition, put forth by two of the "democratic peace" theorists, that during the period of democratic transition, likelihood of war rises. Edward Mansfield & Jack Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," *International Security*, vol. 20, no. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 5~38.

- Major powers might start jockeying for influence in the new nation. There would inevitably be winners and losers.
- A unified Korea would have increased resources directed to extra-Korean affairs than before. It might result in heightened tension between the unified Korea and Japan.

A) Neutral Korea

<positive aspects>

- Korea would play a role of a buffer.
- A higher degree of political independence would be attained by the unified Korea.
- As long as stable neutrality is maintained, financial or military burden would be reduced for surrounding countries, although it might cost more for Korea.

<negative aspects>

- The unified Korea might become an unstable factor in case of crisis. Concerned countries might then start jockeying for increased influence in Korea, thus undermining crisis stability.
- The unified Korea might retain or develop nuclear weapons and other WMDs in order to defend itself independently.
- Korea might be tempted to play surrounding countries against one another. It would complicate relations among them.
- The US forces in Korea (USFK) would have to withdraw from Korea. This would place an increased burden on Japan as

a base of US forces in the Asia-Pacific region.

B) Korea Aligned with the United States

<positive aspects>

- A high degree of continuity would enable a smooth transition from division to unification.
- US presence in Korea would ease China's concern that Japan might improve its influence in Korea. Also, it would make it unnecessary for Japan to prepare for a potential threat from the unified Korea.
- Japan would prefer to see the unified Korea retain values that Japan and South Korea share, such as democracy, free-market open economy, and protection of human rights. Alignment with the United States would make it more likely that the unified country will retain these core values.
- It would be easier and more acceptable for the unified Korea to renounce nuclear weapons and other WMDs. This is favorable to the security of Japan. Also, the cost of defense would not be too high for the unified Korea.
- The burden that Japan would have to bear would remain at more or less the current level if the United States maintains its forces in Korea. Actually, the burden for Japan might even be reduced if the USFK is relieved of its mission to defend against North Korea.

<negative aspects>

- Continued US military presence in Korea and the disappearance of North Korea might worry China and thus heighten tension in the region. For this reason, the USFK is likely to be reduced in size and remain south of the 38th parallel.

C) Korea Aligned with China

<positive aspects>

- The unified Korea would not have to maintain huge a Army to defend the Northern border.

<negative aspects>

- A Chinese-Korean alliance, if formed, would likely be based on the common purpose of challenging the existing international order in East Asia, which would be detrimental to the security of Japan.
- In order to justify shifting its allegiance to China, a unified Korea might exploit territorial and other disputes with Japan. The unified Korea might even resort to use of military force to highlight the confrontation with Japan. In this case, Japan would be forced to embark on major rearrangement on its defense policy and strengthen its defense capability. It would be extremely costly and harmful to Japan.
- It is quite possible that China would offer major military and economic aid to Korea in order to solicit its allegiance to

China. That might include recognition to retain nuclear capability or other WMDs and technological support for those systems.

Evaluation

The assessment made above has demonstrated that different scenarios have different consequences, both positive and negative. Not one scenario was deemed totally palatable or unpalatable. It is all a matter of degree. However, from the discussion above, it is obvious that Japan's interest would best be served by the unified Korea aligned with the United States. This scenario also seems to be the most stable strategic configuration sustainable in the long run and favorable not just to the security of Japan but also to peace in the region at large.

Finally, as to perceptions of the Japanese and the Koreans about unification, Japanese are actually much less worried about the consequences of Korean unification than Koreans think they are. A joint survey conducted by *Yomiuri Shimbun* and *Hankook Ilbo* in 1995 showed that whereas 43% of the Korean respondents thought that Korean unification would have a negative impact on Japan, only 17% of the Japanese respondents agreed. Also, only 11.6% of the Japanese respondents answered that Korean unification would have a negative impact on Japan's security, and 18.9% of them actually said it would be conducive to the security

of Japan.⁵⁾

Conclusion

The discussion above has demonstrated that despite some limits, bilateral security cooperation between Japan and South Korea has been deepening steadily and that Japanese perceptions of Korean unification are not as pessimistic as Koreans might think. Furthermore, rather than generically saying "yes" or "no" to the promotion of bilateral security cooperation or Korean unification, it is much more important to figure out what kind of benefits can be expected and what kind of problems we are likely to face depending on the different scenarios. Only then can appropriate policy goals be determined and appropriate measures identified to achieve these goals.

Unfortunately, the Japan-ROK relationship is still driven strongly by emotion. However, if leaders of both countries stay calm and search industriously for common ground, it should be possible to cooperate to achieve the peaceful unification of the Korean peninsula.

5) *Yomiuri Shimbun*, May 24, 1995.

□ 국문 요약

한 · 일 안보관계와 한반도통일

이 논문의 목적은 한·일 양자안보관계의 현황 및 문제점, 한반도 통일의 여러 시나리오들에 따른 일본과 한국에 미칠 긍정적 부정적 결과들을 보는 것이다. 이를 통해 한·일 양자안보관계를 개선하고 양국이 한반도통일에 보다 잘 대처할 수 있는 근거를 제시하고자 한다.

한국과 일본간에 존재해온 역사적인 적대의식에도 불구하고 1992년 이후부터 양자안보관계는 급속히 개선되어왔다. 흥미로운 사실은 양자안보관계를 추진하는데 보다 열심인 국가는 남한이었다는 것이다. 양자안보관계는 주로 인적교류, 정기적 회담, 우발사건의 방지를 위한 조정, 상호간 寄港(mutual port calls) 등의 네 가지로 구성된다.

이러한 관계로부터 그 동안 얻어진 것은 무엇인가? 이것에 대한 답은 아마도 “별것 없다”일 것이다. 그 동안 전반적으로 양국간의 상호이해가 증가하고 양국간 관계의 활동에 참여하는 사람들의 수도 증가했지만 구체적인 “결과물”은 별로 많지 않다. 그러나 이러한 상호관계는 미래의 보다 긴밀한 협조를 위한 첫걸음이 되었다.

일본의 방위정책에 대한 남한의 관심은 북한의 핵위협으로 인한 위기가 고조된 후에도 계속 높았다. 양국간 상호관계의 증대에도 불구하고 남한은 일본 안보정책의 본질과 그것에 대한 대처방안에 대한 합의에 이르지 못했다. 남한정부는 대체로 일본의 안보정책을 평화적이고 남한의 안보에 기여한다고 본 반면, 남한의 언론과 학자들은 일본을 잠재적인 위협국으로 보고 양자안보관계를 추진하는 것을

꺼려하였다. 이러한 이들의 결론은, 이러한 결론이 갖는 논리에 비하면 그다지 중요한 것이 아니다. 필자는 이들의 논리를 분류하고 분석함으로써 양국간에 존재하는 인식의 차이를 좁히는 방안을 찾으려고 한다.

일본정부는 그 동안 누차 한반도의 평화적 통일을 지지한다고 강조해왔다. 또한 일본국민의 절반이상이 한반도가 결국 통일될 것이라고 생각하고 있다. 그러나 일본인들은 여전히 한반도 통일에 대해 이중적 감정을 갖고 있는 듯하다. 이것의 가장 큰 이유는 통일 후에 과연 어떤 국가가 나타날 것인지 불확실하다는 것이다. 이것은 감정적이고 불합리한 반대라기보다는 정당한 우려이다.

한반도 통일에 대한, 또한 한반도 분단의 지속에 대한 일본의 관심이 어떠한 것인가를 알아보기 위해서 필자는 5가지 시나리오의 결과 - 특히 일본의 안보와 관련된 - 를 검토하려고 한다. 5가지 시나리오는 다음과 같다. (1) 남북한 대치상태로서의 분단 (2) 남북한 평화적 공존상태로서의 분단 (3) 중립국으로서의 통일한국 (4) 미국의 동맹국으로서의 통일한국 (5) 중국의 동맹국으로서의 통일한국

각 시나리오는 각기 다른 결론을 가져오며, 각각 긍정적이고 부정적인 측면을 갖는다. 어느 것도 전적으로 좋거나 나쁘지 않다. 즉 모든 것은 정도의 문제이다. 그러나 분명한 것은 일본의 이익은 통일한국이 미국의 동맹국으로 될 때 최대가 된다는 것이다.

몇 가지 한계에도 불구하고 한·일간 안보협력은 꾸준히 심화되어 왔다. 또한 한반도 통일에 대한 일본인들의 전망은 한국인들이 생각하고 있는 것처럼 비관적이지 않다. 한·일 안보협력의 추진과 한반도통일에 대해 단지 무조건적으로 찬성 또는 반대하기보다는 여러 다른 시나리오에 따른 이익과 손실을 밝히는 것이 더욱 중요하다. 그럴 경우에만, 적절한 정책목표가 밝혀질 수 있고, 그러한 목표를 달

성할 적절한 대책이 세워질 수 있다.

불행하게도 한·일 관계는 아직도 감정에 의해 움직이고 있다. 그러나 양국의 지도자들이 침착하고 꾸준하게 공동의 기반을 찾아간다면 한반도의 평화적 통일은 협력에 의해 달성될 수 있을 것이다. ◇

총 합 토 론

제 1 회의

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사회자: 지금까지 두 분의 발표를 잘 들었습니다. 프로그램에 나와 있는 순서대로 토론을 시작하도록 하겠습니다. 앞서 발표된 두 논문에서 매우 중요하다고 생각되는 3가지 문제를 제시하고 있습니다. 이것은 한국의 언론보도에서 잘 다루고 있지 않은 문제를 다루고 있는데, 토론에 상당히 중요한 내용이 되리라고 생각합니다.

이 세 가지 문제는 첫째, 통일 이후 안보체휴관계의 유지입니다. 예를 들면 미국의 동맹관계를 통일 이후에 어떻게 할 것인가, 실제로 통일을 어떻게 이루고 그 이후에 어떻게 하는가 하는 것입니다. 둘째, Albrecht 교수님의 논문에서 나온 내용으로 미국, 일본, 중국, 러시아는 한반도의 통일에 대해 이해관계가 일치된다고 볼 수 있는데, 한반도의 평화를 이들 4개 국가들이 원하고 있으며 급속한 통일은 이들 국가의 이해관계에 상반된다는 것입니다. 미국은 독일의 급속한 통일을 지지한 바 있습니다. 따라서 이러한 문제에 대해서 토론자중에 어느 분이라도 질문을 하실 수 있을 것입니다. 셋째는 미국을 비

롯한 일본, 중국, 러시아 등의 한반도와 인접한 다른 국가들이 한반도 통일에 어떠한 역할을 하느냐 하는 것입니다.

Thomas Henriksen: 두 분의 논문발표는 굉장히 흥미 있는 것이었습니다. 그리고 사회자께서도 좋은 말씀을 해주셨는데, 두 분의 발표에 대해 비평이라기 보다는 질문을 드리고자합니다.

제가 생각하기로 아주 흥미로운 점은 한반도의 상황과 과거 통일전 독일의 상황과는 아주 다르다는 사실입니다. 예를 들면, 러시아군대가 동독에 주둔하고 있었던 당시에 러시아는 엄청난 영향력을 갖고 있었지만, 지금 한반도의 상황은 다릅니다. 중국이 북한에 대해 어느 정도 영향력을 갖고 있지만, 러시아가 동독에 미친 영향력과 비교해 볼 때 비슷하지는 않습니다. 또 하나 소련은 붕괴되었지만, 중국의 경우는 붕괴되지 않고 오히려 부상하고 있다고 할 수 있습니다. 그리고 NATO와 같은 체제가 아시아-태평양지역에 존재하고 있지 않는 점이 유럽과는 다르며, 한국과 관련된 안보체제가 없다는 것이 큰 차이라고 할 수 있습니다.

미국과 북한의 수교문제는 한국에서는 민감한 문제이기 때문에 다루지 않는 경우가 있을 수도 있겠지만, 예컨대 미국이 외교적으로 동독과 수교를 한 것은 동독이 붕괴되기 15년 전인 1974년이었습니다. 이미 100여개국 이상이 동독과 수교를 하고 있었고, 그 이후에 미국과 수교를 하게 된 것으로서 당시에 논란이 많았습니다. 이와 관련해 볼 때 미국이 북한과 수교를 하는 경우 반응이 어떻게 나올 것인가 하는 것이 아주 궁금합니다. 또한 한·미관계에 어떤 영향을 줄 것인가 굉장히 논란이 될 것으로 생각합니다.

Albrecht 교수님의 발표에 대해서 말씀드리면 Albrecht 교수님은 통일의 여러 형태에 대해서 아주 좋은 말씀을 많이 해주셨습니다. 즉

전쟁이나 붕괴나, 상호 타협을 하는 것이나 등등의 시나리오가 있지만, 중요한 문제로 제시한 것은 미국이 과연 어떤 역할을 할 것인가 하는 것입니다. 사회자께서도 지적한 바와 같이 통일 이후의 미국의 역할에 관한 것이며 아주 중요한 문제입니다. 한국의 입장에서는 통일비용이나 통일의 형태를 자주 논의하지만, 통일 이후 미국의 역할과 아시아 전체의 역학관계가 중요하다고 생각합니다. 그리고 한반도 통일 이후 미군의 대부분을 철수하게 되면 한국의 안보에 많은 영향을 미치게 될 것이며, 미군 철수에 대해서 많은 한국인들도 이를 찬성하고 있고 미국 내에서도 찬성하는 여론이 강합니다. 유럽지역에서도 미군 10만명을 약 3만명 정도로 감축하고 있는데, 독일의 경우 미군과 NATO군이 동독에 주둔하였던 것은 아닙니다. 중국이나 다른 국가들이 DMZ북쪽에 미군이 주둔하는 것을 과연 동의할 것인가 하는 것입니다. 또 하나 지적하고자 하는 것은 붕괴시나리오에서 중국의 역할이 과연 무엇이나 하는 것입니다. 중국이 과연 좌시하고 관찰만 할 것인지, 또는 다른 나라에 영향을 줄 것인가 하는 것입니다. 그리고 북한이 알바니아처럼 되도록 할 것인가, 누가 개입을 하고 누가 어떤 역할을 할 것인가 하는 점을 생각해 볼 수 있습니다. 여러 나라들이 상호 연계를 하거나 동맹·제휴를 하느냐에 따라 남한은 어떤 입장에 서게 될 것인가 하는 문제를 토론해 볼 수 있다고 생각합니다.

사회자: Henriksen 박사님 감사합니다. 다음 토론자는 연세대학교 김기정 교수입니다.

金基正: 먼저 Albrecht 교수의 논문에 대해 말씀드리겠습니다. 오늘 제기된 질문들이 차후에 통일정책을 수립하는 데 도움이 되었으

면 합니다. Albrecht 교수의 논문을 보고 느낀 점은 독일 통일의 경험에 한국에 있어서 중요한 교훈 및 시사점은 무엇인가 하는 것입니다. 이것은 크게 두 가지 점으로 나누어 살펴볼 수 있을 것입니다.

하나는 통일에 있어서 국제환경의 중요성을 들 수 있습니다. 민족통일연구원 김학성 박사님의 말을 빌리면 독일에는 통일정책이라는 것이 존재하지 않았으며, 단지 분단상태를 어떻게 관리하는가 하는 것이 상당히 중요하며 의미가 있다고 생각합니다. 즉 분단상태의 관리를 어떻게 해나가고, 이것이 국제정치적인 조건과 합치되었는가 하는 것이 중요하다고 생각합니다. 주지하다시피 한국의 경우나 독일의 경우 분단 그 자체가 국제정치적 역학관계의 결과였으며, 몇몇 강대국들의 역동적 산물이었습니다. 마찬가지로 통일의 조건도 국제정치적 환경의 성숙과 결부될 수 밖에 없습니다. Albrecht 교수는 이러한 점을 독일통일의 경우에 있어서 적절히 지적하고 있습니다. 독일의 경우에 있어서 '2+4시스템'을 말하고 있는데, 여기서 '4'는 국제정치적 환경이라고 볼 수 있습니다. 따라서 한국에 있어서 이러한 점이 고려되어야 한다고 제안하고 있습니다. 이것이 시사하는 바는 한반도 통일은 단순히 정서적 접근이나 당위적인 해법의 문제가 아니라 바로 정책영역속에 놓인 현실의 문제일 수 밖에 없다는 것입니다.

또 하나의 시사점은 당사국 의지의 중요성입니다. 즉 Albrecht 교수는 자결주의의 원칙을 말하고 있습니다. 자결주의의 원칙에 반대하는 3개국의 비토파위가 있었음에도 불구하고, 독일의 민족자결원칙이 이를 압도하였다고 말하고 있습니다. 한국의 경우에 있어서도 한반도를 둘러싼 강대국들은 현상유지 세력이라고 할 수 있으며, 이들 강대국들은 한반도의 급속한 환경변화를 원하지 않습니다. 이러한 관점에서 우리는 오늘날 미국의 북한에 대한 연착륙정책, 북한에 대한 개입, 그리고 KEDO의 성립 등을 보면 이해할 수 있을 것입니다.

그렇다면 분단상태를 변동시키는 데에 누가 주도권을 쥌 것인가 하는 것은 독일통일에 있어서 민족자결 원칙이 작동하였던 경험에서 알 수 있듯이 한반도에 있어서 남북한의 분단상태를 변경시킬 수 있는 주도권은 남북한 당사자들의 몫이라는 것입니다.

이러한 두 가지 문제가 한국이 독일통일의 경험에서 얻을 수 있는 교훈이라고 할 수 있으며, 향후 통일정책에 나타나야 할 것입니다. 이 두 가지를 종합해 보면 통일에 유리하도록 통일환경을 조성하는데 있어서 어떤 외교를 펼칠 것인가 하는 것입니다. 즉 통일에 유리하도록 통일환경을 조성하는 데 있어서 주변강국과 국제기구 등에 어떤 외교정책을 펼쳐 나아갈 것인가가 우리의 목표입니다. 또 하나는 독일의 경험에 비추어 남북한의 자결주의 원칙을 지켜나갈 수 있도록 남북한간에 어떤 메커니즘을 통해서 어떠한 합의를 이루어 낼 수 있는가 하는 것이 앞으로 통일정책이 지향해야 할 목표라고 생각합니다.

Albrecht 교수의 논문중 다소 결여되어 있는 점은 독일 통일과정에서 독일정부가 미국 정부에 어떻게 접근하였는가 하는 점입니다. 즉 독일의 통일을 원하는 미국의 외교정책과 독일 통일의 이익을 어떠한 전략을 통해서 합치시켰는가 하는 것이 중요한데, 이러한 점을 논문에서 말하고 있지 않은 점이 아쉽다고 할 수 있습니다.

이 문제에 대해 일반화를 시도해 본다면 1980년대 후반부터 1990년대 초반에 유럽의 지역정치 구도에서 어떤 특징이 오늘날 한반도 동북아의 어떤 특징과 결합될 수 있는가 하는 점입니다. 다시 말해서 어떤 국제적 구도 속에서 비토파워와 지지파워가 있으며, 한국이 한반도의 통일을 지지하는 세력과 이익을 결부시키면서도 민족자결원칙을 통해서 어떻게 비토파워를 압도해 나가느냐 하는 점입니다. 또 한가지 Albrecht 교수님의 논문에서 의아스러운 점은 독일 통일에서

민족자결원칙이 비토파워를 압도했다고 하지만, 독일이 갖고 있는 역사적 경험과 국제정치적 위상, 역사적 행위에 대한 주변국들의 인식, 그리고 인식에 대한 지속성 등을 생각해 보면 독일의 민족자결원칙에 대해서 공개적으로 반대하지 못했을 것으로 판단할 수 있습니다. 이에 반해 한반도의 경우는 한반도의 지정학적 위치, 한국의 국제정치적 위상, 한반도의 지정학적인 위치에 대한 주변강대국들의 인식 등이 작용함으로써 독일의 상황과 조금 다르다고 할 수 있습니다.

김국신 박사님이 발표한 논문에 대해서 몇 가지 말씀을 드리고자 합니다. 김박사님의 논문은 '90년대 이래 한반도를 둘러싼 주요한 사건들이 어떻게 지금까지 진행되어 왔으며, 이에 대한 문제제기를 하고 있습니다. 본 논문에서 다소 아쉬운 것은 실체가 없는 통일의교정책에 새로운 지평을 여는 논문이 되었으면 하는 점입니다. 예컨대 본 논문 중에서 미국이 북한과의 수교를 가속화시킬 수도 있다는 점을 지적했는데 그렇다면 왜 미국이 대북 관계를 정상화시키려고 하는지 그 이유를 한번 검토해 보아야 할 것입니다. 여기서 지금 한반도가 처해 있는 국제정치적 상황, 통일이후의 미국의 역할에 대해서 미국 외교정책의 본질적인 문제들을 한번 정도 검토해 보는 것은 어떠한가 하는 것입니다. 그리고 일본의 대한반도 문제 논의에 있어서 한국과의 협력 하에 대북 접근을 할 것이라는 낙관적인 견해를 갖고 있는데, 어떤 조건에서 일본은 남한과의 외교적 협력을 통해서 북한에 접근할 것인가, 혹은 어떤 조건이 주어지면 일본은 대북 행보를 빨리 할 수 있는가 하는 문제를 생각해 볼 수도 있다는 것입니다.

김박사님의 논문에 대해 말씀드리고 싶은 것은 두 가지 문제인데, 통일에 이르는 3가지 시나리오, 즉 점수형, 무력형, 합의형을 들 수 있습니다. 그런데 이 3가지 시나리오가 각기 상호 배타적으로 발생하지 않을 수도 있다고 하는 것입니다. 예컨대 연차적으로 일어날 수도

있고, 북한체제가 붕괴된다고 해서 한국이 즉각적인 접수를 하지 못하는 경우도 있을 수 있습니다. 한국이 갖고 있는 경제적 역량과 국가이익, 그리고 중요한 요인이 되는 국제정치적 구도상의 배경 때문입니다. 이와 같이 북한체제의 붕괴가 한국의 즉각적인 접수를 수반하지 않는다면, 가능한 시나리오는 두 가지로 볼 수 있습니다. 하나는 국제적인 개입으로서 우리의 정서에는 맞지 않지만, 위임통치의 형태로서 PKO 등 국제기구의 개입을 들 수 있습니다. 또 하나는 북한붕괴 이후 체제내 정치리더십의 변화가 일어날 가능성이 있습니다. 강경노선이 붕괴되고 보다 온건한 체제의 리더십의 변화가 있는 경우 어떠한 형태로든 남한과 북한간의 합의가 이루어질 가능성이 있으며, 이러한 합의를 이루고 난 다음에 통합의 문제를 논의해야 된다는 것입니다.

예컨대, 우리는 이러한 3가지 시나리오를 각각 다른 것으로 보고 있지만, 합의형이라는 것은 시나리오의 어떤 유형에도 따라다닐 수 있다는 것입니다. 무력형의 경우도 마찬가지라고 할 수 있는데, 남북한간 전쟁을 통해 북한 지역을 완전히 점령한 상태가 아니라면 남북한간의 협상, 나아가 국제적인 협상이 필요하며, 이러한 과정 속에서 합의형은 항상 무시할 수 없는 대안이 된다고 볼 수 있습니다.

마지막으로 한 가지 말씀드리고 싶은 것은 통일정책에 대한 것입니다. 통일정책은 장기적 목표와는 조금 다르다고 할 수 있는데, 이스턴(David Easton)이 제시한 시스템이론의 가장 원론적인 부분을 인용해 보면, 투입의 변화에 따라서 산출로 나타나는 것이 정책이라고 할 수 있습니다. 그런 의미에서 통일정책의 대상은 우리가 주어지고 있는 가변적인 환경 속에서 북한과 한반도를 둘러싼 강대국이라고 할 수 있습니다. 김박사님은 논문의 결론에서 점진적인 접근을 주장하면서 북한의 붕괴 가능성에 대비해야 한다고 주장하였는데, 구체적으로

우리의 통일정책은 어떻게 되어야 하는가가 중요하다고 봅니다. 즉 우리가 기본적인 노선을 택하고 점진적인 접근을 할 경우에 북한에 대해서는 어떠한 정책이 나와야 하는가 하는 것입니다. 예컨대, 4자 회담의 진행방식이나 의제선택 문제와 대북한 경험을 어떻게 할 것이며, 어떠한 국제정치적 조건일 때 경험을 할 것인가의 문제 등이 통일정책에 포함되어야 한다는 것입니다. 또한 주변강대국들에 대해서도 점진적인 접근일 경우 통일환경 조성을 목적으로 했을 때 주변 4국 외교는 어떻게 해야 하고, 이들을 어떻게 설득해야 하는가, 그리고 분단을 선호하는 세력과 분단을 변경하려는 세력이 일본과 미국 내에 존재한다면 그들과는 어떠한 의사소통을 해야하는가 하는 것이 통일정책에 포함되어야 할 것입니다. 또한 북한 붕괴시의 위급한 상황을 배제하지 못하는 경우 우리는 어떻게 대처해야 하고, 북한 및 주변4국, 국제사회에 대한 외교는 어떻게 되어야 하는가 하는 문제, 북한군의 무장해제, 국제적 개입의 최소화, 그리고 PKO파병시 우리의 외교정책 등이 구체적인 통일정책의 틀 속에 포함되어야 할 것입니다.

사회자: 김 교수님, 감사합니다. 다음 토론자는 민족통일연구원의 김학성 박사님입니다.

金學成: 탈냉전시대에 세계질서가 바뀐 것은 분명하며, 이에 따라 동북아 질서도 바뀌고 한반도 문제 자체도 질적 변화를 가져왔다고 봅니다.

저는 한반도 문제의 질적 변화에 대해 두 가지 문제를 지적하고자 합니다. 하나는 남북관계를 좌우하는 변수가 더 이상 냉전논리가 아니고, 북한의 생존전략에 의해 좌우되고 있다는 것입니다. 또 다른

하나는 동북아 지역 국가들간의 세력관계가 복잡하게 변화되었는데, 이에 따라 한반도 문제가 점차 국제화되어 간다는 것입니다. 저는 오늘 회의가 통일외교에 맞추어져 있기 때문에 두 번째 특징에 대해 주로 말씀드리고자 합니다.

한반도 문제가 국제화되어 간다는 것은 한국의 외교적 역량이 더욱 중요해진다는 것을 의미합니다. 이에 대해서는 김국신 박사님의 논문에서도 많이 언급되었기 때문에 구체적인 언급은 하지 않겠습니다.

다만, 오늘날 상황에서 우리의 통일외교는 어떠한 목표를 가져야 할 것인가 하는 점입니다. 앞의 두 논문에서는 이러한 문제가 제대로 나타나고 있지 않았기 때문에 이것을 부각시키기 위해 두 가지를 말씀드리고자 합니다. 통일외교의 중간단계에서 무엇보다 중요한 현실적인 문제는 통일을 위한 국제환경 조성입니다. 주변강대국들이 남북한관계 개선과 한반도 평화정착에 도움을 줄 수 있도록 만드는 것이 중간단계에서의 일차적 목표라고 볼 수 있으며, 그 다음으로 마지막 최종단계로서 통일의 시기가 닥쳤을 때 주변강대국들이 통일에 걸림돌로 작용하지 않도록 만드는 것이 통일외교의 최종목표라고 생각합니다.

그런데 이 두 가지 목표가 단계적이지만 반드시 첫 번째 단계가 성공적이라고 해서 두 번째 단계가 성공적이라고 볼 수는 없을 것입니다. 왜냐하면 Albrecht 교수의 논문에서 나타났듯이 미국을 제외한 나머지 강대국들이 독일통일을 처음에는 반대했다는 것인데, 당시 서독은 우리와 비교해 볼 때 첫 번째 단계에 해당되는 외교적인 면에서 성공했다고 볼 수 있습니다. Albrecht 교수의 논문에서 주장하고 있는 요지는 독일통일이 미국과 서독의 외교적 성공이라고 보고 있습니다. 이러한 측면에서 어떻게 영국, 프랑스, 소련 등 주변강대국의

반대를 극복했는가 하는 점과 관련하여, 그 해답을 권력정치(power politics)에서 찾고 있습니다. 이러한 요인과 동시에 우연히 민족자결의 원칙이 강조되고 존중되었다는 것입니다.

김기정 교수가 제기했다시피 현재 우리 정부가 취하고 있는 통일 외교의 당면 목표는 일차적 단계인데, '2+4'와 관련된 서독 및 미국의 외교는 우리의 입장과는 잘 맞지 않으며 시사점을 찾기가 어렵다고 볼 수 있습니다. 이와 관련해서 서독 및 미국의 외교에서 찾고자 하는 시사점은 처음에 독일통일을 반대하는 입장에 있었던 주변강대국들의 이해관계를 극복할 수 있었던 서독과 미국의 권력정치의 실체는 과연 무엇인가 하는 것입니다. 여기서 미국의 권력정치에 대해서는 재론할 여지가 없다고 생각되며, 우리의 관심은 서독의 권력정치는 무엇이었는가 하는 점입니다. Albrecht 교수의 논문에 의하면 '2+4'가 출발할 당시 서독은 미국과 영국 등의 국가들과 동등한 위치에 놓여 있었다는 것입니다. 그리고 서독의 권력정치는 미국의 단순한 지지에서 나온 것만은 아니라는 것을 증명하는 가운데, 미국이 NATO와 관련하여 서독을 '파트너와 리더십'이라고 표현하였다는 점을 지적하고 있는데, 이것은 당시 유럽 정치에 있어서 상당한 의미를 갖는다고 봅니다. 그리고 Albrecht 교수의 논문에서 지적하였듯이 미국이 통일을 지지했던 배경은 결국 미국의 국가이익이며 NATO의 존립 필요성에 대한 지지였다고 말할 수 있습니다. 이와 같이 NATO의 존립과 독일통일을 연계하는 것은 결국 미국은 서독의 권력정치를 인정하는 것이라고 봅니다.

이와 관련하여 당시 서독의 권력정치를 분석할 필요가 있다고 생각합니다. 서독은 강대국들과의 협상에서 높은 권력정치는 갖고 있지 못했다고 생각됩니다. NATO군에서 서독의 역할은 미미하였으며 NATO군의 지휘하에 있었고, 통일 이후에도 군사적으로는 독일은 여

전히 약소국이라고 볼 수 있습니다. 그러나 서독의 파워는 무엇보다도 경제적 힘이라고 볼 수 있을 것입니다. 이러한 경제적 힘때문에 서독이 거대한 파워로써 유럽의 통합에 견인차 역할을 할 수 있었다는 것입니다. 경제외적 측면에서 본다면 문화적인 면을 얘기할 수 있을 것입니다. Albrecht 교수의 논문에서는 언급하고 있지 않지만, '89년과 '90년 초반에 주요 강대국 국민들을 대상으로 한 설문조사에서 독일통일에 대해 영국, 프랑스, 미국의 경우 대부분 70% 정도의 지지율이 나왔습니다. 이러한 점에서 볼 때 서독에 대한 주변 강대국의 일반국민들이 보는 시각은 과거의 나찌(Nazi)로만 생각하는 부정적인 인식을 대부분 갖고 있지 않았다는 것을 알 수 있습니다. 즉 이것은 서독의 나찌잔재 극복이 성공적이었으며, 문화적으로도 서유럽의 민주주의를 정착시켰다는 점에서 낮은 권력정치에도 불구하고 외교적 역량을 축적시킬 수 있는 가장 기본적 힘이었던 것으로 볼 수 있습니다. 결국 서독의 파워는 통일을 주장하지는 않았지만, 통일의 시기가 되었을 때 힘을 제대로 발휘할 수 있는 역량을 축적해왔다고 볼 수 있습니다.

우리의 입장은 과거에 비해서는 역량이 많이 축적되었지만 거대한 힘을 갖고 있다고 볼 수는 없는데, 지금 우리가 통일을 위해 준비해야 할 것은 과거 독일이 수행하였던 것들을 교훈으로 삼아야 할 것입니다. '2+4'의 경우는 현재 우리의 입장과 다소 차이가 있다고 생각합니다. 이 문제에 대해 간단히 말씀드리면 Henriksen 박사께서도 지적하셨지만 상황자체가 굉장히 다르다는 점입니다. 예컨대, 유럽지역 질서는 다자간 관계이며 상호 블록대결의 관계로 이루어져 있지만, 한반도를 둘러싼 동북아 지역의 질서는 양자간의 관계로 묶여져 있습니다. 또 하나의 차이는 서독은 시간이 지나면서 지역 강대국이 되었지만, 한국은 서독과 비교해 볼 때 동북아 지역에서 강대국의 위

치를 접하고 있지 못합니다. 이와 같은 관점에서 '2+4'에서 서독이 가졌던 힘과 주변 강대국들의 독일통일의 반대를 극복할 수 있었던 점은 우리에게 어떤 시사점을 주는가하는 것은 대단히 어려운 문제라고 할 수 있습니다. 이러한 점에서 Albrecht 교수도 '2+4'에 중점을 두면서 4자회담을 일정 정도 염두에 두고 논문을 작성하신 것으로 보이는데, 사실은 이 두 가지 문제를 연관시키는 것은 상당히 어렵다고 생각합니다.

다음은 김국신 박사님의 논문에 대해 질문을 드리고자 합니다. 우리가 당면하고 있는 4자회담문제가 성공적으로 이루어진다면 국제관계 및 남북한 관계개선에 많은 도움이 될 것으로 기대합니다. 이러한 4자회담은 앞으로 닥쳐올 통일의 시기까지 생각한다면 그 첫 단계라고 할 수 있습니다. 4자회담은 한반도 통일과 관련하여 국제적인 회담의 시초라고 할 수 있습니다. 여기서 한 가지 중요한 문제는 4자회담이 결국 한반도 문제와 관련한 국제적 협상, 그리고 앞으로 통일의 기회가 닦였을 경우 이해당사국들이 한반도문제를 논의하게 되는데, 이러한 상황을 놓고 볼 때 4자회담이라는 것이 강대국의 한반도 문제에 대한 개입 여지를 보장하게 되는 계기가 될 가능성도 있다는 것입니다. 이와 관련하여 독일의 경우 한반도의 상황과는 다르다고 할 수 있는데, 1954년에 타결된 독일조약에서 장차 독일이 통일되는 경우 전승 4개국이 분명한 비토권을 가진다고 분명히 명시되었기 때문에 '2+4'라는 것이 불가피하였습니다. 하지만 우리의 경우는 현재로서 그러한 점들이 정치적으로 필요할 지는 모르지만 불가피한 것은 아니며, 4자회담의 결과가 마치 그러한 결과를 낳을 가능성이 있고, 또한 그러한 결과를 완전히 배제할 수 없다는 것입니다.

앞으로 4자회담의 결과가 독일의 경우와 같이 한국이 지역 강대국으로 등장하고 통일과정에서 여러 문제를 극복할 수 있는 역량을

갖게 된다면 문제가 달라지겠지만, 통일이 어느 시기에 닥칠지 모르는 상황에서 4자회담이 향후 우리에게 미칠 영향을 배제할 수 없을 것입니다. 이와 관련하여 김국신 박사님께 질문을 드리고 싶은 것은 한반도 통일외교를 보다 거시적인 안목에서 보기 위해서 4자회담의 부정적 결과를 어떻게 극복해야 하며, 이에 대한 우리의 외교전략을 어떻게 수립해야 하는가, 어떠한 방향으로 4자회담을 이끌어 가야 할 것인가 하는 문제입니다.

사회자: 대단히 감사합니다. 이제 시간이 얼마 남지 않았습니다. 김국신 박사님께서 먼저 말씀해 주시겠습니까?

金國新: 몇 가지 질문이 나왔지만 모두 쉽게 말할 수 있는 문제는 아니라고 생각합니다. 먼저 Henriksen 박사가 제기한 문제부터 말씀드리겠습니다. 한반도 통일과 관련한 3가지 시나리오 중에서 미국의 역할이 과연 무엇인가에 대해 질문하신 것 같은데, 기본적으로 미국의 역할은 주어진 것이 아니라 향후 남북관계가 어떤 방향으로 전개되어 나아가느냐 하는 시나리오에 종속되는 문제라고 생각합니다. 전쟁을 통해 남북통일이 되었을 경우 한미 동맹관계는 더욱 강화될 수밖에 없고, 미국과 중국의 관계는 새로운 냉전체제로 들어갈 가능성도 있을 것으로 생각합니다. 흡수통일을 할 경우 '2+4'회담 방식으로 쉽게 해결이 된다고 가정할 경우 미국과 중국관계가 상당히 우호적인 관계로 변화되었을 경우에만 가능하다고 봅니다. 이러한 경우에 미국의 역할은 다자간 안보체제하의 한미동맹 관계 속에서 잘 이루어질 것으로 전망됩니다.

북한이 붕괴되는 통일시점에서 중국이 개입할 것인가, 아니면 개입하지 않을 것인가 하는 문제입니다. 이 문제에 대해 중국전문가에

게 들은 바에 의하면 중국내 소수 민족문제 등 산적한 국내 문제를 놓아두고 북한문제에 개입한다는 것은 현실적으로 불가능하다는 것입니다.

김기정 교수님이 제기하신 질문들은 매우 중요한 문제로서 지금 이 시점에서 확정적으로 말씀드리기는 곤란하며 앞으로 계속 연구해야 할 문제인 것 같습니다. 4자회담의 부정적 결과가 예상된다면 이러한 결과를 앞으로 어떻게 잘 이끌어 나갈 수 있겠는가 하는 것인데, 제 자신의 견해는 향후 4자회담의 결과에 대해 부정적 관점을 갖고 있기도 하지만 앞으로 별다른 성과가 없을 것으로 생각합니다.

한반도 통일문제와 관련하여 독일통일 문제를 논의할 때 우리와 독일의 경우가 유사하다고 보고, 이를 강조하는 경향이 많습니다. 어떤 면에서는 독일의 경험에서 우리가 배워야 할 점도 많고, 유사한 상황도 있습니다. 하지만 2차 대전 이후 분단된 국가 중에서 우리의 경우는 베트남과 유사한 역사적 배경을 가지고 출발한 나라라고 생각합니다. 국제적인 역량 면에서 당시 독일통일과정에서의 서독과 우리 나라를 비교해 볼 때 '90년대 정치적·경제적·외교적인 성공을 거둔 것에 대해 기적적인 성과로 볼 필요가 있으며, 아직 우리가 독일과 같은 힘이 축적되지 못한 것을 비판할 필요는 없다고 생각합니다. 그리고 김학성 박사님의 말씀이 많은 참고가 되어야 하겠지만, 한국과 독일 상황의 유사성을 인식하고는 있으나, 이러한 점을 의식적으로 한국에서 보다 더 강조하려는 경향이 있지 않는가 하는 생각입니다.

사회자: 감사합니다. 이제 시간이 10분 정도밖에 남지 않았기 때문에 청중들로부터 두 세분 정도만 질문을 받겠습니다.

許漫(부산대): 앞의 논문에서도 지적이 되었고 두 토론자의 생생

한 토론에서도 제기되었습니다만, 우리가 냉정한 입장에서 과거 통일 정책을 살펴보면 6공화국의 민족공동체통일방안 밖에 없었다고 생각합니다. 그 이전에 있었던 것은 구호에 지나지 않았으며, 이제 부터는 통일정책을 제대로 수립하면서 이 문제를 고민해야 할 때가 왔다고 생각합니다. 통일방안은 과연 무엇인가 하는 것이 중요하다고 볼 수 있는데, 탈냉전시대가 되면서 오히려 한반도에도 유럽처럼 다원화 되어 가는 환경이 조성되고 있습니다. 따라서 우리가 이러한 환경을 적절히 이용한다면 예상보다는 우리의 통일환경을 빨리 조성할 수도 있지 않나 생각합니다. 저는 구체적인 통일방안의 하나로서 중립적 통일방안을 제시하고 싶습니다. 여기서 중립적 통일방안이란 냉전시기의 통일방안이라 할 수 있는데, 발표자께서 통일이 이루어진다면, 남북한의 군사력이 굉장히 증가하기 때문에, 4국이 한국의 통일을 내버려두지 않을 것이라고 언급하셨습니다. 따라서 주변 4국을 위협하지 않는 통일방안은 바로 중립화 통일방안이라고 생각합니다. 독일의 경우 민족자결원칙이 작용했는데, 우리의 경우는 내부적으로 민족자결원칙을 동원하여 국력을 축적하고, 외부적으로는 국제환경을 조성하여 중립화 통일방안을 수립하여, 이러한 틀 속에서 점진적으로 주변 4국에 대한 통일의교를 해야하지 않는가 생각합니다.

사회자: 감사합니다. 두 분 정도 질문을 더 받겠습니다.

白尙昌(의사): 제가 늘 말하는 것이지만 정신분열증 환자의 치료에 있어서 분열증 환자가 가지고 있는 건강한 자아를 중심으로 건강하지 못한 자아를 통합해 가는 것이 지난 100년간 정신분석치료에서 얻은 경험입니다. 이와 같이 남북한관계에서도 건강한 부분을 기초로 하여 건강하지 못한 부분을 통합해 가는 원칙을 세워야 한다고 생각

합니다. 지난 30년간 남북한 국민의 심적 상태를 관찰해 볼 때, 너무나 편이하다고 생각합니다. 따라서 너무나 편이한 사람들이 한꺼번에 합치게 되면 큰 혼란이 초래될 것으로 보기 때문에 저는 지난 50년간 분단되었던 남북이 앞으로 통합하는 데 있어서 적어도 서로 12년간 분리된 상태에서 북한 인민에 대한 교육을 정립시켜 나아가야 할 것으로 생각합니다.

Anne-Katrein Becker(독일 언론인): 저는 독일에서 왔습니다. 제가 질문드리고 싶은 것은 독일의 통일과 한국의 상황을 보면 외형적으로는 동독의 체제는 공산체제이고 북한체제도 공산체제이지만, 독일이 통일하고 나서 외부에서 볼 때만 공산주의였지 동독인들의 행동은 나찌와 똑같았다고 할 수 있습니다. 한국과 독일의 통일문제를 비교해서 생각해 볼 때 외부적으로는 체제가 동일해 보이지만 동독은 나찌체제이지 북한과 같은 공산체제가 아니었습니다. 이것은 매우 큰 차이라고 생각합니다.

사회자: 마지막으로 한 분만 질문을 받겠습니다.

郭台煥(경남대): 4자회담에 대해서 김국신 박사님께서 상당히 부정적으로 보는 것 같은데, 저는 이 회담에 대해 상당히 희망을 갖고 있으며, 4자회담이 성공적으로 진행되어야 통일이 앞당겨질 수 있다고 봅니다. 여기서 '2+4'는 4자회담이 성공한 이후의 문제이며, 우리 한반도문제에 있어서 '2+4'의 영향력도 어느 정도 인정합니다. 그런데 4자회담의 제1차 예비회담에서 문제로 대두된, 북한의 두 가지 의제, 즉 북미 평화협정과 주한미군의 주둔문제와 관련하여 저는 제2차 예비회담에서 북한의 변화를 기대하고 있습니다. 적어도 주한미군의 주

문제는 북한에 양보할 가능성이 조금 있다고 보며, 북미 평화협정 문제는 우리 정부가 커다란 틀 속에서 수용을 해야 되지 않는가 생각합니다.

그 다음으로 중국의 역할에 대해 말씀을 드리면 4자회담에서 중국이 상당히 전향적인 태도로 몇 가지 제의를 했다고 하는데, 향후 4자회담의 성공 여부는 중국의 역할에 달려있다고 생각합니다. 향후 통일에 대한 중장기적인 평화통일 구상도 시급하지만, 지금 우리에게 닥친 4자회담의 성공도 중요한 것입니다. 저는 김국신 박사님의 견해가 4자회담의 성공에 대해 부정적인 것 같은데, 이에 대해 긍정적인 사고를 갖도록 부탁드립니다.

사회자: 감사합니다. 아주 재미있는 4가지의 비평이 나왔습니다. 마지막으로 논문발표자 및 토론자들께서 간단하게 말씀해 주십시오.

金用浩: 제가 쓰지 않은 논문이기 때문에 자신 있게 말씀드릴 수는 없지만, 첫 번째의 중립화 통일방안에 대해서는 Albrecht 교수님의 논문을 읽고 이 자리에 모셨을 때 저 자신도 질문드리고 싶었던 사항입니다. Albrecht 교수님이 독일의 통일과정에서 막후 역할을 했다고 들었습니다만, 이에 대해 본 논문에서는 언급이 없었습니다. 대부분의 사람들이 생각하기에 중립화 통일방안이 바람직하다고 보고 있는데, 서독의 통일의외교정책은 미국과의 강력한 결속 하에서 통일을 이루어냈다고 주장하는 점에서 저도 역시 이러한 질문을 Albrecht 교수님께 드리려고 했습니다.

저도 이러한 논의가 계속되어야 한다고 생각합니다. 독일 기자 분이 언급하신 것에 대해서 과거 동독과 북한간의 체제문제와 이와 관련하여 통일에 미치는 영향에 대해서 간단하게 언급해 주셨는데, 이

러한 점들에 대해서 앞으로 많은 도움 말씀을 주신다면 통일연구에 도움이 되리라고 생각합니다. 그리고 마지막 질문들에 대해서는 김국신 박사님께서 대답하시는 것이 훨씬 나으리라고 생각합니다.

金國新: 다른 분들의 말씀은 비평으로 받아들이고 곽태환 교수님이 제기하신 문제에 대해 저의 견해를 말씀드리겠습니다. 남북한이 평화적으로 통일을 하기 위해서는 4자회담 등을 비롯한 여러 형태의 회담을 거쳐야 가능하겠지만, 제 생각은 앞에서도 언급한 바와 같이 현재 북한의 김정일체제가 바뀌지 않는 한 4자회담의 실제적인 성과를 가져오기는 어려울 것이라고 전망합니다. 이렇게 말씀드릴 수 있는 근거는 황장엽씨의 증언에서 잘 알 수 있습니다. 북한체제를 보는 황장엽씨의 견해가 남한의 누구보다도 정확하다고 말씀드릴 수 있습니다. 그리고 남북한 평화공존이라는 기본적인 문제에 대해서는 우리 측이 원하는 바이지만 북한에 있어서 남북한 평화공존은 바로 김일성·김정일체제의 몰락을 의미하는 것인데, 이를 북한체제가 받아들일 수가 있었습니까?

金基正: 지금까지 제시되었던 문제에 대해서 간략하게 저의 소감을 말씀드리겠습니다. 국가의 정책은 끊임없이 변동합니다. 이것은 국가정책을 만들어 내는 요인들이 끊임없이 변동하기 때문이기도 합니다. 그러나 국가의 정책은 지속성을 갖습니다. 한반도의 지정학적 위치에 대해서 주변의 열강들은 놀랍게도 지속적인 인식을 가지고 있습니다. 19세기 중반이나 20세기중반의 시기에서도 마찬가지였습니다. 동북아에 있어서 한반도 문제를 어떻게 처리할 것인가에 대한 주변강대국들의 인식을 살펴본다면, 19세기말에서 20세기초에 이르는 열강들의 해법은 한반도를 어느 한 국가에 귀속시키는 것이었기 때

문에 일본의 한반도지배가 가능했던 것입니다. 그러나 일본의 한반도 지배는 만주 침략을 낳았기 때문에, 이후 열강들의 인식은 한반도의 분단이었습니다.

이제 한반도 문제를 두고 지금까지 한반도 검증되지 않은 통일방안은 허만 교수님이 지적한 중립화 통일방안이라고 생각합니다. 이는 상당히 흥미로운 것입니다.

사회자: 모든 토론자와 발표자 여러분께 감사드립니다. 아주 좋은 말씀들을 해주셨습니다. 감사합니다. ◇

제 2 회의

- 사회: 李正夏(고려대 교수)
- 발표: Robert Johnson(Analyst, SAIC)
道下徳成(일본 방위연구소 연구원)
- 토론: Charles Kupchan(조지타운대 교수)
金圭倫(민족통일연구원 연구위원)

사회자: 그러면 Kupchan 교수님의 토론을 듣도록 하겠습니다.

Kupchan: 저는 이번 회의에서 발표된 2편의 논문에 대해 보다 포괄적인 맥락에서 토론해 보고자 합니다. 이 지역의 안보문제에 대한 각 나라의 역할, 권력의 구조가 한반도 통일에 미치는 함축적인 의미를 살펴보도록 하겠습니다.

유럽과 한국을 비교해 볼 때 차이가 있는데 그 하나는 독일은 유럽의 강대국 중 하나였습니다. 따라서 통일이 유럽에 미친 영향은 굉장히 컸다고 할 수 있습니다. 그러나 독일이 통일되었다고 해서 유럽에서의 세력의 균형을 깨지는 않았습니니다. 한국은 비교적 작은 나라입니다. 그러나 한반도가 통일이 되면 아시아지역에서의 세력구조에 영향을 미치게 될 것입니다. 그렇다면 한국과 같은 작은 나라의 통일이 강대국인 독일의 통일이 유럽의 세력균형의 구조에 미친 영향보다 더 큰 파괴력을 가질 것으로 예측되는 이유는 무엇인가에 대해 살펴보아야 할 것입니다.

유럽과 아시아는 발전의 단계가 다르다고 할 수 있습니다. 저는 아

시아의 구조가 근본적으로 다극체제인 반면 유럽은 어떤 의미에서 단극체제(unipolar)라고 보고 있습니다. 물론 러시아가 큰 중심이 되어 있었습니다만, 단극체제라고 볼 수 있습니다. 정치적으로 유럽통합을 통해 하나를 이룰 수 있었던 것입니다. 따라서 독일의 통일이 유럽의 세력균형에 미치는 영향은 적었습니다. 독일이 통일되었어도 하나의 유럽이라는 단일체제 속으로 들어간 것뿐입니다. 유럽은 아주 효과적으로 단극체제로 나아가고 있습니다.

유럽과 아시아를 비교해 볼 때 유럽이 미국의 보호 속에서 단극체제로 통합이 되었는데 아시아는 그렇지 못했습니다. 일본은 미국의 중심적인 경제질서 속에는 들어왔습니다만, 아시아의 통합 속에는 들어오지 못했습니다. 아세안이 있기는 하지만 일본과 미국이 군사동맹을 맺고 있고 한국과 미국이 군사동맹관계를 유지하고 있는 등 미국은 아시아의 여러 나라와 다자간 관계가 아닌 양자간의 동맹관계를 맺고 있습니다. 즉, 통합이 되고 있지 못한 것입니다. 이에 반해 유럽은 역외국가인 미국의 균형자 역할을 이용하여 통합을 이루어낼 수 있었습니다. 그런데 아시아에서도 미국이 역외에서 균형을 잡아주는 역할을 하고 있고 경제적으로는 균형을 잡았습니다만, 전략적, 정치적인 측면에서는 그것을 이용해서 통합을 이루어내지는 못했습니다. 어떤 측면에서는 미국이 어느 정도 긍정적인 역할을 수행할 수도 있겠지만 미국이 다른 측면에서 본다면 장애가 될 수도 있을 것입니다.

아시아의 안보구조는 통합된 것이 아니라 서로 양자관계를 맺고 있습니다. 미찌시타 선생께서도 잘 요약해 주셨는데 표면상으로는 통합이 된 것 같습니다만, 실제로 별로 진전이 없었습니다. 이는 미국에 대한 지나친 의존에 기인한다고 할 수 있을 것입니다. 이로 인해 아시아의 국가들이 서로 협력을 못하고 있습니다. 또한 전후 일본이 아시아의 국가들에 대해 취한 화해조치가 불충분하다는 점도 하나의

요인으로 작용하였다고 할 수 있습니다.

이러한 상황을 볼 때 한국의 통일이 이 지역의 세력구조에 커다란 영향을 미칠 가능성도 있습니다. 근본적으로 다극체제의 성격을 가진 아시아에서 계속하여 안보를 보장해주고 있는 미국이 통일이후에도 역외에서 균형을 잡아주는 역할을 계속해서 할 것인가? 그렇다면 한국의 통일을 어떻게 효과적으로 이끌어 갈 것인가? 근본적으로 동북아시아의 안정에 저해요소로 작용하지 않도록 할 수 있겠는가? 라는 문제가 제기될 수 있을 것입니다.

지난 40년 동안 유럽이 통합을 위해 행하여 왔던 것을 아시아는 아직 시작도 하지 못하고 있습니다. 다자체제 상황하에서 만일 다자주의를 넘어서고자 한다면 아시아의 주요국가인 한국과 일본, 중국이 잘 해야만 할 것입니다. 뿌리깊은 다극적인 대화의 상황하에서 미국이 많은 역할을 하여 왔습니다만, 미국이 절대로 핵이 될 수는 없다는 것입니다. 이러한 점들을 폭넓게 고려해 볼 때 현재의 구조하에서 아시아지역에서의 다극주의체제와 전략적 불안정문제에 대한 해결은 당분간 어려울 것으로 보입니다.

사회자: Kupchan 교수님 감사합니다. 그러면 이제 민족통일연구원의 김규륜 연구위원님의 토론을 부탁드립니다.

金圭倫: 두분의 발표논문을 통해 많은 것을 배울 수 있었습니다. 과연 남한이 동북아시아에 대한 정책을 가지고 있는지 아니면 그 반대인지 한번 생각해 보게 되었습니다. 저희 연구원에서도 지난 6년동안 동북아시아지역에서의 양자관계를 계속 연구해 왔습니다만, 한국이 동북아시아 정책을 등한시하고 있는 것은 아닙니다. 존슨 박사님께서 2010~2020년까지의 기간을 설정하고 한국의 동북아시아 정책,

전략을 수립할 필요가 있다고 지적하신 것은 적절하다고 생각합니다. 미찌시타 선생님의 논문에서는 한·일안보관계에 대해 아주 균형잡힌 관점을 제시하여 주셨다고 생각합니다. 두분의 논문에서 공통되는 주제는 통일의 유형이라고 할 수 있습니다.

이 두 논문의 아이디어를 통합하게 되면 아마도 우리 통일문제에 대한 구체적인 답안이 나올 수 있다고 생각합니다. 다만 여기서 짚고 넘어가야 할 것은 한국의 통일문제를 이야기할 때 먼저 북한에서 일어날지도 모를 변화 가능성이라고 할 수 있습니다. 북한이 어떻게 변화하는가에 따라 이 지역의 모든 행위자의 역할이 변할 수 있기 때문입니다. 북한에서의 변화는 가능한 것인가? 가능하다면 앞으로 어떤 변화가 발생할 것인가에 대해 두 분의 발표논문에는 언급이 없습니다. 이 지역에서의 안보와 한반도 통일문제를 다루기 위해서는 북한의 변화가 중요한 요소임에도 불구하고 언급되지 않았습니니다.

북한의 변화유형을 본다면 첫 번째가 북한의 갑작스러운 조기붕괴이고, 두 번째는 현재의 상태가 도저히 되돌릴 수 없을 정도로 쇠퇴해 가는 것입니다. 세 번째, 북한이 더욱 강경한 정책노선을 추진하고 군부의 역할이 증대되는 것입니다. 네 번째, 북한이 개방정책을 취하고 체제전환을 통해서 경제발전을 도모하는 것입니다. 이러한 여러 가지 시나리오를 종합적으로 고려해서 동북아시아의 안보와 통일 문제를 보는 것이 중요하다고 생각합니다.

또한 이 두편의 논문은 모두 어떻게 한국의 통일과정을 관리할 것인가라는 문제를 주로 다루고 있습니다. 특히 존슨 선생님께서는 통일된 이후 이 지역에서의 안보현황에 대해서 잘 말씀해주셨습니다. 물론 미찌시타 선생님도 마찬가지입니다. 그런데 약간의 변형은 있겠지만 기존의 한·미 안보체제와 미·일 안보체제가 그대로 유지될 것으로 저는 전망하고 있습니다. 그러므로 미국과 일본이 한국의 통일

과정을 관리하기보다는 과정을 보다 촉진하는 역할을 수행할 수 있어야 할 것입니다. 이러한 관점에서 존슨 박사님과 미찌시타 선생님은 미국과 일본의 입장 등에 대해서 많은 아이디어를 말씀해 주셨습니다. 저는 시나리오를 상정할 때 시간적 요소가 있어야 한다고 생각합니다. 존슨 박사님께서서는 1997년부터 2010년까지라고 시간을 명시해 주셨지만 미찌시타 선생님의 논문에는 시간에 대한 언급이 없는데 이 점을 설명해주셨으면 합니다. 존슨 박사님께는 통일이후 한·미 군사동맹체제의 변화가 필요한지에 대해서 묻고 싶습니다.

그러면 이제부터 존슨 박사님께 보다 구체적인 질문을 드리겠습니다. 존슨 박사님께서서는 논문에서 통일의 유형과 동북아 지역의 국제체제의 유형에 대하여 언급하고 있습니다. 그런데 통일의 유형이라고 할 때 이것이 통일의 과정을 의미하는 것인지 아니면 통일된 후의 결과를 의미하는 것인지 궁금합니다. 통일의 유형은 독립변수도 될 수 있고 종속변수가 될 수도 있습니다. 만일 통일의 유형이 과정이라고 한다면 이 경우에는 동북아 국제체제의 유형이 통일의 유형에 영향을 주게 될 것입니다. 반면 통일의 유형이 통일의 결과를 의미한다면 이 경우 통일의 유형이 동북아 국제체제의 유형에 영향을 미치게 될 것입니다.

발표논문의 13페이지를 보게 되면 “both regime undergo substantial change, with the North moderating and improving its attractiveness and the South undergoing a crisis of confidence and at least a partial reversal of its democratic transition”이라는 부분이 있는데 ‘partial reversal of its democratic transition’이 무엇을 의미하는 설명하여 주셨으면 합니다. 그리고 35페이지를 보게 되면 미국의 영향력이 근본적으로 많이 줄어들 가능성이 있다고 말씀하셨는데 통일 후에 미국의 영향력이 필연적으로 줄어들 것인지에 대하여 설명하여

주시기 바랍니다.

미찌시타 선생님께서는 25페이지에서 분단된 상태 하에서 남북관계를 대결국면으로 보는 시나리오를 제시하면서 여기에 대해 긍정적인 측면과 부정적인 측면을 여러 가지 나열하고 있습니다. 그러면서 대결구도하의 분단상태가 한·일관계에 긍정적일 것으로 미찌시타 선생은 설명하고 있는데, 실제로는 부정적인 측면이라고 저는 생각합니다. 이는 한국의 시각과 일본의 시각을 혼동한 데서 기인한 것이 아닌가 생각합니다.

미찌시타 선생님께서는 발표 논문 9페이지 이하에서 흥미롭게도 일본이 잠재적으로 남한에 더 위협적일 것이라는 등의 이유를 들어 한국이 일본과의 안보관계를 원한다는 주장을 제기하고 있습니다. 이 점과 관련하여 미찌시타 선생은 논문에서 한국이 중국과 러시아에 미치는 위협적인 요소보다는 중국과 러시아가 한국에 미치는 위협적인 요소가 더 크다고 말씀하셨는데 9페이지에서 일본이 남한에 더 위협적이기 때문에 한국이 일본과의 안보관계를 원한다는 미찌시타 선생의 논리를 원용한다면 한국이 중국과 러시아와 안보관계를 긴밀히 하는 것이 더 효율적일 수도 있다는 것입니다. 또한 한·일안보관계는 일종의 한·미안보관계와 미·일안보관계의 부분집합에 불과한데 한국이 일본과의 안보관계에 적극적으로 나서야 하는지에 대해서 의문이 갑니다.

사회자: 시간이 많이 지났습니다. 논문을 발표하신 분들께서는 여기에서 제기된 문제들에 대해 아주 간단하게 답변하여 주시기 바랍니다. 방청석에 계신 분 중에서 질문하실 분이 계시다면 보다 구체적으로 질문하여 주시기 바랍니다.

任龍淳(성균관대): 우선 저는 Kupchan 교수님과 의견을 달리하는 점이 있습니다. 한국은 작고 독일은 큰 나라라고 말씀하셨는데 통일 독일의 인구가 6천만이지만 한국이 통일될 경우 인구는 7천만이 됩니다. 산업능력의 면에서도 한국은 작은 나라가 아니라고 생각합니다. 따라서 인구나 경제적인 측면을 놓고 볼 때 과연 그렇게 불러야 되는지 의문시됩니다.

군사문제 전문가인 존슨박사님께 질문을 드리고자 합니다. 한국이 통일되었을 경우 기술적인 관점 그리고 무기체계, 한반도 주변의 안보환경 등을 고려할 때 적절한 군사력의 규모는 얼마라고 생각합니까? 두 번째, 한국이 통일된 이후 소련모델과 중국모델에 기반하고 있는 북한군의 남한군으로의 통합이 가능할 것으로 보십니까? 이 점에 대하여 답변하여 주셨으면 합니다.

사회자: 임 교수님 감사합니다. 전인영 교수님 말씀해주십시오.

全寅永(서울대): 영국과 미국관계가 미국의 대유럽정책의 시금석이었듯이 미국과 일본의 관계는 미국의 동북아정책의 시금석이라고 할 수 있습니다. 이러한 관점에서 미국의 동북아정책이 바뀌어질 수 있다고 보시는지요? 예를 들어 중국이 1972년 이후 구소련과의 균형을 위해 등거리외교를 했듯이 일본이 중국과 등거리외교를 할 가능성은 없는지 질문 드리고 싶습니다.

사회자: 대부분의 질문이 존슨 박사님께 집중되어 있는 것 같습니다. 미찌시타 선생께서 먼저 간단히 말씀해 주시고 존슨 박사가 답변해 주시기 바랍니다.

道下德成: 우선 간단하게 시나리오에 대하여 말씀드리겠습니다. Kupchan 교수님과 존슨 박사님의 시나리오가 상호보완적인 것은 아닙니다. 존슨 박사님의 시나리오는 단기적인 과정에서 나온 시나리오이고 통일과정과 관련된 것입니다. 저의 시나리오는 중기적인 시나리오인데, 주변환경을 고려에 넣지 않고 한국이 어떠한 형태로 될 것인지를 본 것입니다. 끝으로 Kupchan 교수님의 시나리오는 주변국가들간 권력구조 등 주변국가를 고려에 넣은 시나리오입니다. 이런 관점에서 볼 때 존슨 박사님의 시나리오가 첫 번째 단계이고 제 시나리오는 두 번째 단계이며, Kupchan 교수님의 시나리오가 세 번째 단계라고 생각합니다.

Johnson: Kupchan 교수께서 아시아는 다극체제이므로 저와 의견이 다르다고 말씀하셨고 등거리외교에 대한 이야기도 나왔습니다. 제가 발표할 때도 말씀드렸습니다만, 제가 볼 때 중요한 것은 개념적 차원에서의 용어문제라고 생각합니다. 저는 현실주의 정치와 세력균형을 이야기한 것입니다. 다시 말해 지금 제가 말씀드리고 있는 것은 현실주의적인 정치관점입니다. 즉 정치권력에 대한 연구에서 나온 것입니다. 물론 상호의존도가 높을 수 있다는 Kupchan 교수의 지적에 대해서는 동의합니다. 또한 다극체제하에서도 아세안과 같이 통합체제가 있을 수 있다는 점에 대해서도 인정합니다.

중국을 자국의 이익 때문에 다극체제에 관심이 큼니다. 그렇지만 서양의 전문가로서 아시아지역에서의 현실 정치를 바라볼 때 다극체제하에서 어느 정도까지 등거리 외교가 가능할 것인가라는 문제가 있기 때문에 다극체제는 상당히 불안정한 체제라고 생각됩니다. 더구나 이런 와중에서 일본은 독자적인 외교노선을 떠나갈 수 있다는 것입니다. 그래서 아시아지역의 경우 다극체제 하에서 계산을 잘못하게

되면 갈등을 일으킬 소지가 많고 이러한 점은 유럽에서도 수년간 계속되었던 것입니다. 아까도 말씀드렸습니다만, 상호의존요소가 고려되어야 한다는 Kupchan 교수님의 지적에 대해서는 동의합니다. 그렇다고 하더라도 아시아지역에서 안정적인 국제체제를 구축하기 위해서는 정말 갈 길이 멀다고 생각합니다. 물론 Kupchan 교수님께서 제기하고 있는 상호의존적이고 다자간체제가 아시아지역에서도 구축되고 있는 것이 사실이지만 이러한 다자간 체제로는 문제를 해결할 수 없을 것입니다. 결론적으로 제가 말씀드리고자 하는 것은 국제관계를 다루는데 있어서는 현실주의 시각에서 세력균형의 문제를 보아야 한다는 것입니다. 다시 말해 세력균형을 기준으로 해서 국가간의 관계가 영켜 있다는 것입니다.

사회자: 오후 내내 자리를 지켜주신 것에 대해서 감사를 드립니다. 이번 회의는 앞으로 이 분야에 대한 심층적인 연구를 할 수 있는 계기를 제공했다는 점에서 매우 유익했다고 생각합니다. 끝으로 이러한 훌륭한 자리를 마련해준 민족통일연구원과 좋은 논문을 발표해주신 발표자와 토론자 여러분에게 다시 한번 감사드리며 회의를 마치고자 합니다. ◇

<會議日程>

13:30~14:00 등 록
개 회 식

14:00~14:05 개 회 사: 丁世鉉(민족통일연구원 원장)

14:05~14:10 축 사: 權五琦(부총리 겸 통일원 장관)

14:10~16:00 제 1 회의

- 사회: R. J. Lieber(조지타운대학 교수)
- 발표: U. Albrecht(베를린자유대학 교수)
“통일을 향한 외교정책: 독일의 교훈”
金國新(민족통일연구원 교류협력팀장)
“한국의 한반도 통일 정책”
- 토론: Thomas Henriksen(스탠포드대 교수)
金基正(연세대 교수)
金學成(민족통일연구원 연구위원)

16:00~16:15 휴 식

16:15~18:00 제 2 회의

- 사회: 李正夏(고려대 교수)
- 발표: R. Johnson(Analyst, SAIC)
“한반도 통일에 대한 주변 강대국의 대비책”
道下徳成(일본 방위연구소 연구원)
“한·일 안보관계: 한반도 통일을 향하여”
- 토론: Andrew Mack(호주국립대학 교수)
Charles Kupchan(조지타운대학 교수)
金圭倫(민족통일연구원 연구위원)

18:00~19:00 다 과 회

最近 發刊資料 案內

■ 연구보고서

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| 96-01 | 김정일의 당권장악과정 연구 | 최진욱 | 著 | 6,000원 |
| 96-02 | 통일과정에서 매스미디어의 역할 | 이우영 | 著 | 6,000원 |
| 96-03 | 동·서독 인적교류 실태 연구 | 김학성 | 著 | 6,500원 |
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| 96-06 | 북한과 주변4국의 군사관계 | 鄭永泰 | 著 | 6,000원 |
| 96-07 | 韓·美 安保協力 增進方案 研究 | 金國新 | 著 | 4,000원 |
| 96-08 | 東北亞 平和體制 造成方案 | 余仁坤 金永椿 외 申相振 | 共著 | 10,000원 |
| 96-09 | 北韓 經濟改革의 最適方向 研究 | 吳承烈 | 著 | 6,500원 |
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| 96-18 | 북한이탈 주민의 사회적응에 관한 연구: 실태조사 및 개선방안 | 박종철 김영운 이우영 | 共著 | 7,000원 |
| 96-19 | 북한의 경제정책 변화와 남북경협 활성화 방안 | 허문영 | 著 | 5,500원 |
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| 96-22 | 한·러 안보협력 방안 연구 | 강원식 | 著 | 8,500원 |
| 96-23 | 북한 사회주의체제의 위기수준 평가 및 내구력 전망 | 김성철 정영태 오승렬 | 共著 | 8,500원 |
| 96-24 | 북한체제의 변화주도세력 연구 | 이교덕 | 著 | 4,500원 |
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| 96-26 북·미관계 개선과 북한의 대남정책 변화 | 전망 이현경 | 著 | 6,500원 |
| 96-27 한·일 안보협력방안 연구 | 전동진 | 著 | 4,500원 |
| 96-28 북한의 유일체제와 정책경쟁 | 안인해 | 著 | 5,500원 |
| 96-29 韓·中 安保協力方案 研究 | 崔春欽 | 著 | 3,500원 |
| 97-01 한반도 통일과정에서 러시아의 역할 | 강원식 | 著 | 5,000원 |
| ■ 북한인권백서 | | | |
| 북한인권백서 1996 | 옥태환 전현준외 계성호 | 共著 | 10,000원 |
| <i>White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea</i> 1996 | 옥태환 전현준외 계성호 | 共著 | 10,000원 |
| 북한인권백서 1997 | 김병로 송정호 | 共著 | 10,000원 |
| <i>White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea</i> 1997 | 김병로 송정호 | 共著 | \$11.95 |
| ■ 연례정세보고서 | | | |
| 96 統一環境과 南北韓 關係: 1996~1997 | | | 6,000원 |

■ 학술회의 총서

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| 96-01 | 북한정세 변화와 주변4국의 대한반도정책 | 7,000원 |
| 96-02 | 脫冷戰期 韓半島의 戰爭과 平和 | 9,000원 |
| 96-03 | 북한경제제도의 문제점과 개혁 전망 | 9,000원 |
| 96-04 | 북한의 대외관계 변화와 남북관계 전망 | 7,500원 |
| 96-05 | 南北韓關係 現況 및 '97年 情勢 展望 | 7,000원 |
| 96-06 | 4자회담과 한반도 통일전망 | 8,500원 |
| 97-01 | 4자회담과 한반도 평화 | 6,500원 |
| 97-02 | 분단비용과 통일비용 | 7,500원 |
| 97-03 | 한반도 통일을 향하여: 정책과 국제환경 | 7,000원 |

■ 통일문화시리즈

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| 96-01 | 統一과 北韓 社會文化(上) | 14,500원 |
| 96-02 | 統一과 北韓 社會文化(下) | 9,500원 |

■ 논총

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| 統一研究論叢, 제5권 1호 (1996. 6) | 15,000원 |
| 統一研究論叢, 제5권 2호 (1996.12) | 15,500원 |
| 統一研究論叢, 제6권 1호 (1997. 7) | 14,500원 |
| <i>The Korean Journal of National Unification, Vol. 5 (1996)</i> | 6,500원 |

민족통일연구원 定期會員 가입 안내

민족통일연구원은 통일문제가 보다 현실적인 과제로 대두되고 있는 시점에서 그동안 제한적으로 유관기관과 전문가들에게만 배포해오던 각종 연구결과물들을 보다 폭 넓게 개방하여 전국의 대형서점에서 개별구입하거나 본원의 定期會員에 가입하여 구독할 수 있도록 하였습니다.

본원의 간행물 분량이 많아 일일이 서점에서 구입하기에는 번거로움이 있을 것이라는 점을 고려하여 定期會員制를 운영하게 되었습니다. 정기회원에게는 본원의 모든 간행물(연구보고서, 국문 및 영문 저널, 학술회의 총서, 판매되지 않는 수시 「정세분석보고서」 등)을 직접 우편으로 우송해드리는 것은 물론 학술회의 초청 등 회원의 권리를 부여하오니 많은 이용을 바랍니다.

1. 정기회원의 구분

- 1) 일반회원: 학계나 사회기관에서의 연구종사자
- 2) 학생회원: 대학 및 대학원생
- 3) 기관회원: 학술 및 연구단체 또는 도서관 등의 자료실

2. 회원가입 및 재가입

- 1) 가입방법: 회원가입신청서를 기재하여 入金證과 함께 본 연구원으로 FAX 혹은 우편으로 보내주심으로써 정기회원 자격이 취득됩니다.
- 2) 연 회 비: 회원이 된 날로부터 1년간입니다.
일반회원은 10만원, 학생회원은 7만원, 기관회원은 15만원임.
- 3) 납부방법: 신한은행 온라인 310-05-006298(예금주:민족통일연구원)
- 4) 재 가 입: 회원자격 유효기간 만료 1개월전 회비를 재납부하면 됩니다
(재가입 안내장 발송).

3. 정기회원의 혜택

- 1) 본 연구원이 주최하는 국제 및 국내학술회의등 연구행사에 초청됩니다.
- 2) 본 연구원이 발행하는 정기간행물 「통일연구논총」과 *The Korean Journal of Unification Studies*를 포함하여 그 해에 발행되는 단행본 연구보고서(년평균 25-30권), 학술회의 총서(년평균 5-6권), 정세분석보고서(년평균 10-15권) 등의 간행물이 무료 우송됩니다.
- 3) 본 연구원에 소장된 도서 및 자료의 열람, 복사이용이 가능합니다.

4. 회원가입 신청서 제출 및 문의처

: 서울시 강북구 수유6동 535-353

민족통일연구원 정보자료실 (전화:901-2586, 901-2613, FAX:901-2547)

회원가입신청서

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| 199 년 월 일 | | | |
| 신청인 (인) | | | |

※ 본 신청서를入金證과 함께 FAX나 우편으로 보내주시시오.

(서울시 강북구 수유6동 535-353 민족통일연구원 정보자료실 FAX: 901-2547)

※ 신한은행 온라인 310-05-006298 (예금주: 민족통일연구원)

※ 본 연구원에서 여러분들을 위해 어떤 서비스를 더 제공했으면 좋은지에 대한 의견이 있으신
분은 본 신청서 뒷면에 적어주시기 바랍니다.